

1960-61 Cmnd. 1151-IV Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Report--appendix VIII. Evidence. Volume V. Southern Rhodesia Part I: evidence of witnesses who submitted written documents only. United Kingdom. Part II: written and oral evidence 24th May, 1960-10th June, 1960. Part III: Evidence of witnesses who submitted written documents only

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Advisory Commission on the
Review of the Constitution of the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Report—Appendix VIII

EVIDENCE

Volume V

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

Part I: Evidence of witnesses who submitted
written documents only

UNITED KINGDOM

Part II: Written and Oral Evidence
24th May, 1960—10th June, 1960

Part III: Evidence of witnesses who submitted
written documents only

*Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister
by Command of Her Majesty
November, 1960*

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INTRODUCTION

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The principles which guided the Commission in taking evidence, and a broad indication of the scope of the evidence received, are contained in paragraphs 5 to 13 of the Report. The places at which evidence was heard, and the parties into which the Commission was divided for the hearing of witnesses, are set out in Appendix I to that Report.

2. Wherever possible the Commission sat as one body. On those occasions a verbatim record of the evidence heard was normally taken, and such verbatim records are reproduced in full. Editing has been confined to the exclusion of repetitions, and to corrections made solely in the interests of clarity.

3. Outside the main centres, however, the Commission toured the Federation and took evidence in Parties. And even in the main centres the Commission had often to be divided, because of the large number of witnesses who wished to be heard. On some occasions the Parties were obliged to sub-divide into smaller groups. Whenever the Commission was divided in this way it was generally only possible to produce summaries of the evidence received. If complete verbatim records had been taken, the staff of the Commission would have had to be increased to an unmanageable size. It is recognised that the summarising of evidence has inevitably resulted in some compression, and sometimes possibly in over-simplification, of what witnesses actually said. But it is believed that no important arguments have been omitted, and it is hoped that witnesses will understand the need for their evidence to be recorded in this way.

4. In some areas, particularly in Nyasaland, witnesses were reluctant to appear before the Commission or would do so only on the understanding that their names would not be published. Wherever this happened, the witness in question is listed in the evidence under the name of the town or village in which his evidence was heard. In such cases a typical entry appears as—"A European resident of Kitwe" or "An African resident of Blantyre."

5. A small proportion of witnesses stipulated that their evidence should not be published at all, or that part of it should be withheld from publication. So far as is known, all such requests have been complied with. Wherever possible, witnesses who submitted written memoranda unsupported by oral evidence have been asked by letter whether they had any objection to their evidence being published. Witnesses who appeared before the Commission in person were asked the same question orally. We are glad to say that the great majority of witnesses raised no objection to the publication of their names and evidence in full.

6. The documents contained in these volumes have been so arranged that, where a witness gave oral evidence before the Commission, any written memorandum or associated documents submitted by him immediately precede the record of the interview. In some cases, witnesses read a written document aloud to the Commission; such documents are usually treated as oral evidence. The records of oral evidence and the written documents connected with them have been arranged as far as possible in chronological order.

7. The written evidence of those organisations or individuals who did not appear in person before the Commission has been included in separate sections for each Territory, and these documents have been placed in alphabetical order of their authors' names, or of their places of residence in the case of witnesses who wished to remain anonymous.

8. The date and place of any particular piece of oral evidence may be discovered by reference to the beginning of each section. In the case of written memoranda, the date and place of origin has usually been given at the end of each item. Where no date appears, it signifies that the evidence was either undated when received, or that it was submitted on the same day as the oral evidence given by the same witness. Broadly, written documents are reproduced in the same form in which they were received without alteration as to content or spelling. In a few cases, however, corrections have been made at the specific request of witnesses.

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PART I

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

EVIDENCE OF WITNESSES

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WRITTEN DOCUMENTS ONLY

ASSOCIATION OF BUILDING SOCIETIES OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA AND THE ASSOCIATION OF BUILDING SOCIETIES OF NORTHERN RHODESIA AND NYASALAND.

Federalisation of Building Societies

The practical effects of having different Building Society Laws in the territories of the Federation have been studied by the Building Societies Associations of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia and the following submissions are made for the consideration of the Monckton Advisory Commission :—

History :

For a number of years Terminating Building Societies have operated in Southern Rhodesia. It was not until 1949, however, that a Society of the "Permanent" type was established in the Colony.

This was primarily due to the fact that in the absence of specific legislation regulating Building Societies such Associations had to register under the Companies Ordinance. This situation was rectified by the promulgation of the Southern Rhodesian Building Societies Act No. 50 of 1951. There are currently eight Permanent Societies operating in Southern Rhodesia.

The history of the movement in Northern Rhodesia also dates back to 1949 when the first Building Society was registered. Through the Imperial Acts Extension Ordinance, the United Kingdom Building Societies Act, 1874, et seq., were adopted by that territory, followed a few years later by Nyasaland. There are at present six Building Societies operating in Northern Rhodesia, four of which extend their activities to Nyasaland. For the purposes of this memorandum these two territories are treated as one.

Early growth of the movements was gradual and of little importance in the financial structure of their respective territories.

At the time when the Central African territories federated funds invested with Permanent Building Societies were as follows :—

(31st December, 1953)

Southern Rhodesia: £3,591,000. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland : £2,311,000. Total : £5,902,000.

For comparative purposes Savings Deposits and Fixed Term Deposits with the Post Office and Commercial Banks amounted to £31,512,000.

With the advent of Federation, Legislative control of such financial institutions as the Post Office Savings Bank, Commercial Banks, Insurance Companies and Hire Purchase Companies passed to the Federal Government. Jurisdiction over Building Societies was, however, left in the hands of the Territorial Governments.

At 30th September, 1959, public investment in Building Societies had grown to :—

Southern Rhodesia : £43,236,000. Northern Rhodesia : £22,573,000. Nyasaland : £1,266,000. Total : £67,075,000.

At the same time Savings Deposits and Fixed Term Deposits in the Post Office and Commercial Banks had increased to £51,975,000.

In recent years the average annual rate of expansion of Building Societies has been £9,810,000.

Legislation :

Significant differences in the laws governing Building Societies in Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia are set out in the attached Annexure. The important provisions affecting inter-territorial operations are as follows :—

1. Area of Operations :

- (i) Southern Rhodesia
The Statute confines the activities of registered Societies to Southern Rhodesia.
- (ii) Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
No restriction are placed on the area of operations and in fact some Societies carry on business in Colonial Territories outside the Federation. They are not, however, permitted to transact business in Southern Rhodesia because of prohibitions in the Southern Rhodesian Act.

2. Financial Provisions :

Share Capital

(i) Southern Rhodesia

Legislation provides for the issue of "Permanent Shares" which cannot be redeemed except at the discretion of the Society. The acceptance of Fixed Term and Savings Deposits is related to the amount invested in Permanent Shares.

(ii) Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland :

Legislation provides that Shareholders must have the right in the Rules to obtain repayment of Share investments at notice, but it is the practice of all Societies in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to include in their rules a provision reserving the right to the Board to limit or suspend withdrawals. The acceptance of Fixed Term and Savings Deposits is related to the amount invested in mortgages to members.

The foregoing provisions make the two Acts in their present form irreconcilable, thus preventing Federation wide activities. In order to overcome this disability five Societies in each of the territories have established or become affiliated financially and administratively with a Society in the opposite territory. Four of these dual organisations bear almost identical names and in the minds of the public are frequently classified as single units.

3. Reasons for Desiring to Operate on a Federal Basis :

- (a) It will be seen from the foregoing information that Building Societies have become an important factor in the financial structure of the Federation. Furthermore, they are the most important group of institutions whose primary object is to finance the acquisition and development of housing for all races.
- (b) As long as activities are confined to territorial limits development of the movement is likely to follow the lines of numerous small Societies operating on narrow economic margins. This militates against building up reserve funds essential to the stability of any financial organisation.
- (c) Failure of any one Society, no matter how small, would have serious repercussions on public confidence in the movement. This will inevitably retard the ability of Societies to meet financial requirements for housing, not only for Europeans, but for the growing demand from Africans, Asians and Coloureds.
- (d) Public confidence in the movement rests primarily on the security of investments. Stability of Societies is, however, not only based upon reserve funds, but is dependent on stable political and economic conditions within the territories.

In recent times each of the territories has experienced variations of major importance in the political or economic climate within its borders. Experience has revealed that while certain areas within the Federation have suffered economic difficulties, normal conditions have prevailed elsewhere.

It is contended, therefore, that a much greater measure of stability can be achieved by Societies diversifying their activities over the more stable economy of the Federation as a whole.

- (e) As a result of differences in legislation the types of investments offered by Societies in the Northern Territories differ from those in the South. At the same time the Northern Societies find themselves compelled to offer higher rates of interest than Southern Societies in order to attract funds.

Federalisation of the movement could bring about standardisation in types of investments and interest rates, and could benefit the investing and borrowing public.

4. Advantages of Federalisation :

- (a) Considerable economies can be effected by Societies forming larger units operating throughout the Federation. This will result in lowering of administration costs, standardisation of investment and mortgage interest rates on the most equitable levels, and greater ability to building up essential reserve funds.
- (b) Larger units having a wider spread of mortgage risks must result in greater stability and strength to withstand economic recessions. This is important if public confidence in the movement is to be maintained.
- (c) Housing funds can be apportioned equitably over all the areas of the Federation in accordance with demand.

Underpresent conditions one territory can have surplus funds for investment without any outlet, while another territory has an unsatisfied demand for mortgages.

The Northern and Southern Rhodesian Associations have studied the practicability of introducing uniform Building Society Legislation throughout the Federation. It is their considered opinion that this can be done without affecting the financial stability of existing Societies.

New Legislation can be framed to embrace the most satisfactory features of both Acts and in this connection the

Associations have offered the Government their services for assisting with the drafting of legislative requirements.

For the reasons outlined above it is recommended that Building Society Legislation ceases to be a residual function and that it be included as a Federal responsibility on the Federal exclusive list.

Salisbury,

11th February, 1960.

Annexure

FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN LEGISLATION

This Schedule has been prepared by a joint committee representing the Association of Building Societies in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia.

	Rhodesia Southern	Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland	Remarks
Membership	Confined to Shareholders only. No other significance or effect on Society's operations.	Basis of U.K. Acts. Covers Shareholders and Borrowers (unadvanced and advanced members) affects: (i) Amount Society can borrow on Deposit and Loan. (ii) Amount lent to anyone on Mortgage (Collateral Security only be taken from members).	There are no major differences, except in Law. An amendment to the law will not affect any Building Society in either Territory.
Area of Activities	Southern Rhodesia only.	Northern Rhodesia Societies operate outside the Federation.	This need not present a major difficulty in framing new legislation.
Financial Provisions			
(a) Shares	Permanent Shares	No Permanent Shares	It is considered that any share issued by a Northern Rhodesian Society whose Rules incorporate powers for Directors to limit or suspend payment of withdrawals be accepted as the equivalent of a Permanent Share in Southern Rhodesia. Furthermore, that consideration be given to reducing the classes of shares issued to Permanent and Investment Shares.
(i) Limits	Limits on acceptance of Redeemable and Subscription Shares.	No limits from any one Shareholder. (Rules must specify aggregate amount to be taken on Preference Shares).	
(ii) Withdrawal	Permanent Shares. Only Society has right to repay. Other Shares repayable at maturity.	Right to withdraw on giving notice in rules.	
(iii) Ratio to Deposits	(A) Permanent Shares = 25% of Deposits, Loans, Overdrafts and other Shares. (B) Minimum Share Capital = 40% of Deposits, Loans and Overdrafts. Permanent Shares must equal 75% of above requirement.	No provisions	
(b) Deposits			Depositors under both forms of legislation are similarly protected. A simplified form of the Southern Rhodesian Act could be a basis on which to consider any revision.
(i) Limits	Fixed Deposits and Savings Deposits; amounts taken from one source limited according to size of Society.	Limited to 2/3rds of sum secured by mortgages to members. No individual limits.	
(ii) Conditions of Acceptance	Fixed Deposits—minimum period to be fixed 12 months, maximum 5 years. Notice for Savings Deposit withdrawals according to Rules.	Rules must specify minimum of one month's Notice of withdrawal. No minimum or maximum periods.	

	Southern Rhodesia	Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland	Remarks 463
Financial Provisions			
(c) Liquid Assets	Societies must hold in cash or on deposit or in securities, given percentages of Liabilities for Redeemable Shares Fixed Deposits, Savings Deposits and Loans granted not paid out.	No provisions for liquid assets.	Northern Rhodesia accept the principle of "Statutory Liquidity."
(d) Mortgages			
(i) Largest Loan	10% of Permanent Share Capital and Reserves or £100,000 maximum.	No provisions	Both Territories accept the principle of placing a limit as a maximum on the size of an individual loan.
(ii) Loans over £6,000	Aggregate based on a percentage of Assets at end of previous year.	No limits	Both Territories regard £10,000 as a more realistic figure. Northern Rhodesia wish to dispense with a printed schedule of these loans. There is no disagreement in principle.
(iii) Fixed Term Advances	Aggregate limited to 10% of total advances.	No provision	Principle laid down in Southern Rhodesian Act accepted by both Territories.
(iv) Maximum Loan	Limited to 75% of value of property without collateral security.	No limits for members. Advance to non-member must be on basis of a Trustee Security.	Principle laid down in Southern Rhodesian Act accepted by both Territories.
(e) Investment in Property	Limited to 20% of Share Capital and Reserve Funds.	No limits	Both Territories agree the principle of imposing a realistic limit, but prefer this to be based on total assets.
(f) Reserves	Compelled to set aside Statutory reserve equal to 10% of net profits.	No provisions	Both Territories agree the principle of a "Statutory Reserve Fund" but suggest a new approach be made to this item.
(g) Returns	Quarterly returns. Annual Balance Sheet.	Annual Returns	Both Territories agree, Northern Rhodesia asks for these returns to be in simple form.
Provisions relative to Mortgages			
(a) Period of Repayment	Maximum 35 years	No provisions	Both Territories agree that this matter is of little importance.
(b) Security	Township Property and Small Holdings.	No provisions	Northern Rhodesia agree, but consider this definition could be clarified.
(c) Valuation Restrictions	Valuation limited to £50 above purchase price within 6 months of purchase.	No restrictions	Northern Rhodesia agree in principle to the Southern Rhodesian provisions subject to minor amendments.
(d) Collateral Security	Can be accepted from any borrower—must be of specific type.	Can only be accepted for additional advance to a member, must be of specific type. Illegal for non-member.	The principle laid down in the Southern Rhodesian Act is acceptable to both Territories.
Surplus Funds			
Surplus Funds	No provisions	No definition, only surplus funds can be invested in mortgages to non-members, Stock, etc. Investments in Securities not one of the purposes of a Building Society. Illegal to borrow money for this purpose.	Both Territories agree that this matter is of little importance.
Borrowing			
Borrowing	Does not include Fixed or Savings Deposits.	Includes Deposits, Loans and Overdrafts.	See "Deposits."

AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION OF RHODESIA

The Executive Committee of the Association has had an opportunity of studying the Memorandum of Evidence submitted to the Monckton Commission by the Rhodesia Road Federation urging the transfer of responsibility for roads from the Federal to the Territorial Governments.

The Automobile Association of Rhodesia wishes to support this Memorandum.

It suggests that liaison between Territorial Governments would be necessary and would draw particular attention to Paragraph 7 of the First Report of the Select Committee on

Road Financing Programme reading :

"In many of the other federated states in the world, considered opinion is that there is no need for dual responsibility for road matters as between the Central and State Governments. It is, therefore, significant to record that witnesses, including an organisation representative of widely diversified interests, voluntarily expressed the view that those roads under Federal jurisdiction should be returned to the direct control of the Southern Rhodesian Government with a consequential revision of those provisions relating to the apportionment of finances. Your Committee is, nevertheless, alive to the desirability of liaison with the other Territorial Governments on matters of mutual interest. Evidence led indicated that, in view of present harmonious relations, this liaison could be satisfactorily achieved by the setting up of a joint Committee, representative of all Territorial Governments."

Salisbury

5th May, 1960

S. Y. BANDA

I have known the Federation since 1951 when they had the first conference at Victoria Falls in 1951, but I was still in school. Before 1951 they were three names put forward :—

- (1) Close association
- (2) Amalgamation
- (3) Federation.

But when Africans heard all these names did not understand those who understood told others that you should not agree to all names because close-association will mean your land taken after words amalgamation will mean one Native law at the shortest time Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland who feared Native law of Southern Rhodesia started to reject all the names but some European politician told Africans that federation meant more money and partnership which is written in the constitution of 1953, including the preamble too. I still can remember some of the Africans who told us to refuse federation, e.g. Mr. Matinga who is today Federal M.P. when he was the President of the banned Nyasaland African Congress. In Nyasaland still chiefs and leaders, people stood firm up to now the promised date by the (Queen) and British Government in 1891 that Nyasaland will rule itself in 50 years. The 26,000 Africans are inflexible to aims self government outside the Federation. The Federal Government came into power in 1953; the September 4th, from then both Africans, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have not stopped their opposition to the Federation.

Nyasaland Congress formed 1944 :—

Since then we have heard of no trouble until 1953, because of federation, Congress use to say that its Africans that we are not against Europeans who are prepared to stay with us but not those who are not, can go.

Northern Rhodesia African Congress too :—

Have said the same thing we do not want to federate with Southern Rhodesia because its European bad laws and discrimination against the black people, my own addition, the European man can live getting £6 0s. 3d. as his monthly wage, that's why many Africans are not educated, where can one get money to educate two to ten children whilst getting £6 0s. 3d.? The normal fees is £15 0s. 0d. in secondary school, about £6 15s. 0d. primary higher schools, University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland three years ago opened the fees yearly is over £100.

Southern Rhodesia African Congress formed 1957, September the 12th :—

Led by young brain educated man but all Nyasaland African Congress, Zambia African Congress (Northern Rhodesia) Southern Rhodesia African Congress were all made illegal and banned in 1959, reasons you give bad speeches to the Government, why not jail people like other M.P.'s who use to say Africans are like dogs they need only food.

Southern Rhodesia Laws :—

All Africans in the Federation refuse to federate because of Southern Rhodesia bad laws which I would to call one-sided laws (1) there is not even one African man in their house. Lord Malvern who is the key of the Federation said in the House of Lords one year ago that all Africans are liars. Then came back at Salisbury airport said partnership was needed and co-operation, can you come into terms with all people who can't tell the truth at any time ?

The Federation Constitution and Preamble :—

States that until the inhabitants so desire federation will go forward but now the so-called inhabitants over 61,000 Africans don't like it because the discrimination Africans as I was told they like to stay by themselves than to be governed by some Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.

One Federation Minister addressing Europeans :—

In Copperbelt told his European audience last year that federation is a white man's country what is left is to make laws that makes natives keep quite all that proves and makes good evidence that if federation can go Africans will have no future here in Central Africa, will be shot like in South Africa. British Government will not say anything, because they will say internal affairs, what can one do if you were the one sir ?

Emergence Act, by the Government :—

We Africans in Central Africa we regard emergence as a force law which means a failure to the Government so that everybody has no say at any time, no freedom of speech, no freedom of movement. I don't like to say that Africans only are against federation but we have about half of the European population don't like the federation as well because of its foundation it was founded on force you will remember that from 1951 to 1960, blacks have only been saying we don't like federation.

Federation spoken before 1951 :—

1939 the Bledisloe Commission had been question of federating Rhodesia and Nyasaland and had recommended that time was not ripe it to federate, then 1949, the question began to be discussed again in Rhodesia and in London. The Africans who were living in London met and declared their opposition to the Federation, the chiefs on opposition were Dr. Banda and H. Kumbula. 1951 two conferences one at Victoria Falls recommended federation. The Africans did not stop to oppose it on the 21st November, 1951, Lord Chandos told parliament that the United Kingdom Government was convinced to grant federating 1st August, 1953. Your constitution came into force by force because none of the Africans at any of the talks Mr. Gondwe from Nyasaland was sent by Government at Victoria Falls, so he spoke as Government not as Africans of Nyasaland. One of the things showing that Africans in Nyasaland do not like federation is that they even lost one of the chiefs in August, 1953. Chief Gomani in Incheu he died because he did not like federation still there is no change at all.

What the British Officers said in World II short story sirs :—

Away with Hitler! Down with him said the British Officer. What's wrong with Hitler? asked the African. He wants to rule the whole world said the British Officer. What's wrong with that said the African. He is German you see said the British Officer trying to appeal to African tribal.

Consciousness :—

What's wrong with his being German? You see said the British Officer trying to explain in terms that would be understood to the African mind, it is not good for one tribe to rule another, each tribe must rule itself. That is only fair a German must rule Germans, Italians and Frenchmen. But he forgot to say Briton for Britons. Africans joined war and fought hard and Nazi was defeated, but now if the African turns and say Africa for Africans is jailed for years without trials, why? We do not like federation with Southern Rhodesia tell the British Government what we think we want colonial powers until we get self rule whites should be masters in Southern Rhodesia only but not Nyasaland and in Northern Rhodesia please hear us well.

Building Hospitals, Post Offices :—

Federation built hospitals and post offices even before the African has been in full explained about partnership to make him that federating is a god thing. I call that food before greeting a visitor. Sir Roy has said many good things when you read newspapers but none of them that he did but paying us £6 10s. 0d. or £6 0s. 3d. yet federation was to be more money for all but now he says everything will remain for whites only.

You were in Fort Victoria on 10th April, 1960, but because of the shortage of time given to me I did not see you Sir take this please Sir.

Fort Victoria

April, 1960

H. T. BARKER

I would like to give my views to the Commission on two aspects of Federation, these are the future protection of the African masses, and then if we are to have Federation it must be strongly based on a dominant Southern Rhodesia.

African Protection

On the subject of African protection it is unfortunately often accepted that the African must be in need of some form of political protection from the European, and little thought is given of protecting him from his own leaders.

That the African need not fear the European is proved beyond doubt by the past history of this country. African or Europeans have had no need for protection from each other for the last 50 years.

With the rise of African nationalism comes racial strife, as African leaders must direct their charges against the European if they are to establish themselves. Their activities in this direction are encouraged by the support they get from overseas and elsewhere.

The majority of Africans have no idea of what is really involved in "Politics, Freedom, or Federation" (I will refer to this later). As the African leaders amount to a few hundreds out of the mass of millions we have the racial opinion of the few becoming accepted without regard to the masses of Africans.

That safeguards are needed is proved by the actions of African leaders in intimidation of tribal Natives. All these leaders could have devoted their energy to helping the African to advance within the law by good example, rather than conducting campaigns against Africans to obtain their support through fear.

African Background

Fear of "Tagati" rules the African mind, he may be well educated and believe in a Christian God, but "Tagati" is still a greater power in his mind. Let a Monckton Commission member speak to tribal Africans in a suit—they will not be really impressed, but let them don monkey skins and bones, and blow through a piece of wire, and the Africans will be in awe. It is for this reason that the educated African leaders like Kenyatta and others don skins and bones to sway tribal Africans.

Witch doctor rule is powerful.

The African as a whole is a happy chap who wants to be left alone, he is quite content to let anyone look after him, providing the rule is just and does not cause much inconvenience.

To revert to the tribal understanding of politics. In the Native reserves I find that about 60% have never heard of Federation, of those that have perhaps half will say it is something they have in Nyasaland, when asked if we have it here in Southern Rhodesia perhaps 25% will say yes, asked how do they know they reply that it came when the hut tax was increased to £2 some years ago. Of the more enlightened Africans they reply that it is the African wanting his freedom, asked what Freedom is they don't know, except that it is something they haven't got such as Europeans having Banks from which to get money, while the Africans cannot, etc.

With this background of the African I will proceed to our future Federation.

Federal Objects

The main object of Federation was to create a multi-racial society, this has to be built up in an atmosphere of extreme Black Nationalism. With the examples further North it is clear enough to see that emergent African leaders will only accept complete African Government, and it is too much to expect Federal Africans to appreciate any difference between conditions here and say Nigeria. On the other hand it must be agreed that the European will advance the African as time goes on, until he is sufficiently advanced to play his part in Government.

If Federation is to survive as multi-racial it will not be done by African dominance in Government at this stage and can only bring about racial strife. Even with European control it is doubtful if as time goes on, we will stem the tide of African Nationalism until such time as he can see the benefits of European guidance.

This might have been done in Southern Rhodesia on its own before Federation, but under Federation Southern Rhodesia is tied to two lands which will soon come under African Government (I assume it is too much to expect European political control in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia for very long).

Federation in the future will therefore follow the course of political strength as balanced between Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia on the one hand and Southern Rhodesia on the other. In other words African racialism or multi-racial Government.

Southern Rhodesia in Federation

Southern Rhodesia is the king pin of Federations future, it is the only Territory in Africa which has set out to create a multi-racial society. It has a strong European community, not "settlers" but Rhodesians. We have always followed an enlightened policy of African Administration and Africans have always been content.

To the South we have White Nationalism, to the North Black Nationalism, which way will we go? Will Southern Rhodesia be able to control the two Northern territories and lead them along to multi-racial society? I think it will, but only if political control of Southern Rhodesia and the Federation remains in the hands of civilized and reasonable men.

The Federal assembly must be so constituted as to ensure white control. At the present time there are 35 members, 14 from Southern Rhodesia, eight from Northern Rhodesia and six Nyasaland, in addition there are six specially elected African members, two from each territory, this makes the score 16-10-8 or eventually 16 Europeans and 18 Africans. This appears to close a margin to ensure Federation. I don't know when or how long it will take to reach such a position, but if such a position is reached before at least 25 years then Federation will fail.

As Southern Rhodesia must be the dominant partner within Federation she must be strengthened in control of her own affairs, this should be as early as possible. The stronger is Southern Rhodesia the stronger will be the Federation of the future.

Voters qualifications should include the obligation to submit income tax returns and pay normal taxes, surely anyone who accepts responsibility for voting should contribute towards the cost of running the country. This is surely a more fundamental principle than one man one vote—without obligation.

There are between 8,000 and 9,000 registered African business, two years ago three Africans were assessed for tax and last year there were only 35. Africans must accept responsibility as well as privileges in developing the country.

Most Africans think that the Government manufactures its own money, they have no conception of income and expenditure. They must have time to learn as Federation develops under European control and guidance. Only by such means can Federation advance until the African can take his place in Government.

Recommendations

On the basis of the foregoing my suggestions to the commission may be summarised as follows:—

- (1) Southern Rhodesia's status must be strengthened.
- (2) Southern Rhodesia must hold a dominant position in Federal Assembly.
- (3) Governmental control should not pass into the hands of Africans in any territory for at least 25 years.
- (4) Voters rights should include the obligation to contribute towards the up-keep of the country.

I admit these suggestions are generalities rather than concrete recommendations, but they are my views on the subject.

Federation for Southern Rhodesia might be summed up on the following lines:—

Finance was given as the reason
Great benefits as the bait
But we find we have an onion
and to go Khaki is our fate.
It is a sad thought for the future.

Fort Victoria,

March, 1960.

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A. J. C. BETHUNE

Age: 43 years.

Nationality: Federal Citizen.

Occupation: Mining Engineer and Metallurgist—worked with Africans on mines for 20 years.

Education: five years Witwatersrand University Johannesburg.

Period of residence in Southern Rhodesia: eight years.

In the establishing of a multi-racial society in Southern Rhodesia I feel the following facts should be borne in mind.

The period of occupation of Southern Africa by the blacks and the whites is the same. The blacks were not indigenous to Southern Africa any more than the whites. The blacks came down from Ethiopia and the Sudan at the same time as the whites landed at the Cape. It was in fact this migratory life of the blacks, which enabled the Voortrekkers in Southern Africa to trek North as far as they did. They really met no resistance of any real size because the blacks were not really settled in the Country. So that neither the blacks or whites have any prior claim to the country on the grounds of being here first.

A multi-racial society must fail as the African is a different species of human being to the European both physically and mentally. They don't think on the same lines, they are as different from Europeans as a lion is from a leopard. A lion never mixes with a leopard, an elephant doesn't cross with a hippo, an eagle never crosses with a hawk or a sparrow with a wagtail—Nothing in nature mixes.

Africans are just beginning to emerge from savagery even the most apparently tame African when roused loses control of himself and they can't stand much annoyance. We Southern Africans know the African better than anyone else and we know how much they are feared if given power—and those educated ones have not the moral fibre to be trusted with power—given a chance they would pollute the Nation and no white woman would be safe.

They will get justice from us as far as possible, but we would never get justice from them. Governments should not make promises to them, but do what is needed as time goes on, if promised anything they worry till they get it just like children they are, as General Smuts once said "the Governments should not be put into the hands of the nursery."

At the Kariba Dam there was a tribe who had to be shifted and among them, the women when bringing their men water or anything, have to go on their knees for the last few yards. All Africans are the same in their belief that women are there for the convenience of the men.

Their language too shows them to be of a different make-up. There is no word for "Please" or "Thank You" in any Bantu language. There is no word for "Love". The nearest they have is a word meaning "Like". There is absolutely no love in the black man's society.

No black man ever shows of feels any affection for his wife or wives. There is no kissing even of children. There is no gratitude or appreciation in the black man.

He is an opportunist by nature taking all he can get. Kindness does not exist even as a word in his language. He shows no consideration for any animals he owns. He interprets kindness as weakness and attacks what he knows to be the weak points in the white man's society—witness the smashing of hospitals and burning of churches.

Higher education for the blacks is a complete waste of effort and money—the white man's money. There is no society here to absorb them, and in any case many black graduates die about the age of 35 years. They do not practise their professions in the majority of cases, but enter politics.

Primary education is a dire necessity for the masses in order to prevent them being misled by the educated few seeking political power.

Within the next few months 10 million blacks are being given self rule in the Kivu Area of the Congo alone. It appears about 5 million will be given self rule in Nyasaland and 10 million are revolting slowly in the Union of South Africa. It is therefore obvious that tribal warfare is inevitable within the next five years. It is well known that each tribe of black man considers himself superior to all others and each will try to become top-dog. The solution to this problem is the introduction of birth-control methods after the numbers have been reduced by fighting. It is too late to start any birth-control among the blacks now.

A temporary solution might be found in the increasing of the power of the chiefs and Native Authorities in order to

let them Govern their tribes according to tribal customs, and not have them exploited by a few black politicians.

Many whites realise what the effect will be of the blacks getting power and are leaving the Federation. Official figures do not reflect the true position as many whites do not state they are leaving permanently, but say they are on holiday. A visit to the auction saleroom of Bulawayo any Thursday evening will show just how much furniture and household effects is being sold and for what low prices.

A visit to Llewellyn Barracks will reveal how many of the Sergeants and Warrant Officers are just waiting for their time to be up so that they can get out of the Country.

The Africans don't know how lucky they are to have Europeans ruling them—they were always ruled by fear until Europeans took over the Government. Their Chiefs would often do as Lobengula did when he said "what are those over there? birds I think," when his induna answered "no people" he said "go and kill them."

Africans have not the ability to visualise things described to them, no matter how simple, they have to be shown before they can do even quite simple things if new to them, and Africans have a rooted idea that if a ruler must rule and no questions asked. This they will say when talking of some wrong "why doesn't the King stop them." They are great believers in a hereditary ruler—Of course they haven't any idea of how a parliament works, but will follow those educated Africans blindly—It is always found that an organisation run by Africans, unsupervised by whites, gets into a middle soon and the cash disappears read the newspapers and will soon find that out.

If given a share in the Government are the Africans prepared to live according to white man's law? Are they prepared to be limited to one wife. To do away with the Labola system and to support children from a marriage which breaks up and pay maintenance instead of the children becoming the responsibility of the Maternal Grandmother as at present. If there is a multi-racial society there must be one Law regarding marriage for both black and white. No polygamy allowed, and blacks be made to pay alimony to any woman they bigamously marry and to pay the same taxes as the white man? and do their Military training, etc., and be liable to be called up for defence? or any national duty? Bulawayo.

11th February, 1960.

A. A. BRYCE-BUCHANAN

We are the elected Government and any attempt to transfer any part of its authority to unfranchised residents would be to undermine law and order in this country.

The Europeans now resident in the Federation are the only people with the necessary experience to run the country properly and with the informed consideration for the African. To suggest otherwise is nothing but an immense impertinence.

The only hope for the steady advancement of the African lies in the continued residence of the European in the Federation. To judge from British standards of individual advancement it will take the African about 4 to 5 generations, i.e. about 120 to 150 years to reach political maturity.

Most Europeans and particularly British residents are prepared to involve themselves and their descendants in the Christian duty of helping the emergent African for that period. If this is not recognised by the United Kingdom. I can only conclude that the United Kingdom people as represented by their Parliament no longer possess the Christian courage they displayed when William Wilberforce campaigned against the slave trade and persuaded the then British Government to pass the Emancipation Act of 1833 which saved millions of primitive people from slavery.

A population majority-opinion is impossible to obtain in this country because most adult Africans have no knowledge of the issues at stake. They who say they represent African opinion have consequently no opinion to represent and can only be self-elected.

To allay suspicion the United Kingdom should product for verification and scrutiny the agreements said to have been made by an earlier British Government and the Chiefs then controlling the present Federal area, setting out that the Queen (Victoria) would always protect the African. There is some doubt that such agreements exist or, if they do, that they do not convey the meaning the present Government implies.

I think the United Kingdom tendency to appeasement of any attack against them is an aspect of their attitude to African nationalism, such as it is said to be. We here who remember

Hitler know very clearly that nothing is gained by timidity. Appeasement of African clamour would, for the United Kingdom, be a comfortable solution of Federal affairs because if the British resident loses his all, it would cost the British Government and people nothing at all. This is my opinion would place the United Kingdom Government at the same moral level as Colonel Nasser.

It would be a good thing if the present constitution were declared null in 1960 and we wrote another for ourselves or perhaps like Britain have none at all.

The patience of the British resident is nearly exhausted by United Kingdom interference with our hopes. The British are approaching their traditional moment when they think they have been pushed around quite enough. They will then oppose any further political connection with any United Kingdom Government, if necessary with force.

Salisbury,

20th January, 1960.

L. W. CHAPARADZA

I humbly beg to make an apology in writing this letter. Being one of the African citizens born in the colony of Southern Rhodesia and have since fully enjoyed the best administration of the British Government, I feel I have something to say before it gets too late to be felt by the public.

I feel this letter should be read to the Monckton Commission and a copy sent to me. For obvious reasons, I don't think that the British Government would be fair in letting down the Federation to a fall owing to insipid claims for self-government by ungrown citizens who *think* they would manage to nurse the African people and yet in the end the idea, if implemented would surely prove disastrous and detrimental both to the African and European citizen here and overseas.

There are few reasons why I am totally against the dismantling of the enviable Federal State of Central Africa.

- (a) Given the power to rule at so early an age, the African leader would immediately turn his state of Government into Aristocracy and suppression would raise its toll before the expiration of two years. And such hasty claims for self-government are a sure and undoubtable indication that the engine is driving to the dungeon of disaster.
- (b) By allowing the Federation to break down, a good and wide door would open for Foreign power to get rooted in the centre of Africa and so making it hard to marshal and organise our defence forces to oust the aggressors. Be it known to the Government that the power that is driving such claims in such a hasty speed has a secret backing which would ruin our people lest we thought. I just think so as I see the worst muddle of such a political situation waged in Central Africa these days.
- (c) I personally believe in self-government, but the present cradle on which the Central African is lying upon (respecting culture and average education) does not right and justly admit the situation though in adverse judgement that may be granted.

For the sake and safety of my African people I have no fear in the publication of this letter. The truth may hate to my African fellows who may read this letter but it will prove enormously advantageous to men who gulp their food after proper mastication.

Darwendale,

26th February, 1960.

Supplementary Memorandum

L. W. CHAPARADZA

I beg that all means should be sought by reliable African and European Politicians who are not moved by bias and prejudice to determine the right goal for the advancement of the Federation before the final check of the Monckton Commission is over.

A select committee may be set up by the Authorities with men of sound political knowledge. I am not against the decision of the public who might be groping for self-rule and the so-called freedom which the average man has no idea of what he means. My sole aim is to seek the help of reasonable men who have a foresight of what the future may bring to the Central African citizen, should the Federation cease.

By taking such a hostile state (to suggest that some territories secede from the Federation), the British Government

may unsatisfactorily show a type of absurdity which it never showed since the inception of British rule in Tropical Africa. Before the fuse is lighted in this matter, let us be assured there is no miner adept the ground.

We need freedom, but what type is the better than Democracy? Any political claims that have been competed through racialism and hatred have usually led men to disaster and national perplexity. I say this because of the love I have for my people and also for the sake of justice. Let me, Sir, hope in your consideration of this letter and its reference to the Commission.

SIR CHARLES C. G. CUMINGS

1. I was Legal Secretary of the Sudan Government during the years when we introduced the Sudanese to self-government on the Westminster pattern of democracy. I was responsible for the drafting of the successive constitutions (copied by Ghana) and for showing the Sudanese how to operate a parliament and cabinet. At the same time I warned them of the difficulties of working such a system of government by themselves. When a Resolution was being debated in parliament that the Sudan should become an independent democratic republic, I said, "Certain conditions are necessary in a country for democratic government to exist there, and if they are not present in the Sudan no resolution of ours will have any effect; it is no use passing a Resolution that your son will swim the Nile unless, when you come to throw him in he can, in fact, swim, for he will merely drown." The Sudanese politicians were full of confidence, and would not heed; yet that is just what has happened since. Within five years of independence a soldier dictator has swept away the whole democratic system, and with the support of the Sudanese masses, I am reliably informed that, except among a few intellectuals, there is no regret at all at the loss of the so recently acquired parliamentary vote.

We are always being told that the African prefers self-government to good government, but the reasons for the Sudanese politicians being supplanted by soldiers was their bad government. For Westminster democracy to have a chance of becoming firmly established, the Sudan needed a period of years of governing themselves under such a system, but with a British Governor-General who had powers to see that democracy did work.

So my rather unusual qualification for offering an opinion on the matters before the Commission is that I have experience of the transfer of power to an African government, set up under our ideas of democracy, and of its complete and speedy failure. Yet the Northern Sudanese are far more capable of operating such a system of government than are the Africans of the Federation.

2. I start with two general observations.

The first is that political constitutions are made for men. The finest constitution on paper, drafted by the cleverest lawyers, will not work unless those concerned wish it to work; yet a bad constitution on paper will work if those concerned wish to make it work. It is no use just copying the Westminster constitution; instead we should discover the essential facts of the political situation here, and frame our constitution to meet them, and this I shall attempt to do.

My second general observation is that the constitution we are now considering can only be in the nature of a transitional one. All we can do is to provide for the next ten or twenty years ahead, recognising that we are paving the way for the ultimate object of a full democracy. I do not think that there is any chance of either Europeans or Africans now agreeing to something permanent for all time, and I am suggesting that there should be another review of the constitution in ten years time, and a recognition that any Territory could then secede. All concerned might then be brought to agree to give this transitional constitution a fair trial.

3. The people we are concerned with were at the end of 1958:—

	Europeans	Africans
Southern Rhodesia ...	211,000	2,590,000
Northern Rhodesia ...	72,000	2,250,000
Nyasaland ...	8,800	2,720,000
Federation ...	292,000	7,560,000

The Asiatics and Coloureds I will consider in due course, but they do not signify in the solution of the main problem, which is between the Europeans and the Africans.

We must also bear in mind that the preponderance of the Africans over the Europeans will increase, so fecund are the former; indeed the main long-term problem of this country is not the Black-White one, but how the huge increase to be expected in the blacks will be able to exist, let alone raise

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their standards of living, a vital operation which anyone must concede would be far easier with Federation than without it.

4. The Africans.

The essential facts about the mass of the Africans are their ignorance, and their primitive and superstitious nature, which make them easy prey for the demagogue and agitator. Many persons outside this country who propound solutions to our problems either do not know these facts, or deliberately ignore them, yet they are the key facts of our situation. If these millions of Africans were Europeans of the same standard of civilisation, say of the Middle Ages, the superior whites here would feel about them very much as they do now about the blacks.

This means that African politicians, competing with each other for the support of these masses, cannot be reasonable; it is simply a competition to be the most extreme, while branding those with lower demands as traitors.

The very basis of the Westminster democracy, free parties submitting reasoned and practical programmes for the reasoned decision of the electorate, just does not apply to these people. They do not understand it, indeed it is quite contrary to their inherited practices. They have a leader who controls them; they do not understand controlling their leaders, and changing them as they please. So it is only when an African leader has won, by extreme methods, a position of indisputable and permanent supremacy, like Nkrumah and Nyerere, that he can abate extreme policies. In the 20 or 30 years ahead that are all we can now deal with, the African of the Federation who will be able to have any intelligent understanding of central government, and any genuine interest in it, will be numbered only in thousands. The millions of others could only take part in central politics as fodder for unprincipled demagogues.

One hears so much about these people being ablaze with nationalism, a burning desire to govern themselves by democratic processes. I believe that this is much exaggerated. Of course clever demagogues can set a gathering of such people afire. Naturally with the great contrast between the standards of living of white and black there is a fund of latent jealousy that can be blown up. But how can it be argued that the African here desires nothing so much as the parliamentary vote when thousands more in Southern Rhodesia could acquire that vote if they made any serious effort? And see how the complete abolition of the vote has been accepted in the Sudan. It seems to me that the African masses have little desire for the franchise for its own sake, as a permanency; indeed they cannot really understand it. But as a means to an end, to terminate White domination, can show enthusiasm for a vote.

The cry of universal adult suffrage has been used by the African politician to seize power, resolved that no one else will get the chance to do the same against him. The opposition of Ghana have never had a chance. So the next persons to seize power must do so, not through the ballot box, but by holding the real physical power; that is how the military dictatorships in Pakistan, Iraq and the Sudan have come about. It is a question who would hold the physical power here in similar circumstances, perhaps again the Matabele.

But there is another wave sweeping Africa today, and that is the desire of the African to better himself, and this is a tremendous force. Anyone who goes into any African school can see it at work, in the burning keenness of the pupils. But it is not a desire for education for its own sake; it is because the African has seen what the whites have made out of education, and desires to do the same.

It is clear therefore that what the African really needs for the next 30 years or so is a system of government in which he substantially participates, while a tremendous operation of social uplift is carried out among them to raise their standards of civilisation 500 years in the next 50, so as to make it safe for a fully democratic system of government to be introduced, with a reasonable chance of being properly operated and of survival. This would consist of a tremendous educational programme to form an educated population, which would be able to work a fully democratic system, based on adult suffrage, to which they would be introduced through local government, whose activities they can understand. There would also have to be a vast development of those opportunities for employment at higher levels of wages to enable the African to enjoy that much higher standard of living which is the other of our main aims for him. Indeed a problem of government, as urgent as any now, is to be able to raise African wages in the towns to levels at which the decent married man with a family, settled and able to acquire industrial skills, can live in decency.

But if the African is to be expected to co-operate fully in such an operation, he must be assured that every effort is being used by the whites to press it on to its earliest possible conclusion, and that it is not being used to fob him off for a while. For such an operation the present whites here and their resources are sadly insufficient; we would need massive support from outside but could we not count on such support for such an object? The African in Southern Rhodesia has made a general advance in the last 80 years under white control that I doubt can be matched anywhere in world history. Continue that advance for the next 30/50 years, and we shall have in the Federation the most civilised, healthy and wealthy of Africans, and be ready for full democracy.

5. The Europeans.

The essential facts about these are I think the following. The comparatively large settled population in Southern Rhodesia; the extremists here are only a fringe, the great majority being ready to be fair by their lights to African advancement, but absolutely convinced that to abdicate now would not only be to cut their own throats, but would be right against the best interests of the African masses. In the North the white civil servants can contemplate with equanimity the now familiar process of retirement on compensation. The white settlers of Nyasaland cannot hope to replace Colonial Office rule, and that in Northern Rhodesia must be coming less and less to expect to be able to be bolstered up by the whites of Southern Rhodesia. At the same time those in industry and commerce should be fairly confident that they can survive, as they have in India and the Sudan; in particular the employees of the Copper Mines, the great majority of whom look on themselves as only temporarily resident there, must come to see that whatever the government, their industry is so vital and their employers so powerful and well advised, that they can be sure of retaining acceptable living conditions. For the white farmers of the North the situation is the same as in Kenya.

6. Having done my best to analyse the situation for which a government has to be provided, I now turn to consider what might be the best arrangements to provide a government able to deal with that situation.

We want a government in which both Europeans and Africans can participate as nearly equally as possible, which will be fair to both races and which will promote African advancement as fully and speedily as possible; a government in which both races will join to make it a success, convinced that it will promote the interests of both, and make this country a far better one for both than could be achieved by either by itself. It will be recognised as a form of government only for a transitional time, making way as soon as possible for full democracy, when ever that should become viable. I think that the European will have to recognise that this transitional period will come to an end within 50 years, after which time this country will be something like the West Indies are now. During this time the whites who could not contemplate living in such a society would have a chance to go elsewhere. I think that during this time far from demanding independence, we should seek the help of the British Government and others, as fair arbitrators, to help white and black here to get on together by treating each other fairly, until each feels that they can entirely rely on the other for such treatment.

7. I take it that the Commission is trying to find ways whereby a Federation with something like the present powers can work. But if that cannot be achieved, then the only course, short of complete abrogation, would seem to be to have a loose confederation on the lines of the East African Governor's Conference. I do not go into the plan of the Dominion Party for a Central African Alliance, because I cannot believe that it is practical politics.

What does my previous argument lead me to suggest to help preserve the Federation? I see four possible courses of action, the second of which could be combined with any of the others; they are:—

- (a) To entrench, so far as that is possible, in our constitution provisions for "loading" the Federal Assembly with communal members, and for them to have a certain number of seats in the cabinet, on the lines of what is now being considered by the present conference on Kenya. I cannot have much faith in such a course; I think that a substantial representation of both white and black could be achieved in the Assembly without it to ensure that the voices of both are fully heard, and that is all that can be achieved.

If the present Federal Franchise Act were to be replaced by allowing each Territory to use its own law

for the election of its representatives, Southern Rhodesia would see that a substantial number of whites were sent there.

The great hope is that, with a substantial number too of black representatives they would not divide racially but would share power with the whites there and in the cabinet; but to try to lay down just how both races should share power would, I think, be unlikely to succeed. In Kenya it can still seem an advance on the present constitution; here it would be retrograde. If the Federal Assembly and Cabinet was not too "loaded" it would form the permanent part of our constitution and, whichever of the other courses were adopted, of those I now proceed to set out, would be recognised as a transitional one, to give guarantees that assembly and cabinet would govern fairly, until such guarantees were no more required.

- (b) The second possible course is for "fundamental rights" to be enshrined in the Constitution, and for the Federal Supreme Court to be the custodian of the constitution, and to enforce those rights as is done in the U.S.A.

Though I think that this can and should be done here, I do not think that it would be nearly enough in itself. Such a procedure is slow and cumbersome, and can only act in a negative way, by declaring laws and actions unconstitutional and void. It cannot help to bring diverging racial views into harmony, and can indeed exacerbate them, as seems to have happened over the multi-racial schools controversy in the United States. This procedure can only take cognisance of gross wrongs; it could not help African advancement in a positive way.

- (c) Thirdly, I mention the setting up of a Senate, a second chamber with members communally elected, with the idea that one could so give certain defined safeguards to the one of the main racial groups which had not control of the Assembly and Cabinet. This proposal has definite attractions, but many difficulties. For such a Senate to be worthwhile it would have to have real "teeth". Yet it could not be allowed to control money bills or it would be the paramount house; but if it had no influence over them it would have no influence over what would probably be the most important instruments of government policy, for instance the power to impose taxes falling unfairly on one race, and the division of moneys available for education between white and black.

Also I do not think it would be worthwhile to have a Senate which had merely negative powers, to delay or even to veto bills from the Assembly, and no say at all in acts of administration not involving legislation. I think that race which felt that the Assembly and Cabinet had not done it justice, should be able positively to promote policies and bills in the Senate. So for a Senate to be worthwhile it seems to me that it would be necessary to provide that all bills from the Assembly should come before it, and that it could make recommendations on money bills, delay all other bills for a certain time, and veto any bill on the ground that it contained unfair racial discrimination, with an appeal to the Federal Court if the government objected that such a decision could not reasonably have been formed, so that it was an abuse of process. A Senate would be allowed to hold up or veto a bill from the Assembly by providing that it must pass the bill by more than a mere majority, so that a vote of the entire white or black Senators would be effective to block the bill, yet a minority could not be allowed to pass a positive resolution. The Coloured or Asiatic Senators could not be allowed to hold the balance of power. This would give greater importance to the defection of some members of either the black or the white block from the others. In this knowledge would not the voters, black or white, be likely to vote only for Senators whom they could be sure not to defect, extremists?

A Senate would have to be a substantial size to be a House at all, not just a committee, and this country has not a great number of suitable men; its debates would have to be in public when attitudes would be struck, while the essence of the operation should be reasoned negotiation with the government, and the most effective time to influence it would be before it made any public decision, so that it could retract without loss of face.

Something could be done through committees and joint committees as in the U.S.A. but I doubt if it could

be enough. Though the U.S. Senate certainly wields effective power, the history of second chambers in Britain and the Commonwealth does not encourage one to hope highly from the introduction of such a chamber here.

- (d) So I come to the fourth possible course of action, and the one which I find the most promising.

This is the creation of a Council of State consisting of an Executive body composed of the Governor-General, the three Governors, and the Chief Justice which would appoint the members of a lower body, which I call for convenience the Advisory Committee. This Committee would not have so many members that it could not operate as a committee, with round-the-table discussion, and would consist of the same number of European and African members, persons not committed to any political party and able to put forward genuine independent views commanding support; also an Asiatic and a coloured member and really good outsiders, not excluding the possibility of an Indian or an American negro. Such outsiders should be of great value in helping to reconcile our whites and blacks, and by adding to the influence of the committee. Broadly the functions of the committee would be to see that the government promoted African advancement to the utmost of its power, and that it treated all races fairly. It would work for that purpose in private, keeping in close touch with the government, so that it might influence decisions before they were publicly announced. It would also have the powers of Ombudsmen, so that it could take up specific cases of alleged arbitrary or unfair action by government against individuals. Except for this purpose it would not have executive power itself, but if after all it had done to try to influence the government to be fair it should fail, then it could make a recommendation for action to the Higher Council, which would have power by decree to act to correct the unfairness or oppression, or even to take some positive action which the government had failed to take.

Another field in which such a Council might be important would be in seeing fair play for members of the civil service, who are bound to be predominantly white for a long time, and might have to serve a black government.

The hope of such a Council lies in the influence of the Advisory Committee, so that recourse to the Higher Council would be rare; otherwise it would have failed.

8. I am very conscious of the shortcomings of my attempt to assist the Commission. I do think that many Europeans are ready to try to be reasonable, but I am sorry to see little sign of a response from African speakers; and if it is really the African last word to insist on full African government immediately, the European being required to trust such a government to treat him fairly, then I see no course but to dismember the Federation, and instead provide machinery for co-operation between the three Territorial governments on matters, co-operation in which will clearly benefit all three.

Salisbury

29th February, 1960

G. DENGELA

Opposition to Federation

Some bases of the Federation were that:

- (a) Federation was going to bring about partnership.
- (b) Federation was going to bring about sound economic standing.
- (c) Federation was going to abolish racialism.

1. Coming to the economic part of Federation, I, as a person opposed to Federation, it will be wrong of me to say Federation has completely failed to achieve all the above mentioned ends.

Federation has definitely achieved, or is on the way of achieving the sound economic standing in all the three Territories. We have, as an example, The University of our own today; The Kariba Dam for the good of us all today. We have, as an example, most modern Hospitals today. With these few examples I can safely say, Federation was going to be a great success.

The economic side part of the Federation has been achieved and more prosperity is in store for us in future.

2. Coming to partnership, I can say, in a way Federation has achieved economic part of partnership as I have already said. But Federation has completely failed to achieve racial partnership. The fact that the Ministry of Native Affairs in our country is not in the Federal sphere, we, in this country, still suffer from the native policies before Federation.

The existence of Federation, therefore, is of no use to us Africans. If Federation is to continue, the Ministry of African Affairs must be abolished completely. I do not say that it should be transferred to the Federal sphere because the Northern Protectorates will lose their rights as protected countries. There should be no such things as the Native Education Department under the Territorial Governments. This should belong to the Federal Ministry of Education to which Ministry all other races belong except the African race. There is nothing to assure Africans in this Territory, that in future, Bantu Education in South Africa is not going to be copied by Southern Rhodesia, as long as African Education remains the function of the Territorial Governments.

3. Regarding racialism, the Federation has again failed to achieve the abolition of racialism. It is this thorn in the flesh that the banned African National Congress could not endure. If there was no racial discrimination in the Federation the disturbances in Nyasaland would not have come into being.

There is, in the Federation, a form of apartheid, only that it has not got the name "apartheid."

4. Africans have no land of their own. They live in the Reserves from which they can be moved at any time. Very often they are moved to unhealthy or dry places, the good land being offered to the Whites. Also in those Reserves arable land has been considerably restricted to six acres per family. One European can have ownership of 50 square miles compared to 15 square miles for a great number of African Villagers. Therefore Africans want land.

To make things worse, the Government has seriously destocked the live-stock owned by Africans. (This means an African has no security.)

5. To conclude, I say leave the Northern Territories to go alone. The British Government is there to see that the Protectorates are learning to stand on their feet without the Federation interfering.

It should be borne in mind that the establishment of Federation was imposed upon all Africans.

Federation Should Surely Be Abolished

Bulawayo.

D. K. DENTON

Hon. Secretary, United Federal Party—Macheke

For the Federation to continue in its present—or any—form it is necessary that confidence be established.

1. The European must have confidence that the Federation and Southern Rhodesian states will not be at the mercy of extremist African nationalists.
2. The Africans must have confidence that European reactionaries, particularly in Southern Rhodesia, will not dominate the Federal State.

The study of 1 above is beyond the scope of this note but the following are some thoughts concerning 2.

Probably the greatest factor influencing African opinion against Southern Rhodesia is the existing colour bar and to a great extent misguided theories about the colour bar. Feeling amongst United Federal Party supporters here seems to be crystallising into something on these lines: "We are not prepared to relax the franchise qualifications to any extent but we think that the colour bar existing in law can in many respects no longer be justified."

For example we are sure that colour bars regarding hotels and restaurants can be modified progressively. The Southern Rhodesian government has already passed legislation in a number of respects wherein it has done away with or modified the colour bar and as it is able to introduce further legislation to this effect much of the opposition from the two Northern Territories will fall away. However, a government with a small majority and facing an election, must act with a certain amount of circumspection.

From the point of view of the European voters there is a grave danger that unless the British Government can grant reasonable constitutional advances the hand of the opponents of partnership, Federation and British connection amongst the European electorate will be strengthened.

The establishment of a second House, or Senates, for Southern Rhodesia and the Federation would seem to go a

long way towards satisfying African opinion. It might well be that the Senate was somewhat to the "left" of the elected bodies, and while not able to initiate legislation could effectively hamper any discriminatory tendencies on the part of a right-wing government.

Whatever is said by liberals about United Federal Party policy, it cannot be denied that our electoral system provides for an ever-increasing participation by the less advanced peoples whereas many countries that have started on their road to "freedom" with universal suffrage are now moving away from any form of democracy. Our policies may appear to be conservative and those of the newly "freed" African states seem the acme of liberality, but in the long run we stand the best chance of establishing "a Parliamentary Democracy on the Westminster model."

The points raised in this note have been discussed with United Federal Party members in this area, who appear to be in general agreement. But I am submitting it in my personal capacity, and it does not necessarily represent the feelings of this branch of the Party.

Macheke

8th April, 1960

J. DLODLO

1. Husbandry Bill Act

(a) Destocking of cattle in the African areas and denying the existence of goats, sheep, pigs, donkeys, etc. Destocked animals are sold at a give-away price which is a pretty good loss to the African whose life policy is in these domestic animals. All his present and future is invested in them.

(b) Land for ploughing has been limited to a number of acres and this confronts difficulty to big families because they won't get sufficient to pay them the fines of living.

2. African people have been moved from one place to another and in most cases they have been removed from healthy places to unhealthy places and in these parts there is always shortage of rain and water.

No provision has been made for those who shall have built nice, expensive, well up-to-date, modern houses. It is therefore that there is no stability and security of tenure for the African in the Reserve.

3. (i) What has Federation done for us since 1953?

(ii) What will it do for us and when?

(iii) Who is supposed to practice partnership between the Government and the white settlers and blacks although some of them are now Africans because they are born in Africa? The Government, in short, is like father and son.

(iv) Why is that there is no same rate for same job, e.g. Dunlop and S.R. and overseas?

(v) The ban of A.N.C. and the formation of S.R.A. is unopposed same principles. The A.N.C. members have been detained without any trial or judgment given. It is the highest time that the Federal Government must learn the practice of love and justice so that the country may be governed by love and justice.

Education Federal fair for whites, what about African education?

Njube Township

E. M. DUBE

Land

1. The African man has no place in the Rhodesian Reserve areas, he has no place in town, he has no place in the street. That there is no ladder to ascend to heaven, which is evidently the ultimate residence, where is the African man's hope to settle down comfortably?

The Government is quite conscious of this uneasiness and homelessness of the African man. Whenever and wherever the African men are found having a private discussion over their grievances, they are found guilty and thrown into stocks. How, when and where can the African man be allowed to vent his feelings?

Wages

2. Here is an amazing difference and unfairness. It is advocated and in fact it is pressed that the African man has no right, however able or educated he may be, to receive the same wages as a European of the same category as he is. But and a big *but*, when an African buys a car or runs a business, he

is charged identically the same or even a higher price or levy than the European. Where is fairness in this matter? Licence pays as a European.

Native Affairs

3. That the government is quite aware of the fact that an African man can never be found with a sum of five pounds as pocket money, why is it that should there be a dispute between an African and a European, the Native Commissioner adjourns the case and passes it on to the Civil Commissioner who will not deal with the case until the African man affirms that he has an advocate to defend his case. The African man, having failed to get an advocate, is thrown out and the European eventually finds himself getting off with the case. All this is done to preserve the European's prestige. Is this fairness?

Is the United Kingdom aware of the fact that, in the Cattle Sales, an African's cattle are bought or sold at 2d. a pound, while a European's cattle are bought or sold at 1/9d. a pound? Surely this shows that here the European is bent upon taking away the African's property by force in order to swell the European's pocket and keep the African's pocket next to emptiness.

Education

4. That there are two sections: *Native Education* and *European Education* Departments. It is quite apparent that in education there is vast difference. Why is there this difference and what motive is underlying this difference?

Industry

5. In localities there are African residential areas and European areas, but in industry there are only European Industrial sites. Why is an able African not allowed to establish his own firm or factory in the Industrial sites to purchase a stand and pay his employees? If Africans are allowed to work in the Industrial sites, why will they not be allowed to stand on their own there?

Federation

6. Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland form the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The latter two colonies, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are under the Imperial Government while Southern Rhodesia is responsible; why should these two Colonies suffer with Southern Rhodesia the unpleasant consequences of Federation? In the beginning it was distinctly voiced out that Federation only affected European Affairs and the African Affairs would remain Territorial. Why then should we be compelled to sign for Federation? While we in Southern Rhodesia have no objection to either Federal, Chartered, Responsible or any other government, we do not by any means wish to have the other two Colonies suffering the obtaining unpleasant consequences of Federation.

In the Commission its composition includes civil servants, example Chief Simon Sigola.

P.S.—This evidence was intended to be given verbal at Mswzi but for unforeseen reasons failed.

Bulawayo

A EUROPEAN RESIDENT OF FORT VICTORIA*

Racialism figures too much, in fact all out of proportion in the National and individual outlook of today. The utterances of certain spokesmen, especially amongst the Bantu, are given far too much prominence and do not truly reflect the opinions of the law abiding majority, but their own selfish advancement.

To further complicate this already difficult situation, we have representatives from the British Labour Party and other similar bodies having the impertinence to tell us how to mind our internal affairs, whilst there are glaring discrepancies in their own administration. Who made them judge over us?

We Rhodesians, mainly descended from Anglo-Saxon stock, justly pride ourselves on what we have accomplished for the Bantu in just over half a century and on examination it would appear to be a far more impressive record than the British Government has ever achieved in its Crown Colonies.

Further, we do not have the temerity to interfere in other peoples' affairs, like we are called upon to suffer.

There needs to be a real spirit of humility in the way we tackle our problems, as armchair criticism is of no avail in

*Name withheld at request of witness.

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solving affairs that require the wisdom of many a Solomon. Our affairs are so complex that it is not inappropriate to seek God's help in formulating our decisions, for we are not merely considering the present, we are also stewards for the future.

I, as an ordinary citizen desiring no publicity, feel impelled to present these few candid views to the Commission for they reflect deep thought and are not frivolous as so many suggestions which come from overseas.

The established European population of Southern Rhodesia can also be considered as Africans. This is their home; their toil, brains, initiative and endeavour is responsible for well over ninety per cent. of the development in this country. Even if the Bantu had not been here, the labour could have been imported from elsewhere.

Prior to the coming of the European to Southern Rhodesia, the Bantu population was very small, for it led a very precarious existence. The tribes of Mashonaland under their Chiefs were continually being raided and exterminated by the warlike Matabele warriors. Living in complete savagery coupled with such conditions, the population did not have the chance to increase like today under the stable conditions it now enjoys.

Consequently, when the Europeans arrived, they found large areas of land unsettled and not utilised by the local inhabitants. Today the European areas still comprise these areas and the Native Areas comprise the areas where the Mashonas were living at that time. There was, therefore, no exploitation in appropriation of land, as may be imagined.

The Bantu enjoy exclusive rights in their own Reserves. This privilege is not shared by the Europeans for their areas are open to any Bantu who wishes to come in and provide labour or pursue individual pursuits. Any Bantu who has the necessary ability and determination, is quite free to better himself as he sees fit.

Accommodation and a way of living has been provided by the European and in addition, efforts are being continually made by the Government, Municipalities and individuals, to provide and improve for the needs of the Bantu living in European areas. They are even allowed to purchase their own buildings in European areas.

This in accordance with the benevolent European race, who even sometimes go as far as spoon-feeding in some cases. They are practising British justice, for the Britisher who settles in Africa does not change his outlook when he leaves his home to settle here.

The Government and people will continue to make every effort, even at sacrifice to themselves, to help the Bantu in their development and many of them are grateful and thankful for what the Europeans have accomplished on their behalf. The European also bears the main brunt of Tax, the proceeds of which are largely devoted to African advancement.

This true picture reflects the actual position in Southern Rhodesia and is a practical picture of partnership, which is not generally realised by an outside critical world, which is influenced by subversive propaganda largely influenced from Moscow.

There is still much to be done, but it takes time and also a right spirit among all the races concerned. Further, our Law has been legislated, so that no European can take unfair advantage or in any way mistreat a Bantu.

Bearing this in mind, coupled with Southern Rhodesia's magnificent war service, second to none in proportion to her size, and this achieved almost totally by a small European population, then we as a white race are completely justified in standing out for certain entrenched rights, which in no way must be infringed upon.

The security of the properties developed by us must be upheld. For instance, my farm was developed from virgin bush by my late father and has now passed on to me, the second generation. I have every right to expect to will this farm on to my son. We have also a right to retain our own Schools, Institutions, etc., which have been built up from scratch. Even some Hotels should remain exclusively European, as type likes to mix with type.

The future security of our areas must be upheld and in no way jeopardized by a less advanced race, as is happening in Kenya today. The Bantu have not yet developed sufficiently to become intelligent voters, except for the minority. To safeguard the Federation for both black and white, the European must remain predominant in their own areas.

The Bantu must be afforded as much help as can be rendered, coupled with co-operation from them. Without any axe to grind or being petty or pro-European, the bare outstanding basic fact is very clear, that if the Bantu through a

universal suffrage, are able to dictate by getting the major control over affairs of State, then as sure as night follows day justice, fairplay and Democracy will cease to exist in this Central African Federation. Power will move into the hands of a few black demagogues and dictatorship will commence like in Ghana and other African States.

The Commission faces this one fact in their recommendations. Justice and fairplay for all will only be retained by the Europeans holding two thirds of the seats and the Bantu one third. The Bantu can be represented by their own people or European, and so they will have a say and control in the affairs of the Federation. This Constitution must remain without any possibility of amendment for another fifty years i.e. 2010 A.D.

I have purposely refrained from mentioning Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as I do not pose as an authority on these countries. But where I was born and where I have lived, except for war service, I know the true conditions.

Let me end by reiterating what our Prime Minister said: "We are alone capable, by having proved it in the past, of running this Central African Federation without any direction from outside, where they are not fully acquainted with our conditions."

C. F. FULLER

Letter from C. F. Fuller and others transmitting copies of a memorandum bearing a large number of signatures. (See Annexure).

In submitting the signed copies of our Memorandum we would like to explain how it came about that this was organised by four Chartered Engineers, who have never previously taken part in any political activity.

You will have received a Memorandum from a certain Club in Bulawayo implying that the contents are considered opinions of a majority of representative and thinking citizens.

We, who are also members of the Club, considered that this Memorandum was only representative of a certain political group within the Club, and did not necessarily represent a majority opinion. Although the active membership of the Club is about 60, the number of people who can claim membership, including those who attend meetings infrequently, is very much higher than that figure.

Accordingly we drew up a Memorandum which we believed would reflect the opinion of the majority of civilised Rhodesians. A further motive in drawing up the Memorandum was that the average citizen finds himself voiceless in this country where a monopoly newspaper combine holds sway. Incidentally, one of its editors in a radio interview at 7 p.m. on Monday, 4th April, 1960, claimed that they put any Government out of office within six months!

We have had no political organisation at our disposal to help in obtaining signatures and have depended on the goodwill of our friends to distribute copies as widely as possible.

It should also be remembered that civil servants have been forbidden to sign, and this reduces considerably the number of potential signatories (see copy of the Memorandum No. 2927). So far we have collected 24,183 signatures, and we expect to submit a further batch before 6th May.

Our experience has been that fewer than one person in thirty of those asked to sign expresses disagreement with the document. Although no effort was made to canvass the non-European sections of the population, we have noticed that some of the signatures would appear to be those of Asians and Africans.

Bulawayo.

11th April, 1960.

Annexure

Memorandum for submission to the Monckton Commission on the Maintenance of Civilised Government

We, the undersigned, being permanent inhabitants of Rhodesia, submit the following Memorandum so that there can be no possible misunderstanding or doubt as to what the reaction would be should the United Kingdom Government decide to alter the Federal Constitution, or the individual Territorial Constitutions, in such a manner as to allow a "black" majority to control the Government in this, our country and our home.

The Bantu inhabitant is as much a "settler" as the white inhabitant of European origin, being mainly descended from marauding tribesmen who overran this country before the arrival of the Europeans. Whereas the Bantu were by nature murderers and plunderers, our forefathers came as colonists,

bringing with them the benefits of their civilisation, including peace to the warring tribesmen, and as far as possible stamping out witchcraft and murder.

Our country has been developed and built up by European initiative, effort and resources. Protected by the European from self-destruction and the ravages of endemic disease, the Bantu have multiplied fast. Their large population in Rhodesia today is due entirely to the stabilising of the European, without which they would revert to savagery and anarchy.

The dictum laid down by Cecil Rhodes of "equal rights for all civilised men" has been unequivocally accepted and acted upon in Southern Rhodesia, and this must continue to apply throughout the Federation.

The masses of the Bantu people have no understanding of government by democracy, but there is ample evidence that they are happy to share the benefits of freedom and security provided by the "white man's" Government. An electorate composed mainly of uncivilised, immature people would lead to despotism and the certain breakdown of true democratic government.

The point we wish to emphasise with all the force we can muster is that we have no intention whatever of abandoning our hard-won birthright. There can be no question of handing over the future of our children to government by a Bantu majority which, as already stated, would result in despotic rule. Our fathers and forefathers have established our heritage and we are determined to retain it.

We mean to continue the great work of educating and civilising the Bantu people in a spirit of realistic partnership. We have done more in Southern Rhodesia to advance the mass of the Bantu that has been done in any other British territory in Africa. The Commission has only to read the Bantu success stories, recently published by the Federal Information Department, and compare our achievements here with what has been done in Bechuanaland and Basutoland.

We believe very strongly in the ability and integrity of the peoples of the Federation to work out their own salvation. We resent the present tendency for our affairs to be made into a political football by people who are neither resident nor aware of the conditions here. We deem it essential to have our own Federal Civil and Police Services, staffed by men and women who "go home" every night instead of every three or four years—who do not have to keep an eye on what party may be in power "after the next election" in the United Kingdom.

We declare that within the foreseeable future, or until we are satisfied that the Bantu people have acquired civilisation and all that it stands for, we must reserve the right to have our own schools and other social facilities: we will not be forced to accept degrees of integration that are contrary to the will of either people. In no circumstances will we ever submit to uncivilised black domination. We are determined to defend our heritage with every means at our disposal.

We declare that we have not signed any other copy of this Memorandum.

(29,260 signatures were received by the Commission.)

A. E. GREGG and others.

We, the undersigned residents who have made our permanent homes in Southern Rhodesia, have the honour to submit the following evidence for consideration.

We are determined to retain our allegiance to Her Majesty the Queen as the Head of State.

We are determined that we shall not accept an African government for ourselves or our immediate descendants, for the very good reason that, for all practical purposes, no Africans in Southern Rhodesia are sufficiently advanced in morality, honesty, tolerance or the other accepted aspects of civilisation to even compare with the ordinary voter in Britain. We do not wish to bar in any way any of the rare Africans who have reached civilised standards, and we are well aware of the desirability for encouraging the friendship of all the African population, but we are not prepared to accept immediate government by the majority, which would mean, in this country, dictatorship supported by mass hysteria with severe oppression of all opposition.

We deplore the statement that "African nationalism" exists; there has never been anything but African tribalism, and history records no exceptions to the law of the jungle in Central Africa before the white man came, in those days the strongest tribe subdued its neighbours by violent and atrocious means. In the year 1901 there were 467,212 natives in Southern Rhodesia who owned 43,926 head of cattle; today

there are about 2,500,000 natives who own 2,073,592 head of cattle and this tremendous increase is entirely due to the enforced peace brought by the white man combined with the health measures for man and beast which would still be non-existent if the white man had not come to Southern Rhodesia. Having built up this state of satisfactory physical matters, it is our intention to continue the progress and to educate the African in common decency until he gives up his cruel practices such as catching buck and birds in snares, breaking their legs instead of killing them, in order to keep the meat fresh and until he begins to realise that there is such a thing as fair play to the under-dog, be he human or animal.

Some of us have lived in African governed territories and we are determined that the practices established there will never be tolerated here; we refer to the acceptance of bribes by immigration officials, corrupt policemen, stealing of letters in quantity by postal employees, sale of government property by public servants illegally, and general deterioration of public and private life far below any civilised standard.

We would point out that the African tribes of this country have no cultural background of tradition and cannot be put in the same category as the Sudanese or other peoples with strong Arab strain in their make-up; the local tribes' main contact with Arab and other cultures was to be enslaved by them, consequently it will take many generations to implant the necessary strength of character and sense of decency required by voters under Western democracy. The brutal dominance of the Matabele who were in the ascendant when the white man came to Southern Rhodesia to stay, was only supplanting the similar dominance of the tribes the Matabele conquered, and this state of affairs would have continued to the point of near-extirmination of humans and cattle had we not stepped in. Cannibalism was rife in Central Africa up to within living memory (see Johnson's narratives and Grogan's walk records), and all of us have experience of Africans leaving their employment or going sick because some enemy has put a spell on them. We also know from hard experience that Africans need constant supervision in order to be worth any wages at all, and most of us have seen new arrivals from Britain badly let down by their employees just because they tried to treat their African employees as they would treat Europeans.

Amongst the signatories there are qualified professional men who can vouch that even after years of patient training and instruction it is impossible to make an artisan out of a local African, the barrier being mental outlook more than lack of skill, but the result is that the local African population cannot produce even one per cent of the artisans necessary for the continuance of normal services in this country.

We would respectfully invite the attention of the Commission to the current trend of thought amongst African political aspirants, which is well known in this country and has been mentioned in the United States of America; it can be summed up thus: "We Africans cannot run our own country, but we want to control it and if we can get independence we shall do so, keeping white men in the technical services, but holding all the power ourselves, and taking all the money. This is the time to act as if we get our independence now we are sure to be financed by the Americans in order to keep Russia out." This attitude needs no comment as to its inadequacy as a long term policy.

We look to the Commission to propose a form of legislature which will enable us to continue our improvement of the African's economic and cultural being so that he may in due time become capable of thinking and acting in accordance with the Ten Commandments, which are the basis of our civilisation.

Gwelo.

MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF GWELO

J. R. Cannon, Mayor

Population of Gwelo:

	European	Coloured and Asiatic	African
1946	1,644	275	6,445*
1959	6,410	500	18,680

* In employment only

In addition to the figures of Africans quoted above there is an unknown number of Africans in Gwelo who are not working and consequently not "officially" housed.

During the last two years an increasing number of Africans have come in from the rural areas seeking work, and although some new industries have been established, providing work for more people, the rate of unemployment amongst Africans in Gwelo has increased faster than new job opportunities.

Council has sought energetically to industrialise the town. The Town Clerk has been sent overseas on three occasions, and some new industries have been established in Gwelo as a result of contacts made during these trips.

Council has had to face great competition from Salisbury and Bulawayo, especially the former, where greater local markets and the centralisation of government create conditions for a mushroom type of growth.

In order to secure the maximum industrial development to meet the ever growing need of urban employment by Africans, every effort will have to be made to secure the greatest spread of industry throughout the country. The sociological danger of concentrating the bulk of the African population of Southern Rhodesia in Salisbury and Bulawayo are great. In Salisbury, for example, many Africans have to live such long distances from their places of employment that transport and financial problems of great magnitude have arisen.

Siting of the Federal and Southern Rhodesia Territorial Capitals

The decision to establish both the Federal and Southern Rhodesia Territorial Capitals in Salisbury has, over the last seven years, confirmed the fears expressed by many people at that time.

As stated earlier, there was already a marked tendency for industry, with its accompanying population and services, to establish itself in Salisbury, and the superimposing of a second Government on the rapidly growing city created unnecessary over-centralisation and fixed in the minds of many people, principally Africans, that the Southern Rhodesian and the Federal Governments were much closer together than any other Governments in the Federation.

We are strongly of the opinion that the Southern Rhodesia Territorial Government should be moved from Salisbury. Such a move would clearly indicate to all, particularly the Africans of the two Northern Territories, that the Governments were, in fact, completely separated. It would also stimulate development in the region where the Southern Rhodesia Territorial Capital was to be sited.

Participation by Africans in Local Government

The great majority of Africans in Gwelo are not property owners, and are entirely untutored on Local Government. Council feels, therefore, that at the present time, and for some time to come, the Africans cannot participate in Local Government on the same basis as Europeans.

Europeans must own and/or occupy premises which are capable of being separately rated in order to qualify for a Municipal vote.

Hitherto, the only part played by Africans in Local Government has been through membership of African Advisory Committees.

Gwelo's African Population is as follows:—

Single men in rented rooms	3,969
Married families in rented houses (873 families)	3,935
Married families in their own houses (247 families)	1,170
Total	9,074

The problem is how to succeed in arriving at a satisfactory formula for increased African participation when the majority of African men and women are clearly not ready for the responsibility of local government. In the fairly certain knowledge that no single blue print can be completely successful and that succeeding generations require different speeds and approaches one can only apply solutions as they seem appropriate at the time and bearing certain criteria in mind.

The criteria are:—

1. The local authority must be in the hands of responsible people.
2. Local authorities must continue to observe the standards and traditions acquired over a long period of time.
3. Local authorities must not be corrupt.
4. Until some final arrangements are arrived at changes must be made from time to time as the African people advance. Solutions cannot be fixed for all times.

With widely differing standards of living it is inevitable that the European and African residential areas will continue to be separate for the foreseeable future, and in the new African areas, where home ownership is being instituted, the opportunity is being made for Africans to be taught to have an increasing amount of responsibility.

One can visualise changes to the Land Apportionment Act which could, for example, exclude industrial areas from the Act's application so that African as well as European industrialists will be able to develop industries on an equal basis. This might well extend to commercial areas, but there is every likelihood that Africans would suffer strong competition in the African townships and may well be the losers. This is one of the inevitable results when "paternalism" is no longer practised.

Recommendations :

Our recommendations for the foreseeable future are :

- (a) Government policy to be designed to encourage actively the spread of industries and population throughout the country in order to—
 - (i) provide maximum industrial employment for the growing number of urbanised Africans ;
 - (ii) stimulate greater country-wide development which in turn will cause better communications and consequently greater exploitation of all the country's resources.
- (b) Increased scope for African Advisory Committees with some responsibility for expenditure of Beer Hall Profits on Welfare.
- (c) Government Home Ownership areas to have greater responsibilities. African Committees, under tutelage of Municipal Councils, to learn democratic government.
- (d) Party Politics to be kept firmly out of local government as is the case at present.
- (e) That whilst realising and accepting the need to advance the Africans in the sphere of local government, it is felt that a real danger exists to the whole structure of local government if the development is not contained within the capabilities of the majority of the Africans who would be quite out of their depth in providing and maintaining the great public services that modern towns require.

In conclusion, we would like to emphasise the fact that this Colony has, in all its history of self-government had no racial trouble, but the present trend of divided loyalties between the Federal Government and the Colonial Office is breeding confusion and dissension between races.

