

**BUREAUCRACY AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY:
A STUDY OF THE SENATE DIRECTORATE 2015 – 2019**

BY

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DECLARATION

I, ZAKKA ISA FOM, declare that this dissertation is an outcome of my research efforts carried out in the School of Postgraduate Studies in the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies/University of Benin (NILDS/UNIBEN) I state here clearly that this research work is entirely mine with the Supervision and guidance of DR, KABIR AHMED as my supervisor designated.

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CERTIFICATION PAGE

This is to certify that this dissertation titled: **“Bureaucracy and Service Delivery in the National Assembly: Case Study of Senate Directorate 2015-2019”** was carried out by ZAKKA ISA FOM and has been read and approved for the Award of Masters Degree in Parliamentary Administration (MPD) of University of Benin/National Institute of Legislative and Democratic Studies.

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DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to Almighty God for His grace, my late father, Da Pam Fom/Isa Fom, who was called to Glory on January 29, 2021 and my Mother, Ngo Naomi Isa Fom.

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Finally, I thank the survey respondents for making out time from their busy schedules to respond to questions in the questionnaires and lovers of Education.

ABSTRACT

The Senate Directorate performed very crucial role in the legislative process of the National Assembly. As a result, the researcher undertook the study on “Bureaucracy and Service Delivery in Senate Directory of the National Assembly in the 8th Senate (2015-2019)”.

The study adopted the survey design method; questionnaires were administered on a sample population of sixty-six (66) respondents selected through the purposive Sampling Technique and questions asked were in line with the three objectives of the study which examined the contributions of the bureaucracy to the eighth Senate Directorate while the second one determined the adequacy of human and material resources available to the Directorate and lastly, its challenges.

From the study, it was revealed that functions of the bureaucracy included the preparation of Votes and Proceedings, Order Paper, Research and development of Procedures and Practices, staff development, numbering and gazetting of bills and administrative services for the Directorate. In the same vein, it was found out that the Directorate had inadequate working equipment, tools and materials, unstable internet service, inadequate buses to convey staff. It was also discovered that the staff clinic had inadequate drugs; and funds for the running of Committee activities were not always released and offices were inadequate including human resources.

Finally, the study concluded that the bureaucracy of the Senate Directorate performed its role efficiently despite the inadequate manpower, material resources as well as poor working conditions. Therefore, the study recommended the posting of more staff to the Directorate, improved welfare, working conditions, relationships among the politicians, their aides and the bureaucrats as well as clearly specified job roles among bureaucrats and political aides.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The aim of this research is to critically examine, assess and evaluate bureaucracy and service delivery in the National Assembly (A Case study of Senate Directorate from 2015-2019) the National Assembly Senate Directorate (Bureaucracy) in the delivery of efficient and effective services to the Senators of the Eight Senate.

The National Assembly is the law making arm of the government of Nigeria. Section 4 (1)(2)(3) of the 1999 constitution, as amended, confers on the National Assembly the powers to make Laws, which it must exercise for the peace, order and good governance of the federation. The legislature in any democracy plays a vital role in checking the excesses of the Executive, in order to ensure probity in the conduct of government business and also to entrench accountability from the government to the governed (Hamalai, 2011). The Nigerian National Assembly like any other private or public organization depends on an effective and efficient bureaucracy to deliver on its mandate of law making, oversight and representation. Section 51 of the 1999 Constitution provides for the creation of the National Assembly bureaucracy. It provides that:

“There shall be a Clerk to the National Assembly and such other staff as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly, and the method of appointment of the Clerk and other staff of the National Assembly shall be as prescribed by the Act” (Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, 2011).

The National Assembly is staffed with officers that provide the basic support services such as Management of Finances and Expenditure, Chamber, Official Reporting, Legal, Information

and Communication, Medical, Maintenance, Printing, Library and Research Services and so on. The extent, to which the legislature is able to carry out its responsibilities, depends largely on an effective, efficient, proactive and result oriented bureaucrats that will provide the Legislature with adequate support services to enable it discharge its constitutional responsibilities.

The purpose of this study is to critically assess and evaluate the National Assembly Senate Directorate in the delivery of efficient and effective services to the Senator of the Eight Senate.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

The National Assembly is a very important institution which role is crucial to the peace and good governance in Nigeria. The Senate Directorate provides a host of services to the Senators as clearly outlined in the National Assembly Management Profile Handbook (2014). Consequently, the researcher intends to assess the role played by the bureaucrats of the Senate Directorate in service delivery to eighth Senate.

1.3 Research Questions

In the light of the statement of the research problem, the following research questions are raised:

- i. What are the contributions of the Senate Directorate to the Eight Senate?
- ii. Are there adequate human and material resources available to the Senate Directorate?
- iii. What are the challenges affecting the Senate Directorate?
- iv. How well had the Senate of 8th Assembly impacted on nation building?
- v. Did Senate legislation on motions, bills impact positively?

1.4 Research Objectives

The broad objective of this study is to examine the performance of the Senate Directorate in the delivery of effective and efficient support services to the Senators in the Eight Assembly.

Specifically, the objectives of the study are to

- i. examine the contributions of the Senate Directorate to the Eight Senate;
- ii. determine the adequacy of human and material resources available to the Senate Directorate;
- iii. examine the challenges of the Senate Directorate in performing their support services;

1.5 Scope of the Study

This work focussed on the performance of the National Assembly Senate Bureaucracy in providing support services to the Senators in the Eighth Senate. Therefore, it concentrated on the Directorate from 2015-2018

1.6 Significance of the Study

This study is of immense significance because it will facilitate a good understanding on the activities of the National Assembly Senate Directorate. It will also contribute to the on-going public sector reform as it assesses the performance of the National Assembly Senate Directorate in providing effective support services to the Senators in the Eight Senate. In the same light, it will contribute to the literature on the effective service delivery in the Legislature as well as help fill gaps in the current level of service delivery in the National Assembly. And lastly, it will serve as a reference material for students, stakeholders, media houses and other well-meaning Nigerians and the world at large who intend to carry out study on the National Assembly Senate Directorate for better understanding.

1.7 Operational Definition of Terms

For better understanding of some terms used in the study, the operational meanings of the words are as follows:-

1.7.1 Bureaucracy

Bureaucracy according to Routledge (1976) consists of that large group of officials who perform defined functions in the public interest and are on the public pay roll. In an ideal typical case, the bureaucrat has the attributes of impartiality, expert knowledge and obedience to superiors. His duty is to comply with the rules and regulation and endeavor to execute the orders from his/her superior. Bureaucracy in this study means all staff in the National Assembly Senate directorate providing one service or the other.

1.7.2 Service Delivery

This refers to meeting the needs of customers by an individual or group of individual working for an organization. Service delivery in the context of this study refers to meeting the legislative needs of the legislators elected into the Legislature.

1.7.3 Legislature

The legislature is the arm of government charged with the responsibility of law making, representation and oversight functions over executive body. (Hamalai, 2011).

1.7.4 Committee

A Committee is a sub-division of the Senate established to aid the parent body in the preparation and detailed examination of draft laws or other matters for consideration by the upper chamber. It also assists in carrying out investigations on matters or issues referred to it, and make recommendations to the Chamber for final approval. (Hamalai, 2011).

1.7.5 Political Functionaries

These are the elected politicians in the National Assembly. They include the Senators and Members of the House of Representatives (Hamalai, 2011).

1.7.6 Administration Functionaries

These are the support staff that provide the services required and also operate the facilities to enable Legislators to efficiently perform their functions (Hamalai, 2011).

1.8 Limitations of the Study

There are quite a number of limitations to this study. The population of the study was large and consequently the sample size ought to have been higher but a conveniently lower sample size was used to enable the Researcher complete the work on schedule and within available resources. On the other hand, some of the respondents did not fill the questionnaires, compelling the Researcher to leave them out. Furthermore, the Researcher kept following Respondents who have completed the questionnaires day after day before retrieving them; this was not easy considering the tight work schedules of the Researcher. Similarly, there was unevenness in the distribution of the questionnaire between the Respondents' sexes as well as dearth of materials on bureaucracy and service delivery as it concerns the National Assembly and particularly the Eighth Senate Directorate.

1.9 Organization of the Study

The study is made up of five chapters. Chapter one covers the background to the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions, scope of the study, significance of the study and definition of operational terms. Chapter two deals with literature review and theoretical framework while Chapter three discusses the methodology adopted for the study. In this Chapter, issues like research design, method of data collection,

method of data analysis, sources of data, population of the study, sample size and sampling techniques were discussed. Also, Chapter four deals with data presentation, analysis and discussion of findings. Finally, Chapter five contains the summary, conclusion and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This Chapter reviews works done by other scholars on the subject and adopts a theoretical framework on which the study is premised.

The term Bureaucracy is widely used in public administration. Max Weber, the father of bureaucracy, sees bureaucracy as a highly structured, formalized, and also an impersonal organization. He also instituted the belief that an organization must have a defined hierarchical structure and clear rules, regulations, and lines of authority which govern it (Weber, 1905). He argued that bureaucracy was the most efficient way to set up an organisation, administration and organizations. Max Weber believed that Bureaucracy was better than traditional structures. In a bureaucratic organisation, everyone is treated equal and the division of labour is clearly described for each employee. This is true of a typical bureaucracy, as the Senate Directorate of the 8th National Assembly is not exempted from this because there are observable structures, division of labour among the employees, laid down rules and regulations for the conduct of staff and performance of tasks. Bureaucrats in Senate Directorate render services to the legislators such as policy formulation, motions and bill drafting, research, financial advice, official reports and contributes to the role of law making through the preparation of bills for presentation in the Chambers of the legislature and nurses this bill from infancy to maturity when they are assented to by the Chief Executive (Maikasuwa, 2007). Despite Weber's scholarly work on bureaucracy, Balle (1999) argued that bureaucracy is considered as an organizational disease that suffers from major organizations which one can characterize with an enormous amount of paperwork. Furthermore, Ghannadan, (1995) observes that since all official activities of the organization are being performed in a written form. This fact would

lead to waste of time and human resources along with slowing the pace of events and finally result in other problems. One can label these unnecessary & complicated formalities under the title of “red tape”.

