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on the Proceedings  
of the Fourteenth Session of the General  
Assembly of the United Nations held  
at New York

September 15—December 13, 1959

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**REPORT ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION  
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
HELD AT NEW YORK**

*September 15–December 13, 1959*

**INTRODUCTION**

**General**

In recent years the proceedings of the General Assembly have to a large extent reflected prevailing current trends in the field of international politics. The Fourteenth Session was no exception.

2. The keynote of the Session was set in the speeches in the plenary debate, in the course of which Mr. Khrushchev put forward his four-year plan for general and complete disarmament and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd explained the United Kingdom plan for comprehensive disarmament by stages. Renewed hopes of genuine progress with practical measures of disarmament, and the widespread desire for a *détente* in East-West relations captured the imagination of many delegations and led to the unanimous adoption of resolutions dealing with Disarmament and Outer Space. In this atmosphere it was natural that the question of nuclear tests should arouse deep emotions, particularly the projected French experiment in the Sahara which, by simultaneously cutting across pan-African sentiment and the general desire for disarmament, provoked sharp, although not always well-informed reactions. But even the resolution on this item was held to comparatively moderate terms and was no exception to the general rule that the resolutions which emerged from the discussions of the Session were, on the whole, moderate.

3. The strong current of opinion in favour of an East-West rapprochement encouraged the Soviet *bloc* to make a determined bid for an increased share of United Nations elective offices. In this they were largely unsuccessful. Nevertheless a widespread feeling that in the prevailing international atmosphere the Communist Powers should be accorded a greater share of United Nations offices accounted for the determination with which many delegations of moderate views maintained their support for Poland in the sharply contested elections to the Security Council. It also probably contributed to the readiness with which the Assembly supported the arrangements made by the Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers for a Ten-Power Disarmament Committee on which the Soviet *bloc* had equal representation with the Western Powers, as well as to the Assembly's approval of Soviet *bloc* representation on the new United Nations Committee on Outer Space disproportionate to the relative numerical strength of the *bloc* in the United Nations.

4. The increased confidence of the African member States observed at the previous Assembly became even more marked at the Fourteenth Session, at which for the first time the group of States south of the Sahara, still small in actual numbers but backed by an impressive list of potential new members, acted on occasion as a political force in their own right. They naturally

concentrated their energies on African items in both the First and Fourth Committees. However, their opposition to those Powers which still have colonial responsibilities in Africa was tempered by the increasing ability of the latter to demonstrate that they too are concerned to do everything possible to help the emergent African nations to realise their ambitions with as little delay as possible. In particular there was a general tendency to regard African problems as being of particular urgency within the wider context of help to under-developed countries.

5. Members of the Assembly paid much attention in their speeches to the importance of aiding economic development and to the shortage of funds available for this purpose. The Assembly endorsed the proposed formation of an International Development Association under the aegis of the International Bank, while continuing to recommend also the establishment of a new United Nations fund for the purpose of providing loans and grants to needy countries. The continuing activities of the United Nations programmes of technical assistance and the experimental scheme for lending experienced administrators to less developed countries were approved, as was the first year's work of the new Special Fund for pre-development surveys and training. The Assembly also decided that new machinery was needed to encourage industrialisation, and asked the Economic and Social Council to plan it. Enthusiasm for these projects was only tempered by the realisation that enormous tasks still lay ahead, and that there is an acute disparity between the known needs and the resources available to meet them.

6. The Fourteenth Session was fortunate in that no new major international crisis appeared to cast a shadow over its deliberations, although recent events in Tibet and the review of the Hungarian question aroused widespread expressions of sorrow that the United Nations should be a mere spectator in the face of such misfortunes.

#### **Political Subjects: Plenary**

7. During the annual General Debate Mr. Selwyn Lloyd put forward the outline of a phased plan for comprehensive disarmament.

8. There were three main debates on political subjects in Plenary, two familiar and one new. The Assembly again decided after a procedural debate not to discuss the question of Chinese representation. After considering a report on Hungary by its Representative, Sir Leslie Munro, it passed a resolution deploring the disregard by the Soviet Union and Hungary of its previous resolutions and calling upon them to co-operate with Sir Leslie Munro. The new item was "The Question of Tibet"; the Assembly passed a resolution sponsored by the Irish Republic and Malaya deploring recent events in Tibet and calling for respect for the rights of the Tibetan people.

9. The Assembly reached deadlock over the election to fill one of the non-permanent seats on the Security Council, for which a two-thirds majority is required. Poland and Turkey were the two candidates. In 51 ballots held at intervals through the Session neither came near to obtaining enough votes for election. In the last hours of the Session a compromise was arranged by which Poland was elected to the seat on the understanding that she would resign in favour of Turkey half-way through the two-year term of office.

**First Committee (Political)**

10. For the United Kingdom, disarmament was the most important item discussed in this Committee, although the Delegation took a prominent part in the debates on Algeria and on French nuclear tests in the Sahara.

11. Before the discussion on disarmament began in the Committee both Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd had outlined plans for disarmament in speeches in Plenary. The discussion also took place against the background of the agreement reached between France, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom at Geneva, establishing a Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee outside the United Nations. The Assembly passed a resolution transmitting the British and Soviet proposals to the new Committee and another which decided that the Disarmament Commission should continue to be composed of all members of the United Nations. Both these resolutions were adopted unanimously. At the instance of Mr. Aiken, the Irish Foreign Minister, the Assembly also suggested that the Committee should consider the possibility of an international agreement to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. At the suggestion of the Indian Delegation, the Assembly also urged the three nuclear powers to continue their efforts to reach agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, and meanwhile to continue their voluntary discontinuance of tests.

12. On the initiative of Morocco the General Assembly debated the French intention to explode an atomic bomb in the Sahara. M. Jules Moch of France argued eloquently that the proposed test was not dangerous, but the debate showed that the French project had aroused strong feelings, particularly in African countries. Mr. Ormsby-Gore on behalf of the United Kingdom endorsed the scientific arguments used by M. Moch to support his assurances on the safety of the test. The United Kingdom together with Italy and Peru subsequently decided to express in the form of a resolution their hope that France would associate herself with an eventual agreement on the cessation of tests. Although this draft resolution received considerable support, the Assembly eventually preferred to adopt a resolution which expressed its grave concern at the French intention to conduct nuclear tests and requested France to refrain from doing so.

13. The Assembly passed a resolution on the usual lines reaffirming the objectives of the United Nations in Korea.

14. Negotiations between the United States and Soviet Delegations resulted in virtually unanimous agreement on the composition of a new Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to replace the *ad hoc* Committee set up by the Thirteenth Session, to which the Soviet Union had refused to send representatives. The Assembly established the new Committee and accepted a Soviet proposal that an international scientific conference on outer space should be held in 1960 or 1961.

15. After a debate in which General de Gaulle's liberal intentions were frequently praised, the First Committee passed by a simple majority a resolution on Algeria sponsored by Asian and African countries which supported the thesis of the so-called Provisional Government of Algeria that there were two parties concerned in Algeria, the French and themselves, and that discussions between them should cover political as well as military

questions. The French took no part in the debate. This draft resolution was later considerably watered down but failed by a narrow margin to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority in Plenary. For the second year running the Assembly thus passed no resolution on Algeria.

### **Special Political Committee**

16. The most important decision made in this Committee was the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees for a further three years. The debate showed that the *impasse* between Israel and the Arab States on the issue of the repatriation or resettlement of the refugees remained unresolved.

17. The Assembly again expressed its opposition to the policy of *apartheid* pursued by the Government of South Africa and solemnly called upon all Member States to conform to the provisions of the Charter<sup>(1)</sup> dealing with human rights. It also renewed its appeal to the South African Government to begin negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan about the treatment of people of Indian origin in South Africa.

18. The Assembly expressed the hope that it would soon be possible to agree on an expansion of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social Council, and suggested that at its next Session the Assembly should set up a Committee to study the matter if no progress had been made by then. The Assembly rejected a proposal by Czechoslovakia that it should affirm the principle of equitable geographical distribution as the main factor which should influence the choice of Presidents of the Assembly.

### **Economic and Social Questions (Second and Third Committees)**

19. The Second Committee discussed the operations of the Special Fund and the technical assistance programmes, and resolutions were passed unanimously approving the conduct of these programmes and expressing the hope that their resources would continue to expand. The Committee also resolved that the experimental programme for the provision by the United Nations of operational and executive personnel (OPEX) should be continued for a further year. The Committee also recommended to the Economic and Social Council the establishment of a new commission on industrial development, called for studies of methods by which international trade could be increased and fluctuations in commodity prices prevented and asked the Secretariat to prepare a report on techniques to be used in a possible study of long-term world economic prospects and needs. It also passed resolutions encouraging the establishment of industrial development banks, the development of international, scientific and technical exchanges, agrarian reform, the establishment of satisfactory relations between the United Nations and the proposed International Development Association and continued examination by Governments of the possible establishment of a United Nations capital development fund.

20. The Third Committee spent the greater part of the Session drafting various instruments in the field of human rights. It completed a Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which was unanimously adopted by the Assembly,

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(<sup>1</sup>) "Treaty Series No. 67 (1946)," Cmd. 7015.



made some further progress on the draft Covenants on Human Rights, and began consideration of the draft Convention on Freedom of Information. On the social side it recommended a number of miscellaneous resolutions for adoption by the Assembly, including a proposal for the establishment of United Nations awards for research on cancerous diseases; and it made a further appeal to members to give substantial support to the World Refugee Year.

#### **Colonial and Trusteeship Questions (Fourth Committee)**

21. The Fourth Committee again had a very busy session, exceeding its previous record number of meetings in 1958 by nearly one-fifth. It dealt first with the problem of the future of the southern part of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration and reverted to the question of the Cameroons at the end of the session when it considered the report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner on the plebiscite in the northern part of the British Cameroons. The Committee also considered the question of South-West Africa, the Report of the Trusteeship Council, the question of information from non-self-governing territories (including the report of the Committee on Information) and the problem of the Ethiopia-Somalia frontier.

22. The emergence from trusteeship of French Togoland, the French Cameroons and Italian Somalia, and the French decision to cease transmission of information under Article 73 (e) imposed on the United Kingdom an increasingly prominent role in Fourth Committee matters. From the point of view of the United Kingdom the Committee's most important work at this session was in connexion with the future status of the British Cameroons. Although there were some attacks on the United Kingdom and its policies during the debates on the affairs of the Trust Territories and in connexion with non-self-governing territories, the United Kingdom representative in the Committee was able to co-operate with the majority on many questions, and a number of resolutions were adopted unanimously or by large majorities. British achievements in Tanganyika, in particular, and in the economic, social and educational fields in non-self-governing territories generally, commanded respect; and although there were exceptions most of our critics showed some degree of appreciation of the progress which has been achieved.

#### **Administrative and Budgetary Questions (Fifth Committee)**

23. The Fifth Committee had an uneventful session and no major issues arose. Although the budget estimates for 1960 once again reached a record total, the supplementary estimates for the current year were considerably lower than those for 1958 (which had included substantial provision for the cost of the United Nations "presence" in Lebanon and Jordan) and Member States could thus expect to pay a little less in total contributions during 1960. There was also cause for satisfaction in the fact that a degree of stabilisation had been achieved in the staffing of the Secretariat and in expenditure on the main programmes of the United Nations, although the Secretary-General, in his foreword to the 1960 budget estimates, gave a warning that the general trend of existing and new programmes in the economic and social fields seemed likely to call for an increase of the order

of two or three million dollars in the level of the budget over the coming years. The main sections of the budget were voted with comparatively little debate, though particular items excited disproportionate interest and at times the Committee even displayed a tendency, unexpected in the Assembly's financial and budgetary committee, to increase the Secretary-General's proposed expenditures rather than to reduce them. The session closed on a harmonious note with the unanimous adoption of a draft resolution calling for an administrative review of the Secretariat in 1960, which had been co-sponsored by the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and had received the endorsement of the Secretary-General.

#### **Legal Questions (Sixth Committee)**

24. The agenda of the Sixth Committee comprised consideration of the Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its Eleventh Session and a number of procedural matters. Of the latter mention may be made of the item "Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities" on which a resolution was adopted inviting the Secretary-General to convene a conference of plenipotentiaries at Vienna not later than the spring of 1961 to draw up a convention.

### **THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY—FOURTEENTH SESSION**

25. The General Assembly was addressed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, and by two Heads of State, the Presidents of Guinea and Mexico in the course of the Session.

#### **Visit of Mr. Khrushchev**

26. On Friday, September 18, Mr. Khrushchev visited the United Nations and addressed a meeting of the General Assembly. Throughout his visit he was accorded the courtesies normally given to a Head of State.

27. In his speech, Mr. Khrushchev said that never before in history had the people placed such high hopes in an international organisation as they had in the United Nations. Yet the purposes for which the United Nations had been created had not so far been fully achieved and the people still lived in a constant state of anxiety about their future. The time had come to embark on a period of international negotiations, in order to solve urgent world problems. No lasting solution was possible, however, without the participation of the People's Republic of China. Mr. Khrushchev welcomed the improvement in Soviet-American relations on which depended to a large extent the whole development of the international situation.

28. Mr. Khrushchev then turned to his main theme of disarmament. He stressed the enormous destructive power which the nations now possessed. Some ridiculous accident might produce war. Moreover, the arms race had produced a senseless squandering of national resources which might be used for constructive purposes. The Soviet Union was in favour of genuine disarmament under control, but against control without disarmament. So long as only partial disarmament was the objective, suspicions would remain. The Soviet Government had concluded that the only way out of the *impasse*

was through general and complete disarmament. They therefore proposed that over a period of four years all States should carry out complete disarmament and divest themselves of the means of waging war. States would retain only strictly limited police contingents for the maintenance of internal order. An international control organ would be created to ensure that there was no violation of these undertakings. This solution would provide complete security for all States.

29. The Soviet Government realised that some time would be needed to work out so broad a programme. Meanwhile agreement should be sought on such urgent problems as that of nuclear tests. If the Western Powers were not ready to embark on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Government was prepared to come to terms on partial measures.

30. Mr. Khrushchev finally addressed a word of warning to the United Nations. The task of the organisation was to plane down the sharp edges of conflict between States. But if the United Nations was dominated by a group of countries trying to impose their will on others it would disintegrate as the League of Nations had done. A properly functioning international body did not decide issues by counting votes but by searching intelligently and patiently for a just solution which was acceptable to all. At the same time the Great Powers had a duty to reach unanimous decisions to ensure the effective maintenance of peace.

#### **Visit of the President of Mexico**

31. Dr. López Mateos, the President of Mexico, visited the United Nations on October 14 and addressed the General Assembly. In his speech Dr. López Mateos concentrated on the need for developing the principles of international law to replace the old concept of the balance of power, and on the importance of bridging the gap between the advanced and under-developed countries. He also spoke of the role which the smaller and medium-sized nations could play by persuasion in the search for disarmament.

#### **Visit of the President of Guinea**

32. Monsieur Sekou Touré, the President of Guinea, similarly addressed the General Assembly on November 5. His address consisted principally of attacks on the colonial Powers. Claiming to speak on behalf of all Africans, he declared that the continent was an imprisoned land, deprived of its most fundamental human rights. The colonial Powers had sinister plans to divide the Africans in order to remain masters of the continent; but the Government of Guinea would rather be last in a united Africa than first in a divided Africa. Africa's attitude to the two Power *blocs* would depend on the help which she received in her struggle. He appealed to the colonial Powers to abandon their myths and selfishness, and to the United Nations to guarantee true freedom to the peoples of Algeria and the Cameroons.

#### **Opening of the Session and Election of Officers**

33. The Fourteenth Regular Session of the General Assembly was opened on September 15, 1959, by M. Rachid Karame, Prime Minister of Lebanon, who was acting in place of Dr. Charles Malik, the President of

the Thirteenth Session. The Assembly proceeded to elect as President of the Fourteenth Session Dr. Victor Andres Belaunde who received eighty-one votes, one vote being null. Dr. Belaunde had represented Peru at the United Nations for many years and is a popular and highly respected figure. In his opening address to the Assembly Dr. Belaunde expressed the hope, which was frequently echoed in later debates, that the Fourteenth Session would go down into history as "the Assembly of Peace".

34. On the same day the thirteen Vice-Presidents and the seven Chairmen of the Assembly's main Committees were elected in accordance with the pattern established in the Assembly's resolution of December 12, 1957. The Vice-Presidents were Burma, Morocco, Philippines, Turkey, Roumania, Brazil, Sweden, South Africa, China, France, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States. The Chairmen were:

First Committee (Political): Dr. Matsch (Austria).

Special Political Committee: Mr. King (Liberia).

Second Committee (Economic): Sr. Tamayo (Bolivia).

Third Committee (Social): Mme. Ciselet (Belgium).

Fourth Committee (Trusteeship): Mr. Palar (Indonesia).

Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary): M. Nosek (Czechoslovakia).

Sixth Committee (Legal): Sr. Herrarte (Guatemala).

## **Elections to the Councils and to the International Court of Justice**

### *Elections to the Security Council*

35. Elections were held to fill the places of Canada, Japan and Panama, which were due to retire at the end of 1959. Article 23 of the Charter provides that in the election of non-permanent members due regard should be "specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organisation, and also to equitable geographical distribution". A two-thirds majority is required for election.

36. Ceylon and Ecuador were elected on October 12 but the choice of a successor to Japan proved much more difficult. Under the informal convention evolved in 1946 regarding the allocation of the six non-permanent seats on the Council, one seat was allotted to Eastern Europe. Some delegations maintain that the agreement on this convention only applied to the session of 1946, others that it was intended to be permanent. Some delegations hold that the term "Eastern Europe" covers only those eight member countries which are also members of the Warsaw Pact (including Byelorussia and Ukraine). Other delegations consider that "Eastern Europe" must also include Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. There is also the problem that the convention did not provide for the representation of Asian countries. These controversies are reflected in the history of the seat, which has been occupied as follows:

1946-47: Poland.

1948-49: Ukraine.

1950-51: Yugoslavia.

1952-53: Greece.  
1954-55: Turkey.  
1956: Yugoslavia.  
1957: Philippines.  
1958-59: Japan.

(Yugoslavia was elected in 1956 only after a prolonged deadlock, and on the understanding that she would resign at the end of one year.)

37. In the view of the United Kingdom the 1946 convention remains the basis on which the non-permanent seats on the Security Council should be allocated. The United Kingdom has recognised however that the influx of new members into the United Nations, the consequent pressure for Asian representation on the Council, and the failure to achieve any increase in the size of the Council have combined to make the application of the convention extremely difficult, and occasionally impossible, in the case of this particular seat. The United Kingdom supports the wider of the two interpretations of the term "Eastern Europe" referred to above.

38. On August 24 Poland, and on September 24 Turkey formally put forward their candidatures for the seat occupied by Japan. Both these countries had occupied the seat once in the past. In the United Nations, as elsewhere, Turkey is counted as both a European and a Middle Eastern Power. In the first ballot on October 12, Poland received 46 votes against 36 for Turkey. A total of 50 further inconclusive ballots were held on that day and at irregular intervals during the remainder of the Session. Sometimes Turkey held the lead, sometimes Poland, but neither came within striking distance of the necessary two-thirds majority. On the assumption that all members voted, 55 votes were needed for election; the highest total which Poland reached was 48 (during the first day), while Turkey did not receive more than 43 (on November 3).

39. The balloting in Security Council elections is secret, but it was common knowledge that a number of Commonwealth, West European, Latin American and Asian and African Delegations were supporting Poland. They were moved partly by their own interpretation of the convention governing the seat, partly by respect for the part which Poland might play on the Council and partly by a belief that at a time of improving international relationships they should not oppose the Soviet Union by denying a seat on the Security Council to her ally. The supporters of Turkey, among whom were France, the United Kingdom and the United States, believed that Turkey's qualifications for membership in terms of Article 23 were very good, and that her election, taken together with the probable results of the elections for the other non-permanent seats, would produce a reasonably balanced Council in 1960 and 1961.

40. Once it had become clear that neither Turkey nor Poland was likely to gain enough votes from the other to be elected, many delegations turned their attention to the possibilities of a compromise. Since there was little likelihood of a third candidate on whom both sides could agree, most of these delegations concluded with some reluctance that probably the only workable compromise was to split the term into two periods of one year each, as had been done in 1955, giving one year to each candidate. In the second week of November it became known that Turkey was willing to accept a split term.

The Polish Delegation on November 16 issued a Press statement resisting any such suggestion, and the deadlock continued. As the end of the Session approached, renewed efforts were made to persuade Poland to accept a compromise. By December 12, the last day of the Session, informal discussions between delegations had shown that all concerned were willing to agree to a split term, although the conditions had not been worked out. Final discussions were held on the evening of December 12 under the auspices of the President of the Assembly. Shortly after 1 a.m. on December 13, the President informed the Assembly that it had been agreed that Poland should be elected to the Security Council, that she should resign at the end of 1960, and that the sole candidate in the ensuing by-election should be Turkey.

41. Mr. Kuznetsov then restated the Soviet view on the allocation of the seat, stressing that the split term was only a temporary expedient. Mr. Lodge for the United States recalled the terms of Article 23 of the Charter and declared that in future elections the United States would not discriminate against any area or nation, including Eastern Europe, but would examine each candidature in the light of prevailing circumstances. Mr. Michalowski (Poland) claimed that Poland had won "a plebiscite of this Assembly". Mr. Esin (Turkey) accepted the compromise, emphasising that Turkey was not committed for the future. After the compromise had been welcomed by the Representatives of Brazil, Canada and the United Kingdom, Poland was elected to the Security Council.

42. The Security Council will consist in 1960 of China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States (permanent members); Argentina, Ceylon, Ecuador, Italy, Poland and Tunisia.

#### *Elections to the Economic and Social Council*

43. Brazil, Denmark and Japan were elected on October 12 to succeed Mexico, Finland and Pakistan, India withdrawing in favour of Japan after the sixth ballot. Poland, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were re-elected for a further term. The Economic and Social Council will consist during 1960 of Afghanistan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Sudan, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela.

44. The question of expanding the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (together with the International Court of Justice) was again inscribed on the Assembly's agenda and discussed in the Special Political Committee (see paragraphs 166-171 below).

#### *Elections to the Trusteeship Council*

45. These elections were complicated at the Fourteenth Session by a *lacuna* in Article 86 of the Charter which governs the composition of the Council. This Article provides that the Trusteeship Council shall consist of:

- (a) those Member States which administer trust territories;
- (b) the permanent members of the Security Council who are not included in (a);
- (c) "as many other Member States elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number

of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not.”

Article 86 does not say what should happen if a Member State which is a member of the Trusteeship Council because it administers one or more trust territories ceases to administer any trust territory in the middle of the terms of office of the elected members. This situation will occur during 1960. France will no longer have administering responsibilities after Togoland becomes independent in April, and Italy after Somalia becomes independent in July; France is assured of a permanent seat on the Trusteeship Council because she is a permanent member of the Security Council. In order to maintain an equally balanced membership between those members of the Trusteeship Council who administer territories and those who do not, the number of elected members would eventually have to be reduced by three (two because France, as one of the five permanent members, will “cross the floor” to the non-administering side; and one because Italy will cease to be an administering member).

46. The importance of maintaining the principle of equally balanced membership was acknowledged by all. The difference of opinion arose over the question of what action the Fourteenth Session of the Assembly should take to fill the vacancies on the Council caused by the expiry at the end of 1959 of the terms of office of two elected members, Haiti and India. Some delegations, among which was the United Kingdom, considered that the best interpretation of Article 86 was that the composition of the Council should be determined at each time of elections to the Council. The election of two members for a normal 3-year term to succeed Haiti and India should therefore proceed as usual and the composition of the Council should remain unchanged until three more elected members' terms expired at the end of 1961. However there would be nothing to prevent the question from being discussed again at the Fifteenth Session in 1960, when France and Italy would actually have ceased to exercise administering responsibilities. Other delegations argued that Article 86 must be interpreted as meaning that there should be equally balanced membership on the Council at any given moment, even though this meant that elected members did not serve the full 3-year term specified in the Article. Two elected members must therefore retire in April 1960 and one in July 1960. The choice of which elected members should retire could be made by lot in the Trusteeship Council itself or could be arranged at a special or resumed session of the General Assembly.

47. The United Kingdom took part in private consultations continuing over many weeks with the delegations which were principally interested, but unfortunately agreement could not be reached. In the last week of the session the Soviet Union tabled a resolution which provided for a resumed session of the General Assembly in April 1960 to consider the composition of the Council. A few days later Tunisia tabled a resolution providing for the drawing of lots in the Trusteeship Council in April and July 1960 to decide which elected members should retire on each occasion.

48. These resolutions were debated on the last evening of the Session, December 12, before the elections to the Trusteeship Council were held. The

Tunisian Representative, in introducing his resolution, argued that the principle of equally balanced membership took precedence over the requirement that elected members should serve for three years. Mr. Sobolev, for the Soviet Union, supported the Tunisian draft resolution and said he would only press his own draft to a vote if the Tunisian draft failed. The subsequent proceedings showed that both the administering and non-administering Powers were divided among themselves on this issue. The Tunisian and Soviet drafts were opposed by India, Ceylon, Bolivia, the United Kingdom and others. Sir Andrew Cohen said that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be very sorry to see a premature reduction in the number of elected members; this did not of course derogate from their sense of the importance of an equally balanced membership. The United Kingdom believed that it would be entirely proper for the composition of the Council to be adjusted only when the normal term of office for elected members expired. Even if this interpretation were not accepted, it was premature to try to settle the problem at the present Session, before it had really arisen; it could, if necessary, be discussed next year.

49. The Tunisian draft resolution was put to the vote in parts. Those paragraphs which provided for the retirement of elected members during 1960 were rejected by varying votes, the United Kingdom voting against. The remaining paragraphs of the resolution, which now simply provided for the election of two members at the Fourteenth Session and for further consideration at the Fifteenth Session, were opposed by its own original sponsors and also failed to carry. The Soviet draft resolution calling for a resumed Session failed to receive a two-thirds majority (receiving 29 votes for, with 26 against (including United Kingdom), and 26 abstentions). Mr. Sobolev immediately moved a new procedural resolution calling for a special Session of the Assembly to discuss the matter in April 1960. After a tangled procedural discussion it was decided to proceed to the elections before voting on the new Soviet proposal. At about 3 a.m. on Sunday morning, December 13, Bolivia and India were elected to the Trusteeship Council. As a result of these elections, the Trusteeship Council will now consist of Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States (administering members); China, USSR (permanent members of the Security Council); Bolivia, Burma, India, Paraguay and United Arab Republic (elected members). The Soviet proposal for a special Session was then rejected by 26 votes to 32 (United Kingdom) with 21 abstentions.

50. The Assembly thus in effect endorsed the opinion of which India and the United Kingdom had been the main advocates, that the elections at the Fourteenth Session should proceed as usual. It is clear, however, that the problem will have to be discussed again, probably at the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly.

#### *Election to the International Court of Justice*

51. On September 29 Dr. Ricardo J. Alfaro of Panama was elected a Judge of the International Court of Justice by the General Assembly and the Security Council to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Dr. José Gustavo Guerrero. Dr. Alfaro will serve until February 5, 1964.



## **The General Committee**

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52. The General Committee (which acts as a Steering Committee and makes recommendations to the Assembly on the inclusion of items in the agenda) was automatically established by the election of the President, the thirteen Vice-Presidents and the Chairmen of the seven main committees. The General Committee met on September 16 to consider the Assembly's agenda; it also met on several occasions later in the Session to recommend the addition of further items on the agenda. The General Committee's recommendations regarding these items are dealt with separately in this report under the particular subjects concerned.

## **Chinese Representation**

53. In the background of this year's discussion of Chinese representation was the suppression by the Chinese People's Government of the Tibetan rising and the border dispute between the People's Republic of China and India.

54. On July 13 the Indian Delegation, as in previous years, requested the inscription on the agenda of the Fourteenth Session of an item entitled "Question of the representation of China at the United Nations". The General Committee considered this request on September 16, and Mr. Wadsworth, on behalf of the United States, moved that the Committee recommend to the General Assembly a moratorium resolution by which the Assembly would reject the request for inscription of the Indian item and decide not to consider at its Fourteenth Session any proposals to exclude the Chinese Nationalist representatives or to seat representatives of the Chinese People's Republic. This resolution was supported in the General Committee by Sir Pierson Dixon who said that the elements in the situation had not altered in such a way as to justify a change in the position of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom recognised the Government of the People's Republic as the legitimate Government of China and they attached weight to the fact that the item had been proposed by India. But the overriding consideration was that the deep division of opinion on the subject had not lessened, and might well have increased, since the Thirteenth Session. Discussion of the matter would reduce the hopes of making the Session fruitful. The question was on a different level from other controversial questions which the Assembly did discuss because it affected the very structure of the organisation and aroused feelings of particular intensity. The United States draft resolution was carried in the General Committee by 12 votes to 7 with one abstention.

55. The General Committee's report recommending the "moratorium" resolution was discussed by the General Assembly on September 21 and 22. The Representative of Nepal moved amendments which would have had the effect of cancelling the moratorium and inscribing the Indian item. Mr. Walter Robertson, replying for the United States, said that the Chinese People's Government had been imposed by fraud and maintained by mass murder. He considered that it would be an affront to the Charter to seat the Chinese Communists. Mr. Kuznetsov argued on behalf of the Soviet Union that no adequate agreements could be reached on world problems such as disarmament without the participation of the real Government of

China. Sir Pierson Dixon spoke on the same lines as in the General Committee. Mr. Krishna Menon, speaking on behalf of India against the moratorium, argued that the action of the Chinese People's Government in Tibet and their border troubles with India were irrelevant to the question of Chinese representation.

56. On September 22 the Nepalese amendments were rejected, and the moratorium was carried by 44 votes to 29 with 9 abstentions. The vote on the moratorium in 1958 was 44-28-9. As compared with 1958 Greece and Laos switched from abstentions to affirmative votes, Ethiopia and Cuba from affirmative votes to abstentions, and Guinea (a new member) voted against. All other votes remained unchanged.

### **The Credentials Committee**

57. On September 15 the General Assembly appointed the following members to serve on the Credentials Committee: Afghanistan, Australia, Ecuador, France, Honduras, Italy, Pakistan, Soviet Union, United States.

58. When the Committee met on December 9 the Chairman (the Representative of Ecuador) ruled out of order a proposal by the Soviet Representative to reject the credentials of the Chinese Nationalist Delegation, on the grounds that the Assembly had already taken a decision on the subject of Chinese Representation (see paragraphs 53-56 above). This ruling was challenged by the Soviet Representative and upheld by 7 votes to 2. The Committee approved, also by 7 votes to 2, a United States motion which, following the procedure maintained since 1956, recommended the Assembly to take no decision regarding the credentials submitted on behalf of the Representative of Hungary.

59. The report of the Credentials Committee was approved by the Assembly on December 10 by 72 votes to 1 (Hungary) with 1 abstention (Roumania). A number of delegations made statements about the Chinese and Hungarian credentials.

### **General Debate**

60. As usual the Assembly after the opening formalities and elections embarked upon a General Debate. The Debate lasted from September 17 to October 6; all but three delegations took part and 48 of those representatives who spoke were Foreign Ministers. The General Debate gives representatives an opportunity to pursue themes both of general and of particular interest. The topic which held the attention of most speakers was the prospect of an improvement in relations between East and West which had opened up as the result of Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the United States. In his address to the Assembly on September 18 (paragraphs 26-30 above) Mr. Khrushchev had done his best to paint this prospect in vivid colours. The majority of speakers in the General Debate were attracted by the aim of general and complete disarmament which Mr. Khrushchev had proclaimed, although not many were ready to endorse his scheme as it stood, and a large number suggested that it should be considered together with the plan outlined by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on September 17 (paragraph 63 below). There was a general welcome for the

readiness of the Great Powers to try and resolve their differences by direct discussion; some speakers such as the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia and the Permanent Representative of Greece emphasised that this trend could in no way diminish the responsibility of the United Nations, particularly in the field of disarmament.

61. Great stress was laid during the debate on the need for a more intensive effort to improve the lot of the under-developed countries. Many speakers evidently shared the opinion of the Foreign Minister of Colombia that economic under-development is "the most deadly enemy of political stability and international peace". Mr. Krishna Menon (India), speaking in his traditional place at the end of the debate, suggested that the United Nations Secretariat should produce blueprints for a world plan of development. Previous speakers had welcomed the promising start made by the Special Fund and the new scheme for an International Development Association.

62. On September 17 the United States Secretary of State gave a careful and balanced account of the international events of 1959, which in his view had seen both continued movement toward the goal of peaceful change, and also renewed threats of violence. Mr. Herter made a particular plea for the achievement of open societies and the lowering of barriers to friendly communication between peoples.

63. On the same day the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs spoke for the United Kingdom. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said that he had high hopes that agreement would be reached at the Geneva Conference on nuclear tests. He put forward a comprehensive plan for disarmament in three stages, based on the principles that at each stage there must be a balance between disarmament in the nuclear and conventional fields, and that verbal agreements without control were more likely to add to insecurity than to security. The text of Mr. Lloyd's speech (including his disarmament plan) is at Annex I. He reaffirmed United Kingdom support for the United Nations. He suggested that Member States should earmark personnel, either as individuals or in contingents, who could quickly be made available to serve in a United Nations Force, and that a small planning section should be set up in the Secretariat. He thought that the Assembly should be somewhat more selective in the choice of matters for discussion. He announced that the United Kingdom would contribute \$5 million to the United Nations Special Fund in 1960 (compared with \$1 million in 1959) and that our contribution to the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance would also be considerably increased. He gave an account of United Kingdom colonial policy stressing that it rejected the idea of any inherent superiority of one race over another. He reviewed the year's progress in East-West relations and commented on the unsatisfactory situation in Hungary, Tibet and Laos.

64. The particular complaints which were aired during the General Debate included that of Austria against Italy over the South Tyrol, of Iceland against the United Kingdom over fisheries, of Guatemala against the United Kingdom over British Honduras (with Mexico in turn protesting at the Guatemalan complaint), and of Pakistan against India over Kashmir. There were complaints from some African and Asian Delegations about the

persistence of colonialism on those continents; with one or two intemperate exceptions these critics also paid tribute to the progress which was being made, particularly by France and the United Kingdom, in bringing territories forward to self-government. The question of free navigation through the Suez Canal was also raised by Mr. Herter, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and several other representatives of maritime Powers. Mr. Lloyd expressed the hope that use of the Canal would form a link to further, and not an obstacle to obstruct, the peaceful trade of all countries of the area. In her speech the Foreign Minister of Israel gave details of the measures taken by the United Arab Republic against Israeli cargoes, leading up to the detention in May 1959 of the Danish ship *Inge Toft*. M. Farid Zeineddine, Deputy Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, argued in reply that the passage of Israeli cargoes could only be considered as one aspect of the whole Palestine problem, and that Israeli aggression should not be rewarded by granting her the objectives which she sought.

### POLITICAL ITEMS—PLENARY SESSION

#### Tibet

65. On September 9 the Dalai Lama sent a message from New Delhi appealing to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Dalai Lama referred to the discussion on Tibet in the General Committee in November 1950 which had been adjourned in order to give the parties the opportunity to arrive at a peaceful settlement. He regretted to inform the Secretary-General that Chinese aggression against Tibet had been extended so that almost the whole country was occupied by Chinese forces. His appeals for a peaceful settlement had been completely ignored. He asked for the immediate intervention of the United Nations. He adduced arguments to show that Tibet was a sovereign State when she was invaded in 1950. He accused the Chinese forces of killing and dispossessing thousands of Tibetans, adopting inhuman measures of sterilisation, and attempting to destroy Tibetan religion and culture. He appealed for an immediate end to the wanton and ruthless murder of his people.

66. The Secretariat of the United Nations took the view that the Dalai Lama was not himself able to ask for the inscription of an item on the agenda of the General Assembly, but there was a general feeling among delegations that some way should be found for the Assembly to take cognisance of the events in Tibet and on September 29 the Delegations of Malaya and the Irish Republic requested the inscription of an item entitled "The Question of Tibet". In an explanatory memorandum attached to their request, the two Delegations said that *prima facie* evidence existed of an attempt to destroy the traditional way of life of the Tibetan people as well as of a systematic disregard for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Assembly had a duty to call for the restoration of the religious and civil liberties of the people of Tibet.

67. On October 9 the General Committee considered the request for inscription of the item and despite strong criticism from the Soviet Representative decided by 11 votes to 5 with 4 abstentions to recommend inscription. Before the vote Sir Pierson Dixon said that although a number

of legal problems were raised by the request, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom thought it right that the United Nations should be given an opportunity to take cognisance of what had happened in Tibet; he would therefore vote in favour of inscription. The General Assembly accepted the General Committee's recommendation on October 12 by 43 votes to 11 with 25 abstentions.

68. On the same day the Irish and Malayan Delegations tabled a draft resolution, which expressed grave concern that the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the Tibetans had been forcibly denied them and deplored the effect of these events in increasing international tension. It went on to affirm that respect for the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights<sup>(2)</sup> was essential for the evolution of a peaceful world order based on the rule of law, and called for respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life.

69. The debate opened in Plenary on October 20 with statements by the Representative of Malaya, Dato Nik Kamil, and the Irish Foreign Minister, Mr. Aiken. Dato Nik Kamil said that Malaya was concerned only with the violation of human rights and had no desire to arouse a political controversy which would prejudice the efforts being made to relax international tension. He reminded the Assembly that the People's Republic of China had subscribed to the Bandung Declaration of 1955 and declared its full support for the fundamental principles of human rights. Mr. Aiken said that his draft resolution represented the minimum assertion of international morality below which the Assembly could not fall. He rejected the legalistic idea that Tibet should be considered an internal Chinese question and said that it was the duty of the Assembly to speak out against a flagrant violation of human rights even if the Government involved was not represented in the Organisation. He appealed to China to open negotiations with the Dalai Lama for a peace settlement and to recognise the right of the Tibetans to control their own destiny.

70. On the same day Mr. Kuznetsov, speaking for the Soviet Union, said that the item was purely a cold war manoeuvre and was in any case a gross and inadmissible interference in China's internal affairs.