This dissension will in our opinion disappear only when dual authority is eliminated.

Gwelo

19th April, 1960

C. G. HANMER

I have lived in this country since 1921, farming almost all of that time.

The average number of natives I have had in my employ has probably been between 30 and 40 at any one time. I think I must be a fairly good master, natives working for me for long periods. One has been with me over 30 years.

I cannot call to mind *one* native who has been capable of taking more than the smallest responsibility, and then only if I am fairly nearby. They are like rear rank privates.

My thought is that they can only have a claim to a share in the government of the country if and when they show they are worthy of responsibility.

I imagine the present franchise law necessitates an African voter being a man of some substance, and hence probably of greater responsibility than the masses.

I suggest that this should be the governing condition in allowing them to have a greater say in the government of the country—and that this should take place very slowly.

Rusapi.

12th January, 1960

W. J. HARPER

Introduction

1. These proposals are my personal ideas and while I present them on the occasion of presenting evidence in my capacity as Leader of the Opposition, they are not official Dominion Party Policy—there having been insufficient time for the Party to consider them prior to the visit of the Advisory Commission.

2. These proposals dovetail to some extent with the Dominion Party's "Central African Alliance Plan," and are put forward in the event both of that Plan being found

unacceptable in its main features, and the electorate of Southern Rhodesia desiring Secession.

3. The Federation has failed, and its continuance constitutes a barrier to the security of the territories comprised in the Federation and to Southern Rhodesia in particular. It has failed through the incompatibility of its aims, making it inevitably self-destroying. The evolution of a national way of life is of necessity a slow process, which each decision to alter the law being weighed against the probability of acceptance by the electorate. Federation was an overnight creation of a new national way of life, with loyalties to races and governments, and peoples, which in the final stages are incompatible. It was an admitted *experiment*, and was based on hypotheses not sufficiently thought out. Its continuance today is marked by its complete inability to meet the *primary fundamental need* of any country, namely the provision of *political stability* as the absolute pre-requisite to orderly progress of that state.

4. There is an *urgent* need for the states forming the Federation to revert to the concept of an *alliance on a voluntary basis, in an economic union, each politically independent*. This plan puts forward proposals for such an alliance.

5. The Federal concept of a Central Government wielding legislative and administrative powers over the three Territories of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is unworkable. Southern Rhodesia is not prepared to accept the eventuality of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland having control of Southern Rhodesia's affairs through the medium of a Federal legislature. Despite historic promises inferred by the Government of the United Kingdom it has a moral obligation in regard to the indigenous inhabitants of the Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland not to hand them over permanently into a form of Government which is not of their choosing. It will be some time before they are capable of making a choice.

Urgency for action

6. Southern Rhodesians, who object to the eventuality of control from the Northern Protectorates cannot afford to prolong the Federal System, beyond the present time as it may turn from its concept of being an *experiment* into an established system from which extrication will become too difficult to achieve.

Politically stability

7. There will be no economic stability unless political stability is established. The Federal System is fundamentally wrong; under the terms of the preamble to the Federal Constitution, the future of the Northern Protectorates is eventually a matter for the inhabitants thereof—this, added to the fact that the Federal idea is an *experiment* necessarily indicates that the political picture of the Federation is one of uncertainty and lacks essential stability.

The microcosm

8. The proposition that by far the greatest problem of politics in the Central African Federation is the adjustment of the black and white races to each other is correct. But the corollary that the problem is hence the same in seeking solutions to the Federal area as it is if one had only Southern Rhodesia to content with is not correct. The stage of advancement of the three territories is not the same and calls for different solutions at different times. The historic position of each country call for different approaches. Circumstances alter cases.

In Southern Rhodesia the population relationship is nine Africans to one European. In the Federation as a whole there are 28 Africans to one European. A course of action by a Government might well be considered as being suitable for the general good of a country in the first instance, but could not be accepted as reasonable when the population figures differed so greatly as in the second instance. To take a more extreme example, where in the United Kingdom one African child in an English grammar school would create mild interest, in Southern Rhodesia it would create animosity on a national scale. Southern Rhodesian race problems must not be considered a microcosm of the Federal problem.

The price

9. Southern Rhodesians were opposed to an alliance with the Union of South Africa in 1922, they preferred their political freedom that preference is an indication of the fundamental desire of Rhodesians here to be independent. Federation was accepted by the Southern Rhodesian electorate, without a clear appreciation of its ramifications. The Power of the Press Monopoly, the leading politicians of the three Territories and the finances of major business groups, brought overwhelming resources to bear on the electorate to indicate

that advantage only could accrue to Southern Rhodesia through Federation. Issues such as those arising through implementation of the preamble to the Federal Constitution were thought to be of no significance. The United Kingdom Minister of State, Mr. Hopkinson, promised Southern Rhodesians that they would not have to face domination of their affairs from the North.

Today it is clear to much of the Southern Rhodesian electorate that they were misled by their leaders and the Press as to the political implications of accepting Federation.

The fact that Federation was voted for by a majority by use of the one-sided resources available to those who promoted Federation, in no way adds to the acceptability of Federation *per se* to the electorate of Southern Rhodesia.

Secession

10. It is clear that while the electorate of Southern Rhodesia is preparing itself mentally for Secession, if some satisfactory link between the Territories could be worked out, such an arrangement might be welcomed. That arrangement, however, must always be based on the free will of the Territories concerned and it is only on such a basis will the different historic, social, economic and political problems of the Territories be given proper consideration in any common legislation.

Proposals for a Central African Administrative Commission

- (a) There will be no Central or Federal Government.
- (b) The Federal Civil and Military Services will be absorbed by the States at present parties to the Federation, except as required by sub para. (c).
- (c) There will be formed a Central African Administrative Commission, with a permanent Civil Service and presided over by a board of Commissioners, who will be Political Appointees of those Governments subscribing to the Commission.
- (d) Membership of the Commission will be open to any number of two or more states mutually acceptable to each other.
- (e) The Commission's Administration will extend to such functions and areas as its members agree.
- (f) Such legislation as the Commission may require will be made by its Member States on behalf of the Commission and each State will be responsible for adherence to the legislation it itself has passed.
- (g) Membership of the Commission will be on the basis of the free will of the States concerned.
- (h) Member States will be politically independent.

V. J. HAYES

The Maintenance of Civilized Government

(1) The continuance of federation in its present form is clearly impossible due to :—

- (a) African opposition in the Northern Territories to Federation.
- (b) The firm intention of the British Government to provide constitutions for these Northern territories that would enable black dominated governments to assume control at an early date. A result of this would inevitably be that the Federal Parliament in due course would become controlled by an African majority and this would be against the interests of Southern Rhodesia and totally unacceptable to the electorate of the Colony.
- (c) Different stages of economic and political development in the the three territories of the Federation making their continued close association incompatible with their respective aspirations and interests.

(2) It appears therefore that as far as Southern Rhodesia is concerned its future would be best served by seceding from the federation and entering into some form of economic alliance with either or both of the Northern Territories.

(3) The ability of Southern Rhodesia to remain viable as an economic unit on its own is often questioned but I have no doubts on this score and submit the following figures to substantiate this belief :—

Present Federal Budget	£78,000,000
Present Southern Rhodesia Budget	£18,500,000
Southern Rhodesia Budget after taking over Federal services presently enjoyed :—			
£42,000,000	Add interest and	Redemption	
£10,400,000		Kariba	
<hr/>			
£52,400,000			

Income of Southern Rhodesia on its own (taxation, customs and excise, hospital and schools fees)—£42,100,000.

Shortfall — £4,100,000.

This comparatively small shortfall would be more than made up by—

- (1) A probable rise in the price of gold which seems to be imminent.
- (2) Copper Development in Southern Rhodesia.
- (3) Removal of Northern Rhodesian Federal Agricultural subsidies.
- (4) An anticipated influx of investment capital to a politically stable area.
- (4) It must also be remembered that Southern Rhodesia contributes more than half the revenue derived from Income Tax to the Federal Treasury—

Federal	£30,400,000
Southern Rhodesia	£16,500,000
(without adding £3.2 million at 20% surcharge.)					

(5) As far as Kariba is concerned the Southern Rhodesia Government would assume half responsibility for the financial burden vested in the Federal Power Board which would become an international responsibility on same basis as the St. Lawrence Seaway.

Federal National Debt	£226,000,000
Interest and Redemption	£11,700,000
National debt Southern Rhodesia after assuming half responsibility for Kariba				
...	£185,181,220
Interest and Redemption	£10,400,000

Bulawayo

9th April, 1960

C. G. HODGSON

Partnership and Education in Central Africa

The recently formed Central Africa Federation is embarked on a policy of partnership between black and white even though statesmen both in London and Africa have not successfully explained what the policy means. On one point, however, everybody seems to be agreed that a greater degree of education for the indigenous people is a *sine qua non*. Yet, I doubt if more than a few persons have any clearer idea of what education means, than they have of definition for partnership.

As one who has had some recent experience of a practical experiment in partnership my own views on this subject are clearer than they used to be, and perhaps my experience may be of interest.

For over three years I have been the Chairman of an African Co-operative with two stores (trading), which is now in the hands of a Judicial Manager, and faced with the possibility of ultimate liquidation. This business failure has come about because the attempt to make partnership work was hopeless. Had the European element been able to exercise powers, of rigid control over all the activities of the African partners, the story might have been different. Of course, on the other hand, it might not. Failure might still have been the final result, but at least the causes of that failure would have been different.

Rhobantu stores was an all African conception, organised in the first stages by African, with African money collected in small amount by a laborious share selling campaign from town to town and kraal to kraal, at considerable inconvenience and expense to a small group of African enthusiasts. When the company was floated these Africans were advised by a European Lawyer to have three Europeans on their Board in an advisory capacity, and they agreed.

At outset Rhobantu Stores met with every assistance from the European community of the city. The Lawyer who launched their company charged no fee. Their first Secretary (a chartered accountant) gave his services gratis. The three European Directors who were asked to serve on the Board agreed to do so without reward, and were able to bring wide knowledge and business experience of the wholesale and retail merchandising trades to their work. With the help of these gentlemen the wholesale merchants gave every assistance, the bank co-operated, and the Government officials granted permits and lease as requested.

At the start of trading operations the African's activities in buying, selling, banking, accounting, and so forth were rigidly controlled by the Europeans in spite of an undercurrent of operation from one or two African. These were the men who

had objected to having any European Association in the first place, but had been overruled by their colleagues.

Unfortunately this tension grew because the African Managing Director wanted more and more freedom, long before he had proven himself capable of taking greater responsibility. Freedom, among other things, to purchase on credit at the company's expense.

In time, however, he appeared to have mastered the arts of wise buying to such an extent that his powers in this direction might be increased. At the same time, a change in the European directorate made it no longer possible to expect quite the same firm degree of control as the Company had started with. As tension by this time became severe between the African management and their European advisers, it was hoped the granting of a greater degree of autonomy would result in smoother working.

At this point the African had the tiller in their hands and within six months the company was on the rocks! A surprise physical check of stocks and books by the Europeans showed that both stores were heavily overstocked, commitments could not be met, and the cash was deficient by several hundred pounds. A meeting of creditors was inevitable.

The heartening and amazing fact of that meeting was that of all the merchants, lawyers and accountants present not one of whom charged the company a penny fee there was not a man who had any wish to see the business filled up or the African shareholders lose their money. By their unanimous wish Rhobantu stores is now in the hands of a Judicial Manager whose job it is to try and save it from dissolution.

Now what lessons can be learned from this brief recital? Firstly it must be fully understood that what failed was the attempt at partnership, and that Rhobantu stores was merely pulled down in that collapse. In the very beginning there should have been provision for European control or the Europeans should have kept out of it altogether. The African would not have European control, but were wise enough to know that without some sort of European help the birth pains of the company would be more than severe. An attempt was therefore made to effect a compromise, but it was doomed from the start.

Secondly, when advice was given, the Africans, in most instances, did not want to take it; and only did so if forced into a corner. As they grew more experienced in the work this tendency increased to the point almost of defiance. Serious steps were taken, expensive purchases made, additional employees engaged, and all without reference to the Europeans. In the case of Managing Director (who would not be dismissed by the Europeans alone) directives and minutes from the Board, aimed at correcting his own misdemeanours, were openly ignored.

Then finally, when control passed out of European hands human frailty proved too much for discretion, and disaster followed.

Of course the story of the Rhobantu stores is not unique. European businesses have been run on the same lines, and have failed in the same way. It would be unfair and untrue to say that the African cannot run a business, and will never be able to. What he lacks is a sense of proportion, and the sense of citizenship. Perhaps citizenship is the wrong word and should say that he lacks a sense of being part of the community.

Let us take the sense of proportion first . . . It may be criminal to dip a sticky finger in the till, it is plainly silly to pinch a third of the company's capital.

It may be cheating to show a fictitious rate of gross profit on the year's sales, but it is merely clumsy to let the figures drop fifty per cent. in a few months! It may be unconstitutional to defy the Board's directive but it is madness to draw an unauthorised advance of pay the following week.

Yet all these things can be cured by a simple extension of the common conception of education. Generally speaking it is all too commonly believed that educating the native means "something more than the three R's." Which, explained more fully, means that we should aim to increase his efficiency in the trades or professions, and increase his purchasing power by raising his standard of living. Carry that idea a little further and you will obviously increase his sense of proportion to the point where he will no longer do the clumsy things illustrated above.

And you will thereby make it harder to discover his errors!

The only antidote to this, quite simply, is to raise him to that standard where he will not commit these wrongs though he may be well able to do so, and this is where the citizenship comes in.

Now this is not idle dream, and I am no missionary, I am not seeking or expecting perfection. All I hope for is to see the African obtain the same level in these things as the British European communities of Africa and elsewhere presently enjoy, and take so much for granted, despite the fact that their own road thereto has been both hard and long.

I am well aware that we ourselves are far from perfect, I am not blind to bribery and corruption in high places and low. And I can read the law reports in the press as well as the next man. What does surprise me, is that there is not more of this sort of thing in view of how very well equipped we are to be even more anti-social than we are! For within the world that I have enjoyed as my British birthright, each and everyone of us can live freely and happily in the knowledge that he can count on the good behaviour of his neighbour.

We can guess how he thinks. We believe he practices the same loyalties as ourselves, and by and large we are safe in thinking that he concedes to us as much right to live as he does to himself.

That, to my mind, is both the object and the problem of educating the African, to raise him to the point at which he willingly undertakes not to use his own efficiency for his own benefit at the expense of others.

The goal is possible, above all the goal is worthy. In my submission, however, the road will be both long and hard: just as hard as our own history proves it has for us, but with God's help and our own not necessarily as long.

Bulawayo

H. H. C. HOLDERNESS

1. In case the Commissioners wish to know something about my background as a witness I annex to this Memorandum a biographical note.

2. As an Executive Member of the Central Africa Party I support the evidence which the party is submitting to the Commission, but I will be away from Rhodesia when verbal evidence is given on its behalf and would like to emphasize the following points.

3. Having studied the political situation in Southern Rhodesia very closely for a number of years and being deeply concerned with it as one who was born and has his permanent home here, I have been most reluctantly forced to this conclusion: that the opportunity which the country seemed to have, of providing a home for modern African opinion within the framework of its existing party system, was destroyed in 1958, and with it the opportunity of disproving the fear of Southern Rhodesia in the minds of people in the northern territories; and that as a result, unless some unforeseeable and dramatic change occurs, the situation in Southern Rhodesia during the next ten years or so is going to be such that her continued political association with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland can only lead to trouble.

4. Federation as it was instituted in 1953 has failed, in the political field. It has produced not greater but less political stability. The gap between Government and people has never been greater. And this in turn is having, and will have, repercussions in the economic field.

5. This failure has been due mainly to the failure of white Southern Rhodesians to understand the real nature of modern African opinion.

6. When Federation was being planned the white Southern Rhodesian had had twenty years of political control in their country, and they were proud of the result. There had been astonishing economic development and no political trouble of any consequence. White Southern Rhodesians felt they understood "the native." What he needed was a rapidly increasing material standard of living and to be handled with a fair but firm hand politically. All the trouble in the northern territories with "demagogues," African nationalism and so on was due, they felt, to the sentimental policy of the Colonial Office, promoting political aspirations with insufficient economic development to back them. If only the Southern Rhodesian approach could be made to prevail in the north these troubles would be overcome. Naturally money must be spent on "the natives," for education, agricultural development and so on, but the proper technique (the "Huggins technique") was to get on with the job and say as little as possible about it; to avoid at all costs the label of "liberal" or "negrophilist."

7. Thus when Federation was mooted the Southern Rhodesian politicians tended to regard such matter as having a federal as distinct from a unitary form of constitution with its attendant expense of four governors, the mention of "partnership" in the preamble to the constitution, the

African Affairs Board and so on as regrettable anomalies which had to be conceded in order to placate the British Government but which would be ironed out as the Southern Rhodesian view came to prevail in the Federal Government.

8. To anyone who tried to make first hand contact with African opinion after the second world war it was apparent that there was already a widespread feeling of revolt in Southern Rhodesia itself against a system which placed Africans in the position of second class citizens and the Europeans in the position of a sort of *herrenvolk*, and that this derived not only from the existence of discriminatory laws but from the general attitude of the European politicians and electorate which, to use a colloquial phrase, seemed to be one of "perpetual belly-aching" about Africans, about their alleged incompetence and unreliability, their so-called "tendency to revert to barbarism," their inability to govern themselves and so on. It was clear that with the growth of political consciousness amongst subject peoples throughout the world, the social and psychological changes being wrought by industrial revolution here and the political developments brewing in the rest of Africa, this feeling would rapidly grow into a determination to be rid of *herrenvolkism* of all kinds, "to have a go," to prove whether these stereotyped ideas about Africans were true. And it was apparent that there was enough basis in fact for this feeling of revolt to justify the fears of Southern Rhodesia in the minds of Africans in the north. It was clear that only if steps could be taken immediately to break down the stereotyped idea of Europeans about "the native" and of Africans about the European, by bringing them into direct contact with one another in matters of common concern, could the aspirations of Africans in this country be accommodated, the fear of Africans in the northern territories be disproved and the Federation be made to work.

9. There seemed a hope, if only a hope, that a sufficient start could be made in the first five years. There were three vital fields in which it must be made—the franchise, industrial relations and relations between the Government and the "new" African leaders. A Select Committee of the first Southern Rhodesian Parliament after Federation came to the conclusion (which must have been a surprise to the majority of its members) that the abandonment of the colour bar in our industrial conciliation system was desirable, not only in the interests of Africans and of industry as a whole, but also in the interests of the European artisan himself. On the franchise the Tredgold Commission pointed out in effect that it was in the interests of the country and the Europeans that members of Parliament should be sufficiently answerable to African voters. It seemed that the Southern Rhodesian Parliament might produce a franchise which, despite being terribly narrow in relation to the cry for universal suffrage which was inevitably becoming an article of faith with modern Africans, would produce enough African voters to give Members of Parliament a new awareness of what African opinion really was, and also some return in terms of votes for taking the necessary action to revise archaic and oppressive laws. And at the same time an Industrial Conciliation machinery might be established which would open the door to the full use of African skills without undermining the legitimate interests of European employees in industry. These two measures, combined with a sensible approach by the Government to the still tentative and badly organised Congress movement in Southern Rhodesia, might lay sufficient foundations for a successful continuance of Southern Rhodesia's development and of the Federal system.

10. However, the majority of members of the Southern Rhodesian Parliament were ignorant of modern African opinion, divorced from it by the lack of African voters on the voters roll and by the long-standing custom of dealing with Africans through the Native Affairs Department as an intermediary. And the Federal Government was dominated from the start by Southern Rhodesian politicians of the old school. Quite early in the life of the first Federal Parliament the first Federal Prime Minister, nettled by the debate on the Yamba motion for equality of treatment in the Federal Public Services, made some remarks to the effect that "partnership" had never been the policy of Southern Rhodesia—remarks which implied that Southern Rhodesia had only accepted that word in the preamble to the Constitution in order to draw Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland into her web. Later, when the second Federal Prime Minister took over, he made speeches in which, when he talked about "we" and "us" he meant the Europeans, not the people of the Federation of whom he was supposed to be Prime Minister, and started his campaign for "Dominion Status in 1960", by which he made it clear that he meant putting an end to Colonial Office influence in Central Africa and transferring their powers to some authority in Central Africa under the control of the Federal Government. Then came the Federal franchise, which

could be represented as being "more or less the same as the Tredgold proposals" but to anyone who took the trouble to analyse its effect could be seen as confining the votes of African voters to members of the Federal Parliament who had no influence whatever in the House and making the members who did have influence answerable in effect to Europeans only. In 1957, with elections looming ahead, the members of Mr. Todd's cabinet began to be assailed with doubts about the impact of the Southern Rhodesian approach. They were forced to go further in implementing the Tredgold proposals than seemed to them prudent in relation to the European voters. Mr. Todd began to get much too much publicity for their liking on matters concerning Africans. They felt they might recoup the party's reputation with the European electorate by being really tough with the African National Congress. But Mr. Todd was not prepared to go the whole way with them and then he spoiled the whole thing in their eyes by actually allowing the President of the Southern Rhodesian Congress to visit him. . . .

11. Early in 1958 Mr. Todd was disposed of by his Ministers, the right wing of his party joined with the Federal Party to form the United Federal Party, and most of the European electorate (other than the section who traditionally support openly apartheid policies) went with them and the remnants of Mr. Todd's United Rhodesia Party were demolished at the polls in June, 1958. The main plank of the United Federal Party at this, territorial, election was the cry for Dominion Status and getting rid of the Colonial Office, and any attempt to point out that this cry would have the effects which the Devlin Report has since shown it did have, was treated by the European Electorate with derision. The new Southern Rhodesian Government under Sir Edgar Whitehead, though leaving the Todd Government's Electoral Act on the Statute Book and passing a version of the previous Select Committee's Industrial Conciliation Bill, took an early opportunity of showing where it stood in relation to what I have called "modern" Africans by its handling of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress. This is described authoritatively and accurately in the section of the Central Africa Party's evidence to the Commission headed "The Southern Rhodesian Emergency" (pages 27-64).

12. African opinion has been offended with such regularity since Federation, by the actions and statements of the politicians in power, that their policy has often seemed to be one of deliberate provocation. In reality it has I believe resulted from the fact that European politicians have little or no first-hand contact with Africans and little or no accountability to them in terms of votes. The attitude of the official opposition has been even more reactionary if less deceptive than that of the governing party. (My small daughter who is learning to read recently interpreted the Federal motto as "let us deceive to be great"!) The attitude of the Municipalities, which have in respect of Urban Africans far greater power over peoples' lives and liberty than is ever accorded to local authorities in other countries—has been and continues to be more reactionary still, and this applies particularly to the Salisbury City Council. The local European press has acted throughout, in its editorials and in the selection of its news items and articles, as a sort of mouthpiece for the official view and contributed to the complacency of politicians and European electorate alike. No attempt has been made by any European politicians except members of the Central Africa Party to enlighten the European public on the real issues confronting them, and the correspondence columns of the newspaper continue to be crammed every day with what I have described earlier as "bellyaching about Africans".

13. I believe we have now reached the point in Southern Rhodesia where, unless there is an immediate and dramatic change of trend, the only form of political organisation which is likely to be able to accommodate modern African opinion will be one of the Congress type, sponsored by Africans, and those who opposed a sufficient extension of the franchise will turn out to have brought forward the advent of universal suffrage by fifteen or twenty years. The next ten years or so will be ones in which there will be no room left for liberal thinking. African sponsored political parties will arise to fill the vacuum created by the suppression of the Southern Rhodesian A.N.C. and they in turn will be treated by the Government as subversive. They will become dangerous bodies to belong to and will consequently fall into the hands of the most extreme leaders. Further police state measures against them will seem justified. And so the process will go on, until either there is violence in the form of leaderless riots or Africans have been taught the hard way to meet strength with strength. The common voters roll will probably be abandoned as it was in the Cape Province in 1936—the fatal turning point in the Union of South Africa's road to deadlock.

14. I can see only one real hope of avoiding this situation and that is for the franchise to be extended widely enough and quickly enough to break the prevailing ignorance amongst European politicians and the European electorate and to put members of Parliament in a position in which they can hope for some votes in return for enlightened action. What is difficult to see is how the Commission can hope to get a sufficient assurance of such a development from any Southern Rhodesian Government dependant on the present electorate. As the Central Africa Party's evidence points out, whatever hope there was of the Todd Government's franchise producing a sufficient number of African voters was largely negated by the Regulations framed subsequently by his Minister of Justice which Mr. Todd was not then in a position to oppose, and the present position is that the African vote is still negligible and the bulk of the (European) electorate still convinced that their interests are opposed to the interests of modern Africans.

15. I suggest that the greatest hope for some form of continuing political association between Southern Rhodesia on the one hand and the northern territories on the other lies in limiting the sovereignty of Parliament by constitutional safeguards on the lines suggested in the section of the Central Africa Party's evidence headed "Constitutional Safeguards" (pages 14-21). I believe this approach deserves the most thorough and unhurried investigation and should not be lightly abandoned because of objections, however cogent on the face of them, that constitutional safeguards can only have a limited effect. Under a federal constitution, in which there is a basic division of power between the federation and the states, there is a far greater chance than under a unitary constitution of making entrenchment effective. A federal constitution can be treated to some extent as like a partnership agreement, and it could even possibly be used to set out conditions which would obtain in the event of dissolution, in the absence of other agreement, and which in a partnership agreement, though seldom resorted to, have the effect of making each partner's approach to dissolution a cautious and positive one. But reverting to limitations on the sovereignty of Parliament, assuming these can be made effective, they are a perfectly logical step in a situation like ours where there is not at present the same basic unity of objective as in a country like England, and it could put politicians in the position of being able to say—

To Europeans (who now hold all the political power in Southern Rhodesia) :

"It is in your interest to share political power. Only that way can we get political stability based on government by consent, which is the essential basis of the 'Western' approach and a pre-requisite of long-term investment from abroad. Under this Constitution you can let go your grip on the franchise end, and if it turns out that your worst fears are justified, you will be protected in certain fundamental ways from being put in the position which the Dutch found themselves in at the hands of Sukarno in Indonesia."

And to Africans :

"If you hold all the political power now and the Europeans none you would still be fundamentally dependant on capital and knowhow from outside, and some of this would inevitably be European. It is going to be much cheaper for you to get it from Europeans who feel secure and permanent in the country than to have only contract men. This Constitution can make them secure without the necessity for them to cling to superior voting power."

16. Given the limitation of the sovereignty of Parliament there are many advantages to a wide franchise which the proponents of so-called "civilised standards" fail to recognise, and I would mention two :—

(a) Bribery was rampant in English politics until Parliament adopted Disraeli's wide franchise in 1867. Then it became too expensive. Despite our narrow franchise in Southern Rhodesia we have had no monetary bribery but we have had another form of it—the personal smear campaigns which depend on having a narrow enough electorate for the whispered slander to be passed from mouth to mouth. It was used to an unprecedented extent against Mr. Todd in the 1958 election, and it is capable of being used for other purposes than to destroy so-called "liberals". It would no longer be available under a wider franchise.

(b) The political influence of "backward people" is usually more conservative than that of "intellectuals", and once the franchise is wide enough not to be exclusively European it is probably safer from the Europeans' point of view not to confine it to so-called "civilised persons" comprising a high proportion of intellectuals.

17. May I add a further thought on the subject of the franchise. Any form of political representation which gives to a particular class of members of Parliament a different sort of responsibility from that of another class seems to me to be psychologically fatal in that it destroys, if perhaps only unconsciously, the principle of the responsibility of each member of Parliament for the country as a whole. It is as if in 1867 Disraeli had decided to have so many seats reserved for Representatives of Employers and so many for Representatives of Labour.

18. Finally, may I suggest that in trying to find out what Africans really have to say in this country it is necessary to bear in mind that many have acquired the habit of talking with two voices, due to the fact that so much of what the future of themselves and their families depends upon—trading rights, a place to live in, one's reputation with the Government and the police, opportunities for advancement and so on—are traditionally in the arbitrary discretion of Government and Municipal Officials.

19. I shall be away from Rhodesia in Europe until the 8th June but should it be thought of any value and practicable for me to do I shall be glad to appear personally before the Commission.

Salisbury

19th April, 1960

Annexure

Biographical Note :

Harold Hardwicke Clarke Holderness

I was born in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia in 1915, one of five children of the late Mr. J. E. Holderness (who had come from England to Southern Rhodesia as a boy of 18 in 1902, had qualified as a Solicitor and become a partner in the firm of Scanlen and Holderness which had been founded by the late Sir Thomas Scanlen), and Mrs. Holderness (who was the daughter of Clarke Thwaites a magistrate in the Cape Colony).

I was educated at Prince Edward School, Salisbury, Rhodes University College, Grahamstown (with the aid of Beit and Charelick Salomon Scholarships) and as Rhodes Scholar at Magdalen College, Oxford. I obtained B.A. and L.I.B. degrees at Rhodes University College and read politics, philosophy and economics at Oxford but took no degree there due to the occurrence of the war.

I served in the Royal Air Force from 1939 to 1945 attaining the rank of Wing Commander, and was awarded the A.F.C. for services in Training Command and the D.S.O. and D.F.C. for services in Coastal Command.

Political Activities

On returning to Southern Rhodesia in 1945 I felt there was an urgent need for Southern Rhodesians to have a deeper political understanding, and helped to found the Rhodesia National Affairs Association and organise its weekly lunch hour lectures which started in August, 1946, and have been taking place ever since. I helped to found the National Affairs Discussion Group which was formed to make information on national affairs more readily available than the National Affairs Association itself could (though a non-racial body) to the African population, and made early contact in this way with a number of significant members of the non-European communities. When Federation was mooted I helped to organise a non-racial body whose object was to reach agreement on and to define the steps which must be taken if "partnership" were really to be implemented, and I acted as draftsman of a detailed memorandum on the subject. This body became the Interracial Association of Southern Rhodesia, for which I continued to work during subsequent years.

In 1954 I was elected to the Southern Rhodesian Parliament as United Rhodesia Party candidate for the Salisbury North Constituency, and while a member attempted to put Parliament in touch with African opinion as I knew it. I served as the only "legal" member of the Select Committee appointed to study the problem of industrial relations and took a major part in drafting its Report (entitled "Report of Select Committee on Native Industrial Workers Unions Bill"), and also in drafting the Bill presented to Parliament by a subsequent Select Committee of which I was also a member. I was also active in an attempt to persuade African leaders to try operating within the party system which had some very promising initial results at Party Congresses of the United Rhodesia Party. I supported Mr. Todd, and stood as a U.R.P. candidate, in the Territorial Election of 1958 and was defeated by Sir Edgar Whitehead in Salisbury North.

Professional Activities

I qualified as a Solicitor after the war and became a partner of the firm of Scanlen & Holderness. I have served as a Board Member of Central African Airways since 1953 and am a director of various companies.

I am married and have two children.

HORSESHOE INTENSIVE CONSERVATION AREA COMMITTEE

The Horseshoe Intensive Conservation Area is situated on an average 100 miles North of Salisbury, bounded on the East by the Darwin I.C.A., to the South and West by the Umvukwes I.C.A. and the Dade River and the Sipolilo Reserve and to the North by the Zambesi Escarpment.

As an Intensive Conservation Area Committee representing at the moment some 60 farms, largely in an area which has been opened up from virgin bush during the last thirteen years, we feel that we should submit our ideas to your commission.

The majority of us are ex-servicemen, some from the Rhodesia Services and some from the services overseas, but none of us has been in Southern Rhodesia for less than eight years and from a census you would find that the majority of us were in Southern Rhodesia before 1939.

We consider ourselves to be fairly level headed in our views, being neither extremist to the right nor to the left, and because we have worked with the rural African for many years our views may be of interest although it should be pointed out that none of us really understands the African, nor will that ever be possible, as their way of thinking and ours do not coincide.

The rural African is still very primitive, the female even more so than the male. He is surrounded by superstition and will call in the witchdoctor for both good and evil at the smallest provocation. He is, only the last few years, beginning to use the clinics and hospitals provided for him free. His customs and religion are mainly concerned with the propagation of large families and he only works at present so that he can pay for his wife or wives, have his beer drink at the weekend, pay his annual tax, and have a little over for a few clothes and his instinctive love of gambling.

His hygiene is very limited, he still prefers to live in the way he has done for centuries, i.e. a pole and mud hut, thatched. The growing generation with a small amount of education consider that pick and shovel work is beneath them and prefer to try and obtain jobs which will require very little effort on their part, such as clerks, tractor drivers, etc. (As a tractor driver they will only drive, to help load or unload a trailer is below their dignity.) They all prefer the task system and extra money is at the moment of very little incentive, they must be fed each week, he has not yet been taught to look after himself in this way. (We have one farmer who does pay his labour in lieu of rations successfully, he is, however, situated on the edge of the Sipolilo Reserve, where his labour can, if necessary, buy their meat and maize. This is an isolated case and most farmers would have to carry maize and meat for resale and under the present set up it is safer to provide rations so that the labour does receive at least his basic food for the week.)

From this preamble and from our point of view the following points must be taken into consideration when the new Federal Constitution is thrashed out.

1. Education is the number one priority, not only for the male but for the female which to our mind is far more important as it is the female who brings up the children and it is on the children the country will have to rely for a peaceful co-existence in the years to come.

2. At present the voters of the country must be of fairly high educational standards and any idea of universal suffrage must be shelved for many years to come. The status quo of the present Southern Rhodesian qualifications for voters must remain to give the country time to advance both economically as well as politically.

3. It must be realised that the European in Southern Rhodesia is here to stay. It is his home—he has put in vast sums of money and work to create a country out of nothing during the last 70 years and given time to consolidate, he, with the African, can make, not only Southern Rhodesia into one of the foremost countries in Africa, but the Federation into one of the strongest. The majority feel that the idea of partnership can be made to work as long as the Government stays in civilised hands, but it must be civilised and at present there are only a very few Africans who have attained the level of this much overworked word. 70 years is a very short

space of time to turn a primitive into something which the west recognises as a civilised person.

The European in the main will be the person who will provide the necessary employment for the African so that his economy will grow and thus his political advancement will automatically advance at the same time, and it is our opinion that economic advancement is far more vital than political advancement at the present time.

4. Arising from the above it is essential that control from the Colonial Office is removed as soon as is possible—in the main the British public are woefully ignorant of African and African Affairs and the man on the spot is much more fully qualified to face up to the problems which Africa presents.

5. The so called pinpricks of colour bar must be removed, but integration by law must not be enforced. This will come in time in different ways, but from the social point of view this will be very rare because of the inherent views of both African and European. If the African realised that the European at the moment carries for more passes than he is called upon to do in the shape of birth certificates, marriage certificates and passports he would perhaps realise that his pass is a very small affair in comparison. In doing away with this colour bar security must be very far advanced as at the present stage of African development he is subject to be swayed by any agitator who may think he has a grievance and who in fact is only out to attain power for himself and a few of the more advanced Africans.

The rural African, even more so than his urban brothers, does not think for himself, he has always been led and it is up to the European to lead him in the right direction. He knows little or nothing about Federation and only time and more education will make him see its benefits. This time must be given us so that steady advancement can be maintained.

If any of the Commission would care to visit our area in the short time available we would be quite prepared to transport that member or members from Salisbury and back.

DR. W. G. HUTTON

A three point formula for making this country the happiest and most Progressive in the world :

1. Limitation of the birth rate—to limit the problem of ignorance and want.
2. Increase in Taxation—to help provide funds, discourage excessive greed and justify 3.
3. An appeal to Britain and America for temporary technical and financial assistance.

The Federation needs an interval of time in which to catch up on its own back log of ignorance and want. Granted the above points it would be possible to create favourable conditions in the Federation for a major drive to improve health, Housing and Educational Standards in the lower income groups; to raise all capable of being raised to a uniformly high standard of living below which none should ever again be allowed to fall; to provide equal opportunities for advancement for children of all races and classes on British educational lines and to engender in every citizen a feeling of security, national pride and destiny. In short it would be possible to lay the foundation for a stable, and happy country.

Comments

1. Limitation of the birth rate would present the initial difficulty.

For many years past the more responsible citizens of the world have limited the birth rate in their own families to what they considered to be reasonable bearing in mind the interests of the family as a whole. Reasoned control of this kind represents a definite evolutionary advance and is essential to progress. But progress like peace is indivisible in the modern world. One section or country cannot advance far without the mass. If therefore limitation of the birth rate is right for the more progressive and responsible families then it is also right for the less progressive ones and they must be helped along. Again if it is right on the family level it is equally right on the National and international levels.

In the first instance limitation of the birth rate would inevitably mean sterilisation of all women after a certain number of children. A rather shocking thought perhaps but one which improves on consideration and one which will in any case have to be faced sooner or later on a world wide scale. Such a contribution to peace and progress could be regarded as the female counterpart of National Service. It would amount to only a very small personal sacrifice (where necessary) in order to promote a very great National good. It would improve the lot and status of many women, particularly African and Asian women. Better exercise restraint and

reason than exercise all the lower (outdated) animal passions associated with a struggle for existence.

2. The next difficulty would be to convince Africans that this was a plan to advance African civilisation and civilisation as a whole—not a plan to cramp African development and hold back Africans in subjection for ever. Africans must be convinced that it offers the quickest and surest way of raising the whole African population from its present state of poverty and lack of opportunity to one of full and complete maturity, which is, of course, what all decent Africans (as opposed to personally ambitious Africans) want. As Africans gradually obtained a growing number of capable men and women in all departments of National life so they would naturally take over the government of the country with the will consent of all other races.

It would be necessary to convince Africans that Europeans would work to make a success of this plan and to convince Europeans that it would be to their own best interests to do so.

3. In comparison to practical difficulties would probably not be very great. As the benefits of Health, Housing and Education were gradually extended so the obligations incumbent on these benefits could be extended also and as the need for outside technical help decreased so immigration could be brought to a halt.

Political Aspects

America would no doubt be glad to grant almost unlimited aid for a limited period in order to build up to stable self-supporting, reliable multi-racial state—a model state—in Central Africa.

The imagination of Americans, both black and white, might well be fired with an enthusiasm for this peaceful project to an extent as yet unknown save in time of war—so might the imagination of all critics of apartheid.

Britain on the one man vote principle should surrender her leading role in world politics to Communist China or India and she should declare her intention in any future state of world government to encourage Asians to take over the government of Britain—as she is now encouraging Africans, with indecent haste, to take over from her kinsfolk in the Federation. But we must save Britain from the logical results of her own follies and she must help us to do so.

Central Africa Party

Even to debase the franchise in any degree (i.e. to give more responsibility to less responsible people) is an inadequate policy unless it be tempered by a serious effort to raise the quality of each individual vote and to ensure that each vote is cast in an atmosphere free from hate, fear and intimidation.

Dominion Party and United Federal Party

The majority of Europeans do not care very much what happens to the other fellow (especially if he be African) so long as they get the lion's share of what good things are going. The laws of the country have largely been made by such people to favour such people but this was the attitude of mind which bred the French and Communist revolutions and those who subscribe to it in large measure, though they may vote D.P., are in effect actively working for Commission. By their actions they are unconsciously conditioning Africans to accept Communist doctrines and propaganda and anarchy as the only avenue offering any hope of salvation to their problems.

It would do Europeans no harm to study carefully the factors responsible for the development of both these unhappy tragedies of history (the French and Communist Revolutions) just as it would do African extremists no harm to consider the long aftermath of misery which followed in the wakes of both. Europeans and Africans would then be better prepared to tackle the present day problems of the Federation.

Conclusion

The problems of the Federation are the problems of the world in miniature.

The problem of creating one World without Apartheid in which all citizens can live as equals respecting one another.

The problem of overcoming poverty and ignorance and of ensuring that every individual has the opportunity of developing to the full in an atmosphere of peace and freedom within the law.

The problem of forestalling the growth of frustrated masses of people (a ready prey to ruthless leaders) with resultant rising tensions, slaughter and possibly annihilation. Mr. Khrushchev is cunningly suggesting that disarmament is the most important problem now facing the world but honest people

know that if the above ideals could be attained or partially attained, then the problems of disarmament, Germany and even Militant Communism would largely melt away like snow before the summer sun.

The Federation can solve these problems and in so doing can pioneer the way to an era of great evolutionary advancement.

The Federation *can* and it *should* lead the world.

Bulawayo

16th April, 1960

INSTITUTE OF DIRECTORS, RHODESIA AND NYASALAND BRANCH

The Economic Advantages of Federation

Preamble

1. This, the first overseas branch of the Institute of Directors, was formed in March, 1958. Its present membership is 506, drawn from the three territories and all the main centres of the Federation. We can say with due modesty that our ranks include practically all the leading figures in local business life.

Like our parent body in England, we are not concerned with any sectional trade or business, but only in protecting and advancing the interests of our individual members. We conceive the submission of this evidence as a vitally important exercise of that principle.

2. We have absolutely no concern with party politics. This is even more true here than in England. There the Institute has been forced to action from time to time in defence of its most cherished principle, that of sound private enterprise. Here, however, none of the existing political parties or factions seriously dispute that principle.

Our political interest is confined to the responsibility resting in the hands of a government which is honest, progressive, efficient and stable.

3. We are, however, profoundly concerned with the development of the economy. Our members are collectively responsible for a high proportion of the total capital and labour employed here. Moreover, our daily round is constantly providing evidence of the need for the economy to continue expansion on sound lines.

We do not at all subscribe to the belief, not uncommon in parts of Southern Africa, that higher wages replace the need for political advancement. But we are also aware of the opposite danger, of treating the vote as a substitute for a rising standard of living.

Purpose of this Memorandum

4. Our basic contention is that neither the Federation as a whole, nor its three constituent territories, can look forward to a prosperous and stable future unless the whole area is assured of steady expansion in every aspect of its economy—industrial, commercial and agricultural. The Institute considers that African advancement, changes in the franchise and progressive social changes will be valueless if the Federation's economy does not continue to expand at a rate sufficient to provide a material basis which will benefit all citizens of the Federation regardless of colour or social differences.

Economic Purposes of Federation

5. It is, of course, common knowledge that one of the main objects of the federal scheme was to strengthen the several economies.

In the Appendix we quote from the preamble to the Report on the Conference held in London in January, 1953.

The chief attractions to industry were:—

- (a) The market provided by some 6½ million people (now 8 million) with a rising standard of living.
- (b) The elimination of customs barriers between the three Territories.
- (c) The termination of the Congo Basin Treaty.
- (d) The apparent stability of Government.
- (e) The availability of labour supply.

6. The economic arguments always commanded the widest measure of support at the various conferences which preceded Federation. It was observed that each of the component Territories was dependent for its prosperity on a comparatively few primary products and that, with the exception of Southern Rhodesia, secondary industry was undeveloped. Taken individually, all were vulnerable to changes in world demand for their particular exports, but it was believed that if joined together in a Federation, their economies would complement each other and that the new combined entity would be less vulnerable to adverse changes in world markets.

As a corollary to this argument, the first Fiscal Commission (which recommended the apportionment of revenue and expenditure between the Territorial and Federal Governments) made an assessment of the effects on the public finances of the Governments of a fall in the price of copper to £180 a ton. They found that even on this assumption, which seemed unreal at the time, all the Governments would (if joined together in Federation) be financially stable.

In the light of experience it can be claimed that the economic argument has been proved. In 1958 and the first half of 1959, the Federation, then only five years old, was exposed to the shock of a recession in world trade, which substantially reduced the prices and in some cases the volume as well, of all the main products, with the exception of leaf tobacco. Copper in particular fell from a peak of about £360 to £164 a long ton, a price even lower than that assumed by the Fiscal Commission.

In order to protect the Federation's balance of payments from the effects of reduced export earnings, comparatively severe restrictions on bank credit and hire purchase terms were imposed. The capital expenditure of the Governments and of local authorities were reduced.

All this amounted to a drastic trial for the young Federation, but it withstood the strain and has emerged with its economy and finances unimpaired. The favourable balance of trade has been restored, Government budgets have been balanced and trade and industry are again on the upgrade.

Moreover, during this period the Governments have been able to continue with their programmes of capital development, although at a somewhat slower rate. These programmes have been financed partly by internal and external borrowing and partly by contributions from public revenue, without any appreciable increase in taxation. As if to signalise the end of the recession, the year 1959 closed with the virtual completion of two major economic projects undertaken by the Federal Government—the first stage of the Kariba Hydro-electric Scheme and the scheme for the expansion and modernisation of Rhodesia Railways. It is safe to assert that without the enhanced credit which was acquired as a result of Federation, it would have been impossible to have raised the large amounts of capital required for these two projects, in addition to financing the numerous other essential works which have been successfully completed.

7. How well the Federal economy in fact has rallied since the setback of 1958 is shown by the recently published statistical review of the year 1959.

Particularly to be noted are:—

- (a) The re-creation of a very substantial favourable balance of trade;
- (b) that mineral output was the second highest ever—not only due to the recovery in the copper price;
- (c) the large increase in electricity consumption;
- (d) the rise of over one quarter in bank clearances, in a year of little inflation.

In fact, the picture was favourable in all important respects but two. One, that of building, was not alarming in view of the large total of preceding years. But the other, the big drop in net immigration, is a matter of great concern. It is our view that this drop is much less due to the economic aftermath of 1958, than to a feeling of uncertainty. The Institute considers that a high net rate of immigration into Central Africa is essential to continued and rapid expansion. The Federation is chronically short of skills of every kind. Its economic potential can never be rapidly developed unless it is supported by a high net volume of immigration of individuals whose skills and techniques the country needs and who can themselves fit into the future pattern of life in the Territory, a pattern in which racial co-operation is an essential and in which the passing on of skills to increasing numbers of the African population is also vital.

8. To conclude this section of our evidence, we would again emphasise that the economy must be broadly based. We find a tendency, in the case of certain emergent states, to confuse an initial flurry of state-aided expenditure and/or the existence of a few giant business concerns, with a healthy all-round growth.

Of course, both those mentioned are valuable assets. But they do not, in our view, replace the need for a large number of successful small businesses.

Thus, for an economy to advance evenly on a broad front, its prospects must not only satisfy big business and the politicians, but also smaller men of all races.

Vital Problems in the Federal Economy

9. Before examining the economic successes of the Federation during its first six years, we must consider some of the main problems as they previously existed.

There was a large and growing African population, with a generally low standard of living. All of them spring from a tribal and pastoral way of life, with no concept of any alternative.

By reason of the long centuries during which Africa was neglected, they were (and to a very large extent still are) incapable of any original contribution to their advancement. This is not a permanent state, but it is one which must last for some years yet. Thus, it must fall on a small number of Europeans to create conditions for the vitally necessary advance in the living standards of the Africans.

10. This main problem is aggravated in various ways:—

- (a) The land in the reserves is rapidly being used up. Although considerable advances in productivity have been achieved, particularly in Southern Rhodesia, the African population has already outstripped them (in this connection we would draw your attention to the pamphlet published in November, 1958, by the Rhodesian Institute of African Affairs, entitled "The Progress of Africans in Southern Rhodesia").

In Nyasaland, where all but a tiny fraction of the land is reserved for African use, a high proportion of able-bodied males has to go out of the country each year to find work.

- (b) In fact, throughout the Federation, the population is doubling in some 23 years. It is not difficult to contemplate what effects this alone will have by 1980.
- (c) Both Rhodesias, and Southern especially, have made rapid progress in native education. There came out of the schools in 1959, several thousands up to Standard VI, with a further significant proportion considered up to apprenticeship level. It is a matter of extreme importance that suitable jobs are available for them. This aspect is serious enough as it stands. What makes it more so is that these numbers are double those of five years previous; and are themselves likely to increase by 2½ times by 1964.
- (d) There is also the matter of living accommodation for Africans in the towns. This becomes more acute as more and more move in from the reserves.

This is a mammoth problem, and its solution is vital for at least two reasons:

- (i) The unnatural effects of a man living without his family;
- (ii) as will be seen below, one of the most important factors for binding a man to his job is an established family home.

11. All these problems face industry with major responsibilities. To continue to produce increasing numbers of Africans equipped academically and technically to a point at which they are equipped to undertake responsible jobs without gearing the country's economy to produce such jobs invites frustration and eventual economic and political unrest. To expand the Federation's economy and to attract large numbers of rural Africans into towns without producing adequate housing, similarly invites bitterness and instability. To fail to provide adequate housing compels Africans flooding into the towns to leave their wives and children behind and this in turn produces a situation in which the adult male worker adjusts himself to a new kind of civilisation while his wife and children remain in the old rural system of living and thinking. We consider it of the utmost importance that the women should catch up with, and even surpass, their menfolk, instead of, as in too many cases at present, falling further behind them.

It is this Institute's contention that none of these problems can be solved unless industrial and commercial expansion continues and unless the rate of such expansion is maintained. Indeed, industry itself will add to the problem for, as the economy becomes increasingly competitive, the trend will be towards more machines and fewer men, so that only a rapid expansion in the overall picture in secondary industry can absorb newcomers and provide outlets for those already trained and ready to move on to the exercise of greater skills.

12. It is often difficult, in studying the economy of the Federation, to appreciate that this is a country in which the vast majority of the population are still virtually without material possessions. The challenge to industry and to investment inherent in this fact is so important that to fail to meet it must ultimately be catastrophic. In 1959, for example, total African wages paid in the four principal towns

of Southern Rhodesia were £16½ million. Of each 20/-, nearly 10/- was spent on food, 3/6 on clothing 2/- on drink and tobacco, 1/6 on household stores and the balance of 3/- or so on an extremely short list of extras and minor luxuries. Only 8d. in every pound was pumped back into the reserves. Over and above cash wages paid in the four towns, some £5½ million was provided in 1959 in the form of accommodation and rations in kind.

Every additional 5/- a week paid in African wages in these four towns would make available additional purchasing power to the tune of £2½ million per annum. It will thus be seen that even modest increases in wage levels and purchasing power can produce a boost for the industrial and commercial life of the Federation which offers at once a golden opportunity for success, and a measure of tragic failure if the economy fails to satisfy the demands arising from increased purchasing power.

It is not the Institute's purpose to contend that economic improvement is the only answer to the problems of Central Africa. Political, social and racial factors are all of major importance. The direct responsibility of industry, however, for the economic improvement of the great majority of the Federation's inhabitants is plain. Only by way of an expanding economy with a steady, supporting flow of new investment and immigration can a foundation be laid upon which the solution of all other problems can be attempted.

13. This far we have tried to illustrate:—

- (a) The economic importance of Federation.
- (b) The ever-growing need to improve African living standards on social grounds.
- (c) The corresponding need to increase his purchasing power; and
- (d) that increased industrial activity can alone provide the solution to these problems.

In the succeeding sections we quote evidence in support of progress made to date; and emphasise the importance of maintaining Federation, if such progress is to continue.

Our Own Researches

14. We are acutely conscious that your Commission must already have been deluged with statistical information, and are reluctant to add to it. It seemed, however, that we might have access, through our members, to detailed information which would not otherwise be available to you. We therefore circulated a selected list with seven questions, to which summarised answers are set out in paras. 15 to 21 inclusive.

Those on our list are responsible for 18 businesses, ranging in size from several thousand employees to barely one hundred. They cover most of the range of industrial or allied activity and can speak for most of the main centres in all three territories. Those addressed have taken considerable trouble over their replies, and we believe the information supplied to be thoroughly representative.

15. Question 1. State the number of Africans employed in 1952 and 1959 respectively.

The 18 companies showed an average rise of almost 30% since Federation (from 36,172 in 1952 to 46,239 in 1959).

16. Question 2. State the average wages paid to Africans in 1959, as a percentage of 1952.

Increases have in all cases been substantial, and in several dramatic. The average shows the individual wages in 1959 as 230% of 1952. Allowing for cost of living adjustment, the purchasing power of the 1959 wages was approximately 193% of 1952.

17. Question 3. What progress being made by how many Africans towards responsible positions?

All the evidence indicates that there is a growing number of responsible positions open to Africans. Some of these carry salaries and require skills which far exceed anything visualised seven or eight years ago.

Most replies make a sharp division between technical and other responsibilities. It is generally agreed that Africans have shown remarkable aptitude in handling complicated equipment—heavy lorries, bulldozers and other earth-moving equipment and elaborate machine-tools. (560 public service vehicles, over one-sixth of the Southern Rhodesian total, are licensed in the name of Africans).

18. Question 4. To what extent is a sense of responsibility developing alongside improved technical aptitude?

Here, nearly all the replies are similar. If we quote the one below it is because:

- (a) It very closely represents the views of all the others;
- (b) the writer is a progressive and sympathetic employer. "Sense of responsibility lags far behind improvement in

technical aptitude. This manifests itself particularly in matters requiring integrity. All too frequently, as soon as an African achieves a position of trust, graft and other dishonest practices creep in."

The great need of the Federation is to develop simultaneously greater skills and abilities in Africans with integrity and a growing sense of responsibility. The two together are perhaps rare enough in West communities, but there, a failure in integrity often means the end of a career. This deterrent, and the weight of social ostracism, mean less in the emergent African and abilities which lift a man above his fellows can sometimes impose a severe strain in other directions.

19. Question 5. What prospects are seen of increasing openings suitable for Educated Africans?

The answers here must be considered in conjunction with paras. 10(c), 17 and 18 of this memorandum.

They may be summarised as follows:—

- (a) As stated in para. 17, there is a growing number of suitable openings.
- (b) In fact, demand at present exceeds supply. This is due, however, not so much to absence of suitably educated Africans, as to the weaknesses referred to in para. 18.
- (c) As the educational output grows (para. 10(c)), supply will reach, and then outstrip, demand—unless many new openings are created by industry.

20. Question 6. Comments on improved living standards of African employees since 1952:

All agree that remarkable progress has been made since 1952, in clothing, feeding (including canteen meals), health, hygiene, living accommodation (where available), etc., etc. This is confirmed by the Urban African Budget Survey carried out by the Central African Statistical Office, and published in June, 1959. As one among many examples, Rhodesia Railways include today some 200 African car-owners in their Bulawayo township alone, against one in 1952!

But there is still a long way to go. The statistics quoted in para. 12 indicate a way of life which is still very modest. There is also the ever-pressing problem of accommodation, already mentioned.

One must regard 1960, not as the top of the watershed, but as just one milestone on the road forward. If the momentum of the advance achieved since 1952 can be maintained the whole picture must continue to change very greatly for the better.

(While on the subject of living standards, it might be appropriate to consider a typical example—the individual consumption of soap! Our enquiries reveal the following:

- (a) The average per capita consumption in the Federation has risen since 1952 by over one-half.
- (b) It is now 70% above the Congo, more than double East Africa and Nigeria, six times Pakistan, and nineteen times Ethiopia.
- (c) In Nyasaland alone the rise in consumption has been much greater—2.1/3rd times that of 1952.
- (d) It would appear that, whereas in 1952 Nyasaland was well below the three (unfederated) East African territories, it is now ahead of them).

21. Question 7. To what extent is the idea of permanence in the job developing?

All members agree that considerable progress has been made here, but the question is still largely governed by problems of accommodation. Industry in the Federation accepts its obligations in the matter of the provision of housing and the burden this imposes in a community where industry is still rapidly expanding is immense. Further expansion, the maintenance of a high rate of prosperity and the attraction of investment are essential to the provision of housing. In the Institute's view also, training within industry, which is at least as important as academic and technical training in skills is essential to the gradual inculcation of the idea of permanence in the job.

22. We deduce from the above that industry here is already shouldering a number of burdens which go beyond the simple field of profit-making. We recognise, however, that it is dangerous in a developing country to assume that side benefits, housing and major social benefits, can satisfactorily be provided in any way other than by the rapid development of industry itself. There is an inevitable tendency among African employees to assume that such benefits can be miraculously provided either by governments, or employers or by sympathetic governments abroad. It is vital to the Federation that economic realities should apply and be understood, as well as that there should be a recognition of the

social duty of industry to provide whatever amenities it can for its labour force.

Effectively, real purchasing power among Africans has doubled within the Federation in seven years. Without complacency, industry here may fairly claim a major share in this achievement.

It is important to apply the right standard of comparison. This is not with European countries, where many millions of their fellow-citizens took seven or eight centuries to reach a living wage for unskilled labour. It is of a group of African territories which have only been in contact with civilisation for 70 years, and where the full weight of bringing forward a rapidly-increasing African population currently rests on a handful of Europeans.

The Three Territories of the Federation

23. So far, we have been dealing with the Federation as one unit. As stated, our questionnaire was sent to members in all three territories, and all the answers have been consolidated.

It is necessary at this stage to consider how the individual economies of the three territories have been affected by Federation. In doing so, one must remember that they have been, and are, at different stages of political development. The nearer these approach parity, the less their problems will vary.

Southern Rhodesia

24. This, the most advanced territory before 1952, also shows the most spectacular evidence of advance since. We believe this to be due less to geography than to its record of self-government for nearly 40 years.

We believe that Southern Rhodesia has gained greatly from Federation, for reasons which are clear enough not to need repetition. We feel that it has also made major contributions—in the form of its established government, its settled European population, and of Africans who have developed faster from wider contact with European ideas.

Northern Rhodesia

25. This territory is *sui juris*, not only within the Federation, but throughout Southern Africa. Like others, it covers a huge area; but unlike them, its economy is primed by one vast industry. It is difficult to over-estimate the benefits which the territory has derived therefrom.

Nevertheless, total economic dependence on one industry—however well conducted and liberal in outlook—is undesirable. The establishment of other industries in Northern Rhodesia since Federation has been disappointing. There have been various explanations, but we believe the true ones to be the system of land tenure, and lack of confidence of the overseas investor in a Colonial Office Government. It would be far from our purpose to decry the latter, but it is a fact that it carries a label of impermanence, which is not encouraging to long-term investment.

Even so, such major projects as Kariba and railway expansion in the territory would probably have been impossible without Federation. Accelerated progress must, in our view, rest on a rapid approach to responsible self-government within the Federation.

Nyasaland

26. This case is, of course, very different from that of Northern Rhodesia. The economy is on a very much smaller scale. For instance, of the total of £162 million of building plans approved in the Federation from 1954/59, Nyasaland's share was £6½ million or 4% (this from the territory with the largest population).

In proportion, Nyasaland has probably gained most economically from Federation. The previous state of the economy was, however, so threadbare as to make the subsequent very real improvements less noticeable.

Here again, an early advance towards responsible self-government is considered essential. The only condition is that this should be within the Federation. Although both Rhodesian territories were very luke-warm about the inclusion of Nyasaland within the Federation, we feel that the best must be made of the present situation.

We are convinced that its economy, on its own, is non-viable. It is not only a matter of the more obvious consequences: the removal of subsidies by the Federal Government; the shaking of confidence of European agriculture (responsible for more than half the country's exports from 1/40th of the land); possible obstacles in the way of local labour continuing to seek work in the Rhodesias and South Africa. We can vividly remember, in the years before

Federation, the complaints of the local Africans at the shortage of health and educational facilities. Of course, these difficulties continue, but to a lesser degree. They would re-occur with interest within a few months of Nyasaland leaving the Federation.

Summary of Conclusions

27. We shall have failed in our purpose if, in emphasising the remarkable economic achievements of the Federation, we give any impression of complacency. On the contrary, we have tried to show our preoccupation with such rapid growth of population, education, accommodation problems, etc., To a considerable extent we are the prisoners here of progressive policies introduced in previous years. But whatever the reason, the resultant problems must be faced. 1960 must be judged in the light of 1980, with 15 million people in the Federation, practically the whole of which increase must be found suitable employment in industry.

28. We fully appreciate the necessity in a multi-racial state of harmonious race relations. If we have said little on this subject, it is because we regard it as outside the terms of this memorandum; but we feel that industry's contribution to it has been, and is, most beneficial. Everything must be done in future to publicise the great achievements of the Federation, which, both externally and internally have too often gone by default.

We are conscious of, and do not support, the obstacles placed in the way of African advancement by some European trade unions. While understanding the fears for their own future which prompt this resistance, we cannot justify it. At the same time, we do not regard it as a decisive factor. The facts of economic life are rapidly overtaking it, and before long a much greater problem is going to be to find suitable employment for emerged Africans.

We are completely convinced of the need to maintain the Federation. We believe that its economic achievements to date are only equalled by the size of its economic problems. As responsible business men, we know how progress is obstructed by changes of plan. We should regard any change in a plan which is working beyond expectation as fundamentally unsound.

Many of the economic assets of the Federation must be regarded as indivisible. Who, for instance, could set out to unscramble Kariba? One is reminded of the long and disastrous dispute over the water of the River Indus.

In our view, it is vital not merely to settle the future of the Federation, but to make it plain that the basic concept of a state made up of three constituent territories is going to remain a fact in the foreseeable future. This is not to minimise the fact that the problems of the Federation are and will remain difficult of solution. These problems will, in our view, be solved, but there is no hope whatever of their solution unless the whole of the Federal area is assured of a rapidly expanding economy.

29. We shall be pleased to follow up this submission by oral evidence if thought desirable. As already stated, our deputations would be drawn from the following:

Sir Ernest Guest (Chairman)
Maj.-Gen. Sir Peter Bednall (Deputy Chairman)
Mr. E. S. Newson (Honorary Treasurer)
Mr. J. N. Barnes (Honorary Secretary)
Sir George Davenport
Sir Andrew Strachan
Mr. M. Gersh (of Kitwe)
Col. W. D. Lewis (of Limbe).

Salisbury

6th April, 1960.

Appendix

Quotation from the preamble to the report on the Conference held in London in January, 1953

"Closer political association between the three Central African Territories is essential if they are to develop their resources to the full and reach their proper stature in the world. Individually the Territories are vulnerable. Their individual economies are ill-balanced and ill-equipped to withstand the strong economic pressures of a changing world. Of the three Territories only Southern Rhodesia has any significant secondary industries. Northern Rhodesia is very largely dependent on her copper industry, which provides over four-fifths of her exports. Nyasaland, an agricultural community, has to rely too much on a few primary products such as tobacco, tea and cotton and cannot develop herself unaided. The economies of the three Territories are largely comple-

mentary; their closer association is essential if they are to achieve the economic and social development of which they are together capable. All this is common knowledge and common ground. How is it to be achieved? It has been suggested that this could be done by consultative machinery; but the hard experience of the last few years, acquired through the working of the Central African Council, has conclusively disproved this. With the greatest goodwill between the Territories it has been found impossible by such method alone to secure a harmonious and effective programme of economic development of the whole area. No one of these Territories can be expected to subordinate its own interest to those of another Territory for which it has no responsibility and with which it is not politically associated.

Competing local demands for labour and scarce materials hamper the wider development of the Central African economy. Enterprises which would serve each and all the Territories cannot be undertaken because common policy cannot be made effective in action. Development of the largely untapped resources of this potentially wealthy area demands the combined efforts of the three Territories acting together. The right thing must be done in the right place. There are railways to be built; there are rivers to be harnessed; power must be developed to meet the needs of industry; food production must be expanded to meet the ever-growing needs of a steadily increasing population. Such development requires expenditure of capital and material resources on a large scale. Only a well balanced and co-ordinated economic unit would be able to attract development capital from outside on a scale necessary to realise the full potentialities of the Territories. All the inhabitants of the three Territories would benefit if an effective central authority could take major economic decisions in the interest of the whole area."

L. JACOBSON

My name is Lionel Jacobson. I am 35 years old, am married, and have four children. I have a 50% share in a tobacco farm in Karoi, Southern Rhodesia. I manage the farm of 3,400 acres, grow 200 acres of tobacco and approximately 150 acres of other crops such as maize, beans, etc. My assistant is a Rhodesian-born graduate of Gwebi Agricultural College.

There are about 150 African employees on the farm. This figure includes storekeepers, clerk, teacher, tailor, carpenter, builder and tractor-drivers. The highest wage paid is £8 per month to the bossboy or foreman, and the lowest to the general labourer of £3. Most of the labour is contracted on a two-year basis through the R.N.L.S.C. There is a school (registered), and it is proposed to start a canteen, the profits of which will contribute to labour welfare. All labour is given full rations as required by Government regulations.

I came to Rhodesia in 1952, unassisted, and became a Federal citizen in 1958. I am a staunch United Federal Party supporter. I wish briefly to state why I believe the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland should continue in its present state. The benefits of Federation are just beginning to be implemented. It has taken some years of intense study and hard work on the part of Lord Malvern, Sir Roy Welensky, Mr. Julian Greenfield and many others, to shape and from the aims and objects as first mooted in the early 1950's.

We have now reached the stage in Central Africa when advancement plans are being enacted and which are, in the main, acceptable to both the African and European population. Startling progress has been and is being made in every field of human activity to assist and develop the African towards the attainment of higher standards of living. To step outside this framework of guidance and gradual progress which is the only way to civilisation is what the agitators and extremists call "freedom." Their impatience has blinded them to reality.

The European has made sacrifices in order that the African should have the opportunity to share in the wealth of the Federation. The desires and wants of Africans are being considered all along the line in Education, Industry, Agriculture, Labour Relations, Land Tenure and Social and Welfare facilities. The European is playing a large part collectively and individually in providing the income for these advancements.

What has been achieved as a result of Federation in so short a time is certainly equal, if not greater than, similar development in any other country in peace time. It has had to be done within the limited resources of qualified assistance and finance locally available. A satisfying factor of consideration is that the European has accepted his responsibilities with the attitude of mind that development of the African in every sphere is coincident with his own progress.

The European is not and has not been hypocritical in his approach towards the Federal policy of "Partnership." A new principle was brought before them in the early 1950's and was accepted by referendum. The transition period has been one of learning and education in order to adapt himself to the application of that policy of working together with the African as opposed to the prior Colonial ideas of exploitation.

The aims and objects of Federation are now being brought to fruition and only if the present system prevails can they be accelerated for the benefit of the African who will gain much more "freedom" by the patient guidance of properly constituted actions.

The policy of "Partnership" is a new concept and can only be acceptable to either race through a gradual process. It requires patience and restraint on both sides. Now is not the time to nullify what has taken years of work and national income to achieve. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is the last outpost of British democracy in Africa. Our strength, politically and economically, as a Commonwealth nation, lies only in unity. Only as a *closely* knit federation of states can we stand alone.

The natural resources of Northern Rhodesia, the productivity of Southern Rhodesia, can be brought to utilitarian use with the assistance of the labour potential of Nyasaland. The free flow in income and consequent welfare will give all the "freedom" that is desired by any human being.

The future of the country is in serious jeopardy if outside influences of supposedly reasoned thinkers champion the cause of agitators and extremists who are seeking self-aggrandisement and power.

I am, I believe, a typical Rhodesian of sound mind who views the future with confidence insofar as we are able to sort out our problems according to our first-hand experience. I am terrified to think that outside or overseas influences could, by complete ignorance of problems here, deprive me of my livelihood and a decent future for my children. I am unqualified to offer a solution of present-day problems and the ways and means of carrying out any solution are probably outside or beyond my scope, but the foregoing is an honest appraisal of the case for continuation in its present form of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Karoi
7th April, 1960

L. M. JALLUWAH

Translation of my letter

I have been in federation for a long time wholly Federation was not yet take place in Nyasaland. From 1954 is the time which I began to tour Salisbury until now. Therefore I have been looking apace Federation so in my mind seemed federation is a robber as a person who takes something which is not belongs to him.

2. Example. If I take a party with you, and I don't want you to come with me for my luncheon does that mean I like you or not?

3. Could please tell me what Federation means? In my language Federation means (Kugwir zana) if take a thing and another together them on are place. That means you have it. But Federation of Roy Welensky is not mean to take a brown and white thing to gether them. Sir Welensky's Federation is to honour for him self.

4. We don't want Welensky, take him away, please. That means we don't want Federation.
Nyasaland

5. In Nyasaland we let it to a tend in Nyasaland since it cause in Nyasaland that is the time which we saw directly that it is bad. We did not like it, we don't like it, we shall never like it at all until our death.

6. You wip away the state of emergency in Nyasaland. Release Dr. Banda and all detainees and by his gift Dr. Banda must be as a prime minister. Break away Federation in Nyasaland and please release Dr. Banda and all the detainees. Let us have one man one vote, one man one vote. We want self-government in Nyasaland before August.

Salisbury

C. D. JOHNSON (i)

Memorandum I

I am enclosing a paper, the "Evening Standard" of 26/8/59, containing a short article by me, which may be of some help, as a humble contribution towards a solution of the African "Negro" problem. I am an African "White." May this be presented to the Commission please? I shall be delighted, if considered necessary, to personally present it and enlarge on it.

You see, this country is in the same position as Zululand and Natal were in 1905 when a rebellion took place at the instigation of King Dinizulu who endeavoured to gain back the Country to the position it was when his father Cetshways was alive, before the Zulu War of 1879. Dinizulu of course had a *semblance* of a claim but *no right*. The country, as you are no doubt aware, was, after the Zulu war taken over by the Imperial Government and then administered. I personally knew the Chief Civil Commissioner. My father, Archdeacon Charles Johnson, a noted missionary, was instrumental in assisting in the compilation of the Zululand Native Code, which received legal sanction and was printed in Zulu and English, as a guide for the authorities as well as the chiefs when governing their respective tribes. Natal shortly afterwards had a similar code printed.

When Natal became a self-governing colony, Zululand was attached thereto.

As you are also aware, Chief "Mzilikazi" and his followers left Zululand in the early 19th Century, and eventually took over and settled in S. Rhodesia. His brother Chief "Zwangendaba" with his large following went on and eventually settled in Nyasaland. So virtually the whole of the present Federation was occupied by the Matabele (Zulus).

Accordingly when Rhodes took over from Nobhengulas (Lobengula) the son of Mzilikazi, he spiritually influenced not only N. Rhodesia but also Nyasaland.

Accordingly the same method of government prevailed in S. Rhodesia and spiritually in N. Rhodesia and Nyasaland as was obtaining in Natal and Zululand.

All (especially in S. Rhodesia) has been going on well in every sphere of life. In all communities (in their respective regions, being homogeneous congeniality and peace, as far as it was practicable, reigned, under the guidance of chiefs (African negroes) and other heads of communities (cities, etc.) (African-whites).

Why the action of the Governor of Nyasaland should have been questioned at all in declaring a state of emergency, and thereby scotching an extremely subversive movement, which otherwise would have turned the whole country into turmoil and blood-shed, is beyond my comprehension.

Furthermore, to my way of thinking, the Commission, etc., that followed gives the impression that the Labour Party (some of them)—can force anything even to the extent of releasing detainees (criminals, I think) to continue their nefarious acts and thus enveloping the most peaceful, law abiding and loyal (to the Crown) negroes.

I need hardly mention where these so-called "leaders" come from and whose ideology they represent; but they are definitely *no* "leaders" in the true sense, i.e. *earned* by open and true political democratic combat. Their movement has been one clothed with a "gestapo" sense, and with a "selfish" motive.

The Imperial Government was proud of Natal and Zululand, because they *trusted* the authorities governing the country, and the Zulus practically "worshipped" Queen Victoria and her successors.

Salisbury

2nd February, 1960

Annexure to memorandum I

Extract from the "Evening Standard" dated Wednesday, 26th August, 1959.

"The Importance of Speaking African Tongues," by C. D. Johnson (for many years a Magistrate and Native Commissioner in Zululand and other parts of Natal. He retired to Southern Rhodesia 20 years ago).

I was born in 1884 in Zululand, during the Cetewayo-Sibhebu disturbances. During my life among the Africans, and as a Magistrate and Native Commissioner, I have become convinced of two things.

One is that all teachers, preachers and administrators who work among Africans should themselves speak the language of the African.

The other is that the educated and professional African should work and settle among his own people, to provide by example and influence a stable middle class.

We are told that the Disciples and Apostles sent by Christ to preach the Gospel were spiritually endowed with many tongues, enabling them to impart knowledge clearly and understandably in the language spoken by the people concerned and not through biased or partly educated interpreters.

Mother Tongue

Where African education is concerned, the same rule of mother-tongue instruction should apply. Until African students have reached the secondary school stage, I feel, that all instruction should be given in their own language. Thereafter, English should be introduced as a compulsory subject. When the University stage is reached, study can be continued purely in English.

By following this system, instead of gaining half-baked and superficial ideas on little-understood subjects, Africans will have a solid foundation of knowledge.

Then, too, by encouraging an interest in their own people, language, race and traditions, Africans should feel it their pride and duty to work among their own people.

Subversive

The Matabele, for example, are as a whole a dignified and naturally law-abiding race, and one of the largest distinct Negroid nations. They cover, roughly, the whole stretch of the country down to Zululand, from whence they originate.

But recently, exploiting the nebulous appellation of "African," some selfish and turbulent minded natives "planted" in various parts of Southern Africa, have been working in a Gestapo-like fashion under the banner of various subversive movements.

These people would not be such a disturbing influence if there were Europeans who spoke the African languages fluently, and if Africans had their own professional and educated men living among them, providing a stable, educated middle class.

Own People

Just as European doctors, lawyers and teachers are expected to settle among their own people, so African professional men should settle among their own races and serve them.

By their example, and education, other Africans would learn to improve themselves along their own lines, tempered with modern Western civilisation.

This would counteract the influence of those who try to introduce a foreign ideology, emanating from outside this country, which may eventually bring about the utter destruction of the Africans.

Maori Example

If we could follow the lines of New Zealand, with their understanding, appreciation and administration of the Maoris, we should be able to have greater faith in our future and our country.

One way of moving gradually towards the New Zealand tradition of co-existence would perhaps be the creation of a multi-racial area where educated men of all nations could meet on equal terms.

Memorandum II

I am enclosing my further and fuller statement of evidence which, if personal confirmation is permitted or required, I shall be glad personally to present before the Commission here. You are at liberty to make it public if considered worthwhile.

As you will observe, it is a thesis or otherwise a constructive criticism based on my multi-racial Southern African personal experience since 1884.

May I suggest that "British Nationality" embraces *more* than *mere* race and is not, thank God, *only* confined to the British Isles, but embraces, *not* a *Continent* but *only certain countries* in a *Continent* and those countries are multi-racial and distinct from each other and independent of each other with only one thing in common and that is their connection—and a proud one I hope—to the Crown; bearing in mind that each Country has its own domestic problems to solve *without outside interference*.

Corollary: The British Government should consequently encourage its *broad concept* of "Nationality" and discourage any movement on *racial* lines, especially one under the guise of "Nationality" for this would eventually bring about the disintegration and certain destruction of the yet glorious "British Commonwealth of Nations." There is no "Race" in the world which is exclusively "National":—European (white), Asian and "Negro."

This "Gestapo-like" Spectre under, e.g., the euphonious name of "African National Congress" raising its serpentine head in numerous countries in Africa seemingly has only one motive and that is "self," emanating from a certain country, the leader or leaders of which have become the chief leaders of the Afro-Asian movement.

Consequently, the Rule (especially in a multi-racial country) of *Private Life* being kept distinct from *Public Life*, should be strictly observed, the slogan in public life being to do things "without fear, favour, prejudice or illwill," bearing in mind the preservation and sanctity of *Private* rights, homes and investments in the country in which one has thus become a "National," e.g. Rhodesian, Rhodesian-Negro, Central African or Central African-Negro, etc.

The *Suffrage*, on the lines obtaining in Southern Rhodesia and the Federation are the fairest possible to serve all peoples, in general, of the country.

Manhood Suffrage is impracticable here where the Negro Community in general is not only in an embryonic state in Western Civilisation but is still sensitively proud of its tribal or clannish communities whose *homes* and *land* have been generously given and protected by the Government. *Manhood Suffrage* would certainly spell destruction and disruption of this happy system with sad consequences surely brought about by the so-called "Negro-intelligentsia with a 'selfish' Motive."

Salisbury
23rd February, 1960

Annexure to memorandum II

Racialism versus Nationalism

In dealing with these two items you are forced to place each subject on two distinct bases, viz:—

1. Private life
2. Public life

1. Private life embraces personal pride of race, religious persuasion, clanship, tribalism, language, etc. In short your home in an area with kindred surroundings completing a humanly possible ideal peaceful life in a homogeneous community.

2. Public life is distinct from private life in that it embraces all races, clans, etc., and thus comprises a heterogeneous non-racial whole with the main interest of country which one is living in, at heart.

It should therefore be the genuine endeavour of everyone unanimsously to be non-racial in his political outlook with an eye towards the freedom and preservation of private lives in their homes of free choice (vide definition 1 above) by sanctioning the enactment of provincial, tribal, clannish, etc., laws for any private investment in home, etc., for the peace and security of a homogeneous community and also an overall statutory law or laws, common law, language, etc., for the peace and tranquillity of the public in general.

Tribal laws and custom consolidated into a written code in English and vernacular, legally sanctioned. Each chief being independent and only answerable to the Native Commissioner of the District. Periodically a representative of the Chiefs in the District could be elected by the Chiefs and sent by the Native Commissioner to form a quasi Legislative Council under the Chairmanship of the Chief Native Commissioner to discuss improvement or alteration of the Code and make recommendations accordingly to Parliament for sanction.

On these two bases you can classify your thesis on "Government" and "Nationhood" into three sections viz:

- (a) Politics
- (b) Labour
- (c) Social, domestic and religion

(a) Politics on non-racial British Party lines. In view of the Native (negro) being generally at present in a very embryonic state and therefore their tendency to introduce race, tribalism, clanship, despotism, etc., they cannot be leaders in any Party Politics, so the only course to follow being on British lines is white leadership and what better Party Leaders for the present and many years to come than on the lines for this country (Federation) and perhaps other similarly situated countries viz:

1. Dominion Party
2. United Federal Party
3. Central African Party

all being on love of *country* and *nationhood* varying only in *liberalism*.