Despite criticisms of Weber’s bureaucracy and bureaucratic models, it is still relevant to the study and understanding of organizations. It is indisputable that bureaucrats are vital to any organization and are responsible for the realization of organizational goals and objectives. In other words, the bureaucrats are responsible for service delivery to their service utilizers under different circumstances. Service delivery, according to Gowan, Seymour, Ibarreche, and Lackey (2001) is a complex term within the public sector. They noted that it does not just focus on meeting expressed needs, but looking out for the needs that are not expressed, setting priorities, resource allocation, public justification and being able to account for what has been done. In the same vein, Jaakkola and Halinen (2006) saw service delivery as encompassing a number of economic sectors that are not concerned with the production of manufactured goods and are therefore placed under a generic service umbrella. He noted that the service industry as a whole in turn comprises distinct segments such as financial services or telecommunications, which are all different.

2.1.0 Characteristics/Criticism of Bureaucracy in Modern Organization

Bureaucracy which is viewed as a system of public administration for controlling and regulating activities of bureaucrats in a bureau or an organization has a lot of merits and demerits. A typical bureaucracy will have the following characteristics:

- i. **Job Specification:** Bureaucracy helps to break jobs down into simple routine and well defined tasks such that when one employer is assigned to a particular job description, he never knows what is happening in the other division. This kind of arrangement has the advantage of breeding job proficiency resulting from job repetition. However, the idea of job

specialization has the negative consequence of preventing bureaucrats from identifying problems outside their job specification and reduces the overall productivity of the bureaucrat (Armstrong, 1998).

ii. **Hierarchy of Authority:** The second characteristic of bureaucracy is hierarchy of authority (Griffin, 2002). Bureaucracy promotes hierarchy of command, where each level is subject to control by the level above his. Robbins et al (2010) observed that an appointment to an office and levels of authority that go within, are based solely on the ground of technical competence. Robbins further avowed that the positive consequence of hierarchy of authority is that it clarifies who is in command. The disadvantage of this hierarchy of authority is that it encourages mediocrity among employees in lower cadres, because this structure prevents them from contributing to decisions. Also, it allows errors to be hidden and it takes times to implement a change programme.

iii. **Employment and Career:** This is another characteristic of bureaucracy (George and Jones, 2011). It allows all personnel to be selected and promoted on the basis of their technical qualification and offered a full time career. This also has its flaws; employees are promoted on the basis of their technical qualification irrespective of their competence on the job; under this system employee struggle to get additional certification and qualification without necessarily increasing their competence.

iv. **Formal Written Record:** A formal written record is another characteristic of bureaucracy (Robbins et al, 2011). Record keeping by an organization helps to preserve the organizational memory and continuity over time. In view of Armstrong, (1998) Formal written records are used to document all rules, regulations, procedures, decisions and actions taken by the organization and its members to preserve accountability and consistency. This have the advantage of creating organizational history that is not dependent on individual

memory. Disadvantage of this is that, sticking to such record may inhibit flexibility and creativity.

v. **Rules and Procedure:** Mondy (1998) holds the view that rules and procedure are also among the characteristics of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy creates rules and procedures that help set order in place to ensure reliable and predictable behaviour. Established rules and procedures help employees to know what is expected of them per time thereby removing guess work and mistakes. The disadvantage of this however, is that it introduces delays, stifles innovation and creativity.

vi. **Impersonality:** Bureaucracy promotes impersonal relationship among staff of all cadres. This helps to engender fair play and equality among staff of an organization. Impersonality fosters efficiency and reduces bias (Hellriegel, 1988). On the other hand impersonality has the negative consequence of creating an environment of alienation in the firm as employees come to see themselves as a small cog in a wheel.

2.1.1 Modern Trends in Bureaucracies

Several reforms have emerged since the late 1970s which have led to revolutionary changes not only in the manner of delivery of social services and accounting for government expenditure, but also in the structures of governance.

These reforms aimed at commercialization or the application of business management theories and practices in public service administration, now put together to be called in professional parlance, the 'New Public Management' (NPM) (Sowaribi, 2005)

In Africa for example, previous trends of public administration was targeted towards shaping a public sector that could spearhead national development (e.g. post-civil war bureaucracy in Nigeria was tilted towards national development and national integration). Current reforms

and trends in public administration is focused on reducing cost and refocuses the activities of the public sector, to change the way it works and promote the role of the market and non-governmental actors both in service provision and in the economy at large.

Following the changed role of the state and growing demands for good governance globally, the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm emerged, to implant into the traditional administration. Its central focus was to enhance efficiency, productivity, improved service delivery and accountability, and emphasizes a result-orientation as opposed to the process-orientation of traditional public administration. It recommends a reduction in the exclusive reliance on the public sector for service delivery and advocates increased use of private sector and non-governmental organization as alternative mechanism of service delivery (Dzimhiri, 2008).

NPM suggested a customer centric system of public administration as against a typical bureaucratic system that focuses more on the organization. This new paradigm challenged the traditional management and organization of Public Services, which according to Steward and Walsh (1992) was built on:

1. The assumption of self-sufficiency: that where a public organization was responsible for a function, it would normally carry out that function itself, directly employing the staff required to do so;
2. The assumption of direct control: that control over the activities of public organization best exercised through continuous supervision through an organizational hierarchy;
3. The assumption of uniformity: that when a service is provided, it should be provided on a uniform basis within the jurisdiction of the organization;

4. The assumption of accountability upwards: that the accountability of the public servant to those who received a service was through the political process;
5. The assumption of standardized established procedures: that staffing policies required the application of standardized practices through the service.

Hence, the NPM suggested a new approach focusing on decentralize, flatter hierarchies, funding project, contracting out, and a system of co-production or public-private-partnership.

2.1.2 The Politics of Bureaucratic Service Delivery

Two figures who occupy a central position in modern work on bureaucracies are Max Weber and James Q. Wilson. Weber's *Economy and Society* (1978) characterizes many of the quintessential features of the ideal-typical bureaucracy: esteem, professionalization, hierarchical organization, task re-utilization, and the impersonalization of bureaucratic authority. Although Weber considered professional bureaucracies to be essential for modern states, he also recognized that state bureaucracies were political creations with internal politics. Wilson's *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and They Do It* (1991) embeds bureaucracies in their political context, explaining why bureaucracies are so often characterized by red tape and inefficiencies that markets and firms would never tolerate. In Wilson's word, "government bureaucracies are more bureaucratic than industrial ones in large part because we-the people and our political representatives insist that they be" Relevant contemporary literature that expand on Weber's and Wilson's insights about bureaucracies and their internal and external politics include work on the development state, good governance, and principal-agent relationships.

2.1.3 The Development State and Quality of Government

The introduction of a relatively professional, meritocratic and efficient administrative structure was a critical factor in the rapid development of East Asia, including Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan (Jahson 1982, Amsden 1989, Wade 1990). Although the exact role the state played in guiding the economy varied across these state, two distinguishing features of East Asia's developmental bureaucracies were (a) meritocratic recruitment of knowledgeable bureaucrats with network ties to the business community and (b) the overall coherence of the bureaucracy (Evans 1995). Networks, often informal, are crucial to bureaucratic coherence and identity and go beyond what meritocracy alone could provide. Although state institutions rely on networks to hire civil servants, meritocratic hiring criteria break patronage links that would otherwise produce incompetent or capture bureaucrat. By maintaining autonomous and close network ties with industrial elites (Evans 1995), bureaucratic elites could effectively select industries to invest in, subsidize, and/or protect from competition. Johnson's classic *MITI and the Japanese Miracle (1982)* explain the development –state argument using the example of Japan's successful economic model. The presence of a meritocratic and capable bureaucracy enable a “plan-rational” development model that supported economic growth over the long run because the bureaucracy enabled coordination among policy makers and the private sector, lumpy investments with uncertain payoffs, and course changes when initial result proved unsatisfying. State institutions helped to obtain the needed capital investment for industry. Bureaucrats rewarded firms that performed well and sanctioned firms that did not meet strict performance standards (see also Amsden 1989). Although Johnson does not invoke Weber as the foundation for his conception of the bureaucracy, his understanding of the bureaucracy is essentially Weberian (Weber, 1978). One body of research emerging from Johnson's analysis of Japan has focused on the politics of bureaucratic development to explain how effective and capacious

development states emerge and how Weberian bureaucracies facilitate development. Evans (1995) finds that effective developmental list bureaucracies balance autonomy and “embeddedness” enable them to learn from and collaborate with public and private partners without being captured by their administrative subjects. Cross-national statistical work has found that a simple measure of “Weberian-ness” predicts economic performance in a sample of developing countries (Evans and Rauch 1999). Conversely, the absence of a rational legal bureaucracy hinders development (Roth 1968, Evans 1989). The origins of capable developmental states are to be found in a political environment of vulnerability, paired with a lack of economic resources that forces political leaders to invest in state structures that facilitate the delivery of essential public goods and services and economic growth (Doner et al. 2005). The contributions to *The Development State* (Woo-Cummings 1999) examine the politics and economics of development states, continually returning to the role of bureaucrats and state structure. Kohli (2004) argues that the structure of political competition drives bureaucracy and performance and ties this ultimately to the varieties of colonial experience. These works share several common refrains: (a) all bureaucracies are political, and (b) efficacious bureaucracies are never completely isolated from society, but (c) such bureaucracies do not become “mere tools” either of politicians or of private interests. Ineffective bureaucracies, on the other hand come in many forms: Unprofessional bureaucracies cannot carry out their tasks because bureaucrats do not know how, weak bureaucracies are subject to capture by private interest, and predatory bureaucracies consume the seeds of development before they germinate. Subsequent work has measured different bureaucratic characteristics, including career stability, professionalization, salary scales, and *esprit de corps*, and has used these variables to explain corruption (Dahlstrohm et al. 2011) and development (Cingolani) et al. 2015) more recent research in this tradition has focused less on bureaucratic characteristics and more generally on the quality of government –

understood as the quality of institutions regulating government selection and replacement, the capacity to formulate and implement sound policy, and the protection of institutions that govern economic and social interaction (Kaufman 2005). Measurement is a central challenge in such research because of the general difficulty of separating indicators of, for example, bureaucratic efficiency from the effects it is supposed to predict (see Kurtz and Schrank 2007). A deeper problem is that bureaucratic structures are both endogenous and highly correlated with other potential political sources of economic performance. Identifying the causal effects of bureaucracies – even assuming away the problem of measuring their characteristics is a hard problem. Both the developmental state literature and the quality-of-government literature are characterized by a focus on macro-level measures and outcomes. The unit of analysis, typically, is the state. Focus on national bureaucracies is sensible for understating complex state structures and their effects, specifically because bureaucracies are features of national politics. Case analyses (e.g., Evans 1995) allow for a closer investigation of particular policy choices and highlight the complexities of bureaucracies in action, but they still tend to target national policies and organized public and private interest, which have only indirect effects on most citizens. The typical encounter of citizens with a bureaucracy, and the wider context of this interaction, therefore goes unanalysed.