71. Mr. Lodge argued, on behalf of the United States, that the Assembly was competent to discuss Tibet, and should not be deterred from doing so. The destruction of the Tibetan way of life was not reform but a crime which the whole civilised world should condemn. Dr. Tsiang, the Chinese Nationalist Representative, supported the draft resolution but made it clear that to his Government the question of Tibet was a question of the rights of a minority nationality in a multi-national State.

72. On October 21 Sir Pierson Dixon for the United Kingdom suggested that the Assembly's opinion of the events in Tibet might better be expressed through a consensus of speeches than through a resolution resting on a juridical assumption about the status of Tibet which was itself a matter of differing opinion. Although the United Kingdom felt that the United Nations should take cognisance of what had happened in Tibet, Her Majesty's

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(<sup>2</sup>) "United Nations No. 2 (1949)", Cmd. 7662.

Government were reluctantly unable to support the draft resolution for purely legal reasons, based on their doubt as to the applicability of Article 2 (7) of the Charter. The United Kingdom Representative praised the moderate approach of the sponsors of the item and hoped that the opinions expressed in the Assembly would have some effect in restraining and modifying Chinese policy. Other delegations also expressed legal doubts about possible action by the United Nations.

73. Mr. Krishna Menon (India) said that the Government of India did not recognise any independent Government of Tibet. Although they had great sympathy with the Tibetan people and had given refuge to the Dalai Lama and thousands of other Tibetans, a debate on the Tibetan question in the Assembly would bring no relief to the Tibetan people and might indeed have the reverse effect. India would abstain on the draft resolution. He hoped that the Assembly would do nothing which would hinder the prospects of reconciliation and the eventual return of the Dalai Lama in dignity to Tibet.

74. The Irish and Malayan draft resolution was carried on October 21 by 45 votes to 9 (Soviet *bloc*) with 26 abstentions (Afghanistan, Belgium, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, South Africa, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, Yemen, Yugoslavia).

#### **Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency**

75. The Annual Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency for the year ending June 30, 1959, was considered in Plenary on November 3. After a short discussion, in which general satisfaction with the Agency's progress was expressed, the Assembly unanimously took note of the report.

#### **Interim Report of the Secretary-General—Evaluating the Second United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Relation to the Holding of Similar Conferences in the Future**

76. The Secretary-General reported that it was premature to present any firm conclusion about a third conference of the Geneva type. However, in a statement to the General Assembly, when his report was considered on November 17, the Secretary-General said that all the members of the Scientific Advisory Committee agreed on the desirability of holding a third conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy under United Nations sponsorship but in co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and interested Specialised Agencies. The Advisory Committee were of the view that the conference might conveniently be held in Geneva in 1962. A full report would be submitted to the Fifteenth Session. The Assembly took note of the Interim Report without debate.

#### **Progress Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation**

77. Pending completion of its second comprehensive report the Scientific Committee presented an interim report to the Fourteenth Session, seeking approval only for certain programmes of work and for the Committee's

recommendation that it be authorised to meet from time to time (and once in 1960) in Geneva, and in other places to which appropriate invitations were received.

78. During his speech in the General Debate, Mr. Green, the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, announced that his Delegation intended to submit a proposal which would encourage the world-wide collection of more accurate data on radiation and provide for its central collation. Mr. Green emphasised that, even if the nations agreed to stop testing nuclear weapons, the problem of radiation would not vanish.

79. On October 12, Czechoslovakia tabled a draft resolution which put particular emphasis on radio activity resulting from fall-out and requested the Scientific Committee—with more intensive information from interested organisations and all States—to give more attention to this, and, in particular, to the biological and genetic effects of Carbon 14. Czechoslovakia thus anticipated the Canadian draft, the submission of which was further delayed while efforts were made to reach agreement with Czechoslovakia on a single text. These having been unsuccessful, Canada and nine co-sponsors tabled a separate draft resolution on November 2. This proposed that the Scientific Committee should study in some detail, in conjunction with interested organisations, measures to increase the collection and analysis of samples and to provide more effective arrangements for studies of the effects of radiation in general. Member States and the I.A.E.A. were invited to inform the Scientific Committee, which was to correlate the offers, how far they could receive and analyse samples.

80. There was widespread regret, especially among delegations of members of the Scientific Committee, that there was a risk of injecting political controversy into the work of this Committee. It was also felt that it was inappropriate for a political body to direct the detailed work of a Scientific Committee, with the risk that its programme of work would be disturbed and, perhaps, thrown out of balance by undue concentration on aspects of radiation which might be of diminishing significance. The resumption of negotiations between Canada, Czechoslovakia and others, and the resulting decision that the sponsors of the initial two resolutions should together present an alternative draft, was therefore welcomed. The combined draft resolution which was subsequently tabled approved the plans (including the arrangements for meetings) of the Scientific Committee set out in its progress report; requested the Scientific Committee, in consultation with the appropriate international organisations, to consider how to stimulate the flow of information and data which it had requested and how to encourage genetic, biological and other studies (including those concerning Carbon 14) of the effects of radiation on human health; invited Member States to inform each other how far they could undertake to receive and analyse samples in accordance with the Committee's programme; and requested the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Health Organisation to inform the Committee what help they could give. Finally the resolution supported the Committee's requests for information and asked the Scientific Committee to report to the Fifteenth Session.

81. This resolution was introduced in Plenary on November 17 by Mr. Green. During the debate, some speakers stressed that the Scientific Committee retained full discretion for its programme of work; the Representatives of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union held that the resolution should not be construed as expanding the Committee's functions. Importance was attached to the co-ordination of the activities of the Committee with those of other interested bodies. Three speakers offered facilities in national laboratories for the analysis of samples. Representatives of both the United States and the United Kingdom suggested that an interim report to the Fifteenth Session would be enough if preparation of a full report would interfere with the Committee's present programme. The resolution was adopted by 78 votes with no opposition or abstentions.

### **Charter Review**

82. During recent years there has been growing interest, particularly in the United Kingdom and the United States, in the possibilities of revising the Charter of the United Nations. (There were debates on this question in the House of Lords on July 22, 1959, and in the United States Senate on June 23, 1959.)

83. Article 109 of the Charter lays down certain procedures for the calling of a conference to review the Charter. At its Tenth Session in 1955 the General Assembly appointed a Committee consisting of all Members of the United Nations to consider, in consultation with the Secretary-General, the question of fixing a time and place for such a conference and its organisation and procedures. This Committee (which is commonly known as the Committee on Arrangements) met in June 1957 but came to the conclusion that it was not yet profitable to fix a date for a Charter Review Conference. The Committee was continued in being by the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly and asked to report again not later than at the Fourteenth Session.

84. Any amendment to the Charter requires the ratification of all five permanent members of the Security Council. All suggestions for revising the Charter have however hitherto met with an insuperable obstacle in the form of the opposition of the Soviet Union.

85. The Committee on Arrangements met on September 2, 1959, to prepare its report for the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly. Sir Pierson Dixon, speaking early in the debate for the United Kingdom, said that in the conditions of 1945 it would not have been possible to go further than had been done in subordinating national sovereignty to an international organisation. The political, economic and scientific changes of the last fourteen years had however affected the general attitude towards national sovereignty and interdependence. If we were all perfectly rational beings we might now be working towards a form of world government. But, as the Secretary-General had pointed out, deep loyalties still existed which made this course impracticable for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless the time was near when serious thought should be given to developing and strengthening the United Nations so that it could more efficiently perform its prime task of maintaining peace with justice. He mentioned in particular the setting up of a United Nations Force, the strengthening of the International



Court of Justice, and the expansion of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. These ideas should be carefully examined. It might be decided not to fix a date for a Charter Review Conference at once; but the Committee should hold itself ready to do so should the favourable trend in international relations make this profitable in the near future. (The full text of Sir Pierson Dixon's speech is given in Annex VI.)

86. The Representative of the Soviet Union opposed a Charter Review Conference on the grounds that the existing Charter was adequate if it was properly observed and that any amendment was inadmissible so long as the People's Republic of China was excluded. Mr. Lodge said that the United States would favour a Charter Review Conference when a majority of members decided that the circumstances were auspicious. The Representatives of India, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia spoke against attempting to fix a date for a conference. Only Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon) favoured this course.

87. On September 3 the Committee on Arrangements decided by 71 votes to none with 9 abstentions (Soviet *bloc*) to recommend to the General Assembly that it should keep the Committee in being and request it to report with recommendations not later than at the Sixteenth Session (in 1961). The Committee thus reached a tacit agreement that the time had not yet come to propose a date for a Charter Review Conference.

88. The recommendation of the Committee on Arrangements was accepted by the General Assembly in plenary without debate on November 20. The vote was 72 for, and none against with 9 abstentions (Soviet *bloc*).

89. The Assembly discussed separately the question of expanding the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the International Court of Justice (see paragraphs 166–171 below).

#### **United Nations Emergency Force: Progress Report on the Force**

90. The Secretary-General's Progress Report, which attributed the recent quiet on the Gaza Strip and at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba largely to the restraining influence of the Force, came before Plenary on November 21. After an exchange in which the Representative of the Soviet Union attacked the United Nations Emergency Force and Mr. Lodge (United States) defended it, the Assembly took note of the report by 66 votes in favour to 9 against, with 6 abstentions.

91. On December 5, the Assembly adopted a Norwegian draft resolution which, noting the intention of Lieutenant-General E. L. M. Burns (Canada) to relinquish his post as Commander of United Nations Emergency Force, expressed its appreciation of his excellent leadership and approved the appointment as his successor of Major-General P. S. Gyani (India), on the existing terms and with effect from the date when General Burns relinquished command.

#### **Hungary**

92. At its Thirteenth Session, on December 12, 1958, the General Assembly passed a resolution on Hungary in which it denounced the execution of Mr. Nagy, General Maleter and others, condemned the continued

defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly, and appointed Sir Leslie Munro "to represent the United Nations for the purpose of reporting to member States or to the General Assembly on significant developments relating to the implementation of the Assembly resolutions on Hungary". Sir Leslie Munro, who formerly represented New Zealand at the United Nations, had been President of the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly.

93. In the spring of 1959 Sir Leslie Munro informed the Hungarian Mission to the United Nations of his desire to visit Hungary. He also sought through the Soviet Mission the good offices of the Soviet Government in support of his approach to the Hungarian authorities. Both these approaches met with rebuffs. On July 9 he issued a statement which gave an account of his endeavours and undertook to report fully to the Fourteenth Session.

94. On November 16, Sir Leslie Munro addressed to the President of the General Assembly a letter requesting the inscription on the agenda, as an important and urgent matter, of an item entitled "The Question of Hungary". The Assembly's Rules of Procedure provide in certain circumstances for subsidiary organs of the Assembly to request inscription of items. Sir Leslie Munro considered (rightly, in the view of the United Kingdom Delegation) that he was entitled to avail himself of this procedure. The technical validity of Sir Leslie Munro's request was questioned by some delegations but Mr. Lodge put the matter beyond doubt on November 20 by himself requesting inscription of the same item on behalf of the United States.

95. On November 23 the General Committee decided by 15 votes to 3 (Soviet *bloc*) with 2 abstentions (Indonesia and Morocco) to recommend inscription. The General Committee's recommendation was accepted in Plenary on November 25 by 51 votes to 10 (Soviet *bloc* and Yugoslavia) with 15 abstentions.

96. On November 27 Sir Leslie Munro issued his report. He described the fruitless efforts which he had made to visit Hungary, in his view an indispensable first step in his mission. No evidence had been forthcoming in the past year of any basic change which would justify the United Nations in relaxing its attention to the Hungarian question. In this context he thought that all members of the United Nations would regard the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary as a contribution to normalising the situation. There was cumulative evidence that trials of those involved in the events of 1956 had continued. There were reports of a trial in Ujpest which had resulted in executions carried out on or about August 13. Another major trial of young people appeared to have been held in February or March. There had been disturbing reports, which Mr. Kadar had denied, of the imminent possibility of further executions. It was for the Hungarian authorities to allow the true facts to be verified by assenting to a visit to Hungary by the United Nations Representative. The report concluded that no response had been forthcoming from the Hungarian Government to the action taken by the United Nations such as might reasonably be expected of a member of the Organisation concerned to promote its purposes and principles.

97. On December 5 a draft resolution was tabled by Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, France, Haiti, Honduras, Irish Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay. It deplored the continued disregard of the Assembly's resolutions by the Soviet Union and Hungary, called upon the two Governments to co-operate with Sir Leslie Munro, and requested him to continue his efforts.

98. The debate began in Plenary on December 8, when Sir Leslie Munro introduced his report. He said that Mr. Khrushchev in his speech in Budapest on December 3 (in which he had criticised the Rakosi régime) had gone a long way towards accepting the version of the events of 1956 which the United Nations had adopted long ago. Mr. Khrushchev had cited Nicholas I's intervention in Hungary in 1849: Sir Leslie quoted Lord Palmerston's strictures on that action. He also referred to Mr. Kadar's recent statement that Soviet troops would remain in Hungary.

99. Mr. Lodge, for the United States, said that "the spirit of Camp David" could not be used as an excuse to ignore or condone the events in Hungary, nor could the blame be shifted on to Rakosi. It was clear that many segments of the Hungarian population were opposed to the present régime and that foreign troops were needed to bolster its authority. Mr. Janos Peter (Hungary) claimed that the events in Hungary had been the outcome of subversive action by the United States aimed at overthrowing the Hungarian Government. The United Nations was debarred by the Charter from discussing the internal affairs of Hungary. He criticised the flimsy basis of Sir Leslie Munro's report and the call for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, who were in Hungary, as they had been before 1956, for the defensive purposes of the Warsaw Pact.

100. On December 8 Sir Pierson Dixon for the United Kingdom praised the way in which Sir Leslie Munro had carried out his mandate, and hoped that he would continue as United Nations Special Representative. He said it was an anachronism, at a time of improving international relationships, for the Hungarian Government to refuse to the representative of the United Nations even a minimum of information and facilities. The Assembly would welcome any significant sign that the Soviet Union and Hungary were willing to apply the doctrine of peaceful coexistence to the resolutions of the United Nations on Hungary. The United Kingdom shared Sir Leslie Munro's belief that trials and executions connected with the events of 1956 were continuing. Sir Pierson Dixon discounted the argument that Soviet troops remained in Hungary for international reasons. The draft resolution which the United Kingdom had joined in sponsoring had been carefully composed to avoid any extreme or inopportune language. In adopting it the General Assembly would not be endorsing a provocative move in the cold war, but would be acting in harmony with its past decisions and the deep feelings which the Hungarian tragedy had aroused. Mr. Nesbitt (Canada) suggested that the International Red Cross might be allowed to make an independent inquiry into events in Hungary.

101. After further debate, during which Mr. Kuznetsov (Soviet Union) deployed some of the arguments used earlier by Mr. Peter, the draft resolution

was carried on December 9 by 53 votes to 10 (Soviet *bloc* and Yugoslavia) with 17 abstentions. (Afghanistan, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, India, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Republic, Yemen.)

102. The debate and the vote showed that a large majority of the Assembly thought it right that the Assembly should in unprovocative language continue to express its concern over the situation in Hungary; and also that since that situation stemmed directly from the armed Soviet intervention of 1956 it could not properly be regarded as falling exclusively within the Hungarian Government's domestic jurisdiction. The vote on the resolution showed little change from the equivalent vote at the Thirteenth Session.

## **POLITICAL ITEMS—THE FIRST COMMITTEE**

### **Disarmament**

103. Discussion of disarmament took a new turn at the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly. As in previous sessions, there was great interest in ways of minimising the threat of nuclear warfare and the risk of increasing radio-active fall-out by the resumption of nuclear weapons tests. But the agreement reached during the summer of 1959 between the Foreign Ministers of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States to establish a Ten-member Disarmament Committee (consisting of themselves, Canada, Italy, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Roumania) outside the United Nations encouraged consideration of disarmament in a broader context; the presentation of comprehensive disarmament plans by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the General Debate and by Mr. Khrushchev in his address to the Assembly also contributed a positive element to the Assembly's discussions.

### **United Nations Disarmament Commission**

104. The United Nations Disarmament Commission had been expanded at the Thirteenth Session to include, for 1959, all members of the United Nations. Partly because it was generally recognised that this number was unwieldy and partly because the Geneva talks on the suspension of nuclear tests had continued throughout the year, the Commission did not meet until September 10, when it elected Señor Padilla Nervo of Mexico as its Chairman. The representatives of the four Governments which had agreed on the establishment of the 10-member Disarmament Committee had, on September 7, transmitted the resulting communiqué to the Secretary-General and requested him to convene the United Nations Disarmament Commission. They confirmed their view that ultimate responsibility for general disarmament measures rests with the United Nations and emphasised that the new Committee, although outside that organisation (being based on parity of membership between the members of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and therefore not reflecting the composition of the United Nations) in no way diminished or encroached upon this responsibility. Rather, it took into account the special responsibility of the Great Powers and offered a means of seeking agreement and recommendations on the limitation and reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces

under effective international control. They undertook to present reports on the Committee's work to the United Nations Disarmament Commission in order that it and the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council should be appropriately informed of the progress made.

105. Some disquiet was expressed in the Disarmament Commission that consideration of problems affecting all members was being removed from the United Nations. However, there was general relief that discussion of disarmament was, after two years, being resumed in an effective way and recognition that agreement between the Governments represented in the Committee was a pre-requisite to progress in disarmament. The Commission therefore adopted unanimously a resolution welcoming the resumption of talks and the intention of the participants to keep the Commission informed, expressing the hope that the Committee's work would provide a useful basis for consideration of disarmament in the United Nations and requesting the Secretary-General to provide appropriate facilities to the Committee. It also recommended that the Disarmament Commission should be continued in being, including all members of the United Nations, and convened whenever necessary.

### **Discussion in the Assembly**

106. When the Fourteenth Assembly opened, there were four items concerning disarmament on the agenda, one of which was the Report of the Disarmament Commission. The others dealt more specifically with nuclear weapons: the Irish Delegation, reviving an item first presented in 1958, proposed "The Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons"; the Indian Delegation proposed "The Suspension of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Tests"; and the Moroccan Delegation proposed "The Question of French Nuclear Tests in the Sahara". After Mr. Khrushchev outlined his disarmament proposals to the General Assembly on September 18, the Soviet Delegation asked for the inscription of an additional item, "General and Complete Disarmament". Since these five items were all logically connected, some representatives thought that they should be taken together. But the view that each should be inscribed separately prevailed and they were all assigned to the First Committee. The debate there lasted from October 9 to November 20, two-thirds of the time available to the Committee.

### **General and Complete Disarmament**

107. Mr. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, spoke first, closely following the proposals on general and complete disarmament made by Mr. Khrushchev (see paragraph 28 above) and set out in a declaration of the Soviet Government circulated to the Committee. In the course of a brief review of past Soviet policy, Mr. Kuznetsov said that the Soviet Union had decided not to resume nuclear weapons tests so long as the Western Powers did not do so. He then outlined the Soviet three-stage plan for total disarmament to be carried out in four years:—

*First Stage*: The reduction, under appropriate control, of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the United States and People's Republic of China to 1·7 million men each, and of those of the United Kingdom and France to 650,000 each; the reduction of the armed forces of other

States to levels agreed either by the General Assembly or by a special world conference; the reduction of armaments to corresponding levels.

*Second Stage* : The complete disbandment of armed forces of all States; the elimination of military bases in foreign States.

*Third Stage* : The destruction of all types of nuclear weapons and missiles, of air force equipment and of stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological weapons; the prohibition of production and possession of chemical and bacteriological weapons and of scientific research for military purposes; the abolition of war ministries, general staffs, military and para-military training and service; the termination of military appropriations and the transfer of such funds to economic purposes, including aid to under-developed countries.

108. In reply to doubts expressed about the provision for control in Mr. Khrushchev's proposals, Mr. Kuznetsov emphasised that adequate allowance had been made, although control was not an end in itself but inseparable from disarmament: "What is needed is not control without disarmament, but control over disarmament". An international control organ composed of all States should be set up to supervise disarmament and should have powers to correspond to the particular stage reached. When disarmament was complete, the controllers would remain in the country to ensure compliance with the agreement and might institute a system of aerial observation and photography for that purpose. However, the details of control should be left until agreement was reached on the principle of general and complete disarmament.

109. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, first welcomed the apparent general readiness again to consider the comprehensive approach to disarmament which had consistently been the aim of the United Kingdom. The philosophy of the United Kingdom approach to disarmament began with the premise that any generally acceptable disarmament plan must not give any country a significant military advantage; from this we had concluded that measures of conventional and nuclear disarmament must proceed together. Disequilibrium could result in war. If there was to be disarmament, there must first be confidence that equal security was provided against all forms of war and this could be provided only by effective supervision at each stage. He hoped that Mr. Kuznetsov's references to controls implied recognition of the need from the very beginning to watch the implementation of disarmament measures; it was for this, and not for military intelligence, that the West wanted controls.

110. The three-stage plan<sup>(3)</sup> outlined by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Selwyn Lolyd, was before the Committee as a document (see relevant passage of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's speech at Annex I). The United Kingdom approach was pragmatic. The first stage provided for expert discussions which would help to measure the various problems involved and also provide for limitation of conventional forces. At the second stage, there would be reductions of military manpower and conventional armaments at the same time as measures to curb the further manufacture of nuclear weapons; these steps would depend on agreement on an International Control Organ to supervise disarmament. If these stages were completed, there

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<sup>(3)</sup> See "Miscellaneous No. 3 (1960)", Cmnd. 981.

would be a basis of confidence for the more radical measures of the third stage. Mr. Ormsby-Gore commented that we envisaged an international police force as a sanction against a violator of an international treaty on comprehensive disarmament and appeared to differ from the Soviet Union in this. But there were points at which our positions now appeared closer together; for example, the Soviet plan no longer required an immediate ban on nuclear weapons before any reductions in conventional forces. Both the Soviet and our own proposals should be examined in detail by the expert Ten-Power Disarmament Committee, which would report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

111. Finally, Mr. Ormsby-Gore drew attention to certain lessons learned from the Nuclear Tests Conference, notably on the value of patience in negotiation. Although both sides had made real concessions, there remained differences, especially on the largely technical question of what constituted reliable control. Mr. Ormsby-Gore believed that agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests could be reached. If it was, we hoped that others would adhere to it. This would do much to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons. (The full text of Mr. Ormsby-Gore's speech is given in Annex II.)

112. Most other speakers welcomed the hopeful new approach to disarmament negotiations and the British and Soviet initiatives in presenting specific proposals to the United Nations. There was general support for the aim of complete, or comprehensive, disarmament. Some representatives expressed a preference for one plan or the other (a number thought Soviet ideas of timing over-optimistic) but in general it was agreed that both were interesting and should be given detailed expert consideration by the Ten-Power Disarmament Committee. The representatives of certain smaller nations would have liked this Committee to be expanded as their countries, too, were interested in disarmament; some suggested that a representative of the United Nations should attend its meetings. A number of speakers supported the idea of a United Nations force. The prospect of economic and social benefits to under-developed countries if resources were released by disarmament was a recurring theme in the debate.

113. Mr. Cabot Lodge (United States) dwelt mainly on the Nuclear Tests Conference, mentioning the possibility of a step-by-step approach if complete agreement proved impossible. He suggested that the United Nations Disarmament Commission might consider what type of international police force should be established, under what principles of law, and precisely what internal security forces would be required if armaments were abolished. The distinctive contribution of M. Jules Moch (France) was to suggest that high priority in any disarmament programme should be given to measures prohibiting, first, the development, then the manufacture of all means for the delivery of nuclear devices: satellites, rockets, supersonic or long-range aircraft, ocean-going submarines, aircraft carriers and launching pads.

114. While the debate was in progress, agreement was reached on the text of a draft resolution which was sponsored on October 28 by all 82 members of the Committee. The preamble referred to the aim of ending war and the armaments race and of promoting trust and co-operation between nations and expressed the view that any progress towards complete and general disarmament under effective international control would contribute to the achievement of these aims. Considering that general and complete

disarmament was the most important problem before the world, the resolution called on all Governments to make every effort to solve it, transmitted the proposals on disarmament of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and Mr. Khrushchev, together with any other proposals and the relevant records of debate, to the Disarmament Commission, and, through the Secretary-General, to the Ten-Power Disarmament Committee, and expressed the hope that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control would be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time. This resolution was adopted unanimously by the First Committee on November 2 and by the General Assembly on November 20.

#### **Question of French Nuclear Tests in the Sahara**

115. The debate on this item aroused stronger feelings than any other before the First Committee at the Fourteenth Session.

116. The African Delegations pressed to have this item dealt with apart from the other nuclear items on the agenda and, because they considered it a matter of great urgency, early in the Committee's work. The debate was opened on November 4 by M. Benhima, for Morocco. He described the inscription of this item on the Assembly's agenda as "an act of last resort" after direct representations to France had failed. The three Powers which had already tested nuclear weapons had done so on their own territories; the region of Reggane, where the French testing site was placed, was in a contested area. He did not object to France's efforts to strengthen its international position nor question France's right to develop atomic weapons, but the African peoples unanimously asked France to forgo the explosion of its bomb in Africa; the very fact that the explosion would be in Africa would identify France as the nation which introduced the destructive atom to that continent. M. Benhima argued that the French site was not desert and that the population would either be endangered or have to be displaced. Conditions in the Sahara increased the danger from radio-active dust; strontium 90 in particular would be harmful both to the people and to their means of subsistence. Talk of precautions sidestepped the moral issue and France, in pursuit of prestige, was giving no consideration to the alarm of the peoples of Africa.

117. M. Jules Moch, for France, first stated that he would not discuss the question of territorial jurisdiction, which was not on the agenda or within the competence of the General Assembly; this point was later the subject of sharp exchanges with other representatives. In the absence of a generally applicable decision for nuclear disarmament, France was determined not to accept discrimination. France would forgo all military tests the day the first three nuclear Powers renounced their weapons; with them, she would halt, under international control, the production of fissionable materials for weapons, begin the reconversion of stockpiles and eliminate vehicles for delivering these explosives. Meanwhile, he would demonstrate that France was not creating risks and, that being so, the question whether France should, or should not, equip itself with nuclear weapons was one for the French people alone.

118. M. Moch then proceeded to make his scientific case. Since 1945, some 207 nuclear tests by the United States, the United Kingdom and the



Soviet Union had released energy equivalent to that of 91 million tons of T.N.T.; to this, the French experiment would add the equivalent of less than 100,000 tons. The combination of natural and artificial radiation to which man was exposed averaged about 150 units a year (but rose to 3,000 in certain places); past nuclear explosions had added 2 units to this; French tests would add two-thousandths of a unit. The annual dose commonly held to be harmless even for embryos was about 500 units and for adults about 5,000 units. The creation of strontium 90, to which M. Benhima referred, depended on the power of the explosion and would accordingly be negligible in French tests. The Sahara site had been chosen because, contrary to M. Benhima's information, conditions there were the most favourable to safety. M. Moch compared this site in detail with those in the United States and the Soviet Union where atomic tests had taken place analogous to, and sometimes more powerful than, what was proposed by the French; only one oasis was anything like as near to the Sahara site as large cities were to the American and Soviet test sites, and the populations of these cities had never been evacuated. The French authorities would ensure that no one was in the area of significant fall-out. There was no wind towards the South, West or North capable of carrying anything a thousand miles from the Sahara site; a light wind on the day of the explosion would carry radio-active particles to the East, where they would fall within a completely deserted area. The emotional fears which, as M. Moch recognised, were widespread could be set at rest if these facts were explained.

119. On November 5 the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, intervened in the debate to deal with the technical aspects of the effect of a French test on the Sahara and surrounding countries; if there were dangers, it was a matter of concern to the United Kingdom, which had responsibilities for territories in Africa. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had taken every step to satisfy themselves that the precautions to be taken by France would ensure the safety of all concerned. Pointing out that the French test was of an atomic, not a hydrogen, bomb, Mr. Ormsby-Gore told the Committee of the experience of the United Kingdom in conducting comparable tests. In view of the real anxiety on the subject, he believed it incumbent on the United Kingdom to make available to the Committee this information, which showed that a French atomic test of a magnitude comparable with that of our own early tests and conducted in the Sahara would not endanger the health and safety of the peoples of Africa, still less of those living further away. (The full text of Mr. Ormsby-Gore's speech is given in Annex III.) Mr. Cabot Lodge (United States), later in the debate, assured the Committee that tests in Nevada had involved no risk to the nearby population and suggested that this experience was relevant in evaluating the hazards to health from French tests.

120. A number of representatives, notably from Africa and Asia, supported with varying emphasis many of the arguments presented by M. Benhima. There was a tendency to dispute the accuracy of M. Moch's scientific data. There was alarm among a wide range of delegations at any increase in radiation, however small. Speakers for, or claiming to speak for, West African countries were concerned particularly about the risk that

radio-active material would be carried by the wind. The question of sovereignty was raised and one or two speakers related the proposed test to the Algerian question. A number of speakers placed the projected French test against the background of the Geneva negotiations on the suspension of nuclear tests, some questioning whether France would accede to an agreement, others fearing that these talks might be jeopardised and, perhaps, the existing moratorium on tests brought to an end. It was, however, noteworthy that the Representative of the Soviet Union did not say that a French test would release the Soviet Government from their undertaking not to test unless "the Western Powers resume their nuclear tests".

121. Late on the first day of debate a draft resolution was tabled which was eventually sponsored by 22 African and Asian Delegations. The preamble to this resolution referred to world-wide concern over the prospect of further nuclear tests, asserting that they entailed grave danger to the population, and noted in particular the French intention—despite direct representations—to undertake nuclear tests in the Sahara, the anxiety this caused and the "special responsibility" of the United Nations for the safety of the dependent peoples of Africa. The resolution expressed grave concern about the intended French nuclear tests in the Sahara and urged France to refrain from them.

122. There was a substantial body of opinion in the United Nations which regarded the language of this resolution as exaggerated and objected particularly to singling out French nuclear tests when no protest had been made about earlier tests by other countries. This was reflected in amendments to the 22-Power draft resolution which were sponsored by five (later reduced to three) Latin American Delegations. These amounted to a new resolution which, after referring to the risks which could be involved in further tests, concentrated on the Geneva negotiations to suspend nuclear weapons tests and considered it desirable that no State should initiate or renew such tests. The operative paragraph simply expressed the hope that the French Government would reconsider their decision, taking into account the views expressed in this debate.

123. Meanwhile, on November 10, Mr. Ormsby-Gore introduced a draft resolution in the names of the United Kingdom and Italy (later joined by Peru). Mr. Ormsby-Gore expressed full awareness of the anxiety felt in Nigeria and in other countries; he and M. Moch had presented information which, he thought, would do much to reassure those concerned. He emphasised that the desire of the United Kingdom to bring about a satisfactory agreement for the effectively controlled cessation of all nuclear weapons tests had never wavered. But the prize we sought was the cessation of all tests, not of just one low-yield test series. Accordingly, the draft resolution tabled by the United Kingdom, Italy and Peru, after noting both African anxieties and French reassurances as to the hazards to health involved in nuclear tests in the Sahara, expressed the hope that France would associate herself at the earliest appropriate time with the arrangements which might be worked out for suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control and requested France to take full account of the views expressed in this debate. (The full text of Mr. Ormsby-Gore's speech is at Annex IV.)

124. Before the Committee came to the vote, on November 12, Ghana and Indonesia put forward sub-amendments to the Latin American amendments which had the effect of combining the references to the Geneva negotiations in the latter with the original Afro-Asian draft resolution, only slightly modified. The operative paragraphs reverted to their initial form, except that France was requested, instead of urged, to refrain from testing. Under the Committee's rules of procedure, these sub-amendments were voted on first and were adopted. The Latin American amendments were not put to the vote, and the resolution as amended by the Ghana-Indonesia proposals was then adopted by a simple majority, receiving 46 votes (including those of Austria, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway and the Soviet *bloc*) to 26 votes against (including 15 Latin Americans, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States), with 10 abstentions. The United Kingdom-Italy-Peru draft was then defeated, receiving 24 votes (including Australia, Canada, South Africa, the West Europeans except France, 15 Latin Americans, United Kingdom and United States) to 38 against, with 20 abstentions.

125. The resolution as adopted by the First Committee was voted upon in Plenary on November 20, after a debate which sometimes became heated but which introduced no new arguments. Among the speakers who explained their vote, Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that the resolution was in some ways inaccurate and misleading (the experience of the United Kingdom did not bear out the existence of risks) and was misconceived in trying, for the first time, to stop only one particular test. Two preambular paragraphs—one to the effect that France could not assume responsibility for protecting threatened States and the other attributing to the United Nations special responsibility for dependent peoples—failed to get the necessary two-thirds vote. There was, however, a general swing in the Latin American vote, largely as a result of which the resolution as a whole was adopted by 51 votes in favour to 16 against (Belgium, Brazil, Dominican Republic, France, Honduras, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States), with 15 abstentions (Argentina, Australia, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Laos, Paraguay, Thailand, Turkey and Uruguay).

### **Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons**

126. Mr. Aiken (Ireland) introduced a draft resolution on November 13 which the Committee considered at three meetings. After recognising a danger that the number of States possessing nuclear weapons would increase, the resolution called on the Ten-Power Disarmament Committee to consider this problem. It suggested that the Committee should consider appropriate means to avert this danger and examine the feasibility of reaching an international agreement, subject to inspection and control, under which Powers possessing nuclear weapons would not hand over control of them to those who did not possess them and these last would refrain from manufacturing them. The results of the Ten-Power Committee's discussions should be reported to the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

127. Mr. Aiken explained his purpose as being the prevention of any further deterioration in the armament situation; he had withdrawn a similar

resolution last year in the hope, which had not been realised, that the Disarmament Commission would discuss the problem. The language of the resolution was intended to cover all Powers producing nuclear weapons at the time when the suggested agreements were ready for signature; the longer the delay, the greater the danger of an increase in their number and, accordingly, the greater the possibility of incidents. The difficulties of control could be met if the non-nuclear States agreed not to produce or acquire the weapons and agreed also to inspection of their territory and reactors. Mr. Aiken was concerned with a limited but important aspect of the disarmament problem which could not wait for agreement on complete disarmament.

128. Representatives of the Soviet *bloc* spoke critically of the Irish resolution, which ignored the existence of foreign bases and the need to prohibit all nuclear weapons and gave no consideration to proposals for atom-free zones. M. Moch (France) said he would abstain because he opposed a "crystallisation of the nuclear monopoly" and doubted whether the problems of control raised by the Irish proposals could be solved.

129. The Committee adopted the draft resolution on November 16 by 66 votes in favour, none against and 13 abstentions (Soviet *bloc*, China, France, Peru and Spain). It was then adopted in Plenary on November 20 by 68 votes to none with 12 abstentions (as above, excluding Spain, who voted in favour).

### **Suspension of Nuclear and Thermo-nuclear Tests**

130. The First Committee began its consideration of this item on November 18, with two draft resolutions already tabled. The first of these was sponsored by Austria, Japan and Sweden. It noted that the Geneva talks on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests were continuing and expressed appreciation of the efforts being made to reach agreement and the hope that these would be intensified. It urged the States concerned in these negotiations to continue their present voluntary discontinuance of tests and requested them to report the results of their negotiations to the General Assembly. The second draft resolution was sponsored by India and 23 other nations (mostly from Africa and Asia). It made the same points as the Three-Power draft resolution but added, in the preamble, a reference to the "increasing hazards resulting from tests of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons" and "the profound concern evinced by the peoples of all countries" with regard to tests. It also appealed "to other States to desist from such tests".

131. Mr. Jha (India) opened the debate by describing the cessation of nuclear weapons tests as an essential first step towards disarmament. He hoped that agreement would be reached in Geneva; the 24-Power resolution was intended to help in these negotiations. There was real fear of the radio-activity present in fall-out; while the precise effects were not fully known, the possibility of danger could not be ignored and no nation had "the right to cause genetic or other damage to the human species". In the brief debate, other speakers, recognising that much of the ground had been covered under earlier agenda items, generally echoed Mr. Jha's hopes for the Geneva talks and, in most cases, his concern about the risks involved

in any further testing. Mr. Kuznetsov gave the Soviet view of the negotiations at Geneva, which led Mr. Lodge and Mr. Ormsby-Gore to intervene to give their account of these negotiations, for example, on the question of the staffing of control posts. M. Jules Moch pointed out that the most important thing was to ban nuclear weapons and considered that the hazards of radiation had been over-estimated; he objected to the 24-Power resolution because it was over-dramatic and because, without mentioning her specifically, it contained what was in effect an appeal to France not to test her weapons. Several speakers were anxious lest French tests should damage the prospects of agreement at Geneva.

132. As negotiations behind the scenes failed to produce a single agreed resolution, the sponsors wished both drafts to be voted on and, since the broad objective was the same, thought it compatible to vote in favour of both. The Three-Power resolution was adopted on November 19 by 76 votes in favour to none against, with 2 abstentions (Afghanistan and France). The 24-Power resolution was also adopted, although with more abstentions (either because its language was felt to be exaggerated, because of its special application to France, or because the first resolution was considered more helpful in the Geneva context); the vote was 60 in favour, one against (France) and 17 abstentions (including Belgium, Brazil, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, Thailand, Turkey, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States). The vote in Plenary on November 21, when both resolutions were adopted, was 78 for and none against with two abstentions on the Three-Power draft and 60 for and one against with 20 abstentions on the 24-Power draft.

#### **Report of the Disarmament Commission**

133. The "Report of the Disarmament Commission" was inscribed on the Assembly's agenda at the request of the Secretary-General. The report took the form of a letter from the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission to the Secretary-General, transmitting the resolution adopted by the Commission on September 10 (see paragraph 105 above).

134. On November 19, the day before the First Committee reached this item, India and Yugoslavia tabled a resolution which noted with approval the report of the Disarmament Commission, decided that the Commission should continue to include all Member States, transmitted to the Commission the records of the debates on disarmament at the Fourteenth Session and requested the Secretary-General to provide such facilities as might be required by the Commission and the 10-nation Disarmament Committee.

135. After a very brief discussion, during which it was suggested that the Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission might be invited to attend the opening meeting of the 10-Power Disarmament Committee, the resolution was adopted unanimously on November 20 by the First Committee and on November 21 by Plenary.