(b) Labour. Employees being on a non-racial basis, working for industry, mines or any national undertakings, e.g. Railways, Postals, etc. Employees of each undertaking should have their specific non-racial labour union having its executive to work out without bias of race, the genuine definition of:

1. Skilled
2. Semi-skilled
3. Unskilled work and tariff of respective wages.

The Labour Executive submits its proposition to the executive of the relative Employers with, in case of no agreement the option of appeal to arbitration consisting of a judge and assessors whose decision shall be final, thus avoiding possible boycotts, strikes, etc., which are, after all, nothing but subversion, bloodshed, etc., by fanatics.

(c) Social, domestic and religion. As this principally affects the individual person in his private life, it should consequently be confined to homogeneous communities as described in item (1) Private Life, above.

Nationalism, Meaning of:

This consists of the love of country—not continent—by people of *all* races *permanently* living therein and having a stake therein, signifying responsibility and a genuine unselfish desire for the protection, good-will and understanding for all against intrusion of foreign and outside methods, idealism from outside.

A continent consists of numerous and foreign countries, each having its own problems of government and consequently the idealism or ideology of one should not be forced into another on the assumption of one clan or race suitably and selfishly calling it *Nationalism*, as it would result in certain destruction, e.g. Hitlerism, Tschakaism or Zuluism, etc., the latter of which extended as far as Nyasaland, Tschaka's principal chiefs Mzilikazi with his tribe settled and took over Southern Rhodesia and his brother Zwangendaba and following settling in Nyasaland, so Zuluism stretched from Nyasaland to Zululand. Consequently when the Imperial Government took over Zululand, Natal and Southern Rhodesia all the tribes were disintegrated and given land to live their private tribal communal lives, independently and peacefully under the protection of the Government, leaving Crown lands to be bought and developed by whites. Development took place gradually and peacefully until a few years ago some disturbing and subversive and foreign elements has crept in under the nebulous name of "African Nationalism." Is it on Zuluism, Congoism, Mau-Mauism, Ghanaism, Hitlerism, etc., lines, or what? Ah! Who knows, but I think if the system adumbrated above were adopted or considered it would certainly help towards a solution.

It must, however, be borne in mind that when the Imperial Government took over the countries of Zululand, Natal, and Southern Rhodesia it *liberated* the various tribes from tribal (Zulu) despotism and allotted land to each tribe as a *home* to live in homogeneous communities to develop themselves under the guidance and fatherly care of the Government through the Native Commissioners. The Native is *not* confined to his home and area but is at liberty to go anywhere even to the European areas if in search of work and earn a living and return to his *home* given him to live his private communal life. There is no community in the world more free and protected as this. So when he wants to take up politics, he as well as anyone else, enters *public life* in accordance with the non-racial and non-tribal Rhodesian National System.

Now, this system differs entirely from the United States of American System. The Negroes there were emancipated from *slavery* and no land was given them to build their homes nor were they returned to the West Coast from whence they were taken as slaves, but were left to drift about as best they could, and so lost their identity, language, etc., to become what? This grave omission can't now be remedied by causing racial bitterness in forcing the negro into all white societies by law.

The Southern Rhodesian system is in some measure, obtaining in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and adopted as a whole, by the Federation, i.e., the preservation of private rights and homes and homogeneous communities against the old tribal despotism which now is appearing in the racial cynical forms of Nationalism and thus endeavouring to disrupt the present non-racial system of *Country Nationhood* and not the nebulous *continental "African" Nationhood*.

Memorandum III

I am attaching hereto copy of a letter sent to the local "Rhodesia Herald," regarding the above subject, also for your kind perusal.

I submit, with all due deference, that the name "African" is all-embracing in the same way as "British Subject" is, and it goes further: "British African Subject" is confined to the British African States, whereas "African" covers *all races*

in Africa, some countries in which of course are *not* "British" States.

Southern Africa was originally inhabited by "Bushmen" only and more southern still by Hottentots. Later in history, the "Arabs" from "Arabia" crossed over to Africa in search of gold, etc. The Zimbabwe, Khami, etc., ruins reflect a pre-Mohamedan period, they were clearly built by one of the many tribes of "Arabia" with "Phoenician" influences.

The "Bantu" or "Negroes" from the Sudan and Central Africa, were later taken by the Arabs in slavery, and never originally occupied "Southern Africa." The only "Bantu Nation" to be, *very much later*, in real occupation of the land stretching from Nyasaland to Zululand before being taken over by the Imperial Forces, were the Zulus; no other sizeable group of natives were then in evidence. Consequently no special race whatever, of all the African races (i.e. "Whites," "Asians" and "Negroid") can warrantably and exclusively be designated "African."

Having a special knowledge of the "Bantu" and their language I claim to have their confidence. The loyal native (I mean truly loyal to the Crown) fear the appellation "African" for they now associate it with subversive movements recently introduced by e.g. the "African National Congress," etc., which, they say, are foreign and are now even aspiring to "Pan-African" methods. The true natives only want to be called by what they call themselves, i.e. "Bantu" and would accordingly know where they stand!

I strongly urge, therefore, that the natives be called only "Bantu" or "Negroes," as this appropriate appellation would *certainly* contribute towards restoring sanity.

Salisbury

14th April, 1960

Annexure to memorandum III

Letter to the Editor of the Rhodesia Herald
Native v African

Sir,

I am very surprised to read in your paper of 25th inst. that the "City Council" has swallowed the British (some) inspired and Soviet-sponsored appellation "African" as designating "Native" or "Negro" and thus destroying the age-old definition of "African" which is: "a native of Africa"; and the word native means: "a *person* born in any *country* or is an inhabitant thereof."

I was born in Zululand in 1884 and in 1939 I retired and became an inhabitant of Rhodesia. What will the Council now call me? By birth I became a "British Natal-Zululand National" and when I became an inhabitant of Rhodesia I automatically became a British Rhodesian National and the Natives permanently living here are British National Rhodesian—"Negroes" or "Natives."

Mzilikazi and his large following came here from Zululand in the early 19th Century and his brother Zwangendaba also with a large following went further North and settled in Nyasaland (the Ingoni Tribe). So virtually the Zulus occupied the whole country from Nyasaland to Zululand. The "Mashonas" were skeddaddled before the Zulu warriors. It was only after Rhodes and the Imperial Forces arrived here that the natives were peacefully settled.

Many years ago the natives were called "niggers" but as years went by they were, for purposes of "euphony" called "natives" and were described statutorily accordingly. Only a few years back some myopic-brained person or persons called the natives "Africans" and it became Soviet-sponsored in order to get a foothold in Africa. So the self-assumed name "African" is associated with subversive Negro-movements in Africa and if this pseudo-appellation "African" is officially recognised as describing the Negroid Race it will not only be contrary to the true definition but would also give a false impression to the loyal native and thus make confusion more confounded from "African" to "Pan-African" Nationalism!

Fools go where angels fear to tread.

(Sgd.) C. D. JOHNSON

Mabelreign

26th March, 1960

J. F. KAPNEK

I left Salisbury last Sunday, the 14th February, for health reasons, for St. James, C.P., where I have my permanent residence.

It is unfortunate that I cannot give your Commission oral evidence of my impressions of the Federation as it exists

to-day. My age is 78, last September. I came out to Rhodesia from America selling Cash Registers some 56 years ago. I am enclosing a little publicity given to me by the Sunday Mail in Salisbury, which should give you some idea of who I am.*

I would like your Commission to endeavour to pay a visit from Salisbury, through the good offices of the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Grayling, if possible. Go through the Mazoe district, pass the Native Reserve on the way to Umvukwes, and you will note that the B.S.A. Company have recently purchased several additional farms, which they have had cleared and have planted a large number of citrus trees. When you pass through the European agricultural areas you come into a Native Reserve that I believe is very large in extent, and it is reputed to hold a population of approximately 30,000 natives. You will observe the conditions as they exist in the Reserve and the so-called mealie crops that they have planted, and as you pass through an area of between 10 and 15 miles, you come into a place that belongs to me, viz. Frogmore Estates Limited, that has an area of approximately 11,865 acres.

Your Commission will see the difference between the two areas, one the Native Reserve development, and the development at Frogmore under the administration of a young man named Cecil Stein, who was born in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, and you will see a crop of tobacco and a crop of maize which are outstanding in quality.

The old maxim of "seeing is believing" holds good in that case, and I have no reason to assume that your Commission will be impressed with what they see of the development that has taken place in Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia by the European community who came here as I did some 55-56 years ago when the European population was small and living amenities were very poor.

You are at liberty to discuss with Lord Malvern and Dr. Walter Adams, the Principal of the University of which I was the founder and with Sir Roy Welensky, whom I knew as a small boy in Salisbury, and I had the opportunity and the pleasure of knowing his father and mother fairly well.

I trust this short resume will be of some assistance to you and your Commission in your present deliberations.

Johannesburg, Union of South Africa

16th February, 1960

R. D. LEVENDALE

Our loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen and to the Government of Southern Rhodesia and the Federation has not changed.

This loyalty is equally true of our forebears in the South throughout the vicissitudes through which they passed and are passing.

An historical survey of the Coloured people, who trekked to this part of the world together with the Europeans, will indicate and endorse without doubt, their devotion and loyalty to those with whom they shared the hardships and toil of pioneering, not excluding their loyalty to the land of their adoption and their respect for Law and Order like the rest of the Coloured people of this land with whom they are very closely connected.

May we stress that it is not our desire that Federation should be dismembered or fragmented. We have that in your wanderings through the Federation you are in quest of the outlook and opinions of its people in regard to its continuation or its fragmentation under a new formula acceptable to groups of persons to suit their respective political philosophies. To us, however, the breaking up of the Federation, is anathema.

As a Minority Group we see in such an eventuality nothing more than the "ganging up" of Whites and Blacks under the banner of *White Nationalism and Black Nationalism* as opposing forces: Supremacy will be the battlecry from the one side as well as the other and the concept of "Living together in Peace and Amity" will be pushed more and more into the back ground.

In the Federation there are about 20,000 Coloured persons as against 200,000 Europeans thus represent 10% of the European population, let alone the Africans against whom our percentage drops dismally.

Representation in Parliament. Federally or Territorially:

Owing to the paucity of numbers, you will be aware that we have no direct representation although we enjoy full franchise rights. In this respect it requires very little imagina-

* Not reproduced.

tion to force us to the conclusion that, as a Minority Group, we are mercilessly placed between the upper and nether millstones to be ground into the kind of substance that suits the miller, whoever he might be: European or African.

There is nothing alluring or soul-satisfying in this picture we have tried to portray in the two previous paragraphs; and, of course, there is nothing for our continued and slender comfort. Nothing for us as a variety of the Human Race of which we are in no way less than any other your imagination or learning could call up. Nothing for our survival as Loyal British Subjects. This rightly or wrongly, is how the situation will appear to us, if the Federation has to disappear.

Full franchise rights we have, and this is admitted in that we vote for representatives other than our own people, with the result that those for whom we vote, Territorially or Federally, are not sufficiently interested in our welfare. Only recently, the Territorial Government appointed a Commission to inquire into our disabilities:

This is a commendable step and appreciated but long, long overdue.

May we respectfully ask you, gentlemen, if ways and means could not be devised whereby consideration could be given to what we feel should be our lot in the Federation, if not Territorially, in view of the presentation of the two major groups as this stands today?

Federally the number of representatives of the Major Groups is:

Europeans	47
Africans	12
Coloureds	Nil

This request is not at all made on racial grounds. We do not however believe that a say in the framing of the laws of the Federation should be the prerogative of European and Africans only unless it is expected that this multi-racial State is synonymous with bi-racial State: a State consisting of two racial groups only: European and African.

In support of this contention that apparently two groups only are considered in the Federal setup, may we direct your attention to the evidence submitted by Mr. G. T. Thornicroft of Salisbury and his experience as a Coloured man who for no other reason could not be selected to a team of representatives because he is not European nor African.

Since we are only 10% of the European population is it not possible to have at least 4 nominated selected members of this community? in the Federal Parliament? Surely, gentlemen, this is not asking much when the whole concept of Federation was founded on *partnership*.

Dominion Status:

Lastly, we are not at all eager that Dominion status should be granted to Southern Rhodesia.

At this stage it does appear to us that it will bring about the fragmentation of the Federation let alone its disappearance. Moreover, 37 years of responsible or more do not guarantee that race relations will in any way improve to the extent that Minority Groups will be safe guarded and that Colour will not influence the powers that be from dealing with the less fortunate as we see elsewhere, in spite of the fact that that part of the sub-continent had had more than 37 years of Responsible Government.

We suggest that Britain should retain her guiding hand for a longer time until the whole of the Federation is ready for Dominion status.

Gwelo

2nd May, 1960

S. LITHERLAND

The Federation was founded because it was considered to be in the best interests of the development of the three states to have a closer association for the benefit of all the lawful inhabitants of the three territories. The Federation since its inception has made tremendous strides in material and economic development, together with sound and logical political development. So impressive has the development been that economically, especially, it is the envy of other African States. It seems to be, therefore, not only wrong but illogical to contemplate the breakdown of the Federation, and it would be very wise to make provision for the extension of the Federation. It may well be that other African Territories may in due course wish to join the Central African Federation and form a United States of Central Africa. To allow for such a contingency I suggest that the Constitution be amended

to allow for other additional Territories to join the Federation on terms to be agreed mutually between the parties.

I suggest because of the general advancement of the Federation towards independence and bearing in mind the most excellent record of Government in the Federation since its inception the time has come when the Federation has by good government and excellent example earned its right to complete independence within the Commonwealth. To this end the time has come for the removal of the restrictions in the Constitution which require the assent of the British Government to Federal Legislation. It must be remembered that at no time in the history of the Federation or its constituent territories has it been considered necessary by any British Government to invoke their powers to control reserved legislation within the Federation or its constituent territories. I suggest further that the Constitution should be amended by the deletion of the sections dealing with the African Affairs Board and in place thereof there should be provision for an Upper Chamber of Parliament which would include representatives from all leading walks of life in the Federation including representatives of all races.

It is in my opinion very important to keep a qualitative franchise and not give way to demands for a quantitative franchise.

Much emphasis has been placed by certain people and certain press elements on the representation of the African point of view by the African politicians, or would be politicians, who are against Federation. There has never been any proof of any kind that these people, generally African Congress members, do in fact represent the view point of the majority of the adult Africans. On the other hand it is absolutely certain that the great majority of Africans, probably in the region of 95% of them do not in any way understand the system of democratic government, they do not understand what a vote is and the few who do know what a vote is do not necessarily appreciate the use of a vote in a particular election.

The people who demand universal adult suffrage are the African Congress leaders, not the hereditary African Chiefs. It is my opinion and it is most probably true that these people wish for universal suffrage purely for political expediency and in order to get political powers for themselves. It is quite probable that if there were universal suffrage there would be a tremendous amount of bribery, corruption and intimidation on the part of these African leaders in their efforts to obtain the support of the voters. It is quite obvious to any one who knows the Africans well that his interests are at present, better served by the present system of qualitative franchise.

However, it appears to me that the African, however lowly he may be, is entitled to have some say in affairs which immediately concern him, in the day to day matters rather than in matters of national or international policy. In framing constitutions for new countries only the constitution of the national government is considered and franchise is only considered in relation to national government. There is therefore a process of government starting at the top and breaking down to the local government and parochial level, instead of what seems to me the more logical process of building up from the local sphere to the national sphere of government. It must be remembered that the English democracy was built up over the centuries from local government to central government.

Thus in considering the question of franchise consideration should be given to the ability on a qualitative basis of people to take their share in government from its simplest local form through its various stages culminating in territorial and federal government. In this way a person whose ability is only sufficient to allow him or her to take part in village affairs, should have the constitutional right to vote in village affairs, but it would be entirely wrong for this person to have a vote in the federal government sphere if he has no conception at all of the meaning of Federal Government and does not understand the policies of the contestants in an election.

The suggestion I would like to put forward for consideration is that the franchise be set down in the constitution in the following manner:

- (1) Village Government—Universal adult franchise.
- (2) Town Government—qualitative franchise on qualification A.
- (3) Regional Government—qualitative franchise on qualification B.
- (4) Territorial Government—qualitative franchise on qualification C.
- (5) Federal Government—qualitative franchise on qualification D.

Franchise qualifications A to D would have to be worked out on a basis of the status of the individual taking into account various factors including educational standard, financial status, ability and achievement. Franchise qualifications C and D would for the present be the existing Territorial and Federal Government qualifications.

In my opinion universal adult suffrage at the Territorial and Federal Government levels would not lead to good government and would undoubtedly lead to intimidation and corruption in the political sphere by persons who seek political power for the sake of power rather than the opportunity to render good government. Their efforts to obtain political power are based on the fact that their race has the majority of heads and completely disregard the fact that the vast majority have no conception whatsoever of central democratic government.

This attitude has been clearly shown in Nyasaland. The call in Nyasaland by African Congress leaders has been for secession and immediate independence for the country. When the economic advantages of Federal and Federal Government, which are considerable, are put forward as an argument against secession and immediate independence they are brushed aside by African Congress leaders as being of no consequence. Their attitude is that the people want political freedom and the right to govern themselves and their further attitude is that they would rather starve than continue to be in the Federation despite its undoubted advantages.

This attitude does not bear serious examination because :

- (a) there is no evidence that people other than the African Congress leaders and the people they have hypnotised or intimidated really desire to leave the Federation.
- (b) large numbers of Nyasaland Africans migrate to Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa because of the lack of employment in Nyasaland and the better conditions socially and economically in Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa (Dr. Banda was one of these, he stayed away 40 years, he only returned because he is an opportunist, he has no record of service to his fellow countrymen to merit his assumption of political leadership).
- (c) there is no evidence that the mass of the Africans in Nyasaland would knowingly wish to jeopardise their living standards for political freedom.
- (d) complete independence for Nyasaland with the withdrawal of the European from all spheres of Government would lead to utter chaos. The numbers of Africans in Nyasaland who are capable of administering a Government are very limited in numbers, there are most certainly not sufficient of them to administer a Government without the help of Europeans or Asians.
- (e) Nyasaland could not be completely independent because its internal economy is not sufficient to maintain the present standard of living and to develop the country. Financial assistance would have to come from outside sources. The present system of Federation does not place any appreciable financial burden on the individual African. If, however, this were replaced by financial assistance on a purely commercial basis then undoubtedly an increased burden would be placed on the individual African.
- (f) The African people of Nyasaland have not reached the stage where they are professionally and technically in a position to develop their country. This can only be done by resident technical and professional assistance from elsewhere either by Europeans or Asians. This assistance is very well given by the present system of Government.

Great play is made by African Congress leaders of the protection given to Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia and to a minor extent Southern Rhodesia by the British Government seated in England. This protection is entirely theoretical, the only practical result of this protection is that it leads to political extremist both African and British using it as a background for violent attacks upon the constitutional government of the Federation and its constituent territories. It causes a most unnecessary embarrassment to the Federal and Territorial Governments.

The practical protection of Africans comes entirely from the Europeans whether they be residents or transitory Colonial Office people who live in the territories. The individual African looks to the resident European in his time of trouble, he looks to the resident European to feed him, to house him, to give him medical attention, to pay his wages and to help him in other ways. In this way there is a strong bond between the ordinary African and the European. Their relationship is very friendly. The only real source of friction is

between the African political aspirants and the European and ordinary Africans. Many of the ordinary Africans do not like their own political agitators and they criticise the Europeans for not taking strong summary action against them.

The time has come for the British Government to honestly recognise the contribution made to the development of the Central African Federation by the British and European people who have migrated to the Federation, have made their permanent homes here, have developed the country agriculturally, industrially, socially and commercially. The people who have developed a country which on their first arrival was racked by tribal wars and being speedily denuded of its African population. They have brought peace and prosperity to the country, they have worked very hard and it is true to say that the peoples of the Federation are amongst the happiest and most contented in the world. It is therefore, most important that everything possible should be done to ensure the continued development of the Central African Federation into a happy and prosperous country for the benefit of all its lawful inhabitants. This can only be done by allowing the Federation and its three territories complete independence of action free from interference by the British Government. It has been most undemocratic for the British House of Commons to be able to consider, debate and determine affairs of the Central African Federation without there being a single representative of the Federation in the House of Commons and with no resident of the Federation being a member of the House of Commons.

I suggest that the myth of the protected person having been exploded the time has come for the term "British Protected Person" to be done away with in so far as it refers to the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland.

The protection given to persons by the Laws of the Federal Government and the Territorial Government is quite sufficient.
Salisbury

REV. G. O. LLOYD

My impression of the Africans of Que Que and district is taken from experience of managing ten mission schools situated in mining compounds, farms and reserve. This task involves the payment of fifty-two teachers, providing school books for 2,000 children, negotiating with compound managers and organising school committees of parents. As the minister of St. Stephen's Church I preach regularly to African congregations.

After eighteen months of this work which is not a new experience, my impression of the Africans of Que Que and district is that they are unsettled and insecure. As a result a sense of responsibility is as yet undeveloped and, when found, is exceptional. A Christian view of marriage seems hardly to exist even where "church" marriages have superseded tribal covenants. In handling money, unguarded sums disappear unaccountably and in most cases payments are only made "on demand." For some reason or other the solution of all problems seems to lie in education and much will be sacrificed for the sake of education.

Tribal affiliations seem to play a large part in decisions and appointments. Leadership from a person of another tribal group is suspect until it is clear that some benefit is to be obtained from following the leader. This also applies to the leadership provided by the Europeans.

There is nothing new about the impressions recorded above but they lead one to the conclusion that the parliamentary system established in Western Europe and based on the democratic vote would be a misfit here.

Que Que

22nd March, 1960.

MRS. J. M. LLOYD

My grandfather, Rev. W. Sykes, came to Matabeleland with the first missionaries, Revs. Moffat and Thomas, in 1859. My mother, Mary Sykes, was born at Inyati, Matabeleland, in 1862, was educated in England and returned to the Mission at Inyati in 1879. My father, Rev. D. Carnegie, came to Matabeleland as a missionary in 1882, married Mary Sykes in 1885 and I was born at Hope Fountain Mission near Bulawayo in 1889 (their third child), was educated in England and returned to the Mission in 1906; I was married in 1917 and widowed in 1933. My son (a Rhodes Scholar) is married to the daughter of pioneers and my daughter's husband is the son of pioneers. Naturally, therefore, I have always been interested in the Africans, indeed, I have a soft spot for them, and I can speak fairly well in Sindebele, having known it fluently as a child. Apart from my education in England and three years there during the first world war, and

various visits overseas, I have lived all my life in Rhodesia and have grandchildren who are of the fourth generation born in Rhodesia.

The examples which follow are given as illustrations of what I have found to be the African character, behaviour and reactions.

About two years ago I heard an African Girl Guide give her impressions of her trip to England. What impressed her most was the way the white folk treasured and preserved things that were old—apart from old buildings, how they kept old papers, writings, furniture, etc., which she said Africans would just have burnt, as they burnt their kraals when they wanted to move to better pastures. They kept no records or documents because none could read or write; their most precious possession was cattle. This was their way of life less than 80 years ago, in fact during my lifetime.

An African addressed the National Affairs Association in Bulawayo a week or two ago; it was a well attended meeting of both races. He said, inter alia, the white people might well claim their right to live in this country because there were many of the second generation here. That is only half the truth, because there are a great many of the third and fourth generation in the country.

During the last few years when I have visited Salisbury from time to time, my sister and I have had to wait at a section of roads near the Salisbury Kopje at a peak period when Africans were leaving their work; hundreds of them pass us cycling and walking, laughing and shouting happily to each other—no signs of discontent. Lorry loads of Africans being driven back from work, sing together beautifully in harmony, you can hear them from afar—nothing discontented about that.

Witchcraft

You probably know a great deal about this. It is feared and practised by the great majority of Africans—in fact one of the best known agitators against the white people, an expatriate and a B.A., not so long ago during some family trouble, reverted to type and consulted the "Umlimo" (Spirit) that is said to live at Injelele Kopje in the Matopos (this is one of the bewitched kopjes to which no African must point). I heard this man speak at a political meeting once; he used such words as "statistics," "constitution," "economics," which have no equivalent in the Sindebele language and I am sure that had any one tried to interpret his speech to Africans in the Reserves and country districts, it would not have been in the least understood, though it could have given the wrong impression to those happy and contented Africans who can so easily be misled.

I have come into contact with this fear of witchcraft, once in my home about fourteen years ago and once only a few weeks ago in town here. I had a servant called Mahlaba who stayed with me for thirty years. About fourteen years ago he was stricken with cerebral malaria and we took him unconscious to hospital; he recovered. At the same time I had a garden boy who had worked with my husband years before, but had only been with me for a week or two. One evening while Mahlaba was in hospital this boy, named Spend, came to my sitting room, walked quietly across the room and squatted down near me. He wanted to *kuluma*, i.e., talk. What he said was that as I had had Mahlaba for a servant for such a long time no one else could come and work for me and he (Spend) wished his son to come, so would I get rid of Mahlaba. Fortunately I could explain to him in his own language that Mahlaba was my faithful servant, etc., and I did not wish him to leave me. When Mahlaba was fit enough to work again he came back but said he could not work in the same place as Spend for it was he who had bewitched him, made him ill and nearly killed him. Of course I dismissed Spend and all was well.

Africans here have always been afraid of chameleons; I remember as a child hearing of a young native who had one on his shoulder and when he saw it he collapsed in a dead faint. This superstition that a chameleon is "tagati" (bewitched) is still strong. A few weeks ago I was going into the city hall gardens when an African came up to me with an agonised expression in his eyes; he could hardly speak when I asked him what was the matter, but pointed to his bicycle near by. On the back wheel was a large chameleon. I asked the African why he was afraid of it, he replied because it would bite. So I said I thought the real truth was that he thought it was "tagati" and he nodded his head. I removed the harmless chameleon and advised the African to speak to his teacher about it and he would explain that there was nothing to be terrified of. I spoke kindly to this man because I could tell he was of the simple type;

he was delivering some goods for his employer when the chameleon had climbed on to his bicycle. Its rather pathetic.

I am sure many Europeans far abler than myself could tell of the way this heathen fear of witchcraft still dominates the great majority of Africans. At one time it was difficult to persuade an African to go to hospital; he was afraid of being made to "die" before an operation. I know of one, a good, intelligent youth, who was only persuaded to go and have his varicose veins removed because he was so keen on playing "football."

There is a small kopje within two miles of the centre of Bulawayo known as "Intaba sabatagati," which means the hill of sorcerers or bewitchers. Drum messages are sometimes sent from this hill at night. The night that the emergency was declared in Rhodesia this news was sent from there to various other hills. I have this fact on good authority.

Again, the majority of Africans does *not understand* happenings both in and out of their country. I will give a few examples:

1. When Mussolini capitulated during the last war we were explaining this news to some African servants—all good intelligent men—and one of them remarked brightly, "And now I think Rhodesia will win." He did not understand.
2. A friend of mine had a Nyasaland African servant who was an ex-schoolteacher; after some years he wished to return home and did so. Not very long after he came back to Southern Rhodesia saying he did not like Nyasaland any more because they had Federation there. He did not understand what it meant and would not be convinced that Federation also applied to Southern Rhodesia.
3. An African in the Nkana Mine (Northern Rhodesia) worked in the Ventilation Squad. One day he jibbed at his work because he said he had been told that he must not belong to the "Ventilation"—he thought it sounded like Federation, in fact did not understand.
4. An African in Northern Rhodesia wrote to a firm of chemists in Bulawayo only a few weeks ago asking for a pamphlet on Family Planning. He ended his letter by saying that his family was hard up and deserved a very big plan—signed by Mr. and Mrs. Blank. They, poor things, certainly did not understand.
5. A gentleman in Salisbury wanted to have his garden hedges clipped, he let this be known and an African came along and introduced himself as an engineer. When asked what sort, he replied, "a hedge enginee." He did not understand the meaning of engineer in the least.

A note on the custom "Uku-Holisana"

The literal meaning of the Sindebele word *Ukuholisana* is "to receive and share together." This custom prevails throughout Southern, Central and East Africa and is also known as "Tambirisana," "Landiritsana," "Tapilisana" and similar names.

It is the African's rather illogical idea of affluence which, coupled with his intense pleasure in spending amounts of money which he considers too laborious a process to save, seems to have given birth to this custom.

An African in steady employment cautiously sums up his workmates or casual acquaintances, not necessarily of the same tribe or totem, in whom he feels he can repose a fitting measure of trust. When satisfied, he approaches one or two such men and offers to share his wages with them.

If agreed upon, wages are pooled each month and on every pay-day a different member collects "the pool."

At the present time three members appear to be the maximum in any one "club," but in past years when most employers provided rations, these were often much larger.

Today sufficient is usually kept aside for food, cigarettes and beer and the balance paid over. Size of earnings, marital state and amount of education have no relation to *holisana*. In a large urban centre such as Bulawayo, it is estimated that some 70% of the working male population practice this custom.

Members keep faith with each other to a surprising degree and complaints about defaulters are rarely heard of.

The social evils deriving from *holisana* are considerable, particularly the lot of wives and children but it is virtually impossible to convince an African that it is frequently the cause of hardship. He cannot see it that way.

I remember as a child on the Mission Station that when my father extracted a tooth or treated the sick, nearly always the natives brought some token of appreciation such as a few eggs, a basket of grain, or even a fowl. Now that Africans are given free medicines and hospitalisation, they have come to expect such things. Even if they had to pay a small amount, say 6d. for a tooth extraction, or 1/- a week in hospital, they would learn to appreciate their benefits more. When I put this point to the African who addressed National Affairs here a week or two ago, he replied that he agreed with the idea but said that many Africans now are able to go to private doctors—which, of course, is no answer at all.

I am not antagonistic to Africans for they are my friends and many are fine characters; as mentioned earlier, I have a very soft spot for them. But it does seem to be quite wrong that the agitators and those of the educated ones who consider themselves much superior being, should take advantage of their simpler and happy brethren and lead them to believe that they are capable of taking over responsibilities quite beyond them, when such things as witchcraft, "holisana," superstitions and tribalism are still rampant. After all, only 70 years separate them from barbarism.

Bulawayo

12th April, 1960.

BROWN LUZA

Anti-Federation

The Africans of Southern Rhodesia objected the Federation before it came to power because they were never told what it was and how it was going to work. However, when it came to power, each and everyone had a hope that its object would be as follows:

- (1) Equal pay for equal job;
- (2) Education to African children, sitting in the same class with European children; play together and eat together;
- (3) Walking together in any direction of life, such as Hotels, British Passport, voting as far as they are British subjects.

Land Husbandry Act/Land Apportionment Act

When Federation came to power it resulted into depriving Africans of their lands as it is understood that Europeans must have more lands than Africans. It also introduced the Five Year Plan on African Education thereby causing Age Limits in schools. Curbing of cattle in the Native Reserves, reducing the African lands, moving of Africans from good lands to poor lands and high taxation to Africans is a result of this Federation.

Business on Africans

The Africans in Urban Areas who own business premises do not have privileges in their business houses for the simple reason that they only have rights of property in the business houses and NOT the whole premises, e.g., late to pay rent results into dismissal from business houses.

Colour Bar to Africans

We are now 70 years under the British Government and have qualified as British subjects yet at the same time under the yoke of slavery, e.g., a European farmer adopting the system of American Negroes in the plantations under slavery and keeping of free labour force for his lands.

We believed during the introduction of Federation that it would bring about peace among the different races of different colonies yet the result of Federation was the State of Emergency whereby Africans were detained in great numbers and without trial in Public Courts for a period of a year or longer.

Dr. Banda is a prohibited immigrant of Southern Rhodesia as it was announced by the Minister (before Dr. Banda's arrest and detention). During the State of Emergency Dr. Banda was collected and brought to the Federal Prison of Gwelo which is in Southern Rhodesia where he was *banned*.

We firmly oppose Federation and also believe Nyasaland should secede from the Federation as this was strongly confirmed by the deportation of Nyasaland Congress members from Southern Rhodesia during the State of Emergency. That shows the inevitable breaking of the Federation. To encourage free labour in European farms, age limit has been imposed on African Youth. As a result many African youths are lingering about in towns with no work.

S. MAFUKIDZE

Here I will try to give in details the wants of the African people particularly in Southern Rhodesia where colour bar is rife.

Rhodesian Africans accepted the Federation with a mind that it would rescue them from Laws of suppression in:

1. Politics;
2. Economic;
3. Christianity and Education.

Now let's look at these three and study the Federation.

1. The Franchise (Politic) is too segregatory, the Qualifications were wisely set out to serve only the European interest to explain my point: The Federal Government knew very well that an African with a Profession is paid £114 a year while a European is paid £900 a year. With this obstacle in mind the Federal Government says a voter must earn £720 a year. Where then does the Government expect an African to get £720 when it pays him £114 a year? Is this not an indirect way of discriminating an African from voting? If the Federation is to continue there must be Democracy-Practices. The wish of the people should be the stable foundation of the Government. As far as the Franchise is concerned qualifications for a vote should be to suit Africans:

- (i) All chiefs have a right to vote;
- (ii) All people who are 21 and have passed Std. 6 should vote;
- (iii) All Kraal-Heads;
- (iv) Everyone who has had a Business for at least 5 years;
- (v) All skilled workers who have served their masters for at least 5 years;
- (vi) All people who earn at least £75 a year;
- (vii) All master farmers.

At least such qualifications will meet the need of the people of the Federation (not the Europeans of the Federation as is the case at the present moment).

2. It is true that the Federation has done much Developments in the three Territories. Things like roads, bridges, etc., have been improved greatly but what does this mean to an African? Has he been given an opportunity to use these? Certainly *no!* His pay forbids him. His income or pay is £114 a year whilst the car must use on the road, etc., cost him £500, £700, £1,000. Now, can he afford that? How then can an African be expected to believe that these Developments are for both races? As soon as these things are amended we certainly can support the Federation. But when Developments are as they are, for Europeans, Africans are compelled to do away with the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. "Africa for Africans."

3. The Federation has developed Education in Central Africa. But whose education? Only European Education!! How then can an African be expected to think the Government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has come to help him educationally? In Southern Rhodesia the Rhodesian Junior Certificate Examinations are for both white and black. Do they get the same pay when they work? How then can an African be expected to believe that the Federal Government has done something for him educationally?

4. Let's turn to Party Politics a little.

My strong advice to the Monckton Commission is before anything is done and in order to know truly an African Mind, check from Officials how many Africans there are in each Party. After this try with much patience to study the policies of each. This can give the whole picture of what the majority of people think and want. Such Party must have its Policy fully studied before the Constitutional Talks of the Federation. Begin C.U.F.P.; C.A.P.; D.P., etc.

N.B.—The Monckton Commission must not be led astray by the governing party that there is Partnership in this country when it is only Savanhu and a few others who enjoy same pay with Europeans. Only one-third per cent. of the 3,000,000 Africans in the Federation get the same pay as Europeans.

I am not a Politician.

P.S.—The Government have money to pay £85 p.m. to Europeans when it cannot get £20 to pay an African. What kind of Government is it which has money to pay one race and not the other?

Summary

African Demands

1. Men not rich to own property to be allowed to be Members of Parliament.

100

2. Manhood Suffrage (disregarding colour) that is, votes for Parliamentary Elections to be given to all men, however poor.
3. Voting to be by ballot—guided by Scouts.
4. European voters to be equal in number with African Voters in each constituency in order to ensure a right Representative for both Communities is elected.

Mataga

THE RT. HON. THE VISCOUNT MALVERN

I have no doubt that the Commissioners have heard in Northern Rhodesia that Southern Rhodesia only federated with Northern Rhodesia to obtain a share of the profits from copper mining and that at the time Southern Rhodesia was broke. Although the motives activating the Governments at the time the Federal Constitution was agreed, are not strictly germane to the enquiry, I have been urged to submit this note as one of the chief advocates of closer union between the two Rhodesias for over 40 years.

After the last war Southern Rhodesia enjoyed boom conditions and an unprecedented influx of British immigrants. It was estimated at the time that each newcomer cost Southern Rhodesia about £2,000 but that it was worth that so long as we could obtain the capital which we ourselves did not possess from outside sources. There was increased capital investment for development but the State itself had to borrow large sums and to go on borrowing at that rate and unless increased productivity kept up with borrowing in reasonable proportions, the Government would have to draw in its horns. In fact that was what happened and the Southern Rhodesia Government realised that they must draw in their horns and consolidate before resuming considerable expansion but the country was now on a much firmer basis and certainly not broke. I think that disposes of that point.

In regard to only wanting Federation to get a share of the copper profits, I have no doubt that copper profits influenced some of the electorate at the time of the Referendum but I myself never used that argument although I am sure the Southern Rhodesia public would never have agreed to include Nyasaland unless the copper profits acted as a set off.

I myself, although it was not a popular idea, ever since Northern Rhodesia became prosperous, favoured including Nyasaland in any closer union between the two Rhodesias for the simple reason that a considerable portion of the wealth of Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia was created by the surplus population from Nyasaland working in the two Rhodesias and it was only fair in the somewhat destitute state of their home country that some of the wealth created should benefit their home country.

I used that argument with the then Governor of Nyasaland who was not in favour of joining Nyasaland with the two Rhodesias. The Governor seemed surprised at my argument but still seemed in favour of having some of the wealth without surrendering any Governmental functions.

Now to deal with the Southern Rhodesia Government vis-à-vis Northern Rhodesia prosperity. I and my Ministerial Colleagues had been in favour of amalgamation between Northern and Southern Rhodesia for many years. I had attended conferences as a backbencher with the Elected Members of Northern Rhodesia. The leader of the Elected Members of Northern Rhodesia was then Leopold Moore, later Sir Leopold. He did not favour amalgamation then but changed his mind when the capital of Northern Rhodesia was moved from Livingstone to Lusaka. I spoke in favour of amalgamation in several debates in the Southern Rhodesia Parliament. I only ceased to attend these conferences when I became Prime Minister on the rather highbrow pretext that it was not quite the thing to do as a Minister of the Crown in view of the fact that the United Kingdom Government was not in favour of amalgamation.

During the greater part of this period Northern Rhodesia was as poor as a church mouse and little better off than Nyasaland except she had fewer Natives to support and had the Broken Hill Copper Mine. My whole attitude and that of my Government was best expressed in an answer I gave to a heckler in the Copperbelt during the first Federal Election. He asked me if my reason for Federation was to get hold of the copper profits for Southern Rhodesia? My answer was that for twenty-five years or more I have favoured the joining together of the two Rhodesias even when you were very hard up, so hard up that you had no schools for Europeans. I gave your European children education subsidised by the Southern Rhodesian taxpayers because I did not want poor white neighbours whom I hoped to join one day. Furthermore, when you could not afford it, I lent you Southern

Rhodesia surveyors to survey the road up the escarpment so that the two capitals could be joined by a road. Now you happen to be very rich I still like you.

Education for Nyasaland European children was also given at the Southern Rhodesia schools.

The basic excuse for giving this help to the two Protectorates so far as the Southern Rhodesia Treasury was concerned was that from the beginning Southern Rhodesian University Students had received subsidised education at the University level from the South African Governments and we were only passing on this subsidy from the South to the North.

From examination of the closer union of the two Rhodesias and later including Nyasaland, it will be seen that the timing of the Federation to coincide with Northern Rhodesia prosperity was pure chance. The United Kingdom had always opposed change and it was they who half gave it in the early fifties. The time was not chosen by Southern Rhodesia and if the United Kingdom Government had agreed in the thirties we should not have had the severe teething troubles we have now and furthermore Northern Rhodesia could not have claimed that we were after their money because their wealth is recent and depends almost entirely on one commodity. One last word, when I got fed up with the United Kingdom Government and their "craven fear of being great" it was Welensky and the Elected Members of Northern Rhodesia who spurred me on, including a talk I had with the Governor of Southern Rhodesia when I stated I was giving up because the United Kingdom Government seemed quite hopeless with their general ignorance of the subject and their party politics.

I think I have said enough to show that the Government of Southern Rhodesia, one of the sponsors of Federation, was not after Northern Rhodesian money; they merely wanted a closely linked economy so that the Federal area could stand on its own feet and not be absorbed by a larger neighbour. In the early days it was "I suppose I should be ashamed to mention it now" a big imperial idea to strengthen the "British Empire" which I realise is now also another dirty word.

Salisbury

7th April, 1960

T. C. MCHERI

Evidence about the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland would be an Example for the Federation of the Nations of the World if it were not for some minor stumbling blocks, which may hinder its success. These are:—

1. Different Policies: (a) Southern Rhodesia is taken as European country? Its policy is more or less that of U.S. Africa regarding Native Policy. (b) The two northern countries are known as Black States? (c) Southern Rhodesia African has very little voice and rights in his own land. (d) Northern Africans fear to be deprived of their rights.

2. (1) Resettlement and Land Allocation of Southern Rhodesia Africans had bad effects as the Northern Africans are concerned. It was very painful to Africans when some were forced to remove to new and unknown areas, and at the same time Federation was in function. Northern Africans were watching. (2) Destocking had other bad effects. To this we are told the land is small. But too many parts without anybody, and each one of the European Farmers possesses thousands of livestock in the very country. To these points, Northern Africans fear to mingle themselves with Southern Rhodesia where *native* is not free, and can be tossed about.

3. In theory the Federal Government is the highest in the Federation. In practice Southern Rhodesia Government is the highest. This causes the Northern Africans to remain doubting the wisdom of joining themselves with Southern Rhodesia to form the Federation. On this point there are these reasons:—

(a) Federal Government has African Members in its Parliament.

(b) Northern Territories have African Members in their Legislative Councils.

(c) Southern Rhodesia Parliament has no African Members. It has segregative policy in (1) Government; (2) Settlement; (3) Land Allocation; (4) Social Affairs; (5) Economic Affairs; (6) Education. The sixth point includes the whole of the Federation for we have two kinds of Education—European and Native Education with two Departments. How shall we learn about one another, if not from childhood, at University? Very doubtful.

Example for the Federation to the Nations of the World.

Because if its multi-racial peoples the Federation would show the best example to the whole world if toleration is achieved. "Let us aim at federating the hearts of the people," as I sometimes read in the "Rhodesia Herald." If doubts and fears are cast away by sincere examples and sympathetic understanding from the leaders, Federation would be a success. Failure of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, would mean failure of the whole world, and that will be a great disappointment to thinking people. If different races, who live in the Federation, would live together peacefully and happily, different peoples of the world may copy and finally we may live peacefully in the whole world. Speed to Federation or Dominion Status as things are today is not at all wise.

In the Federal Scheme we have the word *Partnership*. This word carries much weight and needs great sacrifice. It would be very much wise to wait and let the Spirit of Emergency die out. Let the multi-racial peoples of Rhodesia and Nyasaland study one another more closely until partnership becomes applicable to every sphere of life, not partnership in this and not in that.

What we need and long for is *Peace*. Peace of mind and heart, where fears and doubts should have no place. We often hear of racial problems, those are made problems not natural. Fairness in every dealing, though multi-racial community of advanced and backward peoples of different colours and languages would bring good understanding to one another.

This country before us, was given to blackman by God, the very God sent European to come and educate his fellow man. What is needed in the Federation is the Spirit of Brotherhood, though inhabited by different races of different colours. In the Monckton Commission there is one member, to represent Africans of Southern Rhodesia, who is a civil servant—Government servant—a chief. What would he say, being Government employee? It is, of course, too hurtful to hear—the house was burned last night, stones were thrown at a car and glasses damaged or the owner beaten.

The idea of Federation is Good. It only needs sacrifice on the side of the teacher—the European, and tolerance of the learner—the African. If the Federation succeeds, with true Spirit of Partnership, though the youngest, *the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland would save the World.*

Que Que

3rd January, 1960

V. MIIONI

G. BARGO

African Advancement on the Rhodesia Railways

In the year 1953, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed. This year, seven years after the inception of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have strongly objected to the further continuation of the Federation.

They are afraid that the racial policies of Southern Rhodesia may creep into their territories much to their detriment.

In the Federal Constitution, emphasis is made of the word partnership. But according to Africans in the three territories, this has become to be interpreted as a mere political phrase without any significant or practical meaning at all.

We do not intend to say more on how much the policy of partnership has been applied with or without success in the various spheres which come directly under the Federal Government.

What we are mostly concerned here is to submit to the Commission a factual account of events in the Rhodesia Railways undertaking in relation to African Advancement. It may be noted here that this choice comes as a result of protracted negotiations which have been going on on the Railways on the subject of African Advancement during the past seven years.

The Railway African Workers' Union decided against giving evidence to the Commission on "a point of principle". The two of us, an African journalist acquainted with labour problems on the Railways and an African former trade unionist leader with a thorough understanding of labour problems in the country feel that we are justified to give the evidence on behalf of the Africans now employed on the Railways.

Background :

The following is a brief resume of the background to the events which have been going on on the Railways since 1953.

In 1953, a Committee consisting of representatives of European and African Unions, and the Railway Administration was formed. This was after it had been claimed that certain jobs which were graded as European jobs had been observed to be done by Africans. It was also claimed that some of the jobs which were graded as European jobs on the Railways were being done by Africans outside the Railway Industry.

The result of the meeting was that a reporter was sent out. Mr. Farrar, a retired pensioner who had been closely connected with the African Affairs Department on the Railways for many years was the reporter appointed.

The Farrar Report

What was then called as the Farrar Report came out in 1955. The following recommendations were made :

- (a) In the countries outside Southern Rhodesia, most of the jobs which reserved for Europeans here were done by Africans. Among the countries cited were the Belgian Congo, Kenya, Tanganyika, etc. Given the chance, the report commented, Africans on the Rhodesia Railways would do these jobs satisfactorily.
- (b) In the both Rhodesias, Africans were doing certain jobs which on the Railways were reserved for Europeans. Among these jobs were those of a clerical nature, drivers under such Companies such as the Swift Transport, Clan Transport, and the Rhodesia Omnibus Company.
- (c) On the question of some of the European graded jobs being done by Africans on the Railways, the report stated that it had been almost impossible to get direct evidence supported by corroborative detail although it was observed in certain districts that it was true Africans were doing these jobs.

Recommendations

An important recommendation was made. This suggested that *twenty-five jobs which were at that time reserved for Europeans should be open to Africans on the Railways.*

In 1957, a Committee of representatives of the European and African Unions with the Railway Administration accepted the Report in principle, and it was then left to the Committee to decide on the jobs to be open to Africans.

Subsequent meetings followed. Several jobs were agreed upon to go to the Africans. Among these included those in the catering department and the handyman's jobs. But then negotiations suddenly broke down as the Europeans refused to accept some of the conditions under which the takeover would go.

Further Schemes

In the year 1957, the Unions presented a Seven Year Plan to the Administration. This meant for an African on the Railways to be advanced, he had to take seven years to reach the European minimum rates of pay. This plan was to start at 40% of the then existing European minimum rates.

The plan was to be sent to the Higher Authority via the Railway Board. But nothing more was heard about it until early in 1959 when the Minister of Transport assured Africans through their Union that he was doing everything possible to open negotiations on the issue.

In July, 1959, the Standing Committee met and the Administration brought out a new scheme almost similar to the Seven Year Scheme. This gave two lapses of seven year schemes during which Africans could reach the minimum European rates. Chances of promotion in this scheme were more favourable to the Africans and the starting wages were by far improved.

This was rejected outright by European Unions while the African Union accepted it in principle, yet demanding certain modifications.

In August, 1959, at a special meeting of the Joint Industrial Board, the African Union met the Railway Administration. The meeting resulted in the Administration publishing the White Paper. The Railway Administration undertook to send it to the National Industrial Council as the jobs involved concerned the Europeans.

Immediately the scheme was announced, havoc broke out in the two European Unions. Demands of the rate for the Job were made by both the Amalgamated Engineering Union and the Rhodesia Railway Workers' Union.

The matter soon sparked off a political upheaval resulting in various political parties trying to win the electorate on the issue. The Dominion Party and the Central Africa Party joined in the political wrangle and made no mistake that

they were going to capitalise on the matter politically. It is significant to observe that at this stage the matter was no longer an industrial issue.

Determined to bring what appeared as political pressure on the Federal Government, and seemingly taking an advantage of their political influence, the representatives of European Union met Sir Roy Welensky, Federal Premier and later passed a vote of no confidence in the Federal Minister of Transport, Mr. William Eastwood.

Another Scheme

Amid all this confusion, the Higher Authority on the Railways, the Federal Minister of Transport, yet brought in another scheme, based on the rate for the job. This gave the impression that the Federal Government had cowed down to the demands from the European Unions. There was immediate violent reaction to the Scheme which resulted in the European Union, the Amalgamated Engineering Union going on a day's strike. This was on the grounds that the Government had conceded to the African demands.

Observations

It will be noted that in most of the schemes which had been advanced up to this time, they had to be abandoned as a result of either:

- (a) from the pressure from the European Unions whose political influence could not be neglected by any Government or political party; or
- (b) from political pressure from all the parties.

Up to the time this memorandum is being prepared, the matter is now in the hands of the territorial Ministers of Labour of Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia. These have already indicated that they cannot rubber-stamp the scheme in its present form.

We would like to note here that it is an important anomaly that whereas the Federal Government can take an active part in the preliminary negotiations on the matters affecting labour on the Railways, it has no final say in the matter.

Transport is a Federal matter but labour on the Railways is a territorial responsibility. This gives the absurd impression in which a judge of a high court could be placed in a position in which his decision has to be modified or reviewed by a magistrate.

We believe the practical application of the policy of partnership on the Railways has been made impossible due to two factors:

- (a) The political set up in the country places a section of a people to use their political influence in order to get what they want industrially. As this is a matter outside the scope of this memorandum, we need not comment further on it.
- (b) There is undoubtedly something basically wrong in the set up of industrial laws in the Railway industry.

Whereas the Higher Authority, the Federal Minister of Transport has power to negotiate up to the highest level with the Unions, what has been accepted by him and the Unions cannot be rubber-stamped by him.

Hence in the matter above, although the European Unions and Federal Minister of Transport have reached agreement on the scheme, the scheme cannot be implemented because territorial labour Ministers have refused to accept it in its present form.

Comment

The Federal Government has had seven years in which to convince Africans that partnership could be made a reality. The Rhodesia is a Federal industry. *By failing to implement African Advancement on the Railways during the last seven years, the Federal Government has, we are compelled to say, also failed to convince Africans outside the Railway industry its sincerity to implement the policy of partnership despite the Government spokesmen's often repeated grandiose boast of its genuine desire to put the policy of partnership in practical use.*

It has also even failed to set a pattern for other industries in the country of advancing Africans. (Note) the minimum rate of pay for Africans both on the Railways and in other industries in Southern Rhodesia is £6 10s. Od. per month as against the European's minimum of £

Our Recommendations

The Railway Industry being the backbone of the Federation and also being placed in the most advantageous position as a Federal responsibility, we very strongly suggest that all

matters affecting it including labour should fall under one Minister—the Federal Minister of Transport. This should include other industries which are a federal responsibility such as the Post Office, Health, etc.

Our reasons for suggesting so are that it is impossible to expect a territorial Minister of Labour accept any progressive measures with regard to rates of pay which might appear higher than what he has recommended in the industries over which he has control.

If the Federal Government had power over labour issues in industries concerning it, we believe this would set a pattern in other industries outside its sphere of influence.

We should also like to emphasise that if Federation has to gain any support at all from the Africans, we believe that it can only do so by breaking down the economic colour bar in the industries by starting with the industries under it, such as the Railways.

We should further like to emphasise that the African and the European has come here to stay. Both of them are dependent on each other. But we deplore the situation in which one section of a community is placed in a situation in which it has to subsidise for living standards of another section of the community. Genuine and bold steps to advance the African must be taken by the Federal Government even at the expense of bitter opposition from those who have put them in power. If the Federal venture has to succeed at all, it has to win the confidence of the Africans.

Bulawayo

8th April, 1960

CHIEF MKANGANWE

Federation

Federation is good when it is carried out in the right way, by those who lead the people. There is no wrong on the motor car but the driver who drives it. We have seven years dealing with the Federation, there should be a great difference.

An African also should have better wages and also should be honoured as a human being. We have great brotherhood through this Federation but there is a difference: one brother is satisfied and the other one is very hungry: this is not caused by Federation, but is caused by its leaders.

Federation should pass laws equally to its people of all races.

Land Allocation

Land allocation is one of the most important plans done by the Federation. One who thought this plan was right to please everyone. But there is one thing on this. Everybody should be given same acres to those whom you found with their lands and those who had more than one wife. Even those who had their lands and were unmarried should also be given same acres as those who have one wife, because this law was passed while they were all present. This also should be done to cattle, everyone should be given the same number. By this we can see how the Co-operation Association judges the price of grain, they make the same price all over to please everybody—this is very important.

I shall not speak, but all I wanted to speak have been submitted in this copy.

E. R. MORTEL—Retired Native Commissioner

An alternative Constitution to that recommended in the White Paper on Federation of the Central African Territories.

Since the publication of the White Paper, there have been innumerable debates and lectures on the proposal to federate the territories of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland. The subject has been debated in the British Parliament, in our own Parliament, and in the Executive Councils of the two Northern Territories; it has been ventilated and reviewed, not only in our local press, but in the principle newspapers of the United Kingdom.

After careful study of the position as it is presented to us at the moment, what is the one and only logical conclusion to be arrived at? It is this: Federation in terms of the White Paper cannot materialise for the simple reason that the Government of the United Kingdom will not grant it without the consent of the Indigenous Population of the Northern Territories and that consent will definitely and continuously be refused.

Moreover, it is submitted, that the majority of the European Population will surely not be so foolish as to agree to a Constitution which will allow of the Bantu (Africans) by sheer numbers to outvote them in the not distant future, and establish a Bantu State to lord it over the descendants of

the European. Conversely, neither will the Bantu appreciate a Constitution which makes no provision against a contingency arising whereby the Bantu may be swamped by hordes of European immigrants into the Territories, and thus depriving them of their land and political rights. Indeed, it is the fear of this contingency arising which influences the Bantu in refusing even to discuss the question of Federation. To be perfectly honest, has the European the right to blame them in assuming this attitude? I think not.

The question now arises: how are we to proceed to realise our aspirations for Amalgamation and Dominion Status in view of the British Governments statement on closer association made in both houses of Parliament on the 21st November last, and in subsequent debates?

The statement is merely a statement, and does not necessarily mean that the Imperial Government is averse to changing its policy for a better one. Indeed, if we can submit a better proposal, and one that will give satisfaction and meet the political ambitions of both the Europeans and Indigenous people of the territories, then the Imperial Government would be bound to accede to our request.

Let us then submit our petition as follows in a skeleton form, the minor details to be filled in later:—

We pray that the three territories may be amalgamated into a single unitary State with Dominion status.

That a Commission be appointed to apportion the land in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland into three areas, namely, the Native Area, the European Area, and an Indetermined Area, in the same way as the land was fairly apportioned in Southern Rhodesia by the Carter Commission. As the country expands and develops, the respective European and Native Areas would augment their holdings by drawing upon the Indetermined Areas for more land as the occasion arose.

Europeans and other races shall not be allowed to reside in the areas reserved for Native occupation except in so far as their presence there is desired and beneficial to Native interests; and conversely, Natives shall not be allowed to enter or reside in the European Areas except in so far as their presence there is desired and is beneficial to European interests. With regard to Southern Rhodesia, this provision has already been made by the Land Apportionment Act on the recommendation of the Carter Commission.

For constitutional purposes, the amalgamated territories should now be divided into provinces, each with its Provincial Council presided over by an Administrator.

These Councils shall each have the power to legislate and make the laws for the internal government of their respective provinces.

There should be four provinces, viz: one for the European Area in Southern Rhodesia, one for the European Area in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, one for the Native Area in Southern Rhodesia, and one for the Native Area in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. (It may be considered advisable to make provision for separate provinces in Nyasaland—one for the Native Area and one for the European Area which would bring the number of provinces to six instead of four.)

It should be noted here that no Native shall be qualified to vote in the election of members to the Councils of the European Provinces, and conversely, no European shall be qualified to vote in the election of members to the Councils of the Native Provinces.

The Constitution of Dominion Government should also provide for a Federal Parliament with a Governor-General representing Her Majesty the Queen. A certain number of the members should be elected by qualified European Voters from the European provinces, and in like manner, a certain number of members should be elected by voters from the Native Provinces. The number of members from the Native Provinces should be in the ratio of one Native Member to every four European Members. The discrepancy between the number of European and Native Members is intentional, for, the matters to be dealt with in the Federal Parliament are of such an important nature to the welfare of the State, that it would be inadvisable in both the interests of the Natives and Europeans, to allow the former in their present state of intellectual development to outvote their fellow members of European descent.

The Federal Parliament would have to deal with such matters as the Natives have not the least comprehension, such as, e.g., Defence, Transport (including railways and national roads), Customs, irrigation, electricity, post and telegraphs, judiciary, etc.

In considering the above suggestions, several questions will immediately arise in the mind of the reader:

(1) Are there a sufficient number of civilised and educated Bantu (or Wanu) who have the competency and ability to form a Government in the proposed autonomous Native Provinces? I think there are provided their Administrators who will be required to personally preside at their Council Meetings are carefully and wisely chosen Europeans, and sympathetically guide them in their political development.

It is considered that it would be in the interests of the Bantu themselves to nominate a certain number of Europeans of their choice, to their Councils, for say, five to ten years, to assist and guide them in their debates and political evolution.

It has been suggested that the Legislative Authority for the respective European and Bantu Areas, should be styled Provinces, with Administrators presiding at their Council Meetings. This is chiefly for the sake of economy. Governors and the formality and ceremonial which surrounds them, incur considerable expense which might well be relegated to the office of the Governor-General.

(2) Administration of the Native Reserves, which are communal settlements, should continue in the initial stages as hitherto.

The powers and rights of the paramount Chiefs should be re-affirmed.

The European Native Commissioners or District Commissioners should be gradually eliminated in the course of time. Bantu aspirants to the Civil Service should be employed as Clerks in the offices of Native (or District) Commissioners, and when qualified by passing the Law and Administration examinations, should be appointed to the position of Native or District Commissioner.

(3) The Coloured Community.

These people have developed into a distinct racial entity, and should be on the common roll of Voters in the European Provinces. They will naturally continue to have the same rights and obligations as the European. There is no necessity for them to have separate representation, as their aspirations, interests and ideals are identical with those of the Europeans. Immigration from the Union should, however, be restricted.

(4) The Indian Community.

The Indians should, like the Coloured Community, be placed on the common roll of Electors, but we cannot allow the same conditions to develop in the Central African Territories as now prevail in Kenya and East Africa. Already there are far too many Indians in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and any further immigration should be restricted if not entirely prohibited.

In submitting, in all humility, this contribution to a possible solution of our Native Problem, let us pray that we may be guided by Providence to be open and fair in our deliberations. In writing this thesis, I have had this ideal constantly before me.

There is no discrimination in the recommendations made as between European and Bantu, except that for some time, the number of Deputies from the Native Provinces to the Federal Parliament, should be in the ratio of one to every four Deputies from the European Provinces. It has already been explained why this one provision, of a temporary nature, is considered to be necessary. As the Bantu progress and develop intellectually, this ratio will by degrees be altered more and more in their favour, until ultimately they will stand on the same footing as the European.

In the meantime, let both the European and Bantu be assured that the land assigned to them respectively by an impartial Commission, will be theirs in perpetuity, and that they will have the power to legislate and rule themselves in their provinces free from interference.

Salisbury

16th July, 1952.

Addendum to memorandum

In the event of any European or Bantu Provincial Council being unable at any time to function, legislate or govern for any cause whatsoever, then in that case it shall be lawful for the Governor-General, acting on the advice of his Ministers, to temporarily administer the said Province by Proclamation under his hand, or, nominate and appoint Official Members to an Executive Council, which shall have the power and authority vested in it to administer the Province for such time and duration as the Governor-General shall deem to be expedient under the circumstances.

J. MOUBRAY

My purpose in submitting this memorandum is to emphasise what I consider the all important issue before your Com-

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mission. That is the desire of the inhabitants of all three Territories for Federation or otherwise.

We have been repeatedly told that Federation will not be thrust upon unwilling peoples. This is quite right and to do so would be disastrous.

We are told that the vast majority of Africans view the Federation with distrust and suspicion. This, I submit, is entirely untrue.

I am a European farmer, aged 39, born and bred in Southern Rhodesia. I have three children all born in Salisbury. I am a Federal citizen, not a white settler. I speak Chinyanja fluently and have a working knowledge of the Shena dialects.

We, my brother and I, employ 151 adult labourers on our farm. Of these, exactly 70 come from Nyasaland. Nearly all these labourers are married and settled on the farm. We provide free schooling, large "gardens," both irrigated and dry, brick built houses, a beer hall, a cinema and a sports field. Since there are only my brother and I managing the farm we operate on the "capitao" system. This means we delegate considerable responsibility to African foremen in charge of our various activities. This system works very well, we trust these foremen and the response is gratifying.

The point I wish to make from foregoing is that I am in continual daily contact with our labourers, and knowing their language, cannot but help following their general trend of thought.

Of these 151 labourers and their wives I can truthfully say that not more than 10 are aware of the implications and objects of Federation. I have discussed it with them, both Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesians. When I have explained to them what Federation means and have asked them for their opinions, they almost invariably answer as follows: "We are satisfied with the present Governments, and if these Governments feel that Federation will benefit us all then we too will accept it."

Our present Federal population is almost 8 million. If it were somehow possible to interview each adult male and female, regardless of race, station or tribe, I am quite convinced, from my own personal experience with our own small section of the community, that the overwhelming majority would be prepared to accept full Federation and all it implies. It is a very, very small minority of our total population which opposes Federation and does so in the name of the vast majority.

Shamva

22nd January, 1960

C. MUIR

Lord Monckton states in his press conference, as reported to-day, 18th February, that he "hopes to obtain a true cross-section of African opinion".

It is certain that, if the Commission's findings are based upon evidence given by volunteers, it will not reflect a true cross-section, but will be the opinions of those vocal Africans who pose as "leaders".

The only way to obtain a true cross-section of African opinion would be to hold a sort of Gallup poll.

If the authorities in each centre collect a sample of, say, 50 Africans, taken off the streets and from their kraals, as they go about their normal business, and question them; there is more hope that a true cross-section will be obtained.

As it is also certain that most of such witnesses, so collected, will be inarticulate types, their opinions could be extracted by means of a series of simple questions, to which, in most cases, a plain answer of "Yes" or "No" can be given.

Lord Monckton will then find that freedom, to many Africans, means that they won't have to pay for anything. He will also find that many Africans do not know one thing about Federation or who Welensky is, and care less.

I make the foregoing suggestion as a means of doing exactly what Lord Monckton hopes to get, i.e. "a true cross-section of African opinion."

I have resided in the Colony for the past 46 years.

Quê Que

18th February, 1960

S. J. MUNODOWAFI

The Beginning of Federation and its Opposition

I feel I must state where Federation started and sort out some of the facts of opposition which proved to be true during the trial stage of our Federation.

Five Points raised by Africans in Britain, 20th April, 1949

1. Federation would deprive of Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the direct political and cultural ties with the United Kingdom, and would mean discontinuation of the policy of deliberate tutelage for Africans now pursued by the Government of United Kingdom in these two Territories.

2. It would mean *Domination* by Southern Rhodesia instead of Guardianship by the United Kingdom.

3. It would extend to Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia the policy of segregation and discrimination.

4. It would, in fact, be only a thin end of the wedge of Amalgamation, since the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia one of the two architects of the proposed Federation, has had recourse to the Federal Idea, only on realisation that his fond scheme of amalgamation was incapable of acceptance by the Africans, and therefore, impossible of sanction by the Government of the United Kingdom.

5. And finally, it would enable the European settlers of Southern Rhodesia to attain to the status of *Dominion*, which would give them an Empire over the destiny of the African in Central Africa.

At this meeting they agreed that, if at any time in the future, the policy of Southern Rhodesia much more approaches that of the United Kingdom, then the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia would be willing to enter into Federal Union with that Colony.

In Southern Rhodesia, certain vocal leaders, as they were called, let their views be known here and overseas. All African convention was formed to organise opposition but was thought unwise and dissolved. Therefore Federation came when these sharp differences between black and white politicians were there. Europeans, on the other hand, were sure of its success and the Africans could not help it in any way, but to have a "wait and see" attitude packed to the brim with suspicion.

Federation's Trial Stage

Federal Franchise Laws

This, from the outset, was based on inordinately high financial or educational Qualifications which ensured that the overwhelming majority of electors were Europeans. e.g. of the 29 members of the Federal Assembly, 29 are elected by the General Voters of Southern Rhodesia who number 67,127, of whom 1,024 are Africans! This agrees with point 2 of the African views stated before.

2. The Bledisloe Commission predicted that the European Electorate of Southern Rhodesia will have a bigger say in the affairs of the Federation.

Sir Roy Welensky, in the "Rhodesia Herald" of 2.5.58, says: "I have always maintained that Independence for the Federation, at least to me means the withdrawal of the Colonial Office from exercising any administrative control in any part of the Federation." Again this statement agrees with Point 1.

In the "Rhodesian Graphic" of September, 1955, the Prime Minister said his Government was pursuing a policy of Selective Immigration designed substantially to increase our European population and resource of skill. This was supported by Southern Rhodesia which put up a table entitled *immigration will prove Federation's salvation*. Europeans in 1953—158,500; Africans in 1953—2,130,000. By adding 10% of Immigration to 2% of European Natural Increase, the figures will be:—

In 1984 Europeans—5,655,328.

In 1984 Africans—5,325,126.

These statements show that the Federal Franchise was made to prevent many Africans from exercising basic human rights and infringe the African's rights under the Law, and give the white races, who are paid high and have high qualifications, chance to dominate for their own benefits and fill the Federation with Immigrants and rule for Ever.

Partnership

By failing to implement the policy of partnership, the purpose for which the British Government agreed to Federation, Federation undermined itself and is torn by conflicting white and black Nationalism so much so that the consolidation of European supremacy destroys the hope of democracy and the ground for nationalism prepared.

In the "Rhodesia Herald" of 21.1.57, it stated among other things that "while it was agreed that partnership and co-operation between the inhabitants would be the corner stone on which the new Federal State would be built, there had been no practical demonstration by the Government to the people

that they really meant to implement the declared policy. Southern Rhodesia segregation and discriminatory laws made implementation of Partnership impossible and will still prevent any form of Federation unless the policy is destroyed altogether and be substituted by a non-racial policy.

Economy and Labour

A European in the Federation is recognised by wealth and an African by poverty. And yet there are few Africans who are also wealthy but unrecognised as people capable of sharing the responsibility of the country as free men. In Southern Rhodesia the Land Apportionment Act puts such a man out of the picture. The artificial restrictions on African wages for labour supplied have retarded Africans development, since they are paid more on basis of colour than of skill. A few exceptions are more valuable in Federal Propaganda than in promotion of partnership. The native Land Husbandry Act aims to urbanize the growing population of Africans in Southern Rhodesia. Industrial Relations are therefore the important ground of economic relations. The unrealistic propaganda of Europeans having high productivity and therefore high level incomes and Africans low productivity and therefore Low Income levels, as stated by Professor Clay in 193—, who said, "the individuals who come out from England to double the wages they received in England are no more efficient than they were before they came and not obviously efficient than the other Rhodesians among whom they now find themselves."

Most of Southern Rhodesia's Labour Force is Migratory and mostly from the two Federated countries, hence the knowledge of Southern Rhodesia Native Policy is a stumbling block to Federation.

Politics in Southern Rhodesia and Federation

This differs greatly from that of the two Northern Territories; hence we have no African M.P. in our Parliament today, because of the social and political rights based ultimately on property and income, plus the attitude of our whites towards Africans, who are regarded as uncivilised, no matter what educational degrees they might possess. The Government has got to remain in the hands of *Civilised* People (with white skins, of course).

The Federal Government has also applied the safeguards of Southern Rhodesian politics with the exception of only having African M.P.'s due to some sort of a pressure from Great Britain's criticism and on the other hand for the purpose of propaganda that Partnership is being implemented gradually in the Federation.

So it has been very difficult for the Federal Government during its trial stage to make especially Africans in Southern Rhodesia who have no representative of their own colour but a white man's representative to understand what is actually meant by Partnership and Co-operation. "Politically our African is immature, and it will take him years even to exercise his Vote" but we of the Federation who are Africans have seen that it is only a refusal to have Africans to participate in the ruling of Federation.

Our Federal Prime Minister in the Rhodesia Herald of 9.2.57, said. "It is time we took a stand, the stand which I am now taking on the issue of whether *civilisation* is to remain here. That is, whether you and I, Europeans, are to remain and whether what we all set store by is to remain and whether on that basis this Federation is to go forward." Lord Malvern, in the Federal Assembly said we have complete control of our own defence Force, and I only hope we shall not have to use it as North America Colonies had to use theirs because we are dealing with a stupid Government in the *United Kingdom*. The Africans regard such statements as threats to take unilateral action towards Independence and if it's taken in this manner, what will become of them; This is the main thing that made the trial stage of Federation a fertile ground of European nationalism versus Poor African Nationalism.

Education

Well developed countries like America never depended on skilled immigrants but they educated their people and today they are well up. Education of all the children in the country should have been one of the first aims of the Federation. The wonderful Technological Developments done by Federation are so great, and have plunged the Federation in raising Postage Revenue to a very uneconomic standard in as far as Africans are concerned. If it were for Education and Health, which would enable the Federation to improve its citizens and train them to be skilled workers in the Development of their country there would not be any African opposed to the Federation at all.

I think there are many countries that would have given money to the Federation for the purpose of improvement of

its citizens in order to be able to develop their country. This would have given equal opportunity for all, and then leave it to ability, enterprise and hard work. This would have given us no room for Racialism, Nationalism at all and the names which our Politicians call one another for no benefit but selfish sectional ends.

Agriculture

Southern Rhodesia started its life free of discrimination with regard to land ownership, occupation and use in the Orders in Council of 1889-1894 and 1898. In 1925 the Colonists sought the apportionment of all lands on a Racial basis. The Morris Carter Land Commission was appointed to report on dividing the land into European and African Areas.

As a result of the Commission's recommendations, the Land Apportionment Act was passed in 1930 to establish territorial segregation, which gave birth to Native Land Husbandry Act.

In the Rhodesia Herald of 13.9.58, Mr. Joshua N'Komo says, "With the bitterness of the sufferings born of Africans, it is a vicious device whose primary aims and objects are to uproot, impoverish and disperse the African people. The two Acts ensure the abundance of supply of cheap labour because no family can live on six to eight acres in a very poor soil or let me say the poorest of soil in Southern Rhodesia is found in the Native Areas Reserves only." Thousands and thousands of money are being spent to improve what Nature made poor, and the African is blamed for bad methods of farming, yet it will not be long before experts see that our Migratory Farming was the best for such soil. Therefore Agriculture is purely European and a few Experimental Farms are places of showing visitors of what the Government intends doing with the implementation of Native Land Husbandry Act; even then those Experimental Farms are on better soil than that put aside for the maintenance of the African families.

As a result of this we have been detribalised and have no Home; we are named Urban Africans and Rural Africans, which means that one has no home altogether, but the other has a useless home which will never enable him to educate his children.

African's Point of View

1. No African wants to dominate as Europeans have done.
2. No African wants Europeans to go back home.
3. No African wants to be ruled without representation.
4. We want to eliminate the main causes of economic and political instability, poverty and personal insecurity of all races.
5. We want a policy that will remove fear and suspicion that any single race might dominate for its own benefit.
6. Federation should ensure that all great Freedoms known as Human Fundamental rights are accepted here as the rights of every inhabitant of the Federation.
7. We oppose any increase in the Constitutional Status of the Federation or in the powers of Federation until Southern Rhodesia has amended its Segregatory Laws and Discriminatory Laws.
8. We want full representative Government for all the three territories to ensure that the desire of all the inhabitants is manifested.
9. We want the constitutional entrenchment of safeguards for Racialistic purposes removed in all the three territories.
10. It is only when such Governments have been established in all three Territories that the time will be appropriate for Federal and Territorial Governments to make a joint approach to the British Government for further constitutional talks on Federation.

Fully representative Governments in the three Territories and the desire of the majority of the inhabitants should be accomplished before anything else. Failing which, Federation should be abolished.

Fort Victoria.

K. MUSHASHU

The Federation of Rhodesia & Nyasaland

Since its inception in 1953, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has raised problems that make it difficult for the average African in the Federation to like it. In the first place it must be pointed out that Federation was imposed on the Africans of both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This clearly shows that from the beginning the Africans of the two Northern Protectorates in particular were opposed to Federation. The opposition was mainly due to the difference in the political status of the three territories. Northern Rhodesia

and Nyasaland are Protectorates whereas Southern Rhodesia is already a self-governing Colony where the rights of the Africans are very limited. This makes it difficult for the Africans in the two Northern Protectorates to accept being joined to a Colony where Africans have negligible political rights. If Federation is allowed to continue it means Britain is violating one of the fundamental principles that she has ever since upheld in governing her Protectorates in Africa. If a Protectorate really means a country in which the indigenous people are protected until such time as they can govern themselves, then it would be wrong for Britain to accept the present working of the Federation which aims at handing over power to the European minority in the Federation. The fears of the African on this point are justified by the hostile attitude of the European settlers towards a speech made by the British Premier, Mr. Macmillan, to the effect that independence would come to the Federation only when the two Northern Protectorates would get responsible government. Hence it appears a situation has arisen which makes the Federation not acceptable not only to Africans but to some of the Europeans as well. This being the case, it is only in the fitting of things that Federation as it exists at present must be abolished.

With the rise of African nationalism, any attempt on the part of Britain to impose Federation on the Africans of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is bound to lead to disturbances. The British attitude towards the present African nationalism is worthy of commendation. By what Britain has done in Ghana and what she will soon do in Nigeria and Tanganyika no one can ever doubt the fact that Britain has in a broad way encouraged Africans to the effect that if they worked hard and proved their worth she would give them responsible government and finally independence so that they become fully fledged members of the Commonwealth. The Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are working towards the same goal and the present Federation if allowed to continue will definitely hamper their progress.

It must not be mistaken that there is any desire on the part of the Africans in the Federation to drive away the immigrants, whether Europeans or Asians. The world has become almost one and more united than it has ever been in human history. This means that no one race can claim to live in a country by itself. But what forms the basis of democracy is majority rule. It is on this point that the Africans in the units that form the Federation want to rule in their respective areas because they outnumber European settlers by far. This state of affairs can be achieved if only the important democratic principle of 'one man one vote' is put into effect, but instead the present Federal Constitution does not make any provision for the incorporation of such a principle.

It is not only in the political aspect but also in the social aspect that the Federation has proved a failure. When the Federation first came into being, partnership was its watchword. Unfortunately as Federation went on in its daily work, the idea of partnership was thrown to the wind. At present there is great discrimination based on colour in the Federation and this is against the principle of partnership. There are many restaurants and hotels in the Federation where Africans are excluded and this proves a great failure on the part of those who direct the affairs of the Federation. The Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, opposed the recommendations of a committee that was selected to go into the question of the colour bar in Northern Rhodesia. He said the colour bar could be abolished not by legislation but by education, but it must be pointed out that in other countries like the U.S.A. and India problems of colour discrimination are solved by legislation or by a Bill of Rights being included in the Constitution.

Africans in the Federation are not given responsible jobs. Very few Africans in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia have responsible jobs in the Civil Service and almost none in Southern Rhodesia. Had it not been for the Federation the advancement of the Africans in the two Northern Protectorates would be faster than it is at present. There are at present separate hospitals for Africans and Europeans in the Federation, and European hospitals are much better than African hospitals, despite the fact that Africans are in the majority. There is no single salary scale for Africans and Europeans in the Federation. Very few Africans are in the European scales despite the fact that there are Africans who hold the same qualifications as Europeans. This is quite different from what is happening in East Africa.

Before Federation, it was easy for Africans in the Northern Territories to get passports in order to go for further studies abroad. Now the situation is difficult and many people are not allowed to get passports and hence they lost opportunities for further studies abroad.

Finally, it must be pointed out that the three units in the

Federation could be brought together by a confederation of one form or another other than by Federation. This confederation could be a military one or an economic one or both as the case may be. But why a political union should be imposed on the African when such a union could be done on military and economic lines only puzzles the average African. It only shows that Europeans insist on Federation because they want to dominate Africans. This idea will lead to trouble if Britain does not do something about it.

After all, Federation was an experiment and since it is clearly shown that it has failed to achieve its purpose, the only wise step would be to abolish it. It is important the Monckton Commission take all these points into consideration in order to arrive at a conclusion that will bring peace and happiness into the Federation.

B. NARSING

A Rhodesian by birth of Indian origin. By trade: a Cobbler, and then an Outfitter and Clothier, now an Insurance Agent and a Company Director. An executive member of the Asian Association. My father came to Rhodesia in 1914.

I am in support of the advanced status of the Federation only on the following safeguards being created in a future revised Constitution:—

1. That the revised Federal Constitution contain specific mention of the term "Federal Citizens," to include Federal Citizens of European descent, Africans, Asians, Coloureds, Eur-Africans, Eur-Asians, and that their rights be enshrined in the Constitution without doubt and differentiation.

2. Though the primary concern of the Monckton Commission is to deal with the advanced status of the Federation and its Constitution, the Territorial divisions and legislatures cannot be divorced from allegiance to the Federal Constitution and the carrying out of its avowed policy of partnership. Therefore, the revised Constitution must have authority to cut across Territorial legislation where it affects the rights of individuals of any one race. In implementing the policy of partnership, it must be accepted that the Territorial authorities are important cogs in the wheels of the Federal machinery, and must play their part in line with the policy of the Federal Constitution.