This represents a natural link to the related literature on European state building (Tilly 1985), which has been fruitfully employed to understand the presence (or lack) of strong states in Latin America (Thies 2005) and Africa (Herbst 2000). Moreover, although work on the developmental state is useful for understanding the development of national capacity in macroeconomic and industrial policy making, it rarely engages challenges of service delivery in, e.g. health care or education in the developing world. As such, it only capture one, albeit important, facet of bureaucratic politics and performance.

2.1.4 Principal – Agent Problems

Quite distinct from the developmental state literature, another large literature addresses the internal operations of bureaucracies and their interaction with elected political officials. In particular, Weber's view of the bureaucracy as a hierarchical organization with top-down delegation (and monitoring) of task to subject matter experts has proven amenable to theoretical investigations within a principal-agent framework. In political science and economics, this has become the dominant theoretical lens to understand bureaucracies (for a review, see Gaillard & Patty 2012). Classic principal-agent accounts capture the hierarchical interaction between a principal and an agent, e.g., between an elected official and a whole bureaucracy or between a supervisor and a frontline civil servant. In this interaction, the principal delegates a task to the agent, who in turn decides how much actual effort to exert.

This type of interaction can give rise to agency problems – divergence between the principal's intended goals and the agent's action – via moral hazard and adverse selection (Dixit 2002). The basis of agency problems is the assumption that the agent has a preference schedule that differs from the principal's (if they were identical, then the agent would act exactly as the principal desires). This assumption underlines most of the literature that we review here, although later in this section, we entertain the possibility that the agent may intrinsically wish to implement the principal's policy. Research on American politics has used the principal – agent framework to fruitfully interrogate the interplay between elected principals and bureaucratic agencies (e.g. Moe Snyder & Weingast 2000, Whitford 2005), illuminating for example, the determinants of delegation to independent, discretionary agencies (Huber & Shpan 2002). This work on delegation of crucial policy-making tasks to politically independent agencies has also played a major role in our understanding of central banking in the developed and developing world (e.g. Keefer & Stasavage 2003, Adolph

2013). But what does this principal-agent perspective tell us about frontline service delivery in developing countries? Principal-agent theories too have become the theoretical bedrock for understanding the poor performance and high absenteeism rates of civil servants tasked with service delivery in developing countries (Chaudhury et al. 2006, Duflo et al. 2012). A large literature on corruption in the public sector also relies heavily on the theoretical scaffolding of the principal-agent framework (Svensson, 2005). The principal-agent framework has also been used to offer potential solutions: the design, monitoring, and sanctioning of incentive-compatible contracts that allow principals to induce high effort in agents (Dixit 2002). For example, performance pay contracts can allow principal to induce increase effort by frontline civil servant such as teachers and health workers. Such incentive schemes, as well as other screening tools, can also be used to affect the recruitment of individuals into the civil service to limit adverse selection problems. Efforts to limit corruption by civil service wages and monitoring technologies employed by principals (e.g., Olken & pande 2012).

Increasingly, randomized controlled field trials have been employed to test the effectiveness of performance pay and monitoring schemes in developing countries' public sectors (for a review of performance pay studies (Hasnain, 2014). Explicit monetary and penalty schemes for civil servants can, under very specific conditions, reduce absenteeism, increase effort, and limit corruption (e.g. Olken 2006, 2007, Duflo et al. 2012). Tax inspectors in Pakistan for example find that a high-powered financial incentive clearly increases revenue, without decreasing taxpayer satisfaction (Khan et al. 2016). As an alternative to explicit performance pay and increased monitoring and reassignments of civil servants can also be used to manage principal-agent problems. Rotation places different agents in the same environment, which facilitates monitoring by helping principals distinguish between outcomes due to the nature of the environment and those due to the actions of particular agent. For example, in a private firm setting, Hertzberg et al. (2010) find that rotations induce loan officers to provide more

accurate reports. States also use rotation to improve efficiency in challenging environments. In pre-modern Europe, the central government rotated the most effective tax collectors to areas in which collection was inefficient (Kiser & Kane 2001). Rotation can also be used to limit informal ties between bureaucrats and their client, decreasing corruption, increasing civil servant' dependence on the bureaucracy, and aligning the interests of civil servants with those of their principals. As Stove (2006) notes, though, rotation is effective only for tasks that do not require strong relationships between employees and clients and employee knowledge of the local context, in fact, although rotation might be a useful tool for managing principal – agent problems, little is known empirically about the effects of rotation on the quality of service delivery in the civil service more generally. Designing successful incentive schemes and management practices is challenging because of the multidimensional nature of many public service tasks.

Dixit (200) argues that public agencies face multiple principle-agent problems and challenges of multitasking, which complicate simple insights from standard principal – agent models. For example, multitasking – the requirement of civil servants to perform a variety of distinct task – generates a host of additional incentive problems and complicates moral hazard and adverse selection still further. Principals might be able to effectively measure only one of the many tasks, inducing agents to neglect the other dimensions of their job (e.g. teaching to the test; Holmstrom & Milgrom 1991). Similarly, Kiewiet & McCubbins (1991) argue that “collective principals” generate additional agency losses because of disagreements among principals about the tasks of the bureaucracy. Hammond & Knott (1996) demonstrate the multiple principals can lead to agency losses even with perfect information about the bureaucracy's objectives and actions. The general result from this literature is that multiple principals inhibit monitoring and increase agency slack. These theoretical concerns have been corroborated by empirical studies. For example, in a detailed study of Nigeria's Civil Service,

Rasul & Rogger (2015) provide evidence that increased autonomy correlates with higher productivity of bureaucrats, whereas increased mentoring lowers output by bureaucrats. They show this lack of success in active management by supervisors is due to poor targeting of incentives and multitasking problems. Similarly, Gulzar & Pasquale (2017) study a setting with multiple principals in India. Using data on India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, they show that locations where local bureaucrats are accountable to a single politician perform better.

Research in behavioral economics, sociology, and public administration also suggests problems with explicit monetary reward and monitoring schemes to induce performance in front line civil servants. In contrast to sparse principal – agent models that assume different preference schedules between principal and agent, this type of work often emphasizes the *esprit de corps* or the intrinsic motivation of public servants as crucial bureaucratic characteristics that affect overall productivity (Perry & Hondgheim 2008). Intrinsic motivation or a strong organizational culture of efficiency.

Interestingly, large parts of the revenue gains come from a small set of taxpayers. Khan et al. (2016) also find some evidence of an increase in bribes to compensate bureaucrats for forgone incentive rewards. In general, there is little work that traces the institutions and organizational structures that help to generate *esprit de corps* within bureaucracies.

This perspective suggests that public-minded bureaucratic agents want to deliver services and do not have to be made accountable via explicit, formalized monitoring and incentive schemes. In fact, introducing pecuniary rewards that violate existing organizational norms might demoralize current civil servants and deter intrinsically motivated people from entering the civil service in the first place (Keefer & Banuri 2013). Some studies, though suggest that high public sector wages and attractive career opportunities attract high-quality applicants

(Dal Bo et al. 2013) and that intrinsic motivation of civil servant amplifies the positive effects of increased monitoring (Callen et al. 2015). To complicate matters further, work on corruption has also suggested that corrupt bureaucracies might attract bureaucrats who are primarily interested in rent-seeking opportunities (Crowley & Smith 2013). Laboratory experiments suggest that job seekers with aspirations for the civil service exhibit a greater likelihood to cheat in experimental games and reveal a preference for corruption (Banerjee et al. 2015). Theoretical work by Gailamar & Patty (2007) suggest that in order to attract “zealots” (i.e. publicly minded and intrinsically motivated individuals) into the civil service, civil service wages must be below market wages to ensure that only zealots remain in the civil service. This condition is quite unlikely to hold in most development-country contexts (Finan et al. 2015), and a common refrain is that state agencies are populated by incompetent and uncaring bureaucrats for whom the civil service is a safe and relatively lucrative career. Thus, merit and promotion procedures – even if they replicated those of Western bureaucracies – are unlikely to produce a civil service populated by those intrinsically motivated to serve the public. Career backgrounds and career aspirations can also affect civil servants’ policy preferences and decisions. Using data from Central Banks from across the developing world, Adolph (2013) finds that central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictable different monetary policies.

A more recent set of studies has also investigated the effect of electoral competition on monitoring, bureaucratic fragmentation, and bureaucratic performance. Electoral competition should improve bureaucrats’ performance. Voters hold their representatives accountable via an election, which in turn encourages politicians to monitor bureaucrats to ensure that they provide public goods and service. In a study of the Nigerian Civil Service, Rogger (2014) finds that electoral competition leads politicians to delegate public goods provision to more capable bureaucrats, improving overall services provision. Evidence from Pakistan also

indicates that electoral competition is crucial for making politicians hold civil servants accountable but (Callen et al. 2014) discovered that Doctor absenteeism is substantially lower in electorally competitive districts and higher for doctors who are personally connected to politicians. They also find that interference with the sanctioning of health workers is higher in less competitive areas, and that the use of Smart phones for monitoring health workers' assigned visit to health care centre is effective only in competitive areas. Although competition may increase politicians' incentives to monitor bureaucrats, politicians who face less electoral competition and thus enjoy longer tenure might be able to incentivize to the plight of the electorate.