#### **Korea**

136. The General Assembly at its Thirteenth Session, on November 14, 1958, passed a resolution which called upon the Communist authorities concerned to accept the established United Nations objectives of a unified,

independent and democratic Korea and in particular to agree at an early date on the holding of genuinely free elections in accordance with the principles endorsed by the Assembly. In replying, on December 4, 1958, to a Chinese Note of November 10 on Korea, Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Peking, acting on behalf of the 16 Governments which had contributed forces to the United Nations Command in Korea, transmitted the text of this resolution to the Chinese Government. On March 4, 1959, the Chinese Government sent a reply on familiar lines.

137. In its resolution of November 14, 1958, the General Assembly decided to debate the Korean question again at its Fourteenth Session. The debate opened in the First Committee on November 23, 1959. As in past years the Committee decided on the motion of the United States to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea to take part in the debate without vote and rejected a proposal by the Soviet Union that it should also invite a representative from North Korea. Mr. Walter Robertson opened the main debate for the United States. After tracing the history of the Korean problem, and appealing to the Communist side to account for those members of the United Nations Command who were still missing, Mr. Robertson declared that the Communists had at present no desire to settle the Korean problem on any terms short of surrender by the United Nations. The withdrawal of United Nations troops would leave Korea exposed to a renewal of Communist aggression. The United Nations could not accept the Communist contention that it had lost its competence in the Korean question. If the Communists genuinely wanted impartial neutral supervision of elections in Korea as they said, such impartiality could easily be found among the 82 members of the United Nations. Those who had upheld justice must not grow weary of the struggle. The long-range prospects of the Republic of Korea were good, provided that the supporters of justice kept faith with their principles.

138. On the following day a draft resolution was circulated, sponsored by Australia, Belgium, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. The draft resolution, after regretting that the Communist authorities continued to deny the competence of the United Nations to deal with the Korean question, noted that the greater part of the United Nations forces had withdrawn from Korea and that the remainder would be withdrawn when the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the General Assembly had been fulfilled. It reaffirmed the objectives of the United Nations and called upon the Communist authorities to accept them and to agree at an early date on the holding of genuinely free elections in accordance with the principles endorsed by the General Assembly.

139. Sir Pierson Dixon spoke in support of the draft resolution on November 24. He said that the diplomatic correspondence between the Governments of China and the United Kingdom showed that the Communist side had not varied its fundamental attitude. When the time came to discuss procedures the Communist side would find the United Nations willing to be flexible about details, but on the question of principle the Organisation must stand firm. The Assembly was the custodian of the right of the Korean people to a real and enduring peace and could not sacrifice that right because they were tired of repetitive debates or seemingly fruitless negotiations.

140. Mr. Tugarinov, speaking for the Soviet Union, criticised the maintenance of United Nations forces in Korea, the refusal of the United States to recognise the existence of North Korea, the dependence of South Korea on United States aid, and alleged violations of human rights in South Korea. His criticisms were echoed by other Communist speakers.

141. Mr. Plimsoll of Australia made a notable speech in defence of the United Nations position in Korea. Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon) argued that new methods of conciliation and negotiation between the two Korean authorities should now be attempted, and that the forces of the Republic of Korea were adequate to defend that country without support from the United Nations.

142. After further debate the First Committee adopted the draft resolution on November 27 by 49 votes to 9 with 19 abstentions. The resolution was carried in Plenary on December 9 by 54 votes to 9 (Soviet *bloc*) with 17 abstentions. (Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia.) This was exactly the same vote which a similar resolution received at the Thirteenth Session.

### Algeria

143. At the Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly, a resolution sponsored by a number of Asian and African States, which called for negotiations on the Algerian question between the two parties concerned, failed by one vote to receive the necessary two-thirds majority.

144. On July 10, 1959, twenty-one African and Asian countries addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council in which, without asking for a meeting of the Council, they drew attention to the grave situation in Algeria which in their view endangered the maintenance of international peace and security. On July 14 the same Governments, together with four others, requested the Secretary-General to include "The Question of Algeria" in the agenda of the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly. In an accompanying memorandum they stated that there had been no indication of improvement in the Algerian situation and that hostilities continued unabated with increasing suffering and loss of human life.

145. On September 16 the General Committee decided to recommend the inscription of this item. The French Representative stated his Government's view that the United Nations was debarred by Article 2(7) of the Charter from discussing Algeria, but did not press his objection to a vote. The General Committee's recommendation was also accepted by the General Assembly. Also on September 16, General de Gaulle broadcast an important statement of French policy in Algeria. General de Gaulle said that the only path worthy of being followed was the free choice by the Algerians of their own future; and solemnly committed himself to ask the Algerians in their twelve *départements* what they finally wished to be and to ask the French people to endorse this choice, which would be made by the Algerians at the latest four years after the restoration of peace. Observers from all over the world would be free to witness the choice. The choice would be between three courses. The first was secession; the second

was complete identification with France, and the third would be internal self-government of a federal type, in a close relationship with France.

146. Since the path to self-determination was open there was no justification for continued war. France would not yield to any group of ambitious agitators who tried to impose dictatorship by force. The future of Algeria was vested with the Algerians and would be expressed by them in universal suffrage, not thrust upon them by machine gun and knife.

147. General de Gaulle's statement received a wide and immediate welcome. President Eisenhower commended it on September 17. On the same day the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, speaking in the General Debate, said that he warmly welcomed the statement and hoped it would form the basis for a settlement of the problem. On September 28 the leader of the Algerian rebels, M. Ferhat Abbas, issued a statement in Tunis on behalf of the "Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic". M. Abbas welcomed the fact that the right of the Algerian people to self-determination had at last been recognised; this had only occurred as a result of the war of liberation waged by the *Front de Libération Nationale* (F.L.N.). The "Provisional Algerian Government" was ready to discuss with the French Government the political and military conditions of a cease-fire, and the conditions and guarantees for the application of the right of self-determination.

148. Speaking in the General Debate on September 30 the Foreign Minister of France, M. Couve de Murville, regretted that the Assembly had decided by inscribing an item on Algeria to exceed the bounds of its competence and to embark on a debate which, by keeping passions alive, would do nothing to advance a solution. In a Press conference on November 10 General de Gaulle suggested that representatives of the F.L.N. might come to France openly or in secret, to discuss a cease-fire, under guarantees of safety. The F.L.N. replied to this suggestion in a communiqué dated November 20 in which they nominated five Algerian leaders held in prison in France to enter into discussions with the French Government, which would have to cover political as well as military questions. This suggestion was rejected by the French Government.

149. The debate on the Algerian item began in the First Committee on November 30. As in 1958, the French Delegation did not participate. M. Slim, the Representative of Tunisia, opened the debate with a notably moderate speech. He welcomed General de Gaulle's statement of September 16 as a turning point. He emphasised that both the French Government and the F.L.N. were now agreed on the principle of self-determination and on the need for a cease-fire. Given the historical background it was reasonable that the F.L.N. should seek guarantees on the political conditions for the vote on self-determination, which were inseparable from discussion of a cease-fire. The representatives chosen by the F.L.N. for the discussions were in much the same position as Dr. Nkrumah before Ghana became independent; their number was not necessarily fixed and the question of composition was a minor one. It rested with the French Government to say that they agreed with the F.L.N. communiqué of November 20 and discussions could begin. Most of the African and Asian delegates who spoke in the debate took a similar line, with the exception of



Mr. Shukairy of Saudi Arabia and M. Ismail Touré of Guinea who used the occasion for straightforward attacks upon France.

150. On December 2 Sir Pierson Dixon spoke for the United Kingdom. He said that the essential task was to develop a satisfactory relationship between the vigorous renaissance of the Arab peoples and the particular contribution which the French genius had made in that area. He doubted whether it was politically wise or juridically permissible for the Assembly to discuss or make recommendations on the question. He recognised that many delegations believed that the United Nations could play a useful role in promoting discussions between those concerned. But any resolution, however moderately worded, which sought to apply a formula, however reasonable it might seem in an abstract way, to the nature of the talks or of the problem might set up new pressures which would retard and complicate a settlement. In the case of Cyprus the Assembly had in 1958 decided not to adopt a resolution which either side to the dispute might consider would make agreement more difficult; agreement had in fact resulted from later negotiations between those concerned. The United Kingdom believed that the Algerian problem could also best be left to those directly concerned.

151. On the same day Mr. Lodge made a speech for the United States similar to that of Sir Pierson Dixon. On December 3 Mr. Sobolev (Soviet Union) spoke in studiously moderate terms, supporting the struggle of the Algerian people for independence, but agreeing that General de Gaulle's proposals could play an important part in a settlement.

152. On December 2 the Representative of Burma introduced a draft resolution sponsored by Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen. The draft resolution recognised the right of the Algerian people to self-determination, considered that the present situation in Algeria constituted a threat to international peace and security, noted with satisfaction that the two parties concerned had accepted the right of self-determination as the basis for a solution, and urged them to enter into *pourparlers* to determine the conditions necessary for the implementation as early as possible of the right of self-determination of the Algerian people, including conditions for a cease fire. In drafting this resolution the sponsors had consulted the representatives of the F.L.N. who were in New York for the debate, and the draft embodied the two principal claims of the F.L.N., *i.e.*, that there were only two parties concerned in the Algerian problem, themselves and the French Government, and that the discussions between these two parties must cover political as well as military questions.

153. There was talk in the lobbies that the draft resolution might in the light of the debate be altered by its sponsors or amended by others in order to obtain wider support. Speaking on December 4 Sr. Amadeo, the Representative of Argentina, invited the sponsors of the resolution to drop the word "two" from the draft and promised his support for it if they agreed. M. Slim (Tunisia) replied that this would not be possible.

154. On December 5 M. Bérard, the Representative of France, made it clear in a broadcast interview that the French Government was not interested

in the possibility of amendments to the draft resolution, since it considered the whole discussion illegal and unwise.

155. On December 7 the draft resolution was carried in the First Committee by 38 votes to 26 (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States) with 17 abstentions (Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Iran, Irish Republic, Japan, Laos, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay).

156. The vote for the resolution fell several votes short of the two-thirds majority which it would require in Plenary, and after protracted discussions the Asian and African Delegations principally interested decided to modify the resolution in order to widen its appeal. When the item was finally discussed in Plenary on December 12, after several delays, the Representative of Pakistan introduced the revised draft in his capacity as chairman of the Afro-Asian group for the current month. The new draft eliminated the reference in the earlier version to the two parties and to a threat to international peace and security. The first operative paragraph recognised the right of the Algerian people to self-determination; the second urged the holding of *pourparlers* with a view to arriving at a peaceful solution on the basis of the right to self-determination in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

157. Speaking on the afternoon of December 12 Sir Pierson Dixon said that the revised draft was still open to serious objection. Its reference to the right of self-determination was superfluous in view of General de Gaulle's statements, and the two operative paragraphs still gave a slant in the direction of the view held by the F.L.N. about the scope of the discussions between themselves and the French. It would be unwise for the Assembly to adopt a resolution which favoured the stand taken up by one side.

158. The Pakistani draft resolution was put to the vote by paragraphs before being voted on as a whole. It was no secret that the sponsors of the resolution hoped that if the second operative paragraph of the draft (which called for *pourparlers*) were rejected, the truncated resolution which would result would pass by a considerable majority. But a number of delegations (not including the United Kingdom) who intended to vote against the resolution as a whole decided that it was logical for them to abstain on each paragraph, on the grounds that their objection was to the adoption of any resolution and not to the contents of a particular draft. Thus each paragraph of the Pakistani draft received a two-thirds majority when voted on separately, but the draft as a whole received 39 votes against 22 with 20 abstentions, and thus failed.

159. As compared with the voting on the earlier draft in the First Committee, Argentina and Sweden voted for the resolution instead of abstaining, Laos voted against instead of abstaining, Cambodia abstained instead of voting for, and Austria, China, Denmark, Norway and the United States abstained instead of voting against.

160. There was a striking parallel between the course of events at the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Sessions. At both sessions a draft resolution

sponsored by Asian and African States received a simple but not a two-thirds majority in the First Committee, the United Kingdom and the United States voting against. At both Sessions the draft was watered down by agreement with its sponsors before the vote in Plenary. At both Sessions the United States switched to an abstention in Plenary, the United Kingdom continuing to vote against; and at both Sessions the modified version failed by a narrow margin to win the necessary majority. In 1959 as in 1958 the General Assembly concluded its Session without passing a resolution on Algeria.

### Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

161. At its Thirteenth Session, the Assembly established an *ad hoc* Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and requested it to report to the Fourteenth Session on the relevant activities and resources of the United Nations, the Specialised Agencies and other international bodies; the international co-operation and programmes which could appropriately be undertaken under United Nations auspices; the nature of legal problems which might arise; and future organisational arrangements. The *ad hoc* Committee included eighteen members (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, Soviet Union, United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States). However, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland, dissatisfied with the proportion of places given to Eastern European countries, announced that they would not participate; and when the *ad hoc* Committee met, on May 6, India and the United Arab Republic were also unrepresented.

162. The *ad hoc* Committee set up two sub-Committees to consider, in consultation with interested Specialised Agencies and international scientific organisations, the technical and legal aspects of the subject. These sub-Committees met on May 26 and by the middle of June had agreed unanimously on reports to the *ad hoc* Committee. The latter met again between June 18 and 25 and, also unanimously, adopted a useful report.

163. On the technical side, the Committee made certain recommendations designed to improve orderly international co-operation in applying the results of space science and on the conduct of space activities. In its legal report, the Committee considered that an attempt at a comprehensive codification of space law would be premature, but made a rough grouping of legal problems by priorities and recommended that this should be kept under review. The Committee concluded that it was not at present appropriate to set up any autonomous intergovernmental organisation for international co-operation in outer space activities, or to ask any existing body to assume an overall co-ordinating function. They hoped that the Specialised Agencies would include in their report to the United Nations information on their activities in connexion with outer space and suggested various possible institutional arrangements within the United Nations. The report of the *ad hoc* Committee was on the agenda of the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly and all speakers except those from the Soviet *bloc* were unanimous in praising the Committee's work and the balanced, factual report it had produced, and specifically endorsed its major conclusions. (In the interests of unanimity, the Western Powers refrained from tabling a resolution endorsing this report.)

164. Her Majesty's Government attached great importance to securing wide agreement at the Fourteenth Session on the nature and extent of future United Nations activity in the peaceful uses of outer space, and wide participation in it; in their view co-operation in this matter was too important to become a controversial issue between States. They therefore welcomed an agreement reached after long negotiations, between the Representatives of the Soviet Union and of the United States which resulted in the submission on December 11 of a draft resolution co-sponsored by twelve delegations. This was in two parts. The first established a Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, whose twenty-four members for 1960 and 1961 would include all the members of the *ad hoc* Committee together with Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Lebanon and Roumania. While this made the Committee rather too large for efficiency, it was not based on strict numerical parity between the Western Powers and the Communist *bloc* and the whole Western representation on the old *ad hoc* Committee was retained. The Committee's terms of reference were similar to those established in 1958: to report to subsequent sessions of the General Assembly on its studies along two main lines: first, on practical and feasible means for giving effect to programmes in the peaceful uses of outer space which could appropriately be undertaken under United Nations auspices, including assistance on a permanent basis for work carried on during the International Geophysical Year, the exchange and dissemination of information on space research and the encouragement of national research programmes for the study of outer space; and second, on the nature of legal problems which might arise from exploration of outer space. The second part of the draft resolution was inspired by a Soviet proposal to convene an international scientific conference in 1960 or 1961, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the exchange of experience in the peaceful uses of outer space. It requested the new Committee, in consultation with the Secretary-General and appropriate Specialised Agencies, to work out proposals for such a conference. The Committee adopted (by 44 votes, including those of the United Kingdom and the United States, to 16, including the Soviet *bloc*, with 15 abstentions) an amendment submitted by Belgium which had the effect of restricting participation in the conference to "interested Members of the United Nations and of the Specialised Agencies". This followed the formula adopted for the Conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and was generally considered appropriate for the somewhat analogous Scientific Conference on Outer Space.

165. The item was taken in the First Committee at three meetings on December 11 and 12, just before the Session closed. The speakers in the debate greeted the new agreement on composition as foreshadowing constructive co-operation in the future. Some indicated possible future activities for the Committee. The speeches again demonstrated the interest which this subject has aroused in all countries, and there was no attempt this year to raise questions more suitable to a disarmament context. The resolution, as amended, was adopted by the Committee by 74 votes in favour and 1 abstention. It came before Plenary on December 12 and was declared by the President to be adopted unanimously.

**Expansion of the Security Council and Economic and Social Council, and Increase in the Number of Judges of the International Court of Justice**

166. A majority of members of the United Nations have for some time favoured an expansion of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council to take account of the increase in membership of the United Nations since 1945 and avoid the kind of dispute which occurred during the elections to both Councils at this session. A smaller number of delegations also favour an expansion of the International Court of Justice. At its Thirteenth Session in 1958 the Assembly stressed in particular that it was desirable to expand the Economic and Social Council, and postponed further consideration until the Fourteenth Session.

167. The Special Political Committee debated concurrently the three items dealing with the expansion of the three bodies from October 13 to October 30. It quickly became apparent that the main elements in the situation were unchanged. Representatives from Asia, and more particularly from Africa, claimed that their region was under-represented in the organs of the United Nations, and favoured expansion of all three bodies. Representatives from Western Europe and the Commonwealth spoke in favour of expanding the two Councils but opposed any increase of the number of Judges of the International Court of Justice. On October 14 Mr. Sobolev, speaking for the Soviet Union, repeated that the People's Republic of China would have to be seated at the United Nations before there could be any amendment to the Charter. Moreover, there was nothing wrong with the present size of the three bodies; the trouble was that the Western Powers had ignored the need for equitable geographical distribution. The consequent injustice to Africa and Asia could be rectified if Western European countries would give up some of their seats. Mr. Beeley, for the United Kingdom, criticised this attitude on October 15 and advocated a reasonable increase in the membership of the two Councils. He drew a distinction between amendments which would alter the structure of the Charter and mechanical amendments designed to bring it up to date; there was surely no reason to obstruct the latter. Arithmetically it could be shown that under existing arrangements Eastern Europe was more exposed than Western Europe to the criticism that it was over-represented.

168. A difference of opinion unfortunately developed among those who favoured expansion of the Councils as to the recommendation which the Committee should make. Señor Urquía, the Representative of El Salvador, tabled a draft resolution which approved the principle of expansion and proposed a Committee of five members "to study the possibility of arriving at an agreement which would facilitate the amendment of the Charter so as to increase the membership of the aforementioned organs" and to report to the Fifteenth Session. This proposal received wide support including that of the United Kingdom and the United States. But a number of delegations from Asia and Africa considered that the setting up of such a Committee would be undesirably provocative to the Soviet Union. They therefore tabled a second resolution which also endorsed the principle of expansion of the two Councils but postponed further consideration of the matter until the Fifteenth Session. Sir Claude Corea of Ceylon was the principal mover

in this initiative. Attempts behind the scenes to unify the two texts came to nothing, and after some confused procedural discussion both were put to the vote in the Committee on October 29 and carried. The resolution of El Salvador received 47 votes (including the United Kingdom) to 25 against with 10 abstentions. The resolution of the African and Asian countries received 39 votes for and none against with 43 abstentions.

169. During the interval between this vote and discussion of the matter in Plenary, renewed and eventually successful efforts were made to produce a compromise text. On November 25 the Representative of Japan, Mr. Matsudaira, moved in Plenary an amendment to the El Salvadorean draft which had been negotiated with a considerable number of Latin American, Asian and African delegations, including those of El Salvador and Ceylon. This amendment provided that if progress was not made towards expansion of the two Councils at the Fifteenth Session, that Session should set up a Committee of the kind suggested by El Salvador. The amendment was criticised from the floor by some delegations who disliked the idea of attempting to bind a future session or maintained that it was constitutionally impossible to do so, but it was accepted by others as a reasonable compromise.

170. The Japanese amendment was eventually carried by 44 votes (including the United Kingdom) to 10 against with 25 abstentions, and the El Salvadorean resolution as amended was carried by 48 votes (including the United Kingdom) to 10 against with 22 abstentions. It was then decided not to proceed to a vote on the resolution of the African and Asian Powers.

171. The Assembly thus took a very small step forward in that it suggested that the next session should set up a Committee to study ways and means of achieving expansion of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council if no progress had been made at the Fifteenth Session. On the other hand, the differences of opinion (which at times became quite sharp) on tactics among those who favoured expansion partially obscured the fact that the real obstacle to expansion of the Councils remains the attitude of the Soviet Union.

### **Question of Race Conflict in South Africa**

172. At its Thirteenth Session the General Assembly had adopted a resolution affirming that governmental policies designed to perpetuate or increase racial discrimination were inconsistent with the pledges of Member States under Article 56 of the Charter; calling upon all Member States to bring their policies into conformity with their obligations under the Charter; and expressing its regret and concern that the Government of the Union of South Africa had not yet responded to appeals of the General Assembly to reconsider governmental policies which impaired the right of all racial groups to enjoy the same rights and fundamental freedoms. On July 15, 1959, the Permanent Representatives of Ceylon, Cuba, Malaya, Ghana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, the Irish Republic, the United Arab Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela requested the inscription at the Fourteenth Session of an item on "The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Union of South Africa", on the grounds that the Union Government had taken no steps to

respond to the terms of the 1958 resolution. On September 22 the General Assembly inscribed the item on its agenda without a vote, despite the objection, which was recorded in a brief statement, of the Minister for External Affairs of the Union of South Africa.

173. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have consistently maintained that discussion of this specific subject by the Assembly constitutes intervention in a matter of domestic jurisdiction, which is forbidden by Article 2 (7) of the Charter. The majority of United Nations Members, on the other hand, contend that the matter is not one of domestic jurisdiction. They argue that the racial policies of the Union Government are themselves contrary to the Charter, in particular to Articles 55 (c) and 56, and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and that they constitute a threat to peace. They therefore consider that this is an appropriate subject for discussion by the United Nations.

174. These opposing points of view were, as in previous years, expressed in the debate in the Special Political Committee. In the course of this debate, which was conducted for the most part in moderate terms, a number of representatives pointed out that the practice of racial discrimination was not confined to the Union of South Africa, and made it clear that it was in their view objectionable wherever it occurred. But they held that the Union Government alone pursued a deliberate policy of racial discrimination, which had been intensified since the previous Session of the Assembly. They also argued that this policy, or its effects, might spread to other parts of Africa, and so constitute a threat to international peace. The Representative of India particularly appealed to other members of the Commonwealth to support the draft resolution which was tabled by 36 countries.

175. The draft resolution expressed opposition to racial discrimination in any part of the world, called upon Member States to pursue policies consistent with their obligation under the Charter to promote the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, expressed deep regret and concern that the Union Government had not yet responded to the General Assembly's previous appeals, and appealed to all Member States to use their best endeavours, as appropriate, to achieve the purposes of the resolution. Although the general tone of the resolution was restrained, its final provision went somewhat farther than the resolution passed at the Thirteenth Session. The United Kingdom Representative voted against the resolution on the grounds that it concerned a matter of domestic jurisdiction which Article 2 (7) placed beyond the Assembly's competence. In explaining his vote he acknowledged the sincerity of the views held by many other Member States on this question, but reaffirmed the United Kingdom Government's view of the applicability to it of Article 2 (7) of the Charter. He emphasised, however, that in the territories for which the United Kingdom Government were responsible their policies were clear and unequivocal; they were helping the people of these territories to move to nationhood in freedom, regardless of race, colour and creed. But he also pointed out that, whatever the merits of this dispute, seven years of discussion and resolutions in the United Nations had brought a solution no nearer. This seemed to be clear proof that the United Nations could not effectively

intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State. To continue to pursue ineffective courses could only damage the prestige of the United Nations. (The full text of Lord Birdwood's speech is given in Annex VII.)

176. The resolution was adopted in Committee by 67 votes to 3 against with 7 abstentions and subsequently in Plenary on November 17 by 63 votes to 3 against (Portugal, France and the United Kingdom) with 6 abstentions (Belgium, Canada, Dominican Republic, Finland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). The South African Delegation did not participate in the debate or the voting on this item.

### **Palestine Refugees**

177. The debate on the problem of the Palestine refugees was given urgency at the Fourteenth Session by the prospect that, if no action was taken to prolong it, the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (U.N.R.W.A.) would expire on June 30, 1960. There was general agreement that further provision must be made for the refugees, but at the outset of the debate there was a wide divergence of view as to the terms on which U.N.R.W.A. might be continued.

178. The Special Political Committee had before it the Annual Report of the Director of U.N.R.W.A., Dr. Davis, for the period July 1, 1958, to June 30, 1959, and also the report of the Secretary-General submitted on June 15 in accordance with his undertaking at the previous Session to make such proposals as he thought helpful or necessary for the continuation of United Nations assistance to the Palestine refugees.

179. The principal recommendation made by the Secretary-General was that U.N.R.W.A. should continue pending the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East either by repatriation or resettlement. The Secretary-General indicated that an additional investment in the area of \$1,500-\$2,000 million would be required by 1965 to make reintegration possible, but he emphasised that he was attempting to do no more than establish the minimum economic requirements for a solution of the problem. The report suggested certain improvements in the operation of the Agency including correction of the inflated refugee rolls, transfer of primary administrative responsibility for the programme of general education to host countries, clarification of the Agency's status and review of its agreements with host Governments. In addition, the Secretary-General recommended assistance for the "economic refugees", *i.e.*, those who, although not eligible for U.N.R.W.A. assistance as displaced persons, had been made destitute as a result of the partition of Palestine.

180. The Director's annual report echoed many of the Secretary-General's proposals. Taking account of the fact that the Agency's mandate expired on June 30, 1960, the Director submitted a budget for the first six months with a "budget guide" for the second half of 1960; on this basis, the total budget for the coming year was estimated at \$38.7 million, reflecting higher costs and increased refugee population and also a somewhat larger provision for education and vocational training.



181. The Special Political Committee began its debate on November 10 with an appeal by the Secretary-General for indefinite extension of the mandate of U.N.R.W.A.; his detailed proposals for organisational improvements, if approved, should be a basis for negotiations between the Director and host Governments. The Director, speaking next, emphasised that first priority must continue to go to relief measures, though there should be as much expansion as possible of activities such as vocational training and individual grants. He considered that, in view of the past record, there was little point in U.N.R.W.A. continuing to have responsibility for mass rehabilitation. U.N.R.W.A. could only help to provide time in which political solutions could be worked out, a process which would probably take at least ten more years.

182. Representatives of the three host countries and of other Arab Delegations spoke on the lines of a joint report on the Secretary-General's proposals which they had circulated on October 6. They insisted that the problem of the Palestine refugees was political and not economic, and objected that support for resettlement was an attempt to alter the political situation which ran counter to past resolutions of the Assembly. Since responsibility lay with the United Nations, they agreed that U.N.R.W.A. should be continued, but considered that it should retain all its present functions (and, some thought, should carry out such additional duties as the management of former refugee property in Israel). There were also objections to the proposal to transfer responsibility for education. However, the Representative of the United Arab Republic stated that his Government was quite ready to confer with U.N.R.W.A. about the best means of facilitating its work.

183. The Representative of Israel argued that the refugees had no absolute right of return; Israel must have regard to the situation as a whole in considering whether to permit refugees to return. His Government would contribute constructively to an overall solution but, basically, this must be sought in the Arab countries and not in Israel. In the context of a solution by integration in Arab lands, Israel did not exclude an extension of the family reunion plan under which thousands of Arabs had already returned. If integration were carried out, and the international assistance offered in 1955 were still available, Israel would be prepared to pay compensation even before the solution of other outstanding problems, though various factors would have to be taken into account in fixing its level.

184. The United States' attitude was stated by Mr. Hancher on November 20. He pointed out that the Agency had thus far been able to implement only that part of its mandate which was concerned with relief. Its very heavy costs and responsibilities would continue to increase unless progress was made in dealing with the more fundamental problems. International support for the refugees should undoubtedly continue after June, 1960, but the mere extension of the mandate of U.N.R.W.A. would not serve the long-term interests of the refugees. He hoped that realistic suggestions would emerge from the Committee's discussion, and promised sympathetic consideration by the United States for any which might help to resolve the problem.

185. Mr. Beeley, for the United Kingdom, confined his speech on November 23 to certain practical points arising from the two documents before the Committee. He supported the Secretary-General's recommendation that U.N.R.W.A. should continue, drawing attention to the forecast that the number of refugees would continue to rise and to the remarkably low annual *per capita* expenditure of the Agency (\$33) which showed both experience and efficiency. While paying tribute to the work of the Agency, Mr. Beeley supported the proposals for remedying certain defects in its operation, notably the inaccuracies of the refugee lists and the uncertain juridical relations between the Agency and host Governments; he welcomed the statement of the Representative of the United Arab Republic in this connexion. The more controversial question of the assumption by host Governments of greater responsibility for education—which was desirable—might suitably be discussed by them individually with the Agency. The margin on which the Agency operated was so slim that there was always danger that valuable work, such as vocational training and individual support programmes, would have to be cut out. With this in mind, Her Majesty's Government could not agree that U.N.R.W.A. was the appropriate instrument for assistance to the economic refugees, which would involve further expenditure of an estimated \$5 million a year.

186. Indonesia and Pakistan had, on November 23, tabled a draft resolution which would extend the mandate of U.N.R.W.A. for five years. This draft made no mention of the administrative reforms suggested by Mr. Hammarskjöld and the Director, and did not meet the American desire for some new approach to the long-term problem. At the suggestion of Mr. Beeley, the Special Political Committee suspended its debate on November 30 to allow negotiations on a revised text between delegations primarily interested. On December 7, the sponsors of the original draft resolution introduced the revised resolution. This extended the mandate of U.N.R.W.A. for three years, with a review at the end of two years; requested the Governments concerned to co-operate with the Agency in efforts to rectify the refugee rolls, and requested the Director to arrange with them the best means of improving the juridical basis of their relations with the Agency; requested the Palestine Conciliation Commission to resume its efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III); called attention to the precarious financial position of the Agency and urged Governments to contribute more generously; and directed the Agency to continue its programme of relief for refugees and, within the limitations imposed by finance, to expand its programme of self-support and vocational training. The Committee adopted this resolution on December 8 by 71 votes to none, with one abstention (Israel). It was adopted by the General Assembly on the following day with 80 votes in favour and none against, Israel again abstaining. This was the first time since 1956 that the Arab Delegations had voted in favour of the annual U.N.R.W.A. resolution.

187. On November 18, Mr. Leslie Carver, Deputy Director of U.N.R.W.A., was killed in a motor accident. The Director and Members of the Committee paid tribute to his devoted work for the Palestine refugees.

### **The Principle of Equitable Geographical Representation in the Election of the President of the General Assembly**

188. At the beginning of each session the Assembly elects a President by secret ballot. Neither the Charter nor the Assembly's Rules of Procedure gives any guidance as to the principles which should govern the Assembly's choice. The Communist Member States have for some time resented the fact that no representative of their countries has so far attained the Presidency.

189. On August 14 the Representative of Czechoslovakia requested the inscription on the agenda of the Fourteenth Session of an item entitled "The question of the consistent application of the principle of equitable geographical representation in the election of the President of the General Assembly". In an explanatory memorandum attached to this request, Mr. Kurka complained about the exclusion from the Presidency of members of the Soviet *bloc*, which he described as an impediment to the strengthening of mutual confidence among Member States. It was generally recognised that the Czechoslovak initiative was connected with the candidature of Mr. Jiří Nosek, Czechoslovak Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the Presidency of the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly in 1960.

190. The Special Political Committee opened its debate on the item on December 2. The debate turned on the question of the relative importance which should be given in electing a President to the personal qualifications of a candidate and to the claims of the area from which he came. Communist speakers argued that, having in its resolution of December 12, 1957, established a pattern for the election of its Vice-Presidents and the Chairmen of its Committees which was based upon the principle of equitable geographical representation, the General Assembly should now provide for the consistent application of the same principle to the Presidency and so bring to an end the discrimination which they claimed had been practised against the countries of Eastern Europe. The Czechoslovak and Roumanian Delegations tabled a draft resolution to this effect, adding the specific recommendation that in the next four years the President of the General Assembly should be elected successively from Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia, Western Europe and "other States", and Latin America.

191. Other delegations doubted whether this was a matter which could properly be dealt with in a resolution and considered that the personal qualifications of a candidate for President should be the main criterion. Speaking on December 4 for the United Kingdom, Mr. Beeley said that the existing practice based primarily on the criterion of personal qualifications was working satisfactorily. Over the years there should in practice be equitable geographical representation, including the countries of Eastern Europe, but if the Assembly tried to establish a rigid system of rotation it would weaken the prestige of the office.

192. On December 3, eleven Latin-American countries sponsored amendments to the Czechoslovak-Roumanian draft resolution. These invited the Assembly to recommend that in electing a President "the principle of equitable geographical distribution shall be upheld to the greatest possible extent, special attention being paid in the first place to the qualifications that the President of the General Assembly must possess in order to perform the important duties of his office". Various sub-amendments were later moved

to these Latin-American amendments, some of which (moved by France and the United States) would have had the effect of diluting still further the references to equitable geographical distribution, while others (moved by Guinea and the United Arab Republic) tended towards strengthening the references to this principle and so moved some way back towards the original resolution of Czechoslovakia and Roumania. The Committee voted on this assortment of proposals on December 8. It passed by 36 votes to 32 against with 8 abstentions a resolution which incorporated the Latin-American point as further amended on the lines suggested by Guinea and the United Arab Republic. The effect was to give equal emphasis to the personal qualifications of a candidate for the Presidency and to the principle of equitable geographical representation. A specific proposal for the rotation of the office during the next four years was deleted. The United Kingdom voted against the resolution together with the United States and most West European Delegations.

193. When the Special Political Committee's draft resolution was taken in Plenary on December 10 it was found that there had been a shift of opinion against it; so far from obtaining the necessary two-thirds majority, it failed to obtain even the simple majority which it had received in Committee. 36 votes were cast in its favour, 40 against (including the United Kingdom) and 6 Members abstained. The Assembly thus adopted no resolution on this subject.

#### **Treatment of People of Indian Origin in the Union of South Africa**

194. At its Thirteenth Session the General Assembly adopted a resolution which noted that the Governments of India and Pakistan were still ready to enter into negotiations on this question with the Government of the Union of South Africa; regretted that the Union Government had not yet agreed to do so; appealed to that Government to enter into negotiations without prejudice to their juridical position on this issue; invited Member States to use their good offices, as appropriate, to that end; and invited the parties to report back to the Assembly. The Governments of India and Pakistan reported to the Secretary-General in July, 1959 that they had approached the Union Government but had received no reply, and also noted that their Governments were not aware of any steps taken by other Member States as suggested in the above resolution. They therefore requested the inscription of the item on the Agenda of the Fourteenth Session. The General Assembly approved inscription on September 22 without a vote, the Union Minister for External Affairs making a brief statement to the effect that discussion of this matter was contrary to Article 2 (7) of the Charter.

195. As in previous years, the item was discussed in the Special Political Committee. The South African Delegation took no part in the proceedings. The debate, which was short and conducted calmly, covered similar ground to the debates at previous Sessions, though most speakers on this occasion tended to criticise the Union Government's racial policies as a whole, rather than their application to persons of Indian origin in particular. Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia sponsored a draft resolution which followed very closely the lines of the resolution adopted at the Thirteenth Session

though its language was slightly more emphatic, including a renewed appeal to Member States to use their good offices in such manner as might be appropriate to bring about negotiations.

196. The United Kingdom Representative, as on previous occasions, abstained on this draft resolution. In explaining his vote he paid tribute to the motives of the Representatives of India and Pakistan and others in raising this matter once again, but expressed the misgivings of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as to the usefulness of further discussion of this issue by the United Nations. He also reiterated the doubts of the United Kingdom regarding the General Assembly's competence to discuss the subject. He made it clear that, if in the view of the United Kingdom Government a suitable opportunity were to arise, they would be willing to help the parties to resolve the dispute.

197. The resolution was adopted in Committee by 58 votes to none with 10 abstentions, and subsequently in Plenary on December 10 by 66 votes to none with 12 abstentions (Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom).

## ECONOMIC ITEMS—THE SECOND COMMITTEE

### General

198. The Second Committee's agenda followed closely the lines of that at the Thirteenth Session. It covered progress and operations of the Special Fund, programmes of technical assistance, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, economic development and the report of the Economic and Social Council. These last two items were taken together and formed the basis of the Committee's main debate and of most of the resolutions which were passed.

### Special Fund

199. The Second Committee debated the progress and operations of the Special Fund for the first time since the Fund was established. The Managing Director explained the principles on which he was administering the Fund: recipient Governments were expected to contribute between a quarter and a half of the cost of projects, which should be of a kind that could clearly be followed up by sustained action. Assistance from the Fund would be limited to a maximum period of five years and assistance would only be given to projects of a certain size. He intended to concentrate on resources surveys, industrialisation projects and vocational training.

200. In the debate which followed general satisfaction was expressed at the way in which the Special Fund was being managed (although Soviet *bloc* Delegations had reservations about this). Particular stress was laid on the suggestion, afterwards adopted by the Governing Council of the Special Fund, that assistance in preparing requests for submission to the Managing Director should be given to Governments which asked for it. The Committee also recognised the desirability of wide geographical distribution of assistance and of arranging for the supply of experts and

equipment from many sources. Stress was laid by a number of delegations on the importance of giving priority to projects leading to industrialisation and economic diversification, though others suggested that the main criterion should be that projects should be calculated to generate the maximum productive investment in whatever field. Although gratification was expressed at the increases in contributions announced by some Governments (including one by the United Kingdom from the sterling equivalent of \$1 million in 1959 to \$5 million in 1960) there was a widespread demand for much larger resources. This was later expressed in a resolution.

201. Discussion of the draft resolution on the Special Fund was complicated by a Soviet *bloc* attempt to use it as a means of opening the way for contributions to the Special Fund by Governments not recognised by the United Nations, such as that in East Germany. The Committee, in confirming, by its vote on the draft, the financial provisions by which membership of the Fund is confined to States Members of the United Nations and of the Specialised Agencies, rebuffed this move. The resolution in its final form commended the work of the Governing Council and Managing Director of the Fund, expressed its confidence that the Managing Director would make the fullest possible use of the resources available and called on Member States to make contributions large enough to enable the Fund to come into fully effective operation within a short space of time. The resolution was adopted unanimously by the Committee (and subsequently by the General Assembly) after the Soviet *bloc* attempt to open the Fund to contributions from the authorities in East Germany had been defeated by 35 votes against (including the United Kingdom) to 12 for (Soviet *bloc*, Libya, Guinea and Ethiopia) with 27 abstentions.