3. That the U.K. Government must retain its right to veto Federal legislation where it may prejudice the rights of any one racial group, or better still, if an Upper House is created which will be strong enough and talented enough, drawn mainly from impartial people representing the best of the country which will guide over both the Federal and Territorial legislations, with specific duties to entrench the rights of minorities, and to remove Federal Territorial and Municipal laws and by-laws which differentiate against individual racial groups and put a stop to any further introductions thereof.

4. The U.K. Government must retain the right to appoint a Governor General, and I am of the opinion that the British aristocracy has always had sufficient men of calibre to do their duties impartially. This, of course, is not always true of the local dignitaries for such high and responsible positions. Apart from their ceremonial and administrative responsibilities, theirs is the task of guiding a country's destiny, and those that believe it to be tied solely to the propagation of the wellbeing of its white citizens only, are not the right people.

5. Unless safeguards are provided and the rights enshrined of the minorities, the United Kingdom Government will find a repetition of what has happened in the Union of South Africa, where the minority rules and the majority suffers. The 'Act of the Union of South Africa' by a British Parliament without reference to the rights of all its citizens and without the specific mention of various races, has caused it a loss of face. What is most shocking is that the United Kingdom Government's hands are tied by its own Act and completely powerless to take any action constitutionally against the Union Government to enforce any justice for the majority of its inhabitants.

Instances

One of the most important elements that has been overlooked in shaping the future of a country is the 'power of the press.' The Constitution must provide the safeguard against the abuse of 'the freedom of the press' where race matters are concerned. The press has, since the Federation and long before, made capital out of racial issues for the benefit of its white citizens. It has ill-treated the privileges of the minority groups such as those of Asians and Coloureds. This has poisoned the minds of the people. It is the very reason why the task of easing racial tension in Central and South Africa have become almost unsurmountable. The press has always toed the line of power politics instead of being impartial and free.

Indians, who are the only spearhead of intelligence facing the whites, have been the most victimised section in this struggle of white supremacy. They have been treated and placed in a very humiliating position by the press and people alike.

As for racial discrimination in public places under the jurisdiction of the Territorial authorities which undoubtedly has effect in the Federal sphere of multi-racial co-operation, such discrimination must be done away with by legislation, if necessary, as a last resort. The social side will automatically adjust itself.

Police who are here to safeguard one and all, are often more interested in the race of the complainant than the complaint itself and there is reason to believe that certain matters are given priority and others judged partially. (General feeling amongst Asians and Coloureds).

Conclusion

Finally what has made Central and South Africa the melting pot of the African Continent, the outcome from which depends the future of Africa and the British influence in Africa, is the inability of its white settlers to live and settle amicably the common problems with the indigenous native and other racial elements, by living in harmony instead of assuming race superiority. Also their inability to share the common things of life has caused more bitterness and strife than the appreciation of bringing Christianity and the Western way of life.

This is clearly evident.

Unless this root cause is removed through the machinery of a higher Constitutional authority, the whites will continue to live with a monkey on their back; the bugbear of racial superiority towards others in all walks of life, and not face life equally with other competitors.

The problems of Africa are more human than administrative. Once having created the ground for solving that problem, administration becomes only one of detail and time.

P.S.—Incidentally, in my schooldays (1942) there were no secondary schools for Asians, but quite a few for "Europeans only." The rest, therefore, has been an uphill struggle. I wonder if that was meant to be 'discrimination with justice.' Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia.

I. K. NKOMO

Abolishment of the Federation.

Built on White Supremacy.

Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be given full and complete sovereignty of independence.

Could split the Commonwealth.

Could endanger the peace of the world.

Mac's philosophy only remedy.

The greatest benefit for all races in South Central Africa, is for this Commission to recommend the abolishment of the Federation to the five Government and to the Constitutional Conference to be held in 1960.

This Federation is built on entrenching White Supremacy and the perpetual enslavement of Bantus.

Reading between lines the following its aims: immediate— to draw Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland out under the protections of H.M. wings, they white settlers use such strategical political slogans as: Partnership, native advancement—socially, educationally, and politically.

Dominion Status come (Westminster)

By European dominated parliament they will peacefully annex Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Long term aim:— A cynism of a systematic extinction of our black race and in future Geographies only White Areas will be written.

Britain's Commitments

Britain should honour her commitments by giving them their complete independence and their sovereign rights and their they can determine destiny by a referendum to join the federation if could be created.

Danger to the Commonwealth

If the present federation is imposed on 8 millions of Bantus in this Federation without their consent only harm could come such shooting in Cholo-Nyasaland and the one 1959—when Africans were shot in cold blood, will always be repeated without splitting the Commonwealth and endanger the peace of the world.

Remedy Mac's philosophy—Gordian knot of white

supremacy. As Alexander The Great, with the Gordian Knot, The Right Honourable H. Mac. the British Prime Minister on his visit broke this Gordian Knot by his speech in Salisbury and Cape Town broke this Gordian Knot of White Supremacy, and brought to light of great multiracial state of the Commonwealth of all races in this part of South and Central Africa.

Commission Fortunate

This Royal Commission is very fortunate in having so great a personage to break the ice before it for his philopy is the Remedy this great evil of the Colour Bar—which was carelessly sown by White Settlers now we are reaping it in Wildwinds.

Bulawayo

3rd May, 1960

W. D. NTULI and D. B. NTULI

The Constitution of the Federation does not contain "colour bar" yet, not withstanding this, a colour bar has been instituted against Africans, both registered voters, and others, because, an African can not live wherever he wish, even if he has the means to meet the requirements of the area where he wishes to live. This applies even in trade, he cannot just trade anywhere he thinks he can do good business.

In education, although the Government is paying for education, there is no proper supervision. Some mission schools out in the country will do anything they like without any interference by the Government. This is so in spite of the raised African tax.

The statesmen do admit that economically the African in the Federation, is lacking and they desire to see him improve. So that he could have a full share in the economical advantage in the country. But we boldly give this as an information, that before Federation some Africans in Southern Rhodesia organised themselves into a Co-operative Society, and had it registered. And because they valued the leadership of a white man, they invited three Europeans to be Directors to the Society with seven Africans. The capital of the Society was raised entirely by African to what it is.

They paid the Attorneys for drawing up the Memorandum and Articles of Association. They paid the chartered accountant for preparing the registration for same. It was after all these preliminaries had been done that the Europeans became Directors. And a chartered Accountant was employed as book-keeper and Secretary.

At the end of the first year of trading the audited accounts showed a loss of £70, and this was not satisfactory to both African Directors and shareholders of the Society, yet it was satisfactory to the European Directors, they did not want any investigation carried out although it was called for.

The European Directors made an assure that in future they will see that the books were properly kept. It is very strange to say, that the following year's accounts were worse than the previous year's accounts. In that they showed clear falsified figures, and because they are white, no inquiries could be made in these accounts. The shareholders of this Society believed that when the Society was placed under judicial management, the Judicial Manager being under the High Court, the position would improve. In actual fact, the position improved from £8,000 sales per year to £26,000, and yet a credit of £4,000 could not be liquidated in six years, although it was reduced to £400 in 1956. It has since gone up to £2,000. This is very strange to us the Society has been paying the income tax over the years, while it alleged that the credit now is £2,000 the recoverable sum in possession of people is over £3,000, and because among these persons there are whites nothing could be done about it.

It is our opinion that in Southern Rhodesia, the Federation is due to suffer because, although there are channels through which Africans could voice their grievances, African grievances are not taken and acted upon as such, when he is in a dispute with a white person, for instance, the African was employed by this Society and earning £12 10s. per month, he was entered by the book-keeper to be earning £257 10s. in 12 months, and because this is written by a white man he was pressed by all those Europeans connected with this Society to accept it. This in our opinion, it is to play upon the ignorance of the African people of Southern Rhodesia.

We believe that some of these things are no doubt causing fears in the minds of Africans, that if this Federation is given independence the provision of the power of veto will go, and that this irregular manner of Government will spread to the Northern Territories. It may be argued that the veto was never used in this country. We contend that in five years

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from now, or even less, the African, if given a chance to develop at the rate he does, he would make full use of it.

It is always stated by our Prime Ministers that arrangements are being made, and in fact had been made in the Federal Constitution for the protection of African interest. But on this we say, so long as the voting qualifications are high above the earning capacity of the majority, and so long as the Federal Constitution draws a discrimination, and the number of African members in the House remain as it stands, so long the African community will suffer. And so long this Federal protection will remain absolute, and so long the minority of the population will use their votes to the detriment of the African progress.

It is not the African who must be persuaded to compromise in this case of Federation, but the Europeans as a whole, beginning with the political leaders. They have got to report politically, and religiously, because this Federation of Central Africa must keep pace with other countries of the British Commonwealth.

We believe that the African has got the land, and that is trading stock No. 1, the whites has got the fully developed intelligence, but his attitude towards the blacks creates a dark future for the Federation.

The case of the Co-op quoted above will show that what is known in other British countries as justice by all the populations living in them, it is exploitation in this country of Southern Rhodesia.

We are convinced that the good living together between black and white in this country does not, and cannot affect either of the races adversely. But would lead to further progress. It is contended by the politicians of the Federation that the higher positions of the Government should remain in the hands of the "civilised and responsible men" but we fail to understand what the exact aim of this other than that these qualities are to be used to thwart or foil the genuine aspirations and undertakings of the undescribed, such as has been the case with the quoted Society. We believe in the leadership of a white man and we accept his standard of development, but the way he uses these qualities in Central Africa leaves very much to be desired.

Education is our hope for Federation to be real in these areas, so that what are known as Native Affairs Departments should go so that education Department should be educational Department comprising of all educational Departments in the Federation.

We believe that the Africans of the Northern Territories can still be persuaded to accept Federation as well as the Africans in the country could be persuaded to accept it. Only if persuasive conditions are created by the majority of Europeans in Southern Rhodesia, they can do this by first recognising the value of labour rendered by Africans in the country, and by accepting the fact that the white men has come to stay in this part of the world, and he should stay. And under these present he has just to adjust himself to be ready to lead not just to govern.

It would be misleading for anyone to believe that an African in this country was contented, there can be nobody contented when there are some who are being prosecuted for being in land of their birth. It appears that in Southern Rhodesia an African cannot claim the right of ownership on the land where he is born.

We would like to state that the name of Society referred to above is "The Rhodesian Bantu Co-operative Trading Society Limited," not "Rhubantu stores" as the statement attached here may make one believe it to be. An attempt was once made to change it to this, but it was rejected by members.

We pray Your Honourable Commission on Central Africa to give its gracious consideration when making its recommendation to matters herein presented which we believe have decisive bearing on the present liberties of the African peoples of this Colony, which liberties are vital to our development and progress and to the happiness and well-being of Her Majesty's subjects.

Highfields

B. NYABADZA

It is stated in the Preamble to the Federal Constitution that the Federation must go forward on the basis of partnership between the races.

Prior to 1953 the official policy of Southern Rhodesia was one of segregation of the races, and this was enforced by the passing of the Land Apportionment Act in 1941, with subsequent amendments. The purpose of the Act was to make it

impossible for anyone to acquire, lease or occupy land set aside for the other race, not only dividing the races, but keeping permanently fixed the amount of land held by each race. The policy of partnership has never been clearly defined, but at least it is fair to assume that it is the reversal of the policy of segregation on racial grounds. I submit that since 1953 the Southern Rhodesia Government, by retaining the Land Apportionment Act, has continued the policy of segregation, and has completely failed to put the policy of partnership into practice.

The effect of the Land Apportionment Act has been to force the African people, who are the great majority of the population, to live in areas which are now totally inadequate for their needs. This is particularly so in the Reserves, which are mainly situated in the poorer, drier and hotter parts of the country. The well-watered lands on the cooler water-sheds, with good roads and near the line of rail, are largely reserved for Europeans. The African population has so increased that there is now very serious overcrowding in the Reserves, but enough land to meet the needs of the people has not been set aside, nor can it be acquired by purchase. While one African family may have to make a living on 50 acres of land there is seemingly no limit to the size of land which a European family may occupy, and most have several thousand acres. In many cases the European land is little used, and the owner cannot find another European buyer when he wants to sell.

The effect of over-crowding in the African area on the land itself is very serious. Some years ago the Land Husbandry Act was passed to try and prevent further erosion, and to encourage Africans in the Reserves to produce more from their holdings. While the Act may be beneficial in some areas, I believe that in the poor sandvelt area the position will continue to get worse unless African people are allowed more land.

I have lived on the border of the Makoni Reserve all my life and it appears to me to be one of the poorest Reserves in the whole of Southern Rhodesia. Recently, under the Land Husbandry Act, the people have been allocated land, but most of them have received only three or four acres of arable land and grazing for three or four head of cattle. Some years ago the Southern Rhodesian Government published figures to show that it is possible for an African family to make a reasonable living on eight acres of arable land and grazing for six head of cattle. Owing to shortage of land, however, the Makoni Reserve has been allocated on the "tight formula," that is to say the plots are much smaller than what was at first considered reasonable. I submit that these small plots and few cattle are not adequate either to make good farming possible or to support a family on a decent standard of living. I have reason to believe that many families in Makoni not only go hungry but cannot from their lands produce enough money to buy such necessities as clothing, sugar and salt and to pay school fees. It seems likely that in the tight formula areas the plot holders will be forced by economic need to work in the towns, while the women and children remain in the Reserve. This is exactly what the Land Husbandry Act was designed to prevent.

Perhaps the greatest sufferers under the new allocations are the widows, who have no support other than their lands. The following two cases are known to me personally:

Mrs. Tabitha Gova of Gova Kraal in the Makoni Reserve is a widow with a son and daughter to support. Another son and his wife and child also live with her. She has been allocated two and a half acres, but has no grazing rights for cattle. The son married too late to qualify for land, and though he has a few cattle at present, he will soon lose his grazing permit as he has no land.

Mrs. Samusodza is a widow and lives in Kafusu Kraal in the Manyika Reserve, which is near and very similar to the Makoni Reserve. She has three children to support, but she has been allocated with only one to one and a half acres of land and has a permit to graze two head of cattle. The arable land is poor and much of it is rock. She is just managing at the moment because her unmarried son is working in town and is able to help her, but he wants to get married soon and then will be unable to continue sending her money. He himself cannot get any land.

In both these cases the land is very poor and totally inadequate to support the widows and their families.

I am a farmer with some experience of farming on this type of light sand-velt soil as I have a 200-acre farm in the Zonga Purchase Area on the edge of the Makoni Reserve. In my opinion this 200 acres is capable of supporting on a reasonable (but not high) standard 15 people, that is to say roughly two

families. Assuming that each of cattle needs 10 acres of grazing (as allowed for in the Makoni Reserve) I believe that the minimum necessary to support a family on this soil is 100 acres (say 10 acres of arable and nine head of cattle) and with this amount it would be possible to farm well. Any smaller amount is not an economic unit.

My farm is bordered on one side by the European area. There the farms vary in size from one to 2,000 acres to 50,000 each farm supporting one or possibly two families. Admitting that Europeans need to live on a rather higher standard than Africans and that each farm is also supporting a labour force (though usually at a very low standard) the difference in acreage between what is considered necessary for an African family and what a European family is allowed to farm is so great as to be most unjust.

With the serious shortage of land for African occupation the burden on the Reserves could be relieved by throwing open the European area for purchasing by anyone of any race. If this is not soon done the Reserves will become poorer and the people more and more discontented, and hatred and possible violence will follow.

The Land Apportionment Act and only discriminates against Africans but it also prevents the races from mixing on any other than a master and servant basis. It is impossible for the races to begin to understand each other and to practice partnership while they are forced to live apart. Individuals who wish to live in a multi-racial community are unable to do so unless they live on a Mission Station. With inter-racial clubs, it is now possible to meet socially in the larger towns, but there is no provision for mixing in the smaller towns or in the country districts. Any move in this direction causes an outcry amongst the European section of the community. Very often it is against the law for an African to enter the European area or for an European to enter the African Locations or Reserves. Government officials do nothing to encourage the races to mix, and often actively discourage it.

Even more serious than the effects of social segregation is the effect it has on the African's ability to advance. For instance, as a farmer, I might well wish to take into partnership a European farmer with technical ability and I might learn much from him. Even if such a man were available I should be prevented from working with him, or employing him, as under the Land Apportionment Act he would not be allowed to live on my farm. African and European farmers have many problems in common and have much to learn from each other, but only on rare occasions such as a Farmers' Day or at Auction Sales do they ever meet.

Sirs, I submit that until something is done to change the Land Apportionment Act partnership between the races in Southern Rhodesia will remain a mockery. Until the policy of partnership is sincerely and effectively put into practice Southern Rhodesia should not be given greater independence, nor should the Federal Government be given greater powers. Rusape.

J. NYAMAKANGA

I believe that the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland should continue in its present form, and that no further powers should be surrendered to it by Her Majesty's Government. But I recommend that the following adjustments be made:

1. African Education should go federal

(a) The present system of taking and keeping education systems under racial blocks—European Education being under Federal government while African is under territorial governments would not enable us to provide the right and best education to our children. Education should therefore be under the Federal government and under one Education department.

(b) Secondary education should be multi-racial.

2. The Government should be more representative of the majority race of the country

Africans in this country are suspicious that the constitution is so designed as to enable the government to remain in the hands of Europeans. Southern Rhodesia is used as an example. Here, the franchise laws are raised each time there are seen to be more Africans to qualify. As a result, and since a responsible government was granted in 1923, only Europeans have been elected to parliament. It is therefore important that Franchise qualifications be lowered *now* or, there will continue to be trouble in this country, and Federation will never be workable.

3. Discriminatory Laws should go

(a) There is so much discrimination that Africans are not even allowed to enter certain trading premises, all cinemas,

hotels and other places where like other sections of the community they should be able to get to. These are a few of the hundred-and-one things that discriminate against non-Europeans. The educated non-European who has spent many years studying Western culture finds himself without sufficient entertainment. He is usually isolated. If he did get something, which is usually in an exclusively African Township, it would not be the best as the best is offered to the European section of the community. I believe that it is too late to continue with these practices and unless they are broken down *now*, frustration will continue and Federation will never work under these conditions.

(b) Although some of these laws are territorial matters, a federal law should be set to supersede them.

4. Labour matter should be federalised

(a) Labour relations should be under the federal government and all employment should be open to all races and at the same wage structure and conditions of service. The unskilled wages (at present appalling) should be raised to enable them to enjoy a standard of living nearer to those in the semi-skilled and skilled jobs. At the present moment the average income for Africans is about £6 per month, while that of non-Africans, chiefly Europeans is about £90. This state of affairs cannot be left to continue and expect good race relations to prevail.

(b) To start with an average wage of unskilled workers should be £30 per month and those of the skilled £70.

(c) As labour efficiency is an important factor to our economic development, labour would improve under one and the same government.

5. Calling up for peace training

At the moment only non-Africans are called up for peace training.

As the security of this country is a concern of every inhabitant of the country, I recommend that all citizens of the Federation be called up for peace training.

Highfield

February, 1960

D. S. PEARSON

W. L. TAYLOR

Introduction

It is generally agreed that economic forces condition even if they do not govern political developments. This is as true of the Federation today, as it is of other emerging nations. It is, therefore, of the utmost relevance to the Commission's task to have before it evidence of a factual and analytical nature which attempts to throw light, not only on past and existing economic circumstances, but also on future trends.

We recognise, and feel it necessary to emphasise, that in submitting this evidence it has been impossible to exclude the human factor. This memorandum does not attempt to provide a sourcebook of arid facts and figures about the Federal economy. It is, on the contrary, a personal document reflecting the individual views and opinions of the authors. We make no pretence to infallibility in our judgements; but, since we have no axe to grind and no party political affiliations, we feel entitled to put this evidence before you, claiming for it objectivity and a degree of technical competence which flows from our training as professional economists with extensive experience of conditions in Africa.

Our evidence is arranged under three main heads. In the first section we deal on the widest canvas with the trends past, present and prospective of the Federation's economy. This, we submit, provides an essential background against which to consider the broader question embraced by the Commission's terms of reference. Secondly, we go on to consider some of the economic consequences, which, if our logic is not at fault, must inevitably follow from the conclusions reached in the first section, regarding future trends of the economy. Attention is drawn especially to the question of income redistribution, a subject which seems likely to be of considerable significance in the Commission's study in view of the existing system in which the franchise depends on economic as well as educational qualifications. In the final section we have felt it necessary to make a more detailed analysis of the main sectors of the Federal economy in order to assess the economic advantages and disadvantages of Federation. Our purpose is to clarify the issues rather than to pronounce judgements and our main concern is to try to assess the significance, both generally and regionally, of the economic aspects of Federation.

I. Trends in the Federation's Economy

1. Growth of National Income

In the first years after Federation economic growth, whether measured in money values or in real terms, was rapid. It is not necessary at this stage of the argument to enquire how much the fact of Federation was itself responsible for this movement; it is sufficient to say that the main thrust was supplied by the operation of two connected forces; namely, the increase in the volume and value of exports and the high rate of investment, financed very largely by the inflow of external funds. The main trends are summarised in the table below which portrays movements of a few key entities.

Table I⁽¹⁾

	Exports		Investment		Gross Domestic Product	
	Volume	Value	Volume	Value	Volume	Value
1954 ...	100	100	100	100	100	100
1955 ...	89	114	129	132	104	117
1956 ...	99	117	156	165	118	132
1957 ...	112	105	168	181	129	128
1958 ...	113	100	131	195	128	126

⁽¹⁾ Source: Figures are calculated from the *Supplement to the Central African Monthly Digest of Statistics*, Vol. VI, No. 3.

In the result as shown above, the national income¹ in money terms increased at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum compound, the real national income (the former adjusted to exclude price changes) by 6½ per cent. per annum in the period 1953 to 1957.

These rates are high by any standards, although it is only fair to point out that the national income per head at the end of the period mentioned was not more than £43.7, lower than, for instance, Ghana (£57.4),² and considerably below that of the Union of South Africa (£124.7).

From 1958 onwards, a slower rate of growth has been experienced. Indeed, in 1958 the national income in money terms remained stationary and there was a fall of 0.7 per cent. in the real national income. In 1959, although no official figures are available, it is probable that the national income has once again risen (at a guess by 3 to 4 per cent. compared with 1958); but the increase has been modest in comparison with earlier rates of growth.

In our submission, the marked slowing down in the rate of growth of the economy, evident since the middle of 1958, has not been caused solely by temporary factors, but is the inevitable result of the operation of more long lived fundamental forces. In short, we believe that the Federation's economic growth over the next five to ten years—to look no further—is likely to be on a significantly lower level than in earlier years.

Before going on to detail the reasons which lie behind this judgment we feel it would be illuminating to contrast our rather gloomy outlook with some of the more buoyant forecasts which have been expressed in authoritative quarters.

In an interview reported in the *Rhodesia Herald* of the 29th May, 1958, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Edgar Whitehead, gave as his opinion that the value of the Federation's Gross Domestic Product could be doubled by 1970. Taken literally, this projection implies a rate of growth of 6 per cent. per annum compound. More recently the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister in an interview in London on the 17th November, 1959, again referred to long-term economic prospects. Speaking of Southern Rhodesia's economy, the Prime Minister suggested that a 6 per cent. compound rate of growth was the *minimum* to be aimed at. As a general rule, Rhodesians tend to be unrestrained optimists, as they need to be in a country which is so open to the whims of the seasons and the inconstancy of world markets; but the Commission would be well advised to discount part of this natural ebullience, which, as we have indicated, is not unknown even in official quarters.

While admitting that the practitioner of the "dismal science" may have a pessimistic bias, we believe that we do not greatly underestimate the prospects in forecasting a *maximum* rate of growth of the national income in the next five to ten years of less than 5 per cent. per annum compound. This forecast, which we are inclined to think might, in fact,

1. For simplicity, we use the term national income in a sort of generic way while fully appreciating the important distinctions between alternative methods of presenting aggregate national income and output concepts.

2. *Economic Report for Africa*, U.N.O.

over—rather than under-estimate the potential rate of growth, should not be taken to imply a steady year-by-year advance. There are certain to be periods of more rapid advance interspersed with periods of recession, as there have been in the past.

Fundamentally, the reason why we expect the future rate of growth to be less spectacular than in the earlier period of headlong advance is because we believe that some of the forces imparting the rapid upward thrust have lost momentum which they are unlikely to regain in the foreseeable future. We have already pointed out that the two chief dynamic forces in the economic progress of the country have been the rise in the volume and value of exports and the high rate of capital investment. Our doubts about the future are concerned with both these elements although our chief fear is with the prospective rate of capital investment which will, therefore, be discussed first.

2. Prospects for Capital Investment

In considering the prospects for capital investment in the Federation it is necessary to look at both the supply side—the provision of savings—and the demand aspects—the availability of suitable investment opportunities. In our judgement, both sides of this equation present somewhat muted prospects for the future.¹

At the present stage of its economic growth, the Federation must necessarily rely to a considerable degree on external sources for its supplies of capital. It has not, in the language of Professor W. W. Rostow² reached (or even nearly reached) the stage of "take-off" into self-sustained economic growth, when it can afford to do without supplies of external capital and finance its capital investment from domestic savings.

True domestic savings are clearly insufficient at the present time to maintain an adequate rate of domestic capital formation. Moreover, in our judgement the future outlook promises little possibility that domestic savings can be increased sufficiently to replace fully the decline in external capital inflow which, as will be shown later in our evidence, seems likely to occur. Indeed, we see certain indications of a possible drop in domestic savings.

It will be noted, for instance, that a substantial proportion of domestically-created savings has in the past been provided by a surplus of government and local authority incomes over current expenditure. Unless taxation (whether direct or indirect) is raised—a move which might well have detrimental effects on other forms of domestic savings and the inflow of external capital—we see only limited prospects of any substantial increases in the public sector's sources of income. On the other hand, we feel convinced that expenditure on items such as education, health and social investment generally, as well as debt service—a subject to which we will return later—is almost certain to rise and proportionately faster than income. We are thus driven to the conclusion that the amount of capital formation by the public sector is likely to decline as available sources of finance created out of budget surpluses diminishes. Indeed, this process appears to have already been acknowledged by the Federal Government, which earlier in 1959 announced cuts in its development programme for the period 1959 to 1965 of £45 million.

1. At first sight, the Federation's savings/investment account, which is summarised in the Table II, might suggest the contrary, since, according to the system of classification adopted, some 73 per cent. of capital investment is considered to be financed out of domestic sources. We feel that this position, which is frequently referred to in official statements as a sign of the basic soundness of the economy, is, in a sense, illusory and due entirely to the unusual system of compiling the Federation's national income and balance of payments accounts. It would be tedious to enter into a detailed discussion of this point; the fact of the matter is that the undistributed profits of the copper and certain other large companies, who, though registered in the Federation, are very largely foreign-owned, are treated as part of domestic savings. In our judgement, this creates a false picture since the disposition of these savings (in the form of dividends, re-investment in the Federation, or investment elsewhere) must, in the final analysis, be the decision of the non-resident shareholders as expressed through their elected representatives on the various boards of directors. For this reason, and because we feel that it is desirable to conform to internationally-accepted procedures, we have made adjustments to the official figures, the effect of which is clearly shown in the Table II.

2. *v. The Economic Journal*, Vol. LXVI, March, 1956

Federation Capital Investment 1954-58

Sources of Finance:	Official Figures		Adjusted	
	£ millions	£ millions	£ millions	£ millions
Private:		340.8 (54.2)		247.8 (39.4)
Personal Savings	106.8 (17.0)		106.8 (17.0)	
Companies (undistributed profits and depreciation provision)	234.0 (37.2)		141.0 (22.4)	
Government:				
Surpluses		117.5 (18.7)		117.5 (18.7)
Total Domestic Savings		458.3 (72.9)		365.3 (58.1)
Borrowed Abroad		170.4 (27.1)		263.4 (41.9)
Total Available Finance		628.7(100.0)		628.7(100.0)
Uses of Capital:				
Investment by Government and Quasi-Government Bodies:				246.2 (39.2)
Railways	38.7 (6.2)			
Electricity	49.7 (7.9)			
General Development, Social Services, etc.	157.8 (25.1)			
Investment by Private Sector:				382.5 (60.8)
Residential & Commercial Property ...	100.3 (15.9)			
Mining	100.2 (15.3)			
Other	182.0 (29.0)			
Total Gross Investment				628.7(100.0)

(Figures in brackets show percentage of total)

3. Personal and Business Savings

Personal savings, it is true, have shown a welcome tendency to rise in recent years, although they are still small in relation to overall capital requirements. Motives behind individual decisions to save are complex and often contradictory. Thus an expansion in savings held with any of the large savings institutions may be due simply to a rise in interest rates or a laudable increase in thrift; equally, it may be due to a desire for maximum liquidity associated perhaps with a feeling of political or economic insecurity. Given the individual savings habits, however, the aggregate propensity of the community to save is dependent on such factors as the size of the national income and the character of its distribution among the various classes of income recipients. As will be shown in a later paragraph, the logic of our argument leads inevitably to the conclusion that a substantial redistribution of income between the main economic categories (which in the Federation correspond roughly to the racial groups) is likely to take place. Without anticipating our subsequent argument, it may be said that we expect aggregate African incomes (in money and real terms) to rise considerably faster than aggregate non-African incomes, which, if they remain little more than stable in money values, seem likely to decline in real terms. This leads to the further conclusion that the aggregate propensity to save in the community is unlikely to rise and may well decline.

Leaving aside the foreign-owned companies, which as we have explained we prefer to treat as external to the economy for this purpose, we can see little prospect of any dramatic rise in savings in the private sector of the economy. The rate of business saving, whether by ploughing back profits or by depreciation provisions, has been exceptionally high in the past, due in part to relatively low taxation and low wage costs. As regards the latter, we are convinced that a steady increase is in prospect, whereas, as has already been suggested, the rates of taxation seem most unlikely to fall and will have to go up. Once again our reasoning suggests a drop rather than any increase in true domestic savings.

4. External Capital

This prospect would be less worrying if the Federation could expect to obtain in the future the same volume of external capital as it has succeeded in getting in the past. Our analysis suggests, however, that this is unlikely, to say the least. Even before Federation, investment opportunities in the Rhodesias, especially in Northern Rhodesia, had begun to attract the attention of overseas investors. At this stage, the exploitation of the great copper deposits in Northern Rhodesia exerted, as it does today, a strong magnetic attraction. In Southern Rhodesia, with the possibility of federation in the air, overseas investors were already starting to take an interest in industrial investment and in the residential and commercial

property markets, which, with a rising tide of immigration, was providing a fruitful source of investment. The agricultural sector, too, especially tobacco, was another favoured field. After federation, the emphasis shifted somewhat; an increasing amount of capital was channelled into the property market which offered tempting prospects of speculative gain, and into the development of secondary industries.

Throughout the period, until only recently, the Federation has enjoyed a favourable environment in overseas capital markets largely because of the promise of political stability and racial harmony. This was further emphasised with the change in government in the Union of South Africa in 1948, when a dramatic falling-off in the rate of capital inflow from abroad took place, the proof of which can be plainly seen in the published statistics. Undoubtedly what was South Africa's loss was in part, at least, the Rhodesias' gain. To the North, the troubles in Kenya also helped to enhance this country's relative attractions to overseas investors. More recently, the outbreak of disturbances in the Belgian Congo and the subsequent involvement of the Federation itself in racial troubles has undoubtedly engendered a mood of disenchantment in foreign investors and impeded the inflow of capital. It is not within our competence to express views on the future prospects for political peace and stability; but we are in little doubt that the general outlook for investment in the Federation, taking into account political, psychological and economic factors, is on a lower plane than in the past.

Turning to specific fields of investment we have already pointed out that copper mining has been in the past a magnet for overseas capital. Investment in the Northern Rhodesian copper mines has, naturally, been influenced by the state of world demand for copper. The fluctuations in demand and price of copper have been considerable and there is no certainty that similar conditions will not occur again in the future. We are not anxious at this stage in the discussion to become involved in long-term forecasts for copper, which, in the nature of things, must necessarily be extremely uncertain. Instead, we have been guided by the public statements of leaders of the two main companies whose opinions we regard as authoritative. It is our certain impression that, while Sir Ronald Prain and Mr. Harry Oppenheimer are both optimistic about the long-term future for copper, neither regards the prospective demand to be such as to warrant, at present, or in the near future, a substantial increase in capacity and an investment programme comparable in size to that undertaken in the earlier phase.

It will be only too apparent to the members of the Commission that property development has formed a major feature in the country's recent economic growth. And for those who have lived through this period in the Federation's development it stands out as the most tangible evidence of the rapid

passage from an immature and primarily agricultural community to the present bustling, commercial centres with their "sky-scrapers" and all the pretensions of modern city life. A great deal of this development has been financed by external capital, much of it from Britain. The incentive very often has been two-fold: a lucrative investment with possibilities of capital appreciation and an opportunity to avoid high United Kingdom taxes and death duties. Both attractions are now somewhat diminished; the property boom has collapsed under the weight of excessive provision of accommodation coupled with a sharp drop in immigration; while United Kingdom tax rates have been steadily reduced and the opportunities for fruitful investment (and speculative profits) in investments in the United Kingdom have become much better. A detailed study of building trends and a knowledge of the state of demand suggests to us that the property market is unlikely to return to anything approaching its former attractiveness, at least for quite some years to come. Moreover, many overseas investors have burnt their fingers, with the result that in future they are likely to be more restrained.

Only on the industrial front do we see any real hope of increased investment from external sources. Within the last year or two overseas firms, particularly in the manufacturing field, have been investing and re-investing more heavily in the Federation. The prospects in this direction seem to us relatively good, since with the expansion of the domestic market, and in particular the African market—where by 1965 total African purchasing power will probably exceed total European purchasing power—the opportunities for local manufacturing industry must certainly be enhanced. To be successful, however, locally-made products must be able to compete in price and quality with imported articles and although local industry can count on certain advantages, such as relatively cheap labour, these are very often heavily outweighed by other factors, of which distance, poor communications and the smallness of the market are the most outstanding. Although we will return to this subject in a later paragraph, we feel we should make it clear at this point that, in our judgement, the prospects for rapid expansion of local industry, such as would help to stimulate the inflow of external capital, is dependent on the acceptance by the Federal Government of a policy of greatly increased protection; even though this is likely to add still further to the country's economic difficulties by increasing costs of production and thereby reducing our ability to export.

5. Investment Prospects in the Public Sector

Having surveyed the scene as far as private capital is concerned we turn now to a brief examination of the prospects in the public sector, in which group we include not only the Federal and Territorial Governments but also local authorities, public corporations and statutory boards. Reference to Table II will indicate that roughly 40 per cent. of all capital investment stems from the public sector. The prospects for raising the necessary finance from domestic sources has already been touched on and we will, therefore, confine our remarks to the external situation. It is a fact that the Federation has up to now enjoyed quite remarkable success in obtaining official capital from abroad, not only from international organisations but also by public issues on overseas capital markets. We do not think, however, that it will be possible to repeat this degree of success in the future.

As far as supplies of institutional capital are concerned, the past record is, of course, dominated by the Kariba Dam scheme. Some £46.5 million was raised from bodies such as the International Bank, the Colonial Development Corporation and other similar organisations. Actual spending on this project is now "over the hump" with the result that the impulse supplied to the internal economy is progressively weakening and will soon be completely dissipated. Although, as we show later, Kariba is of doubtful economic benefit, it has had a stimulating effect in that it has attracted large sums of overseas capital and, since there are at present no plans for any further projects which can attract external capital support of a comparable amount, it looks very much as though the supply of institutional capital in the next five to ten years will be on a lower scale than in the past.¹

The Federation and the constituent Territorial Governments have in the past been regular borrowers on the London capital market; in 1958, a pioneering, though not altogether successful approach was made to the New York capital

market. Since 1954 a total of £42 million has been raised by public issues abroad. The ability to raise large sums on overseas capital markets is dependent on a host of different factors which enter into the borrower's credit-worthiness, a term which, in addition to financial and economic considerations, also refers to the general state of political conditions existing in the country. We are disposed to think that on these grounds alone the Federation cannot expect to do as well in the future as it has done in the past.

There is, however, a more substantial reason for expecting a reduced net inflow of official capital in the years ahead. Money borrowed must eventually be repaid and the time is fast arriving when the Federation's debt repayments will begin to assume serious proportions. Table III gives an indication of the magnitude of this problem.

Table III
Amount of National Debt⁽¹⁾
Due for Repayment⁽²⁾

Period	Internal ⁽³⁾	External	Total
1960-65 ...	14,914,207	15,110,659	30,024,866
1966-70 ...	9,263,912	46,589,263	55,853,175
1971-75 ...	25,134,414	29,619,297	54,753,711
1976-80 ...	45,030,218	23,122,881	66,153,099

(1) Gross; no allowance made for Sinking Fund operations.

(2) An Unknown amount of Internal Debt is held Externally.

(3) At last date of repayment.

It will be seen that by 1965, the Federation will have to find an average £9.3 million a year for repaying its external debt (in addition to which roughly 20 per cent. of the so called internal debt is held by foreigners). At this rate, even if it succeeds in borrowing as much on overseas capital markets in the future as it has done in the past, the Federation will be getting little or no new capital—new borrowing will be swallowed up by repayments of maturing debts.¹ Over and above the debt repayment burden, there is a growing weight of interest payments, which even with the present level of national debt, absorbs something like 20 per cent. of the Federal Government's revenue.

It will be for the Commission to judge whether we have made out our case. If we have, and it is agreed that capital investment, whether from internal or external sources, is likely to be on a lower plane in the future, the inevitable result will be a lower rate of expansion of the economy unless the lost momentum is made up by an increase in another direction. The most promising direction is from an increase in exports.

6. Export Prospects

It should be explained that, after careful deliberation, we have chosen to avoid framing this part of the argument by referring to the terms of trade, embracing imports as well as exports. It has often been said, for instance, that the ups and downs of the Federation's economic progress have been largely due to fluctuations in the terms of trade. While we do not quarrel with this hypothesis, we are of the opinion that it is an unnecessarily oblique and confusing way of stating a simple fact, namely that the volume and average values of exports have varied considerably. On the import side the statistics show a more or less steady increase in both volume and value. Clearly, however, if the Federation could anticipate the future a big drop in the average prices paid for imports this would have a considerable effect on its economic potential. On balance, however, we see no substantial reason why we should anticipate a marked improvement in the terms of trade resulting from a fall in import prices.

Our analysis of the future prospects for exports must necessarily be imprecise, since it involves in part a forecast of world demand for the Federation's products—a hazardous proposition at the best of times. After consulting a number of responsible authorities, such as the publications of the United Nation's *World Economic Report*, the Reports of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, the Annual Report of the International Monetary Fund for 1959 and many others, we are inclined to a relatively optimistic view about the future of world demand. Hence, from the demand side, we do not see any major reason why the future course of the Federation's exports in volume terms should not be as favourable as in the past. As regards values, we think it safest to assume that average prices realised in the next

¹ Of the total loans granted by the International Bank to African countries to date, the Federation has obtained 36 per cent.; of the total commitments entered into by the C.D.C. in African territories (to 31.12.58), 41 per cent. was earmarked for the Federation. Is it possible that this country will obtain such high proportions as these in the future?

¹ It should be noted that a similar problem exists in the private sector as well. Unfortunately, lack of statistical information makes it impossible to measure the magnitude of this aspect of the problem.

five or ten years will be about the same as in 1959. This implies for the Federation's two main commodities, copper and tobacco, average prices of roughly £240 a ton and 32 pence per lb., figures which are generally regarded as "about normal" in the respective industries.

On the supply side, we believe that physical limitations and particularly in the agricultural sector, labour shortages might well exert a restraining influence in the future. Nevertheless, after taking into account the prospects for "new" exports (of commodities not previously exported) it should be possible to anticipate a rate of increase of 3 per cent. per annum (in volume terms) in the Federation's exports (in volume and value terms) approximating to the rate achieved in the period 1954 to 1957. We do not anticipate that exports will do any better than this; indeed, we have a suspicion that our forecast might in fact be too optimistic. Exports, therefore, even if our best hopes are realised, will probably not provide the required additional thrust to the economy sufficient to replace the diminished momentum of investment.

The result of our survey of the future prospects for the two main dynamic forces in the country's economic progress is thus to confirm our view that the slowing down in the rate of economic advancement, noticeable since the middle of 1958, represents a semi-permanent change to a lower level of annual increases. This view is neither pessimistic nor optimistic; it represents no more nor less than a realistic assessment of what the future holds in store.

Before leaving this subject, the Commission might feel prompted to ask why no reference has been made to increased domestic consumption as a dynamic force in the country's future economic development. We appreciate, and we ourselves have made the point (Part I, Section 4, final para.), that the prospects of increased domestic markets might itself attract investment; but against this it has to be remembered that of every £ of income earned in the Federation a very high proportion is "leaked" out of the economy in the form of imports. This and other more esoteric considerations which enter into the theory of economic development incline us to regard the increase in domestic consumption as a consequence, rather than a cause of future economic growth.

II. Future Trends in the Federation's Economy

A number of important consequences flow from our forecast of a lower rate of increase in the economic growth of the Federation, many of which have a bearing on the Commission's terms of reference. We will, however, confine our detailed observations to two aspects, namely the employment problem, and secondly, the question of income re-distribution.

1. Employment

The Federation's population is growing fast. The present (December, 1959) population of 8.0 million is likely to rise to about 9.2 million in 1965 and be not far short of 11 million by 1970. The African population, by far the largest section, while growing at a slower rate than the non-African groups, may be expected to reach 8.7 million by 1965 (at present 7.7 million) and almost 10 million by 1970. Figures of total employment are uncertain; but, leaving aside the subsistence sector, it may be assumed that total number of Africans in paid employment in 1959 was just over 1 million, or no more than 15 per cent of the total African population. Even if this low ratio does not rise—and everything points to the contrary—there will therefore be about 180,000 Africans coming on to the labour market between now and 1965.

This figure, however, greatly underestimates the magnitude of the problem, since, in addition to those in employment, there are many thousands more unemployed and seeking jobs. On the other hand, it has to be recognised that the migratory system is still widespread, thus making any reference to unemployment in the usual sense somewhat unrealistic.

The effect of the Native Land Husbandry Act on the problem of employment in Southern Rhodesia is certain to aggravate this situation. The Commission will no doubt receive a considerable volume of evidence bearing on the operation of this measure, which we recognise as an endeavour to overcome the problem of rural over-population while encouraging the spread of better farming methods. The effect of this Act is bound to add to the problems of urbanisation and African unemployment. In a recent Select Committee Report tabled in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament (*First Report of the Select Committee on Resettlement of Natives*) it was estimated that from 1962/63 some 20,000 persons would have to move from rural areas into urban employment as the result of the implementation of the Native Land Husbandry Act. This rapidly developing situation has already caused the Southern Rhodesia Government to take steps to restrict the

entry of Africans from adjoining foreign countries (mainly Portuguese East Africa) in order to relieve the pressure.

In our judgement, the problem of finding jobs for the rapidly expanding African urban population promises to become still more serious in the future because, as we have shown, the rate of general economic progress will probably be at a slower rate than in the past.

The solution will, no doubt, be sought along many different paths. The most widely favoured course, which has been endorsed by each of the four governments concerned, is the provision of greatly increased employment opportunities through a policy designed to stimulate industrial growth. The main instrument of this policy seems bound to be a tariff wall which, to be effective in a country possessing few natural advantages favouring industrialisation, and with such poor internal and external communications, would probably have to be both wide and high. While reserving our judgement on the actual character and form of the protection granted, we accept the need to stimulate industrial growth; but we do not blind ourselves to the fact that the implementation of this policy necessarily involves a cost which the community will have to bear in the form of higher prices.

As we see it, however, even a policy of active promotion of secondary industry is not certain to be fully successful in solving the problem of employment for urban Africans, the more especially so, because of the slower rate of general economic growth which we think is in prospect. In considering the impact of economic questions on political developments we feel it is necessary for the Commission to take a serious view of the problem of growing African urban unemployment. We would venture to suggest, therefore, that since economic tensions invariably express themselves in political outbursts, the Commission should pay especial attention to the need to provide urban Africans with adequate means for political expression, which manifestly do not exist today in Southern Rhodesia, where this problem seems likely to be felt more acutely than in the other territories.

2. Income Re-distribution

The logic of our argument leads inexorably to the conclusion that a considerable re-distribution of income between the European and African groups is likely to take place in the coming decade. This we believe will come about from two different directions. On the one hand, we argue that the increased employment and the accelerating shift of Africans from the subsistence to the cash economy is one major cause. Another is the increasing educational standards and acquisition of industrial skills which is enabling Africans to demand higher wages. A further reason is the advance of African trade unions and the strengthening of their bargaining power. These and many other developments have been operating and will continue to operate with increasing effect to raise the share of the national income accruing to Africans. Past records show that the share of the national income earned by Africans has been rising slightly faster than the national income itself—implying a degree of income re-distribution. We expect this trend to continue and, even though the national income is likely to rise more slowly in the future, we consider that an ever increasing share will continue to go to the Africans.

On the other side of the coin, we see evidence that aggregate European money incomes have been rising more slowly and might indeed cease altogether in the future, if the rate of overall economic growth falls below our expectations. In real terms it seems pretty certain that the European group will suffer not only a relative decline but very probably also an absolute fall. This surprising, and to some people alarming conclusion, we have reached after careful consideration of all the factors involved. In the main, however, we believe that the *modus operandi* will be via a rise in the price of consumer goods which, as mentioned earlier, we see as an inevitable consequence of the policy of protection designed to increase African employment. Bearing in mind the magnitude of the European's spending power and the composition of his expenditures, we are of the opinion that the impact of higher prices will fall more heavily on European than on African incomes. This is in fact borne out by a comparison of the official European and African Consumer Prices Index Numbers. Added to this is the fact that taxation will most probably have to rise not only to meet the additional expenditure on the provision of educational, health and other social services but also as a means of maintaining the Federation's development expenditure. The major source of revenue for these purposes will necessarily have to come from taxation on the higher income group.

It is a quixotic fact, moreover, that many of the policies which some elements of the European group vigorously pro-

pound with the object of maintaining European employment and incomes, such as "the rate for the job," are themselves contributing to the general reduction in European real incomes via the raising of costs. Indeed, one sees examples at every turn of sectional interests vigorously pursuing defensive policies aimed at preserving existing levels of money incomes, policies which are contributing in no small measure to the overall reduction of the European group's real income and standard of living.

We mention this fact not because we believe a re-adjustment of relative income levels (whether money or real income) between the main racial groups is undesirable. On the contrary, it is our belief that the size of the gap between average European and African incomes is much too wide and is a continuing source of discontent and potential trouble. Nevertheless, we are under no illusion that the European group will be prepared to stand by helplessly in the face of a fall in their income. We expect to see the interested parties striving with every resource at their command to resist what appears to them an attack on their standard of living. In the nature of things, the focus will be on money income: meanwhile the relentless erosion of European real income levels will go on, if not unnoticed, undiagnosed.

We believe, and we feel the Commission will be the first to agree with us, that only harm can come from concealing the true facts. It will serve no one's interests for the Commission to approach its momentous task seeing the economy through "rose-tinted glasses." We would end, therefore, by underlining once more the main burden of our argument.

As we have shown, there is evidence that the rate of growth of the economy has slowed down. The solution of the Federation's grave problems will therefore become all the more difficult. It will not be possible to sit back and let rapid economic growth provide many of the answers; the economic strains, which inevitably express themselves as political tensions, are certain to become more difficult, the need for political wisdom and racial tolerance all the more vital.

III. Advantages and Disadvantages of Federation

Political advancement in the Federation is indissolubly wedded to economic development. For example, Federal voting rights are restricted to persons with a minimum income of £25 per month provided they have completed 4 years' secondary education, rising to £60 p.m. without any educational qualifications. For the Special Voters' Roll only £10 p.m. with 2 years' secondary education is required and £12 10s. p.m. without any education. Since 44 Members are elected by the General Roll and only 9 by both the General and Special Rolls voting concurrently, the latter can hardly be regarded as being of any political significance. Proof of this is afforded by the results of the last Federal election when only those Africans who were endorsed by one of the major European political parties had any chance of election.

We would like to make it clear to the Commission, lest it feels that what we have to say is unduly critical of the Federal Government and the Federation, that we are in full agreement with the establishment of a larger political and economic entity in Central Africa. There is no doubt that from an economic point of view such an enlarged unit has considerable economic advantages, not least in its enhanced ability to raise overseas finance. A more substantial market for the products of local industry is also a major factor and we would hesitate to recommend the reversion to separate territorial units with each one raising tariff barriers against the others. We are not opposed to some form of closer association but to the actual form which the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has taken. This we feel has been an economic liability for reasons already explained in outline above and which we now propose to consider in more detail.

In what follows we shall survey the growth of personal incomes of both Europeans and Africans and then review the industrial and commercial background against which these incomes are earned.

1. Personal Incomes

Figures for per capita personal incomes at current values are given in Table IV.

¹ In 1958 European incomes averaged £596 and African (cash incomes) £13 per capita.

Table IV
Personal Incomes Per Head in the Federation
(Figures derived from *Economic Report*, 1959)

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958
	£	£	£	£	£
Europeans	552	586	616	625	596
Africans—Cash	10	11	12	13	13
Subsistence	8	8	9	9	9
	18	19	21	22	22

This shows an increase of 13% in European incomes between 1954 and 1957, or over 4% p.a. African incomes increased by 22% or just over 7% per annum. Even when expressed in money terms these rates are not unusually high. The European rate of increase is lower than that in some countries in Europe and the African rate, while reasonable in itself, means very little in absolute terms because the increase is calculated on such a small base.¹ It is very noticeable that there has been no significant increase in the proportion of cash incomes to total African incomes, which also indicates that there has been no rapid progress in the economic advancement of the African population.

Table V gives an index in real terms, i.e. at 1954 prices.

Table V
Index of Real Incomes per Head in the Federation

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958
	100	105	107	105	96
European	100	105	107	105	96
African	100	108	114	122	120

Leaving aside the unusual year of 1958 when the slump in the copper market affected the Federation's income, European incomes increased by 5% in real terms between 1954-1957 or less than 2% p.a. African incomes increased by 22% or 7% per annum.

Approximately 40% of the European and 15% of the African populations are in gainful employment. Applying these proportions to the cash incomes of the two racial groups it gives us an average income per head of persons in employment of approximately £1,000 p.a. for Europeans and £90 p.a. for Africans. Thus even the average African employee fails to meet the lowest income qualifications on the Special Voters' Roll (viz. £120 p.a.) while the average European gets nearly 50% more than the highest income qualification on the General Roll.

What are the chances of Africans being able to qualify for the franchise in the future? (For the purposes of this discussion we shall assume that anyone with the requisite income qualification will also have the appropriate educational qualification. In other words we are assuming the most favourable conditions.) For reasons which will appear later, we do not think that African incomes will much exceed an annual increase of 4%. At this rate it is going to take the average African wage earner over 8 years, i.e. until 1967, to qualify for the Special Roll, assuming he has had two years' secondary education. But the average or above average African worker accounts at the most for only one half of 15% of the total population.

To see when an average African employee is likely to qualify for the General Roll, i.e. when he will really have a say in his choice of parliamentary representation, we must delve into the mists of the future. Let us make the assumption of a 4% compound increase in personal income. Then, before he reaches the lowest rung on the income qualifications ladder, £240 p.a., he will have to wait over 25 years; and this assumes that the average African employee has completed 4 years' secondary education.

It may be objected that the assumed rate of increase of 4% p.a. compound in African personal incomes is too low. Recent developments in African advancement on the railways and copper mines and the acceptance of the principle of the "rate for the job" might seem to indicate that the future rate of increase in the incomes of African wage earners will be much more rapid. We are unable to accept this argument. We will no doubt see the emergence of a highly paid African elite labour force earning salaries comparable with Europeans. This, in fact, is already happening but it hardly affects the bulk of the African labour force. An increase in real incomes can only come about through an increase in productivity; wage increases by themselves do not create a rise in real

¹ These rates differ from those quoted in Section I since we are now concerned only with personal incomes per head and not with total national income.

incomes and, unless accompanied by an equal rise in productivity, are merely inflationary; and increase in productivity in its turn can only come about as a result of a rise in the value of production per head of the employed population. In order that the Commission can see what the prospects are for productivity increases in the Federation we shall review the position in the main sectors of the economy and, at the same time, assess the influence which Federation has had on economic development in the three territories.

Prospects for Economic Development

We shall consider the position in the five main sectors of the economy:—

- (i) Primary industry.
- (ii) Manufacturing industry.
- (iii) Finance and commerce.
- (iv) Industrial services.
- (v) Social services.

(i) Primary Industry

The two main products, copper in Northern Rhodesia and tobacco in Southern Rhodesia, accounts for a large part of the country's economic activity and are the mainstay of its exports. Being export products their value is not under local control since prices fluctuate according to supply and demand in the world markets. This applies particularly to copper; the average flue-cured tobacco price having remained between 35d.—40d. per pound in the last few years.

Table VI

	Copper		Tobacco Million lbs.
	000 Tons	£ million	
1955	383	117	122
1956	429	121	209
1957	466	89	180
1958	420	71	194
1959	600	120*	228

*Estimated

Despite an increase in output of nearly 50%, the value of copper produced in 1959 was just about equal to the 1955/6 level. The price of copper now seems to have achieved stability at around £240 per ton so that, for the next few years, the value of copper sold will be closely related to the quantity produced. However, the amount which the market can absorb places a limit on the quantity which Rhodesian mines can profitably produce. While this limit will no doubt rise as time goes on, it is unlikely to allow production to increase at the rate of expansion enjoyed over the past few years. The high figure shown for 1959 was in fact inflated by the American strike and there will probably be some cut-back in 1960.

Tobacco production has been expanding steadily but, for both technical and marketing reasons it is generally believed that the limit is not far above last year's figure. The market has been weakening over the past three years and farmers are now being warned to improve quality rather than increase quantity. Last year's sales value of £30 million may well represent the most we can expect from this crop in the future.

Of the other crops, the most important are groundnuts and maize. The groundnut crop in Southern Rhodesia has been poor for the last two years but continues to increase in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.

On the whole of primary industry the effect of Federation has been small. It has had no effect on the investment and production policies of the mining companies; though it may have helped to raise the output of tobacco growers who are mainly concentrated in Southern Rhodesia. The extension of the Southern Rhodesia Grain Marketing Board's control to Northern Rhodesia has, if anything, had an adverse effect on groundnut producers, since to some extent they have been prevented from realising the best price on the world market.

Primary industry accounts for the major part of African labour requirements. In Southern Rhodesia there are approximately 610,000 Africans in employment of whom just over half (320,200 in 1957) are employed in industry. The remainder are in commerce and domestic service. Of the industrial labour force, 192,000 are employed in European agriculture and 56,000 in mining, making a total of 77% in primary industry. Only 49% of the Africans employed in Southern Rhodesia are indigenous, the remainder coming from Nyasaland (22%) and Mocambique (20%). It is sometimes argued that Federation has benefited both Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland by enabling the former to increase its labour force and the latter to gain opportunities for employment not

available within the territory. However, since Southern Rhodesia employs nearly as many Mocambique as Nyasaland Africans, and since a large number of Nyasaland (50,000) find work outside the Federal Territory, mainly South Africa, it is obvious that Federation has had little effect in providing employment opportunities for the bulk of the African population.

(ii) Manufacturing Industry

Manufacturing or secondary industry in the Federation has made great strides in recent years. For example, Net Output increased from £45.0 million in 1956/7 to £53.7 million in 1957/8, an increase of 19%. This is in money terms, but even in real terms the increase has been most substantial yet secondary industry's place in the Federal economy is still too small for this increase to compensate for the drop in copper prices and output in 1958, when national income showed an absolute fall.

Of more direct interest to our purpose is the territorial distribution of secondary industry. Of the total Net Output of £53.7 million, £43.2 million was produced in Southern Rhodesia, £7.5 million in Northern Rhodesia and £3.0 million in Nyasaland. It should be borne in mind that the populations of all three territories are roughly equal; that the greater part of manufacturing industry is devoted to the production of consumer goods, especially food, drink and tobacco, textiles and general household goods; and that, with the exception of grains, tobacco and dairy products, manufacturers have to import nearly all their raw materials. Thus, the uneven distribution of secondary industry cannot be altogether explained in purely economic terms.

The paucity of development on the Copperbelt is particularly striking in this regard. This is a compact area which contains about 40,000 Europeans and 400,000 Africans (c.f. Salisbury: 82,000 Europeans and 180,000 Africans) with the highest average incomes of any community in the Federation. The total wage bill of the mines alone amounts to some £20 million per annum and yet the whole of the Northern Rhodesia provides only £16½ million of manufactured goods *gross*.

We are drawing the attention of the Commission to these facts because, as economists, we are concerned with the optimum allocation of the country's material resources and we are of the opinion that the present political relationship between the three territories has brought about distortions in industrial development. Furthermore, we are convinced that these distortions arise from the pre-eminent position enjoyed by one territory, Southern Rhodesia, both by virtue of the constitutional provisions whereby the Colony is given parliamentary representation out of all proportion to the relative size of its population, and because of the location of Federal Government headquarters. (It is no accident that Federal M.P.s representing Northern constituencies feel compelled to call attention to the needs of their territories. Representatives from Southern Rhodesia are under no such compulsion since they can rest secure that the Federal Government considers their needs as a matter of course.) We shall revert to this subject in Section (iv) when we come to consider the provision of such essential industrial services as power and transport; in the meantime we respectfully ask the Commission to bear in mind this disparity between the distributing of manufacturing industry and the optimum allocation of resources.

In section (i) we showed that Federation has had little effect on labour mobility between the three territories. There is, however, another side to this coin, viz., whether Federation has had any effect on opportunities for employment. It is generally held that secondary industry has an important part to play in bringing subsistence producers into the cash economy by offering them greater rewards than they could otherwise have obtained. We are in full agreement with this view, yet we can find very little evidence of this beneficial effect in the Federation. It is remarkable, but true, that despite their very different levels of development, approximately the same proportion of the African population in each territory is in paid employment, as follows:—

Table VII
Africans in Employment—1957/8

	000's		
	S.R.	N.R.	Ny.
Number employed	300	285	300
% of total population	11%	12%	11%
% employed in home territory ...	100%	77%	33%

Neither Nyasaland nor Northern Rhodesia is able to provide employment for all who seek work. The position is especially serious in Nyasaland where two-thirds of all persons seeking work are forced to emigrate to Southern Rhodesia or South Africa. (According to recently published figures, employment

in Nyasaland has now dropped still further so that only a quarter of the labour force can now find work at home.) We find it hard to believe that, had the territories remained separate political entities the same situation would exist today. In the case of Northern Rhodesia economic forces alone would have opened up considerable development which, in the event, has fallen to the benefit of Southern Rhodesia. In Nyasaland, where the economy is still largely in the "traditional"¹ stage, special assistance is required and would probably have been forthcoming from the British Government.² That 200,000 Nyasas have to seek work outside their own territory, 50,000 of them outside the Federation, is eloquent proof of how little assistance has been granted by the Federal Government.

To conclude this section, we are strongly of the opinion that the federation of the three territories has adversely affected the growth of secondary industry by distorting the pattern of its distribution. It is not too fanciful to see Northern Rhodesia as the industrial workshop of Central Africa³ but development has been frustrated by Federation whose effect has been to channel industry into Southern Rhodesia.

(iii) Finance and Commerce

In this section we shall deal with both public and private finance and the development of commercial services in the Federation.

Firstly, public finance. It is in this sphere that the greatest emphasis has been laid by the authorities to point out the economic benefit of Federation. In this regard we refer especially to the *Economic Survey of Nyasaland* (vide supra) which the Commission has no doubt studied and which devotes considerable space to proving its contention that Nyasaland has enjoyed substantial benefits from its membership of the Federation. The survey bases its argument on a comparison of the amounts of government expenditure made, and revenue derived from, the territory. We maintain that in point of fact the figures quoted fail to prove the point since they make no mention of indirect taxation. Before Federation, the Nyasaland Government derived more than half its revenue from indirect taxation, mainly customs duties, and the survey's failure to take this into account—or even to make mention of this omission—requires explanation. It may be that, even with the full figures available, it could still be shown that Federation has been to Nyasaland's benefit in the field of public finance. As it stands, however, the verdict can only be "not proven" and the Survey's failure to make any estimate of indirect taxation casts grave doubts on the validity of the strongest case yet advanced for the economic benefits of Federation to the Protectorate.

Yet even if the case as presented in the *Economic Survey of Nyasaland* is accepted, it still does not show that Federation in its present form is the moving spirit behind economic development in Nyasaland. The most cursory analysis of Federal Government finances reveals that, apart from the slump year (from the copper mining point of view) of 1956, the greater part of government revenue is derived from Northern Rhodesia. The annual "subsidy" of £23m. to Nyasaland is in fact merely passed on from Northern Rhodesia by the Federal Government.

The immaturity of financial statistics in this country makes it difficult to make any detailed assessment of private finance, but one factor is perfectly obvious. That is the unjustified proportion of capital investment since Federation which has gone into residential and particularly commercial building, with the consequent distortion of the whole economy.⁴ It is estimated that in the years 1953-7 over 25% Net Private Capital Formation was in this form and no one today seriously denies that this involved a serious misallocation of resources. The present slump in the housing market and the number of half empty "skyscrapers" in Salisbury illustrates the results of this wasteful investment. It is clear to us that this waste was a direct consequence of Federation and of the concentration of government in Southern Rhodesia, leading to an artificial development boom.

Commerce also has suffered from Federation. Although the repeal of the Congo Basin Treaty, as it affected Nyasaland and part of Northern Rhodesia, was one of the Federal Government's more praiseworthy achievements, it cannot be said on balance that commercial activities in the Northern Territories have benefited from Federation. There has been

1. V. Rostow, op. cit.

2. Cf. *Economic Survey of Nyasaland*, p. 65, which shows that from 1953 to 1956/7 C.D. & W. grants amounted to £2,406,000 compared with £1,799,000 in the period 1949-1952.

3. *V. Report on the Development of Secondary Industries in Northern Rhodesia*, by W. J. Busschau, 1955.

4. Part I, section 5 above.

a distinct tendency, noticed in the *Commission of Inquiry into Trading Conditions and Practices, First Interim Report; Drugs and Medicines*, 1959, for commerce to be concentrated in Southern Rhodesia at the expense of the North. The present state of economic development in the Federation necessitates the import of a wide range of consumer goods, amounting to 20% of total consumption expenditure. Importers of these goods obviously play an important part in the country's economy but since Federation there has been a tendency for import agencies to be concentrated in Southern Rhodesia. The higher turnover of the central agents may have led to some reduction in their distribution costs but, at least in the case of the Northern Territories, this has been more than offset by the extra handling incurred by the insertion of an intermediary between the exporter and the territorial agent. According to the *Report of the Commission of Inquiry* mentioned above, this has been a factor in raising retail prices of pharmaceutical products in Nyasaland and its effect must certainly be of more general application.

The importance of commerce in a "transitional" economy such as the Federation's should not be under-rated, particularly that part concerned with retail distribution, since it is the primary vehicle by which subsistence producers are brought into contact with the cash economy. What information can be gleaned from this unmapped field of the Federal economy suggests that commercial development has been uneven in growth in the three territories. This is the least true of Northern Rhodesia where the Territorial Government has made notable and successful efforts to foster commercial growth.¹ These efforts by the Northern Rhodesia Government are an indication of what might have been achieved under different political circumstances.

(iv) Industrial services

We now come to what is probably the most controversial section of the evidence we shall lay before you, since we do not accept the official and popular view of the economic benefits of some of the more ambitious projects upon which the country has embarked. In this section we shall deal with power and transport and we wish to state at the outset that of these two, we consider transport to be of paramount importance. As we shall try to show, it is also the most neglected.

The Kariba Hydro-Electric Scheme occupies a unique place in the Federation's political and economic structure. No one can deny that as a feat of engineering and organisation it stands supreme, bearing comparison with the greatest achievements of modern technology. What is open to serious question is its viability as an economic asset. Kariba represents a supreme triumph for the Federal Government. Yet there are two important questions about Kariba which must be satisfactorily answered before criticism can be set at rest: will it prove an economic asset? Will it benefit the whole Federation?

The usual answer to the first question is a resounding "Yes"! supported by references to its effect on industrial development. This we find difficult to understand since power costs represent only 1½% of the total costs of production of manufacturing industry. In determining the location of industry power plays a very modest role. Mining is another matter; there power costs represent over 10% of the total cost of production but there are only mines where there are minerals. An alternative approach is to point to the rate of growth of power consumption; this proves that further sources of supply are required, but not on the scale of Kariba. The recently announced scale of charges is hardly likely to encourage industry for some time to come since, it will be 7 years² before the lower tariff becomes operative. This has not prevented the authorities from announcing plans for a second stage and preliminary plans for a third. In the meantime, the price will be the same as it is now and it is significant that, having promised that the provision of Kariba power would not raise current prices, the authorities saw fit to increase electricity charges shortly before Kariba came into production. We suggest to the Commission that this question has still to be answered satisfactorily.

The second question can only be answered in the negative. Kariba power will only be supplied to Southern Rhodesia, Lusaka and the Copper mining towns³ of Northern Rhodesia. It will be of no benefit to Nyasaland nor to the rest of Northern Rhodesia (it is not surprising that Northern Rhodesians still bemoan the fate of their Kafue scheme, which

1. *V. Recent advances in the Northern and Luapula Provinces of Northern Rhodesia*, Magnus Halcrow, October, 1959, N.R.G.

2. At current rates of increase in power consumption.

3. This, of course, excludes Ndola.

but for Federation, would now be in operation with much more obvious benefit to that territory).

A cogent argument in favour of Kariba is the support it received from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which made its biggest loan ever for this project. It should, however, be emphasised that the Bank is, by its Constitution, primarily concerned with its loans' security from a strictly commercial viewpoint. Since the Kariba loan was guaranteed by the British Government there was no danger of non-repayment. The Bank had good reasons for making the loan quite apart from Kariba's economic status and we would also remind the Commission that a similar project, the Owen Falls Dam in Uganda, is already proving of doubtful economic value.

If, as we maintain, Kariba is not the "Open Sesame" to industrial expansion which the authorities claim, then it has done a positive disservice in diverting attention from more urgent economic priorities.

The greatest of these is transport, which, far more than power, is woefully inadequate for the Federation's needs. Here again, available finance has been unevenly distributed, the bulk going into Southern Rhodesia. We hope the Commission finds time to cover the Federation by road: We would particularly draw its attention to the roads from Salisbury to Blantyre, from Lusaka to Zomba and the Great North Road from Kapiri Mposhi to Tunduma, the Federation's only link with East Africa. We also suggest that the Commission takes note of the Northern Rhodesia Government's hopes of developing communications with East African Railways to the North and Benguela Railways to the West, hopes which Federation forced into limbo. Since the Federal Government took over Rhodesia Railways in 1953 there have been no major extensions to the system. Considerable sums have been spent on improved methods but these have still to be reflected in lower costs or faster services. Consequently goods from Salisbury to Ndola must still travel 1,100 miles via Bulawayo and Livingstone as they did fifty years ago, although the road journey is only 500 miles.

The Commission does not need to be reminded of the part played by railways in the development of the United States, Canada, Australia and many other countries. There is no reason to suppose that the pattern would have been any different in Central Africa, yet this vital work has been allowed to go by default. After the construction of the Salisbury—Lourenco Marques railway, Southern Rhodesia was reasonably well supplied with transport services. The coming of Federation with political control vested in Southern Rhodesia diverted resources, which would probably have been applied to communications in Northern Rhodesia, to a project whose principal benefit is to the Colony—Kariba.

On these grounds alone Federation has a serious charge to answer and grave doubts are raised about its economic benefits. It also explains our reluctance to assume a future rise in real income of more than 4% per annum. By neglecting its transport system, the Federation has failed to lay that solid base on which sound industrial growth can hope to rise.

(v) Social Services

Social services, by which we mean primarily health, housing and education, are a major factor in the development of a primitive economy. For that reason they fall within the scope of our evidence on the economic aspects of Federation since they constitute part of what is often termed the "infrastructure" of the economy. Like transport their adequate provision is a *sine qua non* of economic growth.

On health we have little to say. Within the limitations imposed by finance the Federal Government has not shirked its responsibilities and no territory has any real cause for complaint. In this respect, at least, Federation has done no harm and probably a lot of good.

Housing, by which we mean the provision of accommodation for urban African workers is a purely territorial matter and one over which the Federal Government has no control. It is, however, closely related to the distribution of labour and opportunities for employment and this, as we showed in sections (i) and (ii), has been affected by Federation. The concentration of industry in Southern Rhodesia and especially in Salisbury, with the consequent employment of large numbers of migrant Africans, has led to a pattern of accommodation which is fraught with sociological dangers.¹ Tens of thousands of Africans live in barracks, euphemistically described as hostels, separated from their wives and families for whom there is no room.

Responsibility for education is split between the Federal and Territorial Governments; the former looks after all European and Higher Education; the latter administers African Education up to secondary school level. This split has had an adverse effect on technical education which in turn has a depressing effect on the rate of economic development.² It also enables Europeans to receive better facilities than Africans, since education up to secondary school level is free and compulsory for Europeans but not for Africans.

In regard to technical and industrial training in Southern Rhodesia, Guy Hunter, in his *Report on Adult Education in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, February/March, 1959, pp. 22-23, comments as follows:—

"We found it hard to believe the paucity of this training, but were unable to discover more than the limited provision here set down.

Dombashawa and Mzingwani schools both run a 4-year course, entered at Standard VI, in building and carpentry (also leather work at Mzingwani). Applications again exceed vacancies by more than 10 to 1.

Beyond these two, which each offer about 50 places per annum in building and carpentry, we did not discover, despite constant enquiry on our limited tour, any other official scheme for teaching the African or Asian a manual trade to fully skilled level."

"University education has a vital role to play in the fulfilment, in the United Kingdom dependencies, of the policy of promoting self-government on secure and social foundations, to which Her Majesty's Government is committed."³

The financing of these university institutions has normally stemmed from generous gifts flowing from central funds under the United Kingdom Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, and the allocations have been used almost exclusively for capital grants, not as contributions towards recurrent expenditure. For the most part recurrent expenditure is contributed by the territorial governments, while public bodies, commercial firms and private individuals have also helped the university institutions in their territories.

However, in regard to grants made available to the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for recurrent expenditure by the Federal Government, Table VIII shows clearly that support for the College by the Federal Government has been niggardly in comparison with the support given to other university institutions by their territorial governments. To enable the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to fulfil its role in the life of the Federation and to meet the many demands made on it (e.g. for medicine, law, engineering faculties) the Federal Government needs to quadruple its annual recurrent expenditure on the College. Instead of that the Federal Government publicly announced in December, 1959, that its second quinquennial grant for recurrent expenditure would be £1½ million which permits an annual recurrent expenditure of £350,000, still far below the annual recurrent expenditure of any of the university institutions mentioned in Table VIII.

Table VIII⁴

University Institution	Value of C.D. & W. Assistance		Government Grant for Annual Recurrent Expenditure	
	£	£
University College of Ghana	£400,000	...	Rather more than	£900,000
University College of Ibadan, Nigeria	£2,200,000	...	Approximately	£1,000,000
Makerere College, The University College of East Africa	£2,462,000	...	Approximately	£650,000
University College of Rhodesia & Nyasaland	£1,475,000	£150,000
University of Hong Kong	£450,000	...	Approximately	£614,000
University of Malaya	£1,519,000	...	Approximately	£1,030,000
University College of West Indies	£2,750,000	£615,000

¹ v. *Report of the Urban African Affairs Commission*, 1958.

² For an analysis of the Federation's needs in technical education in regard to Europeans and Asians see *Report of Survey of Facilities for Technical Education in the Federation*, F. Bray, C. Fed. 8. The author is

now engaged on a Report concerned with the training of Africans.

³ *University Education in the U.K. Dependencies* Reference Division Central Office of Information, London, May, 1959, p. 3.

⁴ Figures quoted are in respect of 1957/59.

Southern Rhodesia now claims to have a greater proportion of African children receiving full-time education than any other country in Africa. When considering this claim, it is instructive to bear in mind the ratios of Africans to Europeans in the three territories. These are approximately:—

Southern Rhodesia	11	:	1
Northern Rhodesia	30	:	1
Nyasaland	130	:	1

Thus, while Southern Rhodesia is relieved of the responsibility of providing education for some 10% of its population, this relief only extends to 3% in Northern Rhodesia and less than 1% in Nyasaland. Bearing in mind that the populations of the three territories are roughly equal and that Southern Rhodesia receives the major share of the Federal Government's revenue distribution, it is not surprising that the Colony is able to look after its Africans' educational needs so comparatively well.

Although considerable progress has been made in getting African children into school and although the governments concerned are aiming at eight years of primary education for every African child the shape of the educational pyramid explains the small number of Africans who reach the higher levels of education. The following quotation illustrates the seriousness of the position in regard to the difficulty in keeping the children in school.

"While there are difficult areas where as many as 40% of children still do not enter school, the national averages are nearer 80% enrolment, and in some areas 90% and even more start school. The difficulty is to keep them there for eight years—each year an appallingly high number fall out. While the current enrolment of children in the lowest forms in the Federation is around 60,000 in each territory, not more than 4,000-6,000 are now reaching their eighth year from earlier enrolments and only about two-thirds of these pass their final examination. Of those who do, barely one-tenth get on to a secondary school. Many of these fall out after two years; and finally a pathetically small number reach the great test—Cambridge Overseas School Certificate. To be precise, in 1957, 87 passed School Certificate in Northern Rhodesia, 75 in Southern Rhodesia, 54 in Nyasaland. In Kenya, with an African population of six million compared with two-and-a-half million in each Federal territory, the School Certificate figure was 363 in the same year. Finally, a very few—we are now down to tens and dozens—get on to a university, either in Salisbury or in Makerere or overseas."¹

There is little point in trying to assess whether the state of education is better or worse now than it would have been had the territories remained separate, but the disparity between educational facilities cannot be ignored. The population ratios indicate that greater skills and responsibilities will be required of the Africans in the Northern Territories than in Southern Rhodesia, yet the provision of educational facilities is in inverse proportion to these requirements. Approximately 70% of all African children in Southern Rhodesia receive some full-time education but only 40% in Northern Rhodesia² and even less in Nyasaland. The implication of these figures for the future economic development of the Federal territories is too obvious to be ignored.

Conclusion

We do not presume to tell the Commission what form the Federation should take in the future but we would ask it to bear the following points in mind:—

- (1) Although some form of economic integration of the three territories has obvious advantages, it does not necessarily have to take the form of the present Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, nor any other *political* association.
- (2) The actual form taken by the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has, on balance, proved an economic liability. We appreciate the difficulties involved in making value judgements on economic welfare, but since two territories are apparently worse off and only one is better off, this statement is indisputable in the light of the evidence submitted above.
- (3) The territories making up the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland do not exhaust the possibilities of economic integration in this part of Africa. In par-

1. "Emerging Africans," Guy Hunter, *Adult Education*, Vol. XXXII, Autumn, 1959, Number 2, p. 102.

2. This figure refers to the urban African population only.

ticular we would draw the Commission's attention to the grave disadvantages suffered by all territories in having no access to the coast. An association which remedied this drawback would surely merit serious consideration.

26th April, 1960

P. PEECH

Chairman, Macheke Branch of United Federal Party

The facts of political life in Southern Rhodesia must be realised. The European elector, faced with uncontrolled and often violent criticism from overseas, feeling that he has possibly not reached the high standards prophesied for him turns against the African who is coming up behind him. Not feeling so assured of superiority as some years ago, he vents his feelings on the Government by voting for the right wing opposition. This feeling of insecurity, combined with a relaxation of white prerogatives (Post Offices, etc.) stirs up a basically racial fear for the future, and results in a tendency to vote for the reactionaries and segregationists. The recognition by Britain of this attitude, previously ignored, would help to avert this anti-British trend evident further South.

The choice is between partnership and the machine-gun resorted to by extremists on either side. If Europeans thought there was no future for them and their children here, and quit the country, the experiment of partnership will vanish from Africa, and two opposed nationalist ideologies will confront each other across the Zambesi. There is probably no greater need than now for the European to remain here to prevent the re-imposition of the slavery, poverty, and desolation for the masses that existed before his arrival. It seems at least unlikely that democracy, or even a reasonably civilised way of life can exist in Africa at the moment without European influence and guidance. Coercion, corruption and witchcraft will lead Africa even further away from Western ideas than it is now.

Southern Rhodesia is different from most other Colonies, in that the white inhabitants, some in their third generation here, regard themselves as Rhodesians and not as misplaced Englishmen. South Africa is comparable, and is an example of a country where a Nationalist Government has become unsympathetic to any ideas except complete segregation and control by machine-gun.

The majority of Africans in the Federation, despite the efforts and propaganda of the extremists, have not yet become hardened against the European, and still trusts and relies on him for his advancement, education and security. The so-called "primitive" African still believes that the European has much to give him, and will not go back on what has already been given.

The European gives voluntarily, but will never accept dictation from overseas from peoples who will never have to put their suggestions into practice, people who will never be affected personally by the failure or success of their ideas.

The gamble of handing over so many other territories to Africans has already been taken. Is it not at least equally worth while taking the gamble of handing over completely to a progressive Government (which includes Africans who support partnership—a Government that has *proved* its ability to govern fairly?