One recent exception from the United States (Carpenter 2001, p. 32) explores how Progressive-era American bureaucracies created "reputations for innovation, service, and moral protection that were embedded in multiple networks." Carpenter's argument begins with the efficacy of the bureaucracy and explores how this supports bureaucratic autonomy, rather than illuminating the origins of the norms within the bureaucracy. Looking at bureaucrats in India, Nath (2014) finds that re-election concerns do not have a meaningful effect on the monitoring efforts of politicians. Instead, politicians with long tenures are able to provide better dynamic contracts that incentivize effort by local bureaucrats. In Pakistan Gulzer (2015) documents the perverse incentives between ruling-party incumbents and civil servants. Ruling party politicians who win close elections are willing to tolerate shirking of civil servants in exchange for their political support. This suggests that if politicians can leverage their control over patronage opportunities and protect civil servants, bureaucratic service delivery will suffer despite the presence of elections. Relatedly, Iyer & Mani (2011) show, using data from India, that politicians prefer control over productivity, leading to assignments that mismatch skilled bureaucrats with less important tasks. This incentivizes junior bureaucrats to invest in loyalty instead of skills. In fact, donor organization had

invested significant resources in interventions designed to mitigate the information constraints that they assume are hampering monitoring and service provision. The conventional wisdom is that information about the quality of government services and politician performance will help the poor to demand greater accountability from service providers and/or politicians and will lead to welfare improvements. The focus of these interventions has been on information about public spending, especially in health and education, corruption, and legislator performance. The results of these interventions, however, have been mixed (see, e.g. Kosack & Fung 2014 for a review of this literature). Moreover, and related to these mixed empirical findings, the argument of Banks & Weingast (1992) presumes that (a) politicians actually consider their responsibilities to ensure efficient bureaucratic function, and (b) politicians are accountable to voters.

If politicians can respond to citizen-monitoring with direct constituency service, then this bypasses the bureaucratic function the solution to a bureaucratic failure is not reforming the bureaucracy but side-lining it. But if voters can imperfectly monitor politicians, then there is a nested, two-level principal agent relationship: Bureaucrats are the agents of politician, who are in turn the agents of the mass public. Viewed through this lens, the requirements for a “McNollgast-style” (McCubbins et al. 1987) solution to the problem of bureaucratic performance where administrative procedures can preserve the preferences of the legislature are particularly unlikely to generate incentives for efficient and efficacious bureaucratic performance in most developing country contexts. Front-line service delivery problems will be particularly acute: unorganized constituents must monitor bureaucrats on behalf of politicians who may not have incentives to respond to citizen demands, and who may not look to bureaucratic reform as the solution to bureaucratic under performance anyway.

We would not be surprised to find that front-line service delivery is poor under such conditions. Although principal-agent models offer powerful insights, they also narrowly cast

our understanding of bureaucratic processes as a form of internal management. The Procrustean dominance of the principal-agent model may limit the types of questions we ask when we look at the internal dynamics of bureaucracies, and more importantly, the interaction of bureaucratic agents with politicians, citizens, and business. For example, although studies of corruption have benefited from principal-agent models for understanding the behaviour of corrupt agents, Callen et al. (2014) also point out that corruption in the public sector is often embedded in larger clientelistic machine politics, whose dynamics are not captured solely by narrow principal-agent models. Cruz & Keefer (2015) demonstrate that good bureaucratic performance emerges not from accountability to voters or citizens, but rather from programmatic parties that allow politicians to resist the clientelistic practices that undermine bureaucratic effectiveness. Person et al. (2013) argue that corruption in general is not a principal – agent problem but rather a collective action problem. As discussed in the preceding two sections, developmental state and principal – agent models offer useful insights for the study of bureaucracies, but they also come with inherent disadvantages for understanding the on-the-ground delivery of public services in the developing world. Developmental state arguments focus too narrowly on national-level macro policy making. Principal-agent models have a lot to offer for understanding the incentives and management of frontline civil servants, but they often focus too narrowly on explicit monitoring and reward schemes. More generally, both principal – agent and developmental state approaches have not sufficiently explored variations in the forms of social embeddedness in which frontline bureaucratic agents operate. We explore the issue of bureaucratic embeddedness in depth with the example of street-level bureaucrats.

2.1.5 Embeddedness and Street-Level Bureaucracies

Street – level bureaucrats are the public service workers – including teachers, police officers, social workers, public lawyers, and nurses who interact directly with citizens and who

implement policy on the ground. Given the nature of street-level bureaucracies, they represent a useful case to interrogate the bureaucratic politics of service delivery in the developing world. Like all civil servants, street-level bureaucrats enjoy discretion in policy implementation, but street-level bureaucrats are distinct from others because they are the final step in the chain of policy implementation. Weber recognized that by nature bureaucracies have large amounts of unregulated social and political power. Due to the nature of their job, bureaucrats must make decisions on the spot and exercise discretion in identifying the beneficiaries of services and resources, choosing the method by which services are distributed, and deciding how and when to enforce government policies (Lipsky 1980). The discretion of frontline providers in decision making allows them to become de facto policy makers through the implementation process (Lipsky 1980). In controlling the implementation of policies, frontline providers directly influence the quality of life for many citizens. They determine which children are educated and how, who receives life-saving medication or an identity card, who is fined or arrested for violating a law or regulation, and who pays how much in taxes. Street-level bureaucrats face a different type of workplace environment than do other types of officials. They have to deal with clients' personal reactions to their decision (Lipsky 1980, p.9), frontline service providers face unique pressures and dilemmas, including inadequate resources and often unclear policy goals and performance measures. Further, there is a continual tug of war between street-level bureaucrats' desire for autonomy and their supervisors' desire for surveillance and control. Although training for frontline service providers is important in equipping them with the skills to confront these and other pressures and to fulfil their tasks, very few studies look at the effects of training. A randomized experiment on police in Rajasthan found that the provision of training on professional skills (i.e. investigation and methods) and soft skills (i.e. communication and mediation) improved crime victims' satisfaction with the police (Benerjee et al. 2014). A literature review on

community health workers who are selected from, training in , and assigned to the communities from which they come and who are not necessarily members of the civil service finds that improved training continuous support, and supervision tends to improve performance and increase community members' use of the health workers (Lehmann & Sanders 2007). Yet the ambiguous role of community health workers within the broader healthcare system and civil service can limit the training they receive and the scope of the services they are able to provide, which weakens communities' confidence in the health worker' efficacy.

2.1.6 Bureaucracy in the Legislature

Bureaucrats in the legislature are often called Support Staff. They render services to the legislators, ranging from policy formulation, motion and bill drafting, research, financial advice, official reporting etc. The bureaucracy contributes to the role of law making through the preparation of bills for the presentation in the Chambers of the legislatures and nurses this bill from infancy to maturity when they are assented to by the Chief Executive (Maikasuwa, 2007). The Bureaucracy also assist in drafting motions, keeps records of proceedings in the Chambers, and gathers background information which enables legislators to better understand legislative proposals, and in the conduct of public hearing (Maikasuwa, 2007).

Just as other arms of government rely on a professional bureaucracy to function effectively, so also the legislative arm of government needs a professional and selfless bureaucracy to effectively function. Smith (1988) corroborated this assertion of the important role of the legislative bureaucracy this way:

“They draft legislation, negotiate with lobbyist staff, exercise control over communication within and outside the legislature. They participate in identifying issue and develop legislative position. They conduct research, gather background information and draft

legislation. They prepare speeches, floor statements and explanations to constituents. They coordinate legislative strategies, brief the legislators on pending legislation and at times they are expected to make suggestions as to the course of actions to be taken”, (Smith, 1988).

In the same vein, Smith, a Democratic Senator in the US Congress agrees that:

“When the legislature depends on the executive agencies or private groups for research instead of relying on its source of information (bureaucrats (sic), it makes its choices from the alternatives offered by an independent check when we have professional staff. They provide us with alternatives, with adequate staff assistance we are now able to understand bills as well as come up with legislation of our own” (Smith, 1988).

The above, shows the indispensability of bureaucracy in the legislature. In fact without a functional bureaucratic staff, the legislature is handicapped in dealing with the highly professionalized executive branch of government. According to Hamalai (2011), the legislative bureaucrat as an independent professional staff of the legislature is more reliable than alternatives from interest groups and the executive branch officials; consequently, they are of significant importance to the Legislature.

2.1.7 Democratization of Public Bureaucracy in Nigeria

Public bureaucracy in Nigeria has been democratized though the principle of representation as contained in chapter II, section 14, subsection 3 and 4 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. The chapter provides as follows:

“The composition of the government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect the Federal Character of Nigeria, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of

persons from a few states or from a few ethnic sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies” (Federal Republic of Nigeria official Gazette, 2011).

Following this provision, the composition of the Federal Public Service and the conduct of its affairs must reflect the federal character of Nigeria. And this can only be seen to have been done if it does not contain a predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups (Maikasuwa, 2007).

According to Maikasuwa (2007) this practice of Federal Character ensures that any Nigerian irrespective of his or her state or ethnicity is fully captured in appointments, promotion and posting in the public service of the country. Chukwu (1990) however sees a problem with this system of representative bureaucracy, in the employment and appointment into government bureaucracy is skewed in favour of representation instead on the basis of merit or knowledge of the job. The Hotline Magazine, under the caption “Federal Character: Reality or Illusion” helps to strengthen the argument of Chukwu. The publication has it thus:

“The inherent assumption in the phrase “Federal Character” are fundamentally based on the salient issues of federalism and democratic representation. In the case of the first assumption, it has been practically denoted that diverse components are to equally exist and there are other diverse groups within the Nigerian geo-political set-up that must fundamentally exist on the basis of equality. The second assumption is indexed to the concept of representation of all sectors and units of the country for the enhancement of unity and in the desire to meet the aspiration of the units. Perhaps, the issue of representation per state is not really the focal point of disagreement but of the methods to be adopted in attaining representation” (Hotline 1987: April 15).