#### **Technical Assistance**

202. There was a full and interesting debate on the United Nations programmes of technical assistance. Delegations, including that of the United Kingdom, paid tribute to the value of these programmes and the way in which they were administered. There was widespread agreement that they had played a significant part in creating the framework for economic development and that they had done so in a particularly important way, by helping countries to help themselves.

203. There was also general support for steps taken by the Technical Assistance Committee of the Economic and Social Council to increase the effectiveness of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, which had just completed its first 10 years of existence. These steps included the decision to experiment with the organisation of programmes on a two-year rather than an annual basis. Reference was made in debate to certain trends such as the growing demand for technical assistance on a repayment basis, the need for close co-operation between the programmes of technical assistance and the Special Fund and the increasingly multilateral and co-operative nature of the United Nations technical assistance activities.

204. Delegations expressed satisfaction at increases which had been announced in contributions to the Expanded Programme for 1960, including one by the United Kingdom from \$2,240,000 (£800,000) to \$3 million (£1,071,430), *i.e.*, an increase of about one-third. At the same time there

was concern at the warning by the Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board that despite these increases it seemed likely that the programme for 1960 would have to be held slightly below the 1959 level.

205. Concern was also expressed by some delegations at the continued tendency for recipient Governments to ask for the services of experts rather than fellowships for their own nationals, at the frequent slowness of recruitment of experts and at the granting of assistance to non-self-governing and trust territories at a time when the pressure on resources was so great. In this last regard other delegations, particularly those wishing to see Africa's share in the United Nations programmes of technical assistance increased, pointed out that the Charter requires the provision of United Nations assistance to such territories. The Soviet *bloc* Delegations made their customary complaints about the inadequate use being made of facilities and contributions offered by the *bloc*, but a number of delegations pointed out that the extent to which available facilities were called upon depended entirely on the wishes of recipient Governments and that contributions would be more readily usable if they were made in freely convertible currencies.

206. Particular attention was paid to the experimental programme for the provision to requesting Governments of operational and executive personnel, the Opex scheme. The Director of the Office of Public Administration explained that so far 112 requests for such assistance had been received from 33 different countries and that nine Opex officers had taken up their posts by October. Enlargement of the experiment was attacked by delegations with doubts about the permanent establishment of the programme. Others thought that the experiment should be continued for a further year on a slightly increased scale to allow the drawing of valid conclusions about its success.

207. Four resolutions were passed on technical assistance:

- (1) A resolution calling for increased financial support for the Expanded Programme, particularly in view of the special needs of newly independent countries, and deciding in future to use the words "technical co-operation" rather than "technical assistance". This resolution was adopted unanimously by the Committee, and subsequently by the General Assembly, after a Bulgarian-Byelorussian amendment seeking to extend participation in the Expanded Programme to Governments such as that of East Germany had been defeated by 10 votes for (Soviet *bloc*, Guinea) to 34 votes against (including the United Kingdom) with 30 abstention
- (2) A resolution noting with appreciation the conduct of the technical assistance programmes carried out under the regular budget and taking note of the steps proposed to facilitate control of those programmes by the Economic and Social Council. This resolution was adopted unanimously by the Committee and subsequently by the General Assembly, although the Soviet *bloc* Delegations abstained from a separate vote on the passage noting with appreciation the conduct of the programmes.
- (3) A resolution continuing for a further year the experimental Opex programme and calling for a detailed report on it to the Thirtieth Session of the Economic and Social Council in the summer of 1960.

This resolution was adopted by 61 votes for, none against and 18 abstentions (Soviet *bloc*, Argentina, Brazil, Belgium, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Portugal, South Africa and Spain) and by 64 votes for, none against and 16 abstentions in Plenary. (The Fifth Committee subsequently voted to increase the appropriation for the experiment from \$200,000 in 1959 to \$300,000 in 1960.)

- (4) A resolution confirming the allocation of Technical Assistance funds for 1960, as recommended by the Technical Assistance Committee, which was passed unanimously both in the Committee and in Plenary.

#### **United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (U.N.K.R.A.)**

208. The Committee received a final report from General Eastwood, the administrator for the residual affairs of the U.N.K.R.A. He gave an account of the projects with which the work of the Agency was to be brought to an end during 1959 and recalled that 34 Member and five non-Member States had contributed a total of \$149.3 million to the United Nations economic aid programme in Korea. He said these contributions had played a vital part in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Republic of Korea's economy.

209. A number of delegations, including that of the United Kingdom, then expressed thanks to the Agency and its staff and expressed confidence in the lasting value of the work which it had done. The Soviet Representative spoke of the progress being made in North Korea, and of the need for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the South and the desirability of early reunification of the peninsula.

210. A resolution commending the work of the Agency was then adopted by 49 votes for to 9 against (Soviet *bloc*) with 11 abstentions (Afghanistan, Ceylon, Cuba, Ghana, Finland, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Libya, United Arab Republic, Yemen).

#### **Report of the Economic and Social Council and Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries**

##### *General Debate*

211. The general debate attracted statements from almost every delegation and covered the usual wide field. There was satisfaction that the economic recession was now past (although some delegations questioned the truth of this as far as the less developed countries were concerned) and at the increasing trends towards convertibility and liberalisation. Some delegations laid stress on the urgency of promoting growth of the economies of the industrialised countries, while others paid more attention to the need for stability. The United Kingdom Representative expressed the view that these objectives were compatible. (The full text of the speech of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs is given in Appendix V.) The Soviet *bloc* countries made their customary claims to steady growth in their economies uninterrupted by setbacks or fluctuations. It was generally agreed that an expanding world trade was of capital importance but opinion was sharply divided on whether the European Common Market and similar developments



were likely to help or hinder this trend. In this regard Soviet *bloc* Delegations reiterated past demands for some kind of universal trade organisation.

212. As in similar debates during recent years the main stress was laid on the development of the poorer countries. The problem was approached by some delegations in the light of what was often called the impending "population explosion". Delegations from under-developed countries saw their main hope in measures to prevent a decline in the price of primary products and in the establishment of a United Nations capital development fund, perhaps financed from savings resulting from disarmament. Similarly, delegations of all kinds (except those from the Soviet *bloc*) emphasised the vital role which private capital had to play. All were agreed on the necessity of closing as quickly as possible the economic gap between developed and under-developed countries and bringing the latter to the "take-off point" at which their development would be self-perpetuating. It was, however, pointed out by several delegations that to try to close the gap by bringing down standards in the more developed countries would have the opposite effect to that intended.

213. Most delegations were agreed on the importance of trying to make long-term economic projections which would show where the greatest effort was needed and where the most important economic objectives lay. Many representatives of the under-developed countries were, however, clear that industrialisation and diversification of the economy were the ends to which their economic development should lead. Many delegations felt that in all this the Economic and Social Council had a vital role to play and a good deal was said about ways in which the work of the Council could be made more effective.

#### *Resolutions*

214. The unusually large number of 12 resolutions was submitted to the Committee under these items. They were all adopted although some were extensively changed in the process of debate.

#### *Financing of Capital Development*

215. Two resolutions were adopted by the Committee in regard to the financing of capital development. The first, sponsored by Greece and eight other Powers, concerned the proposed International Development Association (I.D.A.). The discussion of the draft resolution showed that the Association had the support of most sections of the Committee other than the Soviet *bloc*. The Delegation of Greece, on behalf of the co-sponsors, explained that, whilst the I.D.A. would be the responsibility of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the United Nations was closely interested; the resolution was intended to take account of this interest and to provide for co-ordination and consultation between the I.D.A. and the United Nations. The text as adopted by 57 votes in favour, none against and 11 abstentions (Soviet *bloc*, Guinea, Libya), and subsequently in Plenary by 72 votes to none with 10 abstentions (Soviet *bloc*, Libya), welcomed the decision to establish an I.D.A., expressed the hope that a close working

relationship would be established by the United Nations and called attention to the desirability of similarly appropriate relations with the Specialised Agencies.

216. The second resolution on capital development was sponsored by 47 delegations and concerned the establishment of a United Nations Capital Development Fund. Introducing the draft resolution on behalf of the co-sponsors the Representative of Yugoslavia said that the General Assembly had long approved the principle of such a fund, that there was now no lack of financial resources and that there was general confidence in the administrative competence of the United Nations. The only remaining obstacle to the establishment of this fund was therefore the continued unwillingness of certain Powers who might be expected to become major contributors to work for economic development through the United Nations. In the discussion which followed most delegations suggested that the I.D.A., though welcome, would be no substitute for a United Nations capital fund. Delegations from most industrialised countries, including the United Kingdom, took the opposite view that the establishment of an International Development Association would constitute the fulfilment of earlier undertakings to establish further machinery for economic development within the framework of the United Nations when economic conditions made it possible to do so: they could not at present contemplate contributions to two such funds. The resolution as adopted called for a reappraisal by Member States of their position in regard to the early establishment of a United Nations capital development fund and requested a report on the matter by the Secretary-General to the Thirtieth Session of the Economic and Social Council and to the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly. The Committee adopted it by 63 votes to none with 12 abstentions and the General Assembly by 67 votes to none with 15 abstentions (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States).

#### *International Trade*

217. The Committee showed its customary close interest in international trade, particularly that in primary products, and three resolutions in this field were adopted. The first of these, sponsored by Argentina, Chile, France and Greece, expressed satisfaction with the work of the Commission on International Commodity Trade, encouraged that Commission at its next meeting to consider ways of giving temporary assistance to countries suffering from sudden falls in commodity prices, took note of work being done by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and asked Member States to stand ready to participate in commodity agreements and study groups. Amendments adopted by the co-sponsors after discussion included one encouraging Member Governments to participate in existing commodity agreements (the Representative of the Soviet Union said he would regard this as an appeal rather than a recommendation to Governments). The resolution was adopted by 72 votes to none with one abstention (Iraq) and unanimously by the General Assembly.

218. A second resolution sponsored by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland sought, in its original form, to express approval of a single universal trade organisation within the framework of the United Nations and open

to all countries; it also advocated the conclusion of long term trade and payments agreements and the supply of industrial equipment to under-developed countries by means of medium and long term credits at low interest rates repayable in kind. The idea of a new Trade organisation to replace the GATT was attacked by a number of delegations, including that of the United Kingdom, which also pointed out that the draft text was in fact proposing the development of international trade along retrogressive lines of bilateral barter; it was also pointed out that conditions for the establishment of a universal trade organisation were even less favourable than in 1947, when the attempt to do so had failed. Other delegations felt that the GATT could not meet all the problems of international trade as long as a number of economically important countries remained outside its membership. Yet another view was that if the need for a wider trade organisation was sufficiently widely felt it ought to be possible to expand the GATT so as to meet that need. When it became clear that the original text did not have the support of the Committee the co-sponsors accepted a number of fundamental amendments. The text eventually adopted took account of work being done to expand world trade by existing organisations, asked the Secretary-General to report to the Thirtieth Session of the Economic and Social Council and the fifteenth General Assembly on ways and means of promoting world trade including consideration of existing arrangements, referred to the desirability of working out in the United Nations and other appropriate forums measures to stabilise commodity markets, including where appropriate trade agreements of all kinds, commodity agreements and study groups, and recommended the advanced countries to continue to encourage the export of machinery and industrial equipment by freely negotiated credit agreements. This was passed by the Committee by 72 votes to none with one abstention (China) and in Plenary by 81 votes to none with one abstention (China).

219. The third resolution on international trade was sponsored by Pakistan and nine other Powers. It proposed a small group of experts to examine the possibility of United Nations machinery to offset commodity price fluctuations, with particular reference to compensatory financing. The group should assist the Commission on International Commodity Trade in its consideration of commodity problems and should report to that Commission at its ninth session. Several delegations, including that of the United Kingdom, expressed misgivings about the principle of compensatory financing but were willing to support an examination on the lines proposed. The Soviet Union Delegation explained that they could not vote for the resolution as it called on the International Monetary Fund and the Food and Agriculture Organisation, both of them bodies to which the Soviet Union did not belong, to help the experts. The resolution was adopted by 60 votes (including the United Kingdom and the United States) to none with 11 abstentions (Soviet *bloc*, Sweden, Finland); it was subsequently adopted in Plenary by 72 votes to none with 10 abstentions (Soviet *bloc*, Finland).

### *Industrialisation*

220. The Committee illustrated its growing interest in industrialisation as a vital aspect of economic development by passing two resolutions on the

subject. The first of these, sponsored by the United States and nine other Powers, called on Governments of developing Powers to consider the advantages of encouraging industrial development banks and corporations, and on industrial countries to assist in the formation of such bodies. The proposal aroused little discussion and was adopted in Committee by 61 votes to none with 9 abstentions (Soviet *bloc*); it was later adopted in Plenary by 73 votes to none with 9 abstentions (Soviet *bloc*).

221. The second resolution was more controversial. Sponsored by Brazil and thirty-two other Powers it proposed the establishment by the Economic and Social Council of a Commission for Industrial Development to take account of the growing interest in and need for industrialisation and economic diversification. Whilst all delegations were agreed that there was a clear case for examining the existing United Nations machinery in this field some doubted whether a new functional commission was necessarily the right answer. A number of delegations also felt that it was wrong for the General Assembly to prejudge the decision of the Economic and Social Council by issuing what was in effect a directive about the establishment of a particular kind of body and there was a good deal of discussion about the proper role of that Council in United Nations economic affairs. The sponsors accepted amendments safeguarding the position of the regional economic commissions and drawing the attention of the Economic and Social Council to the various views expressed during the Committee's debate. The resolution was then adopted unanimously both by the Committee and subsequently in Plenary.

#### *Other Resolutions*

222. The growing interest of the Committee in regional trade arrangements was illustrated by the resolution introduced by Argentina and sixteen other Powers on the Latin American Common Market. Latin American delegations spoke of the importance to their countries and to the region as a whole of the common market proposals. Many other delegations, including that of the United Kingdom, expressed the hope that the enterprise would meet with success. The Representative of Japan, in an intervention which laid stress on his country's dependence on free world trade, suggested the addition to the resolution of words emphasising that the Common Market would be non-discriminatory, but he did not press for an amendment when the co-sponsors explained that Latin American countries had no intention of discriminating against countries outside the region. The resolution, which took note formally of the Latin American Common Market and of the objectives at which it aimed was then adopted by 61 votes to none with 7 abstentions, the latter recorded by Soviet *bloc* delegations, who explained that they had not yet received instructions but were on principle opposed to the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions referring to purely regional matters. In Plenary session they changed their vote and the resolution was passed unanimously.

223. A resolution sponsored by Albania, Czechoslovakia and Roumania (joined later by Uruguay) on help by the United Nations to countries developing native petroleum industries ran into early difficulties. Many delegations, that of the United Kingdom included, felt the original text took

little account of the work that was already in hand as the result of resolutions passed by the Economic and Social Council. The co-sponsors argued that the Council's action had been of a formal and recapitulatory nature and that the Assembly should without further delay call for an examination of the whole field of petroleum development. The majority of the Committee took the view that the action of the Economic and Social Council taken in July, 1959 to ascertain what the United Nations could do and had done and to what extent Member Governments wished the organisation to extend its activities in this field was both positive and useful. Furthermore most delegations believed that it would be unwise of the Assembly to take a further initiative until the Council had had time to follow through its own earlier action. The co-sponsors therefore submitted an entirely new text which did no more than note what was already being done, request the Secretary-General to pass on to the Economic and Social Council the views expressed during the Committee's discussion of petroleum matters and express the hope that the Council would be able to decide, in the light of the Secretary-General's report, what further United Nations action was needed. This text was adopted by the Committee by 54 votes to none with two abstentions (Denmark, Sweden) and by 81 votes to none with one abstention (Mexico) in Plenary.

224. A resolution sponsored by Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia on scientific and technical co-operation and exchanges commanded widespread support. The co-sponsors, whilst paying tribute to the important work in this field being done by the regional economic commissions and the Specialised Agencies, especially UNESCO, suggested that scientific and technical progress was now so rapid that a more complete attempt at co-ordination was necessary. The co-sponsors accepted amendments suggested by delegations which felt that the original text placed too much emphasis on Government action at the expense of the many important individual exchanges outside the control of Governments, but refused to accept one by the United Kingdom intended to bring the timing of the report called for by the resolution into line with the timetable already decided on in this field by the Economic and Social Council. The Committee subsequently adopted the United Kingdom amendment by 20 votes to 17 with 25 abstentions and the resolution as a whole unanimously; this was confirmed in the same way by the Assembly in Plenary. The resolution emphasised the value of exchanges of scientific and technical information between countries, recommended Governments to encourage them in the future and asked the Secretary-General to report on the adequacy of United Nations machinery in this field and the possibilities of further action to the Thirty-first Session of the Economic and Social Council.

225. The Committee's growing interest in world population trends and long-term economic prospects was given substance at the Fourteenth Session by a resolution on world economic development sponsored by thirty-nine Powers. The Representative of India, introducing the resolution, said the basic economic problem facing the world was that of balancing the likely enormous increase in the population of the world with the equally remarkable scientific and technical advances now taking place. These advances were such that all the world's economic problems could be solved but a United Nations study of the resources, needs and production capacity of the whole

world was needed. The resolution would ask the Secretary-General to report to the Thirtieth Session of the Economic and Social Council on the methods and techniques to be used in such a study. There was general agreement that it would be useful to extend in this way the study of the techniques of long-term economic projections already called for by the Economic and Social Council and the resolution was adopted unanimously by both the Committee and the plenary meeting.

226. A four-Power resolution on Agrarian reform aroused little controversy. It declared continuing support for land reform programmes, drew the attention of Member States to the technical assistance available in this field from United Nations sources and asked the Secretary-General to consider ways in which the United Nations could continue to help in this work and to report in 1962 to the Economic and Social Council on results already achieved and future prospects. The Committee adopted the resolution by 72 votes to none with one abstention (Chile) and it was approved by the General Assembly by 81 votes to none with one abstention (South Africa).

## **SOCIAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS ITEMS—THE THIRD COMMITTEE**

### **General**

227. The Third Committee had a more profitable, and more equitable, session than it has enjoyed in recent years. It spent much less time than usual on the draft International Covenants on Human Rights, but managed to recommend to the Assembly the adoption of a Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which had been waiting in the wings of the United Nations for a decade. The remainder of the Committee's agenda, apart from the absence for the first time for several years of the question of self-determination and the inclusion of an item on cancer research, followed the customary pattern.

### **Draft International Covenants on Human Rights**

228. Left with little more than a fortnight to discuss this item, the Committee adopted three more articles of the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as against the target of six that its Chairman had set for it. There was less protest than might have been expected at this meagre achievement, owing perhaps to a growing realisation that the pace cannot be forced and that the present slow rate of progress is consonant with the international community's state of readiness for international instruments of this far-ranging, yet binding, description.

The articles adopted dealt with:

- (a) Freedom of movement.
- (b) Expulsion of aliens.
- (c) Principles of fair trial.

Despite the legal complexity of these matters, notably the last, the level of debate was reasonably high. In form at least, the Committee substantially improved the text of the first as recommended by the Human Rights Commission; it was however still unsatisfactory in some of its terms to the United Kingdom Delegation, which consequently abstained in the vote upon

it. The second article was adopted almost unanimously, with the United Kingdom voting in favour, in the form in which the Committee received it. The article on fair trial, which is very detailed, posed some difficult problems in the reconciliation of different codes of national law, with which the Committee dealt for the most part sensibly. Although the resulting text was largely acceptable, the United Kingdom abstained on the article after the rejection (by 19 votes to 25, with 29 abstentions) of its proposal to delete a provision prescribing compensation for miscarriage of justice, which, the Delegation had argued, it was not practicable to draft in a form suitable to the Covenant, as a general norm for all countries. To a lesser extent, the United Kingdom was not satisfied with the terms of two new provisions added in the Committee, relating to the right of appeal and to the question of "double jeopardy".

229. The Assembly adopted a resolution, for which the United Kingdom voted, deciding to give priority to the draft Covenants at the next Session, and asking the Third Committee to devote as much time to them as possible.

#### **Declaration of the Rights of the Child**

230. The Committee received for consideration a draft Declaration from the Human Rights Commission, which was itself a re-draft of a text prepared a number of years before by the Social Commission. The latest text lacked the force that such a document requires, by reason of its length and wealth of superfluous detail. The proposed amendments included a number which, if they had been adopted, would have burdened the draft Declaration with statements of the duty of Governments in various detailed ways to ensure the enjoyment of the rights set forth ("measures of implementation"), thus rendering the text longer still and hardly distinguishable from a Convention.

231. The United Kingdom played a leading part in withstanding such proposals and in putting forward more concise formulations of some of the wordier principles. Although the final text (adopted unanimously by the Assembly) still lacks impact and is indeed much longer than it might be without real loss of substance, its faults are moderate and the text has certainly been improved by the Assembly's work.

#### **Draft Convention on Freedom of Information**

232. The Committee embarked on the fulfilment of the Assembly's decision at its previous Session to discuss the text of this instrument, which has been in abeyance for a number of years because of fundamental differences of opinion about its value and probable effect. While no delegation openly opposed this course, it was made clear by the United Kingdom and others (notably the Scandinavian Delegations) that they had small hopes of a successful conclusion and were not convinced that a Convention would emerge to which they could give their support. They believed rather that it would amount to little more than a catalogue of permissible restrictions on the freedom of the Press, and that altogether different means should be relied upon to secure freedom of information on a far wider basis. These would include educational and social advancement, together with technical assistance

for the less-developed countries in building up a balanced system of information media with its natural correctives.

233. The Convention's supporters showed by their arguments that it was precisely the lack of proper balance in the power of information media, both within individual countries and between different countries, and consequent lack of automatic correctives that concerned them. This led them to believe that some internationally sanctioned measures of governmental control, notably over the activities of foreign correspondents, were necessary and justifiable. Thus, where the text of the Convention speaks of the free interchange of information, they wished to qualify this as "accurate, objective and comprehensive" information, regardless of the fact that, since the Convention could be read in a restrictive, as well as a mandatory sense, it would be the function of Governments to determine whether information possessed those qualities or not, and to act accordingly. Similarly, they preferred that parties to the Convention should undertake to secure the freedom to "gather, receive and impart", rather than "seek, receive and impart", information and opinions, on the explicit ground that the former was a less active and investigatory notion, and ignoring the fact that it limits the sense to journalists and information media alone, whereas the original intention of the Convention was to safeguard freedom of information for all. This amendment was only adopted by the margin of one vote, and on the other side provisions were added, on the proposal of the French Delegation, stressing the importance of being able to form opinions through the fullest possible knowledge of the facts, and the consequent duty of parties to the Convention to respect and protect the right of access to diverse sources of information.

234. The Committee adopted a text of the preamble and the first article of the Convention. The United Kingdom Delegation treated the various amendments on their merits, while abstaining, in view of its lack of conviction as to the usefulness of a Convention, on the resulting paragraphs. By the same token it abstained (with 16 others, including the United States and most of the West European Delegations, with two Scandinavian Delegations voting against) in an Assembly vote on a resolution calling for priority for the question at the next Session, couched in terms identical to those of the resolution already adopted in respect of the draft Covenants.

#### **Report of the Economic and Social Council (Chapters VI and VII)**

235. The debate on the wide range of social and human rights subjects dealt with in these chapters showed the United Nations to be still far from finding a solution to the basic problem of the place of social advancement in the general development of under-developed countries. A resolution was unanimously adopted looking forward to light being thrown on this matter by the study on balanced economic and social development that the Secretary-General will present as a major part of his report on the world social situation in 1961. The Council was also asked in this resolution to consider, among ways of strengthening its work in the social field, the advisability of the Social Commission meeting annually (instead of every other year as at present).



236. A number of other draft resolutions were tabled, mostly expressing individual points of view of delegations on their chosen subjects. After more or less extensive revision, in much of which the United Kingdom played a part, all but one of these drafts were acceptable, though still not without their faults. This is particularly true of those on the United Nations Children's Fund (a resolution which merely contains congratulation on results achieved with exhortation to greater efforts), low-cost housing (virtually a repetition of a resolution of the Council itself), juvenile delinquency (which only adds urgency to the research work that the Secretary-General is already doing in this field), and international relations and exchanges in the fields of education, science and culture (a concession to the Soviet desire to promote this kind of co-operation through inter-governmental channels).

237. Besides this, a useful resolution was adopted, on the Council's recommendation, setting up a separate technical assistance programme (for which \$50,000 has been budgeted in 1960) in narcotics control within the regular United Nations budget, on the grounds that such aid often benefits the international community more than the recipient country, which consequently may tend at present not to give its requests for United Nations technical assistance in this field sufficiently high priority.

238. The United Kingdom abstained, with 21 other Member States, on a resolution promoted chiefly by Sweden which asked the Council to initiate a study on the question of capital punishment, of the laws and practices relating thereto, and of the effects of capital punishment and the abolition thereof on the rate of criminality. The grounds for abstaining were that neither the sponsors of the resolution nor the Committee itself made a serious attempt to define the type of study envisaged or the organ to undertake it; originally the sponsors would have allocated it to the Human Rights Commission, but when it was pointed out from many sides that a useful and constructive study would have to pay far more attention to the sociological and criminological aspects than to the bearing of human rights on the problem, they first provided for some kind of consultation with the Social Commission, and finally left it entirely to the Council to determine how the task should be done. Thus too many unknown quantities seemed to be left for the resolution to deserve support.

#### **International Encouragement of Scientific Research into the Control of Cancerous Diseases**

239. The Delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic proposed this item after the Session had begun, but it was added to the agenda without debate and allocated to the Third Committee. The original Byelorussian proposal, which took no account of the work of the World Health Organisation on cancerous diseases, would have established prizes amounting to \$100,000 every four years (drawn from the United Nations budget) to be awarded by the International Union Against Cancer. In response to approaches before the debate the Byelorussian Delegation revised this so as to make the World Health Organisation responsible for the awards and to ask it further to report to the Assembly on progress in research. A number of delegations, including the United Kingdom, considered that while

international co-operation in the field might well be strengthened, it would be a mistake to take a final decision without first obtaining the views of the specialist member of the United Nations family most directly concerned (the World Health Organisation itself). They also considered that the desirability of United Nations monetary awards was open to doubt. Compromise amendments tabled by Colombia and the United States, which would have left it to the World Health Organisation to decide whether or not to make awards, did not however prove acceptable to the majority, who wanted to put the moral authority of the United Nations behind the project; and a resolution in terms substantially the same as the revised Byelorussian proposal was adopted by the Assembly by 68 votes to none, with 13 abstentions (including the United Kingdom). There was however much less general support for finding the money for the awards from the regular budget, and the Fifth Committee subsequently agreed that the Secretary-General should at the next Session suggest alternative methods of financing them.

### **Report of the High Commissioner for Refugees**

240. There was nothing of special interest in the discussion of this item. Much was said by many members about the progress of the World Refugee Year in their countries, but it tended to show that although more than 60 were by then participating, in only a few—of which the United Kingdom was certainly the foremost—had the campaign begun to yield really tangible results. Lady Petrie described the measures taken in the United Kingdom and the results so far, and the Delegation joined in sponsoring a resolution urging members to make further efforts, which was adopted in the Assembly by 63 votes to 9 (the Soviet *bloc*), with 5 abstentions.

241. Another resolution was adopted, on the High Commissioner's Report itself, by 66 votes (including the United Kingdom) to none, with 12 abstentions (including the Soviet *bloc*). This invites Members to devote special attention to refugee problems and to consider several specific methods of rendering assistance—by improvement of the refugees' legal status, liberalisation of immigration laws, financial contributions, &c. It also authorises the High Commissioner to use his good offices in the transmission of contributions to help refugees who do not come within the competence of the United Nations (as he was specifically authorised to do two years before in respect of the Chinese refugees in Hong Kong).

242. Much interest was shown, as at the previous Session, in the plight of refugees in Morocco and Tunisia, and a resolution, recommending the High Commissioner to continue his efforts on their behalf pending their return to their homes, was adopted in the Assembly by 74 votes (including the United Kingdom) to none, with 3 abstentions.

243. At a special meeting held at the end of the Assembly to receive pledges to the High Commissioner's 1960 programme, a total of about \$4.8 million was promised, including £100,000 by the United Kingdom. That the total amount promised is much higher than in 1958 is largely due to a number of special World Refugee Year contributions.

**TRUSTEESHIP AND COLONIAL ITEMS—  
THE FOURTH COMMITTEE**

**South-West Africa**

244. At the Thirteenth Session a resolution was passed inviting the Good Offices Committee on South-West Africa (which had been established at the Twelfth Session) to renew discussions with the Government of the Union of South Africa in order to find a basis for an agreement which would continue to accord to the Mandated Territory of South-West Africa as a whole an international status, and which would be in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. The Committee's members continued to be Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, Chairman (United Kingdom), Mr. W. M. Walmsley (United States) and Senhor Vasco da Cunha (Brazil). Following a series of meetings in London in January 1959, the Chairman wrote to the Minister for External Affairs of the Union of South Africa, expressing the Committee's readiness to renew discussions with the Union Government, and inviting it to designate a representative or representatives for this purpose. The Union Government replied to the effect that, if the Good Offices Committee should feel debarred by resolution No. 1243 (XIII) of the Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly from giving further consideration to the proposal for investigating the possibility of partitioning the Territory, it was difficult to see what useful purpose would be served by renewing the discussions under the Committee's new and more restricted terms of reference. After the Committee had held another series of meetings in June 1959, a further exchange of letters took place between the Chairman and the Union Minister of External Affairs, as a result of which the latter conveyed his Government's willingness, in accordance with its desire to find a mutually acceptable solution, to have representatives available in New York to explore means to that end.

245. Renewed discussions with representatives of the Union Government took place between September 11 and 21 in New York. In these discussions, the Committee suggested that agreement might be reached on a formula within which further negotiations might take place with a view to the negotiation of an agreement, to which the United Nations must be a party, for the supervision of the administration of South-West Africa in a manner which would not impose greater obligations on the Union Government or impair the rights enjoyed by it under the Mandate.

246. The Union Government, while it was still prepared to investigate the possibility of partitioning the Territory or to enter into an agreement with the three remaining Allied and Associated Powers (France, the United Kingdom and the United States), was not able to subscribe to the formula proposed by the Committee. The Committee, for its part, felt precluded from considering either of the two Union proposals. The Union Government suggested an alternative formula for discussions, which however did not stipulate that the United Nations should be a party to the agreement to be negotiated. The Committee did not consider that this formula improved the position, and therefore reported to the General Assembly that it had not succeeded in finding a basis for an agreement under its terms of reference.

247. In the Fourth Committee, Mr. Louw, the Minister for External Affairs of the Union of South Africa, made a general statement of his

Government's attitude to the Report of the Good Offices Committee, and also to that of the Committee on South-West Africa. He referred to the friendly spirit in which discussions with the Good Offices Committee had taken place, but suggested that the Committee's minimum conditions for continued discussions would have made South-West Africa virtually a Trust Territory, which his Government could not accept. He reminded the Committee, however, of the Union Government's renewed offer to conclude an agreement with the three remaining Allied and Associated Powers; suggested that the door should be kept open for future discussions; and undertook that his Government would continue to administer the Territory in the spirit of the previous Mandate. Finally, he offered to recommend to his colleagues that certain information on the Territory should be made available to the United Nations. He was, however, strongly critical of the South-West Africa Committee's Report, which he considered incompatible with the Mandate procedure and factually inaccurate.

248. In the ensuing debate, most representatives took account both of the Report of the Good Offices Committee and that of the South-West Africa Committee. Their consideration of the latter was considerably influenced by the statements of a number of oral petitioners who had been heard by the Committee before the general debate opened (see paragraph 252 below). Many speakers expressed growing concern at the deteriorating conditions in the Territory which they considered these sources revealed, and at the application in the Territory of the Union Government's racial policies. Among the positive suggestions for a solution which were made in the course of the debate was one for a revival in some form of the machinery which existed under the League Mandate for the supervision of the Territory's administration, but the Committee did not follow it up. Some delegations pressed that one or more Governments, having the competence to do so, should take legal action against the Union before the International Court of Justice alleging failure to observe the terms of the Mandate. Many other delegations, however, expressed the view that a solution could only be reached through continued negotiation and the co-operation of the Union Government. This latter point was stressed by the United Kingdom Representative, who also pointed out that the problem was essentially a dispute between the majority of Members of the United Nations on the one hand and the Union of South Africa on the other. Such a dispute could be ended either by a compromise agreement which would be sought by negotiation, or by more extreme measures which might jeopardise, rather than promote, the well-being of the inhabitants of the Territory. The Union Government had shown, by its decision to negotiate with the Good Offices Committee, its willingness to modify its attitude further in the future. All the possible ideas for a solution including those which had been put forward in the Debate should therefore be fully explored.

249. Representatives of the Union of South Africa were present throughout the Debate, and made detailed statements on the administration of the Territory, a fact which was welcomed by many speakers. In a further statement the South African Representative emphasised his Government's desire to find a solution, and said that his delegation would again take part in the Assembly's discussion of this item at the Fifteenth Session. He also

repeated the offer of the Union Minister for External Affairs to recommend to the Union Government that information about the Territory be made available. Finally, he put on record his Government's willingness to enter into discussions with an appropriate United Nations *ad hoc* body that might be appointed after prior consultation with the Union Government.

250. A draft resolution, sponsored by 23 Powers, was then tabled. After strongly criticising, in its preamble, the Union Government's administration of the Territory, it requested that Government to enter into negotiations with the United Nations through the Committee on South-West Africa, or through any other Committee which the General Assembly might appoint, with a view to placing South-West Africa under the international trusteeship system. It also requested the Union Government to formulate immediately, for the consideration of the General Assembly, proposals which would enable the Territory to be administered in accordance with the principles of the Mandate, the supervisory functions being exercised by the United Nations according to the terms and intent of the Charter. At the same time a further draft resolution was tabled, sponsored by 13 countries, drawing the attention of Member States to the legal action open to them to refer any dispute with the Union of South Africa concerning the interpretation or application of the Mandate for South-West Africa to the International Court of Justice.

251. The first of these two draft resolutions did not appear to the United Kingdom Delegation, or to a number of other delegations, to be one which was likely to lead to the co-operation of the Union Government in further negotiations, the outcome of which it seemed to prejudge, although it was recognised to be a sincere attempt on the part of its sponsors to find a compromise between more extreme points of view on this question. The Delegations of Denmark, Finland, and Sweden accordingly tabled an alternative draft resolution which omitted those parts of the original draft which were most strongly critical of the Union Government, or which sought to impose in advance conditions for negotiations which the Union Government were known to regard as entirely unacceptable. For procedural and tactical reasons this was later withdrawn and its contents submitted as amendments to the original draft resolution. However, after further debate most of these amendments were defeated when put to the vote, and the original draft was approved by the Committee by 56 votes to 5, with 12 abstentions. The United Kingdom Representative voted against it, for the reasons given above, and expressed his Delegation's preference for the Scandinavian amendments. He also voted against the draft resolution on possible legal action, which was later adopted by the Committee by 52 votes to 4 with 17 abstentions. These two draft resolutions were subsequently adopted in Plenary, the first by 55 votes to 5 (Belgium, France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Union of South Africa) with 11 abstentions and the second by 55 votes to 4 (Australia, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Union of South Africa) with 16 abstentions.

252. At an earlier stage the Committee had granted oral hearings to the Rev. Michael Scott and Mr. Kerina (both of whom had been heard at the Thirteenth Session) as well as to five new petitioners, Mr. Beukes, Mr. Kozonguizi and three United States citizens, Messrs. Lowenstein, Bull and Bundy. The South African Minister for External Affairs strongly opposed

the granting of these oral hearings, which were also opposed by the United Kingdom Representative on the grounds (to which the United Kingdom has consistently held) that no private individual should be allowed to address a Committee of the General Assembly, which is an organisation of States; moreover the Council of the League of Nations had not granted oral hearings to petitioners and accordingly such hearings were precluded by the terms of the 1950 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice.

253. Five other resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly on the question of South-West Africa. The first of these related to petitions and other communications received by the Committee on South-West Africa. The United Kingdom Delegation abstained on this resolution, which was adopted in Plenary by 57 votes to 1 with 10 abstentions. The second related to the compulsory removal of persons from the Hoachanas Native Reserve, urging the Union Government to desist from this practice, and was adopted in Plenary by 57 votes to 1 with 12 abstentions, including the United Kingdom.

254. The third resolution related to the withdrawal by the Union Government of a passport from a Mr. Hans Beukes (one of the petitioners referred to in paragraph 252 above), who had been granted a scholarship to study at the University of Oslo. This resolution was adopted in Plenary by 62 votes to 1 with 12 abstentions, including the United Kingdom. The fourth concerned the status of the Territory of South-West Africa, and followed the lines of similar resolutions passed in previous years. It asserted that the normal way of modifying the international status of the Territory was to place it under the international trusteeship system. It was adopted in Plenary by 56 votes to 1 with 13 abstentions (including the United Kingdom). The fifth resolution took note of the Report of the Good Offices Committee and expressed its appreciation of the Committee's efforts. It was adopted by 65 votes (including the United Kingdom) to 9 with 2 abstentions. The General Assembly also re-elected Denmark and elected Brazil and Ethiopia to fill three vacancies on the South-West Africa Committee.

255. After these resolutions on the general question of South-West Africa had been adopted in Plenary, the Fourth Committee received a request from Messrs. Kozonguizi, Kerina and Beukes for further oral hearings in connexion with disturbances which took place in Windhoek, South-West Africa, on December 10, 1959, in the course of which it had been reported that a number of people, including Mr. Kerina's brother, had been killed. The United Kingdom Representative and other representatives pointed out that the Committee was not competent to consider this request since the Committee and the General Assembly had already disposed of the South-West Africa item. The majority of the Committee nevertheless voted in favour of granting the hearing. The South African Delegation then withdrew. After the hearings, at the suggestion of the United States Representative, the petitioners' statements were referred to the South-West Africa Committee for urgent consideration.