Macheke

6th April, 1960.

O. B. PIKE

Grandson of an 1820 British settler, and 50 years resident in Southern Rhodesia

Memorandum (i)

It strikes me that, before you take evidence in this country, first mark that Southern Rhodesia, unlike Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was twice taken from the invading Matabele, who has murdered or enslaved its people: this, after the Pioneers protecting the peasant Mashona, had their people murdered and themselves attacked by these savages.

For some 600 years, courageous Britishers, on adventure, explored the unknown world for treasure and nearly everywhere encountered barbarous savages who they subdued in order to establish law and order and civilisation to develop these lands for the benefit of their people and the world.

Wealth, possessions and Christianity are power, but a stupid British Government lost America through taxing British Settlers without a voice in its expenditure.

The Labour Government gave away the world possessions won by Britain's greatest sons in 500 years. (Power lost).

Your Commission should rule that each of its members first read Cape History from 1812 to 1851 and see why the Boers and many good British settlers were alienated by stupid and arbitrary rule. Making Africans equal to Europeans (more than God did) and not knowing that the more you give them, the more they will beg, saying, "nigger nigger mina"—meaning give give me—hence "Nigger."

Since the beginning until the white men arrived in Africa, it was a dark savage continent, with perpetual wars, disease and pestilence, murders, witchcraft, torture, etc. Now, in seventy years, Europeans here have established law and order; brought Christianity and developed Rhodesia marvellously; employing its native people and making markets for their produce from free lands so that they have never been so prosperous and content. Always getting free education and services, but the Europeans are required to first possess £5,000 before they can get land and they pay for these benefits.

Great mineral wealth has been opened up and the old country is assured of all those necessary for her defence and industry, besides great surplus for world markets.

Africans would never rule here; not only because of tribal feuds in perpetuation and lack of ability, but they would be at the mercy of Communist countries—Egypt, India and China—and they are naturally unenterprising and thriftless. Besides, the Pioneers won and paid for Southern Rhodesia in blood and lives and will always rule it for the benefit of all and not accept backward guidance or direction.

Paradoxically, the British people and their Government, like our enemies, only recognise and assist African Jingoism educated abroad with Communist money, whether in Britain, Asia or America, e.g., Banda, 40 years abroad (nearly all his life). Never did they approach the body of Africans here through their Chiefs who get a mere 60/- a quarter; whereas Jingoism without a mandate from Africans, get elected to Parliament at some £750 per annum. A ready guarantee of unlimited funds is always assured in Britain, America, Europe and Asia to any black or coloured man who is a renegade to his country and who lies about and denounces its Government. This is playing the Communist game.

Yet the poor white of any country would count themselves great to get a fraction of the housing, wages (rations included) and all free services with free land supplied to all the blacks of South and Central Africa and in the Federation particularly.

This country has been capitalist ruled since its inception where Trust profiteering is never restricted or controlled, so that farm produce prices have to be set too high for the common man; hence people immigrate and others cannot live here.

Coal, that has made all great countries, is here locked up to protect Wankie millionaires. This country abounds in coal; often located in drilling for water for native settlements, then hushed up. (If inferior, why lock it up?)

There are vast vacant spaces in our hinterland which could carry America's population and by giving these to any Europeans or civilised persons to work, even with assistance from the Colonial Development Fund, millions of Europeans with their skill, capital, enterprise and industry, would ensure full employment to the fast increasing African population who will otherwise resort to anarchy.

The British Government's £50,000 vote and 4,000 settlers in 1820 saved South Africa and Central Africa to the Crown and these and their descendants in loyalty and ability were unsurpassed in Britain's wars since.

The flash of Black Nationalism throughout Africa is no spontaneous flame of patriotism, but intrigue of Communism with their money freely distributed to renegade and foreign missionaries and African teachers, Asians and coloured haters: "engage a few in conversation and prove."

Remember how we lost America, alienated South Africa and how Australians refused Asiatic labourers and declared Dominion Status, and, above all, bear in mind that the British spirit cannot bear subjection. Does Rule Britannia only apply to stay-at-homes and not to her fighting adventurous Sons? Never by God!

Finally, as the Europeans have successfully ruled the Federation countries to the benefit of all, and since the raw ignorant mass of blacks led by Communist inspired agitators would precipitate an immediate conflict, if one man vote was adopted, let these dangerous men be quietly removed until after the inevitable showdown with Communism; for Central and South Africa are the vital key positions in the defence of Western Civilisation.

Therefore grant of Dominion Status for Southern Rhodesia and the Railway strip and Copper Belt of Northern Rhodesia with protection over the Native Reserves is a necessity without delay.

Britain was at its zenith of her power when only the elite and the intelligentsia ruled it for hundreds of years. The British do not lose their Principles or Courage on immigration as these are too firmly ingrained.

P.S.—In conclusion, which is wise and profitable? Rhodesians, who with their progenitors have for centuries been in close contact with the Bantu, to rule them with, or without the sole direction and order from Sir Galahads living some 6,000 miles away, most of whom have never even seen them. Remember those that are not for White Settlers, are against!

Gwelo.

Memorandum (ii)

Reforms for Native Security and Uplifting

Notwithstanding that Europeans here will never relinquish rule to Africans, the security of our native population is so firmly dependent on that of the European (i.e., interdependent) that to sink the European would leave Blacks at the mercy of native rule with its attendant witchcraft, savagery and chaos and the victims of Communist aggression.

Without European skill, capital and industry, the fast increasing Bantu, educated for jobs that do not exist, would have to resort to violence and robbery to live.

The only urgent remedy is to throw open coal to prospecting (if no good, why lock it up?).

And like America did, give land in our hinterland free to all worthy people of our Commonwealth that would care to work it; also unoccupied land to be sold on a 25-100 years payment plan.

The vast game, in these areas, defying destruction by hired hunters for a decade or more, prove their meat potential.

Meagre prospecting allowed here has found tin, precious stones, copper, etc., only to be curtailed by the voracious concession which should never be given. These eliminate the only true discoverers—the humble prospectors.

With the commercial potential of Lake Kariba, a network of roads should be built between the rivers to it; even if the money had to be got from the Colonial Development Fund.

Abolish the 17½% levy on meat produced by natives, also the 17/5 levy per bag on their maize which produces most of our food to enable people to live without credit. The Bible denounces Government trading on food against its people as corrupt and evil.

Price maize at 20/- per bag; to make more profit by controlling the exorbitant prices charged for their vehicles, machinery, spares and fuels and fertilisers supplied by Trust Companies to farmers, thus attract settlers to come here in everybody's interests.

Immediate action should be taken: for in a short time this country will be filled with hungry native agitators, ready to live on their wits: but these measures would provide work and peace, by supporting five million Europeans to employ the Bantu, whilst developing the country's resources.

Gwelo.

A. E. POTTS

Autobiographical note

I would like to submit the following evidence to the Commission in an effort to assist it in its appraisal of affairs in this part of Africa. I think you will find the suggestion of a new approach to some old subjects, which may help it in its assessment of other evidence.

To enable you to assess the value or otherwise of my evidence, I give the following particulars about myself.

Albert Edward Potts, born 22.2.1908 at South Shields, County Durham, England. Church of England. Joined British South Africa Police at age 21 and came to Southern Rhodesia April, 1929 (31 years ago).

Passed Police and Civil Service language examination in Sindebele, studied African affairs; passed Native Customs and Administration examination, and Lower Diploma Bantu Studies. Spent many years amongst natives in all parts of Southern Rhodesia. Served 22 years in the Police and retired as a Detective Chief Inspector, 1950. At present a District Manager with Old Mutual Life Assurance Society, Bulawayo. I like the country and all the races in it. I have a wife, two sons aged 17 and 14 and a daughter aged 13.

Memorandum

Africa, like Europe, is a big land mass and, many years ago, one assumes that only Africans lived in Africa and only Europeans lived in Europe.

How many people stop to think, however, that just as many different tribal and cultural divisions separated Africans of different origin as did their European counterparts, where Danes and Romans, Huns and Normans had little in common except their colour.

In Africa, as in Europe, there were wars, famine, invasion, refugee movements and wholesale movements of populations both in historic and pre-historic times. So much so, that one can say with certainty that few of the tribes now occupying their particular part of the Federation were from that particular part originally.

The Amandebele for instance came to Matabeleland in comparatively recent times when Southern Africa had already known 300 years of European settlement. Indeed the tribe, and its chief Mziligazi were visited by Robert Moffat (Livingstone's father-in-law) on the 30th November, 1829, in the Northern Transvaal before they had set foot in what is now Southern Rhodesia.

The same is true of the Swazi and Angoni tribes. The Angoni moved into Nyasaland, under Zwangendaba as recently as 1835. The cry "Nyasaland for the Nyasaland Africans" has no meaning whatever. What is a Nyasaland African? Perhaps a Yao but certainly not a Swazi, nor an Angoni, nor a Zwangendaba. If they are Nyasaland Africans, then so is an Indian or European who had gone there before or since.

I think Mr. Chirwa from Nyasaland who is a member of the Commission and possibly the chief proponent of the theory, is a Swazi. The Swazi tribal lands one assumes of course, are in Swaziland in South Africa, but in fact they are not, because before that, Professor Krige, the noted anthropologist, traces their movements from the Congo basin in earlier times. The fact that they, and the Zulus live on the South-east coast but are not a maritime people confirms this theory.

I have heard it seriously suggested—and indeed only a few days ago it was put forward to the British Parliament by Mr. Stonehouse, that a possible solution to Africa's problems would be to move all Europeans out and compensate them elsewhere for their losses. The suggestion is an admirable one if one follows it to its logical conclusions. Australia to be evacuated and left to the Aborigines, New Zealand to the Maoris, America to the Red Indians.

In England, of course, the Danish invaders and their descendants back to Denmark, the Normans back to Normandy, the Vikings back to Scandinavia and the Romans back to wherever they came from. But these are only the historic movements, what about the prehistoric ones?

At Broken Hill recently a skull was found in some ancient workings. It was declared to be of non-Bantu origin and eminent anthropologists—some of whom consider the Bantu a comparatively recent phenomenon in the evolution of man—declared it to be that of a member of "that great race that later settled the European continent." So you see! We white Africans are merely back where we started.

The suggestion of moving peoples back to their places of origin is a ridiculous one. There were Egyptian expeditions to what is now the Union of South Africa, and a Sabeaean occupation of what is now Southern Rhodesia before Himilco, the Phoenician "discovered" Britain and Ireland in 500 B.C. There was a Christian Church at Mossel Bay, a Portuguese Fort at Sofala and settlements all along the East African coast 50 years before Queen Elizabeth I came to the throne of England.

Many English people think that Britain's association with Africa began with Dr. Livingstone. It is not generally known that the white population of Cape Colony alone was estimated at 10,000 50 years before Livingstone was born. At that time large parts of Southern Africa including what is now the Federation, were uninhabited by any indigenous peoples. The settlements were sparse indeed, and occurred only in the climatically favourable parts.

The indigenous populations of today have grown up under the protection of the law and order brought to these parts by older and more civilised peoples.

Another common belief in Britain is that because an African is an African he must have land in Africa and if he hasn't it has been taken away from him by the "white settler."

Gentlemen, I am an Englishman but I do not own any land in England. My father never owned any land in

England, nor as far as I can trace did any of my forebears. I don't feel aggrieved at this state of affairs. There must be many members of this Commission who have never owned land in England and I'm sure they don't feel aggrieved on that account. Yet, being English why don't we have a piece of England? Africans see, in the "Land Apportionment Act" a matter for grievance but, would that we had a Land Apportionment Act for England! Perhaps we ancient Britons would come into our own—if we could be sorted out from the Danes, the Romans, the Vikings, the Normans and other foreigners amongst us.

It may be a revelation to many people but it has taken the civilising influence of the European to make it possible, for the first time since the dawn of man in this part of Africa, for an African to own his own land. In no system of native land tenure that I know of, did the African have any right or title to own land. His system of land tenure was confined entirely to the use of land and the power to give it out or take it away was vested in his chief.

Now, everybody benefits and shares alike from land transactions. Be it plot, farm, or block of flats, the moneys that come to general revenue from transfer duties and Government stamps must be enormous. It would be an interesting exercise to work out even on one single property what its purchase, sale, and re-sale has contributed to general revenue for the benefit of African and European alike. It is a continuous process, and the popular misconception that anyone was shouldered off any land is not in accordance with the facts. Whatever land was acquired in early times was acquired legally and no doubt the proceeds of the sales or concessions was enjoyed, if not by the whole tribe, at least by the chief. He, it must be remembered, was disposing of land that he didn't really possess but had authority over by virtue of his ability to win from, and defend from, some previous occupier.

Another popular fallacy held largely in Britain is that this part of Africa was physically held, and closely populated, by a settled indigenous population. Nothing could be further from the truth. Africans moved about the face of it, fought each other, pursued or were pursued and scratched a bare existence from the top few inches of soil in parts of it, and that is all. Settlements were sparse and enormous areas were unoccupied. When we remember that the Africans had no wells or boreholes as we know them, no written language, and that that universal device, the wheel, was unknown to them, one can picture the primitive scene. Confined to these places where surface water all the year round occurs naturally (alas! how few in Matabeleland) and where there was no tsetse fly, their settled areas were few indeed, and drought meant an immediate move before people and animals were immobilised and died.

If the European, by technical "know-how" and capital, drives the fly back, brings water to the surface where there was none before, and increased the productivity of the soil to give everyone a higher standard of living, has he no right to remain and share the fruits of his labours?

Another popular fallacy is the so-called "discriminatory legislation." When most Africans, and some Europeans, see in practice, a social sanction or barrier, such as the right to enter a certain club or a certain cinema, they immediately bleat about "discriminatory legislation," not realising of course that it has nothing to do with legislation, but is merely a distinction in social strata common in all European countries. If the owner of a block of shops, offices or flats feels that it is in the best interests of his tenants to confine the use of the lifts to "tenants only" or "Europeans only" he is merely exercising a right in regard to his own property which wouldn't be denied him in any country in the world. Uneducated Africans, however (and even some educated ones) see in this a statement of Government policy. To indicate the extent of the muddled thinking that goes on over this subject, I must tell you that I recently heard an eminent Churchman with many years' residence in Southern Rhodesia say "that he was unable to sit down in a public place and have a cup of tea with his friend Ndhlovu because of this discriminatory legislation."

What he meant, of course, is that he hadn't found a restaurant or tea-room where the proprietor (European, Asian or African) or proprietor-company had enough faith in the profit-making ability of a multi-racial establishment to risk the investment of several thousand pounds in building or equipping one.

What discriminatory legislation there has been on the Southern Rhodesian Statute Books in the past has been designed for the protection of the African and has concerned such things as liquor or firearms. The much attacked "Criminal Law Amendment Act," which might have appeared discriminatory on the face of it because it prohibited inter-

course between an African male and a white female, and was not concerned with the morals of the situation but with the protection of a very small minority of that time (the European female) in what was largely a heathen community.

That there was no corresponding legislation concerning European males and African females was merely that that community (the African female) was never in jeopardy. The common law on sexual offences was, and still is, adequate and effective for both races.

There remains one more thing I'd like to say and that is that the Monckton Commission ought seriously to ask itself the question: Has the Southern Rhodesian African benefited more from the Southern Rhodesia Constitution and European settlement in the last 50 years than the Bechuanaland Protectorate African, from his much longer association with the British Crown?

The Monckton Commission ought to make this comparison. The superstition, misery, and abject poverty that prevails in British Bechuanaland has to be seen to be believed. Please take some evidence on Bechuanaland—please make the discovery that there are virtually no schools, no hospitals, no roads, no jobs, no money—and of course, no Europeans in this vast territory.

Perhaps we, in Southern Rhodesia, could find sufficient experienced men to form a Commission to investigate what Britain has achieved in Bechuanaland in the 70 years that it has been responsible for it. Even its administrative capital finds it more amenable to stay out of Bechuanaland and have its existence in an adjoining territory. What Bechuanaland needs is European settlement on the Southern Rhodesian pattern.

There can be no doubt that territories in Africa prosper best when European capital and knowledge are joined with African manpower and patience, under a stable and liberal Government.

There is no limit to the advancement that can be achieved by all races in such circumstances, and if some of our more vocal critics overseas really had African advancement at heart, there is great and noble work here for them. Let them demonstrate their concern for the African, as we do, by good works here in Africa, where so much remains to be done.

Bulawayo
6th May, 1960.

A EUROPEAN RESIDENT OF QUE QUE*

Background

I have been residence in Southern Rhodesia for the past 32 years and during that time my work has brought me in very close contact with large numbers of cross sections of the African population in the country.

I served in the B.S.A. Police from 1928 to 1949 in the rural areas and my work then brought me in close contact with the rural African in the Native Reserves as well as those in employment on farms and mines. Observation of the natives' customs, habits and mode of life was part of my daily life.

Since 1949 I have been employed as African Affairs Manager for the Que Que Municipality and have been in charge of all matters concerning Africans employed in the Municipal area as well as being in charge of the Native Residential area where the majority of the Africans live. This work has brought me in close contact with the urbanised and semi-urbanised African, their habits, customs, mode of living and outlook on life.

Observations

Literacy

I have found the vast majority to be uneducated. The majority of the middle-aged group have had no education and are unable to read. Those in the younger age groups have had a little education—possibly no more than Standard 3. These are still in the minority. The group with Standard 6 and above is very much in the minority.

The Southern Rhodesian African is one the whole more advanced educationally than those from the Northern territories and more have had the opportunity of education over a longer period with the result that the Southern Rhodesian is, on the whole of a better educational standard.

There is a group now coming forward who have secondary education up to matriculation standard. As more schools become available so this group will increase.

Although there are a number of Africans who attain Standard 6 and Junior Certificate standard it is surprising how illiterate they are. There appears to be a general lack of interest in reading—except for newspapers and periodicals. I know from personal experience that no interest is taken in libraries—hence the African's knowledge of the outside world is very limited. In fact, it is limited to what he reads in the newspapers and little else.

Sense of Responsibility

The average African has very little sense of responsibility either to his employer or his fellow African. It has been my experience that the average African will avoid taking responsibility if he can and will not make a decision for himself.

It has also been my experience that the members of the African Advisory Boards which are set up in the Native Residential Areas under Government regulations and on which the more prominent residents are usually elected, avoid making a decision for themselves as duly elected members. They are fearful of criticism from the residents if a decision has to be made which is not popular with the community but at the same time to the community's benefit. In this way the average African fails in the qualities of leadership.

Morality

Taken by and large the morals of the majority of the Africans with whom I have general day-to-day dealings fall far short of normal civilised standards. This lack of decent moral standards indicate immaturity and instability.

Political Consciousness

The average African worker has no interest in politics. His main interests are to better his own living conditions and the education of his children. He realises the value of education as the means to a greater earning power.

African Attitude to Women

It is only very recently that the African is realising the value of education for girls. The women have always been regarded "as hewers of wood and drawers of water." In the past the education of the girls has been neglected for that of boys. Now there are as many girls attending schools as boys.

The African woman has been kept in the background and has not had the opportunity to develop parallel with the men. In consequence she has impeded the general advancement of the African race in this country with her backwardness.

Community Consciousness and Responsibility

There is a general lack of the community spirit among the African population. The team spirit and voluntary service to others is almost unknown. The team spirit is being introduced through the schools but the voluntary service one finds among the European community is almost unknown to the African. The European is expected to perform the voluntary services for the African community.

Knowledge of Finance

The average African has no knowledge on this subject. I have on occasions discussed the subject with numbers of reasonably well educated Africans and it is very apparent that they have a very limited knowledge of the subject. All seem to think that Government and Local Government funds "grow on trees."

Conclusion

The vast majority of Africans still have a very long way to go before he will be qualified as a citizen worthy of having the vote and able to have an intelligent say in the Government of the country. With the development which has been apparent since Federation the pace of African Advancement has increased and he will attain the desired qualifications for the franchise quicker than he would otherwise. It is essential in the interests of the African himself for the Government to remain in civilised hands. At the present it is in the hands of the Europeans but as the African attains civilised standards so the Government will gradually become multi-racial.

18th March, 1960.

A EUROPEAN RESIDENT OF QUE QUE*

Background

I have been a Rhodesian for the last twenty-two years, and lived for ten years of that time in rural areas, being in daily

*Name withheld at request of witness.

contact with Africans, apart from domestic servants that I may have had.

For the last twelve years I have been closely associated with urban Africans in their homes through active social work with African women.

I wish to make just one point only—the absence of registration of African births and deaths. The ramifications of this deficiency are widespread.

1. Franchise

Until such time as there is full Registration of Births and Deaths the Franchise must necessarily be restricted (apart from any other consideration).

2. Identity Passes

Until these registrations are properly established "race" passes are unavoidable for identity purposes alone. This is a stumbling block to partnership. If the African is able, and many think they are, they must progressively take on responsibility to the state and registration is the first which they must take.

3. Education

Until such time as we have birth certificates, children can be deprived of education or start education too young or may be educated for too long. At the moment the date they give on going to school can be altered at will when no proof of age can be given. In all cases an undue drain on the state to provide more and more education facilities for too old a group results.

4. Morality

The registration of births with its recording of responsibility in due course may help to dispose with the "mapoto" system and the huge illegitimate birth rate which results from it.

5. Charity

In the organisation of orphanages, special schools and other government and charitable organisations, lack of dates of birth and parentage does and will increasingly hamper progress in these very important fields.

6. General

In the case of insurance, passports, taxing, banking and many other commercial transactions, the African can rarely prove his age and surmise is inevitable and unsatisfactory.

Conclusion

As soon as it is practicable the Governments must provide the facilities and the African then bear the responsibility for registration of births and deaths. Until this is established, educational progress, responsibility and partnership will be severely retarded and the franchise must remain at a high level.

28th March, 1960.

A EUROPEAN RESIDENT OF QUE QUE*

The Writer's Experience

Coming to Africa in 1925, I went up to Bwana Mkubwa in Northern Rhodesia and was there for just over a year, then going to Angola where I was in charge of motor transport running between Ndundu at the top end of Angola to Kamina, the railhead for the present Leopoldville railway and on the other side linking up with the Lobito Bay line that was at that time under construction. My journeys took me through areas occupied by tribes that had barely been touched by the contact with the European and I doubt if there is anywhere in Africa today where there are Africans who are so completely uninfluenced by the Europeans as they were.

Returning to Southern Rhodesia in the early 1930's, I have spent most of my time, except for war service spent largely in England, in working with Africans of many tribes from Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, Bechuanaland, Portuguese East Africa and some from Tanganyika. For the last four years I have been in close contact with the town African in the Location, the African Welfare Society, Capricorn Africa Society and the local African Advisory Board.

The African Attitude to Government

In dealing with the problems of the African both in regard to being governed and governing, the influencing factor appears to be that of tribal law and custom, which still holds

*Name withheld at request of witness.

undisputed sway over the greater number of them. Briefly, the decisions affecting the tribe have always been left to the chief in consultation with the council of the elders, who have had to take into consideration both tribal custom and usage, but also the likely effect any course taken might have on the ancestral spirits and other malicious influences that might be waiting. Usually this results in action within the closest limits of old and tried methods or in a masterful inactivity.

The result of this type of government is that all decisions are left to the chief and the elders of the tribe and the bulk of the people have no hand in making any decision nor do they have any hand in either the appointment of the chief or the elders. Hence it will easily be understood that the African is not accustomed to having any direct say in his own affairs and is so lost without this authority to guide him that he will readily invest his employer with a degree of the authority of the chief and he will take his problems to him for solution and quite happily abide by his decisions. Hence it will be realised that any form of democratic government calling upon the average tribesman to elect his government from men who are comparatively unknown to him will be so completely beyond his comprehension that he will make no effort to participate. He does find, however, that the present government does tend to interfere with his private affairs and life, far more than his own did, failing as he does to understand how the rapidly changing circumstances make it necessary for this interference, and it is my opinion that so-called African Nationalism is nothing more than a reaction against what he considers to be a busybody interfering government that harrasses him perpetually, making him do things that are foreign to his nature and comprehension. I have noticed so often when discussing de-stocking, the land husbandry act or bye-laws to prevent over-crowding or other undesirable practices, that while agreeing with all the arguments, there is the unexpressed question: "Why is this applied to me?" with accompanying resentment.

The Record of African Control in Public Affairs.

In his own communal affairs the African shows little real desire to arrange his activities in a democratic way, although he pays some small lip service to them only because he probably finds that this is the only way to carry out activities that have no precedent in his tribal life, such as, for example, a sports club. These clubs usually start by a meeting being held of interested persons and a Chairman and Committee and a Secretary and/or Treasurer are appointed, and from then onwards the members of the club evince no further interest in the running of the club, and as long as the officials continue to function in some sort of fashion, no further meetings to re-elect officials or ask for an accounting of their stewardship will be held. Usually the funds are, to our mind, in a disgraceful state, with malpractices and peculation rife. I would suggest that this practice of the personal appropriation of funds is rife throughout all African run affairs and does not seem to arouse any indignation or adverse comment. It is interesting to note in this respect that it has often been remarked to me by Africans, that all the leaders of the African National Congresses are in an affluent condition, with flourishing businesses since they became prominent in that organisation. The implication being that funds raised for Congress had been used for their own purposes. The only way I can account for this condonement by the African of what we would regard as a very dishonest appropriation of funds, is that the idea of any person doing any work for others without some form of emolument is so foreign to him that any peculation is considered to be by way of being an emolument. I cannot believe that this pilfering of funds, even those raised on odd occasions for charitable work amongst their own people, would be tolerated to the degree it is unless it is regarded in the way I have suggested.

A further disturbing fact about the African at present is the complete lack of any form of public opinion and a man can commit the most outrageously anti-social acts and not be in any way discredited in the eyes of his fellow Africans, while to have served a sentence for such crimes which would render a European an outcast among his fellows, does not cause even a raised eyebrow among his own people. In connection with this it is of interest to note that at least one of the leading African National Congress leaders at present undergoing detention has had several convictions of housebreaking and theft committed in an African township.

It is difficult to believe that Africans either desire or are capable of running any form of democratic rule. From my own experience when Advisory Board elections were run by the secret ballot, and the Africans given every encouragement to make a success of it, the poll was only a shade over 11%,

while subsequent elections when Europeans made no attempt to whip up enthusiasm, the poll was 2%. I understand that this is fairly representative of Advisory Board elections throughout the country. I think that the lack of interest by most Africans and their failure to register as voters, is certainly not the feeling of frustration that is attributed to them by some, but a sheer lack of interest by tribesmen in a function of government that is completely alien and beyond their ken.

Prospects of African Governments

In view of the foregoing, I am firmly convinced that any African elected government would be unprogressive and slothful or negligent in countering any social or economic problems that may arise, the solution of which would tend to interfere with the intimate lives of the people, while the largely African administrative service would probably be tolerant of misappropriation of public funds and indolent in their duties, and create such a condition that it would be impossible for any permanent European population to exist. It would be very certain that all pretence to a democratic government would soon wither away and be replaced by a dictatorship or an oligarchy.

I would therefore never accept that any constituent part of the Federation should ever come under an African majority. This majority is absolutely certain to be nationalistic in outlook and anxious to obtain self-government. It will be obvious to the African leaders that should any one territory be able to return a majority of African members to the Federal House, this would seriously embarrass the European section and cause at the same time an ever increasing pressure from the Africans and ultra-liberal Europeans from the other territories, and, not least, from that apparently vast fund of anti-White Settler sentiment from without, which would be a very serious situation for any European dominated territorial government to face.

It must be readily realised that, holding the power of policing and the administration of justice, the levying of taxation other than Income and Excise Tax and import duties, the framing of labour legislation, the control of licences, etc., etc., it would be relatively simple for a Nationalist African Territorial Government to make life so difficult for the European that he will voluntarily leave that territory while at the same time increasing the number of African voters on the Federal Roll by increasing the African Civil Service of that territory. The fact that such a course would reduce the wealth of the area would not deter the Africans at all.

The sharing out of the land left by the Europeans either sold to the Government or expropriated by them would satisfy the masses who are still at heart peasant farmers, while those with ambitions for a wider life would probably secure either Government employment or employment with foreign interests who might find primary products worth exploitation. There would also be loan monies readily available from outside sources for development programmes, which would tide over the period while the African slipped back to his age-old habits of life, and I have no doubt whatsoever that such a regime would receive the greatest approval from the majority of the African population. We are frequently told by the Nyasaland Nationalist leaders that the comparative wealth brought about by Federation counts as nought compared to the satisfying of the desire for absolute freedom of the people of Nyasaland to manage their own affairs. I myself am quite prepared to accept that statement as being quite sincere and think that probably even the hardships that would probably result would be cheerfully borne by the general population.

I personally can never accept that the Africans can in the foreseeable future, hold more than forty per cent of the executive or administrative power in the Federation or any territory thereof, or could create such conditions that will encourage a flourishing European type of culture. Even such near parity of power would still require a second chamber with a European majority with the power of veto, to ensure that the essential requirements of a democratic state were carried out.

The Need for African Preparation for Share in Government

As to the future, I do not think that in say, twenty years, that the African will have shown any great advance in his outlook unless a very strong emphasis is laid on the value of democratic rule and he is subjected to a long course of propaganda. Again, whether or not he will accept and strive to attain that outlook and set of standards that we Europeans consider necessary for a real democratic form of Government, i.e., integrity, initiative, a sense of responsibility, respect-

ability, public spiritedness, charity and fair play, is a matter for conjecture. So far, these qualities are only possessed to a slight degree by a very small number of adults. It is possible that a greater intercourse between the races would help to cultivate a more common outlook than now exists, this, however, is difficult to promote for any great number of the Africans and Europeans, owing to the great gap in the stage of civilisation, which will prohibit any real multi-racialism for a period of many years to come. Problems of Multi-racialism in the Social Sphere

In the following statements I am considering the greater bulk of the population of both races, and readily admit that they do not apply to the top 5% of the African population. I also realise that all do not come under the Federal jurisdiction, but they have to be considered in conjunction with the whole African problem.

In dealing with multi-racial schooling, except at University level, it is hard to see how this can be feasible owing to the gap in culture and the language difficulty. In primary school, no matter what language is adopted as the official language, one section of the children will have to learn it. This in itself will increase the amount of school work for one race and it will be found that the dual language will have a retarding effect on the other.

In the secondary school the problem of teachers also arises. Will African teachers be able to maintain the necessary discipline in the classes? The adult African tends to lack the capacity or even the desire to discipline his own children, and this is even more apparent with European children.

Probably the most difficult problem will lie in the very great difference in home environment, and the resultant difference in hygiene and morals. This latter appears to be the greatest objection at present.

Whether multi-racialism in hotels and places of recreation and entertainment would have any good effect at the present time I very much doubt. The European has too great an antipathy towards the dirt and disease which was until recently applicable to most of the African population, to enable any sort of mixing to take place that is not likely to cause continual friction and bad feeling. The cry of the Liberal is so often that the average Rhodesian thinks that all Africans are like his cook. This is true to a degree but it must be remembered that those Africans who are civilised to a higher degree are unfortunately very few in number and the opening of facilities at present available to the European only, will not prevent a large number of the lower type of African participating. The friction that is bound to result is, in my opinion, more likely to increase racial hatred than the present system.

When with the increase in earning capacity of the African his whole standard of living and, I hope, his sense of responsibility and fastidiousness increasing with it, then will come the time for a more liberal attitude to the breaking down of social barriers and the hoped for resultant increase in citizen-worthiness of the African.

REV. O. D. RAMUSHU

The original concept of Federating Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was and is still a very worthwhile idea. Perhaps the only thing that has done great damage to the whole political set-up in the Federation is prejudice and suspicion. Some people on both sides of the colour-line refused to look at the scheme impartially. They adopted a rigid uncompromising attitude.

1. The Franchise: The ordinary people looked at the idea of partnership as the dawn of a new era in Central Africa; but when the qualifications for the franchise were raised fantastically high, their hopes began to shrink. People saw this as a deliberate attempt by the Federal Government to keep thousands of Africans in a place where they will never have a say in the election of the people they want to form the Government. Although there is now a Special Voters' Roll, it does not meet the aspirations of the informed and enlightened African. He wants to have a say in the Government of his land on a Common Voters Roll. It need not necessarily be Universal Suffrage because the responsible African is after a vote which shows his maturity and confidence in the future of his country. The right to vote and its qualifications should be examined more closely as they affect the future stability and happiness of all sections of the community in this Federation.

2. Partnership: Does this mean equality of treatment by the removal of some irksome laws imposed on the Africans in general. Does it mean the opening up of opportunities based on merit alone and not on colour? If the Federal Government is sincere in its approach to these matters, we

need not fear the future progress of the Federated territories. It is a wild dream to think that everything could be done to please all the Africans within the period Federation has been in existence. One thing stands out quite clearly, it is true to say that all the territories have greatly gained economic advancement because of Federation. Nyasaland, with its poor resources has been the main benefactor. I am bewildered to know the economic advantages if it secedes.

3. Education: There are so many complexities facing the world today and Central Africa needs informed and enlightened leaders. The few graduates we have in the three territories would be overwhelmed by the millions of ignorant people who know nothing of economic and social development. These are in the majority and cannot have the knowledge required to understand science of legal machinery, industrial development, finance and many other subjects which have to be tackled by parliaments in the world today. We need education of the highest and refined quality before Central Africa can begin to clamour for rights which they are ill-equipped.

4. Positive Approach: Federation should remain in being even if it be on looser links. The emerging African should be taken into confidence by his senior partner, the liberal European. He should gradually be introduced into the functions of Governmental machinery. A great deal of patience, goodwill and tolerance is required on both sides. The approach of extremists of both sides is damaging the good cause of Federation. As the Africans prove themselves able, more opportunities for responsible positions should be opened to them before they feel frustrated, and the good relationships maintained for the progress of the whole multi-racial population.

Gwaai Methodist Mission,
Bulawayo
25th May, 1960.

M. RAYNOR

It is impossible to combine apartheid and multi-racialism—land reserved for Africans in Northern Rhodesia has killed multi-racialism before it was born.

Southern Rhodesia and the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia are ripe to abandon the Land Apportionment Act and all discrimination in anything under State Control; including African Affairs Board, Special Voters Roll and especially elected Members of Parliament. There should be no protected jobs for Whites, nor specially created jobs for either inefficient Whites or Blacks. There should be open competition between individuals of all races, and all should get the "rate for the job." The State should be completely colour blind, but it should not interfere with private enterprise. This must sort things out for itself progressively.

Segregation should go from all State Schools as soon as finance has made it possible to build sufficient schools—but private schools should not be touched.

State multi-racial hostels are preferable to co-ersing privately owned hotels.

Land should be controlled only by the Town and Country Planners. They should decide between High Class residential areas, Workmen's areas, industrial areas and land for farming—but colour should not be considered.

There should be a high standard for the franchise and citizenship. We should aim at integrity, efficiency and hard work. A bad citizen of whatever race should lose his citizenship.

The Copperbelt and other parts of Northern Rhodesia such as Kariba, Kafue and Livingstone should amalgamate with Southern Rhodesia to form Central Rhodesia.

West of the Copperbelt the land is reserved for Africans and multi-racialism is out of the question. It should have local autonomy. There should be no Northern Rhodesian Legislature. As it is not multi-racial, it would only breed political agitators, rival leaders and tribal warfare. It should be re-named Western Rhodesia.

The land to the East of the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia should be amalgamated with Nyasaland. The boundary is artificial and at present a tribe can be half in one country and half in the other—Nomadic races are not frontier conscious.

It is not possible to attach the European area of Nyasaland to Central Rhodesia, the Europeans should be given the option of coming to Central Africa and being compensated for what they have left behind or staying on under African rule. Like West Rhodesia this land should have local autonomy.

The Federal Assembly should act as a Second Chamber—the Rhodesians of Central Rhodesia should have an electorate—but the Eastern and Western Rhodesias should be represented by their Paramount Chiefs.

After a testing time of 20 years the Native States should have the option of continuing in the same way or seceding or amalgamating with Central Rhodesia but only on condition that they throw open all their land to all races for development and agree to go "multi-racial." Until the land has been developed, they agree not to have full citizen rights and voting rights. The transitional period might need to be as much as 50 years.

Central Rhodesia should have immediate Dominion Status, Western and Eastern should be Protectorates until they decide what they want to do 20 years hence.

Salisbury,
Southern Rhodesia
13th February, 1960.

J. A. RENNIE

I submit, with my respects, evidence as hereunder, uninfluenced in any way but by my convictions, and conscience.

Competency

Son of Rhodesian Pioneers, and personally resident in Southern Rhodesia for 59 years. Chairman, Victoria Farmers' Co-op. Co., Ltd., and Director in this important Farming Concern for 26 years, served on Council, Rhodesia National Farmers' Union, and on National Committees. Also on District Farming Bodies.

Political Affiliations

Up to time of Federation a staunch supporter United Party (Sir Godfrey Huggins Party). One time served as Hon. Secretary on the Executive of the Party in Fort Victoria. Voted for Responsible Government in Referendum—1923.

Federation

Considered this step bad, and ill-conceived. Proof of this is to be seen in present situation, which has necessitated a Commission. Linking a Self-governing Colony to Two Protectorates, was imperialistic, to say the best for it, and the fruits of it are now patent. Africans in the two Northern Territories have every right to object to being linked South without having had a say in their own destiny, especially after promises made them by the Imperial Government which promised paramountcy for Africans, and which virtually promised what Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are now demanding.

At time of Referendum on Federation, Southern Rhodesia ratio of Black to Whites, about 15 to 1. Federation made it 30, 40, or 50 to 1. So it insured an ultimate Black State, despite and wordings of the Constitution. As a Rhodesian I—and many like me, not blinded by so-called economic gains—could not visualise a future for my children in a Black (not multi-racial) State.

Economic

Possibly economically the conception of Federation had its virtues. On the face of it, the linking of land-locked areas in Africa, with largely similar problems, can hardly be ill-advised. That is why Federation went through. A lot of newcomers also influenced the issue. But a solid body of old Rhodesians knew that fundamentally the step was wrong; and if there was a choice to-day Federation would not be supported.

Fundamentally it was wrong because inherently Africa is first political, and only thereafter do economic matters count. Newcomers, and "outsiders," may consider this a reversal in priorities, but then they do not understand Africa. They do not understand the "non-assimilability" (even if I dare coin a word) of the two main races into one. Only this could have brought economics into true perspective. But the surge of Black Nationalism in Africa, and the existence of White Nationalism, should tell their story to the discerning.

Partnership, with its handicaps and impracticabilities, is all that can be offered; but even this has no chance of existence if the preponderance of Blacks is so overwhelming that the White Partner is faced with extinction.

The Pattern of Africa

It must perforce be: (1) Black Self-governing (or ultimately Self-governing) States. (2) Black/White States (where the White man is sufficiently established and in sufficient numbers or promises of numbers to maintain himself as a Partner).

There must be a "give" in Africa now of as much land to Africans as possible, even with a sacrifice of some minority groups of Europeans, otherwise the time will be too late, and there will be an "eviction" order against even borderline areas such as Southern Rhodesia.

In Black/White areas some domination and frustration will exist, where the Whites have the money, ability and political power, but this will ease as fears of being "swamped" eases—and that is why immigration into these areas of Whites is so important. A multi-racial State can only be successful on a balanced basis. In these areas political and economic rights must come to the Blacks as they earn these: not handed them as a gift prematurely to the detriment of the structure of the State. That is why some are now in detention camps.

Even in Black States political rights must come on a responsibility test basis. And Self-governing independence must also have a formula.

As a codicil to the above, let me say that *Nationalism* in Africa must be accepted, owing to the "non-assimilability" of the races. It is bound to be where the races cannot "hob-nob" socially, as is shown by troubles in the Southern States in America to this day. It is one of the things we have got to get along with; but it is strange that the World agrees with Black Nationalism (it is called evolution, and the "winds blowing across Africa"), but the World will have nothing to do with White Nationalism—that is outlawed. Yet it will be Whites, in time, who will deserve the sympathy of the World. It is they who even now (except for a vision or aim of a bastardisation of races) are fighting a rearguard action in the ultimate set-up of Black/White or multi-racial States. It is this which outsiders, idealists and liberals with a wrong slant and background do not understand.

Future of Federation

It has no future, and I would be utterly dismayed if it continued to have one forced on it. Blame attached little to Sir Roy Welensky, who was already in a Frying Pan in the North, and merely fell into the Fire in his efforts to escape. Blame does rest with Lord Malvern who, faced with economic Stalemate, caught glimpses of the "Afrikaner" in the South, and in his horror, reached out for the lesser of two evils, and swung the country to the North, and into an impossible impasse.

I believe Southern Rhodesia is worthy of Dominion status, and must be allowed to form its loose alliances for economic purposes where it wishes. An economic alliance to the North appears a "must" for purposes of Trade, and maybe also Defence. Closer alliance with Mozambique, which holds our Ports, is also necessary. And, I believe, when the time comes, and the Union of South Africa have their house in better order, Black/White States should, on the face of it, have closer union with Black/White States. If a Republic exists to the South, this may largely negative this purpose.

Communism

In my opinion fear of Communism in Africa is over-rated. Black leaders in Black States have only one ambition namely to lead, and they know they will be subordinated if they fall for Communism. That is why the Middle East do not fall for it. Of course they will always make use of it as a bargaining factor with the West. There is more chance of Communism in Black/White areas, where race frustrations are bound to exist until political rights can be extended. Immigration, I say again, is the greatest necessity in these areas.

Fort Victoria

31st March, 1960.

COUNCIL OF THE RHODESIA SCIENTIFIC ASSOCIATION

The Scientific Advantages which accrue from Federation

I have been asked by the Council of the Rhodesia Scientific Association to present their views to you on the effect of the Federation on scientific matters.

The Rhodesia Scientific Association was founded in 1899 for the purpose of promoting the study and advancement of Science with special reference to Rhodesia and for the purpose of facilitating the acquirement and dissemination of useful knowledge. The majority of the members are residents of Southern Rhodesia, though there are also a few in Northern Rhodesia. There is no other similar society in the Federation.

In the view of my council the scientific advantages which accrue from Federation are as follows:—

- (1) There is an easier interchange of scientific ideas between the three territories because there are more continual contacts than would occur between independent states.

- (2) There is a wider coverage of specialist scientific services than would be possible in smaller units.
- (3) Because of the wider range of interests, it is possible to attract and encourage a higher calibre of personnel in the Federation than would be possible in individual territories.
- (4) The many common scientific problems mean that scientific research can be concentrated with greater benefits to all three territories and furthermore since Research requires relatively large sums of money, these are more likely to be available under a Federal system than under any more fragmented arrangement.
- (5) A general weakness in the other emergent African States is a grave lack of African scientists and mathematicians in comparison with those educated in the humanities. This weakness will probably be cured in time, but until it is cured Scientific Research and Scientific Work must be a preponderately European contribution to any partnership. This contribution is available to all three territories under Federation at present.

The only disadvantage from the scientific point of view of the Federation would appear to be that regional problems of no great general interest may not receive the consideration that locally they deserve, when considered as part of a wider concept. My Council recognises this difficulty but at the same time it feels that this disadvantage cannot weigh seriously against the greater benefits in scientific matters, which are inherent in any pattern of Federation.

Salisbury

25th March, 1960.

ROYAL INSTITUTION OF CHARTERED SURVEYORS FEDERAL COMMITTEE

M. O. Collins—Secretary

In view of the fact that the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors is widely representative of professional people in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, it was considered by my committee that a description of certain aspects of professional life in the Federation might not only be informative, but of value to your work.

The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors is a professional society of the United Kingdom of considerable standing, which has branches both in the United Kingdom and overseas. Its members are qualified to speak in a wide range of subjects, such as land agency, valuation, housing, management, town and country planning, building, surveying, quantity surveying, land surveying and hydrographic surveying. There are two branches of the Institution, one for Northern Rhodesia with 49 members and one for Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland with 140 members. The working of the two branches in the Federation is co-ordinated by my committee, which can therefore be said to be speaking for a considerable body of professional opinion. Since the start of the Federation, the Institution has been attempting to get some measure of co-ordination amongst professional people with common interest. Essentially, such people are Europeans at present. The difficulties which have arisen are due to two causes:—

- (1) The professional standard of any one individual may be based either on those in the United Kingdom or those in South Africa. These standards may vary slightly in the technical qualifications required and even in the degree of independent control which is exercised over professional conduct. Whilst these differences are not fundamental, they make the creation of a single common standard a very slow process.
- (2) Individual territories are in a large number of matters autonomous and this, in turn, encourages a multiplicity of small autonomous professional institutes or societies which sets a premium on individuality and, again, makes a common professional standard difficult of attainment.

These factors, in turn, mean that any funds which may be available from professional subscriptions are either partially exported overseas, as is the case with this institution, or are split up into units, which are barely viable financially.

These limitations in their turn also inhibit any facilities for local professional training and tend to encourage external recruitment from the Union of South Africa or the United Kingdom.

It should also be borne in mind that there are a number of people in the Federation, who are not Federal Citizens and who are not anxious to exchange a United Kingdom qualification for a less widely recognised Rhodesian equivalent. In view of these factors, therefore, my committee is of the

opinion that growth of autonomous professional societies within the Federation must be slow. Furthermore, because of this internal pattern, local professional and, in some measure, technical training for both European and African will also unfortunately develop even more slowly unless some more positive steps can be taken to reinforce it from elsewhere. The foundation of a multi-racial equivalent of the College of Estate Management would be of lasting value, not only to the Federation, but particularly to Africans as a whole. Whilst the need is so apparent, the resources and the forces which might bring it about, are too widely dissipated to be immediately effective. The quicker the Federation can train and utilize its own citizens in a professional capacity, the more stable will the community become. This creation of technical colleges, for both European and African students, is therefore in the view of my committee, one of the paramount needs of the Federation today.

Salisbury

25th January, 1960.

P. RUBATIKA

Introduction

The present tension and strife in the Central African Federation, which on the one hand is influencing Africans in the two Northern territories to decry Federation and want to disintegrate it, and on the other Europeans making their desperate struggle to cling to power in the whole Federal area for as long as possible stems from two backgrounds, which are in conflict with each other.

In the first place—it must be stated in no ambiguous terms but quite emphatically that in order for the Monckton Commissioners to know our present problems and background, they must be made to understand the influences at play both psychological and historical.

Central African problems cannot be looked at in isolation but must be inter-related with the past events and present trends in world movements which are making a great impact in the minds of the people.

For centuries, since the contact between black and white in Africa, the relationship of the two races has, to a very large extent been that of a master and servant, the governor and the governed.

World opinion has rejected the false concept of the white man as the Master race destined to rule over the black people of Africa; Europeans by and large still believe in this concept despite world public opinion, that is why they call their problem unique to justify their worried consciences and privileged position to dominate Africans.

On the other hand due to the rise of African Nationalism which is sweeping throughout the continent of Africa, Africans are no longer contented to be ruled, but want to rule themselves. Hence the head-on clash between white supremacy and African Nationalism. Each side is digging its heels in, no wonder the solution is made very difficult. But there is already a writing on the wall warning these two people that however long and bitter the struggle might take them, whatever sacrifices and bloodshed that might occur, I am convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that African Nationalism will in the end prevail. Our fear as Christians is that if the African wins his freedom, struggle resenting and hating all that is white, then there might be no future for the whiteman in this country. In other words we want a smooth transference of power to be conferred on the African, free from all forms of racialism.

Europeans must look into the future in the interest not only of themselves but of the security of their children, it is important that they come into terms with their black brothers for the good of this country and for their own security.

Political Influences on Federation

Political trends which are influencing political thought in Federation are varied, and broadly as follows:—

South Africa

This country believes in apartheid, many of our white immigrants come from this country and also believe in white supremacy that is the reason why Europeans in this country are struggling to the best of their ability to cling to power as long as possible and to rule even without the consent of the black people. They have been accustomed to rule and cannot entertain the idea of being ruled with justice by the African.

Kenya

Despite a large population of the white settlers, the British

Government has recently stated that Africans shall soon be in the majority in the Federal Assembly of that country. This declaration has a great influence on the politically minded African. They see African National Movements winning their freedom struggle.

Tanganyika

This country borders the Federation and has already been promised Responsible Government with an African majority.

Belgian Congo

This country also borders the Federation and has been promised independence this year.

The African freedom struggle has been won in all the countries that I have mentioned. These events are bound to have an impact on the Federation, and unless the British Government acts now, the future of the Federation will be bleak and dark.

In the eyes of Nyasalanders the Federation is a monster to be hated as it stands on his way to self-determination. The same attitude is true of the Africans in Northern Rhodesia. There can be no doubt therefore that the attitude of the Africans here in Southern Rhodesia will be influenced by what is happening in the North.

To avoid violent racial strife here in Southern Rhodesia as a result of insecurity on the part of Africans and political strangulation by African Nationalists reinforced by Free and Independent states in the North, it would be necessary that the three territories remain Federated. In the Federation there is still hope for both black and white to live in peace and racial harmony provided the Constitution is changed and power is shared between the black and white.

Southern Rhodesia

Since this country was granted responsible Government 37 years ago it has enacted several discriminatory laws which are greatly resented by Africans in this country and which are the main basis of the fear of the Africans in the two Northern countries of Federation. Had Southern Rhodesia, during the 37 years it has maintained a self-government followed a liberal policy, there can be no doubt that the Africans in the North would not be as violently opposed to the concept of Federation as they are now.

The laws which have created fear among our local African communities and which have allayed the fears of the Africans in the north are better illustrated by quoting a few of them. Such are the laws like:—

(a) The Pass Laws, (b) The Native Affairs Act, (c) Native Urban Areas Accommodation and Registration Act, (d) The Land Apportionment Act, and many others.

I would like to add here that Reserved Clauses in the Southern Rhodesian Constitution, particularly those dealing with legislation discriminating between black and white should remain in the Constitution. But, reserved clauses pertaining to such institutions as the Native Affairs Department should be duly amended so that Native Commissioners would remain specialists in judiciary matters pertaining to Native Customs whilst the Native Agriculture Department in Southern Rhodesia could be removed to become a part of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture.

Land Apportionment Act

The false assumption that this legislation was passed to protect the African people from being deprived of all the land by the Europeans cannot be sufficiently emphasised. In fact, this law is the basis of all colour bar and discrimination in this country. It divides the land in the most unfair manner between Africans and Europeans. It compels the Africans to exist by tilling poor and barren soil in the reserves whilst thousands of fertile soil owned by Europeans overseas or some big companies remain unused for years. These Europeans held the land in the hope of re-selling it one day at exorbitant prices.

Needless to state that this same act militates against African interests in Urban areas. The Act strangles the African economically in that it forbids him from trading in the so-called European areas where all other non-African racial communities have access.

The now proscribed A.N.C. here took advantage of the widespread discontent among Africans in the urban areas as well as in the reserves and achieved success. So that there can be no doubt that its retention will always be the tool of subversive propaganda.

Land Husbandry Act

The enactment of this law only a few years back was the beginning of a long struggle between European and Africans

in this country. Inter alia, it provides that all Africans in the reserves get their livelihood out of six acres of arid soil. Experts agree that the land in which Africans farm is poor and thus, in spite of the fact that the law itself is a good one, only its bad effects are now visible. In actual fact it means that a whole family is expected to live and survive out of the bare six acres of the poorest and barren soil. From it they get their food, fees for children who go to school and their own clothes.

Farming

Whilst Africans in the two Northern Territories are opposed to African Agriculture going Federal, it would be an unnecessary drawback for our local African farmers here if African Agriculture were to remain for ever as it is now. We believe that it should be placed under the care of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture so that it can receive substantial financial support and thus be in uniform with European Agriculture.

Partnership

If the policy of racial partnership upon which the Federation was built had been fully implemented with the aim in view of winning the confidence and support of the eight million Africans into accepting the idea of Federation, there is every possibility that millions who at first opposed Federation would have been won towards accepting it. But instead the Government adopted a policy of gradualism dictated by a white minority electorate which has effective power and to whose tune the Federal Government dances. This has tended the African and European liberals here to view the policy of partnership of races as a mere lip-service aimed at pacifying the Government's critics and overseas opinion.

The Federal Government has refused to recognise African Nationalism. This, I consider a fallacy. For whilst they have thus refused to see eye to eye with it one becomes flabbergasted to see that the move of the Government to attain Dominion status is propelled by fears of the very power they refused to recognise. I believe that it is not yet too late to retrieve the situation.

The Federal Government however deserves to be praised for allowing African doctors to be employed on the same salary and grade as their European counterparts, in the Federal Public Service. But it is to be hoped that the Government will soon see it fit to do the same for all the other African employees in the employ of the Federal Government such as Postmaster, African nurses.

A single wage policy must be adopted by the Federal Government.

In all public places colour bar must be abolished.

All hotels and restaurants must abolish colour bar.
Constitution Advancement

Whereas Southern Rhodesia is a colony enjoying responsible Government, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia are under the protection of Her Majesty's Government. It is therefore highly desirable that British protection in these countries should remain until these countries, by consent of the majority of their respective people, have acquired responsible government. Only then can Federation be accepted.

It should be incumbent upon the Commissioners to recommend that no party or organisation be allowed to preach racial politics or to talk publicly aims and objects which are racial and threaten the rights of either the Europeans or the Africans. Nyasaland could be a black state with an African Government, but the Constitution should be so made as to encourage racial politics. Any party which is racial in outlook should be banned and declared illegal. The point I have in mind is such as was entrenched in the Constitution of the Union of South Africa at the time of Union whereby any party with a racial bias was to be declared illegal.

The Franchise

The principle of one man one vote is a right in a democratic state. It has been applied with success in all the emergent African States. In a country where all the people are of one race it has always worked smoothly. But, in a country like ours considerable difficulties are to be encountered, moreso when a minority race has entrenched itself to control the electorate to the disregard of the majority. Here the European electorate represents 1½% of the total population. It therefore follows that 98½% in the Federation are without a vote.

Unless the status quo is radically changed here, prospects of a happy settlement in the Federation remain remote, it

is therefore absolutely necessary that the franchise should be broadened. It could be stated then that one man one vote may not be opportune at this stage, but there can be no doubt that its implementation is the will of the majority of the people. The whiteman must come to terms with the desire of the majority. But there can be no doubt that whilst we will try to secure majority rule as opposed to minority rule, mob rule must, in the best interests of stable Government be resisted with the same force.

The Federal Franchise has been the main cause of African agitation for the implementation of the principle of one man one vote. It must be remembered that the average wage of the African in urban areas is about £72 per annum as compared to that of a European which runs to the average of £1,000 per annum. And yet the Federal Franchise require one to earn £720. This has resulted in producing an electorate which is 96 per cent European and Africans being less than 2 per cent.

It is therefore desirable that the African vote be evenly spread to all constituencies so that it can have the desired effect in the election of members of Parliament. But the European electorate will not yield to this. The Government, which panders to this European electorate, on the other hand cannot see it fit to change the present status quo. We believe, therefore that the British Government could play an important role in this regard.

Education

For the smooth implementation of the policy of partnership and in the interests of harmonious race relations it is of vital importance that African education must be placed on a National basis. We believe that the resources of the Federal Government may not suffice to meet this problem, but, that the British Government be persuaded to provide the Federal Government with a loan of £150 million to be invested in lucrative enterprises and from which the profits accruing could be ear-marked for African Education on a ten-year plan in an effort to achieve a compulsory and free education up to standard 8. That all education from primary up to secondary schools irrespective of race should be placed under educational Councils which shall administer territorially all education. Both Territorial, Federal and British Governments must vote funds yearly to these educational Councils catering for education for both black and white, there can never be a true partnership of races in the Federation unless Africans are educationally advanced enough to appreciate and defend Western standards.

Immigration

As much as possible immigration should be limited only to those with capital and who desire to establish industries here, and to highly skilled experts. Immigrants should not be used to compete with or displace already established artisans, but rather local talent must be sought and trained to take all available posts and thus play a part in the development of their country.

Salisbury

27th April, 1960.

A EUROPEAN RESIDENT OF SALISBURY*

In considering the future of the Federation, it must be accepted that sooner or later the African population of the country will be in the electoral majority, which in turn may or may not lead to an all-African legislature and government. The probability is that this will come about sooner rather than later, but in any event it is highly unlikely that when the time comes for the change-over in electoral power the majority or even a minority of Africans will be in a position fully to understand all the facets of a British-type constitution which are so essential to the proper working of this apparently vague form of government. In this lies one of the more reasonable fears of the average European for the future of this country, a fear which is supported by a glance at other countries where the English form of government has been adopted.

It may be said that after a time the African will learn to run the State in a proper manner according to English views, but be that as it may, the transitional period must be considered and all possible means adopted to ensure a smooth transition of power from the European minority to the African majority, or, ideally, to a multi-racial "majority," since the alternative would be a period of chaos, with a tendency towards dictatorship or anarchy, with a resultant economic setback if not more.

*Name withheld at request of witness.

In achieving this objective two matters of constitutional law become important. The first is whether the legislature should be subservient to the constitution or whether it should be supreme, and the second concerns the form of government in the sense of the division of powers within the constitutional framework. This memorandum will be concerned with the second of these considerations, in the belief that no constitutional system can survive if the form of government which it provides does not both in fact and in appearance meet the needs of the people whom it seeks to govern, both actually and instinctively. Following from this, it is submitted that the view must be rejected which assumes that that form of government which has been developed over the centuries by the inhabitants of the British Isles for their own use is necessarily the only proper and suitable form of government for emergent colonial peoples or indeed for any other nation. Certain examples may be taken to indicate this proposition, while at the same time showing some of the dangers inherent in blindly accepting that the Africans of this country will eventually be able to take over the reins of government upon the existing pattern.

In Pakistan the parliamentary democracy left behind by the British led the country in a comparatively short time to the verge of ruin due to the widespread dishonesty and inefficiency which was allowed to thrive, or at least which the government found itself unable to control. In the result it was found necessary to suspend constitutional government altogether and to resort to a dictatorial form, which in the opinion of one writer at least is a more suitable system for the people whom it seeks to govern, and which is apparently successful. (Sir P. Griffiths: "International Affairs," July, 1959). This probably seems terribly un-British, but then one is not dealing with Britons.

In the Sudan likewise parliamentary democracy no longer exists, due apparently to the inability or unwillingness of the political parties to make it work, thus demonstrating that there is little purpose in giving to a people a form of government which relies largely on the spirit of negotiation and compromise if the people to whom it is given have not that spirit within themselves.

In Ghana a somewhat different pattern has emerged, since the form of parliamentary democracy on the English style has remained. Two lessons may however be learned from this country. In the first place the opposition group, however fine its arguments in Parliament may be, appears to have abused the privileges of opposition by resorting to violent methods outside Parliament. This had led the government to arm itself with emergency powers and to take repressive action against the opposition so that a virtually one-party state now exists. The behaviour of the opposition party however cannot wholly explain or excuse the tendency of the government, and particularly of Dr. Nkrumah, towards the establishment of a dictatorship, and it is significant that in the preface of his autobiography, Dr. Nkrumah states that "a democratic constitution may need backing up, during the period following independence, by emergency measures of a totalitarian kind. Without discipline true freedom cannot survive." One does not yet know what form of constitution the Ghana Government will propose later this year but it will not be surprising to find a powerful presidency at the head of it, and indeed this may well be a form more suited to a people used for centuries to the rule of chiefs.

Thus in three states which have recently achieved independence the British form of government, as it is known and respected by Englishmen, has broken down in one way or another, and it is suggested that the reason for this is that the people whom it was intended to govern were not historically or temperamentally suited to making the system work.

Two further cases may briefly be mentioned, namely France and South Africa. In the former it has recently been found necessary to adopt a form of government with a strong individual centre instead of a purely parliamentary system. In South Africa a few years ago persons to whom British traditions and feelings were foreign had no qualms about removing from the South Africa Act the entrenched rights of coloured voters, an act which, it is suggested, would be regarded as just not done in British surroundings.

It is suggested therefore that a *prima facie* case is made out for the view (a) that the British system of government is not necessarily suitable for non-British peoples, and (b) that in order to preserve stability in nations gaining independence, it is necessary to launch the independence under a form of government which is suitable to the character of the people and which both traditionally and spiritually can be regarded by them as the proper form of government by which people should be ruled.

Turning now to the African peoples of the Federation, one finds that in tribal society the entire manhood of the nation, in varying degrees, took part in the government by a complicated system of horizontal and vertical groupings. At the head of the nation and as the personification of national unity was the Chief, a person in whom power was seen to reside and thus not a mere figurehead, but at the same time not a dictator, for he was himself controlled by advisers and by the laws of his nation. The tribal system was fully democratic and in many ways resembles the constitutional forms in use in modern states. In the concept of chieftainship, however, it differs materially from the present form of government in use in the Federation, in that the Chief was not a mere figurehead, as is the Queen, but had executive functions by virtue of his office, and not merely as leader of a popular political party, as in the case of a Prime Minister. He was seen by his people to be not only the head of the nation but also a person in whom power resided, who could make decisions and to whom his subjects could come for relief, and in his spiritual aspect he was seen as the symbol of unity which discouraged schismatic movements.

The concept of an individual leader was used with success in earlier days when the Native Commissioner was still able to tour his district and take a close if fatherly interest in the progress and the troubles of the people he ruled, and I am informed that to-day an appointed Chief is respected by his people by virtue of his office irrespective of whether he was royal blood or not.

All this raises the question whether it would not be desirable to adopt a form of government in the Federation which incorporates in some way the indigenous concept of chieftainship of the African people, so that the system will be regarded by those whom it seeks to govern as their own system, natural to themselves, rather than a foreign system which is little understood. Irrespective of any practical advantages which there may be, the sentimental aspect is highly important, and it is not insignificant that other states which have traditionally been ruled under a form of chieftainship have in one way or another reverted towards a form of personal rule.

There are, it is true, certain dangers in this form of government, which one may call the presidential form, not least of which is that it can be said to lay the way open for a dictatorship, the fear of which is often heard of and when political power becomes more widely spread than it is at present. This danger, however, could and would have to be checked by the provision of a supreme constitution on the United States of America pattern within which and not above which all government would be carried on, which concept, indeed, accords with the African idea of a chief governing within and not above the strong ties of tribal custom. On the other hand, if the premises of this memorandum are correct, that the concept of chieftainship or presidency is natural to the African population, such a leader will surely arise as has elsewhere, and if this happens it is very much better to have an existing constitutional framework to cater for this situation than to allow a leader to emerge within a governmental system which works in a different way, for that system would soon be abolished altogether leaving only a complete dictatorship, unfettered in any way. Although it is not the subject of this memorandum, the view may be expressed that an assurance of stable government by the provision of over-riding constitutional safeguards would do much to remove the fears of the white population, which lead to the harbouring of ideals of white supremacy.

To revert to the practical aspects of the matter, there is seen to be today in the Federation a tendency for the forming of numerous political groups, due largely to the desire on the part of many individuals to be the leader rather than the led. A continuation of this situation could well lead to a situation like that in the Sudan or in France under the Fourth Republic where government came virtually to a standstill because of the existence of a variety of splinter political parties. Again, it would tend towards the undesirable situation where many of the best brains of the community would be engrossed in political struggles for power instead of settling down and doing something constructive for the community. A form of presidential government would, it is suggested, serve two purposes in this regard. On the one hand, provided that election to office was for a fixed period, it would tend to remove the temptation among would-be political leaders to strive all the time for power because no power could in fact be gained until the arrival of the next elections, unlike the existing system when a government may be brought down at any time. On the other hand, such a system would provide a stable

government above the squabbles of party politics if in fact a number of uncompromising groups did appear.

It remains to consider briefly why changes in the form of government should be thought of at all. The reason is simply this. That when the time comes when the African inhabitants of the Federation are in an electoral majority, whenever that may be, and however much they understand academically the workings of the British constitution, they will still not have had any practical experience of the subject and accordingly may well find that they cannot make it work. If one adds to this the possibility that they will find the British system alien to their nature, the likelihood becomes very much stronger that, when the change of power comes, the majority will overthrow the existing order of things in search for a simpler and more acceptable system. It is essential for many reasons that stable government should continue unhindered in this country, and that we should do all possible to avoid the necessity for a period of unconstitutional government following upon the emergence of the African population as the electoral majority. This is not to say that the inhabitants of the Federation will not in time evolve a system which is very similar to that in use today—they may or may not—but it is the transition period which is particularly important.

The purpose of this memorandum has been to see whether a lesson can be learnt from other countries which have attained independence and to see whether by giving thought now, some of the troubles which have occurred in those countries can be avoided in the Federation. It is intended to do no more than to provide a talking-point which may or may not be of value, and while consideration has been given to a presidential form of government, this is because it is the most obvious difference between the British system and the system under which most other nations of the world have chosen to be governed. It is not intended to put forward this system as a concrete proposal, but merely that it should serve as an illustration of the basic theory, which is that a country can only be governed properly and satisfactorily under a system which its inhabitants feel to be a proper and suitable system according to their particular background and circumstances. Finally, this memorandum does not seek to provide the answer to all the problems of this country, but if within it there is to be found the germ of an answer to part of those problems then it will have served its purpose.

30th January, 1960

A EUROPEAN RESIDENT OF SALISBURY*

I am a Rhodesian by adoption having lived in this country 42 years since childhood. I have no ties with Britain or any other country and regard Rhodesia as my homeland.

I have taken the liberty of submitting my views to your commission on the assumption that you wish to obtain as many points of view as possible from the inhabitants of the Federation in order to arrive at a just conclusion acceptable to the majority of its people.

I have taken this step as I consider my views are by no means isolated and similar views are held by many other Europeans who have no means of making their opinions known either through the Political Parties or Press, in view of the fact that both Political Parties support the continuation of Federation in some form or other able supported by our local Press.

There is a real danger that the Commission will receive little evidence from the large percentage of Europeans who voted against Federation and would prefer to see this country revert to its former status.

I would like to lodge a strong objection to the terms of reference given to your Commission. During the time of the referendum our Politicians gave many solemn assurances that, at the end of ten years, if it was found the Federation was not acceptable we would be given the opportunity to revert to our former status. This fact was used intensively by the Press as a weapon of propaganda. As your Commission is expressly excluded from making such a recommendation this is a gross violation of promises previously given.

I cannot recall a more unhappy period in our race relations since the formation of the Federation. At present a feeling of frustration prevails amongst both Africans and Europeans alike.

The continued attempts to enforce Federation upon us, against the will of the vast majority of the people is wrong, from whichever point of view it is looked at. The only justification I can see for this course of action is firstly—to maintain

British influence over these territories and secondly the fear of our Politicians that if Southern Rhodesia were left on her own, she would be compelled to join the Union of South Africa.

It is my contention that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland which belong to the African people of those territories must be allowed to decide their own future and that Southern Rhodesia be permitted to succeed from the Federation and revert to its former position with the right to manage her own affairs as she did so ably prior to Federation.

29th January, 1960

A EUROPEAN RESIDENT OF SALISBURY*

Bearing in mind your terms of reference and the statements made by Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Federation that the Federation is to continue, it seems that the basic problem is whether the powers of the Federal Government should increase, decrease or remain unchanged.

Despite your terms of reference and the determination of the United Kingdom and Federal Governments for Federation to continue, I would draw your attention to the fact that (a) the majority of Africans in the three territories, (b) a large proportion of Europeans in Southern Rhodesia and (c) a growing number of Europeans in Northern Rhodesia are in favour of discontinuance. Also, the possibility of Southern Rhodesia's withdrawal has been openly stated by the Prime Minister of that Territory.

In view of these two entirely opposite approaches to the problem, i.e. the continuance and the discontinuance, it seems inevitable that there must be a compromise along the lines that all of those functions of government, at present in the hands of the Federal Government, which can be more fairly and effectively carried out by the Territorial Governments should be given back to those Governments.

It seems inevitable that there will be many changes to the present constitution but the changes will, in my opinion, be of no avail unless there is a change of heart by all races in general and by political leaders in particular in their approach to the honest application of the principle of racial partnership.

The Europeans, due to their far greater education and higher standards generally, should make it evident, by practical example, that they truly believe in the practical application of the principle of racial partnership. Since the commencement of Federation most Europeans, and this includes Cabinet Ministers and Members of Parliament, have merely given lip-service to this principle. It is not surprising, therefore, that most Africans have not been attracted to Federation and have, in actual fact, become progressively antagonistic to it throughout the seven years of the Federation's existence.

Clearly, if racial partnership is to be implemented then racial discrimination must be abolished. If there is not likely to be any change of heart which would lead to eliminating racial discrimination voluntarily then, in my opinion, it must be legislated for. Under the present constitution it appears that the Federal Government cannot introduce such legislation—which appears to be an anomaly in view of its declared policy of racial partnership. I submit that the Federal Government should be given the power to legislate for the removal of all forms of racial discrimination because without that power it is not possible for it to implement its policy of racial partnership.

It is mostly in Southern Rhodesia that there is a general refusal by Europeans to eliminate racial discrimination and in view of the fact that it is a self-governing colony whereas Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are Protectorates, I submit that the "Review Commission" should give consideration to a form of Federation which includes only the two Northern Territories.

One effect of this would be that the whole wealth of Northern Rhodesia would become available for developing and diversifying the economies of the two northern territories to a far greater extent than has been done under Federation in its present form. This would assist, very materially, in producing two happier and more prosperous Territories and would guarantee greater and enduring success to them when they become self-governing.

AN AFRICAN WOMAN RESIDENT OF SALISBURY*

It is sufficiently manifest that there is a great deal of opposition to the Federation by the Northern Territories, and as far as the Southern Rhodesian Africans are concerned, the rejection of Federation is chiefly prompted by its failure to implement its professed policy of partnership. In order

*Name withheld at request of witness

to understand why the two Northern territories object to be joined in a Federation with Southern Rhodesia, it is necessary to find out what it is that makes Southern Rhodesia unacceptable in an association with them. Also Southern Rhodesian racial policies are reflected in the Federal Government.

In the following pages, I intend not so much to describe the Federal and Southern Rhodesian legislation concerning the African, but the effects of some of the legislation and especially to call the Commission's attention to the African's degree of awareness of the issues at stake—how he interprets some of these practices and his reaction to them.

From observation, living and talking with the Africans (and of late I have been keen, as a student, to assess the views of the people about life around them in general) I cannot now accept any statement to the effect that the majority of the African is quite happy and contented with the status quo; that any signs of discontent are solely due to the "subversive activities of a few disreputable demagogues"; and that Southern Rhodesia is a zone of calm amid the stormy North and South.

The Africans' distrust of the Europeans and their governments cannot be exaggerated. Coupled with, or springing from, this distrust of the home governments, there is some suspicion that the British Government, faced with a challenging problem, may be persuaded by the local governments' propaganda, to fall on the side of the Europeans at the expense of justice to the Africans. 1923 is regarded as one occasion when the British government formally handed over the African to the mercy of the Rhodesian white settlers. The rejection of the Devlin Report by the British Government is quoted as another instance of the British Government's reluctance to follow up "embarrassing matters." An immediate manifestation of the widespread distrust of the British Government is explicitly expressed by the refusal of some of the Africans to give evidence to the Monckton Commission. The Commission itself is subject to suspicion following, naturally, on some of its members being nominees of distrusted governments—the Federal Government and Southern Rhodesia Government in particular. Secondly Africans feel that even if the Commission made valuable recommendations, the British and other governments concerned, would not accept them if they did not fit neatly into their ready-made plans.

Of course, many of us realise that they have the Devlin Commission's fate as a precedent to go by, that incident is no certain guarantee that the British Government will inevitably act inadvisably this time.

I mention all this not because I am undertaking on myself to back the criticism and suspicion whether rightly or wrongly of both the British Government and the Monckton Commission, but to point out the important factors that emerge from these observations. Firstly, this again underlines the fact that the faith of the African in their two governments and apparently also those that they confer with (i.e., the British Government) has not been maintained but has deteriorated very considerably. Secondly, the seeming calm and absence of many Africans and leaders from coming forward to give their views to the Commission should never be mistaken for mere apathy or lack of any real burning issues to bring forward. I know it is disappointment and despair at the effectiveness of a positive approach when the other group (i.e., the Europeans) is not prepared to meet them half way. Apparently the African has been trying for a long time to get the European to come to terms with him but, it seems, all in vain.

What has the Southern Rhodesian African gained from the Federation? Nothing much, especially when compared with the harm it has done. It has led to that bitterness that springs from disillusionment. In the propaganda for Federation a great deal was said about the enigmatic term partnership. This raised people's hopes for it implied positive progress to a society where the colour of the man was incidental and merit was the criterion—where there would be equality of opportunity within the framework of an ordered and impartial government. The recent but scanty removal of separate entrances into post offices does not impress the African. These are regarded as attempts at whitewashing for propaganda purposes. The real genuine grievances of economic and political discrimination still remain. The Federal Government is further disliked by the African because of its whitewashing practices. It has Africans in Parliament who are not representatives of the Africans in any sense because they are not elected by them. The African members of Parliament are representatives of their white electors and not of the Africans as the Federal Government would like us and the world to believe.

From reading and mere observation of daily events here, I can clearly see that the government of Southern Rhodesia in its official capacity displays the Dr. Jekyll-Mr. Hyde features. Many times this dual personality becomes cumbersome to play successfully. The Dr. Jekyll character is the government as it would like to be known abroad and by the Africans here. Apparently the Mr. Hyde in the government does not escape the notice of the Africans. The fundamental Mr. Hyde characteristic is confirmed by the actions of the majority of Europeans in this country who do not wear masks as is done on official levels. While the government would like to make it known that the white man has no privileges but enjoys what he enjoys on merit, the blunt, down-to-earth white Rhodesian will declare that:—

"All this business about having to remove the so-called 'pin-pricks' is, in my opinion, a lot of eyewash. The reason for removal is not reason at all but excuse for enforcing racial integration upon an unwilling people. What is abundantly clear is that the pin-prick argument will provide an unending string of excuses for gradually insidiously encroaching upon our personal privileges and eventually upon our livelihood. We can only conclude that if the government is not moronic, it is either hopelessly out of touch with the feelings of its electorate or is being subjected to dangerous pressure from outside."*

I quote this just as an example of the prevailing mentality among our European. It also supports the statement above that the apparent move of the government even in the direction of mere whitewashing clashes considerably with the true feelings of its own electorate.

From observation again, the African is a hurt person although different individuals differ in degree and manner in which they manifest their bitterness. I have no desire to sound so pessimistic but sometimes we cannot always manage to turn our eyes from realities and fix them on the mirage of "all will be well," when there is no clear indication to suggest that. I would like to see a reconciliation between the two groups but it is regrettable that the African trust in the genuine goodwill of the Europeans here has been undermined for so long that no half-hearted moves will secure the confidence of the Africans.

May I briefly state some of the deplorable relationships between the Africans and the Europeans in this country, which to a large extent are responsible for racial tensions.

On a purely social level, Southern Rhodesia has unfortunately inherited or copied bad examples from South Africa where the African was considered not to be worthy of respect accorded to other man. Consequently the day to day relationships leave much to be desired. The general trend is to humiliate the African while at the same time the Europeans attempt to assert superiority by harsh and rude means. For example, the Europeans are given priority of service on many counters. The Africans are addressed as "nanny" and "boy" irrespective of their age, occupation or status, and also disregarding the fact that the Africans themselves do not accept these as polite terms of address. No, the European here is too superior to condescend so low as to call a black face "sir" or "madam"! And the young ones are so taught. This type of behaviour does not earn credit from the Christian Western Civilisation even from the most "primitive" African. Psychologically, this is the wrong method to enlist the respect of the African or any other people. The love and confidence of the Africans can only be won by sound moral behaviour and not by the possession of political power over them or by material trappings.

The above examples may be minor in themselves but they reflect an attitude of mind towards the Africans. There are two major evils that I consider to have alienated Africans in this country. These are economic and political discrimination on the grounds not of merit but of the colour of a man's skin. This is an open affront to our dignity as a people. I am baffled each time I try to reason with myself, why the same economic (or uneconomic) output of labour should be rewarded differently. As it is, the government leads in this injustice. How then can the African be expected to believe that those who govern him are civilised and benevolent when the above example seems to disprove this? Where, in such practices, does merit come in? The discrimination in salaries and wages is also linked with the reservation of certain jobs for Europeans only so that the Africans may not compete with them.

The economic colour-bar is also closely linked with the franchise policy. To the outside world our franchise seems

* Rhodesia Herald, Tuesday, April 26th, 1960 (Letters to Ed.)

open to all who can qualify, but we know that since the qualifications are based on income and property, owing to the control on African wages to a certain general level, most of the Africans will not qualify to get on the General Voters Roll. In this respect, discrimination in wages is just as effective as a law in barring the Africans from taking active part in government. The concept of two voters' rolls fails to make sense to me if all votes are of equal value. It perhaps tries to persuade the African into believing that he has a vote when in actual fact his Lower Roll vote virtually carried no weight.

The franchise issue in turn can be followed up in the system of African education. If the government is aiming at building up an integrated state, as it implies in its policy of partnership, one would assume that one of its primary tasks would be to bridge those gaps that exist in our citizens. This would be done through education including education in good citizenship in a multi-racial society. As things are, the general rule is separateness. And however much we may be asked to believe that African education is receiving great attention and is being greatly extended, we cannot but wonder at the paradox of educating the African soundly so that he may be assimilated into the Central African Society, and at the same time maintaining the vested interests of the Europeans—what they term "their privileges"—which can only be maintained in their present form by the continuation of the exploitation of African cheap labour.