As far as Hotline Magazine is concerned, representation as a means of recruitment in the federal bureaucracy is acceptable, but the method to be adopted in attaining representatives

should be carefully examined to ensure balance and merit. However, it is generally believed that the principle negates the principle of fair competition and promotes mediocrity in the public service. Supporting the view, Michael Ani, the former Secretary to the Federal Government maintained that the perpetual utilization of federal character would stand as an impediment against merit and as source for the entrenchment of mediocrity". Lanyi Bolaji contends that extreme application of the federal principle throws merit overboard (Punch, 1985 February) Sina Adedipe feels that the federal character principle is acceptable but that its application should not ignore the historical and sometimes regional factors which accounts for the seeming imbalance in some Federal Government agencies such as Commodity Board, Research Institutes and the Nigerian Ports Authority (Sunday Concord, 1985, 13).

It would appear that even the opponents of the federal principle agree that representation of some kind is necessary to ensure balance in the federal government bureaucracy. However, the bone of contention seems to be the nature and extent of this representation in the Nigeria bureaucracy. The opponent of representation argues that uncritical pursuit of representation might impair merit which is the hallmark of modern bureaucracy. For this group of people, merit is synonymous with technical qualification ascertained through competitive examination. Of course, this is one of the Weberian ideal principle which invariably goes to boost efficiency of service delivery in any organization. Subordination of merit to representation that stands to gain from the application of the federal character may boomerang in the long run. It may lead to lackadaisical attitude to life generally and to any serious attempt to acquire technical qualification in particular. After all, if an unqualified person can reach the peak of federal bureaucracy, what is the need for anybody to struggle to excel?

2.1.8 Historical Development of the National Assembly Bureaucracy

Habu (2017), explains the National Assembly bureaucracy developed from the Administrative Units established in the office of the Colonial Secretary to provide the different legislative councils with support services e.g. legislative councils under the Lagos Colony of 1861, the National Council of 1914, the 1922 Council under the Clifford Constitution of 1946. The legislative council was staffed with expatriates drafted from the House of Commons in London to serve as Official Reporters and Clerks at Table. Resulting from the increased demand from nationalist for the domestication and Nigerialisation of the Civil Service, Nigerians were appointed into the Civil Service including the legislative bureaucracy. Albeit the new development, the Secretary to the Colonial Service continued to serve as the Chief Administrative Officer to the legislature. Notwithstanding, the legislative bureaucracy grew to become a full-fledged bureaucracy dominated by Nigerians.

At independence, following the emergence of the first Republic in 1963, the National Assembly Bureaucracy grew into the Directorates of Senate and the House of Representatives and the Administrative Unit: Sergeant-At-Arms Unit, Official Reporting Unit (Habu, 2017).

In 1966, the First Republic came to an abrupt end following the coup that toppled the Government. The resulting military government suspended the Constitution and abolished the Legislature, and all staff of the National Assembly Bureaucracy were redeployed to the Federal Civil Service (Habu, 2017).

2.1.9 Concept of Service Delivery

According to Chen, (2014) in a study conducted by him and his friends to ascertain how South Africans view service delivery, viewed service delivery as the distribution of basic resources that citizens depend on like water, electricity, sanitation infrastructure, land and

housing. So according to him if all these services are poorly delivered, it amounts to poor service delivery which often is the major cause of protests in South Africa. In a Report of the World Meteorological Organization, service delivery was defined as a continuous cyclic process for developing and delivering user-focused services (World Meteorological Organization, 2017) Service delivery was further divided into four stages namely:-

1. **User Engagement:** identifying users and understanding their needs;
2. **Service Design and Development:** the process between users, providers, suppliers, and partners of creating, designing and developing services, ensuring user needs are met;
3. **Delivery:** producing, disseminating and communicating data, products and information (i.e services) that are fit for purpose and relevant to user needs; and lastly
4. **Evaluation and Improvement:** process to collect user feedback and performance metrics to continuously evaluate and improve upon products and services (World Metro logical Organization, 2017).

It suffices here to argue that service delivery does not just end at identifying and meeting the needs of an individual or an organization but entails a continuous appraisal of service rendered with the purpose of development a culture of continuous improvement in service delivery.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

For the purpose of understanding service delivery in the Senate Directorate, Public Choice Theory was used to explain the current level of service delivery in the Senate.

Public Choice Theory is basically an economic theory of Political Science that was developed by Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan Jr. in 1962. It assumes that political society is composed of self-interested individuals who coalesce around organized interest (Aye, 2008). It also assumes that civil servants pursue their self-interest rather than that of the public. The central tenet of public choice theory according to Boston et al (1996) is that man who is a rational being, desiring to act independently, and seeking to satisfy his personal best interest.

Politicians and government bureaucrats are both driven by self-interest. According to McDonalds and Tollison, (1995) politicians are by self-interest just like anyone else. He further opined that politician's self-interest can be more disastrous as their decision can send thousands of young people to prison or be killed in a pointless war, just to improve their political status.

Proponents of this school of thought believe that though self-interest leads to non-threatening result in the market place, it produces nothing but pathology in political decision. These pathological patterns represent different kinds of "free-riding" and "rent-seeking" by voters, bureaucrats, politicians, and recipients of public funds. For example, coalition of voters seeking special advantage from the state may join together to get favourable legislation enacted. Rather than being particularly needy, these groups are likely to be those whose big stake in a benefit arouses them to more effective action than is taken by that of tax payers at large over whom the costs are spread. Similarly, the managers of the "bureaucratic firms" seek to maximize budget, and thereby to obtain greater power, larger salaries, and other prerequisites.

Public choice theorists criticized the Weberian model of bureaucracy as lacking cost efficiency. The argument was that the increasing role and growth of government bred inefficiency in service delivery; consequently pressures emerged to curtail the expansion of

government and shift towards privatization to ensure cost effectiveness and efficiency (Hood 1995, Larbi, 2003). They concluded that the public sector under-perform because bureaucrats pursue their narrow selfish interest rather than public interest. They therefore recommended downsizing of the public sector, contracts for public sector employees and contracting out services and exposure to competition amongst other measures (Hughes, 2003; Larbi, 2003). Furthermore, proponents of this theory also criticize the poor reward system of the public service that leads to inefficient performance resulting to waste of resources.

The importance of this theory in the view of Ayee (2008) is that it;

- i. Offers a coherent explanation for seemingly non-rational decision making by government;
- ii. Explains why public interest is not achieved;
- iii. It focuses on the power of vested interests, and thus demonstrates the barriers to reforms that are created by pre-existing policies, and by the political relationships that they engender;
- iv. Provides an explanation for the willingness of public officials to respond to the pressure and implication of the lobby groups and other types of special interest;
- v. Provide an explanation for the policy choices that are detrimental to society as a whole in both the short and long term and
- vi. Offers a way of understanding the constraints on policy change that develop over time.

2.2.1 Application of Public Choice Theory to this Study

Okotoni (2001) in one of his works decries the politicization of government bureaucracy in Nigeria. He opined that, there is nothing wrong with the bureaucracy performing political functions, like the Head of the Civil Service and Permanent Secretaries of Ministries but the fear is that unless such political functions are carefully controlled, they can further aggravate the already strained relationship between the political officers and the bureaucrats with unpleasant consequences during a democratic regime. In the National Assembly, politicians wield so much powers, they more or less act as the rudder of the National Assembly Bureaucracy. For example, the Chairman of the National Assembly is the Senate President who happens to be a politician. There is the notion that the Senate President exercises so much influence on who eventually becomes the Clerk of the National Assembly (Chief Accounting officer of the National Assembly). If this is true then most of the administrative decisions in the National Assembly Bureaucracy will have some political underpinnings which breed pathology according to proponents of public choice theory. Because political decisions are coated with some level of self-interest geared towards rent-seeking.

Similarly, there have been complaints from Committee Clerks in the National Assembly of usurpation of their duties by Chairmen of Committees possibly because they want to gain control of Committee funds or keep the Committee Clerks out of the equation of overseeing MDAs from which they get special favours. These tendencies of self-interest are not only common among politicians but also take place among the bureaucrats. They seek to maximize budget to their advantage, and thereby obtain greater power and influence over their Directorates, Departments, Divisions and Committees. This explains why most Departmental Heads, Divisional Heads and Committee Clerks are seen engaging Youth Corps members in committee activities instead of using the staff of the National Assembly

who are career civil servants. The staff end up becoming alienated from the Committee activities and consequently end up being redundant in their offices.

These pathological proclivities of self-interest can stifle productivity, creativity and innovation in the National Assembly bureaucracy due to poor or non-engagement of staff and poor reward system to boost staff performance with regards to effective and efficient service delivery. It is this behaviour of the public sector that is in the heart of public choice theory. While they are supposed to work in the public interest, putting into practice the policies of government as efficiently and effectively as possible, public choice theorists see bureaucrats as self-interested utility maximizers, motivated by such factors as, “salary, prerequisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage ... and the ease of managing the bureau (Niskanen, 1973).

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

Methodology here refers to the techniques for collecting the relevant information regarding the major areas of the research question of the study for the purpose of verifying them. Thus this section is designed to acquaint us with the research design, population of the study, sample size of the study and the various sources where data was collected, different methods employed for data collection and analysis.

3.1 Research Design

Survey design was used for this study considering the nature of the study and the population for the study. This design was chosen because, it involves the collection of data from a sample of elements drawn from a well-defined population, through the use of questionnaire or interviews.

3.2 Population of the Study

The population for this study are the total staff in the Senate Directorate Nominal Roll. Currently, the National Assembly Senate Directorate has about Six Hundred (600) staff in its nominal roll. Staff of the Senate Directorate was chosen because they constitute the focus of this study.