### **Trust Territories**

256. The Fourth Committee first took up the question of the future of the southern part of the British Cameroons. It had been decided at the resumed Thirteenth Session in March, 1959 that a plebiscite should be held

between the beginning of December, 1959 and the end of April, 1960, the choices in the plebiscite and the qualifications for voters to be determined at the Fourteenth Session, because the main parties in the territory were not agreed on these points. Mr. Foncha, Premier of the Southern Cameroons, Mr. Muna, Minister of Works, and Dr. Endeley, Leader of the Opposition, were present as members of the United Kingdom Delegation at the Fourteenth Session. At the beginning of the Session they had still not reached agreement, Mr. Foncha proposing that the choices in the plebiscite should be association with Nigeria or a period of continued trusteeship, and Dr. Endeley that the choice should be between Nigeria and the Republic of the Cameroons. The United Kingdom Representative, Sir Andrew Cohen, asked the Assembly to hear the Cameroonian leaders and consider the position in the hope that a solution would emerge from the debate in the Assembly. During discussions in the lobbies, in which a number of African Delegations took a prominent part, it became evident that the majority of the Assembly would not agree to the continuation of trusteeship in the British Cameroons except for a short period, and consequently that a plebiscite in which continued trusteeship was one of the questions would not be possible. Eventually agreement between the Cameroonian leaders was achieved on the basis of a plebiscite to be held early in 1961. Mr. Foncha conceded that the choice in the plebiscite should be between joining Nigeria or the Cameroons Republic. Dr. Endeley and others who shared his views conceded that the plebiscite should not be held until 1961, thus necessitating a short period of United Kingdom administration after the independence of Nigeria on October 1, 1960, during which the Southern Cameroons would be separated from Nigeria. The resolution which the Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority provided that the arrangements for the plebiscite should begin on September 30, 1960, and that the plebiscite should be completed by the end of March 1961. A compromise was also reached on the question of qualifications of voters.

257. The Committee took up the question of the Northern Cameroons at the end of the Session when it received the report of the Plebiscite Commissioner, Dr. Abdoh of Iran, on the plebiscite which was held in the territory on November 7, 1959. The result of the plebiscite was a majority of 70,546 to 42,788 for deferring a decision about the future of the territory and against joining the Northern Region of Nigeria when Nigeria becomes independent. When presenting his report, Dr. Abdoh expressed the view that one of the reasons for the result was dissatisfaction with the system of local government in the territory. Sir Andrew Cohen, for the United Kingdom, said the result should not be interpreted as a vote against Nigeria. He proposed that another plebiscite, in which the people would be offered the direct choice between joining Nigeria or joining the Cameroons Republic, should be held at approximately the same time as the plebiscite in the Southern Cameroons, *i.e.*, early in 1961. During the debate many speakers laid stress on the importance of separating the Northern Cameroons from the Northern Region of Nigeria before the next plebiscite. As an aspect of this, many delegations expressed the view that the territory should not take part in the elections to the Nigerian Federal Legislature which were due to take place on December 12, 1959. The United Kingdom Representative said that Her Majesty's Government could not accept this view. It was then too late to stop the elections which would take place only a few days later and there

was no sign that this was what the people in the territory wanted. Even the parties which had campaigned against immediate union with Nigeria in the plebiscite were campaigning in the elections. The United Kingdom Government did, however, propose that the members representing the Northern Cameroons in the Federal Legislature and in the Northern Region Legislature would not sit after Nigeria became independent.

258. Because of disagreement on this question of elections, no Afro-Asian Delegation felt able to sponsor a draft resolution on the Northern Cameroons; but all members of the Assembly eventually supported the draft which was tabled by Canada, Denmark and Sweden, after it had been amended to include a paragraph noting that it was too late to take a decision with regard to the participation of the Northern Cameroons in the Nigerian Federal elections, and another paragraph declaring that such participation should not influence the free choice of the people in the forthcoming plebiscite.

259. The resolution recommended that the plebiscite should be conducted on the basis of universal adult suffrage. In the previous plebiscite there was adult male suffrage, as is the case for elections in the Northern Region of Nigeria. Sir Andrew Cohen reserved the position of the Government of Nigeria on the question of women's votes, as that Government would have to be consulted after the elections of December 12. A majority of Members were strongly in favour of universal suffrage and had only agreed to male suffrage for the previous plebiscite because it was not practicable in the time available to arrange for a new registration.

260. Two Ministers from the Northern Region Government, who were present during the debate as members of the United Kingdom Delegation, indicated their acceptance of the resolution subject to the reservation on the franchise.

#### *French Cameroons*

261. It had been decided at the resumed Thirteenth Session in March 1959 that the trusteeship agreement for the French Cameroons should be terminated on January 1, 1960. It had also been decided to reject a proposal, supported by most of the African Delegations, that elections supervised by the United Nations should be held before independence. Although by the time this matter came up in the Fourth Committee independence was only some six weeks ahead, a draft resolution was tabled proposing that a special United Nations mission should be sent to the territory to try to achieve a reconciliation between the Government and the parties which had resorted to terrorism. The draft resolution was supported by the African Delegations who had previously demanded United Nations supervised elections, and by a number of others. The Representative of France strongly opposed this draft resolution on the grounds that it misrepresented conditions in the territory; that to send a mission of the kind proposed would be an insult to a young country on the eve of its independence; and that it would not assist in restoring order and would damage the prestige of the United Nations. The draft resolution was defeated by 33 votes to 41 (including the United Kingdom) with 7 abstentions.



262. The Representative of Italy informed the Committee that the Legislature of the Trust Territory of Somalia under Italian administration had requested that trusteeship should be terminated earlier than December 2, 1960, the date laid down in the Somalia Trusteeship Agreement. He could not propose a new date to the Committee; this would depend on the time required to complete the many preparations which were being made for the transfer of power. After discussion, a draft resolution was tabled proposing that the Trusteeship Agreement should be terminated on a date to be agreed between Italy as the Administering Authority and the Government of Somalia. This at first seemed likely to gain support, although some amendments were proposed, for example that the agreement of the United Nations Advisory Council in Somalia should also be required in fixing the new date. A number of delegations, however, pressed for the fixing of a precise date and ultimately a revised draft resolution was put forward fixing July 1, 1960, as the date for termination of the trusteeship agreement. This was adopted unanimously.

#### *Other Trust Territories*

263. The Assembly adopted a resolution fixing the date for the termination of the trusteeship agreement for the Territory of Togoland under French administration. At its previous Session it had accepted that Togoland should become independent on a date in 1960 to be agreed between the Governments of France and of the Trust Territory. The date fixed was April 27, 1960.

264. Considerable attention was concentrated on the Trust Territory of Ruanda Urundi under Belgian administration. During the debate on Trust Territories, the Belgian Representative announced new plans which his Government had adopted for the reorganisation of the administration of the territory. During the Assembly session, disturbances mostly involving fighting between members of the Bahutu and Batutsi tribes broke out in the territory. There were suggestions that the Assembly should send a special mission to investigate the situation. Eventually the Committee adopted a resolution requesting the Trusteeship Council to despatch early in 1960 the normal visiting mission (which would in any case be visiting the East African Trust Territories during 1960), and to instruct it to investigate the causes of the disturbances. The Belgian Representative voiced certain reservations about the wording of the resolution but did not oppose it and it was passed with no dissenting vote.

265. Sir Andrew Cohen, the United Kingdom Representative, made a statement on the constitutional position, and advances in other fields, in Tanganyika (the text of Sir Andrew Cohen's speech is at Annex VIII). There were suggestions during the debate that a date for independence for Tanganyika should be announced, but generally the report of recent developments there was well received.

266. The Fourth Committee also adopted a number of resolutions dealing with the Trust Territories generally:—

- (1) A resolution asking the Secretary-General to initiate discussions with Administering Authorities with a view to establishing, during 1960, in at least some of the larger Trust Territories such as Tanganyika,

Ruandi Urundi and New Guinea, information centres for the purpose of disseminating information about the United Nations and the international trusteeship system. The United Kingdom Representative abstained on this resolution, explaining that while Her Majesty's Government were willing to discuss the matter, information about the United Nations was already being disseminated adequately and the United Kingdom Government saw no need for the establishment of new information centres, particularly since demands for information centres in independent countries were already more than could be met by the present resources of the United Nations Office of Public Information.

- (2) A resolution on offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Trust Territories. This resolution, on the lines of others passed in previous years, asked Administering Authorities to take all necessary measures consistent with the interests and needs of the territories to ensure that scholarships offered by Member States were used. The United Kingdom Representative voted in favour.
- (3) A resolution stressing the importance of "expeditious measures on a planned basis" for the training of indigenous staff in the Trust Territories. The United Kingdom Representative, who explained that this was in line with the policies of Her Majesty's Government supported the resolution.
- (4) A resolution calling for the fixing of timetables and targets for the attainment of independence by the Trust Territories of Tanganyika and Ruandi Urundi in the near future. The United Kingdom Representative voted against this resolution on the grounds that it is not the policy of Her Majesty's Government to fix final target dates for independence until the last stage of development towards independence is reached.
- (5) Three resolutions dealt with aid to Trust Territories and former Trust Territories. The Representative of Haiti proposed the establishment of a special committee to study the means by which the United Nations could provide aid to former Trust Territories which had become independent. A draft resolution for this purpose was amended in the Committee to request instead that the Economic and Social Council should make a study of this question; this resolution was then adopted. A resolution inviting the Secretary-General and the Specialised Agencies to give urgent and sympathetic consideration to requests to supply such territories with experts or other forms of technical aid was adopted with no dissenting vote. A resolution noting with satisfaction the assistance given to French Togoland by agencies of the United Nations was also adopted.

### **Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories**

267. Under this item the Committee considered the report of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories which had concentrated its attention during 1959 on education. The United Kingdom Representative made a comprehensive statement on education in British territories, which was generally well received.

268. The Committee adopted a number of resolutions dealing with non-self-governing territories :

- (1) A resolution establishing a Committee to investigate the principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit information under Article 73 (e). (At the three preceding Sessions proposals for a Committee to deal with the question of transmissions had been carried by simple majority in the Fourth Committee but had failed to obtain the required majority in Plenary.) The draft resolution tabled at the Fourteenth Session proposed that the Committee's investigations should be confined to general principles and that the Committee should be composed of an equal number of administering and non-administering members. The United Kingdom Representative explained that since it was clear that the Committee would not be entitled to investigate particular cases or the affairs of particular Member States, the United Kingdom Delegation would withdraw its previous opposition to the proposal and would be willing to be elected to the Committee. The Representatives of Portugal, Belgium and France opposed the resolution, which was carried by 53 votes to 9 with 12 abstentions (including Australia, New Zealand, the United States, United Kingdom and the Netherlands). Later the United Kingdom was elected a member of the Committee, which is to report to the Fifteenth Session of the Assembly.
- (2) A resolution about the Report on Progress in Non-Self-Governing Territories, based on information supplied under Article 73 (e), called for by the Assembly at its Eleventh Session. This resolution asked the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories to examine this report "with a view to ascertaining the progress made by the inhabitants of the non-self-governing territories in the light of the objectives set forth in Chapter XI of the Charter". The United Kingdom Representative abstained on this resolution, which was adopted by 55 votes to 1 with 7 abstentions, explaining that Her Majesty's Government remained sceptical about the value of the report and continued to have reservations about the legality of the Committee on Information.
- (3) A resolution on the association of non-self-governing territories with the European Economic Community. The United Kingdom Representative voted against this resolution, in company with most members of the European Free Trade Association and of the European Economic Community because it invited the Committee on Information to pay particular attention to this question which, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, is more appropriately dealt with in the GATT.
- (4) A resolution urging the participation of non-self-governing territories in the work of the United Nations and the Specialised Agencies. This was adopted by 51 votes to 2 with 12 abstentions. The abstentions included the United Kingdom whose Representative explained that, although the United Kingdom had done much to associate its territories with the work of organs of the United Nations and the Specialised Agencies, the resolution appeared to concern the composition of

delegations of Member States, which was a matter for the States themselves.

- (5) Two resolutions dealing with education. The first, proposed by Roumania, called for the development of primary education in non-self-governing territories up to the level enjoyed by the peoples of advanced countries. The second called for racial integration and equal treatment for members of different races in education. The United Kingdom supported both of these resolutions.
- (6) A resolution on the dissemination of information about the United Nations in non-self-governing territories. This resolution asked Administering Members to take measures to spread information about the United Nations among the inhabitants of non-self-governing territories and asked the Secretary-General to report to the Fifteenth Session of the Assembly on measures which had been taken and further measures which might be needed. The resolution was adopted by a large majority, the United Kingdom voting in favour.
- (7) A resolution on the voluntary transmission of information on political developments in non-self-governing territories. This resolution, on the lines of similar resolutions adopted in the past, urged Administering Members to transmit to the United Nations, in addition to the information on economic, social and educational conditions required by Article 73 (e), information on political developments. It expressed the view that this would enable the Assembly to make a better assessment of the information on educational, social and economic affairs, and that the voluntary transmission of political information was fully in accord with the spirit of Article 73 of the Charter. The United Kingdom Representative voted against this resolution, explaining that, in Her Majesty's Government's view, the United Nations should not put pressure on any member to exceed its obligations under the Charter in this way.
- (8) A resolution noting and approving the United States decision to cease transmitting information in respect of Alaska and Hawaii, which had become States in the American Union. This resolution was amended to include a paragraph asserting the competence of the Assembly to determine whether a territory is non-self-governing. The United Kingdom Representative, while warmly congratulating the people of Alaska and Hawaii, explained that he was compelled to abstain on the resolution because the assertion of the Assembly's competence was not in accordance with the views of Her Majesty's Government.
- (9) A resolution dealing with offers of study and training facilities for inhabitants of non-self-governing territories in similar terms to that adopted in relation to Trust Territories (paragraph 266 (2) above).

269. A draft resolution calling upon Administering Members to submit to the United Nations for consideration at the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly, time-tables for the attainment of independence by non-self-governing territories, was tabled by Guinea. The adoption of such a resolution, dealing with political progress in non-self-governing territories, would have been unprecedented in the work of the Fourth Committee.

During the debate the Representatives of India, Ghana, Mexico and others appealed to Guinea to withdraw the draft resolution because it would have endangered the co-operation on which the work of the Fourth Committee was based; the United Kingdom Representative also appealed for its withdrawal, to which the Representative of Guinea eventually agreed.

### **Ethiopia-Somalia Frontier**

270. The Fourth Committee was informed of the failure of the parties to reach any agreement on the terms of reference for arbitration. The parties had been assisted by Mr. Trygve Lie, the independent person appointed by the King of Norway in accordance with the resolution adopted at the Thirteenth Session. Considerable efforts made in private negotiations during the Fourteenth Session to promote an agreed solution were rewarded with some progress. The Italian Representative made it clear that the Government of Somalia would be prepared to accept the provisional administrative line as a provisional frontier, provided it was demarcated by a Commission in which there was United Nations representation. It did not however prove possible to reach agreement on arrangements for demarcation and the Assembly did not adopt any resolution on this subject.

## **ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY QUESTIONS—THE FIFTH COMMITTEE**

### **Budgetary Questions**

#### *Main Estimates for 1960*

271. Appropriations approved by the Committee totalled (gross) \$63,149,700, an increase of \$2,347,580 over the corresponding figure for the previous year. Income other than staff assessment was estimated at \$5,357,500, leaving a net estimated expenditure figure for 1960 of \$57,792,200. (Income from staff assessment was estimated at \$6,329,000.)

272. As in previous years, approximately two-thirds of the gross total (\$41,837,200) was accounted for by the direct costs of the Secretariat, and about one-half (\$31,925,200) by salaries and wages. Relative to this the other items of expenditure continued to be held at a modest and reasonable level. The travel of representatives and members of missions and committees, and expenses incurred by special meetings and conferences, amounted to \$947,900. The various "special missions" and the United Nations Field Service were estimated to cost \$3,730,100 in 1960, and the administrative expenses of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (partially offset by a grant-in-aid from voluntary funds) a further \$1,467,000. The cost of common services and equipment, and special expenses relating to the acquisition of major capital assets (including the proposed new United Nations building in Santiago, Chile: see paragraph 290 below) were expected to account for just under \$12 million; and about \$2.4 million was appropriated for technical assistance activities financed from the regular budget of the United Nations. (These activities are in addition to the work done by the United Nations and its agencies under programmes contributed by Member Governments on a voluntary basis, e.g., the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the United Nations Special Fund.)

273. In debate, many delegations expressed the view that a budget considerably in excess of \$60 million gave cause for reflection, particularly as regards the economically weaker members, some of whom were near the limit of their financial capacity. The United Nations budget should be seen in the context of other international commitments, both within the United Nations family of organisations and elsewhere, and the burden on members who not only carried their assessed share of the activities of the United Nations family, but contributed also to its voluntary programmes, was steadily increasing.

274. At the same time, the 1960 budget seemed to many delegations to have established a reasonable balance between economy and efficiency, having regard to the level of work programme which the majority of members felt justified. Certain increases (*e.g.*, an appropriation of over \$1 million for the Economic Commission for Africa) were held to be essential to the healthy development of the United Nations. This did not, however, imply that a policy of stabilisation, particularly with regard to administrative and operational costs, should not be endorsed. In this connexion, it was noted that United Nations expenditure had risen by some 25 per cent. between 1955 and 1960; the increase over the same period over the entire United Nations family of organisations was almost 50 per cent.

#### *Supplementary Estimates for 1959*

275. The Fifth Committee approved a supplementary gross provision of \$854,980 to the amount (\$60,802,120) appropriated by resolution 1338 (XIII) for 1959. More than half (\$442,500) of this provision was in respect of inescapable increases in staff costs and in expenditure on staff travel. A further substantial amount (\$348,000) was required for special meetings and conferences (this increase was wholly attributable to the Conference on Nuclear Tests in Geneva). Compensating savings were found in other sections, particularly in that covering the technical assistance programmes, where the original estimates for the Opex Programme (provision of operational, executive, and administrative personnel) proved to be considerably in advance of what the Secretary-General was able to achieve in 1959.

276. There was less criticism than in previous years of the need for substantial supplementary appropriation. In 1958, supplementary provision of over \$6 million had been found necessary, but it was recognised that this very large additional appropriation had been made necessary by exceptional circumstances (the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon and tasks in the Middle East arising out of General Assembly resolution 1237 (ES-III)).

277. The reduction in the level of supplementary requirements for 1959 more than offset the increase in the main estimates for 1960, thus resulting in a lower contribution base for 1960; and the relative modesty of the provision, in which the Advisory Committee had found scope for only minor reductions, testified (in the opinion of most members) to a strengthening of administrative and financial control.

#### *Working Capital Fund*

278. As in previous years, the Secretary-General found it necessary to draw attention to the serious cash position of the Organisation. Cash requirements continued to be greater than available resources; at the end

of 1958, outstanding contributions to the regular budget totalled \$7·8 million and to United Nations Emergency Force assessments, \$15·4 million. The root of the difficulty was the failure of Member States to pay their contributions immediately they fell due. The Secretary-General thought that, if the solvency of the Organisation was to be maintained, there was a case for increasing the level of the Working Capital Fund by \$3 million or \$4 million in 1960; but as responsibility for the cash position was not his alone, but rested equally with Member Governments, he refrained from putting forward a formal recommendation. After consideration by the Advisory Committee, and discussion in the Fifth Committee, it was agreed that the Working Capital Fund should be increased by \$1·5 million, which would bring it up to the level of \$25 million for 1960, and would accord with the recommendation made by the Advisory Committee in 1958, when the level of the Working Capital Fund had been extensively discussed. As in previous years, the Secretary-General was authorised to borrow cash at normal rates of interest from special funds in his custody, but a proposal to authorise him to borrow on a short-term basis from commercial sources was rejected. The Fifth Committee also requested him to address a special appeal to Member States for earlier payment of their contributions, and to report the results to the General Assembly at its Fifteenth Session.

#### *Future Estimates*

279. In previous years, concern had been felt at the extent to which new programmes and new expenditures arising in the middle of a financial year affected the original estimates agreed by the Fifth Committee. On the initiative, therefore, of the Delegations of the Soviet Union, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States, the Committee unanimously accepted a resolution aimed at restricting to a minimum additions to the total work programme for any one year. This resolution requested all organs of the United Nations to consider ways and means for deferring "new projects" until suitable provision for them could be made in the main budget estimates of a subsequent financial year. Exceptions would, however, be made in projects of "major and urgent importance" or where the new expenditure could be offset by postponing other projects of a lower priority.

#### **United Nations Emergency Force: Cost Estimates and Financing**

280. The original estimates for 1960 submitted by the Secretary-General for the expenses of the Force totalled \$18,916,000 but at a later stage these estimates were revised upwards to a total of \$20,206,000. In the Secretary-General's view there was no possibility of substantial savings in the cost of maintaining the Force in 1960, beyond those which had already been taken into account in the estimate; a decrease or limitation in the size of the Force would require a reassessment of its functions and responsibility.

281. As regards 1959, the Secretary-General submitted revised estimates providing for increased requirements totalling \$1,900,000, against which savings of \$950,000 on other items could be estimated. On the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the Fifth Committee agreed that the remaining net additional requirement of \$950,000 could be financed by a transfer from the \$1 million

provided under Section 9 towards the reserve for compensation in respect of equipment, materials and supplies provided by Governments to their contingents. The 1959 budget thus remained within the total of \$19 million appropriated by the General Assembly in 1958.

282. The Advisory Committee and the Fifth Committee agreed that for 1960 an appropriation of \$20 million should be made for the Force. It was suggested, however, that efforts should be made to hold expenditure within a target figure of \$19.5 million.

283. As in previous years, the debate in the Fifth Committee paid special attention to the method of financing the expenditure on the Force in 1960. In pursuance of resolution 1337 (XIII) the Secretary-General had consulted with Member States as to how in their view the maintenance of the Force should be financed. By the time the financing was discussed in the Fifth Committee, fifty-one Member States had replied. Of thirty-nine favouring assessment of the United Nations Emergency Force expenses among all Members, thirty considered that the basis of assessment should be the scale of assessment adopted for the United Nations budget, while nine preferred the introduction of some different scale of assessment. On the other hand, eight Member States (Saudi Arabia and the Soviet *bloc* less Czechoslovakia) reiterated their view that only the States "which took the action resulting in the creation of the Force" should pay its expenses. Of the remainder, two indicated merely their inability to contribute, one proposed that the costs be defrayed entirely by voluntary contributions, and one preferred to await the discussion before taking a definite position.

284. In the course of the debate, the Representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, while maintaining their position that the expenses of the Force should be financed on the regular scale of assessment, announced that, subject to Parliamentary approval, their Governments would make voluntary contributions to the expenses of the Force in 1960 of about \$3.2 million and \$275,000 respectively.

285. As a result, a seven-Power resolution was introduced which took account of the fact that voluntary contributions of this order would permit of a 50 per cent. reduction in the assessments of all Member States except the five highest contributors (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States). The resolution after formally assessing the amount of \$20 million against all Member States on the basis of the regular scale of assessment, decided that voluntary contributions pledged before the end of 1959 should be applied to reduce by 50 per cent. the contributions of as many Member States as possible, beginning with those assessed at the lowest percentage rate; it went on to provide that, if Member States did not avail themselves of this 50 per cent. credit, the amounts involved would accrue to the 1960 budget for the Force. This resolution was finally approved in Plenary by 49 votes to 9, with 21 abstentions.

286. During the debate both the Secretary-General and many representatives drew attention to the failure of certain Member States to pay their dues for the upkeep of the Force. As at October 31, 1959, there was a balance due of just under \$19.5 million out of a total assessment for 1957, 1958 and 1959 of about \$55.2 million. By the end of 1959, the Secretary-General estimated that the United Nations Emergency Force Special Account



would have to draw over \$6 million from the Working Capital Fund and would have unliquidated obligations of over \$12 million. There was no substantive discussion on how this short-fall might ultimately have to be met.

### **Scale of Assessments: Committee on Contributions**

287. As a revised scale of assessment for Members' contributions to the United Nations budget had been agreed in 1958 for the years 1959–61 there was no discussion in the Committee, as there had been in previous years, about the detailed level of assessments of individual countries. The only new Member, the Republic of Guinea, was assessed at the minimum level (0·04 per cent.) and her contribution for 1958, the year of admission to membership, was, in accordance with a precedent established in 1957, placed at one-ninth of a full year's assessment.

288. Considerable discussion arose, however, on a related item—the availability of the material at the disposal of the Committee on Contributions. This question had first been raised in 1958, when there had been considerable criticism of the assessment level proposed for certain Member States. Some representatives argued that Member States whose assessment had been increased were not able to judge the appropriateness of the increase unless they were able to compare their assessment with that of other countries whose economic circumstances were considered to be similar. To do this it would be necessary to make available to Member States the data used by the Committee on Contributions in deciding the level of assessment. On the other hand, other speakers contended that the question of assessments was of such complexity involving not only statistical calculations but also factors of judgment, that the Assembly had always preferred to leave it to a small group of experts—the Committee on Contributions—whose competence and impartiality were unquestioned. Moreover, should access be authorised to all the material available, some Members might be reluctant to continue supplying confidential information to the Committee.

289. In the event a compromise resolution was worked out which recognised that although it would be desirable for the material at the Committee's disposal to be available to all Member States there were practical difficulties in the way. At the same time the Contributions Committee was asked to review the matter periodically so that, at its discretion, future requests for "pertinent" information on the material used by it as a basis for its recommendations might be granted.

### **United Nations Buildings**

#### *Headquarters Building for the Economic Commission for Latin America in Santiago, Chile*

290. In 1958 the Committee had accepted a gift of land in Santiago by the Government of Chile and authorised the Secretary-General to proceed with the construction of a headquarters building at a cost not to exceed \$850,000. The Secretary-General, however, now found it necessary in 1959 to submit a revised estimate of \$1,550,000. He attributed the increase in estimates of \$700,000 to a rise in building costs and prices in Chile (accounting for about 30 per cent. of the total increase), an increase in

space requirements and a revised contingency item of \$200,000. While some representatives felt that the revised proposals were sufficiently justified, others considered that the large discrepancy between the revised proposals and the initial cost figures presented in 1958 disclosed a disturbing weakness in the processes of planning and estimation. The critics emphasised that in 1958 the Fifth Committee had approved the \$850,000 appropriation on the basis of what it believed to be a reasonably firm estimate and a precise scheme of financing. It was, however, agreed after discussion that the project should go forward "at a cost not to exceed \$1,550,000", of which \$20,000 would be appropriated for 1959 and the balance in annual instalments of \$382,500 for each of the ensuing four years.

#### *Modernisation of the Palais des Nations in Geneva*

291. Upward revisions of estimates were also found necessary for this project, which had been originally approved by the General Assembly in 1957. The effect of the revisions was to raise the total appropriation required from just over \$1.2 million to just under \$1.8 million. These increases were due to altered requirements and improvements in the Assembly Hall area of the Palais. The basic method of financing by ten instalments between 1957 and 1966 was continued, but with a variation of the repayments schedule whereby the amount of the annual instalment would rise from \$121,000 to \$131,000 in 1963 and to \$311,000 for each of the three years 1964 to 1966.

#### *New Library Building in New York: Gift of the Ford Foundation*

292. The Secretary-General announced that the Ford Foundation had offered to donate \$6.2 million for the construction of a new library building on the headquarters site in New York. This amount represents, with the accruing interest, a sum sufficient to cover the cost of constructing, furnishing and equipping the new library in accordance with the highest modern standards.

293. This munificent gift was doubly welcome because not only is the exterior of the present library incongruous with the rest of the United Nations buildings, but its facilities have long been inadequate to the growing demands made on it by delegations, by the Secretariat, and by outside educational bodies. The gift was gratefully accepted, and the Secretary-General was authorised to proceed with the building and equipping of a new library on the headquarters site, within the amount of the gift. It was recognised that additional expenditure would be necessary, first, to relocate the present library facilities during the transitional period, and secondly to bring the staff and the collection up to a standard comparable with the new library building to be built. The Secretary-General will report on these matters to the Fifteenth General Assembly.

#### **United Nations International School**

294. The United Nations International School was established as a private venture for the education of the children of members of the United Nations Secretariat, but over the 10 years of its existence its scholars had

been drawn also from the children of members of permanent Missions to the United Nations and from families in New York not directly connected with the United Nations.

295. Throughout most of its existence the School has been in financial difficulties, and from time to time subventions, mostly of comparatively small amounts, have been accorded it from the United Nations budget to tide it over particular difficulties. In 1958 the General Assembly decided, as a special measure, to make a grant of \$32,700 towards meeting the expected deficit in respect of the academic year 1958-59, and requested the Secretary-General to use his good offices in helping the School to find permanent quarters in Manhattan and to raise funds privately for the construction of a building.

296. This year the Secretary-General proposed that the United Nations should take a more substantial and permanent stake in the financing of the School. He put forward a suggestion for placing the annual net revenue of the United Nations Gift Centre (a revenue producing activity) in a special fund to assist the United Nations International School. In 1960, the amount involved would have been about \$150,000. The Secretary-General argued that such a device would obviate the necessity for continuing a grant-in-aid to the School, and would allow it to plan its future with assurances of solvency, thus qualifying it for capital assistance from voluntary sources for the building and equipping of new premises.

297. This proposal was sponsored in an eight-Power draft resolution. An alternative draft, submitted by the Delegations of Argentina and the United States suggested that the Assembly decide in principle to contribute to the School for a period of five years, and defer until the next session consideration of the idea of a fund financed from the Gift Centre revenue, as well as other means of financing.

298. Both these proposals were objected to by several delegations (including the United Kingdom) which, while sympathising with the School's difficulties, could not accept that the regular budget of the United Nations should have a continuing financial commitment to the School, or any obligation to cover its operating deficits, particularly as the School served children of families not connected with the United Nations.

299. The delegations sponsoring the two draft resolutions referred to above eventually reached a compromise resolution by which the School Trustees were invited to establish an International School Fund, to which the United Nations would contribute, over a period of five years, such continuing financial assistance as the General Assembly considered necessary. For the year 1960, it was proposed to make a contribution of \$100,000. The Secretary-General was also asked to use his good offices in finding suitable permanent accommodation for the School, in developing plans for a new building and in helping to raise funds from private sources for the benefit of the School. This resolution was ultimately adopted as a whole in the Fifth Committee by 38 votes for, none against with 18 abstentions, and in the Plenary by 55 votes for, none against with 19 abstentions; on the operative paragraph relating to continuing financial assistance over five years the voting in the Fifth Committee was 32 votes for, 22 against with 6 abstentions, and in the Plenary by 46 votes for, 15 against with 13 abstentions.

## **Public Information Activities of the United Nations**

300. At the Thirteenth General Assembly in 1958, the report of the Committee of Experts on United Nations Public Information had given rise in the Fifth Committee to the longest and most controversial debate of the Session. Eventually, after much discussion the Secretary-General was invited by resolution 1335 (XIII) to give effect so far as practicable to the recommendations of the experts and to report progress at the next Session of the General Assembly.

301. The Secretary-General's report was made available to Member States in the early autumn of 1959. The Secretary-General made it clear that this report was to be read as an interim provisional submission only. The task of reorganising the Office of Public Information was not one which could be completed in such a short space of time.

302. The debate in the Fifth Committee was therefore more restricted than in 1958 and concentrated more on administrative details and on financial policy. After a series of resolutions had been put forward representing various points of view, the Committee approved a unified resolution with the following main operative paragraphs. The Secretary-General was requested to pay special attention to "adequate regional representation" in the Office of Public Information and in the distribution of information centres. There was general agreement that the establishment of new information centres, particularly in areas where mass information media were less developed, was of the highest priority and to this end the Secretary-General was asked to consider a further decentralisation of headquarters staff and services. On the financial side, the Committee took note of the policy of budgetary stabilisation proposed by the Secretary-General and requested him, in the light of this policy, to plan his information programmes for 1960 on the assumption that the total net expenditure of the year should be about \$5 million.

303. This last provision implied that the Secretary-General would have during the year to find savings of about \$150,000 in his estimated budget. It also however implied a recognition that the ceiling of \$4.5 million for information expenditure which had originally been suggested by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and supported by many Member Delegations both last year and this, was now too low to meet the increasing demands of Member States for United Nations information and news.

304. The Committee also agreed that the Secretary-General should appoint a panel of qualified persons, representing the main geographical areas and cultures of the world, to consult and advise on United Nations information policies and programmes and to ensure maximum effectiveness at minimum cost. Finally, it invited him to report to the Fifteenth Session on the implementation of these measures and on the further implementation of resolution 1335 (XIII).

## **Questions Affecting the Secretariat**

### *Organisation and Management of Work of the Secretariat*

305. The last general review of the organisation and work of the United Nations Secretariat was in 1954-55. Since then, the membership of the United Nations has risen from 55 to 82, with a concurrent increase in the volume and

scope of the Secretariat's activities. In discussion in previous years, and in reports of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the usefulness of conducting periodic general reviews of the structure and functioning of United Nations bodies had been emphasised. On the initiative of the Delegations of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States discussions were begun early in the Session with the Secretary-General and with Member States about the possibility of another overall review to take place in 1960 or 1961.

306. As a result of these discussions, a resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States (the United Arab Republic later joined as a co-sponsor) was unanimously adopted. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Committee of Experts to work with him in reviewing the activities and organisation of the Secretariat with a view to effecting or proposing further measures designed to ensure maximum economy and efficiency of the Secretariat. The Committee was to be composed of six persons, experienced in the various aspects of administration, and chosen with due regard to geographical distribution. This Committee would present an interim report to the Secretary-General in 1960, to enable him to present provisional recommendations to the General Assembly at its Fifteenth Session; a further report or reports, together with the Secretary-General's final recommendations, would be put forward to the Sixteenth Session in 1961.

#### *Geographical Distribution of Staff*

307. The question of an "equitable" geographical distribution of staff has appeared regularly on the Fifth Committee's agenda for some years. At the 1958 Assembly a resolution was adopted asking the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to achieve a better geographical distribution of staff, giving particular regard to posts at the top level. Although the Secretary-General's progress report on what he had achieved in the past year was welcomed as a step in the direction of a wider and better geographical distribution of appointments many delegations commented on what they regarded as a continuing imbalance in the distribution of staff. Some members expressed the view that, as a means of achieving a better balance at the higher levels, the "principle of geographical distribution" should be applied not only to recruitment but to promotion. This argument, however, was rejected by those who believed that to admit the element of nationality into a promotion system would be inequitable to the individual, and harmful to the Organisation; quality, not nationality, should be the basis of promotion.

308. After considerable discussion the Committee endorsed a resolution originally submitted by Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Republic, which recommended that in recruitment priority should be given to qualified candidates from Member States which have either no nationals, or a disproportionately small number of their nationals, on the staff. The resolution also recommended that vacancies at the higher levels of the Secretariat should be filled, as far as possible, by qualified candidates "representative of geographical areas and main cultures which are not represented, or not adequately represented, in these key posts".

## LEGAL ITEMS—THE SIXTH COMMITTEE

### Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its Eleventh Session

309. The Report contained the results of the work of the International Law Commission on the Law of Treaties and on Consular Intercourse and Immunities. It also stated that the Commission had decided to give first priority at its next Session to the item on Consular Intercourse and Immunities and also to place on the provisional agenda for that Session the subjects of State Responsibility, the Law of Treaties and *ad hoc* Diplomacy. The Sixth Committee unanimously recommended, and the General Assembly adopted without discussion or votes, a resolution taking note of the Report of the Commission.

310. In the course of discussion of the Report two draft resolutions were tabled in the Sixth Committee. The first requested the International Law Commission, as soon as it considered it advisable, to undertake the codification of the principles and rules of international law relating to the right of asylum. The second draft resolution declared that it was desirable to initiate preliminary studies on the legal problems relating to the utilisation and use of international rivers with a view to determining whether the subject is appropriate for codification, and requested the Secretary-General to prepare and circulate to Member States a report containing information regarding the laws and legislation of Member States, bilateral and multilateral treaties, decisions of international tribunals and a survey of studies by non-governmental organisations. The Committee recommended these draft resolutions to the General Assembly. The General Assembly adopted the former by 56 votes to none with 11 abstentions, and the latter by 63 votes to none with 3 abstentions.

### Reservations to Multilateral Conventions: the Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation<sup>(1)</sup>

311. This item was placed on the agenda of the Fourteenth Session on the proposal of India. The Representative of India, in introducing the item in the Sixth Committee, explained that India had signed the Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (I.M.C.O.) and that, after the Convention entered into force in 1958, an instrument of acceptance by India was deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations as depositary of the Convention on January 6, 1959, the date on which the First Session of the Assembly of I.M.C.O. was convened. The instrument stipulated that the acceptance was subject to a number of "conditions" concerning the consistency with the purposes of I.M.C.O. of any measures of the Government of India for assisting its national shipping. The Assembly of I.M.C.O. adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary-General of the United Nations to circulate the Indian document to States Members of I.M.C.O., and deciding that, until the Member States had had an opportunity of expressing their views, India should be free to take part without vote in the proceedings of the I.M.C.O. Assembly. The Secretary-General thereupon advised the Indian Mission to the United Nations that the practice as to the circulation of reservations or declarations applicable

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<sup>(1)</sup> "Treaty Series No. 54 (1958)", Cmnd. 589.

to conventions adopted prior to General Assembly resolution 598 (VI) of January 12, 1952, would be followed. The Government of India took the view that the Secretary-General's communication amounted to an intimation that the Indian instrument of acceptance could take effect only if all States Members of I.M.C.O. expressly or tacitly accepted the "conditions" which India had attached to it. Two States Members of I.M.C.O. transmitted formal objections to the Indian "conditions", but India nevertheless considered herself a full member of I.M.C.O.

312. The Representative of India stated that India, in accepting the Convention, had merely made a declaration of policy not amounting to a reservation, and intended only to restate the purposes and the advisory and consultative functions of I.M.C.O. with which any measure adopted by the Government of India would be consistent. He also contended that the Secretary-General of the United Nations should have accepted the instrument of acceptance without question, that it was *ultra vires* and contrary to the United Nations Charter for him to act under the instructions of I.M.C.O. in circulating the declaration, and that the procedure followed violated General Assembly resolution 598 (VI).