Before I discovered this incongruity, I had long felt that African Education was not only receiving inadequate attention but also that somehow there was a conscious move to slow up the general advancement of the African. This naturally would provide yet another "good" reason for refusing the African a share in the governing of the country. If he is ill-educated he stands a remote chance of (a) earning an income to qualify for the vote, and (b) of being regarded as civilized according to the Western meaning of the term. "Government will remain in the hands of the civilized" is the policy of our European Government.

At present African education is heavily weighted on primary education in proportion to secondary education that is provided. Consequently there is a heavy pupil wastage. Whether wrongly or rightly, we ask a question in view of other policies of the government towards Africans. Is this emphasis on primary education meant to produce a large semi-educated African population which will neither ever aspire to political power or compete with the educated European in the economic field? We agree that there is a shortage of teachers but that position would not be nearly so bad if the policy of discrimination which implies superiority and inferiority did not discourage many Africans from taking up the teaching profession. Africans are human beings who, psychologically, react as other human beings do. They feel insulted, lose confidence, patience and on the other hand they can appreciate honest intentions, goodwill, friendship and love.

Many a time attempts to justify the monopoly or privilege of the European in this country are made. The gist of the argument is as follows: The European has built up all that Southern Rhodesia is today. He has converted the bush that Zambesia was before his advent. He has built tarred roads and railways where only a criss-cross of footpaths joined the villages. Look at the modern towns the European has raised in the bush of Africa. The European has therefore an undisputable right to have a monopoly in what he has created. Why should he be asked to share his self-made wealth with the African, etc.?

A person who is unacquainted with the real facts underlying the development of this country may be taken in by this and similar arguments. This argument however presents a false picture of the story of the conversion of "bushy Zambesia" to the Southern Rhodesia of today.

Firstly the natural resources belong to the country and have not been brought by the European. The country's inhabitants should be entitled to whatever their habitat yields.

Secondly, in order to be brought to use, we realise that these natural resources have to be exploited and to do so requires the know-how, labour and tools. The Europeans had the know-how and the African, far from being an onlooker while the European hewed the wood and the granite to make roads and railways, dug trenches for foundations of houses and drainage, participated in the building of Rhodesia as soon as the European first came here. Nor could the African be regarded as a hired labourer, for the wage he got was not the equivalent of the labour he put in. Not only does the history of African wages show this fact; I can well remember not more than eight to ten years ago, the Africans from the neighbouring reserve were asked by

law to spend some months each year away from their homes doing road construction or other similar types of public work. They are compelled by law to do this and as far as I know they were not paid for it. How, in the light of these facts, can the African be discounted in building Rhodesia? The development of this country demands a great amount of capital. The capital that the European invested in this country is far too little to have produced what this country is. The history of automation and mechanisation is almost nil. Even to this very day picks and shovels, wheelbarrows, axes, etc., are still tools used extensively. One needs only look at any major operation today—be it the building of a sky-scraper in Salisbury, agriculture, mining, the making of roads, dams, gardens, etc., there are many Africans engaged in doing the manual work and a few European supervisors.

We do not want to rob the European of what genuinely belongs to him, but we only claim our fair share in our land and not be used by the Europeans as one of the country's natural resources to be exploited or mere tools for his own benefit.

If the African is to have the fair deal he claims, the European is inevitably called on to a genuine standard of living that his poor or rich environment and his labour entitles him to. The instinct of selfishness is society's most disruptive enemy. The way things are at the moment is not the way to the self-preservation of the Europeans and surely not a way towards making Central Africa a happy home for their children.

Perhaps we in Central Africa especially in Southern Rhodesia are sunk so deep in our own folly and the resulting fear, disillusionment and disappointment that we are not sufficiently clear-headed to save ourselves. I would like to hope that both the Monckton Commission and the British Government will not watch us drown or hasten that drowning, but genuinely try to save all from folly and the bitter fruits of it. A little harm to achieve a greater good is, I think, more worthwhile than immediate satisfaction that leads to greater disaster.

A EUROPEAN RESIDENT OF SALISBURY*

I have the honour to submit the following memorandum which I request may please be placed before the Monckton Commission:—

1. On returning to Southern Rhodesia in 1946 I came to conclusion that the Southern Rhodesian native policy bordered on suppression, and the attitude of the average European towards the African was wrong. There have been certain reluctant concessions to the African, but the general outlook is unchanged.

2. I was shocked and horrified when in 1951 the federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was mooted. The main reason for proposing federation seemed that it was considered it would make for a better economy. The British Government had obviously not yet learned the lesson of the almost insurmountable difficulty created in Africa by European settlers who want the best and more than their share of the land, and would like the Africans to be permanent second class citizens in their own country.

3. I happened to be in Cape Town in February, 1951, when The Right Hon. Patrick Gordon Walker, then, I believe, Secretary for State in the United Kingdom Labour Government, arrived there en route to Rhodesia, etc., to study the possibility of federation. I wrote him a long confidential letter, supported by classified press cuttings, protesting against federation. His private secretary politely acknowledged my letter and returned my cuttings.

4. At this time the status quo of the three territories concerned was briefly:—

(a) *Nyasaland*. A small, rather poor economically, British Protectorate with a tiny handful of whites. The Africans hoped that they would be eventually granted self-government when they could determine their own future, either remaining a separate state, or perhaps federation or amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia and/or Tanganyika.

(b) *Northern Rhodesia*. A comparatively large British Protectorate, economically rich, with a population of about 2,000,000 blacks and 50,000 whites. The Africans were naturally anxious for self-government, and probably would not be averse to absorbing Nyasaland (should she wish it) and possibly linking up with Tanganyika to create a large African block.

The European population was mainly centred on the copper belt, and there was little European settlement outside. The

* Name withheld at request of witness

European mine employees, many from the Union of South Africa were highly paid and I do not think that many of them regarded Northern Rhodesia as their permanent home. They realised it was a blackman's country and eventually they would be squeezed out by the African surge of nationalism and the Africans' ability, in most cases, to competently take over their jobs. For them it was a matter of making hay while the sun shone, perhaps saving up enough money to buy a farm in the Union, or for the artisan from the United Kingdom, returning there and possibly buying his own business.

(c) *Southern Rhodesia.* A self governing colony with certain reservations regarding legislation referring to natives only, but to some extent this proviso has been overcome by making laws for all races, but in practice only applicable to Africans. The population was roughly 200,000 whites to 2,000,000 blacks. About half the land was occupied by Europeans many of whom were Afrikaners, and whose outlook is very similar to that of the Union of South Africa.

5. Federation was decided upon in a referendum open only to the European electorate of Southern Rhodesia (the handful of Africans then on the voters' roll can be ignored). Only some 60% voted for federation and in my opinion the scale was tipped by the promise of lower income tax, a reduction of excise on liquor and tobacco and other economic benefits, to be paid for by revenue derived from the buoyant copper mines of Northern Rhodesia.

6. The Europeans of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were generally opposed to Federation, and regarded Southern Rhodesia as a sucker.

It is amazing that about 60,000 Europeans in Southern Rhodesia should be allowed to decide the destiny of nearly 6,000,000 Africans.

The Africans, almost to a man, of all three territories were bitterly opposed to federation and today are probably even more so now that many of their leaders are detained. One may well ask why the Southern Rhodesian Africans dislike Federation, for possibly they would have something to gain. I think the answer is that they do not wish to see the Africans of the other two territories dragged down to their level.

7. Many Europeans, including some overseas, seem to think that because we have stopped tribal fights amongst Africans they should be for ever grateful and prepared to suffer permanent indignities. The Europeans, with 2,000 years of civilization and culture, perhaps forget that they have been involved in two major wars this century, and would probably have had a third by now, but for the fear of atomic warfare. I know that two wrongs do not make a right, but let us not be hypocrites.

8. Many Europeans do not realize that their races, customs and languages are as diverse as those of Europeans.

9. The white artisan class, which includes many immigrants from the United Kingdom, fears African advancement most. They have never had it so good, often a car, a large house and two servants. Some had been the under-dog in the United Kingdom, but now the boot is on the other foot. The African naturally resents the very great difference in the standard of living between black and white. Many Europeans are over paid for doing comparatively menial jobs which could well be done by Africans, the majority of whom exist below the Poverty Datum Line (see Plewman report). The difficulties of advancement for Africans have been clearly depicted recently in the press.

10. In Southern Rhodesia it is a criminal offence punishable with imprisonment without the option of a fine, should an adult African male have sexual intercourse with an adult European female, both parties consenting, but not being married. In Salisbury, the capital of a multi-racial community, there have recently been two convictions. Ethically it may be wrong, but surely it should not be a criminal offence.

11. Both the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Native Affairs Department of Southern Rhodesia are publishing "Fact Pamphlets." They appear to be extraordinary propaganda and often seem to savour of paternalism, a "Look what we have done for the African attitude, aren't they ungrateful."

In view of certain facts published in a Native Affairs Fact Paper dated April, 1959, and commented on in the *Evening Standard*, I wrote to this paper and the following is a copy of my letter published on the 23rd June, 1959:—

"In your issue of May 8 it was stated that during the 1958-59 financial year the Southern Rhodesia Government spent more than £5,000,000 on African projects, compared with about £2,000,000 collected in revenue from Africans in 1957.

"This information was disclosed in a Fact Paper, published

by the Native Affairs Department, which gave the following details of revenue collected:—

Native Tax, indig, and non-indig, dog tax, pass fees—
£1,287,523.

Cattle and grain levies—£733,328.

Dip fees, etc.—£304,640.

Total—£2,245,491.

"No mention is made of revenue collected from Africans through customs and excise on such items as bicycles, clothing, gramophones, records, wireless, etc., cameras, cigarettes, tobacco and European type beer, etc.

"It would be of interest to know if an estimate of the revenue thus derived could be given.

"A substantial sum of money is obtained from taxation paid by companies whose success is to a degree dependent upon the efforts of both European and African labour, and thus provides more funds, presumably for the benefit of all races.

"I believe that a male African becomes liable to pay £2 annual taxation (non-payment is a penal offence) on attaining the age of 16 (with certain exceptions), regardless of the amount he may earn, and is also subject to income tax.

"Thus an African earning £150 per annum with a wife and three children pays £2 direct taxation, while a European in similar circumstances earning £1,500 pays nothing.

"In equity I suggest that African tax as such should be abolished and a personal tax introduced, imposing an annual levy of £2 on all males regardless of race, on reaching the age of 18, students and certain other categories being exempted until a later age.

"The Fact Paper intimates that the European section of the population has to find the many millions of pounds spent on Africans over and above what they (the Africans) pay in taxes and levies, and to some extent this is doubtless correct.

"In most countries, however, it is normally accepted without comment that the better-off pay more in taxation than the poor. In the Federation the dividing line is generally speaking defined by colour.

"I can well imagine the outcry there would have been in England early this century if the poor had been told that they were being subsidised by the better-off minority section of the population."

Much to my disappointment there was no further correspondence on this matter in the *Salisbury Evening Standard*, for I like to be told if and where I am wrong.

However, a little later the question of African taxation cropped up again in a slightly different form in the *Salisbury Sunday Mail*. On this occasion my criticism was of a Fact Paper published by the Federal Information Department. The following is a copy of my letter (except one paragraph which is a repetition) published in the *Sunday Mail* on the 19th July, 1959:—

"I should like to congratulate you on your leader advocating a personal tax, and pointing out that while all adult male Africans pay a poll tax of £2, thousands of married Europeans earning up to £1,300 pay nothing at all.

"On page 35 of a booklet called 'The Facts,' which, I believe, has been circulated extensively in the United Kingdom, compiled by the Federal Information Department, it states:—

'All people are liable for income tax but, for example, only 12 Africans paid this tax in 1958, when the total of taxpayers was 65,866.

'The reason for this small number is that most Africans have many dependants for whom they can claim rebates. A married man with two children can claim rebates that make him not taxable on an income of less than £1,300 per annum.

'While an African would only get a single rebate for his first wife (he might have three or four wives), he would benefit considerably from the rebates on each child, irrespective of the total or the ranking of the mother.'

"In my opinion this is misleading, for it indicates that many more Africans would be subject to income tax if they did not have so many dependants. Any person earning up to £1,300 with a wife and two children is exempt from income tax. I doubt whether many Africans earn so much, and the question of dependants, therefore, seems irrelevant.

"You state that the average European in the Federation earns about £90 a month, or about 14 times as much as the average African. Thus the average monthly earnings of an African are about 130s.

"This seems to make the question of dependants ridiculous, for the majority of married Africans, even without children or dependants, must be a long way from being liable to income tax.

"An acquaintance told me that he had read of an African who paid £3,000 for a lorry. I pointed out to him that a Southern Rhodesian bachelor was assessed at £33,000 in 1957 and it was puerile to judge incomes by quoting exceptions.

"It would, in fact, appear that the average African does not pay income tax because of his low rate of pay."

There was no further correspondence in the *Sunday Mail* on this subject and I would submit that I succeeded in disclosing false or misleading information published in Native Affairs and Federal Information Departments Fact Papers.

12. In fairness to the Federation it should be pointed out that there have been certain signs of liberalism recently. An African minister has been appointed to the Federal Government and there are African Public Relations Officers in London, all with attractive salaries. It would have been difficult for these Africans to have refused these jobs, even should they disapprove of many of the aspects of white policy. Some members of the Labour Party have referred to them as stooges, but the appointments were doubtless a brilliant propaganda move by Sir Roy Welensky.

In Southern Rhodesia separate entrances for black and white to post offices have been abolished, and there have been multi-racial athletic meetings, but European sport is generally closely associated with the Union of South Africa where a European member of the Federation is eligible to win a Springbok cap for rugby, soccer, cricket or hockey and possibly other sports.

Admittedly the University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is multi-racial, but in my opinion if the two races are to ever understand one another and get on together, then multi-racial education must start at the primary schools.

13. Broadly speaking I consider that Africa should be for the Africans and Europe for the Europeans. The Europeans admitted to Africa should be in an administrative, advisory and technical capacity only, with a view to eventually handing over the country to the Africans as in Ghana. The Sudan and Nigeria, etc. Full co-operation will then generally be obtained from the Africans, and when eventually they are granted self government they will still employ many Europeans for the time being, but of course there will be no European settlers on the land which is the main cause of trouble in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia. With the strong nationalist movement in Africa today, I predict much trouble, unless their aspirations are met. Europeans are now thinking how they can protect themselves against the surge of African advancement, and their bleat, especially if you could see some of them, of 2,000 years of civilisation and culture, is pathetic. Prominent statesmen, and others, are continually impressing upon Africans that they do not appreciate what the European has done for them in 60 years—stopped tribal fights, ended slavery, educated them, introduced modern medicine, etc.—and they are very ungrateful. But the young and intelligent African, born and bred in the town, is not interested in all this. He knows that because of the colour of his skin he is being kept back and does not get the same opportunity in life as his white contemporary, many of whom regard him as just a savage under the skin. He lacks the opportunity of technical training, etc., in fact he is a second class citizen in his own country and looks like remaining so. These comments refer to Southern Rhodesia only, for I am not sufficiently acquainted with the facts in the other territories to make a statement.

14. Although irrelevant, I cannot resist adding that in England I regard it as a grave mistake admitting West Indians, etc. By all means allow them to enter temporarily as students, etc., for specialised courses and suchlike, but not indiscriminate immigration of all sorts and types who just do not fit into the general set-up.

15. The European in Southern Rhodesia will quickly agree that coloureds should be kept out of Britain, but if it is suggested that Europeans should be prohibited here (except experts) then his face falls and he disagrees.

A certain amount of pleasure is evoked over racial riots in England, and the attitude here amongst Europeans is that the United Kingdom has no right to criticise what happens in the Federation when she cannot keep her own house in order. They seem to forget that the United Kingdom has a sacred duty towards the Africans of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

16. It is a strange thought, but if the African had had a white skin and European features, otherwise just as primitive as we found him, then there would have been no colour

problem. Inter-marriage would have taken place and the two races would have blended into one. Britain was more fortunate in her invaders—Romans, Normans, Vikings and Saxons, etc., but I am not quite so sure about the present penetration of West Indians and other coloureds.

17. Salisbury, the capital of the Federation, must make a great impression upon any visitor. It is a fine city with every indication of prosperity. The first impression may be that nothing can be amiss with the Federation, but it should not be forgotten that there are even finer cities in the Union of South Africa.

18. There is much elation in the local press from time to time when a large overseas company of international repute decides to start production in the Federation. It is regarded as an indication of confidence, but I do not really think that these powerful overseas firms of international fame are really very interested who is running the country as long as conditions are reasonably stable. Lord Robins, President of the British South Africa Company, has said that he is not frightened of the prospect of African majority governments in the Federation, but the European artisan is and he therefore sticks rigidly to his closed shop attitude of the "Rate for the job," often much more than it is worth, in the hope of keeping the aspiring African out.

19. One often hears Europeans say that they have nowhere to go should conditions in Southern Rhodesia become intolerable for them. After all, they have only been here about 60 years, and Australia, where the African is a prohibited immigrant, is crying out for Europeans.

20. This memorandum could be summed up as a mass of destructive criticism. What is the answer?

In my opinion Southern Rhodesia is scrambled and the whites and blacks will have to sort out their problems in the same way as the Union of South Africa. Fundamentally the two set-ups are not so very different. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be allowed to secede from the Federation and go their own ways. Even if this did happen and Southern Rhodesia found herself on her own again, it is doubtful whether the whites could indefinitely dominate a black majority. The Union of South Africa is not finding it too easy today. Anyhow it seems only fair to leave Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland out of the squabbles south of the Zambezi.

21. I think that "African Nationalism" by Ndabaningi Sithole (available in Salisbury and costing 13/6d.) would be of great interest to all members of the Commission.

22. I am afraid I have not mentioned "Partnership" once, so I will end with an extract from a Rhyming Alphabet Competition which appeared in the *Central African Examiner* dated 20/6/59:—

"P is for partnership mystical order

"They call it apartheid south of the border."

14th March, 1960

A EUROPEAN RESIDENT OF SALISBURY*

During many years both in this Colony and in South Africa, I have been struck by the apparent importance of witchcraft in the lives of Africans—more particularly those living their lives in the Reserves—though I can quote examples of witchcraft having a significant influence upon particular Africans living in an urban area and of a type which one would not expect to be influenced in this way. The Law Reports both in the Federation and South Africa record cases from time to time involving witchcraft though such cases are normally reported because the judgment contained some significant principle of law or practice and the fact that witchcraft comes into them is only incidental. Such cases, however, do provide dispassionate and impartial evidence of the existence of witchcraft and of the part that this plays in influencing the thought and actions of the people affected. To a layman like myself in these matters it does seem as if a person credited with occult powers in African society can and does wield a disproportionately strong influence among his associates, and on the other hand cases are not wanting where a mere accusation against a person that he or she is a witch or has caused misfortune to others by witchcraft can justifiably put the persons so accused in real and substantial fear of their lives.

The cases that I mention above include cases where the accused has been charged with murder, the accused having been incited to commit the crime on the grounds that the victim was engaged in witchcraft. The Press also from time to time has references to crimes, including in particular murder, being committed by various Africans as a result of a

* Name withheld at request of witness

belief in or a fear of witchcraft. These instances are not cases of many years ago but many of them have happened in recent years. The fairly recent outbreak of murders in Barotseland under the influence of witchcraft is still fresh in the minds of most people.

I have noticed in the Press that in the Belgian Congo, and also parts of Northern Rhodesia, there is apparently widespread belief that certain Europeans make a habit of kidnapping Africans, killing them and canning their flesh for sale. I do not think that it especially springs from any belief in witchcraft and I have only Press articles and Press reports on which to rely, but presumably such reports would not be published if they were not substantially true. Irrational beliefs of this character, held apparently not by one or two persons recognised to be of an unsound mind, but by whole groups or communities cannot fail to be significant.

I do not claim any expert knowledge in the above matters but would respectfully suggest that if at all possible an expert should give evidence before the Monckton Commission thereon. As far as I know Dr. Michael Gelfand has made a very lengthy and careful study of the Mashona and no doubt his views would be entitled to great respect. I cannot unfortunately suggest any names of witnesses who have studied these matters in the Northern Territories and it may well be desirable for experts to be called from these Territories. In any event, if it should be established that witchcraft is a significant factor in the lives of many of the African communities in the Federation, I submit that this should not be lost sight of when recommendations are made on constitutional matters.

Salisbury

10th February, 1960

Addendum to the final paragraph of the above Memorandum

I have since been in touch with Dr. Gelfand as promised. Dr. Gelfand has referred me to a short work written by him for the Information Department entitled "Proud Record." The first chapter of this work seems to cover most of the relevant aspects of the above subject succinctly and the preface written by Dr. Birney also deals with the matter.

Salisbury

22nd April, 1960

SALISBURY AFRICAN WELFARE SOCIETY

Resolution from the Executive Committee

This Committee believes that the satisfactory development of the Federation will greatly depend on the removal of the many existing hindrances to personal relationships between the inhabitants of different races, and that planning for better relationships must include the formation of a non-racial Social Welfare Department and the development of non-racial social welfare services.

SALISBURY CHRISTIAN ACTION GROUP

(1) The nature and composition of the Group

The Salisbury Christian Action Group is a group of Christians of all races. The Group meets once a month in Harare to discuss problems which concern the public conscience of the Christian and to evolve appropriate action upon them in accordance with Article 1 of its Constitution: "The purpose of the Christian Action Group shall be to act upon fundamental Christian principles generally and in particular upon the principles expressed in the Group's Statement of Principles." As a result of its practical work the Group has wide contacts, particularly among the African people of Salisbury. The Group itself has some hundred full members, about two-thirds of them being Africans. It has no connection, either formal or informal, with Christian Action in London or with any political party.

(2) The character of the evidence to be submitted

The Group shares a common Christian approach to the problems of Central Africa but its members do not necessarily share a common political programme. One of the issues upon which there is much difference of opinion with the Group is the issue of Federation. Some members are in favour of the Federal idea; others are not. Some feel that with certain changes it is possible for Federation to survive; others do not. The Group cannot, therefore, give evidence recommending certain measures to ensure the success of Federation nor can it give evidence recommending the break-up of Federation. It has, however, decided to present to the Commission a number of its observations on the state of African opinion in Southern Rhodesia, which all its members believe to be factually accurate as a result of discussions within the Group and of contacts outside it. The Group

believes that these facts, as it considers them to be, may not be brought before the Commission by any other body and that it is vitally necessary for the Commission to appreciate them in order to perform its work. It presents them under a sense of Christian obligation, and seeks to do so factually and without sentimentality or prejudice in an attempt to assist the Commission. In the written evidence which follows the Group wishes to make a number of assertions on the state of Southern Rhodesian African opinion. It is prepared to give amplifying and illustrative oral evidence if the Commission should wish it to do so.

(3) The common view of Southern Rhodesia's benefits from her membership of Federation

Evidence will no doubt be submitted to the Commission which tends to show that in many ways Southern Rhodesia has benefited from her membership of the Federation. The Commission will be told of the economic benefits which have accrued due to her association with the Copperbelt and to the availability of the markets of the North, and of the industrial development which has been stimulated as a result. Evidence will also no doubt be presented to show how since Federation the traditional patterns of Southern Rhodesian life have been modified to the benefit of the African population and to show how Southern Rhodesian governments have moved towards partnership under the stimulus of the Federal ideal. No doubt liberals both in Central Africa and in England will present to the Commission their belief that Federation is an essential for Southern Rhodesian progress and that, as for instance the London *Economist* has said, the territory can *only* achieve the necessary changes peacefully if she is associated with the Northern territories in the Federal framework. The evidence of certain Europeans, who hold that since Federation the African has advanced in Southern Rhodesia to a positively dangerous degree will no doubt strengthen the Commission's impression that Federation has been good for the Southern Rhodesian African. Finally evidence will no doubt be brought by the Southern Rhodesian Government to show how favourably the colony contrasts in terms of public order and prosperity with the two Northern territories.

From all this evidence the Commission may well derive the impression that Federation has substantially advanced the real interests of Southern Rhodesia; that Southern Rhodesian Africans in particular have benefited from the Federal connection; that the continuance of the Federal connection is desirable—perhaps essential—for the continued advance of Africans in Southern Rhodesia; and that Southern Rhodesia within the Federal framework is, as Dr. Reginald Bennet, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary to the Colonial Secretary, recently described it, "very peaceful and contented with no suppressed tensions."

(4) Modification of this common view

The Christian Action Group feels obliged to advance three modifications of this common view which will, we believe, assist the Commission to see the situation of Southern Rhodesia and her relationship to the Federation more clearly. These modifications are:—

- That Southern Rhodesian Africans so far from favouring the continuance of Federation are very generally either indifferent or hostile to it;
- that so far from Southern Rhodesia being a "very contented" society there exists among Africans in the colony a profound distrust of and disillusionment with both the territorial government and the British government in its residual capacity of protector;
- that so far from there having been an overall advance in Southern Rhodesia since Federation there has in fact been a steady worsening of fundamental conditions for Africans in the Colony and a steady deterioration of race relations.

The Group would like to take each of these points in turn and discuss them at greater length.

(5) African indifference or hostility to Federation in Southern Rhodesia

Given the sort of evidence on Federal benefits to the Southern Rhodesian African to which we have already referred, it might have been thought that whatever the opposition to Federation among the Africans of the North there would be a generally favourable attitude towards it amongst Southern Rhodesian Africans. For a considerable time this was so. Although African organisations in Southern Rhodesia combined to oppose Federation at the time of its inception, there was no ground in the colony for persistent opposition to it. The Africans in Southern Rhodesia did not have the

confident expectation of progress towards African dominated territorial governments which was felt by Africans in the North and could not reasonably see Federation as an impediment to such a progress. Nor could they, of course, share the alarm of the North over the introduction of those Southern Rhodesian policies which already conditioned their environment. As a result opposition to Federation in Southern Rhodesia almost died out and there arose instead a feeling that Federation might actually be to the advantage of the Southern Rhodesian African. So widespread was this feeling that the now-banned Southern Rhodesian African National Congress for a long time refused to join in the anti-Federation propaganda of the North and under the guidance of its President, Joshua Nkomo, took the line that a Federal union of the three territories was desirable. *But* in the last two years, and particularly in the last year, there has been a great shift of mood. The Southern Rhodesian African National Congress shifted during 1958 to an openly anti-Federal line and in 1959 events caused the attitude of African "moderates" to change to, at best, indifference and, at worst, hostility. There are three main reasons which Africans give for this change:—

(a) Sympathy for the North

As the result of the Nyasaland emergency and the publication of the Devlin Report, which convinced Southern Rhodesian Africans of the reality and urgency of the demand for secession in Nyasaland, many Africans have come to feel that they cannot morally accept any advantages which may accrue from Federation at the expense of African aspirations in the North. This feeling is not a high moral luxury felt by a few but a very widespread reaction of sympathy with Northern aspirations and a determination not to be held accountable in any degree for their frustration.

(b) Many Africans feel all the more strongly that the benefits to them from Federation are not worth the compulsion of the North because they do not believe that those benefits have been substantial. They do not feel that either the actions of the Federal Government in its own sphere nor the actions of the Southern Rhodesian Government, since Federation have significantly transformed the areas of opportunity of the Southern Rhodesian African. As a result of this they do not feel that it matters very much whether Federation continues or not.

(c) Other Africans again feel that in so far as the Federal Government has influenced the Southern Rhodesian Government—whether by precept or example—that influence has been for the bad rather than for the good. Africans in Southern Rhodesia have always distrusted Sir Roy Welensky more than they did Mr. Todd, or even more than they now distrust Sir Edgar Whitehead. They believe that whatever influence Welensky and the Federal Government exerted in the Todd crisis was unfavourable to Todd's prospects and consequently that the Federal Government must take much of the blame for an incident which Africans persistently regard as a rejection of the partnership ideal. Nor do they believe that the Federal Government has shown many examples of partnership. The recent decision to do away with partitions in the Federally controlled post offices in Southern Rhodesia came derisively late to make any impression on Africans. Nor does the presence of African representatives in the Federal House impress them. Indeed, owing to the nature of the Federal franchise and the way in which these representatives are elected it is true to say that Africans in Southern Rhodesia prefer the territorial set up, which has so far not produced any African members of parliament at all, to the Federal set up which has produced unrepresentative ones. Statements by the Federal Prime Minister have not seemed to Africans to show much respect for their capacities. Various legislative actions of the Federal franchise and the provision for enlarging the Federal house—have created great distrust and disillusionment among Africans. Finally, many Africans believe that the Southern Rhodesian emergency of 1959 was not in any sense a territorial necessity but was undertaken in order to fulfil the desire of the Federal Government to put down disturbances in Nyasaland with Southern Rhodesian rather than with British troops. For all these reasons many Africans in Southern Rhodesia are hostile to the influence of the Federal Government.

(d) Attitude to Dominion status

Taking all these attitudes into consideration it is clear

that any increase in the powers of the Federal Government as at present constituted or any movement towards Dominion status would be resented as deeply by Africans in Southern Rhodesia as by Africans in the North.

(6) African distrust of government and law in Southern Rhodesia

The profound and disturbing distrust of constitutional and legal institutions and of governmental good faith which now characterises Southern Rhodesian African opinion is best illustrated, as it was largely caused, by the events of last year. Southern Rhodesian Africans believe that the British Government's rejection of the Devlin Report and the Southern Rhodesian Government's assertion that the normal processes of law were inadequate to meet the challenge of the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress demonstrate that governments are not prepared to accept the findings of "experts" or of the law unless these findings are in their favour. They believe also that the Southern Rhodesian emergency legislation—especially the Act retrospectively legalising all the steps taken in the implementation of the Land Husbandry Act which had previously been successfully challenged at law—and the creation of a special Tribunal shows that the territorial government is prepared either to ignore or to "fix" the law so as to produce the results it requires. They also believe, however unjustly, that the present form of the Monckton Commission and its terms of reference prove that the British Government is prepared to "fix" commissions of inquiry in order to achieve the results that it wants. There has therefore come about a complete failure of confidence both in the territorial and in the protecting governments.

The Group finds it necessary to mention specially in this connection the appointment of the Monckton Commission itself. It intends no impertinence in the reflections which follow and feels that it would be doing the Commission a disservice if it did not make clear the regrettable, but in its opinion, certain fact that the Commission's appointment on its present basis was responsible more than anything else for the distrust and disillusion of Southern Rhodesian Africans. The actions both of the British and of the Southern Rhodesian governments have been responsible for this.

The Group has already mentioned the effect of the British Government's "rejection" of the Devlin Report. But it must be stressed again what an impact this had upon African opinion in Southern Rhodesia. Here was a Commission, appointed by the British Government, restoring African faith in the impartiality and independence of such commissions by its Report, only to be rejected by that Government on grounds which seemed to them inadequate. Africans now feel that even if the Monckton Commission reports in a way "favourable" to them, the British Government would ignore its recommendations. They feel, as many of them say, that it would be a "waste of time" for them to give evidence to the Commission.

But over and above this, as we have said, Africans feel that the British Government has been very careful this time to ensure that no embarrassment results. They feel, however unjustly, that the Monckton Commission is not an independent or impartial commission and that its function is not to find facts but to sanction policies. They cannot believe, in any case, that the British Government needs to send out a commission to find out what they think. They feel that they have already made their desires sufficiently clear and that insofar as the Monckton Commission is intended to find out the facts of African opinion it would again be a "waste of time" to appear before it. Finally they feel that the terms of reference of the Commission inhibit it from making a full inquiry. They believe that there is a great difference in approach between asking "How can this continue?" and "Should this continue?", even if it is theoretically possible for the answer to the first question to be "It cannot." (As Mr. Baxter, the British civil servant who played a great part in the creation of Federation, wrote in the recent *The Case for Independence*, it makes an astonishing difference when you stop asking whether a thing should be done and start asking how to do it.)

As for the Southern Rhodesian Government, Africans believe that it played some part in persuading the British Government to abandon the idea of a parliamentary inquiry which would have been acceptable to them. But above all they resent the individual selections by the Southern Rhodesian Government for its representatives on the Commission. In varying ways, most Southern Rhodesian Africans maintain, the three men nominated are so obviously unacceptable to them that they are forced to the conclusion that the nominations were made as an act of defiance of African opinion.

For these reasons—and in some cases also because there is a fear of victimization where the man concerned is a government employee—most politically conscious Southern Rhodesian Africans are refusing to appear before the Commission. This may not be so obvious or so disturbing as the situation in the relatively new and relatively weak. But the Commission should realise that even many of the Africans within the multi-racial organisations which are giving evidence have personally refused to be associated with the evidence given. This fact is merely one of many indications that the multi-racial organisations—the “partnership” organisations—are in for a very difficult time in future as a result of the hardening of African opinion already described.

This hardening of opinion and the general distrust of government will in themselves make it impossible to achieve the objects of the Federal preamble for Southern Rhodesia. One of the main considerations of the Commission should be to seek means of reducing the distrust and disillusionment which so far its existence has unhappily sharpened. In this connection we would like to stress that any agreement between the Southern Rhodesian Government and the British Government to remove the remaining reservations from the Southern Rhodesian constitution would be taken by African opinion in Southern Rhodesia as a whole to constitute a final betrayal of trust. Southern Rhodesian Africans look rather to the British Government to exercise its influence more actively for their benefit and to the Southern Rhodesian Government to earn their confidence before demanding complete independence.

(7) Deterioration of conditions in Southern Rhodesia since Federation

This section of the Group's evidence is not concerned to show that Federation has worsened Southern Rhodesian conditions—though, as we have said above, this can to some extent be argued. It is the purpose here to show that *despite* Federation conditions in Southern Rhodesia have grown worse; that Federation as such is no solution to Southern Rhodesian problems; and that even within Federation Southern Rhodesia could go in the way which we, as a Christian Group, and all men of good will, desire to avoid.

Those areas of Southern Rhodesian life where improvements have been made since Federation largely fall into the category of the so-called “pin-pricks.” Life for a Southern Rhodesian African is still full of affronts to his personal dignity but it is slightly less full than it was. The Land Apportionment Act has been amended to allow an African lawyer to practice in Salisbury; Africans can now be regarded as “employees” under the New Industrial Conciliation Act; it is said that the Southern Rhodesian Civil Service will soon be open to Africans—and so on. These achievements can be properly criticised on account of their inadequacy in respect of the total problem of discrimination. It is not the intention of the Group to make this point. We are confident that other organisations will present evidence which will clearly show the great areas of discrimination which still remain. The point we wish to make here is that attempts to remove pin-pricks without attempts to remove the fundamental causes of poor race relations will do little to solve any of Southern Rhodesia's problems. These fundamental causes we consider to be:

- (i) the refusal of many within the Federation to regard all men as of equal dignity before God; and
- (ii) a resultant failure by government to express this principle in the social and economic fields.

We regret that we can see no evidence of a resolute attempt to eradicate these causes of lack of harmony between the peoples of the territory.

The effect has been the strange paradox of apparent advance—to some people alarmingly rapid advance—in race matters attended by an obvious sharpening of racial tension. These two phenomena are not cause and effect as the Dominion Party holds. The truth is that while a little has been done in the shop window the harmful pressure of traditional Rhodesian policies upon the African has greatly increased as the result of new economic and social circumstances. The Group wishes to discuss one example of this.

Land Apportionment and Land Husbandry

In appearance the years since Federation have seen a loosening of the Land Apportionment Act with such amendments as that already referred to which allows an African lawyer to practice in Salisbury and another enabling the University College to accommodate African students. But in fact the Act has come to bear much more heavily on rural Africans because of its implementation by the actual movement

of Africans from European areas since the war and because of the increasing pressure of a rising population in the Reserves. As a result of this pressure the promised allocation of land in the Native Purchase Areas of Southern Rhodesia—which were the African share of the Land Apportionment division—has been only about one-third completed, since the Government cannot dislodge tribal squatters from the land which ought to go to African master-farmers. Also as a result of this pressure the Government has introduced the Native Land Husbandry Act, as a desperate attempt to patch up the situation. This Act compels the adoption of personal ownership of land and thus breaks another implicit promise—namely that the African in the Reserves would be able to lead his traditional way of life. Thus an Act which originally did not do immediate, practical injustice since there was enough land for all purposes now does very great injustice and causes a great discontent among the rural Africans. The success of the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress in the Reserves was not due to agitation playing upon ignorance but to exploitation of this real rural grievance.

Land Husbandry does not only mean that Africans have to adopt private ownership or that Reserve land not fit for intensive farming will have to support it. It also means that many Africans have to uproot themselves from the country and find a permanent place in the towns. Thus a development already stimulated by industrial growth has been deliberately fostered by Government. But the Land Apportionment Act was explicitly enacted on the assumption that Rhodesia would remain a fundamentally rural society and it is not in the least suited to the concept of permanent African settlement in the towns. In fact the Act and its attendant legislation not only hamper the “emerged” African who would like to stay in a city hotel or open a business in town or own a house in a smart suburb, but it also surrounds the ordinary worker with a host of irksome provisions. In short Southern Rhodesia is trying to control modern conditions with outdated legislative machinery—the machinery of separate development in an age of involuntary integration.

Since Federation no Southern Rhodesian government has really attempted to come to grips with this dilemma. The Land Husbandry Act, which was hailed as a liberal and progressive measure, was in fact a desperate attempt to make the traditional system of segregation and land division workable in new and impossible conditions. The Industrial Conciliation Act does make some provision for the new multitudes of African workers but the Government has not yet evolved any kind of coherent urban policy and the latest Report by the Select Committee on Resettlement of Natives is no more than another attempt to keep Land Apportionment intact. And Federation as such has brought into play no influence tending towards the solution of these problems. The only service “partnership” has provided in this respect has been to lend its name to some desperate attempts to save traditional patterns by a patch-work of concessions. Africans at any rate believe that the so-called liberalism of a man like Sir Edgar Whitehead is nothing more than a particularly clear-eyed realisation that these traditional patterns must be made sufficiently flexible if they are to survive. It is not unreasonable to maintain that measures of this “liberal” nature would have to be taken by any Southern Rhodesian government whether inside or outside Federation.

(8) Conclusion

In conclusion the Group would like to combine the three modifications it has presented to form a reflection upon Dr. Bennet's view that Southern Rhodesia is “very peaceful and contented with no suppressed tensions.” This is completely untrue. Southern Rhodesia has not moved from a society in which the African was regarded as essentially inferior to a society in which there is recognition of his potential or actual equality. Southern Rhodesia has moved from a small, rural society of paternalist pattern where discriminations and injustices were blunted, to a much larger, urban society of modified paternalist pattern in which discriminations and injustices are acute. This has produced a deep sense of discontent among the majority of Africans, whether in the Reserves or in the towns. It has produced a whole host of “tensions” which, since the banning of Congress, have been “repressed.” Moreover the superficial advances in racial thinking which have accompanied this fundamental deterioration have been counteracted by the suspicion and disillusion which the conduct of the Federal, Southern Rhodesian and British Governments has created in African minds. If these tendencies continue—as they easily could in any Federal set-up and certainly would in a continuance of the present Federal set-up—it will be hard to avoid disaster in Southern Rhodesia. The Group believes that unless the Commission recommends action consistent with the Christian doctrine of man, and capable of such imple-

mentation as will both dispel distrust and also stimulate thinking which will attack the fundamental problems of Southern Rhodesian society it will have made very little contribution to the future of Southern Rhodesia.

26th April, 1960

C. R. SELF

I am an Englishman by birth, aged 57 years, and have been resident in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland since 1947, where I was in business as a Fine Art dealer and photographic portraitist in Ndola, Northern Rhodesia, until retiring in 1956.

My experience in Central Africa has led me to the following conclusions :—

- (1) No stable multi-racial state can be permanently established unless the fear of racial domination by any race is eliminated.
- (2) There can be no racial co-operation in the political, economic and social spheres unless the fundamental recognition of human dignity is firmly established.
- (3) There can be no normal and harmonious governmental control unless the existing racial tug-of-war for paramountcy is eradicated.
- (4) The implementation of the policy of "partnership" to which the people of the Federation are morally committed, cannot be effected unless we construct a political foundation for this policy.

I believe the above four points to be principally governed by the franchise. An efficacious and equitable franchise formula will give us the necessary foundation required to enable us to build a strong multi-racial state.

I propose to build this foundation with the essential materials of the Common Roll and universal suffrage.

The misshapen edifice, namely the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, has been erected without due thought being given to the huge multi-racial structure which we have endeavoured to build. The result is plain to see—a resemblance of a multi-racial structure built without a plan and without a foundation.

There is an atmosphere of suspicion and a feeling of fear and mistrust among the people which has bred insecurity, parochialism and racialism. The minds of the people have been partially paralysed by the highlighting of racial issues within our political parties, thus placing vital economic and social problems "off focus" to the detriment of our main goal, a united and strong Federation.

If the materials which we must use to build this foundation are to be effective, I am convinced that the races must first be welded into a pliable political union (where race is in the picture but not highlighted) and normal party politics will replace the racial politics now dominating the scene.

The alternative to this political welding is separate factions, each concerned mainly with their race and the representative power they can attain. Unless some constructive tenet is entrenched within the Constitution to ensure a positive partnership of the races, such an ideal or goal can never materialise. To implement the "purist" doctrine of democracy as is possible in a mono-racial society—"one man—one vote"—without due consideration being given to the enormous intellectual, cultural and technical disparity of the races on the one hand and the numerical disparity on the other would not only be calamitous for all concerned but injudicious and cowardly. Such a step would be easy to take, but it would not be a solution to our problem; on the contrary it would aggravate it. The transfer of power from one race to another in this part of Africa would not be a victory for Britain but a defeat, the repercussion of which would be felt throughout the Commonwealth.

Furthermore, to leave the African at the mercy of unscrupulous exploiters in the international political field of today, where the world is split by two distinct ideologies, would I contend, be considerably more dangerous to all concerned in Central Africa, than any hypothetical exploitation of the African by Europeans within the boundaries of the Federation. It would also, I contend, be a betrayal of a people who have contributed more to world government and African welfare in particular than any other in the history of mankind.

There is a feeling here that the European may be sacrificed to appease unenlightened public opinion within the coloured communities of the Commonwealth as a means of cementing relations with Britain. It is my humble opinion that such a

sacrifice, having regard to the African mentality, a mentality akin to the beasts of the bush from which they have so recently emerged, would have just the opposite effect to that possibly envisaged by H.M. Government. This statement is not derogatory to the African, but it is indisputable, for how can they have any other mentality in view of their short glimpse of our civilisation?

I believe that British influence in Central Africa is just as important to the peace of the world, as is British influence in the Commonwealth, for without it both would disintegrate and culminate in political and economic chaos.

I believe that an equitable franchise based on parity for all races throughout the three territories as essential if we are to have lasting racial harmony and if there is to be a future for the Federal concept of government. To perpetuate this parity and avoid future struggles for racial paramountcy we must tie the races together from the beginning so as to allow all races to participate in the government of the country without any race ever being able to dominate another. That formula is, I contend, the purest form of democracy possible is a multi-racial state such as the Federation aspires to become.

I cannot visualise a stable multi-racial society within the Federation unless fundamental rights and human dignities are recognised and political uniformity in all three territories and all four governments is established.

The ox wagon mentality of the old South African settler in Southern Rhodesia is the major stumbling block to this necessary uniformity. Unfortunately this mentality is being sponsored by the Federal Government. Speeches made by the Federal Prime Minister prove without a shadow of doubt that he is turning away from the world trend of *Politics Before Bread* or the recognition of human rights and dignity as a prerequisite to harmonious race relations and economic security. We, the European have no moral right to adopt this "Colonial" attitude to millions of Africans, this outmoded paternalism which Sir Roy Welensky has denounced for years in Northern Rhodesia in rhetoric onslaughts against the Colonial Office. To turn away from the tide of African aspirations (Political parity with the European) is not only foolish but immoral and dangerous. No problem was ever solved by turning your back on it! It is an antiquated attitude which has resulted in the hardening of African opinion against the European and his consequent summit demands. If this attitude is permitted to continue, the African will learn to hate the European who is so vitally necessary for his well being.

Owing to the hard core of public opinion in Southern Rhodesia which has been taken as a criterion or model in framing Federal policy, the Africans in the two Northern territories are becoming less and less enamoured of Salisbury and all it stands for in their eyes and the Federal concept of government. We cannot I humbly contend, continue to ignore this unhappy situation, nor can we morally request that more power be granted to the Federal Government.

Only the administrative skill of Britain combined with courageous statesmanship and diplomatic ingenuity in approaches to the Southern Rhodesian Government, could produce a common satisfactory franchise formula for all four governments in conformity with Britain's policy for the two Northern territories. Success at these approaches would, I believe, save the Federation from dismal failure and provide the opportunity to prove to the world that our experiment with "partnership" is more than an ideal, that it is an unqualified success.

If no franchise and constitutional uniformity can be achieved, then we may as well face the facts and dissolve the Federal Constitution without further delay before race relations are irremediably strained.

All three territories will then be obliged to proceed independently towards political maturity and independence to form any political and economic alliances they may so desire.

The opinions which I have expressed with regard to the Federal and Southern Rhodesian governments are widely held by many educated Africans I have approached in Northern Rhodesia when asked to explain their apparent aversion to Federation. They said in effect, that the "white man's colony" attitude of the Southern Rhodesia Government together with the trade union and railway associations of the Federal Prime Minister who was elected mainly by the railway employees of Broken Hill, his constituency in Northern Rhodesia, provide little scope for African political recognition or advancement in the economic life of the Federation.



These fears are not, I think, without foundation, and it is these fears more than any facet of nationalism that is the real reason for the African "rejection" of Federation as they know it.

Of the millions of Africans within the borders of the Federation, so few have any affiliation with any political or nationalist organisation, and every European here knows that the African political parties and nationalist movements in existence are no indication of the political thought of the vast majority of the Africans.

This I consider most important, for I believe that given political parity with the safeguards as I have suggested, the African will readily accept it as an equitable solution of their problem.

When all Africans from the age of 21 years are eligible to vote, they will associate themselves with moral political parties as opposed to national movements as at present. Lack of membership or followers, lack of funds and the improbability if not impossibility of securing a partner of another race to stand on their electoral platforms will surely mean the death of any fanatical or nationalist organisation of either race, thus paving the way for clean party rivalry as in a mono-racial society.

My suggested franchise reform will, I believe, ensure that the African will learn to appreciate the full meaning and advantages of democracy and thereby profit by it, whereas African paramountcy is almost certain to lead to autocracy, political corruption and feudalism.

A freely elected government with the aid of the plan I envisage will go a long way towards removing the fear of racial domination and economic stagnation, for it is fear and only fear which accounts for the hardening of the European's attitude towards the African when the subject of political and economic advancement is raised.

Once this "partnership vote" is adopted, it will provide the vitally necessary foundation for the future construction of a huge multi-racial structure where party politics and not racial politics will play a major part.

Its application in all three territories is my aim, but if this should prove impossible, I believe that its implementation in Northern Rhodesia, would provide H.M. Government with an opportunity to hand over her responsibilities to the Northern Rhodesian Government in the full knowledge that by virtue of a democratically elected government, in which all races without restriction have participated, she has kept her vows to the African people.

Although all races within the Federation get along extremely well together in their every day activities, there are of course a few isolated cases of friction caused mainly by misunderstanding. This is only to be expected amongst races so diversified in their background and way of living.

It must be remembered that the emergent African is passing painfully through a transitory stage and in consequence is often bewildered, inscrutable, and thus misunderstood.

Most cases of friction which come to our notice through the medium of the Press are between the lower orders of the various races, clearly indicating only a lack of understanding and patience normally derived from learning and experience.

A sympathetic approach when dealing with Africans will in most instances produce excellent results and mutual trust, for fundamentally he is a good man with a keen sense of humour and justice. He is traditionally courteous and law abiding, but with a childlike simplicity that can be both annoying and frustrating to a keener mind governed as it inevitably is by the competitive struggle of our civilisation.

A handful of political agitators seeking self aggrandisement and power have, the usual disgruntled followers as will be found in any country in the world, but those Africans who have a responsible outlook have made a niche for themselves in every walk of life such as industry, commerce, the Arts, the Trade Union movement and the professions. These are shining examples of the rewards to be obtained by patience and perseverance on all sides.

Political parity (the acknowledgement of human dignity), providing the races are joined in partnership from the electoral platform to the legislative vote in the Assembly (a partnership representation of every individual regardless of race),

will provide the opportunity for us to develop the best in all races so vitally necessary if we are to place "race" off focus and hold our own in this highly competitive and scientific world of today.

There may be imperfections in the formula, but it is equitable, efficacious and expedient.

The European loses power, the African gains political equality with all races combined for he occupies a place on every seat, and what is more important his dignity as a man is established and maintained. The Asian, Eurasian and Eurafican will have equal opportunity in the political field with the European, thus prestige is maintained with a place in the sun for everybody.

Furthermore, whichever way the disparity between the various races may swing, either numerically or by virtue of knowledge and skills, it can have no detrimental effect on the efficaciousness of the governmental machinery, for power is vested in a partnership of the people, governed only by political policy and not in any one race.

Responsibility is shared, individual freedom of expression assured as in any form of partnership and the political aspect of the Federation is placed on the same footing as any mono-racial country.

Umtali
14th January, 1960

Appendix I Suggested Franchise Reform for Northern Rhodesia— Introduction of "Partnership Vote"

(1) Government of the territory by *Dual Representation*, i.e. a dual seat for every constituency.

(2) Every constituency to be represented in the Legislature or Parliament by a combined representative body comprising one African and one non-African sitting jointly as an entity with a joint mandate from every voter.

(3) Every voter, regardless of race will be required to cast his vote for the two candidates nominated by political parties or two candidates independently nominated. In every instance both candidates' names are bracketed together on the ballot form and the marking by means of a cross is all that is necessary to cast a valid vote.

(4) Any political party may nominate one African and one non-African to represent their party as a candidate for election.

No single candidate without a qualified partner can be nominated as a candidate to contest any seat.

Any partnership of one African and one non-African after being duly sponsored can apply to contest any seat of any constituency.

(5) For the purpose of the franchise, Asians, Eurasians and Euraficans will be classified as Europeans and can therefore be nominated as candidates for election alongside their African partner.

(6) No nomination or application for candidature which contains the name of a European with an Asian partner, a European with an Eurasian partner or a European with an Eurafican partner is valid, for this would make under clause 5, two "Europeans" in partnership which is invalid.

Only in this way can the Asian, Eurasian and Eurafican be assured of a voice in the government in conformity with the partnership, parity and universal suffrage principle of the formula. The essence of this multi-racial partnership franchise is a partnership of African and non-African on an equitable basis. Thus there is an African on every seat with the remainder of the minority races occupying the other half of the seat. Every race is thereby fairly represented. This is the purest and most equitable form of democracy possible in a multi-racial society such as exists in Northern Rhodesia, where it is essential to avoid any possibility of domination by any race. It will be seen that this formula provides an agreement of the political aspirants from the electoral platform to the legislative vote in the Assembly.

This formula takes into account the numerical disparity of the races on the one hand and the civilised standards of the races on the other. Whichever way these disparities may

swing in the future, it can have no detrimental effect on the efficacy of the formula.

(7) No individual member of the dual seat has any mandatory powers. The seat is incomplete unless it is dual. No individual member without his partner represents anybody.

As every member of the dual seat is acting jointly with his partner and sharing the mandatory responsibility, and not just representing members of his particular race, the partnership and non-racial aspect of the franchise is inviolate.

(8) The Dual seat has only one casting vote in the Legislature, thus avoiding representation and legislation by race and conforming to the partnership principle governing the vote and the mandate. As both members of the dual seat are advocating the same policy, no more friction owing to conflicting opinion on any issue before the legislature, is envisaged than is to be encountered in existing legislatures anywhere. In fact there is less likelihood of conflicting opinion than at present owing to the assumption that both members of the dual seat will be cognizant of the economic and social situation in their constituency for which both are jointly responsible. However when disagreement does occur, it can be contained as at present by Party discipline through the Whip and regulations governing decorum and procedure through the Speaker of the Assembly as at present. The dissenting seat will have in mind the repercussion of their action on the other side of the Assembly as in every Assembly. I think it is safe to assume that legislation will be less discriminatory than under existing systems.

(9) Franchise for all citizens of the territory from the age of 21 years. In this connection it must be borne in mind that if one is thinking in terms of the counting of heads, the disparity in some constituencies will favour the African and in others the European. In any event we must not lose sight of the fact that there will be an African on every seat in every constituency. In no other way can we avoid racial representation and racial paramountcy and with all that implies.

(10) The qualification for the franchise is the ability to complete a Registration Form and a Ballot Paper.

Under this formula, it is immaterial what the disparity is in the constituency or the Common Roll. As an African is on every seat in the Legislature we must agree that he is fully and equitably represented. His own political ability, astuteness and ingenuity nurtured by his partner will ensure that the African peoples are given the best the country can provide under any given set of circumstances.

(11) All nominated candidates for election to swear allegiance to the Crown, the Constitution and the people of the constituency they seek to represent.

(12) In the event of death or retirement of one member of a dual seat, the remaining member must, if he wishes to retain his seat, stand again with his newly chosen partner for re-election.

Appendix II

Comments on the suggested Franchise Reform and the Introduction of the "Partnership" Vote in Northern Rhodesia.

The plan offers equal opportunities for all races without the possibility of domination by any race.

It is universal suffrage with a difference, the necessity of which is plain to see and provides Northern Rhodesia with de facto self government by virtue of a democratically elected parliament and the opportunity for H.M. Government to keep her pledge to the African people.

The plan kills extremist quasi-political organisations at one stroke on account of the improbability of any member being able to find a partner willing to stand on his electoral platform.

The country would be governed by way of keen party and political rivalry instead of as at present by temporary, inequitable and inexpedient experiments which only encourage and foster racialism and deny partnership and democracy.

It removes the main plank from the platforms of international subversive organisations, for it provides political parity for all races and precludes the possibility of the under privileged classes being exploited from within and without the boundaries of the territory.

As every citizen with the necessary qualifications (the minimum possible) has the prerogative of the vote, the African

has equal opportunity with the European or other races to be the most efficient member of the dual seat if he so desires.

There is no "stooge" or "boss" on this partnership seat. It is in fact the nursery from which will evolve the "Partnership State" to which we are morally committed and which all the world is watching with the keenest interest and sympathy.

As no normal or orthodox mono-racial franchise system can operate successfully in a multi-racial state such as Northern Rhodesia where the disparity in the civilised standards of the two main races is so pronounced, the only alternative to such a plan as I have suggested, would be the continual tightening up of the franchise qualifications in attempts to avoid the inevitable domination of the political scene by the black proletariat.

In any case the multi-racial state could not endure and its destruction would be inevitable.

The Asians, Eurasians, and Euraficans would also have a place in the sun, and prestige and pride of race would follow from this recognition of human dignity.

As the trend in the world today is for new ideas, new systems and new approaches to old and accepted doctrines, why should not we in Central Africa follow these trends and not allow conservatism bar our way to a solution of an administrative problem just because a formula might be unique and not in conformity with old accepted ideas? Why should we not be entitled to introduce a facet of democracy most suitable to our peculiar needs?

No doubt the plan may need modification and strengthening, but I humbly suggest that care should be taken not to depart from its principles of *Equality—Fraternity—Fidelity*.

L. A. SLACK

I have been in Southern Rhodesia 31 years.

I arrived here from England at the age of 19 years under the 1820 Settlers' Scheme.

I am married with four children. My wife is the granddaughter of an 1893 Pioneer, my children are third generation born Rhodesians.

My eldest son is in his last year at Reading University where he is taking a B.Sc. Agriculture, he plans to take over the farm from me.

I have been farming my present farm for the last 17 years.

The farm was a portion of a large estate which was extensively leased to Africans, some 30 African families were occupying the farm. Their total earning power was about £600 to £1,000 per year, the present earning power of the land is approximately £17,000 per year, of which £4,000 is paid out annually in African wages.

The land was in such a state of erosion at the time of my taking this over that it would not have continued producing as it was.

The number of cattle on the farm was 300 head and was the principle form of income.

Five African families stayed on with me at the take-over and four of the families are still with us.

I employ 85 workers and their families. I provide a school for 62 children with three teachers, at present providing education to standard six. There is also an Anglican Church under the supervision of St. Faith's Mission. My wife, who is a qualified nurse looks after the health of the Africans.

My farm is no exception but rather the rule in this district.

I believe the rural Africans in this area are as happy, well cared for with educational possibilities second to none in Africa.

I believe under the Southern Rhodesian system with plenty of contact between Africans and Europeans the African as a race stands a better chance of advancement than in any other part of Africa.

I believe the most important forms of advancement should be economic, educational, moral and health.

I see no reason why an African on reaching a European standard of Western civilisation should be penalised in any way at all. But I am very much opposed to "one man one

vote" until Africans reach a standard equal to European standards.

I believe that if the Southern Rhodesian way of life could be spread to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland the Federation would be a far happier place.

It is my experience, having employed numerous Europeans, the Rhodesian-born bring about the most harmonious race relations.

Headlands

5th April, 1960.

L. M. SMART

(1) As a citizen on the electoral roll of the Federation I should like to place the following observations before the Commission appointed to advise the Governments concerned on the forthcoming review of the Federal Constitution.

I have been a resident of Southern Rhodesia for 13 years, after serving Colonial Government Railways in East Africa, West Africa and Malaya from 1913 to 1942. I mention this only to indicate that I have had the benefit of administrative experience elsewhere.

The difficulties encountered by the Federation have stemmed principally from the following causes :—

- (a) dual jurisdiction in the Government of the United Kingdom by the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office with regard to the affairs of the territories ;
- (b) further dual jurisdiction and overriding authority by the appointment of an African Affairs Board as part of the Federal Constitution ;
- (c) loose phrasing of the Preamble, creating misunderstandings on Land and other matters ;
- (d) confusion in the minds of the public as to the powers, duties and responsibilities of the Federal Government vis-à-vis the Territorial Governments ;
- (e) the ambitions of inexperienced African nationalists in the Protectorates, fostered by sources outside the Federation, the essence of their case being the dismemberment of the Federation regardless of the consequences.

(2) United Kingdom responsibility for the Protectorates

To establish co-ordinated authority designated to promote good government and administration it is suggested :—

- (a) that the Protectorate affairs of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be transferred from the Colonial Office to the Commonwealth Relations Office (a precedent exists in the case of Bechuanaland, Basutoland Swaziland where a High Commissioner is responsible) ;
- (b) the Governor General of the Federation should act on behalf of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations so long as the Protectorate status of those territories remains in force ;
- (c) the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would be responsible to the Governor General in their spheres of duty.

(3) Second Chamber to replace African Affairs Board

With regard to Article 70, which sets out some of the duties of the African Affairs Board, it should be observed that the Federal Assembly is debarred by Article 30 of its own Constitution from legislating on Trade Union and Industrial Conciliation matters. It follows that the African Affairs Board has only limited supervisory duties to perform.

For the further reasons given in para. (1)(b) of this memorandum, the African Affairs Board should be replaced by a Second Chamber in which, among others, Paramount and Senior Chiefs and Elder Statesmen would deliberate.

It soon becomes evident that men of sage experience in African Affairs should have been brought into the structure of the Federal Constitution instead of vesting a sub-committee of the Federal Assembly with extra-ordinary powers. A Second Chamber merely means the adoption of long established and proved methods of government.

(4) Proposed amendments to the Preamble

(a) in line 13 the words "control of land in those territories and for the . . ." should be deleted. Provision exists in Article 33 for the safeguarding of land in the Protectorates and suspicion was aroused unnecessarily by particularising control of land in the Protectorates in the Preamble to the Federal Constitution ;

(b) following the procedure adopted elsewhere in the Constitution the closing words of the Preamble should read :—

"when the respective Legislative Houses of the territories by an affirmative vote of not less than two-thirds of all the members so desire to go forward with confidence towards the attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth."

The words in the Preamble which have caused most misunderstanding are :—

"and in particular would foster partnership and co-operation between their inhabitants."

The contracting parties in partnership are the three Territorial Governments and Article 42(2) requires them to consult together and with the Federal Government on all matters of common interest and concern.

Particularising in general terms about "inhabitants" in three different territories has fostered misunderstanding as to what the delegates may have discussed and desired to convey to the Preamble. These misunderstandings have been exacerbated by separatist movements fostered by parallel movements in the United Kingdom.

(5) Clarifying functions of Governments

According to the Press, several Federal and Territorial Civil Servants have been deputed to study the relationship between Federal and Territorial Administrations. After some months of consultation both in the Federation and in the United Kingdom they should be amongst the most qualified to suggest necessary clarification of functions. I should like to offer comments, however, on the following questions :—

- (a) Agriculture and Animal Husbandry ;
- (b) Police ;
- (c) Roads.

(a) Agriculture

Due to the difficulty of finding a suitable strain of wheat, the Federation unhappily has to import wheat to make its bread. Unfortunately, too, butter has to be imported. There is an urgent need for intensive agricultural development if production is to match, as it should, the industrial development planned as a result of Power installations such as Kariba. But the Federal Department of Agriculture has control only of European agriculture in Southern Rhodesia ; in Northern Rhodesia it acts in an advisory capacity on non-African agriculture ; in Nyasaland it has no duties.

There should be one Ministry to cover all agriculture and animal husbandry in the Federation. The Department would have to be organised on regional lines and there would have to be divisions within the regions—mainly European and African—for administrative convenience.

There is a wealth of scientific and practical farming experience in the Federation waiting to be co-ordinated which should be utilised to the fullest possible extent under the direction and drive of one Ministry.

(b) Proposed Federal Police Force

It is suggested that Item 36 of the Federal Legislative List should be altered to read :—

"The establishment, training, maintenance and administration of a Police Force and Police Reserve by an Inspector General for service under the direction of the Governments of the respective territories while serving in those territories."

The present Territorial Police Forces would be absorbed in this Federal Police Force.

The result would be the establishment of a unified, disciplined Police Force, well trained and provided with modern equipment. Contingents of this Force could, with the co-operation of the Governments concerned, be moved from one territory to another at the request of a Government to the Inspector General. No Government wants to use military

forces as auxiliary police if this can be avoided. It seems that the best means of avoiding it would be to have a first-class Federal Police Force with properly trained Reserves.

(c) Roads (Item 19)

As far as I am aware, the Federal Government has not set up a Road Construction Department but arranges for the Territorial Governments to act for it, presumably because it would incur wasteful expenditure if it had a Road Construction and Maintenance Department for inter-territorial roads only.

The Federal Government might well be excluded from road construction and maintenance, which in any case is a natural local and territorial public work.

Arising out of this subject, it remains to be said that one of the most urgent needs of the Federation is the construction of a Class I road by the Territorial Governments of Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (and Portuguese East Africa) to carry heavy-duty transport vehicles (as well as passenger vehicles), exchanging the products of Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia in a steady stream. The links between the governments and peoples of Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia which have been forged in goodwill and friendship over generations would in this way be strengthened in a harmonious federation.

(6) Powers of Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for the Federation

The powers contained in paragraph (7) of Article 29 should be cancelled in so far as the Federation is concerned.

One more point concerns the relations between the United Kingdom and the Federation. When it is deemed necessary by a member of the Government of the United Kingdom to reiterate that the Protectorate status of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland will remain in force so long as it is desired, or when he is called upon to give such an assurance in Parliament, it would be proper to add the words "without prejudice to the powers conferred upon the Federal Government."

Omission to do so constitutes a failure to recognise the existence of a Convention in regard to the Federation and fosters dissention.

I would add that this memorandum contains my own conclusions arrived at long ago, and is not connected with politics.

Salisbury

20th January, 1960

N. J. SMIT

I am an African Personnel Manager (Compound Manager). For the past 25 years I have been Native Administrating. This incorporates their welfare, discipline, hospitalisation, health, housing construction and generally caring for the African from the smallest baby to the retired old man in the Compound. This entails more than I could put on paper, e.g., I must act as a liaison between employer and employee, black and white. 90% of disputes arising is usually between natives, the rest may involve Europeans. Disputes fighting, thieving, criminal assaults and drunkenness are commonplace among natives. I settle most of these disputes but any major issue is referred to the police by regulation. After patient cross-questioning of the natives involved in any of the above-mentioned, it is usually obvious to me where the trouble lies. To defend himself a native will nearly always choose to lie, especially when he is guilty. By using justice and fair play, I think I have succeeded as a native administrator. As I have said before, I couldn't possibly put everything my work entails on paper, but an open invitation to anyone, including the Members of the Monckton Commission, is freely given, to spend a few days with me at my work and then perhaps they may have some *little* idea of the frustrations involved.

Constitutional Changes

If only the Federal Government was left to work out our own salvation as envisaged in the 1953 Constitution, we could endeavour to make this new venture (partnership) a success.

The awkward position the Conservative Party has been placed in by the Opposition Labour Party because of their deliberate harmful interference makes it extremely difficult for the Conservative Government to continue to give partnership a fair trial.

To coin a phrase we must have a "go it alone policy" with the blessings of the Conservative Party.

Improvement since Federation (particularly in Nyasaland—more has been done in seven years than the United Kingdom did in 70 years). Honest partnership; Sir Roy Welensky must explain since Lord Malvern conveniently forgot to mention it, i.e., Senior and Junior partnership to begin with, until the Africans are fit and proper civilised people to take on Senior partnership responsibility. As the contribution of the African is very little, he should consider himself very fortunate to be any sort of partner.

The rise of African Nationalism is plainly due to outside interference, particularly the Labour Party. They are grovelling to the Africans to ridicule the Europeans' efforts. I, for one, was certainly not in favour of partnership, due to my knowledge of these people and my forecasts then are now being realised. In spite of this, since partnership was accepted, I will, with everyone else, make every effort to make it work.

The general progress since Federation has been purposely overshadowed by propaganda—part of this must be borne by the British Conservative Party as they are running with the hare and barking with the hounds, ref., Kenya, Nyasaland—Northern Rhodesia coming. What constitutional changes could I suggest, or anyone else in the Federation, when Federation has already been destroyed by Britain! All this propaganda was mainly publicised—not by "slumming tenements" in Birmingham, Liverpool or Glasgow (and many others)—but by your "Castles and Stonehouses," etc.

What a slap in the face for hard working civilised Europeans in Nyasaland to have to stand by and allow Sir Robert Armitage and "Mau Mau" McCleod to hand over the reins to a foreigner, Dr. Banda and his henchmen. Those Europeans did not only work very hard but invested all their life savings in this backward country. Has all this work, money and effort by these brave Europeans been sold out to the uneducated black masses by the ruling of the British Government? Why bluff the European in this country by asking for views on the future constitution of this country when part of it is already sold down the river by the British Government. This black smudge they will never live down, as Britishers in this country now openly declare their disgust of being born and being part of anything British. Rather than let this country be given to the uncivilised black masses as Britain is doing now, as she thinks to her advantage. Since Russia will eventually take this country from the blacks "with Dr. Banda's blessing" (at least they would *make* the Africans work, something Britain can't do or is unwilling to do) is Britain so stupid that she cannot see that she is merely encouraging what she is trying to prevent. Why and for what use was the enormous amount of money given to Ethiopia by Russia? Isn't it suspicious that Ethiopia donated immediately £5,000 for the so-called Vanderbyl Massacre?

Since the British Government is not really interested in the opinions of a mere 200,000 Europeans here, I take this opportunity to inform them of some facts. Whether or not this will be absorbed will apparently make little or no difference as Britain has obviously already decided on our constitutional changes regardless of the findings of this Commission.

If it has been found that the majority of the Electorate in this country is fast asleep then I shall exclude myself from this apathy. I suggest that very soon Dominion Status to Southern Rhodesia will be given as a peace offering for the disgraceful and shameful handling of the two Northern Provinces by Britain, which of course are, or *were*, part of this Federation of which we are supposed to be discussing the future Constitution.

It is known that Britain is not in command of her own affairs as she is apparently only another State of the U.S.A. How can Britain or U.S.A. tell us how to handle the African when they themselves cannot solve their own racial problems.

Federation can never work with outside interference and only the people with intimate knowledge of this precarious situation (which few Britishers appear to *appreciate*) can themselves work out what is best for all in this country.

*"He that never changed any of his opinions,
Never corrected any of his mistakes."*

My evidence to the Commission is completely unbiased and honest. During the past 25 years I have learned the vast difference between Western civilisation and the African—his backwardness should not be the yardstick to a compromise. The appeasement policy which has been adopted in most parts of Africa will not advance the African.

In 1890 the arrival of the European, e.g., explorers, hunters, traders and missionaries, found inter tribal warfare the order of the day—fighting for mastery by burning, looting and killing. Disease, witchcraft and famine were commonly accepted. The European had to break down many barriers, including strong superstitions, before he could persuade the native to visit a qualified doctor when he was sick as against visiting the witch doctor or native herbalist. In most cases it was necessary to force the native to avail himself of free hospital treatment. Only now, after 70 years of patient handling and teaching, is the native beginning to accept that the European was right and now, at any hospital or clinic, natives can be found in hundreds every day—not that hundreds are sick every day—but they now believe that a “*Jection*” (injection) will take away all their cares and troubles. Even now, very seriously ill natives are never brought to hospital or see a qualified doctor because of very deep rooted superstitions. A large proportion of the present deaths is due to the above.

The lust for learning amongst Africans is phenomenal. This lust is primarily due to lack of early teaching, i.e., before the age of five years, by the uneducated parents. When they do go to school repetition is something which they accept readily and indefinitely without frustration. Unfortunately, when they reach about Standard III to VI and have only sufficient knowledge to read and write, they now regard themselves educated and above the labouring class. These so-called educated Africans will walk and roam around soliciting clerical or some light job but will not consider manual work. Those who eventually have to take manual work become agitators and ultimately misfits. It is not surprising that the higher educated African, such as the offsprings of the Lovedale Institute in the Union of South Africa, with which the Rev. Dr. Shepherd (one of the Monckton Commission members) was very closely associated, the Union Government has taken over Lovedale, due to the amount of agitators educated there. The fruits of their teachings has been transplanted throughout the three provinces of the Federation to no good advantage!! The whole blame must not be borne solely by the Institute, but the foundation they received there was of some encouragement to enable them to be freely accepted and encouraged for further teachings in anti-white feelings, in United Kingdom, Russia and U.S.A. An example of the results of the globe trotting can be seen in our highly educated Africans, such as Jomo Kenyatta (Mau Mau atrocities leader who is about to be re-enthroned!!!). We are not now discussing Tom Brown's schooldays but the schooldays of another Tom. Tom Mboya is his name but not quote “Tom Boyer or something,” as an American called him a few weeks ago on a programme on the F.B.A. This is as much as the average American knows of this No. 1 Agitator. It is surprising that Mr. Average American did not know our No. 1 Agitator's name, in spite of the fact that Mboya was given film star's publicity in U.S.A. including T.V. appearances and opportunities to speak at public meetings. The Commission no doubt should know the Nazi type history of Tom Mboya and from that should be able to draw their own conclusions.

I hope the Commission will be better informed by now, since their insistence of a foreigner being pleaded with to give evidence of something he knows little about. The man in question is Dr. Banda. This Dr. Banda can no longer speak his mother tongue, or so it would appear, because of his higher education in other countries which apparently have little or no knowledge of our Federation. Dr. Banda, as an educated man, should know better than to ignore and abuse tribal authority which is the only type of rule a native will understand for the unforeseeable future. If a native is left to rule natives, instead of finding advancement we can only expect to find what was tragically found on the arrival of the European in 1890. Dr. Banda is well aware of these facts and knows that unless he and his henchman dispose of tribal leaders he will never reach the top. Dr. Banda no doubt thinks he is at the top and he will stay there but, in actual fact, there are a few more budding Dr. Bandas who will be only too keen to take over. By now, no doubt, the Commission will be in possession of the facts of Dr. Banda's murderous plots (Nyasaland riots) so fresh that the blood that was spilled has not yet clotted. If Dr. Banda has by now been coaxed and pleaded with to give evidence to this Commission, it seems that I can add nothing more as Dr. Banda, being the leader, has probably *led you* up the “garden path” or otherwise. I think that such a learned man as Lord Shawcross, Q.C., should find a legal way of dealing with Dr. Banda for his murderous plot.

Probably the Commission has been well informed by African Welfare Administrators throughout the country of

Welfare activities. It is astonishing the amount that is being done by municipalities, farmers, industries, mines, etc. In general the African contributes nothing or *very little* towards this social aspect of his life. If this combined effort could possibly be known, including the enormous expenditure met by these industries, it would not only stagger the Monckton Commission but this very population of ours, e.g., free Cine shows at regular intervals, football, athletics, tribal dancing, ping-pong, women's clubs, libraries, writing rooms, first aid training and many other amenities. To go into this social welfare for the African in full requires much detail. This social welfare, which is taken for granted by the African (not always appreciated), is something which the European as provider receives little or no thanks for. In spite of all these efforts by the European to improve the African socially, results are very disappointing.

I know of one African who has appreciated and used his higher education to good advantage (Mr. Savanhu, our federal Minister). Mr. Savanhu is a genius amongst the Africans and the only educated one who hasn't used his education to intimidate and lead the less fortunate Africans into riots, murders, boycotts and strikes.

The present boycotting of Technical Schools in Northern Rhodesia is proof that the native is unable or incapable of appreciating or accepting what is being done for him.

If the trials and tribulations felt by the European led by Cecil John Rhodes and his dream of Central Africa (not only settlers) since 1890 could be measured by a sober and just adjudicator, it should be realised that the efforts made are, on the whole, in vain, as the present situation proves.

Interference by the Central Africa Party caused a serious and irreparable amount of damage. The Central Africa Party cannot take all the blame. Unfortunately this country has not learned yet to close its doors to British newspaper reporters and British M.P.s who are only seeking sensation and political gain. The trouble these people have caused here has not yet been fully realised. Mrs. Castle, M.P., Mr. Stonehouse, M.P. and Mr. Callaghan, M.P., should, if they have any conscience at all, feel very guilty about the murderous plots, atrocities and open defiance of the law in the Federation today. If these M.P.s and reporters already mentioned, ever ventured to come out here and live and fraternise with the Africans, they wouldn't live long enough to tell the tales, as it has been proved time and time again that the African always strikes first at the people who think they have helped him most, e.g., attacks on missions with violence at each outbreak of trouble.

Not forgetting to mention the interference and great trouble caused by Father Huddleston, Rev. Michael Scott and Mr. Todd, leader of the Central Africa Party (all Missionaries) which is still being felt today and no doubt shall be felt for many years to come because of the fact that this type will never know how to handle an African. I am fully aware of the wonderful work being done by Missionaries in this little or nothing in return.

North since the only explicitly African organisations here are country, most of them working in poor conditions and getting

If Mr. Oppenheimer (Anglo-American) and Mr. Prain (Rhodesian Selection Trust) have already given evidence to the Commission. I should like to give the Commission what they probably conveniently forgot to emphasise. Their obvious ambitions for cheap African labour substituting the European if taken too far will ultimately, with my little experience of only 25 years of Native Administration, prove to be an expensive flop.

In conclusion, I propose that a commission should be set up to enquire into all commissions set up during our Federal troubles to enquire into the slums in every town and city in the United Kingdom. Half, or more than half, of those people work harder for less money than most of the natives here receive for doing less work. I don't know of one labourer in the United Kingdom who can live on only one-ninth of his salary, but I do know of several natives here who can do so quite easily, not excluding the pleasure of their pints of beer at week-ends. When this Commission starts its enquiry in the United Kingdom would it please also visit Old Age Pensioners and compare their incomes and conditions with that of old people here. I have no doubt that such a commission of enquiry would never be held in the United Kingdom as it is always a much happier thought to find fault with others than with ourselves.

Que Que

25th March, 1960

SONS OF ENGLAND PATRIOTIC AND BENEVOLENT SOCIETY DISTRICT GRAND LODGE OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA

Memorandum submitted to the Government and people of Southern Rhodesia upon the necessity to preserve the future administration and control of the country in civilised hands

1. The Annual Session of the District Grand Lodge of Southern Rhodesia of the Sons of England Patriotic and Benevolent Society at its meeting in Salisbury on the 7th May, 1960, approved the following memorandum as representing the considered views of the Society and urges the Government and people of Southern Rhodesia to adopt the principles and recommendations contained herein as a basis for securing the future well-being of the country.

2. It has been said that the year 1960 will prove to be the most momentous in the country's history. Political and national events in the first four months of this year have done nothing to disprove this forecast but have rather tended to emphasize it. The Monckton Commission is nearing the end of its tour of the Federation and its quest for evidence which will enable it to make recommendations to the four Governments who will be reviewing the Federal Constitution later in the year. The appointment of certain commissioners created misgivings in the minds of the European and African communities and published statements by some of the commissioners before the Commission commenced work tended to increase rather than allay those misgivings. The visits of Mr. Harold MacMillan and Mr. McLeod and, to a certain extent, Lord Home, in recent months have increased the apprehension of the European sector of the community by the inferences that Her Majesty's Government intends to invest the future administration of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland upon lines similar to that adopted in Ghana, outlined in Tanganyika and foreshadowed in Kenya.

If such proves to be the case, there can be no doubt that there will be an immediate impact upon the Federation as a whole and eventually upon Southern Rhodesia. There has been a tendency amongst British politicians in particular, to outline proposals, with certain reservations, which will clear the path for the eventual amalgamation of the three territories comprising the Federation. This policy is in contradistinction to the statement by Sir Roy Welensky in the Federal Legislative Assembly that the review of the Federal Constitution did not include the possibility of amalgamation of the three territories nor for the secession of any territory from the Federation.

3. The situation became even more more confused when Sir Edgar Whitehead announced that he reserved unto himself the right to recommend the secession of Southern Rhodesia from the Federation and then, paradoxically enough, Sir Roy Welensky said that he was not without sympathy to Sir Edgar's approach.