3.3 Sampling Technique

Purposive sampling technique, also called judgment sampling which entails the deliberate choice of a respondent due to the qualities the respondent possesses, was used for the study. It is a non-random sampling technique that does not need underlying theories or a set number of respondents. This technique allows the researcher to decide what needs to be known and sets

out to find people who can and are willing to provide the information by virtue of knowledge or experience (Bernard, 2002 pp: 33). Therefore, Purposive sampling was used to select the respondents from the pool of staff in the National Assembly Senate Directorate.

3.4 Sample Size

The National Assembly Senate Directorate has about Six Hundred (600) Staff on its nominal roll. Eight (8) staff each were purposely selected from Chamber Office, Committee's Office, Bill Office, Journal/Documentation Office, Table Office and Ten (10) staff from Management Office bringing the total number of staff used for this study to fifty (50). Similarly, sixteen (16) Senators who are Chairmen of sixteen different Senate Standing Committees were also purposively selected bringing the total number of respondents used for the study to sixty six (66).

3.5 Sources of Data Collection

This study used two (2) major data sources, primary and secondary sources. The primary data were obtained via the use of the questionnaire while the secondary data were obtained from journal, books, newspapers, bulletin and online sources.

3.6 Instrument of Data Collection for Primary Sources

This study utilized both open ended and close ended questionnaires as primary instrument for data collection. The questionnaires were structured into four sections, section A to section D. Section A solicited information on the bio-data of respondent, section B solicited information on the contribution of the Senate Directorate to the Senators in the Eighth Senate, section C solicited information on the availability of human and material resources to the Senate Directorate, while section D solicited information on the challenges of the Senate Directorate.

3.7 Secondary Data Sources

The secondary data were collected from journals, books, newspapers, bulletins and online resources.

3.8 Data Analysis Technique

The data used in this study were analyzed using Statistical Procedure for Social Sciences (SPSS). Similarly, the results of the analysis were presented in tables showing the frequencies and percentages of respondents holding the same or different opinions on questions asked in the questionnaire

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

This chapter covers data presentation, analysis and discussion of findings. A total number of sixty six (66) questionnaires were distributed to the target respondents. However, only 51 questionnaires were filled and returned while 15 were returned unfilled. The data presentation, analysis and discussion of findings were done according to the objectives of the study outlined in chapter one.

4.1 Bio-data of the Respondents

In the questionnaire, the following questions were raised in connection to the personal information about the respondents:

1. What is your sex category?

Table 4.1.1 Respondents Sex category

S/N	Respondents Sex Category	Frequency	Percent (%)
1	Male	38	75.0
2	Female	13	25.0
	Total	51	100

Source: Field Work April, 2021

Table 4.1.1 reveals that 38 (75%) of the respondents are males while 13 (25%) are females. This does not necessarily mean that we have more males than females in the Senate Directorate, but it shows that more of the questionnaires were administered on male respondents.

2. What is your marital status?

Table 4.1.2 Respondents' Marital Status

S/N	Respondents Marital Status	Frequency	Percent (%)
1.	Married	50	98
2.	Single	-	-
3.	Divorced	1	2
4	Widow/widower	-	-
	Total	51	100

Source: Field Work, April, 2021

Table 4.1.2 shows that 50 (98%) of the respondents were married while 1 (2%) was divorced. However, none was single or widow/widower. This means that majority of the respondents used for this study were married.

3, What is your age bracket?

Table 4.1.3 Respondents Age

S/N	Respondents Age	Frequency	Percent (%)
1	18 – 31	-	-
2	31 – 40	6	12
3	41 – 50	42	82
4	51-60 and Above	3	6
	Total	51	100

Source: Field Work, April, 2021.

Table 4.1.3 indicates that none of the respondents was between the age of 18 and 30 years. However, 6 (12%) respondents fall within the age bracket of 31-40, while 42 (82%) of the

respondents fall within the age bracket of 41-50 but 3 (6) of the respondents are 51 years and above. This implies that most of the respondents are young and still very vibrant.

4. What is your highest educational qualification?

Table 4.1.4 Respondents Educational Qualifications

S/N	Respondents Educational Qualifications	Frequency	Percent (%)
1.	O/Level	-	-
2.	ND/NCE	4	8
3.	HND/B.SC	23	45
4.	MBA/M.SC	19	37
5.	Others	5	10
	Total	51	100

Source: Field Work, April, 2021

Table 4.1.4 reveals that none of the respondents' highest qualification is O/level, However, 4 (8%) of the respondents possess ND/NCE while 23 (45%) possess HND/BSC. Furthermore, 19 (37%) of the respondents have MBA/MSC but the remaining 5 (10%) of the respondents possess other qualifications. This shows that the respondents are educated and still vibrant.

5. What is your job designation?

Table 4.1.5 Respondents' Job Designation

S/N	Respondents Occupational Designation	Frequency	Percent (%)
1	Director	1	2
2	Deputy Director	2	4
3	Assistant Director	3	6
4	Chief	6	12

5	Assistant Chief	13	25
6	Principal Officer	26	51
	Total	51	100

Source: Field Work, April, 2021.

Table 4.1.5 shows that 1 (2%) of the respondents was a Director while 2 (4%) were Assistant Directors. Also, the result reveals that 3 (6%) of the respondents were Assistant Directors while 6 (12%) of them were Chiefs and 13 (25%) were Assistant Chiefs. Furthermore, the result also reveals that 26 (51%) of the respondents were Principal Officers.

6. Do you agree that the Senate Directorate performs the following functions?

Table 4.1.6 Functions of the Senate Directorate

S/N	Functions	Strongly Disagree Freq./%	Disagree Freq./%	Neutral Freq./%	Agree Freq./%	Strongly Agree Freq./%
1	Preparation of Votes and Proceedings	-	-	-	6 (12%)	45 (88%)
2	Supply of Acts, Bills, and relevant documents to Senators	-	-	-	1 (2%)	50 (98%)
3	Research and development of procedures and practices	-	-	-	11 (22%)	40 (78%)
4	Preparation of Order Paper	-	-	-	-	51 (100%)
5	Secretariat for Committees	-	-	-	10 (20%)	41 (80%)
6	Administrative services	-	-	-	7 (14%)	44 (86%)
7	Staff development and training	-	-	-	-	51 (100%)
8	Numbering and gazetting of bills	-	-	-	-	51 (100%)

Sources: Field Work, April, 2021.

Table 4.1.6 shows the result of analysis on the functions of the Senate Directorate. The result reveals that 6 (12%) of the respondents agree that preparation of Votes and Proceedings is a functions of the Senate Directorate while 45 (88%) of respondents strongly agree to that. On supply of Acts, Bills and other relevant documents to Senators by the Senate Directorate, 1 (2%) of the respondents agree while 50 (98%) of the respondents strongly agree. Regarding research and development of procedures and practices as a function of the Directorate, 11 (22%) of the respondents agree while 40 (78%) strongly agree to it. Furthermore, all the 51 (100%) respondents strongly agree that preparation of Order Paper is one of the functions of the Directorate while on the other hand, 10 (20%) of the respondents agree that the Directorate also serve as Secretariat for Committees while 41 (80%) of the respondents strongly agree to that. In addition, 7 (14%) of the respondents agree that bureaucrats provide administrative support to the parliamentarians while 44 (86%) strongly agree to it. Regarding Staff Development and Training as a function of the Directorate, all the 51 (100%) respondents strongly agree to that. Finally, the 51 (100%) respondents strongly agree that numbering and gazetting of bills are also a function of the Directorate.

7. What are the contributions of the Senate Directorate to the 8th Senate?

Table 4.1.7 Contribution of the Senate Directorate to the Eight Senate

Year	Total No of Votes and Proceedings	Total No Order Paper	Total No Training for Senate Staff	Total Number of Bills Referrals to Senate Standing Committees
2015	189	189	Nil	65
2016	185	185	Nil	108
2017	190	190	1	74
2018	209	209	1	54

2019	218	218	Nil	50
Total	991	991	3	350

Source: Nigeria Senate President's Office 2021

Table 4.1.7 shows that in 2015, the Senate Directorate produced a total number of 189 Votes and Proceedings as well as Order Papers. In the same year, no training was conducted for staff but there were a total of 65 bills referred to and worked on by different Committees. Similarly, in 2016, 185 Votes and Proceedings as well as Order Paper were produced, while there was no training but a total number of 108 bills were referred to various Standing Committees. In the same vein analysis of the data reveals that in 2017, 190 Votes and Proceedings as well as Order Paper were produced, while one training was carried out but a total number of 74 bills were referred to the relevant Committees. Furthermore, the tables show that in 2018, 209 Votes and Proceedings as well as Order Paper were produced, while there was one training but a total number of 54 bills were referred to various Committees. Finally, a total of 218 Votes and Proceedings as well as Order Paper were produced, No training was held but 50 bills were referred to different Committees.

8. How would you rate the support services rendered by the Senate Directorate?

Table 4.1.8 Rating of Support Services Rendered by the Directorate to Senators

S/N	Rating Options	Frequency	Percent (%)
1	Very low	2	18
2	Low	-	-
3	Neutral	2	18
4	High	7	64
	Total	11	100

Source: Field Work, 2021

Table 4.1.8. shows that 2 (18%) of the respondent Senators rate the services of the Senate Directorate very low but none rate it as low. Furthermore, 2 (18%) of the respondent Senators were neutral. However, 7 (64%) of the respondent Senators rate the services rendered as high. The inference from the above analysis is that majority of the Senators believe that the Senate Directorate is carrying out its support services very well, thus, assisting them to fulfil their constitutional mandates. This is true considering the number of referrals and achievements by the Directorate during the period under review.