313. Many representatives in the Committee held that the Secretary-General derived his authority in this particular matter from the final articles of the I.M.C.O. Convention and from the request in the resolution passed by the I.M.C.O. Assembly. They therefore considered that if the General Assembly gave other instructions to the Secretary-General or to I.M.C.O. it would be claiming a supervisory authority over a Specialised Agency which it did not have. The Committee was however virtually unanimous in welcoming the statement by the Representative of India that the Government of India had merely made a declaration of policy intended to be consistent with the Convention, and not amounting to a reservation. The Committee recommended to the General Assembly a draft resolution which noted the statement made on behalf of India explaining that the Indian declaration was a declaration of policy and that it did not constitute a reservation, and which expressed the hope that in the light of this statement an appropriate solution to regularise the position of India might be reached in the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation at an early date. The General Assembly adopted this resolution by 72 votes to 1, with 2 abstentions.

314. The Committee also debated at length the general question of the procedure which the Secretary-General of the United Nations should follow when, acting as depositary of a multilateral convention, he receives a ratification to which one or more reservations are attached or receives objections to reservations. General Assembly resolution 598 (VI) of January 12, 1952, requires the Secretary-General to circulate all reservations or objections, without expressing an opinion on the legal effect of such documents, but leaving it to each State to draw legal consequences from such communications. This resolution applied only to conventions concluded after January 12, 1952, under the auspices of the United Nations. A number of delegations argued that there would be practical advantage in authorising the Secretary-General to follow the same procedure in all cases regardless of the date on which the particular convention had been concluded, while others considered that the procedure instituted by resolution 598 (VI) could

not be extended to all conventions without exception until a thorough technical study of all aspects of the problem had been made. The Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly a draft resolution requesting the Secretary-General to apply to his depositary practice, until such time as the General Assembly might give further instructions, the procedure laid down in resolution 598 (VI) in respect of all conventions concluded under the auspices of the United Nations which do not contain provisions to the contrary and requesting the Secretary-General to obtain information from all depositary States and international organisations with respect to depositary practice in relation to reservations, and to prepare a summary of such practices, including his own, for use by the International Law Commission in preparing its reports on the Law of Treaties and by the General Assembly in considering these reports. The General Assembly adopted this resolution by 74 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

### **Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities**

315. At its Thirteenth Session the General Assembly, having considered the draft articles and commentaries on diplomatic intercourse and immunities prepared by the International Law Commission at its Tenth Session, decided to conclude the item "Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities" in the provisional agenda of its Fourteenth Session with a view to the early conclusion of a convention, and decided to consider at its Fourteenth Session the question to what body the formulation of the convention should be entrusted. A majority of representatives in the Sixth Committee favoured the convening of a conference. Some representatives maintained that the conference should not be convened until such time as the reports under preparation in the International Law Commission on consular intercourse and immunities and *ad hoc* diplomacy were completed and these subjects added to the agenda of the conference. Some representatives also argued that "all States" must be invited to the conference, while a majority favoured the practice hitherto followed by the United Nations of inviting only States Members of the United Nations and the Specialised Agencies and States parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice<sup>(5)</sup>. A generous offer having been made by the Austrian Government to arrange for the conference to be held in Vienna and to pay the additional costs as compared with those of holding a conference in New York, the Committee recommended to the General Assembly a draft resolution deciding that an international conference of plenipotentiaries should be convoked at Vienna not later than the spring of 1961 to consider the question of diplomatic intercourse and immunities and to embody the results of its work in an international convention, and to invite all States Members of the United Nations and of the Specialised Agencies and States parties to the Statute of the International Court, to participate in the conference. The General Assembly adopted this resolution by 67 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

### **Publication of a United Nations Juridical Year Book**

316. The Committee had before it the report by the Secretary-General, requested by the General Assembly at its Thirteenth Session, on the Question of the Publication of a United Nations Juridical Year Book. A majority

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<sup>(5)</sup> "Treaty Series No. 67 (1946)", Cmd. 7015.



of the delegations which took part in the discussion favoured the publication of a Year Book. Some however declared that their attitude would depend upon the financial implications. There was also controversy about the contents of the Year Book. A suggestion that it should include articles by private individuals under their own names gave rise to various objections, as did also the suggestion that it should include abstracts of selected articles appearing in the principal legal journals of the world. The necessity for including bibliographical material was stressed by several delegations, and one delegation in particular advocated the inclusion of abstracts of articles concerning the United Nations and other questions of international law on the lines of the abstracts already published by UNESCO on questions concerning the social sciences. The Committee recommended to the General Assembly a draft resolution, deciding that a United Nations Juridical Year Book which would include documentary materials of a legal character relating to the United Nations should be published, requesting the Secretary-General to submit as a first step a report to the General Assembly at its Fifteenth Session containing a detailed outline of such a Year Book and deciding to consider this report at the Fifteenth Session. This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by 71 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

**Question of Initiating a Study of the Juridical Régime of Historic Waters, including Historic Bays**

317. This item was included in the agenda of the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly in pursuance of a request made by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958. In debate in the Committee some representatives referred to specific cases of claims in respect of historic waters and bays, but the majority reserved their position with regard to the substantive issues and held that the debate should be limited to the question of initiating a study. The Committee unanimously recommended to the General Assembly a draft resolution requesting the International Law Commission, as soon as it considers it advisable, to undertake the study of the Question of the Juridical Régime of Historic Waters, including Historic Bays, and to make such recommendations regarding the matter as the Commission deems appropriate. This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly without discussion or vote.

ANNEX I

**SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1959**

Mr. President,

It gives me great pleasure to congratulate you upon your election to your high office. You have had long experience at the United Nations. You are a well known, highly respected figure. Those who have known you for many years, as I have, add affection to their respect. We admire your intellectual capacity, your gift of oratory, your integrity and your very human personality. I hope you have a very happy and successful period of office.

I should also like to pay a tribute to the retiring President, Dr. Malik, of the Lebanon. He was elected at a time when conditions were not easy for him but he never faltered in his duty. He has our respect and our good wishes.

### **Strengthening the United Nations**

Sir, this is the annual stocktaking of the United Nations. It is the occasion on which we have to examine the year's work against the background of world events. We have to consider the extent to which that work has been successful and how the United Nations can be strengthened.

### **The Charter and its Inspiration**

British support for the United Nations is based on the following grounds. First of all the Charter embodies the hopes of the whole human race for peace and justice among men. It sets out a pattern for the regulation of international affairs. Notwithstanding human imperfections, the Charter enshrines the great ideals which should lighten the hearts of men in anxious times.

### **Keeping the Peace**

But quite apart from the idealism of the Charter, there is a number of practical ways in which the United Nations can help to promote peace and stability in the world.

One of its most important functions is to try to stop aggression and war, and to keep the peace. Although owing to the use of the veto in the Security Council, the United Nations cannot always act quickly and directly, nevertheless it can make vital contributions to keeping the peace. A conspicuous example of this has been the work of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.

### **A United Nations Force**

I dealt, Mr. President, at some length in my speech in the General Debate last year with the question of a United Nations force. I have always favoured this idea, but I have realised that it is a topic upon which one must carry with one a consensus of world opinion. The realities impose upon us the necessity to hasten slowly. I understand the limitations. It could not be a fighting force. It could only be put into position by a decision of the United Nations. Its deployment would depend upon the agreement of the countries concerned. I also acknowledge the practical difficulties. To contemplate such a force in permanent being would raise great problems of administration and cost. What however I do favour (and I hope that serious consideration will be given to it by the Governments of Member States), is the earmarking by Member States of personnel, either as individuals or in contingents, who could quickly be made available. I also favour the setting up of a small planning section in the Secretariat to work out in advance plans for dealing with the problems resulting from a decision to assemble such a force for a particular purpose. Last year I said that I thought that international public opinion by and large was ready for

some initiative of this sort. I hope that during this Assembly some indication will be given of the views of other Governments upon what I have been saying.

### **The United Nations “Presence”**

There is a second way in which the United Nations has shown its capability for helping to keep the peace. That is by the introduction of what we have come to call a United Nations “presence” in a troubled area. Again I look to the Middle East for an example. The special arrangements made by the Secretary-General following our Emergency Session last August, his visits and Mr. Spinelli’s work in the area have undoubtedly played a useful part in removing misunderstandings and contributing to the lessening of tension which happily has taken place since this time last year.

We know that lasting stability and true peace can only be brought about by the will and the efforts of the Governments and peoples of the region. It must be for them in the first instance to achieve harmony of aims amongst each other, or, at least, a reasonable working relationship.

It was with such hopes that we voted last August for the Arab Resolution. We welcome signs that the spirit of that Resolution persists, and, no doubt, the Governments of the area will back up the efforts of the Secretary-General.

In this connexion, to mention a somewhat controversial topic referred to by Mr. Herter, I hope the use of the Suez Canal will form a bond to further, and not a barrier to obstruct, the peaceful trade of all the countries of the area. I have made clear on past occasions the support of Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom for the principle of the free passage of ships of all nations through the Suez Canal—a principle which was embodied in the 1888 Convention<sup>(6)</sup> and which has been adopted by the United Nations as its declared purpose.

### **Conciliation**

The very fact that the United Nations has not, as a rule, been able to take speedy action to deal with particular crises, has led to these new methods and new techniques being developed. The Secretary-General has spoken of the United Nations serving a diplomacy of reconciliation, of mediation and conciliation. I think that the United Nations representatives in the Middle East have quietly, unobtrusively and successfully sought to operate such a diplomacy.

### **The Secretary-General**

Sir, we are filled with admiration for the work which the Secretary-General himself does, his journeys and his untiring efforts to find ways to iron out differences and to harmonise the relations between States. We have complete confidence in him and his work and he has our full support.

### **The Evolution of the United Nations**

I have read with great interest the section in the Secretary-General’s report with regard to the role of the United Nations. He refers to the work of the permanent delegations and their growing diplomatic contribution outside the

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<sup>(6)</sup> “Commercial No. 2 (1889)”, C. 5623.

public meetings, often in close contact also with the Secretariat. He referred to the possibility of the organisation of regular meetings of the Security Council in executive session. He also made an interesting suggestion at the meeting of the Economic and Social Council this year about the possibility of short special meetings of that Council at Ministerial level. These are interesting and imaginative ideas.

### **Forum for Debate**

The United Nations is also an invaluable forum for public debate. We, the United Kingdom, sometimes find ourselves at odds with other members with regard to the inscription of items for debate. We hold certain views about the Charter and Article 2 (7), which are well known. We also think, however, that the inscription of items should be approached not just from the legalistic point of view; there also should be a practical political attitude towards the agenda. In other words, members have to consider whether the inscription of an item and a public debate here, is going to make a settlement more likely or less likely; whether it is going to create an atmosphere in which reasonable compromises are almost impossible, or the reverse.

Last year, Sir, we did not oppose the inscription of the Cyprus item. In the event the debate here was conducted with restraint and dignity; no doubt because of that fact, it contributed to creating an atmosphere in which direct talks between the Greek and Turkish Governments, and later the Greek, Turkish and British Governments and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, became possible, talks which happily resulted in complete agreement. I don't think, speaking quite frankly, the earlier debates on Cyprus helped at all, but last year's one was in our view timely and did help. It is a matter of judgment. I cannot accept the conception, although I know it it is held by many, that inscription should be automatic. It seems to me to be that such an attitude involves a certain abdication of responsibility.

Lastly on the matter of inscription may I just say this.

Yesterday the General Committee agreed to recommend the inscription of an item on Algeria. Since then, we have read the statement of policy made in Paris yesterday by the President of France, in which he declared his intention that:

“The men and women who live in Algeria will be in a position to decide their own destiny, once and for all, freely and in the full knowledge of what is at stake.”

I warmly welcome President de Gaulle's statement of policy. It is clearly one of the highest importance. I hope that it will be very carefully considered by all those interested, and that it will form the basis for the settlement of this problem.

### **The Specialised Agencies**

Mr. President, Sir, there is one aspect of the activities of the United Nations which does not arouse any controversy and that is the work of the Specialised Agencies. We will continue to give our full support to those Agencies. We believe in the great importance of the practical work which they do in all aspects of economic and social development, for example, improving health, agriculture and technical skills throughout the world.

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One way to show our realisation of the imperative necessity for further effort along these lines is to increase the contributions to the United Nations Special Fund and Expanded Programme for technical assistance.

### **United Kingdom Contribution**

The United Kingdom Government propose, provided we receive the approval of our Parliament, to give next year to the Special Fund the sterling equivalent of 5 million dollars, as compared with 1 million dollars this year. We also propose to give the equivalent of 3 million dollars to the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. This represents an increase of over  $\frac{3}{4}$  million dollars above our present contribution and the total of 8 million dollars is well over double our present combined contribution to the combined programmes. This is more than just a gesture on our part. It is an earnest of our confidence in the value of the programmes undertaken by Mr. Paul Hoffman and Mr. David Owen, and of our belief in the great role of the United Nations in promoting economic development.

But apart from technical assistance, and apart from the help which the Special Fund can give, we all recognise the urgent need of capital for development. The International Bank and its affiliate, the International Finance Corporation, have done valuable work. We were enthusiastic participants in the recent measures for increasing the resources of the Bank and the International Monetary Fund. We hope that the Bank will be able to maintain and, indeed, increase the volume of its lending.

The Commonwealth is also playing its part in this work of providing capital. Discussions at the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference in Canada last year were very much to the point, and one of the main purposes of the Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council, which was then set up, is to study means of mobilising resources to finance the development of less developed countries in the Commonwealth. The United Kingdom also announced its intention at the conference to make Commonwealth assistance loans for the same purpose.

We are also giving favourable examination to the proposals made at New Delhi last autumn for the formation of an International Development Association. We are ready to play our full part in working out plans for its establishment and contributing to its capital. We believe that such an association has a key role to play.

We also intend to increase next year our contribution to the Children's Fund by \$280,000.

### **World Refugee Year**

In my speech last year, I referred to the proposal for a World Refugee Year. The idea of this came from a group of young men in Britain. It received the support of the British Government and, as you will remember, it was supported in this Assembly by an overwhelming majority.

In the United Kingdom the year was launched on June 1. Our Committee is under the patronage of Her Majesty the Queen. The target of the British Committee is £2 million to be raised by voluntary subscriptions. The Government is also making a contribution and we have agreed to accept for

admission to the United Kingdom a certain number of handicapped refugees. It is a source of great encouragement to us that some 56 other countries have taken up the plan with enthusiasm. It is a timely example of international co-operation for a common purpose and I earnestly hope that it will have far reaching results in the alleviation of one of the greatest of human tragedies.

### **Colonial Policy**

Sir, I should like now to say something about the British Government's special responsibility towards the peoples of the dependent territories under British administration. We are guided by one objective, to help the peoples of these territories to advance towards self-government or independence to become nations which can stand on their own feet in conditions of stability, prosperity and freedom.

In the last 15 years there have been great changes, above all, in Asia and Africa. The membership of the General Assembly is the best proof of our record in this matter. We see here to-day the representatives of many nations which were formerly under British rule and which have gained their independence in this period. Very soon I have no doubt that we shall welcome here another African nation, the Federation of Nigeria.

This task of building nations is not easy. It cannot always be quick and the problems have to be tackled step by step. But it is a great creative work in which the representatives of the territories concerned are playing an increasing part. With them, we are overcoming the many problems which stand in the way of advance, problems of under-developed natural resources, of shortages of trained personnel and, particularly in certain territories, the problems of human relationships.

In those territories where different races or tribes live side by side, the task is to ensure that all the people may enjoy security and freedom and the chance to contribute as individuals to the progress and well-being of these countries. We reject the idea of any inherent superiority of one race over another. Our policy therefore is non-racial; it offers a future in which Africans, Europeans, Asians, the peoples of the Pacific and others with whom we are concerned will all play their full part as citizens in the countries where they live, and in which feelings of race will be submerged in loyalty to new nations.

We are greatly encouraged in this task by the sympathy of all those who are contributing in many different ways to these developments. We prize very highly the Commonwealth ideal which provides the setting and context for our efforts and from the international community as a whole, we ask for understanding of our problems, recognition of what we have done and appreciation of the efforts we are making to build for the future.

### **The Major Problems**

#### *East-West Relations*

Sir, in this annual stocktaking, the thoughts of many of us are dominated by two sets of problems which are interrelated. First of all, East-West relations, and secondly, the problems of modern armaments. Since shortly after the end of the war the world scene has been bedevilled by bad relations

between the Communist *bloc* and the Western countries. At times there has been open, if limited, warfare. At other times there has been the cold war with its bitter propaganda and political manoeuvring. Occasionally little shafts of sunlight have come through the clouds when, for example, the Austrian Treaty<sup>(7)</sup> was signed, or when the Geneva agreements about Indo-China<sup>(8)</sup> were reached. But on the whole the record has been a sad one, and when in November last year it culminated in the Soviet Note about Berlin, I think many of us had our feelings of anxiety as to exactly where the world was drifting, acutely reinforced.

It was because of our anxiety on this score that the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, and I went to the Soviet Union last February to see what might come of frank talks with the Soviet leaders about the state of the world. Those talks were frank. I believe that they had a measure of success in improving the atmosphere. They were followed by the acceptance by the Soviet Union of a Foreign Ministers' Conference and we—the two Governments—also agreed to take practical steps in the fields of trade, cultural relations, personal contacts and the improvement of communications in order to promote a better state of affairs in the relations between our two countries. Since our meetings in Moscow agreements have been reached covering all those matters, agreements which I regard as a sound beginning, but only a beginning. I profoundly believe that if we know more about one another, if Governments and peoples have the opportunity of meeting and mutual understanding, nations may cease to try to tear each other apart.

The Foreign Ministers' Conference at Geneva was lengthy. It did not reach positive agreements. In spite of that, I believe that it did end with the respective points of view more clearly defined and the differences narrowed. The Conference made a definite contribution to the creating of an atmosphere in which further improvement in relations between the two *blocs* is in my view possible.

The view of my Government is that this process will be assisted by a meeting between Heads of Governments. It is of course quite unrealistic to think that Heads of Governments at one single meeting can find some magic formula for solving the problems of this troubled world. We hope it will be the first of a series at which differences will be frankly discussed and we hope that, taking the problems one by one, some progress can be made towards their solution.

I want however at this point to make one thing absolutely clear. We do not regard this as a process exclusive of the United Nations. This is not an attempt to push the United Nations on one side. In pursuing this course of reconciliation we consider that we are trying to fulfil our obligations under the Charter. The Secretary-General in his Introduction to the Annual Report, said some very wise words on this subject. He put exactly the right interpretation, if I may say so, upon these developments. He said that they were not only in keeping with the principles of the Charter. He reminded us that, and I quote, "the United Nations is not intended to be a substitute for normal procedures of reconciliation and mediation, but rather an added instrument providing, within the limits of its competence, a further or ultimate

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(7) "Treaty Series No. 58 (1957)", Cmnd. 214.

(8) "Miscellaneous No. 20 (1954)", Cmd. 9239.

support for the maintenance of peace and security. Viewed in this light, the various diplomatic and political activities in the course of the past year are in full harmony with the intentions expressed in the Charter. They may even be said to reflect obligations which Member nations have assumed in the Charter". That is the end of the quotation. After referring to one or two matters requiring attention, he continued by saying that in his view, and I quote, "these developments are not only in keeping with the principles of the Charter but are also free, I believe, from implications which impair the position of the Organisation in principle".

Although I have spoken encouragingly of certain aspects of East-West relations there are other matters which cause us deep distress.

These are the situations in Hungary, Tibet and Laos.

#### *Hungary*

Over Hungary, I much regret that the Hungarian Government has refused to co-operate with the work of Sir Leslie Munro the United Nations representative. The flagrant disregard of the recommendations of the General Assembly is a matter of deep concern to us.

#### *Tibet*

Over Tibet, we have been greatly grieved to hear accounts of massive repression there by Communist China, of the suppression of ancient liberties, and ruthless assaults upon the historic life of a sturdy and friendly people.

#### *Laos*

Finally, over Laos, I have had many discussions on this topic with my fellow co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, Mr. Gromyko. We have not been able to reach agreement on a common course of action. I believe, however, that the recent action of the Security Council is having a pacifying effect. The Sub-Committee will report back in due course. I do hope that then there will be agreement on measures to alleviate the situation and to preserve the rights of a sovereign people to live their own lives in independence and security. And we for our part will certainly be ready to consider at that time any proposals from any quarter designed to achieve that result.

#### *Disarmament*

Mr. President, the second great problem is disarmament. There are some who say that you can have no disarmament without political settlements, but others who say that you will not get political settlements while the present race in armaments continues. The truth is if we can get political settlement it will make agreement on disarmament easier; if we can get an agreement on disarmament, it will make political settlements easier. Progress in either field will cause a correspondingly favourable reaction in the other field.

I myself have been concerned in most of the disarmament discussions which have taken place since November, 1951. There was the work in 1951



in the Sub-Committee in Paris under the chairmanship of the then President of the Assembly, my distinguished colleague Dr. Padilla Nervo, whose election as chairman of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations last week I warmly welcome. There was the work in London in 1954 when the Anglo-French plan was prepared. There were the debates here in New York at successive Assemblies. There was the consideration of the Soviet proposals of May, 1955 and our amended Anglo-French proposals of 1956. There was the work in the Sub-Committee in London in 1957 when certain partial, or first stage, proposals were put forward by the Western Powers. I do not want to cross old battlefields again to-day or to revive old controversies.

#### *Nuclear Tests*

One satisfactory feature of the 1957 discussions was that a proposal, which I put forward myself, for a meeting of technical experts and scientists to discuss the possibility of controlling a ban on nuclear tests was accepted in the following year by the Soviet Union. A successful conference of experts took place in Geneva in July and August of 1958, and the present Conference between the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom began at the end of October last year. Since the Russian tests in November, 1958, no further tests have taken place and there has been steady progress in working out a treaty relating to the cessation of nuclear tests. Many articles have been agreed and without doubt this conference has been the most realistic and sustained attempt to reach an agreement upon one aspect of armament development ever undertaken. We have learnt a lot during it about some of the problems of control. In spite of the remaining difficulties, and there are remaining difficulties, I still have high hopes of an agreement which will pave the way for wider agreements.

#### **New Disarmament Body**

Throughout these discussions, however, I have been anxiously awaiting the moment when it would be appropriate once again to attempt progress towards an agreement on disarmament in its most comprehensive aspects. I need not remind you of the abortive attempts in 1957 to set up a disarmament commission with a new limited membership, and the failure since the discussion in the Sub-Committee in 1957 to get anything resembling a negotiation going on these wider aspects. But M. Couve de Murville, Mr. Gromyko, Mr. Herter and I myself took advantage of our meetings in Geneva on certain European problems, to discuss the forum in which new talks on disarmament might take place. We had also been able to exchange views individually with the Secretary-General when he visited Geneva for the opening of our Conference. In the event we reached an agreement which was announced in a communiqué from the Four Governments on September 7. That agreement was at once communicated to the full Disarmament Commission, and the Commission by a resolution adopted on September 10 welcomed the resumption of negotiations announced in the communiqué. The resolution recognised, as had the Four-Power communiqué, that the ultimate responsibility for general disarmament measures rests with the United Nations, and it welcomed the intention of the countries concerned to keep the Disarmament Commission appropriately informed of the progress of their deliberations.

## **A Fresh Start**

Sir, the way is thus open for a fresh start, and I am confident that the work of the Ten-Power Committee will help the United Nations in its future discussions and, I hope, decisions.

In my speech in 1957 I tried to indicate certain principles which I believe have to be accepted if progress is to be made towards an agreement. The first of those principles is that disarmament must proceed at all stages with a balance between disarmament in the nuclear and conventional fields. Secondly, control is the test of progress. Verbal agreements without control, however solemnly concluded, are more likely to add to insecurity than to security. Bearing those considerations in mind we in Britain have been examining the lines on which it might be possible for progress now to be made.

### **The Objective**

Our aim is to move forward by balanced stages towards the abolition of all nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction and towards the reduction of other weapons and armed forces to levels which will rule out the possibility of aggressive war. Obviously progress must be made by stages and I will now try to indicate the way in which I think it might be made.

#### *First Stage*

In the first stage the following matters should be dealt with:

Firstly, nuclear tests. If, as we very much hope, agreement is reached at the present conference between the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, that agreement should be endorsed by other nations. We believe that that is an important step towards dealing with the vexed question of the spread of nuclear armaments.

Then there should be a technical conference on the feasibility of controlling what is called the "cut-off", in other words, ceasing to use fissionable material to make weapons and that is an even more important step if we are indeed to stop the spread of the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

Thirdly, the Great Powers should agree to maximum limits for their forces. There should be the establishment of an international body charged with the task of collecting information on present levels of forces and conventional armaments. The object of this would be to try to establish some basis for limiting conventional armaments. In this context armaments are even more important than the levels of forces.

Fourthly, we should pursue the idea of the handing over of specific quantities of designated types of armaments to the custody of an international control organisation.

And if these other ideas are acceptable I think we should follow up the not very successful conference of experts on measures against surprise attack with a further conference to consider the political as well as the technical aspects of this particular problem.

There should be a study of the problems involved in the use of outer space. It is true that some work has been done on this in the United Nations but

the Soviet Union have not taken part in that work. I would hope that their attitude would change on that point and recent remarkable events make that hope not unreasonable.

Finally at this stage we should study between us the nature and functions of the international control organ which will not only have to control disarmament measures, but also will have increasing responsibilities within the framework of the United Nations, to preserve world peace as purely national armaments diminish. In 1954 in the Sub-Committee we did spend considerable time studying the problems of the control organisation. The United States paper submitted on that occasion might provide a basis for this further study. We have also gained considerable experience as a result of the discussions at the Nuclear Tests Conference in Geneva. All this would be the beginning: the First Stage.

### *Second Stage*

At the second stage, or intermediate stage, the following steps should be taken:

There should be progressive reduction of conventional armaments and military manpower under proper control.

There should be the introduction of the cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

We should begin to reduce stocks of nuclear weapons by successive transfers, under international supervision, of existing military stocks of fissionable material, whether fabricated into weapons or not, to non-weapon uses.

There should be establishment of a system of inspection against surprise attack.

There should be agreement on a system to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

We should begin to develop the capacity of the international control organ to take measures to keep the peace. That would be the Second Stage, or Intermediate Stage, at which real progress was actually being made with real disarmament.

### *Third Stage*

The ultimate objective or the third stage, should be comprehensive disarmament by all Powers under effective international control including the following matters:

There should be a ban on the manufacture of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction.

There should be a ban on the use of such weapons.

There should be a ban on the use of outer space for military purposes.

There should be a re-examination of the possibility of controlling and then eliminating the remaining stocks of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

There should be establishment of effective international control of military budgets.

As progress is made in dealing with remaining stocks of nuclear weapons, there would be the final reductions of conventional armaments and military manpower to the levels required for internal security purposes only.

The international control organ should reach its final form and attain its full capability for keeping peace.

Now sir, this is an outline on which I believe progress can be made if there is the will. It is comprehensive. The development of the plan would of course depend upon the development of the techniques of international control. Just as the Nuclear Tests Conference has been slowly working out a draft Treaty for dealing with a cessation of nuclear tests and has reached agreement on many of those articles, so I think we should seek to work out a draft treaty embodying the proposals which I have outlined. It would mean the attainment of the objective which we all have in mind. This may seem too ambitious a plan. But once we can get started and get some mutual confidence, I believe things could go quickly.

### **Conclusion**

Mr. President, I have tried to put before this meeting of the General Assembly, frankly and without bitterness, the British views upon some of the great problems confronting the statesmen of the world.

The British attitude can be summarised in this way: We earnestly desire peace and stability in the world. We know that peace is the common interest of all of us. Global war, whether nuclear or conventional, would be a disaster, infinitely worse in its consequences than World Wars I and II. Under modern conditions no one can be a victor in global war. Such a war would constitute a common defeat.

The role of this Organisation is clearly defined. The United Nations cannot be a substitute for the efforts of individual Governments. It can supplement and consummate such efforts.

If humanity is to survive, the Great Power *blocs* have got to learn to live in peace, one with the other. I am not at all despondent about the future. So much is at stake that I am certain that the basic wisdom of those who lead the world, reinforced by the universal instinct for survival, will lead to better and more fruitful relationships between the nations. This view may be regarded as unduly optimistic, but there are many forces working for good in the world.

I think all of us here, Mr. President, are conscious of our responsibilities. Let us do everything within our power to see that the verdict of history is that we did meet the challenge of our times; that we were not found wanting; that we did make our individual contributions to the promotion of world peace and world stability; we did try to satisfy the aspirations of so many for an international society from which there will be banished inter-racial hatred, want, ignorance and disease, the fear of war.

Mankind can destroy itself. Mankind has also the opportunity to achieve higher levels of spiritual and material well-being than have ever before been possible.

**SPEECH BY THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
ON OCTOBER 19, 1959, ON DISARMAMENT**

**Disarmament**

Mr. Chairman, you and our distinguished colleagues of this Committee will be well aware that successive Governments in the United Kingdom have for many years now been strenuously seeking a solution to the problems of comprehensive disarmament. This has always been our goal, and we have consistently proclaimed the need for it.

I use the term "comprehensive" as that is the term that we have always used. But I assure you that this single adjective "comprehensive" has the same meaning for us as the two adjectives "general" and "complete" which have been preferred by some speakers in the debate.

Thus, there is, for my Government, nothing novel in the concept that lies behind the formal title of the item we are discussing. It is a concept we have discussed before, both within the United Nations and outside it and indeed back in the days of the League of Nations. What is perhaps novel is the readiness that now seems to be abroad to consider once again, in what we earnestly hope may be a new spirit, the comprehensive approach to disarmament. I welcome this readiness and I have been glad to note that others have echoed the sentiments of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, who, in his address to the General Assembly on September 17 last, said:

"I have anxiously awaited the moment when it would be appropriate once again, to attempt progress towards an agreement on disarmament, in its most comprehensive aspects".

Again and again in recent years my Government have made proposals for comprehensive disarmament. In 1954 we put forward, in conjunction with France, a plan which was supported by the United States and Canada in the Disarmament Sub-Committee. Then, after taking into account various changes in the position taken up by the Soviet Union, a revised Anglo-French plan was presented to the Sub-Committee in 1956. And here in passing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to acknowledge the part played in the production of both those plans by M. Moch. I am very happy to see him here during this debate. We were still unable to reach agreement and it was solely because progress towards some far-reaching solution seemed to be barred that we attempted instead to find a partial solution. We never abandoned our desire for comprehensive disarmament but there was a general feeling that this objective was too ambitious in the political atmosphere in the world which then existed. It was out of our reach and we therefore turned in 1957 to try to arrive at an agreement on a first stage plan which would at least start us down the road towards disarmament. After five months of discussions such a plan was presented by the Western Powers and it was given overwhelming support by the 12th Session of the General Assembly in its resolution No. 1148. But once again agreement could not be reached between East and West.

This was discouraging but it in no way decreased our determination to search patiently for a solution. It was not our fault that international discussion on disarmament then ceased for nearly two years. The Soviet withdrawal from the Sub-Committee simply left us with no forum in which negotiations could take place. However, in the meantime—during 1958—negotiation switched to a subject which, while it is not true disarmament, is nevertheless closely related to it. I refer, of course, to the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests, a topic on which I will have something more to say later. Agreement on this would be a contribution to disarmament and a very valuable one because it would build confidence.

Although, therefore, we were having no success in discussions of disarmament proper, we never lost sight of our goal, and I would like to remind the Committee that the subject was revived during the discussions of the four Foreign Ministers at Geneva this past summer. At the outset of those discussions, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France and the United Kingdom tabled the Western peace plan. One part of the first stage of that plan was described in the following words:

“In order to facilitate further the solution of political problems and the improvement of international relations, the four Powers would, in an appropriate forum, initiate discussion of possible staged and controlled *comprehensive* disarmament measures”.

Later in the summer the four Foreign Ministers, while still in Geneva, were able to agree upon a possible composition for a new body which could again take up the subject of disarmament in all its aspects. This body is of course the Ten-Power Committee which it is hoped will meet in Geneva early next year. The decision to set up such a committee was reported to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and we were naturally very gratified when the Commission, in its resolution of September 10, unanimously approved the arrangements which we had made with our associates. Once again a forum exists in which detailed negotiations on disarmament can be resumed after a two year break. This is a highly important development which my Government welcomes wholeheartedly.

Mr. Chairman, I think I have said enough to indicate that the attempt to reach an agreement on disarmament and if possible a *comprehensive* agreement, has run as a clear thread through British foreign policy for a long time. This being so, I feel I must now say something about what I might describe as the philosophy underlying our approach to the disarmament question.

We have proceeded from the obvious premise that any generally acceptable disarmament scheme must not give any country or collection of countries a significant military advantage. From this premise we have concluded that measures of conventional and nuclear disarmament must be related and proceed, as it were, hand in hand. A disarmament agreement must give equal security to all, and must therefore equally control all means of waging war, the so-called conventional as well as the nuclear. We should like to see the abolition of the nuclear means. However, this, carried out on its own now, would leave some countries, or groups of countries, with only relatively small conventional forces. On the other hand, other countries, or groups of countries, would still have very large conventional forces. The result would

therefore be to upset the present military balance in the world, precarious though it may be, and thus heighten tension, not diminish it.

It is not the slightest use working for a disarmament plan which would result in our adding to the risk of war breaking out. For it is war that is the enemy, not just nuclear war. Others have already reminded us that war fought even with conventional weapons is now an incredibly horrible and destructive thing. The appalling results and the catalogue of human misery and degradation flowing from two so-called conventional wars in this century are still vividly in our minds. Even since 1945 the lethal power of conventional weapons has immensely increased but the truth is that there is not the slightest prospect that a world war fought in the future would be confined to these so-called conventional weapons.

In this connexion I would like to quote from a statement made at the end of the third meeting of the international conference of scientific experts held last year in Kitzbühl. The conference, which discussed questions connected with disarmament and atomic energy, was attended by leading scientists from many countries including the United States, the Soviet Union, India, Japan and the United Kingdom. The statement to which they all subscribed said this :

“ Although the nations may agree to eliminate nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of the world, the knowledge of how to produce such weapons can never be destroyed. They remain for all time a potential threat for mankind. In any future major war, each belligerent State will feel not only free but compelled to undertake immediate production of nuclear weapons, for no State, when at war, can be sure that such steps are not being taken by the enemy. We believe that, in such a situation, a major industrial power would require less than one year to begin accumulating atomic weapons. From then on, the only restraint against their employment in war would be agreements not to use them, which were concluded in times of peace. The decisive power of nuclear weapons, however, would make the temptation to use them almost irresistible, particularly to leaders who are facing defeat. It appears therefore that atomic weapons are likely to be employed in any future major war with all their terrible consequences ”.

I think we should be wise to note this warning by such eminent scientists and we must recognise therefore that it is war in all its forms that now threatens the very existence of mankind. It is therefore our task to bring under control and finally to eliminate the means of waging war in any form. In the meantime we must avoid creating a disequilibrium which could bring nearer the very calamity we are seeking to prevent.

It is no use pretending that this is other than a most formidable task. In our opinion an essential ingredient of all progress toward the comprehensive disarmament we seek is confidence, confidence on the part of all that the scheme does in fact provide equal security against all forms of war. In our view the growth of mutual confidence which would follow from satisfactory agreements on measures of disarmament would promote the dissolution of many international tensions which themselves keep alive the dangers of war. This is one of the main reasons why my Government has always, in all its disarmament proposals, laid great emphasis on the question

of the control over disarmament measures. In an age which is characterised by suspicion, no country could be expected to discard the weapons to which, in the ultimate resort, it must have recourse to defend its national security, without an assurance that others are similarly discarding their weapons, in accordance with the terms of an international agreement. Therefore, each stage of disarmament must be supervised, and effectively supervised, to assure all that the process of disarmament is in reality increasing their security and not endangering it.

We all know very well that the question of effective control has been the cause of the breakdown of so many negotiations in the past. I was therefore interested to note that in his speech on October 9 our Soviet colleague said that:

“The Soviet Union adheres to the only correct concept, namely that control is not an end in itself, and that it is inseparable from disarmament”.

He went on to say:

“What is needed is not control *without* disarmament, but control over disarmament”.

I agree with the Soviet Representative; but I would add this. In my view what is needed is, that from the moment when disarmament starts a satisfactory control must be established to ensure that disarmament is in fact taking place precisely in accordance with the undertakings given. The Soviet Delegate himself put it in these words:

“Control must constitute a means of verifying the implementation by States of concrete measures on disarmament”.

I hope that this is a recognition of the fact that control must be there to watch over the implementation of the disarmament measures from the very beginning. We on the Western side wish to institute control solely for this purpose and not, as has sometimes been suggested, for obtaining military intelligence. We are sincerely seeking means of preventing war, not means for waging war, and I hope that the Soviet Government will accept that.

I have devoted some time to what I have described as the philosophy underlying our approach to comprehensive disarmament, because I feel it may be of some help to the Committee in their understanding of the proposals which were outlined by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd during his speech on September 17.

For the convenience of the Committee my Delegation have circulated in the form of a United Nations Document, the United Kingdom declaration on this subject. You will see that Mr. Selwyn Lloyd did not attempt to fill in all of the details, nor did he claim that he was doing more than indicate the way in which he considered progress toward comprehensive disarmament might be made in three stages. But if you will examine this outline, you will find the following elements in it. First of all, it provides the means for obtaining information in order that the magnitude of the various problems may be measured. It provides for expert and technical discussion, at an early stage, of individual elements within the whole complex—elements all of which will have to be dealt with if the various steps are to be kept in balance. There would also be a limitation of conventional forces.



This is a pragmatic approach which does not begin by calling for drastic measures which are unlikely to prove realistic at so early a stage.

Major reductions would come about in the second stage, when reductions of conventional armaments and military manpower take place at the same time as measures to curb the further manufacture of nuclear weapons. And I would remark that the first stage could not be completed and no start could be made on the second stage until there had been agreement on the nature and the relevant functions of the International Control Organ which will be responsible for supervising the various measures of disarmament.

The point I am making is that if the reductions contemplated in the second stage were carried out on the foundation of the preparation provided for in the first stage, then confidence would have been established and there would be the right climate of opinion for us to proceed to the much more radical measures outlined in the third stage.