4. In this background of political instability the European community is very unsettled as to its future and that of its descendants in this country. The Society submits this memorandum as an honest and impartial statement of its views, which, we believe, also represents the views of most Europeans in this country and we call upon the Government to implement the policies outlined in order to meet the wishes of the electorate and, at the same time, assist the Non-European races along the road of advancement which all acknowledge should be opened to them.

5. In the preamble to the Federal Constitution it was acknowledged that the three Federal territories are the rightful homes of all lawful inhabitants, whatever their origin, and in a definition of "partnership" Lord Malvern drew an analogy to the existence of senior and junior partners in a business firm. With the passage of time these principles have slipped into the background and if the pattern of government adopted, or contemplated by the British Government in other parts of Africa is developed in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, no matter what form of protective measures are introduced for the benefit of the European minority, it will mean that Europeans will become unwelcome in the countries they have helped to establish and to the prosperity of which they have contributed in no small measure.

6. The British Government's policy in other African territories has been based on the enfranchisement of all races, and as the indigenous races are in the majority the effect has been to transfer political, and therefore economic, power from the European to the indigenous races overnight. The outcome of this policy has created a struggle for domination between races and there are manifestations of a similar struggle developing

within the Federation notwithstanding the principles of partnership upon which the Federal Constitution is based.

7. The principles of partnership constitute a compromise between the apartheid policy in South Africa, which is aimed at white domination, and the policy of black domination which is gaining ground rapidly in some of the countries north of the Federation. The European population in this country wishes to preserve its identity and is still willing to embark upon a liberal policy of partnership but it is not prepared to surrender the blood, tear, toil and sweat of our forefathers, brothers and sisters to black domination. We wish this fair land to remain a suitable home for ourselves, our children and their descendants.

8. In its basic form the problem facing the country today is one of human relationships in the form of government, central and local, mode of living and mode of working.

9. Government

Political thought in Britain nowadays is directed to the principle that the franchise in all democratically governed countries should be extended to all adults, irrespective of race, colour or creed. To British politicians adult suffrage is a prerequisite to any country being granted full Commonwealth status. It is obvious that political expression is the dominating thought and they are encouraged by the opinions expressed by extremists and nationalist groups. The necessity to observe the fundamental differences between the various races which inhabit this part of Africa is completely ignored, whereas the Society believes that until these differences have disappeared a widening of the franchise, both national and local, would be inimical to the interests of the Federation or Southern Rhodesia.

10. In Southern Rhodesia, the indigenous African, generally speaking, does not possess even a goodly proportion of the economic productive capacity of the European. Until the African has managed to raise his economic worth to a level comparable with the European, the Society does not consider he should be enfranchised. It is recognised, however, that achievement of this status cannot be obtained in the short term and that some form of progressive enfranchisement should be devised to enable the African to emerge gradually as a responsible citizen. To confer upon the African collective political power without his graduating as a responsible citizen would be courting disaster and would probably lead to anarchy and chaos.

11. The Society believes the political evolution of the African must go hand in hand with his economic advancement. Not only must the African improve his economic productive capacity before securing full franchise but he must also assume all the responsibilities of citizenship. He must increase his productivity to the point where his employer will no longer subsidise his housing, transport, clothing, feeding and use of water and electricity. Paternalism on the part of the employers must be completely eliminated and the African must assume the same responsibilities within the community as his European counterpart. The economic stability of the country would be imperilled if the minimum wage for Africans was raised immediately to a level where all Africans could assume all the above responsibilities as their economic productive capacity is so low that the country would be unable to compete in world markets. The cost of production would rise to an uneconomically high level and as a guard against inflation the value of the currency would have to be depreciated. Such action would bring in its wake a train of events which would be deleterious to the internal and external economy of the country and would reduce the confidence of the external investor in the country. Consequently, we urge the Government to embark upon a systematic policy of imposing upon the African all the responsibilities of citizenship within the economic capacity of the country so that no lessening of trade and economic expansion will ensue. It is emphasised that the policy must be systematic so that all inhabitants may be left in no doubt of the Government's intentions and the manner in which they will be carried out.

12. The Society believes the disparity between the economic worth of African and European labour is the base and cause of the divergence of opinion within the country upon the future participation of the African in the government of the country. It is recognised that implementation of the above recommendations will, of necessity, take time, and that African political extremists will agitate for wider political expression without the above prerequisites being fulfilled. To assuage such political agitation and to demonstrate goodwill between races the African should be given, again on a pro-

gressive basis, an ever increasing say in the conduct of native village settlements and native urban areas. Concomitant with his assuming ever increasing personal responsibilities there should be granted, as a "quid pro quo," ever increasing political power in the urban or local sphere. Assuming the principle of establishing native village settlements and native urban areas is perpetuated, the Society believes the franchise should be granted to the inhabitants of those areas on the basis of an electoral roll with set minimum limits of residential qualifications and earning power. The latter requirement has been included in order to overcome the problem of subsidisation by employers which will persist for some considerable time and to provide a stepping stone to the system of national enfranchisement outlined below. Initially, control and administration should be operated jointly with the existing European administration but as the Africans, as a body, can demonstrate their ability to administer and control, so should the responsibility be transferred progressively to the Africans so that, eventually they assume full responsibility for the control and administration within their own areas.

13. In the sphere of national politics the Society does not support the principle that educational standards should be taken as a criterion in determining the qualifications of voters. In a multi-racial community where there is such a divergence in the economic worth and living standards of the respective sections of the community, it is desirable that in order to retain government in the hands of civilised people the economic worth of each person to the country should be the yardstick upon which the electoral laws are based. Although many methods and systems of evaluating such economic worth have been examined it is considered ownership of property or income are most readily determinable and should be accepted as the basic criteria. The existing law requiring ownership of land, including buildings, worth £1,500 or an income of £720 per annum should be accepted as the minimum qualification for enfranchisement and voters, who are aged 21 years or more, must be able to read, speak, write and understand English and be able to complete the voter's registration form without help.

14. The minimum qualifications set out above should be adjusted every five years to take into account any rise or fall in the purchasing power of the currency. In making this recommendation the Society considers adoption of only one qualification will prevent the government of the country passing into the hands of persons enfranchised on lower qualifications who may not have the same degree of responsibility to themselves or the community as other enrolled voters. The Society does not believe the British system of one man one vote is suitable or practicable in this country if government is to be retained in the hands of civilised people. Finally, the proposal eliminates the tendency for political expression to be on a racialistic basis as all voters will be expressing their views as Southern Rhodesians instead of Europeans or Africans.

15. Mode of Living (Race Relations)

External influences, organised religion and the actions of many politicians, educationists and industrialists have tended to destroy in large measure the goodwill which undoubtedly existed between races a few years ago. The reasons for this loss of goodwill are many and cover a wide field.

16. Firstly, the actions and speeches of the so called African leaders are inflammatory and intimidatory yet their leadership is open to question. It is not clear whether they base their claims to leadership upon their personal ability, their educational standards or by popular choice amongst their race. The acquisition of degrees at some institute of learning does not bestow the right to lead and their election by popular vote is open to doubt. In 1948, African leaders coerced their race into a nation-wide strike but the Government asked employers not to deal too harshly with strikers upon their return to work as the latter had been misled by their leaders. Within a period of twelve years the African leaders are pressing for a more rapid advance of the African race and for the admission of Africans into every sphere formerly reserved exclusively to Europeans. The Society believes the natural and accepted leaders of the African race are the tribal chiefs and headmen. They have an inherent dignity and wisdom of their own and do not seek personal aggrandisement through political activity.

17. Secondly, the average African is completely ignorant of the personal responsibilities borne by the Europeans. He believes the European is paid high wages and receives the same benevolent treatment from the Government as is

accorded him. He knows nothing of the expenses incurred in rent, water, electricity, medical and dental treatment, hospitalisation, transport and income tax. Only by a progressive transfer of those responsibilities to the African will this ignorance be dispelled.

18. Thirdly, the goodwill of the European is being lost when he realises the extent of the facilities and amenities provided for Africans to which he is contributing. The trend of events is leading him to believe that he is actually contributing, at considerable expense, to his passport out of Southern Rhodesia and the Society can testify to the loss of several members who have left the country in recent months because of the political and racial situation.

19. Fourthly, through the attempts of various religious bodies and representatives of foreign governments, increasing pressure is being brought to bear upon the authorities for Africans to enter European places of entertainment, hotels, etc. Social integration must not be forced upon the community—it must be allowed to evolve slowly through demonstration by the Africans collectively that they have improved their standards of social behaviour to a degree which the Europeans will accept. Reports of riots in an African cinema because of the low quality of the film in no way encourages the European to accept multi-racial places of entertainment.

20. Fifthly, the conduct and social behaviour of the African leaves the European with a feeling of irritation and nausea. The breast feeding of children on pavements, the raucous shouting, singing and dancing in the streets, the causing of obstructions on pavements with bicycles and the irresponsible riding of bicycles in and across traffic are but a few examples. In many instances cited above police action would result if perpetrated by a European, but tolerance is exercised by the police towards Africans to such an extent that there appears to be two laws in the country—one for white and one for black.

21. Finally, the opening of public offices on a multi-racial basis and the introduction of African labour behind counters has helped to destroy goodwill between races. The attitude of the African behind the counter, who takes a malicious delight in provoking the European customer, has resulted in a diminution in the number of Europeans attending the offices personally. If the trend continues the time is not far distant when all counter assistants in those multi-racial public offices will be Africans owing to the small number of Europeans who will attend these offices.

22. Many of these items may appear trivial or petty but collectively they assume alarming proportions in the eyes of Europeans and contributes towards the general feeling of instability in the country to-day. The European did not come to this country in order to improve the lot of the African and eventually hand over the results of his labours to him. He used his initiative and left his home country wherever that may have been, with one purpose in mind and that was to improve his own lot and that of his children. In drawing attention to these matters, the Society emphasises that it wishes to assist in the gradual advancement of the African in all spheres but not at the expense of present European standards. The advancement of the African's code of behaviour, politically and socially, should go hand in hand with his economic advancement. Once he achieves the latter, advancement in other fields will follow naturally and without complaint from other sections of the community.

23. Mode of Working

It is submitted that every inhabitant in the country both European and African, should be able to foresee continued security for himself and his children. Any uncertainty must be removed particularly uncertainty which cannot be rectified or ameliorated by the individual. Security is derived from an assured income and income, in general, is derived from employment. Consequently, by examining labour and employment conditions it should be possible to assess the future security of the individual and to determine what course of action will ensure and improve that security.

24. Labour can be broken down broadly, into the following categories:—

- (a) Unskilled labourer ;
- (b) Semi-skilled worker ;
- (c) Skilled artisan ;
- (d) Technician ;
- (e) Technologist ;
- (f) Executive.

25. Although the list is based on industrial categories, other fields of occupation can be nearly related to one of the categories, e.g. a clerk, depending on his status, could be related to categories (b) or (c).

26. On the assumption that the true prosperity of any country can only be achieved by the full employment of all workers, it is necessary to examine each of the above categories in turn :—

(a) Unskilled labourer

Although a fair proportion of the European population falls into this category it is in the main African. Through the rapid increase in the African population and the inability to support such an increased population in the reserves the country is faced with the urbanisation of a high proportion of the African population. The supply of labour in this field already exceeds the demand and the problem of unemployment, with its attendant evils, has arisen. The introduction of the Foreign Migrant Workers Act has tended to ease the problem in the urban areas but as resultant available labour in the rural areas increases so will the urbanisation of indigenous Africans be accelerated.

(b) Semi-skilled worker

Competition between Europeans and Africans in this field is increasing. Unfortunately the Europeans in this category are of relatively low intelligence, are unlikely to acquire any exceptional skill in any occupation and have no ambition to improve their lot. They look for security by refusing to recognise the right of Africans to compete with them on merit. Although the surplus in this category is lower than in (a), the surplus is likely to increase by the graduation of Africans from the above category.

(c) Skilled artisan

At the moment the available labour in this category is predominantly European but the field is being opened up rapidly to the African and competition between the two races will undoubtedly increase.

(d) Technician

Labour in this category will remain for some considerable time, almost entirely European.

(e) Technologist

The same conditions apply as in (d).

(f) Executive

In this field the appearance of the African will be the exception rather than the rule in the foreseeable future, as occupation of these key posts will be determined essentially on merit.

27. From the foregoing it will be seen that the major problem will be the maintenance of full employment in the lower categories where a surplus of labour already exists or will exist in the near future, and if stability and security for all is to be achieved it follows that there must be a rapid expansion of industry, involving the investment of capital and augmentation of labour in the higher categories in order to ensure a balanced labour force overall. To secure external capital investment there must be a stable economy, a complete absence of political and racial friction and the prospect of a reasonable return on investment.

Industrial expansion must be related to available markets. As the African's earning and spending power increases the potential of the home market will be enlarged but success in the export market will depend upon the ability to produce goods at competitive prices in world markets. There will be a temptation to reduce production costs by the exploitation of cheap African labour. This must be resisted at all costs if harmony between races, stable conditions and security for all sections of the community is to be achieved.

28. Concomitant with increased earning power arising from education, training and improved dexterity and ability Africans must assume the increased responsibilities outlined earlier so that the sole criterion in determining the suitability of applicants for posts in the lower categories will be merit.

In accepting this criterion, a responsibility devolves upon the Government to impress upon Europeans in the lower categories the existence of competition from Africans and to state boldly that it accepts the principle of "rate for the job." In accepting this principle it should be clearly understood that effort not apathy will be required from Europeans if they are to meet the competition from emergent Africans.

29. In order that similar opportunities will be made available to all sectors of the community it is considered educational qualifications for school leaving should be related to an educational standard and not merely age. Similarly, in technical education, proficiency to a determined standard should be attained before a worker can be recognised as a skilled employee.

30. The Society believes that it is the responsibility of the present generation to ensure that the European standards upon which the economy of this country have been built are in no way reduced on account of the great surplus of low grade labour becoming available.

31. General

The recommendations contained in this memorandum are summarised, for ease of reference, below :—

1. The productivity of the African must be increased but as his earning power rises so must he accept, on a progressive basis the responsibilities and duties of citizenship.

2. The African shall assume, on a progressive basis, responsibility for the administration and control of native village settlements and native urban areas.

3. The qualifications for an enrolled voter in parliamentary elections shall be :—

(a) A citizen of the country ;

(b) Aged 21 years or more ;

(c) Ability to read, write, speak and understand English and be able to fill in the voter's registration form without help ;

(d) An income of £720 per annum or own land, including buildings worth £1,500.

4. The minimum qualification set out in (d) above shall be adjusted every five years to take into account any rise or fall in the purchasing power of the currency.

5. The elimination of racialism from politics.

6. The control of the African's advancement, politically and socially, to the pace of his economic development.

7. The restoration of goodwill between races by reducing the pressure upon Europeans to accept prematurely the admittance of Africans to places of entertainment and public offices provided primarily for the benefit of Europeans.

8. The insistence of government remaining in the hands of responsible and civilised people.

9. The rapid expansion of industry.

10. The standard of employment to be based solely on merit.

11. The provision of adequate facilities, particularly educational, to enable all sections of the community to qualify for advancement.

12. The need to impress upon Europeans the existence of competition from Africans for employment and that the sole criterion in determining the suitability of Africans for employment will be merit.

32. These recommendations and submission are made by the Society in the belief that they constitute the means by which stable conditions and security for all sections of the community will be achieved.

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P. STAUB, M.P.

I wish to submit as evidence to the Commission the editorial headed: "Snare for Monckton Commissioners" in the "Central African Examiner" of 7th May, 1960, which appears in pages three and four of that publication.

It seems to me that this article makes a number of points which might be of interest to Members of the Commission.

Salisbury

6th May, 1960

Annexure

Extract from the Central African Examiner, Volume 3, No. 25, of the 7th May, 1960

This "Looser Form of Association" Snare for Monckton Commissioners

The Monckton Commission has now almost completed its work in the Federation. It still has ahead of it several weeks of hard work in London, but it is not too soon for Rhodesians and Nyasalanders to begin asking themselves how much—and how little—they should expect from the Commission's report when it is published later in the year. The Commission's terms of reference are:—

In the light of the information provided by the Committee of Officials and of any additional information the Commission may require, to advise the five Governments, in preparation for the 1960 review, on the constitutional programme and framework best suited to the achievement of the objects contained in the Constitution of 1953, including the Preamble.

The significant words of the Preamble are:—

And whereas the association of the Colony and Territories aforesaid in a Federation under Her Majesty's sovereignty, enjoying responsible government in accordance with this Constitution, would conduce to the security, advancement and welfare of all their inhabitants, and in particular would foster partnership and co-operation between their inhabitants and enable the Federation, when those inhabitants so desire, to go forward with confidence towards the attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth;

Now, therefore, the said Colony and Territories shall be associated in a Federation. . . .

It is perfectly clear from these terms of reference, read in conjunction with the Preamble to the Federal Constitution, that the Commission has not been appointed to consider whether or not the Federation should be dissolved, and the public statements of Dr. Banda, Mr. Harper, and even Sir Edgar Whitehead, should not be allowed to obscure that fact.

In a Federation which stands for a middle, multi-racial course, it is only to be expected that secession from the Federation will become a political rallying-cry both for the White nationalists and for the Black nationalists. But one of the political facts of life is that secession is not a live possibility in the Federation today. Dr. Banda has, of course, made it a cornerstone of his "minimum" demands for Nyasaland; Mr. Harper is itching for the opportunity to fight a general election over it; and the tired old arguments that Federation bled Northern Rhodesia dry economically is still trotted out regularly in some quarters in Lusaka.

But, whatever the secessionists say publicly, many of them admit privately that the chances of secession are slender. They are indeed. They do not seriously exist unless all five Governments concerned, including the British Government, agree to the secession of any member-Territory. The likelihood of that happening is remote, and is likely to become more so.

The Monckton Commission is, therefore, most unlikely to give dismemberment of the Federation serious consideration*—not only because to do so would be to step outside the bounds of its terms of reference, but also because there is little point in recommending a course of action which is certain to be rejected by the five Governments which appointed the Commission.

* This does not mean that there will be a minority report from at least one member advocating secession.

The real danger is not that the Commission will recommend secession, but that it will fail to see that any recommendation which does not have the effect of strengthening the Federal State—any recommendation for a "looser kind of association between the three territories"—will, ultimately, have precisely the same effect that a straight recommendation for the dissolution of the Federation would have.

The issue of whether or not the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland should be federated ought to have been decided, once and for all, in 1953. It wasn't. The fatal flaw in the Federal Constitution was that it provided for a review of itself to be held in from seven to 10 years time. This proviso, more than anything else, kept alive in the minds of the anti-Federationists the hope that, "when the review comes, we'll be able to break it up". It was this that led Mr. Chipembere and Mr. Chiume to invite Dr. Banda back to Nyasaland. It was this that created the choking pall of doubt that has hung over the Federation for the past year, and which will not be blown away unless and until the review talks afford proof not only that Federation is here to stay but that it will be strengthened rather than weakened.

Any weakening of the Federal State, any reduction in the overall powers of the Federal Government, any attempt to replace the Federation with a loose form of economic union, any plan to hold yet another constitutional review in a few years, will give the anti-Federationists nearly as much encouragement as the immediate dismemberment of the Federation. Any of these actions would indicate plainly to the anti-Federationists that the British Government is still not firmly convinced of the desirability of Federation, and would encourage them to redouble their efforts towards making Federation fail.

While African nationalist leaders in the Northern Territories are encouraged (as they are being at present) to believe that secession is a real possibility, every African nationalist leader is a secessionist. To be anything else is to commit political suicide in today's atmosphere. But at least some African nationalist leaders are realists; when they finally become convinced that Federation is here to stay, they will work within the Federal system—first in Territorial Legislatures and Executives, later in the Federal Parliament and Cabinet. They will begin reluctantly, and not because they are particularly happy about the system. In time, the reluctance and the dislike will disappear, as the advantages which only Federation can bring to Central Africa become plain to them.

It should be possible to begin making this kind of progress next year, immediately after the constitutional review. But it will be possible only if that constitutional review, once and for all, destroys all illusions about the ephemeral nature of the Federation, and, by strengthening the Federal State, gives a clear pointer to the future. To do anything else—to try to turn the Federal Government into a kind of glorified Central African Council (1947-pattern)—is to cling to all the doubts and uncertainties of 1959 and 1960, to invite new disturbances in the Northern Territories, and to sacrifice the last hope of building in Central Africa a new nation, based on British democratic and non-racial principles.

We hope, and we believe, that many members of the Monckton Commission are fully aware of this and that they will recommend the necessary strengthening of the Federal Government. This does not mean that none of the Federal Government's powers should be returned to the Territorial Governments. Some—health and roads among them—might well be better administered by the Territorial Governments. But, in return, the Federal Government must receive other functions and powers—including perhaps labour relations, the maintenance of law and order, and the establishing of a Federal police system (preferably on similar lines to Britain's police structure, as outlined by Colonel A. S. Hickman in "The Examiner" of 15th August, 1959)—so that the Federal Government is strengthened overall.

At the same time, we hope the Commission makes a strong recommendation to the five Governments to take the opportunity of the constitutional review to make it perfectly plain to all that the Federation is here to stay; that there is no intention to break it up; and that no further constitutional reviews are planned. A copy of this "Declaration" might also usefully be handed to the Secretary of State in Washington.

W. X. STUTTAFORD

I, Wallace X. Stuttaford, do hereby declare and state:—

1. I was born at Vredfort in the Orange Free State on the 5th day of June, 1890, of parents who both hailed from Devon. I was brought by them to Southern Rhodesia, together with seven brothers and sisters, by ox wagon during the latter months of the year 1895, arriving at Bulawayo on the 16th day of January, 1896, after an adventurous journey during which two of my sisters—Alice, who had just come out from Devon, then aged 21, and Lilian, born in Winburg, O.F.S., then aged 12—were lost in the veldt for four days and nights, a short while before the Jameson Raid passed our convoy on the road.

2. As with most families, we suffered all the privations and difficulties resultant upon the outbreak of rinderpest which killed our trained oxen, the Matabele Rebellion of March/April 1896, in which my father served, and the Boer War period.

3. My father, employed by the newly formed Municipality of Bulawayo as a Works-Overseer, had charge of numerous native labourers from various parts of Matabeleland and Mashonland, such as the Amandebele, the conquering tribe as well as Batonkas, Shonas, Shangaans and others, and I became well acquainted with their conditions, habits and respective characteristics. As a school-boy and cadet, on camping and shooting expeditions, and in many exploratory journeys through the Matopos and in and about the environments of Bulawayo, I was able to observe, at first hand, the primitive state in which the natives of the country then lived. My observations have since extended from Plumtree to Salisbury and Kariba and from Wankie to Umfali. I have also made trips to the Copperbelt and to Maun in the Bechuanaland Protectorate by way of the South Bank of the Zambezi and Katchikau.

4. I got to know the Fingos, brought up and settled by Cecil Rhodes at Ntabasinduna, Inyati, and eventually in the Eastern portions of the Colony, the Makarangas, the Mandawus, and the Maxesurus. One of my friends, a Makaranga by name Jopo Dzaniwa Shumba, frequently visits me now. He owns portion of a farm in the Umshangashe area of the Victoria District, was a young warrior who fought against the Amandebele Impis on their raids from the Matopos across to Victoria at and about the time that the Pioneer Column reached Fort Victoria. He is now said to be over 90 but is extremely active. Many others, old and young, raw and partly educated in the Gutu, Zaka, Nuanetsi, Selukwe and Chibi Districts and known to me.

5. I attended St. George's School in Bulawayo, from 1899 to 1908, taking Articles for law in 1909, was admitted in 1914 and, after brief practice served in France, returning to practise in August 1919. Since then I have gained some knowledge of Native Law and custom and of the Statutory Legislation of Southern Rhodesia as administered in relation to our native peoples, both in connection with civil disputes and criminal defences, in the course of which I have gained an insight into the habits, conditions and ideas of many sections of our various native tribes.

6. In 1953, after taking considerable deliberation, I voted against Federation, taking the view that our natives generally had not then become sufficiently advanced educationally, culturally, and in the many other spheres which make for civilisation, to release control and yet enable them to establish themselves in peaceful occupations and contentedness; but when Federation came about I decided that, as an individual citizen and so far as possible, I would do everything I could to assist our Governments in their efforts to achieve this end, confident that with the ability of those responsible in our Governing bodies there would be no great difficulty—given time. In my view that time will be shorter if interference by fanatics, agitators, pseudo-missionaries and evangelists, and all persons with distorted mental attitudes, not only in and about the Federation but also from our homeland and elsewhere, are eliminated and discarded forthwith.

7. This country, and I would include the whole of South Central Africa, does not belong to the natives nor to any portion of their peoples. It was acquired, as so many other component parts of our Commonwealth were acquired in earlier history, by right of conquest. The pioneers and early settlers and their successive Governments, under the Chartered (B.S.A.) Company and since, in the course of their development of the country, have "lifted" the natives greatly and improved their conditions generally beyond the comprehension of the said fanatics and agitators and, while certain peoples amongst the natives, such as the Nyasas of whom many worked for me on a small farm I own near Shabani, are easily led and much given to mass or mob hysteria, they on the whole are appreciative of what has and is being done for them by the Governments and people of Nyasaland, and

Northern and Southern Rhodesia. The great majority of them are contented in the knowledge that their conditions and status are being improved all the time.

I am able to say this with conviction from long experience in Southern Rhodesia particularly, and the knowledge I have gained over the years.

8. I fear greatly that if the comparatively small bodies of agitators are not restrained, are not checked and are given audience the present position might develop into revolution or civil war.

9. I am devoted to this country, have noted over the years the many sacrifices made by its small white population and the consideration granted to the native people throughout the country, and I am satisfied that, given unrestricted opportunity, adequate consideration will in the ordinary course be granted, wholeheartedly and unreservedly, in the future.

Fort Victoria

14th January, 1960

A. T. TATE—Part I

Before elaborating the subject on which I wish to give evidence I had better explain who I am and what experience I have in order to be able to do so.

I have lived in the Federation since 1912, and have served in the B.S.A. Police; the Rhodesia forces during the first world war; the Northern Rhodesia Police; and finally the Nyasaland Police where I served 21 years. I acted as Commissioner of Police for the last 18 months of my service with that force, and retired with the rank of Deputy Commissioner. After my retirement I continued to live in Nyasaland. I again served the Nyasaland Government in various capacities. One of these was the post of Assistant Secretary for defence and security. I also worked as Town Officer, Blantyre-Limbe, and dealt with all African matters in the combined townships. I was also a Magistrate.

I propose to deal mainly with the administration of African affairs, and to touch lightly on information. I give this evidence on the assumption that it is the British Government's desire to uphold the idea of the Federation of the three territories, so that in the future it can become a large and prosperous state within the Commonwealth. The reason why this should be so is obvious, and so many people will give evidence why it is necessary, that I do not intend to elaborate that question.

Before I left Nyasaland it became quite clear to me that there were many officials in the Colonial service who were opposed to federation. This arose not so much from the mental attitude of supporting Congress aims for self-determination, but from the selfish point of view of their own interests. In conversation with a few of these officials I was told quite plainly that they would never agree to become Federal government servants. I must admit, however, that these officials made this statement before the rapid advancement of African territories to independence, as no doubt it was in their minds that in the event of the Federation taking over more control of state affairs they could ask for a transfer to other Colonial territories. Colonial officials believe that conditions under which they work are better than those offered by the Federal government. One of the main considerations is U.K. leave every three years with passages paid. This insistence on U.K. leave arises from the fact that they do not associate themselves with the Federation. They believe they are contracted to do a certain job in the colonies, and when time expired retire to Britain. This has always been the desire of the young recruit. It was my idea when I first came to Rhodesia, but with the passing years one's ideas change. The point, however, to keep in mind is that there are still many officials in N. Rhodesia and Nyasaland with these ideas, not to mention some of the older ones who know of no other conditions and that unless they can be convinced now of the desirability of Federation, the harm they can do during the next few years may be fateful. I state this in all seriousness. Social conditions in Nyasaland are different from the other two territories. There is a great deal of multi-social gatherings, especially among the official classes. What is said officially during the course of duty, can so easily be negated by statements made by an opponent of Federation over a drink, even if it is by innuendo only. One must not blame the colonial official, it is his own interests and advancement he mainly seeks, one must blame the organisation which tries to allow a human being to serve two masters.

The British point of view can be understood. With pressure from the rest of the coloured dominions, the United Nations, and Americas, they refuse to release the control of African affairs until the majority of the population, that is Africans, agree to hand over their affairs to a Federal government. That day, in my opinion, will never come under dual control.

It has been my experience in Africa that the African on the

whole, is friendly towards Europeans (I do not argue from the extremist's point of view) and it is also my experience that Africans will listen to experienced men whom they know. They do not like sudden change, but are reasonable to proper explanation. This, of course, is just human nature, and applies to all races except extremists which I have found are always one track minded persons who bring back the argument to their own theories. But Africans do like discipline, and they admire a determined leader to whom they can look for guidance and justice. A Federal government can never be such a leader whilst the Secretary of State holds the whip hand in the Northern Territories. It is a characteristic of African mentality to try to get a hearing from the top man, that is, in African opinion, "the chief". He will by-pass Provincial Commissioners (if allowed to) to get to the Governor, the Governor to the Secretary of State, and to the Crown if he could. While this state of affairs continues, the Federal government has no hope of being an authority, as the African, to show his disdain of Federal powers by-passes the Federal government through colonial officials, and so the contempt of Federal constitutions continues to grow.

The point I wish to make is that unless the Provincial and District administration, and all other non-federal departments are placed under federal control, and the officials of these departments have to look to the Federal government for their advancement pay, and pensions, there is little hope of the Federation in its present set up being successful. If this object could be achieved, a time limit would have to be imposed for officials to make up their minds whether they would accept Federal conditions. The time limit would have to be short, say six months. There is not much time left for delay. When district officials become federalised they would be liable to be transferred within the Federation, and a general post would have beneficial results.

There is also need for a definite declaration to be made by all governments concerned, and this includes the British government as to whether the Federation is to continue or not. It is amazing how the human mind re-acts to a definite decision. There is no doubt that there would be political disturbances, and political excitement, not only amongst the local congress members, but by other African States which look forward to the black domination of the whole of Africa. It would cause a furore amongst opposition parties, but would be a nine days wonder which would be forgotten in our time. The younger generation of Africans would grow up under Federal conditions controlled by an all Federal Civil Service. No doubt there would be demands in the future by federal Africans for greater responsibility, but this would be an internal affair, and would no doubt resolve itself in the same way as the internal affairs of Britain have over the past 50 years. But—this cannot happen under dual control. While the African and the colonial Civil Service can look to Britain as the country with a big stick to flog the Federation to give way to their demands, so internal dissension will continue.

In the interim period the office procedure of the three territories should be reorganised; the Governor General's department should be enlarged, and all correspondence, despatches, reports, and recommendations between the Northern Territories and the Colonial Office, and vice versa, concerning policy should pass through a central office under the Governor General. All despatches to and from the Colonial Office would then be examined, argued, and finally accepted in some form, or rejected, by all three territories before reaching the Colonial Office, or the territorial Governors for action or consideration. This would make administration an internal affair before final agreement was reached in any controversial matter; at the same time the British Government would not lose face by relinquishing control in the Northern Territories.

The British Government has accepted the view that the peoples of Africa must decide their own destiny. There is, however, a great difference between Central Africa and other States in Africa, which are completely African. The phrase "a bold and imaginative decision" is often on the lips of politicians and leader writers, when it comes to handing over a territory to Africans. Why should it not be just as bold and imaginative to hand over to the Federal Government the internal affairs of the Federation. The only answer is, of course, that it is against pre-conceived ideas, and would affect Britain in the eyes of coloured nations. It has been stated before that disturbances would follow such a decision, but when the Federal State is an accomplished fact, there is little doubt that disturbances would die away to be replaced by the usual democratic methods for the benefit and advancement of its inhabitants.

From this stage information would have to be a first priority. The only way to reach the rural African is through a vernacular press, and District Commissioners. With all departments under Federal control the advantages of Federation, and

the contradiction of false rumours could be better put over. To obtain a balanced output of information a central information office should be set up with its own printing press. Within such central office there should be interpreters and translators of the various languages spoken in the Federation. Information and reports should be collated in this office by experts with a sense of security and political values, and then passed out to the public. The vernacular press should be printed in all languages and sent to the districts of the language groups concerned. This would ensure nation wide publicity of all views, news and whatever information required to be published. It would also ensure instantaneous publicity of information, and the "letters to the Editor" from all districts should be all revealing of public opinion. The insidious propaganda of evil minded persons must be countered in a proper and determined manner. The truth of the matter must be got down to the grass roots, because it is the simple villager who in the end will decide what form of government he wants, not the ambitious congress individual inflamed by outside influences.

It is my firm conviction that the man in the street, that is the African, does not want Congress government. I have been told this by many, but, and here is the great snag, they are afraid to come into the open for fear of reprisals, as they have no faith in government promises of protection. They have seen too many Congress men go to prison and come out again to get their own back. If there is any doubt about this statement one has only to remember the bicycle chain gangs, and the recent cases of arson.

Waves of idealism hit Africans hard. Religion swept through Africa. This was followed by African controlled religious sects, the most important being the Watch Tower. Here was a religion which said "The last shall be first and the first shall be last". To the quiet and contented villagers these fanatics were regarded as the "Mpatuka". (Those apart). This fanaticism died away with the last generation, and nationalism has taken its place. I suspect that the villager still regards Congress fanatics as the "Mpatuka"; the only difference now that African politics is a world wide subject for interference is how much support will the "Mpatuka" receive from the powers that be. Patient Africa can only wait and see, and bend like grass in the wind, till the next wave of fanaticism hits it.

The only other point I wish to mention is that of security reports. I once asked a senior security officer why he did not report the favourable side about Federation. He replied that it was not his business to pass on favourable reports, as he was concerned only with the aspect of affairs which threatened the security of the territory. After reading present day security reports one is left with a sense of depression, and I can only suggest that if security departments take the attitude of the officer I have mentioned, then the Native Affairs department should render a good relations report to balance the outlook.

To sum up:—

I consider that the Civil Service throughout the three territories should be federalised.

The information departments reorganised on national lines.

Governments to make up their minds concerning what they want, and to make a joint declaration stating exactly what is to be the political future, so that both white and black will know where the Federation is going, or what the ultimate aim is.

To disregard the voice of fanaticism, and to pay more attention to the gentle and voiceless masses of friendly Africans.

To let the Federation work out its own salvation, and if this cannot be done without some controls for the sake of political expediency, then at least there should be a ten years period given to the Federation in which to try.

That while this is being organised, reports, despatches and recommendations which the Northern Territories render to the Colonial Office, and the Colonial Office to the Governors concerned, should pass through a central office under the direction of the Governor General. The British Government should direct despatches to this office stating what political advancement it thought necessary, but if accepted, would be put forward by the Federal office, and not through local governors as something Britain will do, but the Federation will not.

That something on these lines be put into operation at once. If not, then break up the Federation, and let the future stresses of defence, economics, communications, and the business needs of modern times do what the quarrelling politicians cannot make up their minds to do, that is, bring the territories concerned to a closer economic and political understanding for the benefit of all.

The break up of the Federation would bring rejoicing to the inhabitants of all three territories—for a time—not in the least to Southern Rhodesians who are heartily sick of these

eloquent and dissatisfied demagogues from the Northern Territories, not so much for their desire for advancement, but because of the world wide attention paid to these so called self-styled leaders who have only to gather a few followers, proclaim they are a party, demand audiences with Governors, Secretaries of State, and gain broadcast and television interviews as publicity stunts (always with a slant against the Europeans), while the European who pays the piper, and the voiceless African villager who feels the edge of a bicycle chain suffer in silence.

Time might bring them to their senses, so it's either all (with limited controls in the way of a senate) or nothing.

Now is the time to use vision and courage. Do not use expediency to placate different points of view giving away a little bit for everyone, but nothing definite for the country as a whole. Churchill's statement still holds good: "Give us the tools and we will do the job". We cannot do the job in this country without a Federal Civil Service and a Federal voice to put forward any major policy required by the British Government.

When we do know where other people think we ought to go, then will be the time for us in Southern Rhodesia to say where we intend to go.

Marandellas

21st January, 1950

A. T. TATE—Part 2

In the first half of my memorandum to the Commission I advocated the abolition of dual control of political affairs within the Federation. I should like to follow up this recommendation by some views on how the different legislatures of the three territories might function.

It will be seen that in the first half of my evidence I stated that all correspondence between the Protectorates and the Colonial Office (that is the British Government) and vice versa should be conducted through a central office under the Governor-General, and this part of my evidence will be based on that assumption.

It is quite clear that to even think of closer co-operation between the three territories the Africans in the two Northern Territories will have to be given more control of their own affairs, and if this is done it means that African representation on the legislative councils of those territories must be increased. It is, I think, also quite clear that at the present stage of political and secular education of the Africans of the Protectorates, it is not possible to pass full control of all state matters into their hands. There must be a compromise in order, on the one hand, to satisfy the aspirations of the political demagogues, and, on the other, the soberly thought of the more advanced Europeans (both Federal and British) which, despite pressure from all sides must consider the African population as a whole, and not just the politically-minded few, egged on by outside sources.

I therefore put forward the following proposals for consideration.

That in Nyasaland a Legislative Council be brought into being which will consist of Africans only. It can consist of any number of members a commission will recommend. They will be elected by universal suffrage by Africans only. It will have its own Prime Minister, and any number of Ministers thought advisable. This council will deal with territorial matters only, and will have territorial funds at its disposal to spend as it thinks fit. The council will have powers to pass or repeal legislation of territorial matters. It will conduct its affairs on the lines laid down for Legislative Council procedure. The Governor will hold the power of veto. There will also be constituted an Executive Council on which an approved number of Nyasaland Europeans will be elected, there will also be the usual number of Nyasaland officials. To this Executive Council the African Legislative Council will appoint its ministers. The Official and European members will equal the appointed African members, with the Governor or Chief Secretary holding the casting vote. A Legislative Council of this nature will ensure that the African can control his own affairs, but there will be a veto to curb any exuberance of the African Legislative Council. In the event of the African Legislative shewing its democratic nature by walking out of their council, if the veto was used, the Executive Council could carry on with government.

In the first half of my evidence I recommended that parts of the Colonial Civil Service be federalised, and therefore would not come under the jurisdiction of the Legislative Council. A division of the Service would have to be worked out. There might be many Europeans who would be willing to serve in a territorial service.

There should also be appointed a third council which would deal with Federal legislation and finance. This would consist of any number of officers necessary for its operation, but not the Governor, who is a representative of the British Government and is responsible for territorial matters only. All funds passed by the Federal Authority to the territorial government for works in Nyasaland should be allocated by this council. It could of course provide funds to the African Legislative Council, which could deal with the money as directed. But, in defence, communications, European education and such like Federal matters the federal funds should be kept under strict control of this, for want of a better term, could be styled the Territorial Federal Board. There is one controversial matter still outstanding in Nyasaland and that is European Agriculture, and this would have to be brought into line with the other two territories.

There would be close co-operation between the Territorial Federal Board and the Territorial Legislative Council. There could be African members on the Board, but there must be a European majority for some years to come.

The Territorial government would then be as follows:— An all African Legislative Council under its own Prime Minister responsible for all territorial matters left to it under the Constitution.

A mixed Executive Council with an official majority. A territorial federal board to deal with matters given to it by the Federal Authority.

A Governor responsible for Protectorate affairs, but dealing with the British Government through the Governor-General.

A division of the Civil Service on lines to be planned.

The question of the police remains to be settled. Only one arrangement suggests itself. There should be a Federal Police Force and a Territorial Police Force. The Territorial Police would be under the control of the territorial government. The Federal Police under Federal control. This means that the Territorial Police would deal with local crime, statutory offences, etc., and also local disturbances, but could call on Federal Police for assistance when required, but it should be clearly understood that the Territorial Legislative Council would be held responsible for local affairs and minor disturbances. The Federal Police, if called in, would be under Federal control. There could be a Federal Criminal Investigation Department and Finger Print Bureau.

In a memorandum such as this only the broad outlines of such governmental arrangements can be discussed, but the outlines I have suggested might give a clue to an arrangement which would be acceptable to all the governments concerned, the Civil Service and to the African political aspirations. Over the years as political passions become subdued, modifications could be made and, if it worked, it might mean that in the end a real and live Federation could be brought into being.

So far as Northern Rhodesia is concerned similar arrangements could be made, possibly with modifications. Mining, Communications, Broadcasting, Agriculture and European education are already Federal concerns so there is no objection to an African Legislative Assembly as suggested for Nyasaland.

With regard to Southern Rhodesia, this country should be declared a Dominion in its own right and, as a Dominion, would co-operate within the Federation on the same lines as it does at present. There is precedent for this as Australia is responsible for certain Colonial or Mandated territories in the East, and there seems to be no objection to that arrangement.

The Federal Parliament should be abolished and substituted by a Federal Council, to which members are nominated by the three territories. There should be about twenty-five to thirty members who would elect their own President. The numbers of such members from each territory to be worked out by a Commission. This council could have legislative powers similar to those enjoyed by the present Federal Parliament and could appoint its own Ministers to deal with departmental affairs, the same as is done at present, but, say, with a rank as Commissioner.

To nominate a Council, which is in effect a Parliament, might appear to be a startling innovation to those who follow the fetish of one man, one vote. But modern thought is coming to the conclusion that thinking on new lines must be done to solve Africa's problems where mixed races are concerned. It must be realised that at present the Federal Parliament deals with high State matters, Defence, Security, Foreign Affairs. Under the present system with more Africans coming on the Voters' Roll every year, there might, particularly in the Northern Territories, come a time when the African will out-



vote the European and there would be a majority of Africans on the Federal Parliament. At the present stage this would be undesirable and, so far as I can see, Southern Rhodesia would not stand for it, especially in the realms of Defence, Agriculture and European Education. With a nominated Federal Council this could not happen.

Outside this Federal Council Southern Rhodesia would operate as a Dominion, conducting its own affairs in all matters independently of the Federal Council, but would assist in skill Defence and other matters as the position required, and receive from Federal finances sums to help the cost of these services as at present.

It is seen, therefore, that in a set-up as suggested, there would be three territories more or less self-contained with the Africans, especially in Nyasaland, with the dominant voice in territorial affairs. In the future they could either come closer together, but if a break did occur, the territorial governments could continue to operate but without Federal funds. These funds could then be shared by the other two, if say, the secession of Nyasaland took place. If the three territories decide to separate, each territory would work on its own revenue and would have to look to its own resources for defence, education and all other matters which were once Federal.

Such is the broad outlines I put forward. The idea is similar in a way to the Dominion Party's policy for a Central African alliance.

There is one other matter I wish to mention. This is commerce. Nyasaland is the poorest of the three territories, and one of the reasons for this is that the whole of the retail African trade is in the hands of Asians. The internal African trade in Nyasaland is large. Every year the banks import new capital to pay for the agriculture produce grown by Africans. Tobacco, ground nuts, rice coffee, cotton, maize, etc. Admittedly a large proportion of this money goes to Britain for the purchase of goods, but the profits from the retail trade is pipelined to India and the annual importation of capital continues. If the profits from this retail trade were directed to Africans in business, the wealth so obtained would circulate internally and build up over the years. There would also be created a middle class of African business man, which would stabilise the political picture.

The European has had to give way on many of his old convictions and it is time for the Asian to hold some of the burden. So far he has sat with folded hands reaping in the profits from trade, which rightly should be in African hands, and then gets hot and cold as the winds of political passion blow around the African territories.

Commercial colleges should be established to educate the African in business methods. Special funds could be provided to establish modern African trading centres. Originally this could be done by co-operate societies, but as the African's business acumen increased individuals could branch off on their own. The African is a shrewd trader but a rotten business man, but they could be trained. If a scheme on these lines was put into practice, say by the suggested Federal Council, the political advantage of some direct help to Africans would be enormous. Over a number of years Asian retail business would disappear and be substituted by African retail traders who would spend the money in the Federation.

Marandellas
9th February 1960

TOBACCO EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL OF RHODESIA

1. Tobacco production in the three Territories of the Federation for the last crop year ended September, 1959, was as follows (million lb.):

	<i>Southern Rhodesia</i>	<i>Northern Rhodesia</i>	<i>Nyasaland</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
Virginia flue-cured ...	186.35	12.63	2.25	195.93
Virginia fire-cured ..	.08	--	26.40	26.48
Virginia sun and air-cured ...	—	.14	5.42	5.56
Burley ...	—	.58	2.75	3.33
Turkish89	.08	—	.97

While the Virginia flue-cured crop is produced entirely by the European grower, the bulk of the production of other types is in the hands of the African peasant farmer.

2. All tobaccos grown in the Federation, with the exception of Turkish, are sold by a system of free auction on floors established in Salisbury and Limbe. Control of the marketing arrangements for the European production of Southern and Northern Rhodesia is vested in the Rhodesia Tobacco Marketing Board, while Government Agencies in all three Territories arrange for the collection and sale of the African production.

3. The Tobacco Export Promotion Council of Rhodesia was established by the Rhodesian Tobacco Marketing Board

two years ago to undertake the work of promoting the sale overseas of both Southern and Northern Rhodesian Tobaccos. More recently the Council, at the request of the Nyasaland authorities, extended its activities to include tobacco produced in this Territory and it can now claim to operate on a truly Federal basis.

4. The importance of this development is illustrated by the fact that no major consuming country is interested in only one type of tobacco. All buy a variety of types for blending in to their own particular tastes. It follows that an organisation which in its studies and negotiations can cover the whole range of Federal production is in a better position to achieve positive results than one which is limited to one or two types or Territories.

5. Since home consumption is relatively small, the Federation has to depend upon capturing and retaining export markets if tobacco production, which provides the means of livelihood for a considerable proportion of its European and African population, is to be maintained, let alone expanded. This has to be done in the face of intense competition from other major producing areas, notably the United States, Canada, China and India, and as a rule in markets which are particularly concerned with securing a reasonable balance in their own import/export trade and so anxious, at least at Government level, to be accorded opportunities for their products to compete in the Federation's market. In this respect the operations of TEPCOR has become an adjunct to (if not precedent to) the activities of the Federal Government in developing trading arrangements with the Governments of other countries.

6. It should be appreciated that it is not TEPCOR's function to sell tobacco, but rather to explore opportunities and to endeavour with Government assistance to remove barriers so that the trade representatives can do business. This is best achieved by co-ordinated effort on a Federal basis, as has now been evolved.

9th June 1960

D. TYNDALE-BISCOE AND A GROUP OF RHODESIANS

If the pioneers were able to revisit the scene of their adventures they would wonder amazed not only at our material progress but particularly at us. Why, with every possible, and, to them, incredible, means of well being and security are we so obviously and desperately distrustful of life and ourselves? Life to them was a festing ground. Why then, do we, when faced with problems that could overtake us, camouflage any failures by some sort of neurosis?

Remember the Munich pact which resulted from Britain having run away from her moral obligations, choosing material safety above spiritual integrity. Never were the people more unhappy. But at Dunkirk, when they had risen to the challenge, they were serene, proudly cheerful and self confident; and they stood fast.

We descendants of pioneers or old Rhodesian families, feel that we are in danger of running away from our moral obligations now. Scare talk will get us nowhere. We are young people who do not intend to run away. We will be the ones to face the consequences if we fail in our duty, and it is our intention to help rather than hinder, in as practical a manner as possible, those controlling our destiny to face the challenge like men.

The formation of a multi-racial Senate is now being considered. Would not a Constitutional Court, to act as Custodian of the Constitution and a Bill of Rights, better serve the nation? The appointment of the Constitutional Court's members could be so ordered that they would be immune from the influences of party politics.

This Court might consist of, say, twenty-five life members, nine of whom would be Europeans, nine Africans and two Asians or Coloureds, with the remaining five members consisting of the four Chief Justices of the Federation and Territories and a Chairman appointed by the Governor General.

Their duties would be to sit when required each year and to examine any legislation in any of the Territorial Governments or in the Federal Parliament which is challenged as discriminating against any race. They would have the power of rejecting or returning any bill with their recommendations. Their word would be final and have the force of law. They could be invited to advise on the franchise which must necessarily remain qualitative while the great majority of the people have little background of the moral code on which Western Civilisation depends. They might also be called to serve on any commissions of enquiry that we have thrust on us from time to time.

The existence of this Court would not only allay the fears and suspicions of each race, but also have the effect of quietening the more vociferous voices abroad concerning

our policies. Our actions would be open to inspection by an impartial body. It would be the first step towards confidence. With it all the territories could remain within the framework of the Federation. On this hinge opens the door of our further suggestions.

We feel that in a country in which some areas are overstocked and others not being used at all, there will always be a bone of contention. It has happened in other countries with sometimes disastrous results, particularly where a privileged class owned most of the unused land. We propose, therefore, that a tax be imposed on the owners of unused arable and industrial land, worked on a percentage of its market value. All land for sale should be open to purchase by anyone capable of using the land, except in Native Reserves, where first option will be given to the Crown as Trustee of the inhabitants of those areas. In cases where this law might cause hardship, any land for sale that cannot be easily sold should become the property of the Crown to dispose of with a guarantee to reimburse the original owner with the full market value at the eventual time of disposal.

We think such a law in a growing country will make land speculation unprofitable and render more land available for development, provide more employment in a land where unemployment could eventually become a problem, and alleviate the pressure on overstocked areas.

We have been told that we in Southern Rhodesia spend more on African education per head of population than any other African territory. What possible use can this serve if those we have educated do not have equal opportunity to use their talents for the benefit of the community, are banned from using public places, and generally treated as aliens in their own land? What is the object of creating something with one hand and destroying it with the other? Do we want to produce useful citizens or are we producing our own agitators?

There are, we know, certain people who fear losing their jobs to the African. Our answer is that they have little faith, for with confidence and equal opportunities, new industries will grow up and there is no reason why opportunities and scope will not be greater for those prepared to do a decent day's work. But those who are holding a "cushy" job purely on the colour of their skin, who are "leftists" in Britain and "rightists" here, who are not prepared to increase their efficiency, let them leave now. Sooner or later they will have to leave anyway.

In fact we fail to see the reason for all outmoded colour barriers. At times they cause us great embarrassment and any self-respecting African much hurt. The conditions now being made legal specifically for the Trade Fair at Bulawayo and the Monckton Commission have put us under particular scrutiny in this respect. It seems incongruous to us that people should be happy with African or Coloured servants in their houses, hotels and cinemas, entrusted with their food and most intimate belongings, and yet resent self-respecting African or Coloured people using public places. If people want privileges, let them pay for them and not regard them as a birthright. We suggest, therefore, that all outmoded Colour barriers should be removed. There will be some effervescence at first but it will not take long for people to find their natural group in society. At the same time we call on all self-respecting people of all races to ensure that privileges are not abused and behaviour remains exemplary.

We feel the present policy of lifting barriers one by one is like throwing toys to growing children. The "children" we are dealing with are not a homogeneous body. Some of them have grown up. Let us allow them to prove their maturity. The right of admission to all public places always has been, and can remain, reserved, and price ranges fixed to suit tastes.

We do not suggest that our proposals cannot be greatly improved in detail. We offer them purely as an example of the moral code on which Western Civilisation depends, and a general basis on which we hope those controlling our destiny can build.

Shall we by selfish grasp on passing privilege continue to spurn this God-sent opportunity of adding to the British Commonwealth a new member of its family of nations? If we do, the nemesis we shall surely bring upon ourselves and our country may set in train the disintegration of our Commonwealth with all it can do for the good of the human race.

8th April 1960

A EUROPEAN RESIDENT OF UMTALI*

I append below evidence which I would like duly considered by the Monckton Commission, in regard to constitutional reform of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; to this end, I have classified my evidence under three headings

* Name withheld at the request of witness.

(a) Constitutional Boundaries, (b) the Franchise, (c) Alternatives to (a) and (b) should these not be acceptable.

(a) Constitutional Boundaries: The Federation as it exists now is an uneconomical demarcation of the three territories. I would suggest, in view of African Nationalism, and to save further strife, and useless expenditure, financially and otherwise the territory of Southern Rhodesia secedes from the Federation, and becomes a Dominion within its own rights, with this provision (1) that the Southern parts of Northern Rhodesia, which is highly populated with Europeans, and that area of the Copperbelt, which has been developed industrially by the European, be annexed to Southern Rhodesia, and that the Northern territory of Northern Rhodesia and Barotseland, and Nyasaland have their own separate and independent Governments, with the provision that they remain within a Federation for five years, and should they decide by the majority vote, to leave the so-called Federation, they should be at a liberty to do so. If the majority in these two territories agree to leaving the so-called Federation, those Europeans who live in this area, should be financially recompensed if they wish to leave the territory, expenses to be met by the Federal Government, or better still, by the Territorial Government of that territory to which this person belongs.

(b) Franchise: The system of the dual voters roll should now be instituted, and we should dispense with a very quarrelsome and difficult method of applying the present Franchise system. May I suggest: (a) that the natives should have their own separate areas in Southern Rhodesia and the Europeans have theirs; both races would have their own method of Government within their territories, and their members of Parliament would be chosen from their respective races. The Asian and Coloured people would come within the European theatre.

The full text of this Franchise can be had from my copy of Evidence as submitted to the Franchise Commission in 1958.

(c) Alternatives to (a) and (b): If my method of constitutional and territorial reform is not acceptable, may I suggest that we secede from the Federation without further delay, and remain as we were before the inauguration of the Federal constitution.

There should be a referendum in regard to (a) whether, we (Southern Rhodesia) are to remain in the Federation or not. Another referendum as to whether we are to become a Dominion, or revert back to a Colony, should be adopted.

An immediate General Election should be held, to determine whether this Government has the support of the electorate or not, and this should be both Federal and Territorial. A referendum is required on the Franchise Commission, so that we can decide on who will be allowed to have the right to vote. It is evident from the evidence submitted to the Franchise Commission that it was only Sir Robert Tredgold's findings which were adopted, and the evidence as submitted by the individuals was disregarded.


I would like to digress here, and point out to the Commissioners that it is very difficult to get people to submit evidence; no doubt this trend is very British, and the people that we consider our advisors are in fact men who will always see justice and fair play carried out; thus, a referendum is the only way by which the electorate can really give you concrete evidence of their wishes.

Should Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia break away, which I think rightly they should do, providing my paragraph (a) regarding a reform of the territorial boundaries is instituted, I feel that it is only fair that the Europeans there should be financially recompensed, should they wish to leave the territory. Should this be acceptable to you, Commissioners, and in your recommendations I think you would have the support of every European in the Federation, and I am sure that in a case of this nature, everyone would assist you in carrying out reasonable recommendations, as submitted by you to our Governments here.

I would point out further, that from my experience as a Colonial Officer in the British Colonial Service, and as an Aide-de-Camp, I do with all sincerity say that an African majority would be detrimental to the Europeans. No doubt this is evident to you, when you see Nationalism at its worst, as in Ghana, and Egypt, and from the statements of the future Minister of the Interior of the proposed independent Nigeria.

Many of us are immigrants who have married into pioneer families, and have children born and bred here; in other words, this is our home. I would like to keep it as such, and under no circumstances would I give the African, in his present state of illiteracy, the right to vote. He can, at this moment, even outvote the European who has a heritage of more than 2,000 years.

21st January, 1960



A EUROPEAN RESIDENT OF UMTALI*

Basis of Evidence Submitted

(a) This evidence is submitted from the viewpoint of a Southern Rhodesian citizen of British birth, who was encouraged to settle in the Colony 13 years ago, who has acquired fixed property, has educated or is educating four children, and during his residence has endeavoured in various fields to assist the development of a country he has for many years regarded as his home country.

Until recent times the question of "Temporary settlement" has never crossed my mind: I was persuaded and induced to become a Rhodesian citizen and have left behind all connections with the United Kingdom—other than ties of relationship.

(b) It is submitted that the place of the European in S. Rhodesia is unique in the Federation: in neither of the two Northern territories is the European population anything like so great, nor have the Europeans in those territories acquired such a stake in the country of their adoption freehold tenure has been more restricted in those countries, civil servants owe allegiance to the U.K. and for the most part have no stake in Central Africa.

(c) Over ½ million Europeans in S. Rhodesia have a strong claim for consideration.

(d) The European in S. Rhodesia has made the foundation for all progress achieved in what is the most developed of the three territories. It is safe to say that, without European private enterprise, development would have proceeded at the pace of a snail. No metropolitan government would have achieved (through the services of colonial civil servants or even development corporations), the economic upsurge of the past decade. He has deserved his place in the country.

(e) European residence and development of S. Rhodesia has not been to the detriment of the African: on the contrary the existence of the European has brought in its train improved health, education, earning power and opportunities for the African population. The Commission will learn of these from statistics it will doubtless be given from Government sources. The economic and social progress of the African has made great steps forward: there is no indication of retrogression in these respects, rather a continuing improvement.

(f) The major issue open to doubt is political and this may be simplified to the point of saying that the problem in S. Rhodesia is the extent to which the African should participate in the political life of the Colony. In this evidence I shall try to face the fact that political advancement is necessary to the future well being of the African and to indicate the lines it might realistically follow.

The Future of S. Rhodesia

1. It is submitted that S. Rhodesia's participation in the Federation is probably undesired by Africans and Europeans alike, that it is unnecessary and that it is undermining all the development that has been achieved: thus being of very limited value to European and the African alike.

The degree to which continuance of Federation is desired can be gauged by a referendum (to which I refer in para. 5 below). I believe it to be a duty of the Commission to recommend that the inhabitants of all the three territories be given their chance to express their views on this vital matter, in the light of experience to date. Federation was only ever regarded as an experiment; all of us, black and white, whose future is inextricably bound up with that of Central Africa, should be given the chance to express our views again.

That Federation is unnecessary will I hope be clear to the Commission from this and other evidence you will receive. This association of territories with incompatible aspirations is a mistake: let the three agree to differ, let us have an end to attempting the impossible.

That development is being undermined can be gauged from the restricted immigration and inflow of capital that has been recently apparent—the Commission will of course readily verify these facts. One further example will suffice—the staggering amount of vacant office accommodation in the large Salisbury sky scrapers, which are prima facie evidence of progress, but which in their empty condition are evidence of the extent to which optimism concerning future development has been shown to be false.

2. The two Northern territories are predominantly "black", under 1/3 of the white population of the Federation lives there. With the major exception of the Copper industry they are economically unsound. It is the avowed intention of the Conservative U.K. Government that it shall continue to protect the interests of the inhabitants of these territories until such time as they are fit to govern themselves. A labour Government

* Name withheld at the request of the witness

would hasten the process. Government in both territories by Africans is accordingly inevitable.

3. Government in S. Rhodesia by an African majority is not acceptable to the European. Furthermore, I submit that the European is at present the natural leader of the community. Other evidence will doubtless reveal these facts to the Commission.

4. In such circumstances Federation must be unworkable and it will be in the interests of all three territories to accept this fact now and cease to endeavour a reconciliation of the irreconcilable. An inordinate amount of time and nervous energy must be expended daily by persons concerned about the future of this Colony. Confidence in the future is being diminished daily and the only solution is to face facts and reorganise promptly.

If the Commission is in doubt about the lack of confidence by Europeans I draw its attention to emigration figures: albeit that these have only been available in recent years. The measure of the current confidence of Europeans can also be usefully gauged by a study of savings deposited with Building Societies on short or medium term investment: compared with savings deposited on a long term investment basis: a greater interest in short term investment is revealed. Other indications will doubtless be revealed to the Commission.

5. A break up of the Federation would, prime facie, be acceptable to the majority of the inhabitants of the two Northern territories. I believe that a referendum in S. Rhodesia would reveal a similar desire.

Conclusively to establish the wishes of the inhabitants I recommend to the Commission that a referendum be held throughout the three territories.

6. Assuming such expressed desire to dismember the Federation, the basic difficulties to such a re-organisation (from a S. Rhodesian viewpoint) would appear to be:—

- The need for assurance of future development for the African S. Rhodesia.
- The effect on the S. Rhodesia Economy of a divorce from the Copperbelt.
- The economic future of the two Northern territories—the political future being happily left to them or to their "guardian" in the shape of the U.K. Government.
- The effect on World opinion.

7. As to 6(a). It is submitted that the prime need is for African economic advancement. At peasant level there will be ample evidence of achievements before your Commission. At professional level there are as yet few who have qualified: for them outlets amongst their own people and within the European community must needs be found. The major "gap" is the absence of what may be termed an African Middle Class: it will be essential to create such a class, indeed its creation would be the major solution to the problems of African advancement. Given those three levels in the African community it should not be impossible to offer improved political participation: indeed it will then be vital to do so, but strictly on the understanding that European rule will remain. The question of sharing leadership with Africans is not within sight—this is a matter for future generations to determine, when economic advancement of the African, coupled with a developed sense of individual and political responsibility, may well bring about such a state of affairs. If European control is undermined now, then European influence and direction will be undermined and Europeans in the Colony will return to their present uncertain place in the community. The European must be assured of a place in the country, trust must be reinvested in him to improve the prosperity of the African, and allow political expression to advance with such prosperity.

8. As to 6(b). It is submitted that in the long term it will be better for Southern Rhodesia to resume its former status, even though it would cease to enjoy economic benefits from the Copperbelt. Development may proceed at a slower pace, but on the other hand the unwanted economic burden of Nyasaland would be discarded.

9. As to 6(c). I assume that Northern Rhodesia will have no cause for discontent with its resultant economy. Nyasaland must resolve its future with or without U.K. guardianship—the majority of its inhabitants will by referendum have said so: let it be so.

10. As to 6(d). It is assumed that World opinion is interested in a stable political and economic Southern Rhodesia. I submit that this already self-governing Colony has proved that it is capable of steady progress in both these fields, and that a return to the application of all its resources and energies for the benefit of its own inhabitants would improve its

chances of orderly and progressive development: no longer would the energies of so many of its inhabitants be dissipated for the doubtful benefit of the Northern territories. If sacrifices had to be made to counter the loss of the Copper industry, they would be made by people who could see a firm future for their country. Contentment of this sort would ensure political stability, wise economic policies (evidence of which has already been shown by the Southern Rhodesia Government) would bring prosperity to the peoples of all races. In short there would be a return of confidence in the future: World opinion in turn would reflect such confidence.

Conclusion

The Commission is asked to conclude that a referendum should be held to determine the wishes of the inhabitants of the three territories as to the continuation of Federation.

It is submitted that the contents of this memorandum, considerably augmented by data, which will undoubtedly be made available to the Commission, amply justifies such a conclusion.
18th January, 1960

A EUROPEAN RESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA*

Memorandum I

Review of Federal Constitution: The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Present Constitution permits continuation of the Colour Bar and Residential Segregation.

I attach a Memorandum written by me in informal, but challenging vein more than two years ago, and should be pleased if you would forward a copy thereof to each member of the Monckton Commission, together with a copy of this letter, for information.

I also enclose a number of photographs† taken in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia. Would you kindly distribute these amongst the members of the Commission and exhibit them at the Enquiry?

The Commission will note that the Memorandum is written under a *nom-de-plume*, although I identified myself, as author, to the few people to whom I addressed copies.

I have lived in the Federation for over ten years, but I now reside in the Union of South Africa.

Submission:

I consider that the Commission, in its responsible task of reviewing the Federal Constitution, cannot ignore the existence, in the Federation, of the colour bar and segregation between races, particularly between white and non-white. If the Commission, in reviewing the Constitution, has, among its terms of reference, a duty to determine whether the Constitution is being implemented faithfully, then it should determine whether or not the colour bar and segregation form an integral and acceptable part of the way of life of the inhabitants of the Federation.

If the Commission decides that the colour bar and segregation of the races in the Federation are alien and repugnant to the way of life envisaged in the Constitution, then it is in duty bound to condemn these elements which at present constitute an integral part of the day to day existence of nearly every person in the Federation. Not only is the Commission obliged to condemn these features of life in the Federation, but is morally bound to recommend the introduction of legislation, or the amendment of the Constitution, to provide that persons guilty of operating the colour bar or of acts of segregation are punishable for criminal offences.

It may be said that no such laws exist in Britain and that their introduction in the Federation is therefore unnecessary. Let it be pointed out that the population of Britain consists of a homogeneous group, whereas the population of the Federation, like the United States of America and the Union of South Africa, is made up of large numbers of different groups. As the Commission is aware, the United States has enacted laws prohibiting segregation, and the Union has enacted laws to enforce segregation.

The attached Memorandum points out that segregation in the Federation is practised as rigidly, if not more rigidly than in the Union,—in the former case without the assistance of law! Segregation and the colour bar are therefore implemented voluntarily at the will of the peoples of the Federation. In the circumstances, a mere condemnation of the colour bar and

* Name withheld at request of witness.

† Not reproduced.

of segregation is inadequate, and likely to be ignored by the population, particularly as these practices continue in the face of hostile world opinion.

If the Commission decides that the colour bar and segregation of the races in the Federation are no hindrance to the way of life envisaged in the Constitution, then it is condoning the way of life as it exists in the Union of South Africa. There is no Middle Course

Federation was established over six years ago, and the Federal Parliament has amended legislation from time to time to give, in token form only, a greater "freedom" to the African population.

As indicated in the first paragraph of this letter, the attached Memorandum was prepared over two years ago, and some of the remarks contained in the document must be brought up-to-date,—for example, there are no longer separate entrances for "Europeans" and "Africans" at the Post Offices in the Federation and the offending signs on the doorways have been removed. Further, Africans may now buy State Lottery tickets! In addition, the word "Europeans" has been obliterated from the benches in Cecil Square, Salisbury. And the Secretary to one of the Ministers of State is an African . . .

But nothing has, as yet, been done to integrate the various peoples of the Federation! Nothing has been done to break down the colour bar in European (Government) schools in the Federation; the Municipal and Town Management Board swimming baths are kept strictly "white" or "black"; the cities and towns still retain their (segregated) "European," "Coloured," "Asian" and "African" areas, and "job reservation" is as prevalent today as it ever was.

I submit that the European population of the Federation is as strongly opposed to social integration as it was ten years ago, and only an amendment to the Constitution or legislation is likely to bring about the destruction of the colour bar and segregation of the races of the Federation.

The Commission will be failing in its duty if it does not decide one way or the other in this matter.

I have no quarrel with the present way of life of the peoples of the Federation. Their way of life is similar to that in the Union of South Africa. But I feel that the Commission should not be ignorant of the way of life today of the peoples of the Federation.

It is not my wish to support this letter and Memorandum with verbal evidence. Suffice it to be suggested to members of the Commission that they check the matters cited in my Memorandum with circumstances as they find them in Salisbury, the Capital city of the Federation, and that they endeavour to carry out the check without the "Assistance" of a guided tour of inspection.

East London

Union of South Africa

7th January 1960

Memorandum II

The racial policies of the Union of South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland:

A comparison

"South Africa's detestable policy of apartheid . . ." (Ghananian newspaper *Ashanti Pioneer*.)

"I deplore South Africa's racial policies. . ."

(Mr. Harold Macmillan, British Prime Minister, speaking at a British Television Press Conference.)

"The menace to Christianity of Mr. Strijdom's policy of Apartheid in South Africa. . ."

(Mr. Wm. Connor, alias "Cassandra", writing in the *Daily Mirror* on the 29th April, 1958.)

"The South African Regime, in many respects, is more tyrannical than that of Communist countries. . ."

(Mr. Fenner Brockway, Labour M.P. in the House of Commons on 31st July, 1958, during discussion on defence arrangements involving South Africa and the adjoining British Protectorates.)

"The Union of South Africa is the only country in the world that pursues unabashed a policy of racial discrimination. South Africa alone deliberately flouts the feelings of



common humanity that has brought us together as members of United Nations."

(Mr. Ramon P. Mitra (Philippines) in the United Nations Assembly on 10th October, 1958.)

Statements of the above nature have been uttered by many people for many years, and I am rather puzzled at the fact that the Union of South Africa has been singled out for this type of attack, especially as her adjoining neighbours, Southern Rhodesia, the "senior" member of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, practises "apartheid" (racial segregation) without shame and without publicity! If the critics of South Africa "deplore" apartheid and find it "detestable" because it has been entrenched in legislation in the Union, and not in the Rhodesias, I think they need to look more closely at the position in order to gain a balanced picture. If this re-examination is undertaken without prejudice and without bias, I feel sure that the balanced picture is within their reach.

The Union's critics may, in the honesty of their research, even ask themselves whether there is not perhaps some reason, other than mere skin colour, that has brought about apartheid in the Union of South Africa and in the Central African Federation—the latter not yet a self-governing dominion!

I have lived in both South Africa and Rhodesia for many years, so I am not entirely ignorant of the native (or "African") policies of the two countries. I have always endeavoured to keep up-to-date with the changing legislation in so far as it concerns the non-white peoples on both sides of the Limpopo River.

It is obvious that mere generalisation is insufficient to give the critic a true picture of the apartheid policies and practices of the Union and the Federation. I must, therefore, be forgiven if I go into a bit of detail.

I have no intention of commenting on the rights or wrongs of the Union's apartheid policy. I propose to restrict my comments to the parallel or near-parallel as it exists in Southern Rhodesia, and, in some instances, in Northern Rhodesia, and to examine, briefly the development of the avowed (and acclaimed!) policy of "partnership" in the Central Africa Federation as opposed to the policy of "apartheid" in the Union.

It is generally accepted that, if two men have displayed heroism in some form or another, and the one man is feted and the other ignored, then fairplay has been side-stepped. It is "not cricket", in fact, it is very un-British! It is, surely equally true so say that if two men are guilty of a crime, and the one is arrested, slated in the dock and condemned, whilst the other gets off "scot free", and is not above standing idly by as a witness and pointing an accusing finger at his "partner-in-crime", justice has once again miscarried.

If apartheid is considered to be a crime, then I feel that Southern Rhodesia should be in the dock with the Union of South Africa. I am reminded of the story I heard some years ago of several people who were travelling in a train in England. The passengers included a South African and a Rhodesian. The topic of conversation got round to the subject of apartheid in South Africa, and so roundly was the Union and the South African denounced for supporting such a policy, and so high did feeling run on the matter, that at the next stop the Rhodesian called the guard and informed him that the South African was travelling first-class with a third-class ticket. The guard having turned out the South African, the other passengers asked the Rhodesian how he knew that the South African was a third-class ticket-holder. "His ticket was the same colour as mine", was the reply.

In order to look at the Rhodesian scene, one can obviously do no better than examine the "apartheid" position in Salisbury, which is the capital city of Southern Rhodesia and the capital city of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland . . . yes, the capital city of the country that has proclaimed to the Commonwealth and the world that its future is being built up on partnership between the races!

Let us see how that "partnership" is being implemented after five years of Federation . . . federation came into being in October, 1953. . . .

Upon one's arrival in Salisbury, there is nothing to distinguish it from any thriving multi-racial city in the Union of South Africa. The populace, as in Union towns, shares the pavements. The more menial tasks, such as pick and shovel work, are, in the main, performed by Africans. The white South African who has known apartheid as the accepted way of life as far back as he can remember, feels quite at home

when he notes that the *whites* in Salisbury live in what Rhodesians refer to as the "European" areas, such as "The Avenues", and the suburbs of Highlands, Hatfield, Avondale, Eastlea, Marlborough, Belgravia, Greendale, etc., that the *coloureds* (mixed races) live in their own suburb of Arcadia, that the suburb of Ridgeway has been set aside for the *Indians* (or *Asians*), and that the *Africans* (or *Natives*) live in Harare, Mabvuku and Highfields African Townships. It is also to be noted that the African (domestic) servant of the white Rhodesian lives in a room (*kia*) at the back of the plot.

The whites in Salisbury (many of whom have never seen South Africa), re-assure themselves and their visitors from the Union of South Africa that the non-whites are not allowed to own houses in "European" areas, and, as proof of this, they produce their Title Deeds to their properties. This document contains the Colour Bar clause: "This property shall not be sold to or occupied by persons other than of European descent." No need for the Union's Group Areas Act in the Federation!

But alas, you are told in serious and troubled tones, there are "European" areas where the security of the white populace has been rudely shaken . . . A Chinaman . . . ("Yes, we know he was a decent, respectable citizen, nevertheless, a Chinaman") had the audacity some years ago to occupy a house in Avondale! And a member of the Indian diplomatic staff ("Who does he think he is?") had the cheek to send his dark-skinned child to the Avondale "white" School! On both occasions incensed parents wrote protesting letters to the local newspapers, and the latter case was discussed at length at two meetings of the Avondale School Committee and led to the resignation of Committee members. (A "Little Rock" story that never reached the headlines!)

You board a bus and note that both the driver and conductor are Africans. But the passengers are all white. You ascertain that there is no bus service for the Coloureds and Indians. They are not allowed to travel on these buses. No, there is no special bus for them. "There is a separate bus service for the Africans, with their own termini", you are told. You cannot help recalling that it is still customary in towns and cities in the Union for non-whites (including Africans) to travel as passengers on buses with the whites, and that the buses are not partitioned for this purpose.

A closer study of the transport question reveals that the Rhodesia Railways passenger train service is divided into 1st, 2nd and 3rd class accommodation, and on the same pattern as in the Union. A Rhodesia Railways official explained: "We do have Indians and Africans travelling First Class, but we would not dream of putting them into the same compartment with Europeans. Even the Indians and Coloureds would not travel in a sleeper compartment with Africans". Rhodesia Railways, in an official reply, in response to allegations of "apartheid" on trains travelling between Bulawayo and Salisbury stated: "In the interests of all races it is obvious that different races, while accommodated in the same class of carriage, should not be placed in the same compartment." (*Rhodesia Herald*, Salisbury).

On the taxi ranks it is to be noted that taxicabs are marked "First Class" and "Second Class", and on enquiry you are told that it is customary for the whites to use the First Class and non-whites the Second Class taxis. Some Africans do use the First Class taxis, but white people do not like to travel in taxis which have carried black passengers.

The white South African, who has become accustomed to the Union being maligne'd because of its apartheid practices, and who has had the "partnership" principles of the Federation held up to him as an example of black-white co-existence, is naturally somewhat puzzled at all this, but worse is yet to come. . . .

Upon entering a grocer or butcher or hardware shop, or a laundry, it is noted that the whites are separated from the non-whites, either by entrance or by railing partition. Some shops separate their clients by placing a notice reading "Africans" at one end of a counter, and some serve their African customers through a hatch or hole in the wall! This surely is going too far! We do not do this in South Africa! When whites and blacks go into shops in the Union, they usually mix at the counter . . . but not so in the capital city of the Federation!

Take a walk in Salisbury's beautiful parks. You wish to sit in the shade of the Jacaranda trees in Cecil Square (where the Union Jack was hoisted by the Pioneers in 1890, claiming the territory for the British), and you find that every second bench is marked "Europeans". Obviously the unmarked benches are for the use of non-Europeans.

Every visitor makes a point of visiting the States Lottery Hall to see how the drums of fortune roll, and on buying a sweepstake ticket, he will be struck by the wording thereon: "No person shall sell or give a ticket to a Native". (It is to be noted that the sweepstake ticket is printed by the Southern Rhodesia Government and that the lotteries are drawn in public under the supervision of the Minister of the Treasury). The visitor's obvious reaction is to ask: "But surely, in this country the Government does not subscribe to this practice of differentiating between man and man on the colour of his skin?"

The answer to this question is to be found on a visit to the Central Police Station on the corner of Inez Terrace and Railway Avenue, where white and non-white offenders are escorted through separate entrances and accommodated in separate cells! Furthermore, an African constable would not dare to lay hands on or arrest a white law breaker. He has to call a white policeman! In this connection it was reported in the Rhodesian and South African Press that the Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police in Northern Rhodesia has said that it was intended to recruit a limited number of Native policewomen as an experiment, and that their duties, in relation to the Native people, would be similar to that of European policewomen and would have particular reference to matters affecting Native women and children.

Federal Government support for, and furtherance of the practice and custom of "apartheid" among the races is to be seen at the entrance to the General Post Office in Salisbury. There, for all to see, is the sign "Native Entrance". You decide that this notice was put up perhaps 20 or 30 years ago, and does not necessarily interpret the policy of the Federal Ministry of Posts to-day. This view is dispelled when you visit the newly-erected post office in Avondale, and note the word "Natives" (not even "Africans") at one of the two entrances to the building. Furthermore, you cannot fail to note, in the recently-erected Parcels Section of the General Post Office in Salisbury, that the entrance has been divided—over one door appears the word "Europeans" and over the other, "Africans".

The Schools under the control of the Education Department (Government) are separate for those of different races—except, apparently, for the children of thick-skinned, dark-skinned diplomats who interpret the term "partnership" too literally, and who fail to heed the customs and practices of the country in which they are temporarily domiciled.

The average white Rhodesian will say that there is no colour-bar in the new Rhodesian University at Salisbury. Britain contributed heavily towards this multi-racial University for the Federation, and it is interesting to investigate just how loyal white Rhodesians are being to their University—sworn to a policy of multi-racialism, whereas the universities in the Union are moving steadily towards total apartheid. Enquiries reveal that there had certainly not been any drop in the number of Rhodesian students attending the Rhodes University at Grahamstown (Cape Province) and the University of Cape Town. On the contrary, the number has been steadily increasing! This increase in attendance of Rhodesian students at the Union's Universities is taking place despite the fact that the new University Council of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is offering substantial grants to Rhodesian and South African students to take Teacher's Training Courses in Salisbury.