9. Does your Unit/Division have available the following material resources for effective work?

Table 4.1.9 Assessment of Availability of Material Resources to the Senate Directorate

S/N	Availability of Material Resources	Strongly Disagree Freq./%	Disagree Freq./%	Neutral Freq./%	Agree Freq./%	Strongly Agree Freq./%
1	All the staff in your unit or department have Personal Computers attached to them	42 (82%)	-	-	9 (18%)	
2	Every office has stable internet service	18 (35%)		-	8 (16%)	25 (49%)
3	There are enough staff buses to convey staff to and from the office	15 (29%)	-	-	-	36 (71%)
4	The departments and units have well-equipped Library.	15 (29%)	36 (71%)	-	-	-
5	National Assembly Clinic is fully functional with required drugs in the Pharmacy	-	33 (65%)	-	13 (25%)	5 (10%)
6	Funds are promptly released for running departmental activities	-	28 (55%)	-	-	23 (45%)

7	Annual leave and training allowances are paid to staff when going on annual leave or training	25 (49%)	-	8 (16%)	18 (35%)	-
8	There are enough offices in all your unit/division	19 (37%)	-	-	32 (82%)	-
9	All the offices have functional Photocopiers and Printers.	-	22 (43%)	-	17 (33%)	12 (24%)

Source: Fieldwork, April, 2021

Table 4.1.9 shows analysis on availability of material resources to the Senate Directorate. From the table, 42 (82%) of the respondents strongly disagree that not all staff in the unit/department have personal computers while 9 (18%) agree that all staff have personal computers. Furthermore, 18 (35%) of the respondents strongly disagree that every office has stable internet service, 8 (16%) of them agree while 25 (49%) of them strongly agree to that. On the availability of enough buses to convey staff to and from office 15 (29%) of the respondents strongly disagree to that while 36 (71%) of them strongly agree with that statement. Regarding the Departments/Units having well-equipped library, 15 (29%) of the respondents strongly disagree to that while 36 (71%) of them simply disagree. In the same vein, 33 (65%) of the respondents disagree that the National Assembly Clinic is fully functional with required drugs. On the other hand, 13 (25%) of the respondents agree that the National Assembly Clinic is fully functional with required drugs while 5 (10%) of them strongly agree to that. Also, on prompt release of funds for running Departmental activities, 28 (55%) of the respondents disagree with that while 23 (45%) of them strongly agree that funds are promptly released for the running of the Departmental activities. On the payment of annual leave and training allowances to staff on annual leave or training, 27 (53%) of the respondents strongly disagree while 24 (47%) agree to that. In respect of enough offices in the Units/Divisions, 19 (13%) of the respondents strongly disagree that there were enough

offices while 32 (82%) agree that there are enough offices. Concerning the availability of functional photocopiers and printers in the offices, 22 (43%) of the respondents disagree. 17 (33%) of respondents agree while 12 (24%) strongly agree to that.

10. How many staff do you have in your Division/Committee?

Table 4.1.10 Distribution of Staff in the Senate Directorate

S/N	Division/Committee	No of Staff
1	Bills Office	55
2	Table Office	10
3	Journal/Documentation Office	5
4	Management Office	8
5	Clerk of Committee's Office	7
6	Chamber Office	7
7	Office of the Clerk of Senate	5
8	Office of the Deputy Clerk Senate	5
9	Committee on Rules and Business	8
10	Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges	7
11	Senate Public Accounts Committee	13
12	Senate National Intelligence Committee	7
13	Senate Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development	7
14	Senate Committee on Air Force	5
15	Senate Committee on Army	5
16	Senate Committee on Anti-Corruption and Financial Crimes	6
17	Senate Committee on Appropriation	12
18	Senate Committee on Aviation	6
19	Senate Committee on Banking Insurance and other Financial Institution	7

20	Senate Committee on Capital Market	7
21	Senate Committee on Communication	6
22	Senate Committee on Cooperation and integration in Africa and NEPAD	5
23	Senate Committee on Culture and Tourism	5
24	Senate Committee on Customs and Excise Duties	6
25	Senate Committee on Defence	7
26	Senate Committee on Diaspora Non-governmental Organization	5
27	Senate Committee on Drugs and Narcotics	6
28	Senate Committee on Petroleum Downstream	8
29	Senate Committee on Petroleum Upstream	8
30	Senate Committee on Ecology and Climate Change	5
31	Senate Committee on Education (Basic and Secondary)	7
32	Senate Committee on Employment Labour and Productivity	6
34	Senate Committee on Establishment and Public Service	6
35	Senate Committee on FCT	6
36	Senate Committee on Federal Character	6
37	Senate Committee on Federal Road Maintenance Agency	5
38	Senate Committee on Finance	7
39	Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs	7
40	Senate Committee on Gas	8
41	Senate Committee on Health	7
42	Senate Committee on House	6
43	Senate Committee on ICT and Cyber Crime	6
44	Senate Committee on INEC	6
45	Senate Committee on Information and National Orientation	6

46	Senate Committee on Interior	6
47	Senate Committee on Inter-Parliamentary Affairs	5
48	Senate Committee on Industry	6
49	Senate Committee on Judiciary, Human Rights and Legal Matters	6
50	Senate Committee on Land Transport	5
51	Senate Committee on Legislative Compliance	5
52	Senate Committee on Local and Foreign Debts	6
53	Senate Committee on Local Contents	6
54	Senate Committee on Marine Transport	7
55	Senate Committee on Media Public Affairs	6
56	Senate Committee on National Identity Card and National Population	6
57	Senate Committee on National Planning	6
58	Senate Committee on Navy	6
59	Senate Committee on Niger Delta	6
60	Senate Committee on Police Affairs	6
61	Senate Committee on Power, Steel Development	6
62	Senate Committee on Poverty Alleviation and Social welfare	5
63	Senate Committee on Public Procurement	6
64	Senate Committee on Primary Health and Communicable Diseases	6
65	Senate Committee on Privatization	5
66	Senate Committee on Science and Technology	5
67	Senate Committee on Solid Minerals	6
68	Senate Committee on Special Duties	6
69	Senate Committee on Sport and Youth Development	6
70	Senate Committee on SDGS	6
71	Senate Committee on State and Local Government	6

72	Senate Committee on TETFUND	8
73	Senate Committee on Trade and Investment	6
74	Senate Committee on Women Affairs	6
75	Senate Committee on Water Resources	6
76	Senate Committee on Works	6
77	Senate Committee on Intergovernmental Affairs	6
	Total	531

Source: Clerk of Committee's Office 2021

Table 4.1.10 reveals that the entire Senate Directorate has a total number of 531 staff. Further analysis reveals that the Bills Office has 55 staff which is the highest followed by Public Accounts Committee, Appropriations Committee and Table Office which have 13, 12 and 10 staff respectively. The remaining Committees have between 5 and 8 staff. The import here is that staff to Senator ratio is slightly above 5. This is not good enough considering the work the Directorate is saddled with.

11. What do you think are the challenges the Senate Directorate is faced with?

Table 4.1.11 Challenges of the Senate Directorate

S/N	Challenges of the Senate Directorate	Strongly Disagree Freq. (/%)	Disagree Freq. (/%)	Neutral Freq.(/%)	Agree Freq. (/%)	Strongly Agree Freq.(/%)
1	Poor staff welfare	-	-	-	4 (8%)	47 (92%)
2	Poor working condition of staff	-	-	-	8 (16%)	43 (84%)
3	Poor working relationship between Committee Clerks and Committee Chairmen	-	-	-	45 (88%)	6 (12%)

4	Overlapping of functions between Aides of Senators and Staff	-	-	2 (4%)	40 (78%)	9 (18%)
5	Inadequate equipment and working tools for staff	-	-	-	13 (25%)	38 (75%)
6	Lack of Cooperation between Committee Chairmen & Committee Clerks	-	-	1 (2%)	22 (43%)	28 (55%)
7	Inadequate training for the Staff	-	-	-	16 (31%)	35 (69%)

Source: Fieldwork, April, 2021

Table 4.1.11 shows analysis of responses in respect of challenges faced by the Senate Directorate. From result, 4 (8%) of the respondents agree that poor staff welfare was a challenge while 43 (84%) of the respondents strongly agree to that. Similarly, 8 (16%) of the respondents agree that poor working condition was a challenge while 43 (84%) of the respondents strongly agree% to it. In the same vein, 45 (88%) of the respondents agree that poor working relationship between Committee Chairmen and Committee Clerks was part of the challenges while 6 (12%) strongly agree to that. Furthermore, on overlapping of functions between legislative aides and bureaucrats as a challenge, 2 (4%) of the respondents were neutral, 40 (70%) of them agree while 9 (18%) strongly agree. On inadequate equipment and working tools for staff, 13 (25%) of the respondents agree that it was a challenge while 38 (75%) strongly agree to that. However, 28 (55%) of the respondents strongly agree that lack of cooperation between Committee Chairmen and Committee Clerks was a challenge while 22 (43%) of the respondents agree to that but 1 (2%) respondent was neutral. On inadequate training for staff as a challenge, 16 (31%) of the respondents agree to while 35 (69%) of them strongly agree to that.

4.2 Discussion of Findings

The broad objective of the study was to examine the performance of the Senate Directorate in delivering efficient and effective support services to Senators of the 8th Senate. Consequently, in line with the first objective of the study which was to determine the functions of the Senate Directorate, the result of the study revealed that the Directorate performed functions such as preparation of Votes and Proceedings, Order Paper, Research and development of Procedures and Practices, staff development, numbering and gazetting of bills and administrative services for the Directorate as empowered by the Senate Standing Order and the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). In addition, the result revealed that the contributions of the Senate Directorate to the 8th Senate was mostly in the areas of Order Paper and Votes and Proceedings followed by bill referrals which the Senators rated staff contributions as high.

Furthermore, results on the assessment of availability of material resources in the Senate Directorate, revealed that the Directorate did not have adequate working equipment, tools and materials. Most of the staff do not have personal computers, the internet service was unstable, inadequate buses to convey staff to and from office and there were no libraries at the departmental/unit levels. The study also discovered that the staff clinic does not have required drugs and that funds for running Committee activities are not always released. Similarly, the study also revealed that staff are sometimes not paid leave or training allowances. In the same manner, most staff of the Directorate have offices but a good proportion of the staff do not. Similarly, most offices have functional photocopiers and printers but a large number do not have such equipment to work with. Equally, result from the assessment of human resources indicated that the Senate Directorate has 531 staff in all but most of the Committees have between 5 and 8 staff with the exception of the Bills Office which has 55, followed by Public Accounts Committee, Appropriations Committee and Table

Office which have 13, 12 and 10 staff respectively. This implies that Committees do not have required number of manpower as the ratio of staff to Senators is about six. This results are consistent with that of a research conducted by Maikasuwa (2000) on “Bureaucracy and Service Delivery in Federal Legislature: A Study of the National Assembly, 1999-2006” which shows that staff ratio to Senators was 7.