My Government has, of course, taken a very great interest in the views expounded by the Soviet Premier, Mr. Khrushchev, on this same subject in his speech to the Assembly on the day after Mr. Lloyd had spoken. There were naturally differences between the two presentations. One, for instance, lay in the Soviet view of the sanctions we should retain against a violator of the international treaty on comprehensive disarmament. In this connexion, Mr. Lodge put before this Committee certain ideas. He suggested that possibly the Disarmament Commission might consider what type of international police force would be required if all nations laid down their arms; what principles of international law should govern its use; and precisely what internal security forces would be required by nations in these circumstances. These are very big questions which will need further study by us all. At first sight our approach to them seems different from that implicit in the Soviet declaration. But it is not my intention in this debate to lay emphasis on our differences. We have noticed with pleasure that there are also elements in the Soviet proposals which show that there are important points upon which our two positions have come closer together.

To mention those that have struck me in particular, I note that the Soviet proposals no longer contain a demand for an immediate ban on nuclear weapons before any start can be made with reductions in conventional forces. This is a major change, and is a move in the direction of balanced disarmament which we have consistently advocated. Then again, foreign bases are to be abolished only as conventional disarmament becomes complete. This could have a significant effect upon the attitude of those countries whose sense of security at the present time rests upon arrangements of this kind.

These are, I think, hopeful auguries and we are fully prepared to examine the Soviet proposals thoroughly, constructively and in every detail. We hope our own proposals will also serve as a basis for similar careful consideration. However, I agree with the distinguished Soviet representative that at the present stage it would not be appropriate to go into all the aspects of the problem in great detail. We appreciate for instance that our own proposals will certainly require further elaboration, and I have no doubt that the Soviet Union will also be anxious to fill in a picture which they have so far outlined

to us only with broad sweeps of the brush. Like the United States Delegation we are prepared to take large steps or small steps provided only they are steps that lead us in the right direction.

The distinguished representative of Argentina has already expressed the view that these various proposals should first be examined in detail in the new Ten-Power Committee which was specifically designed for this task. I warmly endorse this strictly practical approach; I think that this is clearly the best procedure—I also feel it would be appropriate if the Secretary-General were to appoint a representative at the proceedings of the Ten-Power group, as has been done, for example, at the Nuclear Tests Conference. We hope this can be arranged.

It will also be a great help to that body if the Assembly will make available to it the records of our present discussions. I hope that this course of action will commend itself to the Soviet delegate, since I noticed that when Mr. Khrushchev returned to Moscow from the United States, he said on September 28:

“The question of disarmament is so serious that we should not press our partners with its solution. . . . So let us not make hurried statements; let us be patient and give the statesmen time to consider our proposals. . . . We are ready to discuss *any* amendments to our proposals. We are ready to discuss other proposals too, if they are submitted for the purpose of achieving the same goal as ours”.

I am sure it would be unwise if we were to take up firm positions without, as Mr. Khrushchev has said, giving time for patient consideration. When, as I hope will be the case, progress is made in the Ten-Power group then, in accordance with the undertaking already given, it will report to the Disarmament Commission. This will ensure, and the point has already been made by the distinguished representative for Brazil, that the United Nations, whose responsibility in the disarmament field my Government is the first to recognise, can again express its views and help to guide us on our journey which is being watched with hope and longing in every continent.

I promised earlier to come back to the question of the Nuclear Tests Conference, which will resume its discussions in Geneva on October 27. The distinguished representative of the United States in his speech on October 14 gave the Committee a full, and if I may say so, a very accurate and well-balanced account of the progress of negotiations in that conference and of the point that we have now reached. I do not wish to burden the Committee with a repetition of what Mr. Lodge said. But as you know Mr. Chairman, I myself have taken part in those negotiations and I hope I may be permitted to make one or two observations and perhaps underline one or two of the points made by Mr. Lodge. As I have said earlier, the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is not in itself real disarmament. But the Conference has provided us with valuable lessons whose application to the complex of disarmament measures is unquestionable. It has taught us a great lesson in the value of patience in negotiation. We have been at work for nearly a year and the result is that we have come nearer, I believe, to agreement on a subject in the sphere of disarmament than at any time since the second world war. As the Committee has heard, we have already agreed on the

language of 17 articles and the preamble of a draft treaty. While I certainly do not wish to be unduly pessimistic about the Soviet suggestion that we should attempt to attain universal and comprehensive disarmament in four years, I must say that in the light of my experience we should not encourage the peoples of the world towards over-optimism on this score. The problems we face are formidable and if we cannot overcome them all in a moment of time people should not lose heart, for we travel hopefully. No negotiations can succeed unless all parties are prepared to display patience and to make concessions. In the Tests Conference, both sides have made very real concessions and no one should underestimate them.

This has enabled us to make substantial progress in Geneva, but it would be foolish to ignore the fact that there are still differences which are not yet resolved. These differences arise essentially on the question of what will constitute adequate control. The problem is largely a scientific and technical one. As Mr. Lodge has already explained, after the conclusion of the conference of experts in the summer of 1958, new scientific information on the possibilities for detecting underground nuclear tests became available. This cast some doubt on the validity of certain of the experts' conclusions. We have asked that this new scientific evidence should be examined and discussed dispassionately, for we believe that we should be deceiving our people and the world at large if we set up a control system that was based on false premises. We are not seeking to impose a control system more burdensome than the scientific facts warrant. All we ask is that whatever control system is established, it should be one that all can rely on, and know they can rely on.

I firmly believe that it should be possible to reach an agreement in Geneva on this question of nuclear tests. We shall resume the negotiations with the sincere intention of arriving at such a result. If we are successful in reaching agreement, we hope that all other countries will adhere to the treaty; it is being so drafted as to enable them to do so. By these means it is possible to foresee the day when the world may be assured that no further tests of nuclear weapons will take place. If that situation is reached, we shall be well on the way to preventing the spread of these weapons, since no country, we believe, would invest the vast funds required to develop nuclear weapons if they were not able to test them.

But apart from the direct benefits which would flow from an agreement on nuclear tests we believe it would have certain important political advantages. It would mean that the Powers concerned had all accepted a measure of international inspection and control. It would constitute a practical example of such international control in the disarmament field and above all it would demonstrate to the world that countries from both East and West could reach agreement to work together and co-operate for a specific purpose. This alone could have a highly significant effect upon the whole international political climate and throw open the road to further measures of real disarmament.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to conclude by summarising very briefly the basis from which we approach a solution of the problems before us.

We have long advocated comprehensive disarmament; we have regretted the delays that have arisen which have impeded negotiations towards that end; we welcome the desire now manifest to tackle the problem again, and

the creation of machinery for that very purpose. We believe that the best hope of progress lies in discussion, in the first place, in the Ten-Power group, due to meet next year in Geneva. The group will also have the benefit of views expressed here at the present Assembly of the United Nations. They will no doubt wish to examine in detail the proposals for comprehensive disarmament, which have been outlined already by the Soviet representative and by Mr. Lloyd on behalf of the United Kingdom. In considering these proposals, and any others which may emerge in the course of our debate, the Ten-Power group should be guided by two fundamental principles.

These are: firstly, that conventional and nuclear disarmament must go hand in hand so that the balance of security between nations is not upset; secondly, that progress at each stage of disarmament should be subject to effective international control. The ultimate responsibility of the United Nations for disarmament should be clearly recognised and the Disarmament Commission should, as it has itself recommended, be kept in being and should be informed of the progress in the Ten-Power Committee.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that these thoughts may commend themselves to this Committee as a practical approach to the problems before us. I can assure you that the United Kingdom will play its full part in striving to bring about the widest possible measures of disarmament.

We are all conscious of the terrible burden that the existing level of armaments imposes upon us. There are innumerable projects which would benefit our own country and the whole of humanity if only some of the resources at present devoted to armaments were available to us. The problems connected with such a switch in resources are ones we would easily and gladly overcome. I believe that the prospects for making a start in this direction appear brighter to-day than at any time since the Second World War, and it is with renewed hope that we look forward to the negotiations that lie just ahead of us. Each step forward we can take will of itself add to mutual confidence between nations and thus make that peace which is essential to our survival more secure.

### ANNEX III

#### **SPEECH BY THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE ON NOVEMBER 5, 1959, ON FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTS IN THE SAHARA**

There was a particular passage in the speech of the distinguished Representative of Morocco when he yesterday introduced the subject now under discussion, which I regard as significant. He said:

“For reasons which my Delegation does not have to emphasise, France has not found itself in the same position as certain other States in the field of atomic weapons. Atomic power has become, in this new hierarchy of values, a new criterion of authority in international affairs. Does France consider that it must catch up in order to strengthen its position; we do not see any objection to that.”

This passage from the opening speech in our debate made it clear that in putting this item on the agenda the Moroccan intention was that the

discussion would be confined to the specific question of the effect, in the Sahara itself and in the surrounding countries, of an atomic test. This confirmed the impression I had previously obtained from reading the explanatory memorandum submitted by the Moroccan Delegation last August, which is contained in document A/4183.

This particular and definite question is certainly worthy of our serious consideration. If there might be damage to the health of peoples living in and around the Sahara it would indeed be of concern to us. The United Kingdom has a very special interest in ensuring that no action which is contemplated could do harm to those peoples living in Africa who have not yet attained independence, and for whose welfare my Government have a special responsibility. We have taken every step, on their account as well as that of other nations, to satisfy ourselves that the measures to be taken by France will ensure the safety of all concerned.

At the beginning of his first speech to the Committee the distinguished Representative of Morocco made the following remark:

“I would refer to serious studies and irrefutable evidence establishing the certainty and the reality of the danger and the nature of the harmful effects to which the African population would be exposed.”

The Moroccan Representative speaks of the certainty and the reality of the danger. These are very categorical terms to use and I should therefore like to devote a few minutes to considering how serious the threat to human health might really be from a French atomic test conducted in the Sahara in the neighbourhood of Reganne.

But before I do this there is one point which I would like to clear up. From some of the statements that have been made it has struck me that there may be some confusion in the minds of certain members of the Committee as to what it is the French intend to explode. M. Moch has made it clear that the French experiments will be concerned with what is commonly called an atomic or A-bomb. Great as is the force of such a weapon it is a mere fraction of the force of a thermo-nuclear weapon, commonly called the H-bomb. An H-bomb is something that projects a large quantity of radio-active matter high into the stratosphere. We are not concerned with that here. We are dealing with an A-bomb. This makes a profound difference.

As the Committee is aware, my country has conducted a number of nuclear weapon tests at Maralinga in Australia. We can therefore furnish some information which will perhaps help to put the extent of any danger there may be into proper perspective.

I should perhaps begin by reminding the Committee that the nearest Australian town to the Maralinga testing site is at a distance of only 62 miles. We have heard M. Moch tell us how the nearest centre of population to the French test site, and that a small oasis, is at about the same distance as Las Vegas from the Nevada testing site, that is just short of 75 miles. This question of distance is one of considerable significance because, as I shall shortly show, the amount of radio-activity decreases sharply as the distance from the point of explosion increases.

When a nuclear device is exploded, a quantity of radio-active debris is produced. This debris assumes the shape of a gigantic mushroom, with which we are all so familiar from the many published photographs of nuclear

explosions. Most of the radio-activity resides in microscopic particles of dust, which comprise the dome of the mushroom—the so-called “mushroom cloud”. The balance of the radio-activity resides in the heavier debris forming the stem of the mushroom. I intend in the course of my remarks to say something about what subsequently happens to these two parts of the mushroom, but before I do so I wish to emphasise to the Committee the speed at which all the radio-activity from a nuclear explosion, that is to say, the radio-activity both in the stem and in the dome decreases.

As the result of measurements made by our own scientists, we know that if the radio-activity one hour after an explosion is given the nominal value of 1,000, then within seven hours it has fallen to a value of 100: that is to say, it has already decreased to one-tenth of its earlier value. After two days it has gone down to a figure of 10: that is already one-hundredth of what it was an hour after the explosion, and after two weeks the figure is down to one-thousandth of the activity an hour after the explosion.

I would now ask the Committee to bear with me while I examine the genesis and the subsequent course of the two parts of the mushroom. First, what I have called the stem.

When the explosion takes place there is a strong uprush of intensely hot gases which draw up a quantity of sand, stones and similar material from the surface of the earth beneath the explosion. This material becomes highly radio-active, but being relatively coarse and heavy, in comparison with the microscopic dust in the cloud itself, it falls back to the ground almost at once within a few miles of the point of detonation. Its radio-activity decays just as quickly as that of the cloud. It has been found at Maralinga that this material travels only a very short distance indeed. For instance, at the living quarters which are less than 20 miles from the Maralinga test site, there has not been enough measured radio-activity to call for any precautionary measures, notwithstanding strong dirt-laden surface winds in the area. This strikes me as an extremely significant scientific fact.

The Committee will be aware, for M. Moch has reminded us of the fact, that in the Sahara there blows for a part of the year the Harmattan wind. This is a low-level thermal wind blowing in a westward direction from October to January. This is a very important point for my Government because, as the Committee will realise, any westward wind over the Sahara blows in the direction of territories for whose safety and welfare we are at present responsible. I am thinking particularly of Nigeria.

In a year's time we look forward to welcoming Nigeria as a member of the United Nations. But at the moment it is up to us, the United Kingdom, to satisfy ourselves that no danger can come to the peoples of Nigeria as a result of a French atomic test in the Sahara. The nearest Nigerian territory to Reganne is at a distance of about 900 miles. That is why I have laid great stress on the fact that the radio-active material from the so-called “stem” produced in a nuclear explosion is deposited on the ground quite near the point of explosion. I would like therefore to repeat the figure which I quoted earlier of the distance from the Maralinga test site in Australia to the nearest Australian town. It is 62 miles. Thus, we have this very striking comparison between 62 miles and 900 miles. And, of course, whenever we ourselves have conducted an experiment at Maralinga we have always had to satisfy

—and have most willingly satisfied—the competent Australian authorities that no risk was involved for the people living in the area.

I shall turn now to the behaviour of the dome of the mushroom, better known as the mushroom cloud. The height to which this cloud rises depends upon the force of the explosion; broadly speaking the greater the explosion the higher the cloud rises. In the case of an explosion of the size which M. Moch has indicated to the Committee the mushroom cloud would rise to a height of 20,000 to 30,000 feet. This height is important, because over the Sahara winds at this height blow eastwards across the Sahara all the year round except for a period between June and August or September.

Our experience in Australia has been that aircraft given the task of following the cloud and equipped with the most sensitive apparatus for detecting radio-activity, have usually “lost” the cloud in a matter of 4 to 10 hours after the explosion, so dispersed has become its radio-activity. By this time the cloud has been carried a distance of from 100 to 400 miles from the site of the explosion. The very fine particles carrying the radio-activity in the cloud drift slowly down to earth, their radio-activity decreasing all the time at the rate I have already mentioned. Eventually, these decaying radio-active particles reach the ground as fall-out. They do, of course, add to the natural radio-activity there, to which man has been subjected from time immemorial, but the question is how much. This radio-activity is measured in units called milli-roentgens. Over the surface of the world, excepting in a few areas where natural radio-activity is unusually high, such as Kerala in India, man normally receives a “dose” of 100 to 150 units per year.

Now let us consider what happens at a place *down wind* of a nuclear explosion: that is at a place which is in the direction where the fall-out from an atomic cloud is likely to be the most concentrated. At a place 900 miles *down wind* (though in fact, of course, Nigeria is not *down wind* of Reganne) a man would receive from the fall-out originating from an explosion such as I have taken as my example, a total additional dose of radiation of about eight units. Of these eight units, two would be received in the first year and the remainder in diminishing amounts over the rest of his life. That is, in the year after the explosion an addition of two units to a normal background dose from nature of between 100 and 150. These figures have to be set against the fact that the accepted safe dose of radio-activity for the general population, including the most sensitive members, such as young and unborn children, is 500 units per person per year.

I have gone into this scientific data at some length because I believe that it is incumbent on us, as a Power that has tested nuclear weapons, to make available to the Committee information, which my colleagues will find convincing, that a French atomic test of the magnitude described by M. Moch conducted in the Sahara will not be endangering the health and safety of the peoples of Africa, still less of those living further away.

I have thought it right at an early stage in the debate to make available to the Committee my country’s view based upon the best scientific advice available to us and upon a considerable degree of experience in this field. I have confined myself to the technical aspects of the matter and I would like to reserve my country’s right to speak again if necessary later in the debate.

The Representative of France yesterday dwelt upon the considerable additional knowledge which we could all derive from the experience of the United States in carrying out their tests in Nevada, many details of which they have made public. Again, we know that the Soviet Union has carried out many tests in quite close proximity to large centres of population. We can all assume, of course, that the Soviet Government would not dream of carrying out such experiments if they entailed grave dangers and risks to the Soviet people. I have no doubt therefore that the Soviet Delegate will be eager to tell the Committee that from their own experience they can say categorically that they have not been endangering the lives of their citizens, and this in itself will reassure those countries in Africa and elsewhere who have expressed concern about the French tests.

The whole subject of nuclear science is not easy for the normal layman to follow, and we are keenly aware of the very real anxiety that exists in the minds of many of our friends. It is our duty here to discover the true facts for our peoples and to approach these matters in a responsible and rational manner. As I have indicated, we in the United Kingdom have acquired much expert knowledge in this field and I felt that it was only right to let my colleagues have the fruits of that knowledge in language as plain as I can make it and without bias. That has been the limited task I have set myself this morning.

#### ANNEX IV

#### **SPEECH BY THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE ON NOVEMBER 10, 1959, ON FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTS IN THE SAHARA**

Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor in order that I may explain to the Committee the reasons why my delegation has sponsored the draft resolution which has been tabled to-day as document No. A/C1/L239.

It has for a long time been the declared policy of my Government to work for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests under effective international control. Indeed it was the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, who, when progress in the Disarmament Sub-Committee was dragging in 1957, suggested that for this problem at least, the technical approach was the right one.

For a long while the Soviet Government (and I mention this merely as a fact of history and not as a reproach) resisted this proposal. But in the early part of 1958, they changed their minds and agreed that a technical conference between eminent scientists should be held in Geneva to discover whether it was theoretically possible to establish a control system that would be effective. My Government was of course delighted at this positive response by the Soviet Government and, as is well known, the conference that ensued succeeded in reaching agreed conclusions, on the basis of the scientific information at that time available, that it should be possible to control the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.



As I explained to the Committee during the course of my speech on the previous item on our agenda, further scientific information came to light after the conclusion of the Experts' Conference last year which gave rise to certain difficulties. This further scientific information has not yet been examined by the conference at present in progress but the latest news from Geneva encourages me to hope that it soon will be, and that our remaining problems will then be overcome. But although unexpected difficulties have prevented the speedy conclusion of an agreement let me assure the Committee that our desire to bring about a satisfactory agreement for the effectively controlled cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, has never wavered for an instant.

I devoted some attention, during my speech on comprehensive disarmament, to the progress which has so far been made in Geneva. I explained how, because a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests is our objective, we have been prepared to exercise the utmost patience in those negotiations; I ascribed the progress we have so far made, both to this patience, shown by all the participants, and to the fact that the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom have all made concessions of considerable importance.

There was another point about the nuclear tests which I perhaps did not emphasise enough when I spoke on comprehensive disarmament. When we started the present Conference at Geneva we saw this as the first act in the process of disarmament. We believed that if we could take this first step together to establish an international control organisation which would supervise a particular measure in the disarmament field we would have accomplished something unique in the history of the post-war world. We would have started down the road to real disarmament, including of course measures of nuclear disarmament.

I think it would be hard to exaggerate the significance of such a development for the whole future of international relations. The Committee will recall that when we started the present negotiations in Geneva, at the end of October, 1958, my Government, together with the Government of the United States, gave an undertaking to abstain from testing in order to ensure that the negotiations should start and be continued in the most propitious atmosphere. The precise undertaking was that, if the Soviet Union would do likewise, we would hold no nuclear tests for a year from the time of the beginning of the negotiations.

It is still the declared policy of my Government not to resume nuclear testing while useful discussions continue at Geneva, while the United States recently extended the voluntary moratorium on its testing programme until the end of the present year.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot think of any more convincing proof of the sincerity and determination with which my Government is seeking a comprehensive agreement, in which all countries will be able to join, for the permanent cessation of all nuclear tests.

It is this that is the important issue facing us—the cessation of all tests by all countries under effective international control. Not just the stopping of one small low-yield test series by the United Kingdom or France or the

Soviet Union or by the United States. A far greater prize is within our reach and that is what we strive to win.

I believe that it is to the winning of that prize that this Committee should direct its attention.

That is why the draft resolution calls on France to join in the ultimate agreement. This seems to us a constructive attitude to take up.

Mr. Chairman, the resolution contained in document A/C1/L238 entirely ignores the central and important issue I emphasised a moment ago, the cessation of *all* tests by *all* countries under effective international control. It concentrates on "the grave dangers and risks to which . . . nuclear tests would expose the population of many countries, in Africa and elsewhere and especially those bordering on the Sahara"; and, again, it speaks of France "creating conditions of danger in Africa". The purpose of my intervention on November 5 was to try and put such statements into perspective, on the basis of the best scientific information available to us—scientific information based on actual experience. It is often the unknown which tends to cause fear. I spoke as I did because I hoped that what I said would go some way to reassure those less familiar with the phenomena involved, for as I then said the whole subject of nuclear science is not easy for the normal layman to follow and we are constantly aware of the very real anxiety that exists in the minds of many of our friends. I do not for one moment attempt to deny that there is anxiety at any rate in Africa. Indeed I said the other day that I was fully aware of the concern on this subject that is felt in Nigeria and in other countries. Listening to further speakers in the debate has re-emphasised my awareness of this widespread concern. This morning I should like to make it very clear that we in Britain fully recognise the sincerity and concern of the peoples and Governments in Africa as a very important factor in the situation. We have a special duty to inform this Assembly of the views which are held in countries for whose foreign relations we are still responsible, including Nigeria, which has expressed special interest in this subject and which is shortly to become independent.

We have had to consider how we can most effectively reflect these anxieties in what we do here. To me it seems that the most rational objective which we here at the United Nations should set ourselves is to bring about the ending of all nuclear tests. That would be a most important and significant step.

This is the objective which we seek in the resolution which my Delegation has sponsored in company with the Delegation of Italy.

It does not seek to ignore or belittle the fears that have been expressed in our debate. It recognises quite frankly that they have been voiced. Nor does it pass over in silence the important statement made by the Representative of France in regard to these matters, a statement which, we believe, should do much to reassure those who have expressed these fears.

What it does do is to request France to take full account of all the views expressed in this debate.

The resolution also recalls the terms of resolution 1252 of last year, a resolution to which we then subscribed and which we still uphold. This

resolution urged the States concerned in the Geneva Conference to make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapon tests under effective international control. We are making that effort, and making it with a universal application in mind.

Mr. Chairman, as my Delegation sees it, the resolution which has been sponsored by Morocco and 21 other countries is frankly a negative resolution. If the United Nations in years gone by had simply called upon an individual nation to stop a particular test I do not believe it would have brought us one inch nearer to a comprehensive ban. Indeed, if the Assembly had thought it would have been useful they would no doubt have passed a resolution designed to stop first of all the United States tests. Then one to stop the Soviet tests and the United Kingdom tests. But the Assembly has never previously embarked on this course, no doubt because it recognised that this was not the main issue. We consider it a far more positive action and one that is in accord with the highest aspirations of the Assembly, to work for an agreement at Geneva between the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom and then to seek the adherence of all countries in the world to the resulting treaty. I have told the Committee that this great possibility has been in our minds from the beginning of the Conference, and all three parties to the negotiation have agreed so to draft the document which they are negotiating that everyone will be able to join. This seems to me the positive and constructive approach to the problem before us.

There is a great prize to be won and we should not allow our efforts and our attention to be diverted from the winning of it.

We believe that the resolution that we, together with Italy, have sponsored contains these constructive proposals. We believe it expresses the views of many in this Committee and I hope therefore that it will obtain wide support from my colleagues.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## ANNEX V

### **SPEECH BY THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE SECOND COMMITTEE ON NOVEMBER 10, 1959, ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES**

Mr. Chairman,

A few days ago this Committee heard Mr. Walter Nash, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, deliver an address which held the close attention of its members. He combined shrewd common sense with that humanitarian idealism which is an essential ingredient in all our work. Like so many other distinguished speakers in the Assembly, Mr. Nash began his statement by addressing himself to the subject of disarmament. We are all thinking hopefully, but I hope also realistically, about the prospects of disarmament. Next year the Ten-Power Committee will start work in Geneva, with the blessing and support of this Assembly.

I shall come back to the question of disarmament later, but the hope that it may be achieved, and the intention to achieve it if possible, must underlie the approach of this Committee and of all the Committees of the Assembly to their work.

I know that I shall not surprise the Committee when I say that my Delegation is in full sympathy with all those preceding speakers who have pointed out—so many of them with great eloquence and feeling—that this is not the best of all possible worlds. I recognise, with them, that there is much unnecessary wrong in the world, and an immeasurable amount of preventable human suffering. Those among us who have the means must do all that is in our power to alleviate backwardness and misery and to provide the economic and financial fuel which is needed to prime the economic engines of the poorer parts of the earth.

But if the world picture is still dark it is not as black as it was 30 or 20 or even 10 years ago. In these last years there have been real advances—a real change in attitudes and states of mind. The world has recognised the existence of the problem of under-development, and real progress is being made towards finding practical means of accelerating and maintaining development.

The United Kingdom Government recognise that a great deal of the progress that has been made is due to the activities of organs of the United Nations. We believe very firmly, as Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said in his intervention in the Assembly's General Debate on September 17, in "the great role of the United Nations in promoting economic development" and we have given practical evidence of this belief during this Assembly.

Because of the more hopeful political atmosphere which I have mentioned I believe that this is a particularly suitable year, and this discussion in the Second Committee a suitable occasion, to look at the progress achieved through international action, and at the expanded role which international institutions can play in accelerating the further advance we must achieve before the impending population explosion bursts upon us. I am glad to find that I am in good company in this debate in pursuing this train of thought.

This year the economic background against which development must be pursued is improving. In the industrialised countries it is good. In the United Kingdom, for example, industrial production in August and September was between 6 and 7 per cent. above the level of the same months in 1958. This surge forward has been combined with the maintenance of stability in our prices and we are doing our utmost to maintain such stability. I shall come back in a moment to the implications of this prosperity for economic progress and development in the rest of the world.

Meanwhile I am glad to say that the situation for the primary producers of the world is also looking better. Here I must take issue with those who pursue what I believe to be the fallacious theory that the industrialised world, by the process of industrialisation and development of substitutes, is gradually cutting itself off as a market for primary products. Although selective statistics may at times point in the opposite direction I believe it to be broadly true that the increase in industrial activity has led and is continuing to lead

to an increased consumption of primary commodities and may also lead, at least in many instances, to an increase in the prices obtained for them. In my own country, during the first nine months of 1959, while our exports rose by 3 per cent., our imports, mainly of raw materials and semi-manufactures, went up, at an accelerating rate, by 5 per cent.

Now I do not deny that the producers of even those primary products whose consumption and whose price have gone up can legitimately hope for more. Nor do I deny that certain products, such as coffee, sugar, lead and zinc have not been doing so well. For the countries which produce these commodities, the good fortune and prosperity of other countries can only be cold comfort. But in the instances I have mentioned international action, in which we are participating to the best of our ability, is being taken, and will, we hope, lead to remedies which are effective. We believe that this year and in 1960 the great bulk of the additions to the world's resources of foreign exchange will accrue to the primary producing nations, aiding their balances of payments, and putting them in a better position to buy the goods they need for their development.

I agree with those speakers who have emphasised the great importance of enabling the under-developed countries to pay their way by trade, and to raise their economic level by their own efforts.

In the early days after the war when we were engaged on our own reconstruction, in which we were assisted on an unprecedentedly generous scale by the United States, we had a watchword for the future. This was "Trade, not Aid". It did not mean that we did not require urgently the aid we were receiving. It meant that to pay our way in the future and to release ourselves from dependence on the generosity of another we had to restart the machinery of international commerce, manufacture our own products and find markets for them and become ourselves a market for others. In this we succeeded. The slogan "Trade, not Aid" has now been taken up here by several speakers. One or two—not from the less-developed countries—have suggested that trade is decreasing and that barriers are rising. This suggestion does not square with the facts. The United Kingdom Government have just announced the removal of practically all our remaining restrictions on imports from countries with a market economy and have come very close to completing the programme of liberalisation and non-discrimination which has for long been our declared policy. We have, furthermore, subjected our agricultural policies to a searching examination by Committee 2 of the GATT, which is the specialised organ concerned with agricultural protectionism. In the near future, too, the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade will hold a general examination of tariff levels.

In relation to the State trading countries we have also been doing our best. On May 24 last we signed to our mutual satisfaction a Five-Year Trade Agreement with the Government of the Soviet Union and we look forward to a substantial increase in trade in both directions.

I thus agree with those who have said that financial aid from the industrialised countries can only be at best a supplement to the domestic

efforts of the under-developed countries in raising themselves to that level of economic activity at which their efforts produce self-generating and accelerating results. But we are all agreed that financial aid—capital resources coming from the developed countries—is at the present time essential. In order to provide these resources it is necessary that the developed countries themselves should be prosperous, and indeed the primary producers know from bitter and sharp experience that depression or even recession in the industrialised countries has a destructive effect on weaker economies. The maintenance of their own prosperity must be a primary objective of the industrialised countries not only for their own sake but because their capacity to aid other countries depends upon it. Three months ago there was published in the United Kingdom a Report, of great interest, on the working of the monetary system. The Committee, headed by Lord Radcliffe, which prepared it took evidence from many official and non-official economists. Among the statements it quotes, almost in passing, is evidence given by a Treasury official who said that the Treasury's view was that long-term economic planning should be based on the assumption that resources should be found for a surplus in our current external trade balance averaging £450 million a year in the early 1960s. These figures, the Report went on, while in no way sacrosanct, give some indication of the order of magnitude required to allow a strengthening of reserves *consistently with our making a capital contribution to the economic development of the outside world.*

It is becoming clearer than ever this year that there is a general and conscientious acceptance by major industrialised Governments of the fact that it is their duty, and in their interests, to accelerate at as rapid a rate as their resources permit the economic development of under-developed countries. Mr. Nash expressed the same opinion powerfully and sincerely the other day. It is a view held by the United Kingdom Government and by other Governments with which my country enjoys close and friendly relations, not as something to be said for propaganda purposes abroad, not as an overcoat to be worn when the cold blasts of dissatisfaction blow upon us but as an integral part of our general domestic policy. The other day a distinguished representative speaking in this debate suggested that there was no connexion between the prosperity of the industrialised countries and the economic growth of the under-developed countries. Whilst this may be true for autarchic and semi-autarchic economies, it is not and cannot be true for countries which depend on world trade and which are animated by good will and a conscientious realisation of their duties.

My Government's policy is summed up in the following passage from the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the new Parliament at Westminster last month:

“The improvement of conditions of life in the less-developed countries of the world will remain an urgent concern of My Government. They will promote economic co-operation between the nations and support plans for financial and technical assistance.”

A few days later, speaking in the House of Commons the Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, referred to the improvement of conditions of life in the less developed countries of the world as one of the great challenges of our time. He went on to say:

“Economic assistance given from United Kingdom public funds went up by over 30 per cent. in the last financial year and will continue to go up. This is an addition to the hundreds of millions of pounds of private investment which goes overseas every year. Much of this assistance will continue to go to Commonwealth countries but from our greater strength *we have already undertaken to play an increasing part in various international efforts.*”

These statements, I may again remind the Committee, were not made to be heard abroad, but were statements of policy made to our legislators as an expression of a deeply felt belief.

One other example. Three months ago, when the President of the United States came to the United Kingdom on a visit, he and our Prime Minister took part in a half-hour's discussion which was televised to the British public. One of the main subjects with which their conversation dealt was that of economic aid, and what they both had to say struck a chord among British people, and I believe elsewhere in the world.

Not only is it our view, then, that we must maintain our own rate of economic progress if we are to help the less-developed countries adequately both by trade and by the provision of capital; it is also true that the policy we are following fits in precisely with that being adopted in the United Nations, and is in accordance with the Secretary-General's advice, given in his own statements to the Economic and Social Council, and summed up in the introduction to this year's World Economic Survey. He said, and we agree with him, that it is the responsibility of the developed countries to ensure their own continued growth for this purpose. In agreeing with him we would only say, as we have said earlier in the Economic and Social Council, that we believe that such growth is not inconsistent with stability of prices, and that stability of prices in the industrial countries together with prosperity is an essential ingredient of world economic progress. We believe that the validity of these assumptions is being proved during the current year.

Having said so much on this subject I would like to go one step further, and to follow up the lead given by a number of earlier speakers in this debate. A feature of the present economic situation which is often referred to is the widening of the so-called “Gap” between the richer and the poorer nations. It is said—I think that the original terminology comes from Karl Marx—that the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer. As Mr. Nash reminded us, this is not literally true as a broad generalisation. The rich *are* getting richer and are using part—though not everywhere yet enough—of their increased wealth to aid the poorer members of the world community. It is inevitable that *per capita* production and consumption in the industrialised countries should increase faster than in the less-developed countries at the present stage. This process must inevitably go on until the time comes when the less-developed countries reach what has been called “the economic take-off point”. As the Secretary-General himself reminded us, the widening markets in, and the increase in resources from, the industrialised countries is indispensable to the growth and strengthening of the weaker economies, and only by the further continuation of this process, based on goodwill on all sides,

can we hope to get the less-developed countries to that point where their own economies begin to develop rapidly. It has been suggested by some speakers that at the present rate it would take some hundreds of years for the poorer countries to make a very limited degree of progress, and that in that time they would have fallen further behind. But the whole purpose of the grand operation in which we are all so deeply involved must be to bring the poorer countries to that state where their own production begins to increase at a much higher rate, approximating to that reached earlier by the industrialised countries. I do not believe that we need think of the period involved in the sort of terms which have been used. The so-called "Gap" is therefore a shorthand way of describing the different rates of growth of different economies at different stages of development and is to that extent, an economic tautology. Our aim is ultimately to remedy the state of affairs of which the "gap" is but a symptom. We do not believe that the symptom will outlast the circumstances giving rise to it.

At the beginning of my statement I promised that I would come back to the subject of disarmament. This is, as our distinguished President said at the beginning and so many of us have been saying since, a year of hope for disarmament. I noticed with interest that in his statement to this Committee Mr. Krishna Menon reminded us that we must be modest and practical in our approach, and must not assume too much. He reminded us, as others have done, that if disarmament is achieved considerable resources could be released for employment elsewhere. The distinguished delegate of Yugoslavia, in his statement at the beginning of this debate, drew again to our attention the declaration adopted by the Assembly in 1953 committing its members "to devote a portion of the savings achieved through such disarmament to an international fund within the framework of the United Nations, to assist development and reconstruction in under-developed countries". I have quoted these carefully chosen words in full because, as we have heard, their meaning and intention can be distorted to some extent if they are compressed or paraphrased. A similar thought was included in the proposal of certain Latin American Delegations in the disarmament resolution adopted two years ago at the Twelfth Session (No. 1148 (XII)). This received the votes of all members of the Assembly, including the United Kingdom, except for ten delegations who chose to abstain.

From the very beginning of discussions of this subject, some ten years ago, the United Kingdom has consistently recognised that the coming of disarmament could help to make additional funds available, and we must continue to look forward in the hope that this will be so. But for our part we prefer not to think in terms of promises for an unspecified future. We prefer that, if possible, our performance should go beyond our promises rather than the reverse. And so, while we must set this long-term goal in front of us as an aspiration, we have been thinking in more practical terms. We are indeed not a little satisfied with the fact that while Mr. Khrushchev in his speech to this Assembly on September 18 was talking in those terms of hope or expectation for the future we, along with some other countries represented in this Assembly, were, already, in advance of disarmament, well embarked on the process of giving that assistance, both capital and technical, about which we are all now so much concerned.



I should like to give the Committee a few facts about our present performance. United Kingdom expenditure *from public funds* on economic and technical aid of all kinds, including funds channelled through international organisations, rose from \$210 million in 1957–58 to \$280 million in 1958–59, an increase of one-third. These figures exclude military assistance and certain emergency expenditure, relief funds and so on, which have been running at an additional \$84 million or so a year. We expect the total for 1959–60 to show a considerable and indeed striking increase on these figures. I do not need to remind you that we have supported the increase in the capital of the International Bank and were the first to subscribe to it. And these Government expenditures are additional to the outflow of private capital from the United Kingdom which has been averaging over \$840 million a year in gross figures, or about \$560 million a year in net figures, that is to say after allowing for the flow of capital from other countries to the United Kingdom.

In passing, I must correct one or two statements which have been made here that interest, profits and dividends received by private investors exceed the outflow of private capital. These statements were no doubt based on the erroneous figures reproduced in both the interim and the printed edition of the study on the International Flow of Private Capital 1956–58, which have since been corrected by the printed errata produced by the Secretariat. The corrected figures show that private capital outflow from the United Kingdom was \$560 million in 1956, \$756 million in 1957 and £532 million in 1958. Interest, profits and dividends accruing in the same years were \$322 million, \$305 million and \$148 million respectively. In each year, therefore, a considerably smaller sum and not, as stated by some speakers, a larger sum, was earned as return on capital invested. Furthermore, as we learn from a similar publication prepared by the Secretariat in 1958 for ECOSOC XXVI (L/3128) and I quote:

“These figures include in each case ‘some reinvestment of retained profits’ only because the available information is seriously incomplete. It is therefore likely that, if allowance is made for *all ploughed back* profits, the total outflow of private capital from the United Kingdom would be substantially greater than the above figures imply.”

The corollary is that the figures of profits, &c., exported from the countries concerned would be substantially less.

As I showed earlier our capacity to make such contributions to the world’s development depends on our balance of payments position. We cannot expect or hope for any great improvement in it, beyond the present satisfactory level, and it would therefore not be wise to expect at the present time any considerable further increase in our capacity to expand capital aid beyond the very large figures described above.