Likewise, from the study results, the study further revealed that the 8th Senate Directorate was faced with a lot of challenges in the discharge of its duties. Such challenges, it was revealed include, poor welfare, poor working conditions, poor relationships between Committee Chairmen and Committee Clerks. In addition, the result indicated that there was overlapping of functions between aides and the Committee Clerks as well as inadequate working tools were identified as challenges militating against the effective and efficient performance of the Directorate. This position was also corroborated in a study conducted by Maikasuwa (2007) on “Bureaucracy and Service Delivery in Federal Legislature: A Study of the National Assembly, 1999-2006” where he identified that lack of basic working tools, recruitment of unqualified staff, political interference in the activities of the administrative machineries, budget constraints, poor attitude to work, stagnation of promotion, lack of healthy relationship between legislators and bureaucrats as the challenges affecting service delivery in the National Assembly.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presented the summary of the findings, conclusion and recommendations.

5.1 Summary of Findings

This study set out to critically examine the contributions of the Senate Directorate of the National Assembly to the members of the 8th Senate. Consequently, the study confirmed that the contributions of the bureaucracy of the Senate Directorate include preparation of Votes and Proceedings, supply of Acts, Bills and other documents to Senators, research and development of procedures and practices, preparation of order paper, secretariat for committees, administrative back up services, staff development and training, and numbering/gazetting of bills.

However, the study also confirmed that there was dearth of material and human resources in the Senate Directorate as most of the staff had no personal computers, internet service was unstable, buses to convey staff to and from office are inadequate and there were no libraries at the departmental/unit levels. The study also expounds that the staff Clinic did not have required drugs and that, funds for running committee activities are not always released. Similarly, the study also revealed that a good number of staff were sometimes not paid leave or training allowances. In the same manner, most staff of the Directorate have offices but a good proportion of the staff did not. More so, most offices have functional photocopiers and printers but a large number do not have such equipments. The result from the assessment of human resources also indicates that the Senate Directorate had 531 staff in all but most of the committees have between 5 and 8 staff with the exception of the Bills Office which had 55, followed by Public Account Committee, Appropriations Committee and Table Office which

have 13, 12 and 10 staff respectively. What this means is that the Committees did not have required number of manpower as the ratio of staff to Senators is about six. The study shows that Committees have between five and eight staff with the exception of a few Committees which had 55, 13, 12 and 10 staff. This shows that the Directorate bureaucracy had the ratio of about six staff to a Senator.

Furthermore, the study revealed that the bureaucracy of the 8th Senate Directorate was faced with numerous challenges such as inadequate budgetary allocation for staff welfare, poor working condition of staff, poor working relationship between Committee Clerks and Committee Chairmen, overlapping functions between political aides and staff, inadequate working equipment and tools for staff, lack of cooperation of Committee Chairmen and Committee Clerks, and inadequate training of staff for better service delivery.

5.2 Conclusion

The role of the bureaucrats in any establishment cannot be overemphasized. The Senate Directorate of the National Assembly is not an exception. The bureaucracy of the Senate Directorate assists the Senators in carrying out their constitutional mandate through service delivery, but such services are hampered by inadequate human and material resources available to the Committees, as well as poor welfare, working conditions, training and relationship between the bureaucrats, the politicians and their aides. Consequently, there is the need for posting of more staff to the Committees, improved welfare, working conditions, training and relationships management for maximum performance by the bureaucrats.

5.3 Recommendations

In line with the challenges identified hampering efficient and effective service delivery in the Senate Directorate, the study recommends as follows:-

1. **Improved staff welfare:** This issue of staff welfare is a critical factor in motivating staff to put in their best in the performance of duties. Therefore Management should ensure that workers allowances are promptly paid to avoid industrial disharmony.
2. **Work conditions:** The conditions under which workers operate affect their performance. There should be adequate offices from which staff can conveniently sit to carry out their duties. Other things like provision of a well-lit office, air conditioners and lifts also boost the morale of staff in the course of their job performance.
3. **Improve relationship among Politicians and the Bureaucrats:** A good working relationship goes a long way improving performance of the bureaucrats. Consequently the usual friction between Committee Chairmen and Committee Clerks should be reduced through thorough enlightenment of the former during their orientation to see the latter as crucial in the Committee operation.
4. **Clear job functions between bureaucrats and political aides:** Lack of clear job roles by some political aides led to conflict and rivalry between them and the bureaucrats. Management should more to educate both the parliamentarians and their aides about their roles and that of the Committee and clearly spell out to them the limit of their area of responsibilities.
5. **Provide necessary working tools and Materials:** Staff cannot perform wonders in the absence of working tools, equipment and materials. Consequently, Management should ensure that adequate computers, photocopiers, printers, offices etc. are provided to staff to facilitate their service delivery.

6. **Training:** A staff cannot give what he or she does not have. Consequently the issue of training should be taken seriously by Management of the Directorate. Staff need to be trained and retrained.

5.4 Suggestions for further Studies

The researcher hereby recommends the following areas for further studies.

1. How the 9th Senate Directorate can improve on the achievements of the 8th Senate Directorate of the National Assembly.
2. The impact of bureaucratic input on the legislative process of the National Assembly.

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APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE 1

National Institute for Legislative Studies and
Democratic Studies (NILDS),
No.18 Danube Street, Off IBB Way.
Maitama, Abuja.

5th May, 2020.

Dear Sir/Madam

I am a post-graduate student of the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies/University of Benin. I am undertaking a Study titled: **Bureaucratic and Service Delivery in the National Assembly (Senate Directorate).**

Note: **Service Delivery as used in this questionnaire means all support services provided by the Senate Directorate to the Senators.**

Thank you.

ZAKKA ISA FOM

PG/NILDS/1818048

Instruction: please tick the spaces provided and where necessary provide relevant answer to the questions.

SECTION A: BIO-DATA

1 What is your Sex Category?

a) Male []

b) Female []

2. What is your marital status?

a) Married []

b) Single []

c) Divorced []

d) Widow/Widower []

3. What is your age bracket?

a) 18 -30yrs []

b) 31 – 40yrs []

c) 41 – 50yrs []

d) 51 – 60yrs and above []

4. What is your highest educational qualification?

a) O' Level []

b) ND/NCE []

c) HND/B.Sc. []

d) MBA/M.Sc. []

e) Others specify _____

5. What is your job designation?

a) Director []

b) Deputy Director []

c) Assistant Director []

d) Chief []

e) Assistant Chief []

f) Principal Officer []

Section B: Contributions of the Senate Directorate to the Eighth Senate

6. Do you agree that the Senate Directorate performs the following functions?

S/N	Functions	Strongly Disagree Freq./%	Disagree Freq./%	Neutral Freq./%	Agree Freq./%	Strongly Agree Freq./%
1	Preparation of Votes and Proceedings					
2	Supply of Acts, Bills, and relevant documents to Senators					
3	Research and development of procedures and practices					
4	Preparation of Order Paper					
5	Secretariat for Committees					
6	Administrative services					

7	Staff development and training					
8	Numbering and gazetting of bills					

7. What are the contributions of the Senate Directorate to the 8th Senate?

- a) Votes and Proceeding []
- b) Order Paper []
- c) Training for Senate Staff []
- d) Bills Referrals to Senate Standing Committees []

8. How would you rate the support services rendered by the Senate Directorate?

- a) Very low []
- c) Low []
- b) Neutral []
- c) High []

Section C: Availability of Material and Human Resources

9. Does your Unit/Division has available the following material resources for effective work?

S/N	Availability of Material Resources	Strongly Disagree Freq./%	Disagree Freq./%	Neutral Freq./%	Agree Freq./%	Strongly Agree Freq./%
1	All the staff in your unit or department have Personal Computers attached to them					
2	Every offices has stable internet service					
3	There are enough staff buses to convey staff to and from the office					
4	The departments and units have well-equipped					

	Library.					
5	National Assembly Clinic is fully functional with required drugs in the Pharmacy					
6	Funds are promptly released for running departmental activities					
7	Annual leave and training allowances are paid to staff when going on annual leave or training					
8	There are enough offices in all your unit/division					
9	All the offices have functional Photocopiers and Printers.					

10. How many staff do you have in your Division/Committee?

Section D: Challenges of the National Assembly Senate Directorate

11. What do you think are the challenges the Senate Directorate is faced with?

S/N	Challenges of the Senate Directorate	Strongly Disagree Freq. (%)	Disagree Freq. (%)	Neutral Freq.(%)	Agree Freq. (%)	Strongly Agree Freq.(%)
1	Poor staff welfare					
2	Poor working condition of staff					
3	Poor working relationship between Committee Clerks and Committee Chairmen					
4	Overlapping of functions between Aides of Senators and Staff					
5	Inadequate equipment and working tools for staff					
6	Lack of Cooperation					

	between Committee Chairmen & Committee Clerks					
7	Inadequate training for the Staff					

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

QUESTIONNAIRE 2

Dear Most Distinguished,

I am a post-graduate student of the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies/University of Benin. I am undertaking a Research titled: **National Assembly and Service Delivery in the Senate.**

Note: **Service Delivery as used in this questionnaire means all support service provided by the Senate Directorate to the Legislature.**

Instructions: **Please tick spaces and where necessary provide relevant answers to the questions.**

SECTION A: BIODATA

1. What is the name of your Senatorial District?

2. What is your sex category?

a) Male []

b) Female []

3. How will you rate the services the Senate Directorate is providing for you to perform your duties of Law making, Oversight and Representation?

a. Excellent []

b. Good []

c. Neutral []

d. Poor []

e. Very Poor []

4. How will you rate the general performance 8thNational Assembly?

5. How can you rate the 8th Assembly in terms of Executive and Legislature relationship?

Thank you for your cooperation and time.

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