But, to go back to my theme of a moment ago, even now, when real disarmament has not yet begun, we stand ready to contribute \$140 million towards the capital of the proposed International Development Association, this, in addition to what we are already doing, year by year, in other directions. That Fund will be, in our view, “an international fund within the framework of the United Nations”. It is proposed, as everyone here knows, to establish the Development Association under the aegis of the International Bank; but

the Bank is in close constitutional relations with the United Nations, and it makes a report every year to the Economic and Social Council. Just as we leave the responsibility for the organisation of certain types of activities to the World Health Organisation, Food and Agriculture Organisation and so on, so, in the view of my Government we must make use of the special skills and capacities of the Bank to handle the organisation of this kind of fund, at any rate for the present.

I am well aware that there are many delegations represented in this Committee which have felt that the Assembly itself, and the United Nations at its Headquarters, should have the primary responsibility. But we have been glad to find that, although there are different views about some aspects of the I.D.A., the 68 members of the Bank—and those 68 members are all represented in this Committee—have been unanimous in their decision to go ahead with the preparation of a fund with an initial capital of \$1,000 million.

All this does not mean that the United Kingdom Government does not recognise the deep and burning sincerity and beliefs of the supporters of what has been called SUNFED. We recognise the importance of continuing to discuss these and similar ideas here in this Committee and in the Economic and Social Council. But I should be deceiving you if I led you to believe that we could at present contemplate taking part in any multilateral capital development fund in addition to that which I have been discussing.

In his opening speech in the Plenary debate Sir Claude Corea in supporting the view that provision must be made for capital assistance gave us a masterly survey of the various types of international institutions within and outside the United Nations framework which are engaged in or concerned with this subject. I do not need therefore to cover that ground again. But I do want to say that we believe, with the Secretary-General, and with a number of other delegations who have spoken in this and in the Third Committee and in the Plenary itself, that the Economic and Social Council has an important co-ordinating role to play, and that we want it to play that role with the maximum efficiency. As the Secretary-General has said, there is some room for an improvement of the Economic and Social Council's procedures. The Council has subjects of the most vital importance to discuss, and he is right in saying that it is important "to organise its work in such a way as to render possible a searching examination and discussion of key issues of decisive general importance at a policy making level". The United Kingdom Government has always felt that some of the subjects the Council had to deal with demanded precisely the kind of attention which the Secretary-General was talking about and we have for many years, both under the former Labour Government and under the present Conservative one, made a practice of sending a Minister to the summer Session of the Council, to take part in its principal debates. I myself have had the great privilege of taking part in the Council's work in this way. It is natural therefore that we should have welcomed the Secretary-General's initiative, and we shall be very happy to see the Council strengthened if its member Governments find that they agree with his proposals.

If we do what he has suggested to us I believe that we shall find that in the Economic and Social Council we have a forum at which such subjects as that of the work of the I.D.A. and the Bank and the International Finance

Corporation and other bodies concerned can be studied and appreciated at the proper level in their relation to other aspects of the work of the United Nations. If for example, representatives of Governments at the policy-making level were prepared to come to the spring meeting of the Economic and Social Council when the reports of the Bank and Fund are discussed, and when the Managing Directors of those agencies are present to explain their reports, I believe that the discussions held there might have fruitful results in terms of the policies not only of the member Governments of the Economic and Social Council, but of the world at large.

## ANNEX VI

### **SPEECH BY SIR PIERSON DIXON IN THE COMMITTEE ON ARRANGEMENTS ON SEPTEMBER 2, 1959, ON A CHARTER REVIEW CONFERENCE**

The United Kingdom has always taken a keen interest in the constitutional development of the United Nations, including the possibility of making changes in the Charter.

Although this is not the occasion to go deeply into matters of substance, I feel that I ought to indicate briefly the direction in which our thoughts have moved, so that our attitude to the decision which this Committee is to take may be clearly understood.

Those who originally drafted the Charter did not mean it to be eternal in its present form.

In Article 109 they made sensible and far-reaching provision for amendments to the Charter.

Our meeting to-day takes place as a result of this provision and of the arrangements made in accordance with it by the General Assembly at its Tenth and Twelfth Sessions.

The world situation to-day is not what it was when the Charter was drafted.

The statesmen at San Francisco in 1945—in words recently used by Lord Attlee, who was himself one of those statesmen—endeavoured “to set up a better League of Nations”.

Now, as Lord Attlee also said on the same occasion, the League of Nations was essentially an attempt to establish the rule of law without any surrender of sovereignty by the individual member nations.

The United Nations, as it was set up in 1945, had and has the same essential character.

Everyone, I think, would agree that in the conditions of 1945 it would not have been possible to set up an international body which went further than this.

For many reasons into which I need not now go it would not have been possible at that time to convince the great majority of people in any country that the time had come for their countries to surrender national sovereignty.

We are all conscious of the political, economic and scientific changes which have transformed the world in the last fourteen years.

I believe that most of us recognise that these changes must affect our attitude towards national sovereignty and the need for international co-operation.

As Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said in his speech during the General Debate at the last Session of the General Assembly, the requirement of our world now is interdependence between the nations.

The logic of the changes of which I have spoken, if we were perfectly rational beings, might well be that we should now be working to create a form of world government.

But the obstacles to that are, of course, very great.

Our distinguished Secretary-General drew attention to them in a speech in my country last year when, referring to proposals for world government, he said that most of us would agree that "the political realities with which we live, rooted as they are deep in the disparate histories and cultures of many peoples, make this course impracticable for the foreseeable future".

We are, after all, dealing here with some very deep loyalties—patriotism, convinced beliefs in different ideologies, and, as Mr. Hammarskjöld said, disparate cultures.

But in spite of that I still cannot help feeling that the time is near when all of us should give really serious thought to how our organisation needs to be developed and strengthened in various ways, so that it is capable of fulfilling more efficaciously its prime task, of maintaining peace with justice.

I have sometimes felt that our organisation, in its understandable preoccupation with keeping the peace, has not always remembered that the Charter must be interpreted as requiring not just peace, but peace "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law".

Various ideas have been put forward, which, while preserving the essential framework of our organisation, go some way towards meeting this objective.

These include the setting up of a United Nations force and the giving of more authority to, or at least making greater use of, the International Court of Justice.

There are also a number of more immediate points concerning the day-to-day working of our organisation on which some amendments to the Charter would be useful.

Although some of these points would involve amendments to the Charter as a matter of form, they would, in substance, do no more than bring certain provisions in it up to date.

Here I am thinking in particular of a possible expansion in the size of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council so as to provide wider representation on these bodies to take account of the increased membership of the United Nations.

What I have said shows, I hope, that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom believe that it would be useful for the members of the United Nations to examine our Charter and to consider carefully whether changes in it should be made to take account of the evolution of the

international situation and of international thought which has taken place since 1945.

But this does not necessarily mean that we should decide to hold the Charter Review Conference next year or that we should decide any firm date for that Conference here and now.

My Government hope that, as a result of negotiations and exchanges of view which have already taken place and are proceeding, there may emerge a more stable period in international relations, with tensions reduced and mutual confidence increased.

If and when we can record solid and substantial achievement in this direction we may have created auspicious circumstances which would permit the United Nations to embark hopefully and profitably upon a thorough and searching examination of the real substance of the problem which must be considered in any Charter Review.

I think therefore that this Committee should be careful not to make any recommendation which would have the effect of putting itself indefinitely into cold storage.

If we should decide at our present meeting not to recommend a definite date for a Conference I feel that we should at least recommend that this Committee should meet again before too long to make a fresh report to the General Assembly.

I shall be very interested to hear the views of my colleagues on the Committee, and with your permission, Mr. Chairman, would like to reserve my right to speak again later.

## ANNEX VII

### **SPEECH BY LORD BIRDWOOD IN THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON NOVEMBER 9, 1959, ON THE QUESTION OF RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA**

We in the United Kingdom Delegation are very conscious of the force and sincerity of the views held by many Member States on this item, which comes before us in succeeding years: but I regret that once again we cannot accept that the Assembly is competent to intervene in this issue and we must, therefore, again vote against this resolution. I would not want our attitude to be misunderstood. This does not mean that we are not in agreement with many of the sentiments expressed in the resolution. For instance, the universal proposition advanced in the first operative paragraph is one with which we have, on our record, always been associated. In the territories for which my Government are responsible, our policies are, we believe, clear and unequivocal. We are helping the people of those territories to move to nationhood in freedom, regardless of race, colour, and creed. We are, therefore, committed to the progressive removal of any remaining restrictions based upon race as soon as this may be practicable. In the appropriate

place and at the appropriate time my Delegation has made this policy clear many times in the United Nations, the most recent occasion being in the speech by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom before the Assembly on September 17. If, therefore, on this occasion we once more register a vote against this resolution as a whole, it is because we still feel that it contravenes the Charter and that the need to maintain the integrity of the Charter is of paramount importance and must take priority over other considerations. Article 2 (7) was placed conspicuously in its governing position at the beginning of the Charter after long and careful consideration. "Nothing contained in the present Charter", it states—that is, nothing that follows thereafter, for example, Article 10 or Articles 55 and 56—"shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any State". Weighing those words and their implication carefully, I find myself wondering how many Member States would really care to renounce the protection which is rightly provided them, by the existence of this Article? How many States would lightly wish to see it either abolished or (in some rash moment), bypassed? How many of them could be sure of remaining unaffected in such circumstances? Any such development would, I submit, amount to a tacit amendment of the Charter without complying with the constitutional formalities required for a legal amendment.

Turning to the resolution itself, I have indicated that where broad principles are concerned we are not unmindful of our duty. We have, however, noted—and I say this notwithstanding the sincere assurance given earlier by the distinguished Delegate of India—that as compared with last year, new paragraph L would seemingly appeal for action by Member States against the Union; that would, in our view, be interference in the internal affairs of South Africa; and for that reason we have to resist any such suggestion. For the same reason we must ask once again to be understood if we neither condemn nor support the actions of the Union within her own territories. Indeed, if we were to contemplate doing either, we would have to bear in mind certain conditions elsewhere to which other speakers have drawn our attention. The distinguished Delegates of the United States and the Netherlands—I think—reminded us that in many parts of the world—in parts of Europe for example—there were possibly conditions which could equally merit the attention of those who seek to uphold the principles of human rights. Quite frankly, the assumption that anything said which exposes alleged conditions in one country—South Africa—is in defence of human rights; while any reference to alleged conditions in other countries increases tension and is part of a cold war, is a proposition with no appeal whatsoever for us.

Finally, whatever the intrinsic rights and wrongs may be in this dispute—and its very existence causes us deep regret in that it involves on different sides, countries with whom we have exceptionally close relations—the fact remains that seven years of discussion in the United Nations, and the passing of many resolutions—do not seem to have brought us any nearer to resolving it. In the view of my Delegation, this is clear proof that whatever the inclination of a majority of its members may be, the United Nations can take no effective action in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. This being so, surely the United Nations can only

lose prestige, if it persists in trying to follow courses which eventually lead us nowhere?

The rule of law has been referred to in this debate—the strict regard for the provision of the Charter to which my Delegation adheres—I would assure this Committee—is thus prompted by a genuine concern for the preservation of the effectiveness and prestige of the United Nations as an organisation which can, and does, deal effectively with those questions for which it was both designed and equipped.

#### ANNEX VIII

#### **EXTRACT FROM THE SPEECH BY SIR ANDREW COHEN IN THE FOURTH COMMITTEE ON NOVEMBER 6, 1959, ON TANGANYIKA**

Now, Sir, I would like to turn to Tanganyika, the largest of the Trust Territories and no Cinderella among them. Indeed Tanganyika is destined to be one of the great nations, one of the great independent nations on the African continent. Before I deal in detail with the affairs of Tanganyika I would like to mention one most pleasant thing. The Governor of Tanganyika, in addressing the Legislative Council very recently said, and I quote “ We are looking forward to welcoming Mr. Hammarskjöld to Dar es Salaam for a brief visit during the second week of January. This will be the first time that a Secretary-General of the United Nations has ever visited Tanganyika, the largest of the Trust Territories.” And I should like also to quote from the debate in the Legislative Council on October 22 on the Governor’s address, when Miss Johansson, speaking for the members of the Legislative Council, said “ Mr. Speaker, when rising to express great satisfaction with the constructive spirit of his Excellency’s speech I have been delegated to express on behalf of this side of the House our deep gratefulness for one passage in his Excellency’s speech. That is about the visit in January next year of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It is a proof that our endeavours to build up Tanganyika as a nation, with tasks for all co-operating, has got the sanction of indeed a wider multi-racial unit, the United Nations, and we will wholeheartedly welcome Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld to Tanganyika ”. I would like to say how much we in the United Kingdom Delegation and how much the United Kingdom Government welcomes this particular visit.

Mr. Chairman, I speak on the subject of Tanganyika with considerable pleasure because the record of the last year is one of good progress. This is a matter of satisfaction to the United Kingdom as Administering Authority; it will also, we believe, be a matter of considerable satisfaction to the members of the Fourth Committee. The developments reported to the Committee last year showed that Tanganyika was a Territory which was on the move. The Administering Authority and the leaders in the Territory were already deeply involved in the complex process of building up the machinery for self-government. Since the last Session of the Assembly several new and important steps have been taken. Some of these have been

referred to in the section on Tanganyika in the Report of the Trusteeship Council. But the Trusteeship Council debated Tanganyika in February and March and there have been other important developments since then. One reason for my early intervention in this debate is to be sure that the Committee has all these important facts before it.

First of all I would like to refer to the statement made to the Legislative Council of Tanganyika by Sir Richard Turnbull, the Governor, just over a year ago, and I will quote one passage from it in full because of its importance. "In terms of population, the Africans are and always will be an overwhelming majority in Tanganyika and as the country progresses it is right and proper as indeed it was natural and inevitable, that African participation both in the Legislature and in the Executive should steadily increase. It is not intended, and never has been intended, that parity should be a permanent feature of the Tanganyika scene. On the other hand, it was intended, and always has been intended, that the fact that when self-government is eventually attained, that the Legislature and the Government are likely to be predominantly African should in no way affect the security of the rights and interests of those minority communities who have made their homes in Tanganyika. I am glad to note that the responsible leaders of major political parties in the territory are in complete agreement on this important matter and that there is therefore a good prospect that in due course there will exist in Tanganyika a Government in which Her Majesty's Government will be able to divulge their trust as being a Government under which responsible people of all races will feel secure." This statement was very well received—indeed welcomed—by everybody in the Legislative Council of Tanganyika. Now let us see what steps are being taken in the spirit of that statement.

Sir Richard Turnbull, as one of his first measures as Governor of Tanganyika, decided that the second part of the general elections, the first part of which had already been held in September, 1958, should be advanced from September, 1959 to February, 1959. Now what was the result of these elections? The result was a great victory for the Tanganyika African National Union led by Mr. Julius Nyerere, to whom already in this debate, and rightly so, warm tributes have been paid, and who after the election was elected as Chairman of the newly-formed Tanganyika Elected Members' Organisation. One of the most satisfactory features of the election campaign, Mr. Chairman, was the good co-operation between members of the different races and the absence from the election of racial divisions. The members elected are all either T.A.N.U. candidates or candidates supported by T.A.N.U. In the Elected Members' Organisation—known as T.E.M.O.—the elected members of all races, African, European and Asian, are co-operating harmoniously together.

When the Legislative Council met after these elections, an important statement on constitutional development was made by the Governor on March 17. One of the main points in the statement was the appointment of the Post Elections Committee, which had first been mentioned publicly in April 1957. The intention in 1957 was that the Committee should sit following the elections to consider among other things whether a Council of Ministers should be established. It is a measure of the increased speed of constitutional



progress that in the statement of March 1959, the Governor was able to announce not only the appointment of the Committee, but also the actual establishment of a Council of Ministers.

Referring to the Post Elections Committee the Trusteeship Council recommended as follows: "The Trusteeship Council reiterates the hope expressed at its 20th and 21st Sessions that this Committee will be given the broadest terms of reference and that its composition will be as representative as possible. Now that elections to the territorial legislature have taken place, the Trusteeship Council considers that it would be appropriate for the elected African representatives to have substantial representation on this Committee". The Committee was indeed given wide terms of reference. They included the question of changes in the provision for representation by elected members in the Legislative Council, the number of constituencies and their boundaries, the question of changes in the franchise and the system of tripartite voting. Indeed on this the terms of reference included the statement that, "it is not intended that parity of representation in the Legislative Council should be a permanent feature of the Tanganyika Constitution". The composition of the Committee, Mr. Chairman, was also broadly based. Among its 14 members there were 8 elected and 5 nominated members of the Legislative Council. And there was indeed substantial African representation. The chairman was Sir Richard Ramage, a distinguished civil servant with much experience both in West Africa, and more recently in Uganda, where he was a very successful Chairman of the Public Service Commission. The Post Elections Committee has now very recently presented its report to the Governor, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies is now considering it.

In March Sir Richard Turnbull made another important statement, which I will quote. He said "I hope at the same time [as final decisions on the Committee's recommendations are made public] to make an announcement concerning the next moves forward and to indicate the periods within which, provided the Government of the Territory has operated efficiently and peace and good order have been maintained, we can hope to accomplish these further steps in our constitutional programme. This announcement will include a forecast as to when, provided there are no untoward developments, we may expect unofficial majorities to be introduced into the Council of Ministers and into the Legislative Council." In his recent statement of October 20 the Governor said "In the meantime, in accordance with my undertaking of last March, I have been considering with Ministers of the Government, and with the Secretary of State, the question of further advances in the constitutional field". Now, Sir, as members of the Committee will be aware, there has recently been a general election in my country and we have a new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Iain Macleod. Obviously the new Secretary of State must have time to consider these very important matters affecting Tanganyika, including the recommendations of the Post Elections Committee. But I would like again to quote from the Governor's speech where he said, "The Secretary of State is very conscious of the fact that the people of Tanganyika are anxious to have, as soon as possible, a clear indication of the decisions of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the next constitutional steps; and he has authorised me to give an assurance that these matters will be treated with all possible dispatch".

In the statement of March, Mr. Chairman, the Governor also announced his intention to appoint a Council of Ministers on July 1, 1959, with five unofficial Ministers. At its 23rd Session the Trusteeship Council adopted the following recommendation: "The Council welcomes the statement of the Special Representative that the Administering Authority is now thinking in terms of the appointment by the Governor of unofficial Ministers, chosen from among the elected representatives, and hopes that this step towards the development of responsible executive government will be taken in the near future". This, Sir, has indeed happened. Hitherto, unofficial members of the Executive Council have not held responsibility for ministerial portfolios, although more recently they have served as Assistant Ministers. Now there are five unofficial Ministers with full responsibility. Three of these are Africans, one an Asian and one a European. In his speech to the Legislative Council the Governor paid tribute to "the great energy and vision both in policy matters and in routine duties of their portfolios" which the new Ministers have already shown since assuming office. We have been glad to see one of them, Mr. Kahama, the Minister for Co-operative Development, in this country recently attending a conference about coffee in Washington.

Mr. Chairman, I venture to say that all this shows clearly that great advances have been made during the past year. In addition two further advances in the future have been foreshadowed. The first of these is the promised statement on constitutional development, to which I have already referred and which will deal with the timing of the establishment of unofficial majorities in the Council of Ministers in the Legislative Council. These are fundamental matters in constitutional progress and this undertaking to make a further statement means that we shall be ready shortly to map out the next moves forward in the Territory.

Secondly—and also very important—the Governor at the opening of the Legislative Council on October 20 announced his intention that the life of the Council should be brought to an end not in 1962, as would normally have been the case, but in 1960. The purpose of this is to enable new elections to be held in September 1960 and the Governor has announced that they will be held in that month or as soon thereafter as the necessary preparations can be completed. This obviously is a very substantial move forward. The new election will no doubt be held on the basis of the arrangements to be made in the light of the Post Elections Committee's recommendations, and this is likely to represent a step forward from the basis on which elections for the present Legislative Council were held in September, 1958, and February, 1959.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, we have made important steps forward during the current year, and we look forward to the announcement of the next steps. The Administering Authority and the Governor are working harmoniously with the political leaders of the people of Tanganyika. The different races are working together harmoniously in the Legislative Council and the Government. There is excellent co-operation between civil servants and elected Ministers. The debate in the Legislative Council on the Governor's address, which took place on October 22, bears eloquent witness to this spirit of harmony and mutual understanding. There was a general welcome for the Governor's speech; there was a spirit of confidence in the future, and

confidence in the way in which Tanganyika is going forward. The art of politics, Mr. Chairman, is essentially the art of human relations. In terms of a Territory, a Trust Territory, moving forward to independence, this means on the one hand imagination and sympathy with the aspirations of the people and on the other hand understanding of what the Government has to offer. There has to be in fact, faith by both sides in each other. These things I venture to suggest are present now in ample measure in the Trust Territory of Tanganyika. As a result the political progress of the Territory and the people is going forward smoothly in an atmosphere of mutual trust and personal good will. This is a tribute to all who have to handle these problems, all who hold positions of responsibility whether as political leaders or as senior officials in the territory.

Now, Sir, I would like to turn from the political side to the economic, social and educational sides. We have seen that great progress has been made in Tanganyika. But there are very large problems ahead—let us not ignore this particularly in the economic field and recently these economic problems have been causing us some anxiety. Good progress has been made in Tanganyika over the last ten years in economic development, owing partly to the initiative of the Government and the hard work and co-operation of the people, but also to favourable economic circumstances resulting mainly from high prices commanded by Tanganyika's exports. But the country, which remains predominantly agricultural, is unevenly developed and considerable additional capital investment is needed for further expansion. Apart from considerable progress in the production, marketing and distribution of many commodities, there has been a substantial expansion in trade and commercial activity. Unfortunately increased production in agricultural products has not reaped its full reward because world commodity prices have tended to fall over the last five years. These falls in commodity prices have of course been reflected in Government revenue. Although the financial year 1957-58 shows a small surplus, the year 1958-59 is at best likely only to produce a balance and the prospect for the current financial year is the probability of a considerable deficit. In the past Tanganyika has not been able to build up very large reserve funds, and it is clear that the failure of the current revenue to expand at a sufficiently high rate to meet the steadily rising recurrent costs of the administration is going to present a very difficult problem for a number of years.

Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are anxious, and indeed determined, that there should be no cutting back of expenditure in such fields as social services and education, on which the future progress of the territory and its people so heavily depend. In order therefore that the Tanganyika Government can continue to plan for basic services at reasonable levels, Her Majesty's Government has undertaken to assist Tanganyika in meeting its financial difficulties as and when necessary.

At its 23rd Session the Trusteeship Council expressed concern at the budgetary situation and welcomed the assurance of Her Majesty's Government to which I have just referred. The Council's recommendation continued, "The Council is of the opinion that the Administering Authority should in the meantime study all possible means of increasing public revenue, particularly by increasing production, improving qualities and accelerating

the rate of industrialisation". The Administering Authority is in fact doing this, one means being to enlist the help and advice of the International Bank. An International Bank survey mission—a distinguished mission of experts—visited the territory in June at the request of the Tanganyika Government to assess the resources available for future development, to consider how these might best contribute to a balanced programme of social and economic advance, to make recommendations for practical measures to further such a programme and to indicate the financial implications of these recommendations. The members of the Mission are now considering their report, which we hope will be available early next year. The Administering Authority expects this report to be of particular value in planning for the further economic progress of Tanganyika.

I would like to spend a little time referring in detail to some of the economic and social problems. Water development in the territory of Tanganyika is of special importance to economic progress. Several large dams and irrigation schemes have been set on foot by means of surveys, hydrological investigations and pilot schemes. We have received—and we have warmly welcomed—considerable assistance from the Food and Agriculture Organisation. The main scheme in which the FAO is interested is the investigation of the great Rufiji River basin in the south central part of Tanganyika. Eleven FAO experts have been working and a pilot irrigation scheme and pilot farm is in operation. Sixty-five hydrological and meteorological stations have been established in the Rufiji basin, covering a total area of 68,000 square miles. The scheme contemplates, if it comes into operation, a basin of irrigated farming with African tenant farmers.

The Tanganyika Government is steadily pushing forward with its vital agricultural extension work and experimental work, with its plans for helping African farmers to increase their efficiency and, particularly important, with the training of African staff. Two of the most important industries, apart from sisal and tea, are the cotton and coffee industries in which African farmers are specially interested. The cotton industry has recently encountered difficulties in marketing: the produce board and the Government sought expert advice on the organisation of the industry; and negotiations have been going forward between producers, ginneries and the Government about arrangements for the handling of the crop in a market which is now very competitive. The Tanganyika Government plans to lend some £500,000 through the Lint and Seed Marketing Board for the construction of four new co-operative ginneries as part of the reorganisation of the industry. I know, Sir, from experience in a neighbouring territory how important this is to African farmers and co-operative members. The Government is also doing all it can to improve the quality of Tanganyika coffee to enable the territory to retain its small, but to the people of the territory, extremely important share in the world market.

A field in which Tanganyika has been outstanding is the field of co-operation; in this steady progress continues. Ten years ago there were only 79 co-operative societies, with a membership of about 60,000; now there are over 600 societies with a membership of about 350,000. Co-operative societies are now considering the formation of a territory-wide union to represent co-operative opinion to the Government and public. The co-operative movement is most important to the African people of

Tanganyika and very important to the development of the share of Africans in the economic life of the country.

Medical progress continues. There are now 76 Government hospitals, or dispensaries with beds, and 36 mission hospitals with resident medical practitioners, as well as a number of hospitals maintained by agricultural and industrial concerns. Expansion continues and work will begin next year on three new hospitals and on the expansion of a number of existing hospitals.

I turn now to education. No country can progress satisfactorily without a sufficient supply of educated leaders, and there is much ground to cover in Tanganyika in this respect. As the Trusteeship Council was informed at its 23rd Session, the Government has set up a Committee to consider how, within the framework of the existing development plans, the present education systems for the various races in Tanganyika might best be integrated so as to lead to the development of a single system of education for the territory. This is a matter in which I know that the Trusteeship Council has been specially interested and I believe the same will apply to this Committee. The Tanganyika Committee to which I have referred will soon be submitting its report.

The Government of Tanganyika attaches special importance to the development of secondary education, which is the key to success for expansion both of the primary system, of technical education and of higher education. The number of students taking the school certificate examination in December this year will be more than twice as great as the total who sat for the examination last year. The introduction in January, 1959, of higher school certificate classes in some secondary schools will enable scholars to proceed straight to a degree course without the necessity of spending two years in preliminary intermediate study at the University as in the past. At Makerere, the University College of East Africa, there are nearly 200 Tanganyika students and the number is steadily increasing. There are of course also large numbers of Tanganyika students taking higher education elsewhere, including overseas.

I wish to make it clear, Mr. Chairman, that I do not talk of the educational problems of Tanganyika in any sense of complacency. As I have said, there is a great deal of ground to be covered, and the problems are difficult because of the great cost of expanding education. But this is something very close to the hearts of the people and Government of Tanganyika and they will press on with educational development with all means at their disposal.

The expansion of higher education facilities in East Africa is now being considered by the East African Governments. A working party on higher education which visited East Africa last year recommended that there should be a University of East Africa with an inter-territorial college in each of the three territories. The complex task of working out the programme to achieve this objective is now being undertaken, and the Government of Tanganyika aims to ensure the establishment of the University College in Tanganyika as soon as circumstances justify this.

Finally in this detailed account—which is necessarily, I am afraid, very selective—I want to say something about the Africanisation of the Government service. The Governor the other day gave what I believe was

a most encouraging report to the Legislative Council on this subject. The importance of the civil service as a basis for self-government and the need for trained local personnel in all spheres of the Government needs no emphasis from me. The Government's determination to press forward in this field is evident and very creditable results have been achieved. The appointment of locally recruited staff to senior posts in all branches of the civil service is proceeding at a steadily increasing rate. Some 10 years ago the first locally born officers were recruited to posts in the higher civil service. In March of this year 253 such posts were occupied by local officers. In the last six months this number has risen to 360, of whom 270 are Africans. Taking into account vacancies now being filled the total by the end of November will be over 400 local officers, over 300 of them Africans.

Further details of this progress could be given, but I think I need only mention the following. First with regard to the administrative service, there are at present five African District Officers and three graduates are in training in the United Kingdom for entry into the service as cadets. A further six Africans are acting as District Officers with a view to their substantive promotion to that post, of these three are on courses in the United Kingdom. The establishment of Assistant District Officers has been raised from 47 to 67 and the Public Service Commission is now engaged in selecting candidates to fill the additional posts. This expansion will result in a significant widening of the field from which appointment as Acting District Officers can be made. In the Education Department 57 Africans hold higher posts. In the Medical Department 25 local officers are in the senior ranks, 25 of them Africans. Eleven of these are medical officers. If there is no wastage of serving officers and if those now studying qualify in due time, there will by 1965 be a total of 32 African doctors in the Government service—a substantial proportion. These figures I think show that good progress is being made. It will also be clear that, as I have said, there is a great deal to be done, and I can assure the Committee that the Tanganyika Government, in co-operation with the Legislative Council and all concerned, will proceed in this task with the utmost vigour.

I would like, even though I have spoken at some length, to quote the last paragraph of the Governor's address to the Legislative Council, because I think it is very relevant. "As I told Honourable Members in the early part of this Address, the Session upon which we are now embarking will be the last Session of this Council. The year ahead of us is likely to be a momentous one for, quite apart from constitutional matters and preparations for a General Election, the Council will have to devote itself to the complex and far-reaching issues of economic development. The shape of the development plan to which I have already referred will depend to a large extent on the recommendations of the World Bank Survey Mission; but we must disabuse ourselves of any idea that some magic formula for prosperity is to be presented to us. In this country, as in other parts of Africa, our wealth depends on the exploitation of our minerals, on the improvement of our agriculture, our forests and our water supplies, and on the development of our communications; and equally on the education of our people; for well-trained minds and properly developed skills form as great a part of a country's wealth as do mineral workings and carefully tended fields. But we

depend also, and for the foreseeable future we will continue to depend, on sources outside Tanganyika for capital investment and technical expertise. Our objective must be so to develop the resources of this country, both by local and external enterprise, that it can command the revenues necessary to maintain its government, to service its loans, to expand its social services and to meet all its financial commitments. In these endeavours we can continue to rely upon generous and understanding assistance from Her Majesty's Government. But the achievement of real progress is going to demand not only the most fruitful use of outside aid and co-operation with foreign enterprise, but a stern and continuing individual effort on the part of the people of the Territory." That, Sir, if I may say so, says far more eloquently than I could what the problem is. But I also want to tell the Committee what Mr. Julius Nyerere had to say on the same subject. Mr. Julius Nyerere, in welcoming the Governor's statement on constitutional matters, made it clear that this welcome was subject to the reservation that his demand and that of his party for the establishment of what he called responsible government should be granted. This demand, as I think I have made clear, is now under consideration by the Secretary of State. By responsible government Mr. Nyerere means a Council of Ministers with an elected majority. Now, Sir, starting from that point, I would like with the Committee's permission to read out some passages from Mr. Nyerere's statement. Mr. Nyerere said:

"Why, Sir, have we elected to proceed in this way? There are several reasons why we, the people of Tanganyika, have decided to proceed in this way. First, Sir, the attaining of independence by any colonial people is inevitably a process, unless Her Majesty's Government is willing to grant us independence to-day at this hour. I know, and my colleagues know, that it is bound to take time. We are not worried about that for we know that eventually this country is bound to become independent. Secondly, and this is a more important reason and it follows from the first, and I would like this reason to be accepted very sincerely by all people, secondly we are anxious to see that this process, which is an inevitable process, that this process does not create enmity between the people of this country and the people of Britain. This matter, Sir, of human relations is important. In fact it can be everything in life."

Mr. Nyerere went on to say:

"We in Tanganyika want to demonstrate to the people of Britain by the very methods which we are adopting to reach our independence that we want nothing but lasting friendship between our two peoples. We are not doing this out of weakness. We do not regard this as a struggle between our people and the people of Britain. This is a development of historical process. We are not doing this out of weakness for we know, as I have said, that we are bound to win. We are doing it from a sincere desire to avoid the addition of bitterness to a world which already has too much bitterness."

If I may make another quotation from Mr. Nyerere's speech:

"Last, Sir, but not least, we have a tremendous task ahead of us, a task which any under-developed country like Tanganyika must face. We want, as we have said, to wage a war against poverty, ignorance and

disease and raise the standard of living of our people. We know that this task cannot be properly done without the willing co-operation of our people and the harnessing of all the available brain and skill in Tanganyika. All these matters will depend upon the manner in which we achieve our independence. It is for this reason that we, the people of Tanganyika, have chosen to seek our independence in the manner in which we are doing it.”

Now, Sir, I think that these quotations both from the Governor and from Mr. Nyerere, the Head of T.A.N.U., are most significant and most encouraging and I am sure that the Committee will agree with this.

I would like, if I may, Sir, in conclusion to draw together the points which I have made in this statement about Tanganyika. I look back on my own experiences in the last three years as a member of the Trusteeship Council and I try to envisage the points to which the members of the Trusteeship Council attach special importance. I believe that generally the members of the Trusteeship Council have been satisfied with the way in which we have been carrying out our responsibilities. But the Council would be of no value if it did not make its views felt clearly and there are certain questions on which, in the most friendly spirit, the Council has shown us that it has strong views. Now I would like to mention what I think these matters are, although perhaps some of my colleagues are in a better position to do this than I am.

I think they are as follows. The members of the Council have felt that we ought to make a statement as Administering Authority about the ultimate aim of our policy in Tanganyika. They have felt that we must work closely and harmoniously with the political leaders in Tanganyika, above all the African political leaders. They have emphasised the importance of co-operation between the races. They have stressed that Africans should have a steadily increasing share in the Government. They have argued that parity on the elected side of the Legislature should be abolished. They have pressed for the extension of the franchise. They have argued that the economy should be strengthened by increasing the efficiency of agriculture and promoting industry. They have urged the need for expansion of higher, secondary and other forms of education and they have said that the different systems of education for the races should be integrated. They have emphasised the importance of the Africanisation of the Government service.

Now, Sir, I have not mentioned these points just to be able to come back and say “We are doing all these things”. But I think that it is due to the Government and people of Tanganyika to recognise that in fact all these things are being carried forward. The Governor’s statement of a year ago makes absolutely clear what the ultimate aim of policy in Tanganyika is, and this has been accepted with satisfaction by the political leaders there, the Africans among them. The elections which we have organised have been for the purpose of giving representative Africans, elected by their people, the opportunity of playing a bigger part in the Legislature and the Government. These elections, the detailed arrangements for which were in some respects criticised by some of my colleagues on the Trusteeship Council, none the less gave the Nationalist Party preponderance on the elected side of the Legislature. There has been harmonious co-operation between the races in the Tanganyika Elected Members’ Organisation. There



are local Ministers, including three African Ministers, playing a valuable part in the Government itself. The Post Elections Committee includes in its terms of reference the question of parity in the Legislature and the question of widening the franchise. We have had on the economic side an International Bank Mission. The expansion of education is going steadily forward and a Committee on the question of integrating the school system is shortly to report. Great progress has been made in the appointment of local people, particularly Africans, to senior posts in the civil service.

The progress of the past year, Mr. Chairman, is in fact very satisfactory and very promising for the future. Co-operation between the Government and African political leaders and harmony between the races is outstanding. Important steps in the constitutional sphere have been taken during the year and the Governor has promised to announce the next steps forward as soon as possible; these are now being considered by the Colonial Secretary. Again I wish to emphasise, Mr. Chairman, we do not want to be regarded as viewing the situation in Tanganyika with complacency. I think that the general atmosphere and the political situation is very good. There are difficulties and problems ahead for the people of the territory and for the Government, particularly in the economic sphere, particularly in the field of expanding education and the social services. But, as I have said, the best possible atmosphere now exists in the territory for dealing with these practical difficulties and for facing them as a united people and a Government united with the people. I think that the quotations I have made from the Governor's speech and from Mr. Julius Nyerere's speech well illustrate that.

The progress of Tanganyika, I venture to suggest, Mr. Chairman, is something of which its people can be proud. It is something of which we as Administering Authority can be proud. And it is something of which everybody here connected with the Trusteeship system can be proud. What is happening in Tanganyika is, I think, a good example of our customary British method of helping the people of a territory forward to independence. To promote steady political progress, but at the same time to accompany this with economic, social and educational progress. To recognise that the country is moving forward to independence rapidly and that its people must be prepared in all spheres, and to take the necessary steps systematically and in time. To advance in close co-operation with the people, in consultation with their leaders, and with their leaders playing an ever increasing part. To move forward from step to step, judging the substance and timing of each step from the experience of the last. This is the way that we believe is right and we believe it has been shown to be right in some countries which have recently joined us here as members of the United Nations and one great country on the other side of Africa which we shall welcome here next year.

We believe in fact, Mr. Chairman, that in Tanganyika we have clearly demonstrated by our actions our belief in the principles of Trusteeship and our determination to help the people of Tanganyika to achieve the objectives of Trusteeship at the earliest possible moment. We believe that the good faith which we have shown and the good results which we are achieving in co-operation with the people justify us in proceeding in the manner which we think right and which I have just described. It is a way which is suiting the people and is welcomed by them, and we believe will be welcomed by the

members of this Committee. My friends in the City of London, Mr. Chairman, have a saying that one should invest in success. It is not our British habit to appear in international gatherings and proclaim our success; but I am talking here not simply of British achievements, but of something which we are doing in co-operation with an African people. And I think that it is due to them that I, who speak for them in this international gathering, should recognise that in the present progress of Tanganyika and its people, just as great harmony exists, so at the present time great success is being achieved. And I hope that this Committee will also be prepared to invest in success and to recognise that we are carrying this process forward, with the people of Tanganyika, in the right way.

## ANNEX IX

### UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE FOURTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

#### **Delegates :**

The Right Hon. Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P., Her Majesty's  
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. David Ormsby-Gore, M.P., Minister of State for Foreign  
Affairs.

Sir Pierson Dixon, G.C.M.G., C.B., Permanent Representative to the  
United Nations.

Lady Petrie.

Lord Birdwood, M.V.O.

#### **Alternate Delegates :**

Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, K.C.M.G., Q.C.

Sir John Carmichael, K.B.E.

Mr. Harold Beeley, C.M.G., C.B.E.

Sir Andrew Cohen, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., O.B.E.

Mr. Alan A. Dudley, C.M.G.