The following statistics make interesting reading:

Rhodes University. The number of students from the Federation registered at the University during the period 1953/1958—

1953	153	1956	157
1954	156	1957	177
1955	154	1958	174

University of Cape Town. Students from—

	Southern Rhodesia	Northern Rhodesia	Nyasaland
1954	254	56	4
1955	271	72	4
1956	338	78	3
1957	356	96	5
1958	425	100	10

Did I use the word "loyalty"? Surely Rhodesians do not doubt the calibre of their own University? Why is it that they are travelling, in increasing numbers, over long distances (1,400 to 1,600 miles) to universities in the Union of South Africa? Can it be that parents and students alike secretly favour the "detestable policy of apartheid in South Africa"?

It is futile for the Federal and Territorial Governments to deny the existence of numerous enactments on the Statute

Book which bear a suspicious resemblance to counterparts which were given birth in the Union Parliament. These include laws dealing with Native Reserves, Squatters, Passes for Natives (situpas), Native Housing, etc. Suffice it for me, at this stage, to mention the Land Apportionment Act and the Natives (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act as examples.

The Pass System for Natives in the Union of South Africa has been roundly condemned throughout the world. Notwithstanding this, it exists and is strictly enforced in all its facets in Rhodesia. Failure on the part of a Native to carry a Pass in Rhodesia means imprisonment. My Native servant was arrested and beaten up by an African constable less than 100 yards from my home in Salisbury because he had committed the "crime" of leaving his pass in his room instead of carrying it on his person. He was imprisoned for 3 days, then fined and ejected—bruised, and with his clothing in tatters!

And yet, British newspapers are filled daily with the most sensational details of the consequences of apartheid in South Africa.

When Federation came into being, no time was lost in ensuring that the Indian population of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would not trek South to the more lucrative fields of commerce in Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali and Gwelo. Accordingly, Indians in the former territories are not allowed to enter Southern Rhodesia without special permits which limit their stay in the South.

The Indian is a good businessman, and it is probably feared that, if he were allowed freedom of movement, he would threaten the white man's hold on Commerce in Southern Rhodesia.

A recent incident on hotel premises 30 miles from Salisbury, involving the hotel manager and an Indian client received wide publicity in the Rhodesian and South African Press. The Indian, who is (or was) an officer in the Indian Diplomatic Service in Salisbury, had ordered tea and was ejected with his family on the ground that the "right of admission was reserved". It is obvious that white Rhodesians do not like the idea of drinking out of cups or glasses, or of sleeping in beds previously used by non-whites. Hoteliers in all parts of the Federation have yet to face the impact of "partnership" on their line of defence: "The right of admission is reserved". At present, a dark-skinned potential client is sufficient reason for this "right" being invoked.

Although a spokesman of the Federal Government at first said that his Government could do nothing about the above-quoted incident the matter has, apparently, been reviewed at higher level in Salisbury since the Prime Minister of India (Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru) announced in New Delhi on the 18th March, 1958 that "India has informed the British Government that no useful purpose would be served in continuing Indian diplomatic representation in the Federation as Indian representatives continue to be discriminated against on racial grounds". It will be noted that, although the Federal Government has an avowed policy of "partnership among the races", and that its leaders from time to time denounce racial discrimination, it has, nevertheless, deemed it necessary to introduce measures for "exempting diplomatic representatives in the Federation from local race laws and customs" and that the new regulations will come into force on 1st June, 1958". (Quoted from the *Rhodesia Herald*, Salisbury).

It is also obvious that White Rhodesians do not like to share their leisure and pleasure hours in the company of non-whites. In the Old Palace Theatre (a cinema) in Salisbury, Coloured and Indians are allowed a limited amount of seating at the extreme rear of the gallery near the noisy projector box. Unless policy has changed in recent months, no non-European is granted admittance to the newly-erected Rhodes Cinema in that City.

No wonder a visiting journalist referred to the Federation as the country of APARTnership!

Overseas newspapers and writers of books on racialism in the Union of South Africa have made much play of the effects of the Union's policy in so far as it concerns the injured, the dying and the dead. They have expressed the view that the Union would rather see a black man dying at the roadside than convey him to hospital in a "European" ambulance. It is probably unnecessary, at this stage, to say that the Government and local authorities of the Federation do use separate ambulances for the different races. The sick are nursed in separate hospitals, the women have their babies in separate maternity homes (for example: The Princess Margaret Hospital for Asiatics and Coloureds in Salisbury, opened by the

Queen Mother some years ago), and non-white dead are buried in a separate part of the Cemetery!

A periodical published in Johannesburg for Africans recently published an article concerning Adriana Matimba, a Dutch girl who married Patrick Matimba, a black man from Southern Rhodesia. After their marriage, Patrick brought his bride back from Europe to St. Faith's Mission, near Rusape in Southern Rhodesia, where he worked. The periodical said: "So long as they stayed at the Mission, there were no difficulties. When Adriana had to go to hospital, she got a bed in a "white" hospital, but when her husband, Patrick, came to visit her, he was told blacks were not allowed in. Eventually she went to a non-white hospital and that problem was settled."

The largest building contract in Rhodesia (Kariba Dam project excluded) is the Llewellyn Hospital being built at Kitwe in Northern Rhodesia. It contains separate sections for European patients (the Haslam block) and African patients (the Patrick Dixon block) a "European" nurses' home and a hostel for female African staff. It will be completed at the end of 1958.

Surely Father Trevor Huddleston (author of *Nought for your Comfort*), who did not hold his punches when writing about Sophia-town (Johannesburg), was not blind to racial discrimination being practised in Salisbury? He could not have failed to see the white Rhodesian's way of life when he (Huddleston) paid his occasional visits to Salisbury, via the home of the Archbishop of Central Africa, en route to the Anglican (St. Faith's) Mission near Rusape, where Patrick Matimba lives. Why did Huddleston avoid bringing Southern Rhodesia's racial discrimination before the critical eyes of the world? He has not hesitated to malign the Union in so far as South West Africa is concerned, although I doubt whether he has ever visited that part of Africa!

The Federation recently withdrew certain restrictions regarding the supply of "European" wines and beer to Africans. This step has been received with mixed feelings by a large section of the population, irrespective of race, especially as the average wage earnings of the African is so low.

In passing, and in view of the widespread allegation that the great majority of Africans in Southern Africa live below the bread line, it is interesting to note that since the Africans in Southern Rhodesia were given the "freedom" or "liberty" to buy "European" beers and wines, they have consumed 5,000,000 pints of beer and 83,670 bottles of wine in less than 10 months, at a total cost of £347,427.

A South African Member of Parliament (Nationalist), upon being asked to comment on the above, said that South Africa differed from the Federation in that it was the only wine-producing state in Southern Africa. Africans in the Union were able to obtain brandy illicitly and it was possible that they would not be interested in buying wine and beer. If the Union Government allowed the Africans to buy wine, the people who said that the Union suppressed the Africans would say that South Africa was pouring its surplus wine down the throats of the poor natives!

It should be noted that no native in Southern Rhodesia may obtain brandy, whisky and other strong drink without a permit. This "permit system" has, for many years, applied to natives in South Africa who hold a Standard VI (Form I) Certificate standard of education.

I have referred above to the low earnings of the Africans in the Federation. It is significant to note that the average wage paid to Africans in the Union is almost double, and is sometimes treble that paid for similar labour in the Federation, notwithstanding the fact that the cost of living in the Union is so much lower than in the Federation. Because of this, many thousands of Africans from the Federation are to be found "illegally" in the Union, working side by side with South African natives.

It is common knowledge that the United Party (the "opposition" political party in the Union) endorses the policy of apartheid in the same way as the Government (the Nationalist) Party. Why, then, it may be asked, do so many South Africans emigrate to the Federation? The answer may be one of several; rates of pay for Europeans are considerably higher in the Federation than in the Union; South Africans (especially English-speaking) do not like the anti-British attitude of many Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, and not a few have experienced difficulty in mastering the Union's other official language—Afrikaans. Others again, view with distaste the possibility of the Union becoming a republic. Many of these people would, doubtless, return to the Union if the United Party were returned as the Government Party, just as

many "new Rhodesians" from Britain, who left the "Old Country" when the Labour Party came to power after World War II, returned to Britain when the Conservative Party was later returned to power.

NO! South Africans who have emigrated to the Federation have not left the Union because of its "apartheid" policy.

Rhodesians admit that franchise legislation in the Federation, providing for a dual voters' roll, savours strongly of the separate voters' representation roll for Coloureds in the Union. Although provision is made in the Federal Franchise Act for voters to transfer from the "lower" to the "higher" roll as they qualify, no white Rhodesian can deny that the franchise laws will be adjusted if the white man's voting powers, and his powers of controlling the country, are in danger of being swamped by the votes of the non-whites. The much-voiced motto of "keeping the government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in civilized hands" obviously means keeping the government in "white" hands.

Mr. P. Sakota (African member of the Legislative Council in Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia) said on the 20th August, 1958: "Franchise qualifications were set high so as to exclude Africans. The word 'partnership' is a mockery, which means European supremacy in Northern Rhodesia. How can we be junior partners in our own country?"

Your Parliament is all white, but we have Africans as members of the Federal Assembly, said a staunch supporter of the Government (United Rhodesia) Party to me in Salisbury. I asked: "Would you vote for an African candidate as against a white one?" He replied: "Naturally not, certainly not as my representative in the Assembly."

Let us examine the significance of the presence of Africans in the Federal Parliament: This Parliament, or Assembly, as it is called, consists of 53 elected members. Eight of these are Africans who represent Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. There are also European members who represent African interests. The Federal Assembly, therefore, consists of 45 whites and eight non-whites. Is this ratio proportionately representative, to any degree, of the multi-racial population of the Federation? There are 234,600 Europeans, 6,810,000 Africans and 28,100 persons of "other races" living in the Federation. Thus the whites are outnumbered by nearly 30 to one. There are, as yet, no Africans in the Federal Cabinet. If and when African Cabinet Ministers are appointed, it is a safe bet that they will deal with African Affairs only. Representation indeed!

Sir Roy Welensky (Prime Minister of the Federation) has often indicated, in his retorts in the Assembly, that he regards the African members of Parliament to be elements of nuisance. Their presence in the Federal Assembly is, therefore, merely a sop to British "Home" opinion, a facade to the lip-service policy of "partnership" among the races, and of little consequence when it comes to the task of ruling the country.

The whites in the Federal Assembly and the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly fear the return of the Labour Party to power in Britain. Can they be blamed for this fear? Mrs. Barbara Castle, a radical left-winger, who, by her public utterances on racial matters in Southern Africa has displayed her gross ignorance of such matters, has been appointed Chairman of that Party!

Mr. Harold Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, has said that Britain has no power to alter South Africa's (apartheid) laws. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that Rhodesia's Native laws dealing with the arbitrary removal of Native Squatters, the Pass Laws, the Land Apportionment Act (dividing the country between black and white), Registration and Accommodation (of Natives) legislation, etc., have all to be approved by the Governor-in-Council, who is the representative of Her Majesty the Queen.

Neither must it be forgotten that there exists, in Salisbury, a Standing Committee of the African Affairs Board. One of this Committee's functions is to draw attention to any Federal legislation of a differentiating (racial) character, and to ask that it should be "reserved for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure". Britain, therefore, has power to alter the Federation's apartheid laws. Britain could possibly "persuade" the Federation to introduce laws (as in the United States of America) to prohibit apartheid. Britain's present policy of endeavouring to bring about a multi-racial mentality in the Federation is going to prove too slow a process of brain-washing!

That the white Rhodesian is not happy with the "partnership" implementation position, influenced, as it is, by pressure

from Whitehall, is reflected in the following editorial published in a South African newspaper last year, reviewing four years of Federation:

"The present Federation leaders face many difficulties, both in satisfying increasingly articulate Native opinion and in retaining the support of white Rhodesians. South Africans will watch with sympathy their struggle to reconcile these two conflicting demands while at the same time coping with pressures from the British Parliament, which still holds so important a key to the future of the Federation."

Many South Africans can surely testify to having heard responsible Rhodesians say: "Of course we practise apartheid—possibly more rigidly than you do in the Union, only we don't shout about it."

If apartheid is to be deplored because it is on the statute books, as in the Union, but is not frowned upon when practised in a voluntary basis, as in the Federation, I am drawn, in the first instance, to the conclusion that it is an indication of the lack of unanimity on the question that compels the ruling political party (in the Union) to legislate on the matter, whereas, on the second instance, it can only be concluded that the people are of one accord to such a degree on the question of applying apartheid voluntarily (as is the case in Rhodesia) that it is unnecessary to introduce legislation to enforce it!

Recent events in the Federation show that the position has not changed—

A white woman and a black man in the Federation appeared before a magistrate to face a charge of sex relations. It is a criminal offence in the Federation for a white woman to have sex relations with a black man.

Lusaka Town Council has set aside further residential stands for the Asiatic Community of the town, and reserved a site in this area for a swimming bath for this community.

In the November (1958) issue of the *Federal Outlook*, the official organ of the United Federal Party, published in Salisbury, an all out drive was made to gather votes to the Federal Party in the recent Federal Elections, in which the Federal Party gained an overwhelming majority of seats in the Federal Parliament.

Here are two extracts from this issue of the *Federal Outlook*:

"We will maintain the present system of separate schools for Europeans and non-Europeans."

"The United Federal Party has men with experience and knowledge of how the country should and can be governed. Its achievements over the past five years are here for all to see."

Yes, separate schools for black and white. The achievements of the United Federal Party are available for all to see. Those readers who doubt my statements regarding apartheid in the Federation, and especially Southern Rhodesia, should make a point of seeing these things for themselves.

After the United Federal Party's victory at the Polls, Sir Roy Welensky said (in Salisbury on the 14th November, 1958):

"The election results have demonstrated that Rhodesians are prepared to adopt a liberal approach to African Affairs."

Just how liberal an approach the electorate will permit the Government to adopt, remains to be seen. But there still remains the question of apartheid!

When Sir Roy Welensky (or his successors) can report that all discriminatory laws and regulations have been repealed; that Africans can sit with white audiences in cinemas and other places of entertainment; that they can hire rooms and eat with other guests in all hotels in the Federation, that the African Locations have been abolished; that Africans may use all lifts, public conveniences, (toilets), swimming baths, park benches, entrances to shops, Government and Municipal Buildings; that African children attend the same schools as the whites, and use any swings and see-saws in the parks; that there is no separation of white, brown and black patients in ambulances, hospitals and maternity homes; that an African, Indian or Coloured person may own the house "next door" to a white person, and live in it; that the "Pass system" throughout the Federation has been abolished; that whites, browns and blacks share buses and railway carriages "sleepers" ad lib.; that an African may buy sweepstake tickets and hard liquor he chooses; that he may court and marry a white man's daughter; the Federation's electoral laws will not be amended from time to time to prevent a "black" Parliament and

control passing out of the hands of the white man . . . then, and ONLY then, can it be truthfully said by those who live in the Federation: "We practise partnership in this country, irrespective of race, colour or creed, and apartheid has no place in our society."

Until then . . . well . . . the Federation appears to have a long, long way to go, hasn't it?

TREX.

"It is quite clear that the Europeans have no intention of implementing a policy of partnership in this country."—(Mr. Joshua Nkomo, President of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress).

"Natives suspicious of new Racial Affairs Office in Salisbury." If the Office will help in removing the Colour Bar in public places under the Federal Government, I shall regard it as a step in the right direction," said an African member of the Harare Branch of the Federal Party in Salisbury. (Reported Johannesburg Star, 12th November, 1957).

"In a sense it is best that the Nationalist Party (in South Africa) has won. Candid apartheid is preferable to sickeningly hypocritical liberalism." ("Times of India" when results of General Election in South Africa in 1958 were known).

"His (Cecil Rhodes') views on the Native problems were in harmony with those of Dr. Malan today." (Joy Packer in her book *Apes and Ivory*, pp 170. Published 1953).

"Rhodesians virtuously denounce Malan's apartheid in South Africa, but there is no real difference," said Dauty Yamba, one of the African Members of the Legislative Council, commenting on the shop "hatches" in Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia.

Paskale Sekota, another Member of the Legislative Council, said: "They keep saying that they want partnership between white and black—with one partner inside the shop and the other being served through a hatch." (*The Heart of Africa* by Alexander Campbell. Published 1954).

"Never before in time of peace has any country been so maligned, slandered and maliciously attacked as South Africa has been in the past ten years. Yet, when I read newspapers and see what happens in other countries, I say "why pick on us?" There are all forms of discrimination in other countries, including some of those who attack South Africa. The only difference is that while discrimination is legal in South Africa, it is not legal in those other countries. But there is discrimination all the same." (Mr. Eric Louw, South Africa's Minister for External Affairs. New York, U.S.A. 7th October, 1958).

"The only safe deduction I draw from the results of the poll is that Rhodesians do not want to go too far too quickly along the road of collaboration. Mr. Garfield Todd (former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia) apparently interpreted too literally the clauses in the Federal Party's constitution which refers to the rights of the African people to political representation." (Press comment on Southern Rhodesia's Parliamentary election results—1958).

East London
Union of South Africa

Memorandum III

Two aspects referred to in my Memorandum might bear further comment, namely: the number of Rhodesian students of all races who attend Universities in the Union of South Africa, notwithstanding the fact that there now exists the University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland at Salisbury, and the average individual earnings of Africans in the Federation as compared with the earnings of Africans in the Union of South Africa.

(a) Students from the Federation attending Universities in the Union of South Africa.

In my Memorandum I referred to the fact that, despite there being the University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland at Salisbury, Rhodesians were attending, in increasing numbers, the Universities in the Union, and this, notwithstanding the fact that the latter were moving steadily towards total apartheid.

The last figures given in my Memorandum were in respect of the year 1958.

It is interesting to note that the number of Rhodesian students attending the Rhodes University at Grahamstown, South Africa, increased from 174 in 1958 to 220 in 1959. (1960 details are not yet available). The number of Rhodesian students attending the Cape Town University has increased from 535 in 1958 to just on 600 for 1959.

A critic, upon reading these particulars, suggested that the reason for so many Rhodesians attending South African Universities was possibly not because Rhodesia's own University is multi-racial but because the latter is only able to offer courses in a limited number of subjects, i.e. Arts (B.A. General), Science (B.Sc. (General)), Agriculture and Education (Post-Graduate). In order to clarify the position, I contacted several local Universities, and I am indebted to the University of Cape Town for the following information regarding the number of students from the Federation who, in 1959, attended the Cape Town University in courses which are available at the Rhodesian University:—

Arts (B.A. (General))	...	97	
Science (B.Sc. (General))	...	71	
Agriculture	...	Nil	(Agriculture is not offered by U.C.T.)
Education (Post Graduate)	...	4	
		<hr/>	
		172	

The Rhodes and Natal Universities were unable to furnish me with the required details in time.

From the foregoing it will be seen that :

- (a) Rhodesians are still attending, in yet increasing numbers, the Universities of South Africa, and
- (b) 172 Rhodesians, in 1959, attended the University of Cape Town in courses offered by their own University in Salisbury. This number is in excess of the total number of full-time students at the Salisbury University in all courses during 1959, which was 166 !

The originals of letters dated the 2nd and 28th March, 1960 from the Registrars of the Universities of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and of Cape Town respectively, are enclosed for your records.

- (b) African Earning Power—Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa compared.

In my Memorandum I indicated that widespread condemnation of the wages paid by employers in the Union to their African population warranted review when compared with the wages paid by their Rhodesian colleagues.

Bringing matters to a common basis of comparison (i.e. excluding allowances for lodgings, feeding, clothing, or provision in kind) it should be noted that, according to the Year Book of the International Labour Organisation for 1958, the average wage of unskilled labourers then in force in South Africa compared more than favourable with that paid in other areas in Africa. The wages given in the Year Book were approximately as follows:—

South Africa	1s. 3d. per hour
Southern Rhodesia	6d. " "
Northern Rhodesia	5½d. " "
Belgian Congo	10d. " "
Ghana	8½d. " "
Nigeria	8d. " "

In 1959 the wages for Africans in the printing industry in Durban, Natal were increased from £2 11s. 9d. to £3 5s. 9d. per week. On the Witwatersrand and in Pretoria (Transvaal) the minimum rates applicable to some 5,500 Africans in 30 different industries were increased by £1 2s. 6d. per week to a new minimum wage of £3 3s. 3d. per week. Recent increases ranging from 11s. 0d. to 15s. 6d. per week and benefiting some 7,000 employees (African) in the Kimberley, Bloemfontein and East London centres of the Union have also become effective.

If African wages in the Federation have not kept pace with these increases in the Union, the Africans in the latter territory must be said to be in a better financial position and able to enjoy a superior standard of living than their brothers in the Federation.

East London
Union of South Africa
31st March 1960

UNITED CHURCH OF CANADA

The United Church of Canada says it must regard present constitutional developments in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland with serious and sympathetic attention. Within the Federation—in Northern Rhodesia—the United Church has fifteen missionaries.

The present system of government, unstable and unrepresentative of the high African majority, is now being studied by the Monckton Commission. While the present African population outnumber the European twenty-five to one, they have only about one-fifth of the membership in the Federal House.

The African people are still unreconciled to the principle of federation, fearing that it will frustrate their desire for advancement to full political rights. In spite of this, there is pressure in some circles for strengthening the Federation by granting Dominion status or at least some increase in the powers of the Federal government.

In the light of these facts and on the basis of Christian principles the Executive of the United Church General Council has made the following declarations, aimed at supporting the stand of the Christian communities in the Federation.

- "1. We believe that no steps should be taken toward Dominion status or toward any increase in the powers of the present Federal Government until, by extension of the franchise, the African people, who form the vast majority of the population, have been given adequate opportunity to make their wishes known.
- "2. We believe that during the forthcoming constitutional talks this autumn there should be complete freedom to discuss any modification of the present form of association of the three territories, or even the complete dismemberment of the association."

The United Church of Canada will make these declarations known to the Christian Council of Rhodesia, the British Colonial Office, and the Chairman of the Monckton Commission.

4th May 1960

UNITED FEDERAL PARTY—I-Irewa/Mtoko Branch

1. We, as a branch consisting mainly of farmers consider that in the agricultural field Federation has given tremendous impetus to the original Southern Rhodesian policy of improved agricultural practice, the implementation of the Land Husbandry Act and Conservation Works in the African Areas.

2. We also consider that relationships between African and European farming and rural communities have become increasingly cordial, to their mutual benefit, due largely to the working of the Federal Natural Resources Act, and the Southern Rhodesian Land Husbandry Act, thereby giving rise to a condition of greater co-operation between the two. For example :

- (a) Local I.C.A. Committees invite groups of African farmers from Native Purchase Areas to joint meetings with a view to resolving and instructing on misunderstandings that arise, because Africans fail to perceive the similarities applying to both farming communities, due to the fact that I.C.A. and agricultural matters, European, are federal, and in the African sphere are Territorial.
- (b) Individual African farmers are increasingly consulting their neighbouring European counterparts on local and comparative agricultural practices, i.e. fertilizing practices, better seed, improved maize cropping, irrigation and cropping, improved animal husbandry, and the correct use of machinery. (A situation due largely to the better financial position of these African individual land owners as against the tribal community system which previously existed.)
- (c) A recent example of agrarian co-operation is the formation of a Federal Turkish Tobacco Growers Association open to all Turkish growers. This is a direct result of the result of the process of evolution of African farming being encouraged by European Agricultural communities under the direction of the present Federal Government's policy; a policy pursued only in Southern Rhodesia prior to Federation.

3. It has been the practice of European farmers to establish farm schools and clinics at their own expense for the benefit of Africans in general, not particularly for their own employees, their wives and children. This has become more widespread in Southern Rhodesia since Federation and seems to have been taken up in the two Northern Territories also since Federation and the improved security of tenure resulting therefrom.

4. It is our considered opinion, that the qualitative vote should remain in force, until, by such means as education and experience, those, who now do not qualify, have gained the necessary knowledge and responsibility which would entitle them to that vote.

At present it is more than obvious that some form of benign government, such as is exercised by the Federal Government, should continue for many years to come.

It is a characteristic of the African rural employee in particular, irrespective of tribal origin, that there is no desire for responsibility in any sphere, as is evinced by his attitude to his European employer, whom he regards (in his own words)

as his "Father and Mother", and to whom he relegates all responsibility for his well-being; spiritually, morally and physically, to the point where, often, the distracted European finds himself in the position of physician, judge, jury, policeman, spiritual adviser and director of moral standards.

Salisbury
Southern Rhodesia
28th January 1960

J. W. VERA

I am a Southern Rhodesian, and this evidence is given in complete ignorance of what goes on in the Northern Territories. And I must also add that my evidence is mine, and mine alone, it does not in any way represent anyone else's views.

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has been a big stepping stone towards a full economic prosperity of the Central African countries, especially to the more backward parts of the Federation.

It does, however, have to be borne in mind that it would be utter nonsense for anyone to suggest that, since its inception, the Federation has been plain sailing. Any project of this magnitude is bound to bring along with it some problems, especially in its early stages. It is these problems we should be fighting ceaselessly to overcome, rather than condemning the whole set-up at this stage.

I have seen some changes of heart in this country during the Federation's short life. This is to me a presage of what shape this country will take in future. I, as an African, feel that the European in this country is beginning to see that the African will have to take his place in this country, and I must say that it is being big-hearted on his part. These things cannot be changed overnight. The change for the better in this country is inevitable. It is a question of time and patience. If the African, on the other hand, does not nurse this change of heart, he may harden it, and the result will be chaotic and bloody. This is what I shudder to think about. We all need each other in this country, and it is the duty of every one, regardless of colour or creed, to work hard to iron out our differences.

I have a number of things which I would like to see changed. The Federal sphere does not include any matters that affect the African's day to day life. I feel some things like Education, not only higher Education, should be the responsibility of the Federal Government.

I also feel that the position of the Specially Elected Representative for African Interests should not be confined to Europeans only. It should be left wide open for anyone interested in standing as a Specially Elected person for African Interests.

Bulawayo
18th March 1960

C. VERNON

Introduction

There are three main and diverse facts which must be reconciled if the objects of the present Constitution of the Federation are to be achieved. These are:—

- (1) That Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are being influenced to oppose Federation.
- (2) There is a clamour from certain African organisations in both of the Northern Territories for "independence" for their Countries.
- (3) That Europeans of the Federation are not prepared to permit a lowering of the political, economic and social standards they have set.

We wish to comment on these facts and then to conclude with our views on some relevant matters.

The Anti-Federation Campaign

The most pertinent feature relating to the inhabitants of the Federation is that the vast majority are primitive and uneducated by modern world standards. Is it reasonable, therefore, to expect this overwhelming majority to have any conception of the political complexities of a federation of states? It is certain that the mass of the inhabitants had no idea of what "federation" involved. Of the relative few who were able to express an opinion it seems that most were opposed to the Scheme but it is arguable, judging from the reasons given for their attitude, if even these opponents fully understood the implications of federation. However, these persons during the interim appear to have worked up much support for their views from the masses. There is little doubt that intimidation in one form or another has been responsible for a great deal of this support. It is believed that the respective Governments would now find it an insuperable task to change the present outlook of the people without the exercise of unpalatable measures.

Time does not permit of first improving the educational and economic standards of the masses to a satisfactory level but action to this end must continue at an increased tempo. We are left, therefore, with the one remaining possibility, namely, to endeavour to alter the views of the leaders of African opinion so that they accept the Federation and they in turn persuade their followers to do likewise. Seemingly, the only likelihood of achieving this would be by changes to the existing Constitutions of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and that brings us to our second main fact.

The "Independence" Cry

Constitutional advances in other parts of Africa together with the effects of the All-African Peoples Conference at Accra in December 1958 have, doubtless, inspired the demands for African controlled governments in the two Northern Territories.

A new Constitution for Northern Rhodesia was granted only last year. Although this contained a number of progressive steps over the previous one, it was not accepted by the extreme nationalists. If this Constitution was believed to meet the full requirements of the position as it existed just twelve months ago, it can hardly be said after so short a period that the progress of Africans has been so rapid it now warrants the further extension of their powers in the government. However, a close review of the reasons for and the circumstances which resulted in this new Constitution might well be worth-while.

Referring to the Constitution of Nyasaland, provided there were safeguards regarding the composition of the Executive Council to ensure good government, it may be politic to have a majority of Africans in the Legislative Council. This would certainly indicate to all the intended future status of the Protectorate.

Despite the suggestions in the two preceding paragraphs and bearing in mind the well used weapon of intimidation, a serious difficulty is how to ascertain if the majority of Africans are really concerned about political advancement. The view that it is only the relative few vociferous politically minded Africans who are concerned is held by most Europeans—hence the latter's insistence that civilized standards of citizenship be maintained.

The Attitude of Europeans

Only a referendum could test the strength or weakness of secessionists against pro-Federationists. There are secessionists in both Northern and Southern Rhodesia but they are so for different reasons. Broadly, those in the North feel that Southern Rhodesia has gained most from Federation by virtue of the revenue obtained from the northern Copper Mining Industry. Those in the South feel that Northern Rhodesia will eventually become a "Black" state. Under these circumstances they both believe their respective Territories will be better off without Federation. The pro-Federationists believe that the Federation is here to stay, that it can be and must be made a success.

There appears to be, however, common ground in one respect. Judging from the utterances and writings from both sides, whether politicians or laymen, there is a determination that civilized standards shall be maintained in their Territories or (as the case may be) in the Federation as a whole.

Most of the capital investment in Nyasaland is represented through members of the Nyasaland Tea Association. The European majority opinion in that Protectorate was probably reflected when the directors of the Association recently stated that, "... the members of this Association are not in a state of despair, are not thinking in terms of negotiating for Government compensation and have no intention of 'getting out'..."

To end our comments on the three main facts, we believe that, generally, there would be no strong opposition to Africans taking a greater part in the government of the Territories and the Federation provided there were no accommodating lowering of qualifications and the necessary personal qualities merely to bring this about.

We now turn to certain relevant subjects.

"Inhabitants" Versus "Electorate"

It is a truism that in any modern democratic state the electorate is held to be the responsible section of its population. That has been and must continue to be the case in the Federation.

In our view it will be many years before all the adult inhabitants of the three Territories are sufficiently educated to qualify as being politically responsible people. Surely the electorate and not the inhabitants should decide the destiny of the Federation. If progress must depend upon the time when the masses become politically mature, then there could be no surer brake to the political and economic advancement of the Country.

Perhaps a great deal of uncertainty in the public mind would

be removed if amendments to the Preamble of the Constitution were made in respect of the above.

The Franchise

It would be difficult to find a better summing up of the position regarding the franchise in the Federation than that contained in the Report of the Franchise Commission (1957) which relates to Southern Rhodesia. We would respectfully commend especially to the present Commissioners, Lines 96 to 222 found on pages 2, 3 and 4 of that Report. (See appendix.)

Although the existing two voters' rolls system, i.e. the "General" and "Special" rolls is not the ideal in a country believing in democratic principles, under the peculiar circumstances prevailing here there seems to be no satisfactory alternative. In our opinion there should be no immediate change in the qualifications for the franchise. The history of the Federation is too short to warrant any alterations at this stage. To support this opinion it is officially estimated that a considerable number of Africans who are qualified to vote have still not registered despite urgings to do so by political parties and the Government itself.

Composition of Parliament

The numerical strength of Parliament appears to be adequate. For as long as separate arrangements regarding the franchise for Africans (which in effect is the main purpose of the "Special" roll) have to persist, so likewise must continue certain provisions to ensure there are African Members of Parliament. A review of the present arrangement respecting the latter, however, may be justified. It is certain for instance that African opinion would welcome the replacement of the European Members "for African interests" by Africans. Also, it may now be desirable that the four specially elected African members from the Northern Territories be elected by all the African voters in those territories.

The Legislative "Lists"

It is not easy for a layman to appreciate why certain present allocations of responsibility between the Federal and Territorial Governments came about. The most puzzling, perhaps, are those in connexion with Education and Agriculture. Responsibility for these is divided on a racial basis between the Federal and Territorial Governments. This gives rise to suspicion among the African intelligentsia.

The overall defence of the Federation is a Federal Government responsibility while the respective Territories maintain their own police forces. It has happened recently when police of one Territory have been sent on duty to another—~~so~~ why not have an overall police force? Southern Rhodesia has a Minister of Justice and yet the Prisons Department is administered by the Federal Government. There may be other instances of this seeming divided administration.

The experience gained to date through the present allocations should indicate whether or not a reconsideration of the "lists" would be advantageous.

Conclusion

One certainty is, if the fact of Federation has not the acceptance and goodwill of all responsible people concerned it cannot be a success.

The Commissioners have the full sympathy of all thinking people in their tremendous task. Events since 1st April 1960 relating to Nyasaland have made this task even more difficult.

Bulawayo
April 1960

APPENDIX

Extract from the Report of the Franchise Commission (Southern Rhodesia) 1957

"The Approach by the Commission to the Principal Issues presented in its Terms of Reference

By our terms of reference we are enjoined to consider "a system for the just representation of the people of the Colony in its Legislature under which the Government is placed, and remains in the hands of civilized and responsible persons."

We feel that we should emphasize, at the outset, that, in our view, the first requirement is more fundamental and more important even than the second. No system that leaves any substantial section of the people labouring under a justifiable grievance can, in the end, prevail. It must result in a sense of cleavage, which means that the consent of the governed, upon which all government must ultimately rest, is withheld. Unless the principle is accepted that all sections of a people have their highest interests in common, that people will perish. A house that is divided against itself cannot stand.

It may be accepted that the ideal system for the government of a people is democracy based upon a universal adult

franchise, but it is open to question whether this system can function except under certain conditions. For it to operate satisfactorily it requires a homogenous electorate, at a fairly high standard of civilization and divided by political divisions, based on the policies and record of the government and opposition, and not confused by differences, such as race or colour, that tend to create artificial divisions cutting across the real issues. In a young country with a mixed population, at vastly different stages of development, it has yet to be proved that such a democracy can survive, and an objective approach to this possibility suggests grave doubts.

The concept of democracy based upon the adult suffrage has involved so much emotion, not to say passion, that we are fully aware that to challenge its efficacy, even under special conditions, involves a measure of temerity. Nevertheless, if we are faithfully to fulfil the task before us, we must make that challenge. To do so we must essay an examination, brief as it may be, of the first principles of government.

It seems to us that there is nothing mystic about the principles of government and that they should be examined sanely and rationally. We deplore the tendency to treat the concepts such as "democracy" or "self-determination" as fetishes to be followed unreasonably wheresoever they may lead. To vest any form of government with quasi supernatural attributes conceals the cardinal principle that government was made for man, not man for government. This might have been assumed to be self-evident were it not denied by implication in many aphorisms that have obtained a wide acceptance in current political thought, aphorisms which were accepted as axiomatic in certain of the evidence and some of the memoranda submitted to us. It is common, for example, to hear the view expressed that self-government is more important than good government. The assertion of a principle such as this cannot be supported by reason but only by elevating "self-government" to something approaching transcendental status. Again, it is often asserted that the franchise is a right not a skill and is, therefore, independent of age, judgment, education or any such considerations. It would be easy to multiply instances of slogans or catchwords that induce or indicate an entirely irrational approach to the solution of questions that are vital to the survival of organized communities.

We hold that government is a man-made Institution and that its prime object is to secure to the individual the opportunity to lead the good life, as he sees it. We hold that the democratic system of government can be justified, and amply justified; on the principle, in itself manifestly right, that every man should have a say in his own government. But we believe that this right, like every other right, should only be exercised when it can be done without detriment to the rights of others. There is indeed a maxim, accepted in the legal systems of all civilized countries, which being interpreted, means that no man should so use his own as to hurt another.

In approaching the franchise with these considerations in mind it must be remembered that, even in the most advanced democracies, the voters only constitute a proportion of the inhabitants of the country. In the United Kingdom the electorate is less than 70 per cent. of the population. Moreover, in casting their votes the voters may affect the rights of generations to come. This means that a voter's right to vote must be considered in the light of its possible effect on other voters and other inhabitants of his country born or yet to be born. Surely he should only be permitted to exercise his right if he can do so intelligently. If he does so arbitrarily or capriciously, he may be doing serious injury to his fellow citizens. Surely democracy involves government for the people, not merely government by the people.

Oddly enough, even the most ardent advocates of the adult franchise see no logical inconsistency in excluding mentally deficient or those who, because they are below a certain age, are considered not to have the knowledge and experience to exercise the vote. And it was interesting to notice that, even amongst those who advocated before us the adult suffrage, only a few were prepared to support the proposition that all African women should immediately be admitted to vote. The more reasonable were prepared to concede that, owing to the state of tutelage in which they have been held for generations, most African women are, at the present time, not in a position to exercise the franchise intelligently. Yet it is estimated that they represent substantially more than half the African population of the Colony. Once these sections of the people have been excluded the principle that everyone is, by virtue of his humanity alone, entitled to vote is gone, and the question becomes merely one of degree. Is it possible to devise any other tests of the capacity to vote intelligently? It may be that the difficulty in devising such tests might lead to a rejection of all but the most elementary. But, assuming that a test appears that is reasonable and practical, then it is

difficult to see how any rational person could resist its application.

In a report such as this it is obviously impossible to adduce chapter and verse to establish how far the above theoretical approach has been justified by experience, but we believe that this could be done if the time and space were permitted. In some countries the extension of the franchise to people who were incapable of exercising it with judgment, or who lacked the necessary political tradition, has led to the breakdown of popular government. There is much evidence of the danger on the one part of power falling into the hands of political bosses, and on the other of the growth of a multiplicity of warring factions that find it impossible to unite in sufficient strength to form an efficient administration. Indeed there is good reason to think that Fascism, and similar totalitarian systems, are a reaction from popular government carried beyond the point when the majority of the voters are worthy of the privilege of voting.

We are entirely satisfied that a country is amply justified in making an endeavour to confine the franchise to those of its inhabitants who are capable of exercising it with reason, judgment and public spirit. It is in this sense that we have interpreted "civilized and responsible persons", as used in our Commission.

The difficulties of devising a test or tests of the capacity to vote are admittedly great (the history of the events leading up to the appointment of our Commission shows this) but we do not think they are insuperable. We do think, however, that if such tests are to be practical they must be broad and general. An educational test is obviously justifiable. All other things being equal a man with a mind trained and disciplined is unquestionably at an advantage when compared with an untutored fellow. A means test may be supported on the assumption that, under our present economy, a man does not earn more than a subsistence unless he has certain qualities of mind and character. (This is the real justification of the means test, and it is only prejudice that rails against such a test as putting a premium on wealth.) But tests that cannot have a wide general application immediately create difficulties by introducing an implied comparison between things that are incapable of comparison. For example, we had a number of suggestions that certain professions should be regarded as giving a special right to a say in government. But who is to compare, in capacity as a voter, a schoolmaster with the head of a vast industrial organisation, or a serjeant-major in the army with a building foreman?

The most formidable difficulty in evolving tests of fitness to exercise the franchise lies in the fact that it is well nigh impossible to evolve a satisfactory test of character, and character must enter into the picture. Intelligence in itself is not enough for it does not necessarily equate with a right attitude of mind. A disinterested and altruistic approach to problems affecting the common weal is obviously desirable in those exercising an influence in the affairs of state, but this is not to be measured by examination results or even by success in acquiring an income. But as against this it may be pointed out that even the most estimable character is not in a position usefully to exercise the franchise unless he has judgment as well as virtue. Moreover, self-interest in the political approach is not wholly to be condemned, provided it is informed and enlightened.

Finally it must be remembered that no general rule can be conceived that does not involve its hard cases. The most that can be hoped is that these should be reduced to the minimum consistent with a sound general system."

J. S. de VILLIERS

The striving for dominion status by the ruling political party in the Federation is unfortunately motivated by a desire to have a free hand in dealing with the African section of the population without the fetters imposed by the present constitutions, and thus to please the European electorate and remain in power. Sir Edgar Whitehead has told me personally that, in order to prevent having a large "poor white" element, which would "block" all African progress, he envisaged legislation reserving certain semi-skilled occupations for whites only, such as train stewards and drivers of Railway 'buses. This he cannot do under our present Southern Rhodesian Constitution. The fact that the provisions of the Constitution have never been applied by the British government proves nothing. Lord Malvern has explained that whenever his government proposed introducing discriminatory legislation they first sounded the British Government for their attitude. I am sure that but for these provisions in the Constitution our Statute Book would have been stained with as many apartheid laws as that of South Africa, and that the Africans would have been disfranchised. However, the danger facing us in the future is that a reactionary African government, looking back in anger, will oppress

the white population. This fear, conscious or sub-conscious, accounts for the reluctance of most whites to grant the Africans any concessions, and is a more potent factor than the fear of economic competition. To remove this fear, and at the same time to put the non-Europeans at ease, I suggest that all four Constitutions be amended by Letters Patent to introduce an irrevocable clause laying down that any future law which discriminates against or confers a privilege upon any racial group whatever, shall be null and void *ab initio*, whether or not the British government agrees to it. Only with such an entrenched clause will it be safe to grant us dominion status, which will then symbolise the emotional fusion of all our races into one common nation.

Such an entrenched clause is feasible and will be applied by any honest and competent court, as has been demonstrated in South Africa, where, unfortunately, the "entrenched clauses" could lawfully be repealed.

To ensure that we shall always have an efficient and incorrupt judiciary certain further provisions will have to be entrenched in the Constitutions. The most obvious danger is of course that an unscrupulous government may "pack the bench", as has happened in America. There should therefore be a limit to the number of judges constituting the Federal Supreme Court. I suggest seven, including the three Territorial Chief Justices. The present practice of elevating politicians to the Bench, either to reward a loyal comrade or to eliminate a rival, must cease, and an advocate or barrister should not be eligible for appointment to the Bench if he has been a member of any legislature (inside or outside the Federation) during the preceding six years. Judges should not be called upon to do non-judicial work, such as serving on delimitation commissions, political tribunals, commissions of enquiry, etc. No Minister of Justice or Law appointing a man to the Judiciary should be influenced by the thought that he could be used because of his alleged impartiality the better to serve such Government's ends, and, what is equally important, the public must have confidence in a Judge's impartiality. There is also a feeling among many lawyers in Southern Rhodesia that it is undesirable that the Minister of Justice should have the prerogative of appointing judges. I suggest that the appointment of a new judge be made only with the consent of the relevant Leader of the Opposition and the relevant Chief Justice.

I suggest that until the "no-discrimination" clause has been entrenched the *status quo* be maintained, with Britain retaining her rights of active intervention in our affairs, and until the Judiciary has been reformed all residents of the Federation be allowed the right of appeal to the Privy Council.

Bulawayo

January 1960

W. J. WARD

London born, I have spent over 47 years in Central Africa, (Belgian Congo, Angola and the Rhodesias) and feel duty bound to submit my ideas and suggestions for your consideration. The reminiscences contained herein will I hope serve a useful purpose.

After reading *King Leopold's Rule in the Congo* compiled by a German named Morel in collaboration with Sir Roger Casement, who received his just deserts as a traitor, my impression was that this volume was intended to cause a rupture between Britain and Belgium just prior to the outbreak of the first World War.

History seems to be repeating itself inasmuch as there are subtle and sinister influences operating, both in Africa and elsewhere, to prejudice world opinion against the white population here and hand over the fate of the simple African majority to a bunch of black dictators, which will be selling these simple souls back into slavery.

Europeans such as myself have grown up with the natives throughout a long period of years and, perhaps unconsciously, have learned to understand them, to appreciate their good qualities, understand their imperfections and to cultivate a desire to gradually assist them to better their conditions.

If any of you gentlemen would have known the native in his raw state of 50 to 60 years ago I think that you would realise what a revolutionary job the Europeans have done in raising them to their present standard in such a comparatively short time.

I quite agree that some of them should be earning more money but to do so other than gradually would induce a great deal of unemployment. Industries must earn a certain margin of profit and if this margin is to be absorbed by a high wage structure the industries will either close down or reduce the number of employees. New industries must be started and new markets found in order to create sufficient employment for the rapidly increasing population.

The European standard of living is not so high as visitors

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may imagine. Many women are compelled to undertake employment in order to balance the family budget, many of the Europeans in Salisbury cannot afford motor cars and the majority of high class restaurants-cum night clubs eventually go into liquidation. The present standard of living does however create a great deal of congenial employment for the native population and a planned immigration policy would induce further industries and thereby still greater volume of employment.

How to induce capitalised groups to start more industries? In the present unsettled condition of the Federation I do not think that industrialists are keen to invest capital here and I would therefore suggest a 20 year plan of mutual co-operation between black and white in the building up of industries, commerce, agriculture, ranching, suitable economic housing, education—with emphasis on the technical side, teaching native women needlework, cooking, child care and to be house proud.

To elaborate on my suggestion, which would be for each of the Northern Territories, I submit the following :—

A. In my humble opinion the natives have brains which, developing over such period, would enable them to resist the evil workings of witch doctors, ignore threats of reprisals by types such as Hitler-mimicking Banda and his satellites, ignore the mass hysteria inspired by such types and, in fact, become law abiding citizens living in harmony with the Europeans with no colour bar but the inevitable and varying social stratas.

B. A co-ordinating committee be installed in each territory to plan and carry out development schemes for the benefit of the population both black and white. Such committees to consist, not of elected members but of ones selected for their good qualities and experience in varying types of development schemes such as industries, mining, afforestation, deforestation, irrigation, ranching, good farming, exportable crop growing and in particular an economic but suitable type of housing for the natives. These committees should consist of picked men in the £5,000 per annum-plus class and any Africans appointed to such committees, which is an essential to induce good race relations, should be paid similar salaries so that they would have no inferiority complex.

I have no objections to politicians as such but due to elections there is often no continuity of programme and newly elected Ministers receiving portfolios are often inclined to know all the answers in defiance of men with life long experience. Thus money can be wasted with nothing really attained except a depleted exchequer.

Furthermore, intending investors would be encouraged to come to the Federation if they knew that well planned development schemes were in the hands of capable and experienced men who when the necessity arose could be replaced by men of similar experience and thus ensure a continuity of the development programme.

C. The reactionary and power seeking section of the native community would doubtless cause a deal of trouble if such a scheme was propounded but I venture to express the opinion that it would receive such wide support, both from black and white that the reactionary section would be eliminated within a period of months. The ordinary native or let us call him the wage earning class is a simple type of individual and if it was brought home to him by well aimed propaganda that there was a committee in being which included some of his own people earning the same salary as the European members, all working together harmoniously for the benefit of all races, excellent results would be attained and over the 20-year period we could prove that the experiment of Federal partnership was no myth but an accomplished fact.

The propaganda should be brought to the female section of the native population which wields quite an influence and would certainly welcome the scheme with its assurance of peaceful security.

D. I am fully convinced that if such a scheme was put into operation here, the Union of South Africa would adopt a similar one there as a graceful retreat from their aggressive National policy.

To diverge somewhat from the foregoing theme, I would ask you gentlemen to be patient and read my following remarks regarding the Belgian Congo where I lived for over twenty-two years.

There the surge of African Nationalism is in no way something new.

In the early days there, if a Belgian emigrated from Belgium to the Congo, the assumption was that he was escaping from some crime committed in his mother country. Elisabethville and the adjoining mine Lubumbashi was populated by approximately 65 to 70% British, then Greeks and Italians and

perhaps 5% Belgians. The executives on the mine were almost 100% American and British and the labour for the mines was supplied by Robert Williams & Co., recruited from Northern Rhodesia. The Congo natives did not wish to work in or on the mines and the Union Minière du Haut Katanga was eventually compelled to spend millions of francs on recruiting inducements to get hold of any Congo native labour.

A Britisher could travel on foot anywhere in the "Bush" in perfect safety but this did not apply to Belgians.

As far back as 40 years ago I and some friends were asked by two deposed traditional chiefs to secure arms and ammunition for them to drive out the Belgians. The only rail engine drivers available were ne're-do-wells from the Union who could not secure further employment there and the Belgian authorities then decided in 1919 or 1920 to train natives as engine drivers, with considerable success.

Again, about 1930, there was a proposed revolt timed to start in the middle of the rainy season when transport by road was most difficult and all Europeans were to be eliminated. I happened to secure information from a deposed chieftainess and informed the authorities accordingly. They scorned the idea until they asked a certain chief to come to the Boma and his reply was that they could go to his village if they wished to see him.

I hope that I have made it clear that the Belgians were very much disliked by the natives right from the word "go" and that dislike has continued until now.

What is happening in the Belgian Congo should therefore not be considered as a pattern of what is happening in Africa or what is likely to happen in the future.

I quite agree that there is a surge of nationalism throughout Africa but this emanates both from black and white. As far as I am concerned I have spent almost a lifetime in Central Africa, got married in Ndola, have two children born there and have a happy home in Salisbury. As a family we love Africa, do not wish to go elsewhere and we are always prepared to help a native on his way.

Whilst in Ndola, practically all the native bus owners came to me to prepare their applications for Road Service Permits which I performed gratis so that they would not be outwitted by the octopus concern—Central African Road Services. I also compiled their monthly returns and worked out their timetables—also gratis. When Central African Road Services threatened the N. Rhodesia Government that they would withdraw all their vehicles from the roads if they did not get 100% monopoly a commission of enquiry was instituted to which I was appointed delegate for the Motor Traders Association and also delegate for the Native Bus Owners Association.

I mention the foregoing as an example of co-operation between black and white. There are unnumberable similar examples by other "old-timers" such as myself which probably would not be brought to your notice.

In conclusion, Gentlemen, I would ask you to give serious consideration, from every aspect, of my suggestion for a 20 year plan, discuss it with more influential people than myself in the Federation.

Salisbury
30th April, 1960

E. R. WATTS

The Economic Development of Nyasaland

The most important and convincing reason for including Nyasaland in the Central African Federation has always been based on the desire to lift the country out of the rut of over-population and underproduction. It is reasoned that, by association with two territories having more advanced economies, Nyasaland will herself be developed. Certain inconsistencies in this argument first came to my notice in 1958 when I visited the Federation after working for three years in Nigeria. During a year at Oxford University, studying agricultural economics, I have since had a chance to go into the question more fully. The enquiries I made while at Oxford, together with the experience of four months in a neighbouring territory of the Federation, have led me to believe that the retention of Nyasaland within the Federation is not likely to encourage the full economic development of that territory. Briefly, my reasons for holding this view are as follows :—

- (a) Nyasaland is accepted by all the parties concerned as a "primarily African territory". Politically and economically therefore her rightful place is in association with the other primarily African territories to the north. The fact that she has been linked with the European-dominated territories to the south has retarded the type of economic development found in primarily African territories like Nigeria and Ghana. While being denied

the Rhodesian type of development because of her primarily African character she is also denied the Nigerian type of development because of her close links with European-dominated states. The result is economic stagnation so far as the indigenous people are concerned.

- (b) The system of migratory labour, which is likely to continue indefinitely under the present federal structure, retards the economic development of the territory supplying the labour. This is particularly so when the labour is recruited, transported, housed and supervised under conditions which sap initiative, destroy family life and encourage Africans to think of themselves as "second-class citizens". This is not to say that an independent Nyasaland would immediately stop such migration—but it could at least take steps to gradually absorb surplus labour locally.
- (c) The absence of a large proportion of the male inhabitants for a part of each year due to the system described above retards agricultural development. Where the flow of labour is artificially stimulated by recruiting corporations there may not necessarily be unemployment in the area. Agricultural extension work has been further retarded by the loss of faith in government and government officials following the imposition of Federation in 1953.
- (d) Industrial development in the Federation is extremely localised and most of the economic expansion that has taken place since 1953 has taken place in 3 main centres—Salisbury, Bulawayo and the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt. Those areas which lacked development in 1953 are still, by and large, under-developed today. Unless there is rigid government control of industrial development this process is likely to continue. Since the Federal and Territorial governments are open to strong pressure from the industries concerned it is unlikely that they will be strong enough to take such action. Thus industrial development, the main hope for the absorption of surplus labour within Nyasaland, is very unlikely within the Federation.
- (e) If Nyasaland remains in the Federation African economic development will be inevitably retarded by the network of pass laws, residential restrictions and the imprisonment or restriction of considerable numbers of the better educated and active members of the community. These restrictions have increased considerably since 1953 and if the Federal Government is given more power in Nyasaland will increase still further in the future.

Before completing this memorandum I would like to cover in more detail some of the factors causing economic under-development. Economists have for a long time been searching for the causes of under-development and while a number have been isolated there are undoubtedly a whole complex of inter-related factors involved. Lack of capital is an important factor and shortages of other factors of production, such as land, can also be important. In the immediately post-war period capital was thought to be the most important missing component causing under-development. More recently, and particularly since the publication of a book called *The Strategy of Economic Development* (Author: Hirschman, Publisher Yale), the missing component has been thought to be "entrepreneurship."

An entrepreneur could be simply described as someone or some group of persons who risk their own resources in providing the community with goods or services. Lack of entrepreneurship means that these goods and services are not supplied. Because of the communal attitudes to wealth found throughout Africa it is difficult for Africans to become entrepreneurs. This problem may be overcome either by importing entrepreneurs, as in the Federation, or by the encouragement of local entrepreneurs, as in Nigeria or Ghana. While the former method has the advantage of speed and the latter has the advantage that development is more uniform and stable. In practice most countries have to import some capital although increasingly in West Africa indigenous managerial staff are being used. In the Federation the process of importing capital and entrepreneurs has gone to such an extreme that it has severely restricted economic development amongst the indigenous people. This restriction has particularly important repercussions for Nyasaland.

In West Africa, during the past 10-15 years many Africans have become wealthy traders, transporters, and small scale industrialists. A cement company was recently financed largely by individual Nigerian shareholders. The United Africa Com-

pany, a British firm, now has a high proportion of its managerial staff recruited from amongst local Africans. Such developments, particularly where they involve a European working under an African, are next to impossible in Nyasaland at present.

The development that is found in West Africa is the result of a well worn economic ladder which enables Africans to develop as entrepreneurs usually via small scale trading or transporting. Such development is restricted in Nyasaland because of the competition from Asian businessmen. Powerful Chambers of Commerce coupled with somewhat rigid licensing laws further discourage African traders. European prejudice and the lack of educational facilities restricts the entry of Africans into the professions and particularly into positions where they might work over Europeans.

In recent years one of the prime factors in the development of West Africa has been African Nationalism. This has given Africans faith in their own power to help themselves and has encouraged both European firms and government departments to Africanise their staffs. African governments have, by legislation and grants, encouraged the development of African entrepreneurs. Very wisely, according to most economists, the same governments laid great emphasis on education and the desire for this was accentuated by the unlimited scope for advancement given to those with the necessary qualifications. If Nyasaland remains in the Federation all these stimulants to development will be severely restricted.

The conclusion of my argument is that Nyasaland has benefited little from incorporation in the Federation and her proximity to the European-dominated areas of Southern Africa have tended to retard economic development. If development, in the fullest sense, is to be encouraged in the future then her links with these territories, and in particular Southern Rhodesia, must be loosened rather than strengthened. It is essential that the people of Nyasaland should decide their own destiny within the near future. This must entail some provision for secession if her people desire it. In the intervening period Federal responsibilities in the territory would have to be reduced and rapid progress would have to be made towards an African-elected majority in the Legislative Council. These are the minimum prerequisites for the restoration of the confidence of the people in their government and for bringing to an end the present period of economic, political and social stagnation.

18th January, 1960

C. WORTHAM

A. Dominion Status

1. It may be confidently asserted that, amongst the objectives set out in the Preamble to the Federal Constitution of 1953, the one of most concern to the majority of the electorate of Northern and Southern Rhodesia is that the Federation should, in the near future:— "... go forward with confidence towards the attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth."

2. In this connection, I would like to quote verbatim a letter to the editor of the *Sunday Mail*, (The Federation's largest Sunday newspaper), which was published on 2nd August, 1959, under the heading—"A Date Must be Fixed Soon" with which I am in full agreement. It reads as follows:—

"It is vitally important for the continuity of the Federation's economic development that a definite fixed date should be laid down in the 1960 constitutional talks for the grant of Dominion Status to this country.

The present political uncertainty is causing investors, both local and overseas, to adopt a "wait and see" attitude. It is most unfortunate that Sir Roy Welensky has been forced by overseas pressure to abandon the achievement of independence in 1960.

Responsible Rhodesian opinion must back Sir Roy to the hilt in demanding a fixed date for self-government. Unless this is done there will be a whole series of crises of confidence every time the constitution is reviewed, which in turn will dangerously impair our economic growth.

Certain rather naive persons claim that before obtaining self-government we must first build up "human confidence" between the different races.

This approach ignores the fact that the pacemakers among the politically conscious Africans in the North are driven by the urge to concentrate power wholly in African hands.

Mr. Nkumbula has stated that Northern Rhodesia Africans will never accept a multi-racial government, while



moderates like Savanhu and C. J. Matinga have little standing among their people (the same phenomenon may be observed in Kenya).

The great majority of African politicians in the North will never accept Federation however "liberal" the Europeans of Southern Rhodesia may become, because Federation means sharing power with people of another race, and after the example of Ghana this is something they are not prepared to do.

(signed) Esmond L. Lewis Evans, Hatfield."

3. There have been a number of recent indications (amongst them a speech by Sir Roy Welensky) that the attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth is not practicable in the immediate future, because of the protectorate status of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. There is no valid reason however why the Federation should not receive full self-government in the Federal sphere—which is what is meant by "Dominion Status" in this memorandum.

4. It is not generally appreciated that in certain respects the Federation, so far from progressing towards a higher constitutional status, has actually retrogressed. This process came about through changes introduced into the Federal Constitution by the U.K. Government, after the draft scheme was voted on by the Southern Rhodesian electorate (if my memory is correct) April 1953, and prior to the coming into effect of the Constitution in September/October of the same year.

5. I will quote two examples of these changes introduced by the British Government. (In the absence of contrary evidence, one can only assume that the latter was the agent responsible.) The draft Federal Scheme Command Paper No. 8754 was published in Southern Rhodesia as a supplement to the *Territorial Gazette* of 27th February, 1953, and was the draft Constitution which the Southern Rhodesia electorate was required to accept or reject in a referendum shortly afterwards.

6. In Section 10 of Cmd. 8754 it was stated that amongst the exclusive powers of the future Federal Legislature would be External Affairs. In the actual Constitution *Statutory Instrument No. 1199 of 1953* published by H.M. Stationery Office (reference G.P. & S. 7249-10,000-19.8.53), however, this most important provision had been watered down to read:—

"Such external relations as may from time to time be entrusted to the Federation by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom." (See the second Schedule, page 50).

7. The original section 10 of the draft Federal Scheme was admittedly qualified to some extent by paragraph (5) of section 6 and possibly by footnote (20) to paragraph (1) of section 48—see pages 10, 7 and 23 of Cmd. 8754. Nevertheless, I have no doubt that a constitutional lawyer would find that the legislative authority of the Federation in the field of external affairs in the actual Constitution had been considerably circumscribed as compared with the original provisions in the draft Federal Scheme.

8. A more far-reaching change was caused by the introduction of the controversial (one might almost say "notorious") clause 29(7) into the Federal Constitution. This reads as follows:—

"(7). Nothing in this Constitution shall affect any power to make laws for the Federation or any of the Territories conferred on Her Majesty by Any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom."

9. The practical effect of this clause if implemented, would be to completely undermine the legislative sovereignty of the Federal Government. I have carefully read through the draft Federal Scheme, and can find in it no parallel provision to 29(7). Indeed, it may be doubted whether the Southern Rhodesia electorate would have accepted the Federation had Cmd. 8754 contain any such provision. It is true of course that in April 1957 the U.K. Government, as a result of a visit by the Federal Prime Minister, to recognize a convention whereby in practice Article 29(7) would be null and void; nevertheless I believe I am right in saying that the present Opposition in the U.K. is not prepared to honour this convention. In view of the fact that 29(7) had no parallel in the draft Federal Scheme, I submit that it is a simple matter of justice that it should be totally repealed, in order to put the matter beyond doubt.

10. It can no doubt be argued that the language of the draft Federal Scheme, and perhaps even some of its details, had to be altered to convert the model into the actual Constitution. A careful comparison of the two texts, however, must indicate to any person of normal intelligence that some of the

differences between the two go far beyond the mere tidying up of loose ends, and in fact represent a complete breach of faith by the British Government towards Southern Rhodesia. Unless the British Government can produce concrete and definite evidence that the Southern Rhodesian Government and electorate agreed to the above changes prior to the coming into force of the Federal Constitution in September 1953, then one can only conclude that it is a Government which can not be trusted. Whether a more detailed comparative examination of the two texts would reveal further additions and subtractions of a similar nature from the original I do not know.

11. If this is the sort of treatment that Rhodesia gets from a Government which is supposed to be balanced in its attitude towards the Federation, then I dread to think what we may expect should Her Majesty's loyal Opposition come to power, in view of the known hostility of a large part of it to the Federal Government and its supporters.

12. To sum up, the argument so far: not only does the present immature constitutional status of the Federation mean that a heavy price has to be paid through lost or delayed investment, but judging by past experience it is absolutely vital that the country should be rendered immune to interference by British political parties of all complexions. It would appear that the only way in which the Federation can be protected against meddling by British Cabinets, whether in the Federal sphere of by "back-door" methods in the two Northern Territories, is by the full attainment of Dominion Status as previously defined at the earliest practicable moment.

13. It is hardly possible for a single individual to exhaust all the arguments in favour of the early attainment of Dominion Status by the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Nevertheless there are at least two more which I should like to bring to the attention of the Commission.

14. To judge by the tenour of letters addressed to the different editors of the *Argus Press* in recent years, a very considerable proportion of Rhodesian electors are highly sceptical as to the likelihood of the U.K. Government giving due weight to legitimate Rhodesian interests. I do not wish to give the impression that this is necessarily the result of malice on the part of the latter—in many cases one suspects that it is the product of inadequate knowledge of conditions in a country some 5,000 miles distant from Westminster. I remember on one occasion (I regret I cannot quote the exact date and place) Sir Edgar Whitehead at a political meeting in Salisbury remarked to the effect that he was certain that the British Cabinet was in most cases completely unacquainted with the background necessary to handle the majority of problems that came to his desk.

15. There is more to the matter, however, than British ignorance, which under the circumstances may be regarded as partially inevitable. What is likely to happen when Britain has to adjudicate between the interests of the Federation (which at present is still a partially dependent state) and those of another and perhaps more important member state of the British Commonwealth? I do not think the answer requires much imagination. A strong hint that Mr. Nehru would be more influential than Sir Roy Welensky in determining Britain's role in Central Africa was given by a reproduction of an article from *The Economist* in the *Rhodesia Herald* for 21st March, 1959, under the heading—"British Interests Must Come Before Local Politics". (May I say in passing that I regard the *Economist's* innuendos in this article about the Rhodesian policy of "repressing" the African as being inaccurate and in bad taste; for a more balanced and informed picture I would cordially recommend Mr. B. G. Paver's *His Own Oppressor*, which was published recently). Another example which might be quoted of the way in which Britain has sacrificed the interests of a member of the Commonwealth to appease a larger power is the Alaska boundary dispute between Canada and the United States, when the former were stated to recall "... Britain's repeated sacrifice of Canadian interests for the sake of harmony with the United States"—see *Canada: a Political and Social History* by Edgar McInnis, second edition, October, 1959, page 400. Coming nearer home one might mention the surrender of Jubaland to Italy, and Chamberlain's proposals in the inter-war period to return Tanganyika to Germany.

16. Apart from the sin of commission, however, there is also the sin of omission. Will the U.K. Government, acting in certain fields as the agent of a partially dependent Rhodesia, act with the same vigour on Rhodesia's behalf as it would if its own interests were at stake? The story of the modification of the Congo Basin Treaties are a disheartening portent.

17. When the Federation was instituted the fact that parts of the Northern Territories fell within the Congo Basin Treaties area meant that a uniform customs tariff could not be applied. (See *Freeing Trade in Central Africa* by M. Desborough in *New Commonwealth* for 1st April, 1957.) The Federal Government asked the British Government to take steps to remedy this anachronism, but the latter replied that nothing could be done. The Federal Ministry of Commerce, however, in negotiations with the parties to G.A.T.T. succeeded where the British Government alleged that nothing could be done.

B. A Federal Police Force

18. Item 35 of the draft Federal Scheme envisaged the establishment of a Federal Police Force. No steps appear to have been taken to create such a force, and it seems to me that this should be remedied. The Nyasaland Police were clearly inadequate to cope with the recent Emergency, and extra police and troops had to be supplied from Southern Rhodesia, thereby enabling certain Nyasaland Africans to criticise Salisbury. With the mounting instability in the (Belgian) Congo, it is clearly important to have a fully effective police force which is not subject to divided control and which can be deployed on our northern borders. Attention may also have to be paid to the results of the activities of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Council, which, at a meeting in Cairo on February 13th, 1959, adopted a resolution stating that a special section of its secretariat would be formed to "actively help the freedom movements in the still dependent countries of Africa". (See pages 16000 and 16664 of *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*).

C. A Unified Civil Service

19. When Sir Roy Welensky visited Britain in April 1957, it was agreed in principle that the four civil services in the Federation should be locally based, and interchangeable. Little or no progress appears to have been made towards these objectives.

20. To those familiar with the matter, the desirability of having a locally based service is obvious. Such a service would enjoy better relations with the public than Colonial Office employees who are constantly liable to transfer, and would also in my opinion lead to increased efficiency.

21. In this connection I would like to quote the commentary of the Bledisloe Report of 1938 (appointed to investigate the question of amalgamation in Central Africa) upon the state of affairs in Northern Rhodesia at that time:—

"Upon arrival at Lusaka for the purpose of taking evidence, we found that in many cases the chief executive offices of the Government were temporarily filled by acting officers. The Governor had left the Protectorate in March 1938, to take up appointment as Governor of Trinidad, and his successor did not arrive until after we left Africa. The Chief Secretary to the Government, who was administering the Government in the meantime, had been transferred to Northern Rhodesia as recently as November 1937. The office of Chief Secretary was temporarily occupied by the Financial Secretary, who had himself been transferred from Nyasaland only a few months before our arrival. His duties as Financial Secretary were in turn being performed by one of the Secretariat officers. The Principal Assistant Chief Secretary had also left on transfer to another post, and the Senior Provincial Commissioner was carrying out his duties. The Attorney-General had only recently been transferred to Northern Rhodesia. In addition, the Director of Agriculture, the Commissioner of Police and the Solicitor-General were absent on leave."

Salisbury

Southern Rhodesia

29th January, 1960

C. B. WYLLIE

Introduction

I attach a résumé of a viewpoint of an ordinary individual who has been a resident in Southern Rhodesia for thirty years.

I consider Southern Rhodesia my home and my country just as much as it is that of the African Population. My children are being educated here and will no doubt continue to live in Southern Rhodesia when they are grown up. I feel therefore, that as a family man, I should have some say in the future of this country.

1. History

(a) Although the History of Southern Rhodesia is relatively short, it has the tradition of the Liberal outlook of the Cape Province which inspired the European founders of the country when they originally opened it up for European settlement. The Cape Province had self-government when Rhodes conceived

his idea of expanding British influence in Africa and with this expansion, he introduced the Roman Dutch Law from the Cape and the tradition of self-government. No doubt the members of the Commission have considered the parliamentary history of this country, but in so short a span of time, there is little written history. I would however, venture to recommend for their consideration, these two books; *Birth of a Dilemma* by Mason and *His Own Oppressor* by Paver

(b) For thirty-seven years, Southern Rhodesia has been self-governing and the policy adopted by successive governments, in particular the advancement of the Africans has been done voluntarily and not by compulsion from the British Parliament or International agitation. The main efforts in this direction are for the improvement of the Economic Status, Education and Health before enlargement of the Franchise. When we decided by a referendum to go into the Federation, we did so voluntarily and not with the idea of granting one man one vote because we realised that at this stage the African was neither sufficiently advanced nor able to understand the workings of a modern state. Any attempt to hand the Government over to unscrupulous and ignorant African Politicians would not only lead to chaos, but probably inter-tribal warfare.

(c) I do not think the inhabitants of the United Kingdom realise that there are different tribes in the Federation whose development, methods of government and even language are quite alien to one another. Comparison could be likened to the differences between the Russians and Italians.

2. Development

For many years the financial cost of making roads and communications, building of hospitals and schools was borne by the Europeans and the Africans benefitted from these services without having to contribute. It is stated that no one on the grounds of race or colour must be debarred from the use of any amenities which the Europeans have created for themselves, but funds have not been provided for the establishment of recreational facilities for the Africans on the same scale. I agree that these facilities are inadequate and leave much to be desired but continuous efforts are being made to expand these services and again, largely financed by Europeans e.g. the Department for Native Education—£2,641,000 for the Financial year 1958-1959.

3. Consciousness of Responsibility

(a) The African is not used to elections and voting procedure which is contrary to thought and custom. His knowledge of the Western way of life is minute and his understanding of it virtually non-existent and therefore, he is in no way equipt to operate a Western form of Government.

(b) As under Native custom, they have had little general responsibility, their behaviour when released from the discipline and traditions of their Tribal Chiefs and habits are by European standards uncivilized and destructive when reverting to their normal primitive instincts. It is only necessary to note their behaviour in their Beer Halls and the use of Witch Doctors to encourage rival football teams in support of these statements.

(c) When Africans have been educated and trained, they make little attempt to assist their own people, but prefer either to work amongst Europeans, or expect to have posts created for them in the Civil Service. When removed from European supervision, their standards of integrity and honesty are inclined to be reduced and they revert to their more primitive instincts. It is essential therefore, that parental leadership of Europeans is continued for at least another three generations.

4. Political Conclusion

The establishment of Universal suffrage would merely play into the hands of agitators. It is essential therefore, to retain high standards of education and earnings as the qualifications for the vote. By the creation of African civil servants, businessmen and farmers, the number of members in the Federal Assembly should be increased to allow representation from these classes who by virtue of being homeowners and landowners would tend to take a more responsible view of not only their rights, but their duties to their own people and the country as a whole.

5. General

By touring the country in large parties guarded and shepherded by the police, it is doubtful if the members of the Commission can either get the true "feel" of the country, or even begin to understand the differences and problems. They would learn far more by going around unheralded with only a plain clothes policeman as guide and talk to Africans and Europeans at work and in their homes, seeing conditions and people as they really are, not prepared for their visit, or with ready-made instead of extempore evidence.

Salisbury

1st April, 1960

PART II

UNITED KINGDOM

WRITTEN AND ORAL EVIDENCE

24th MAY, 1960—10th JUNE, 1960

24TH MAY 1960

Memorandum

D. L. S. NAIRN

The Future of The Federation of Southern Rhodesia,
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland

"The African will only be an enemy if we make him one". This was said by Lord Malvern, on September 20th, 1955, in an address on the subject of race relations.

2. I wish this was axiomatic, but I am by no means certain that it is. There are so many influences at work aimed at arousing suspicions of the motives and the intentions of Europeans that, even with the most fair and skilful handling of events, many Africans could be turned into enemies in spite of and not because of what the Europeans may do. But one thing is self-evident. It is that any policy based on a determination to keep Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland tied together in the present Federation against the wishes of any one of them will fail; more tragic even than that—it will surely and inevitably unite all African opinion in growing hostility against Europeans and, in particular, against the Europeans whose homes are in Africa and who look forward to a future for themselves and their children in Africa.

3. This is so obvious that it is difficult for people who have never lived in Central Africa, and even for many who have and do still live there, to understand how politicians get support for a policy which appears to be based on the inviolability of Federation.

4. The first thing we have got to try to assess is just how great the support is, that those politicians do enjoy, for that part of their policy which is based on the inviolability of Federation.

5. Let me look first at African opinion. I do not believe that anyone can disagree with any conclusion that there is no support for and unlikely to be any support for Federation in Nyasaland and that open and active opposition to it is more likely to increase rather than diminish. Indeed, in Nyasaland, the insistence on the inviolability of Federation is welding the Africans into a racially solid, anti-Europeans phalanx.

6. In Northern Rhodesia, although there has not been the same bitterness over and mistrust of Federation as in Nyasaland, it would be very difficult, to-day, to find any active and open support for it. I am convinced it is not an over-statement to say that it will not be long before those Africans, who actively oppose Federation, will be able to unite the vast majority of Northern Rhodesian Africans under their racial banner.

7. It is not so easy to assess African opinion in Southern Rhodesia. The problems which face the Africans there are not the same as the problems facing the Africans in the two Northern States. The Africans in the North fear and dislike the thought of being dominated by the well-established European population of Southern Rhodesia but, in Southern Rhodesia, the Africans have lived with that European population for more than one generation. They know them, they understand them pretty well, to a very large extent they trust them and Federation did not appear to change their situation at all. The result is that Africans have confidently joined the political parties in Southern Rhodesia and have taken their full place as members of those parties and as Members of Parliament, even although so far those parties have been predominantly European.

8. Prospects should look bright for eventual full racial partnership (as in the University) and for co-operation. But do they? I am not so sure. In the African townships of Southern Rhodesia those who would like to see the Europeans driven out of Africa (with perhaps some of them permitted to remain there on sufferance) are busy and have gained enormous strength during the last five years. There can be little doubt that the main driving force behind them and the attractive appeal they are able to make derive their strength and power from the solidarity of African opinion in the North. In my view, even in Southern Rhodesia, those politicians who stand fast on the inviolability of Federation will not be able to hold the support of many Africans for long.

9. My general assessment of African opinion is, therefore, that African support for Federation is negligible and that active opposition is widespread and increasing.

10. What is the state of European opinion on Federation amongst those who live in Central Africa? Perhaps I could try and paint a picture of the scene as it displays itself to my eyes.

11. The Europeans of Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia (and it must be remembered that they have

different problems and different outlooks) are like three swimmers who find themselves in great difficulty in troubled waters. Those from Nyasaland, a far from powerful swimmer; those from Northern Rhodesia, a more powerful swimmer but accustomed to having to make a short rather than a sustained effort (and with a belt of somewhat heavy treasure buckled round his waist); those from Southern Rhodesia, a strong and powerful swimmer who would have good prospects of reaching the shore and even of helping his fellow swimmers to reach safety if they could all agree on the best point to aim for. But their situation, as well as being dangerous, is complicated. Very near to them, on the seaward side, is a far from seaworthy craft which has recently put to sea after having been hurriedly built out of unseasoned timber and, a bit further out, is a large and solid looking ship which, while taking no part in these events, is clearly watching with interest all that is going on. On the other side of the swimmers, and a good deal further away, is the shore. People, both black and white, can be seen running about at the water's edge but they are too far away for it to be possible to make out their intentions.

12. The men in the unseaworthy craft can be seen quite clearly and they are all shouting to the swimmers to make for them and climb on board—apparently quite oblivious to the fact that their craft is in immediate danger of capsizing. The two least powerful swimmers are clinging onto their companion and begging him to pay heed to the advice being so freely given by the men in the boat.

13. The strong swimmer is in a dilemma. He has the safety of his companions to consider (and one has that important belt round his waist); he has noticed that the nearby craft is in considerable danger of sinking, but it is so much closer than the shore; he can understand what the men in the boat are shouting but the voices of the people on the shore are too distant to be made out; it is almost impossible to discuss the situation with two men who are in grave danger of drowning in the turbulent sea. This picture, I believe, represents the present state of European opinion. Already a majority know that the best hope of a happy and prosperous future for them in Africa lies in making for the shore, but it is a hard decision to make and for the moment they have not the courage necessary to make it. It is easier to allow themselves to be dominated by the personalities who man the nearby craft.

14. My assessment of European opinion, therefore, is that in Nyasaland the support for an inviolable Federation is strong; in Northern Rhodesia it is probably stronger still, but in Southern Rhodesia, while there is still widespread support for Federation, more than fifty per cent (probably as high as 70 per cent) of the Europeans would be very ready to agree that Nyasaland should be given the right to opt out as soon as she has a responsible Government capable of expressing the views of the population as a whole. And, of course, as soon as that is accepted it is inevitable that the same right must be extended both to Southern and Northern Rhodesia.

15. It is too often forgotten that, at the time of the vote in Southern Rhodesia on the issue of Federation, some 44 per cent of those who voted cast their vote against Federation. In the light of events since then and from my contacts with people in Southern Rhodesia, I believe a much larger percentage would vote against Federation to-day. They now see the danger of trying to keep something intact which will never have the support of representative Governments in all three of the States involved. The trouble is that in no election has this been a clear issue and many other considerations have been involved which have influenced the way people have voted.

16. We in Britain have a heavy responsibility for the future, not only of the Africans, but of the Europeans who live in Central Africa. We were responsible for the Federation in the form it exists today and no one can honestly dispute the fact that, had it not been for the insistence of the British Government, Nyasaland would never have been included in the Federation. Since 1953, however, Britain has been backward in giving a lead which in this context really means giving wise advice in a form that is both helpful and acceptable. Much advice, no doubt, has been given by the Government, by the Press and in many other forms, but no attempts have ever been made to put it into any sort of palatable form, far less to make it attractive to the people it is intended to influence.

17. In the light of these conclusions what should our policy and aims be for the future?

18. First, we must face the fact that Federation, in its present form and under its present name, is never going to be acceptable to a large enough proportion of the populations concerned to have any chance of success. We must admit that

the experiment has not won over any African support to its side, but has unfortunately stimulated racial tensions. This does not mean that we should make a blunt statement that Federation has failed, but it does mean that we should let it be known to the four governments concerned and to the peoples in the Federation that we would be very ready to see them (and to help them) work towards some alternative form of liaison. We could well make some suggestions to them. Might it not be better to unite together in a Central African Commonwealth instead of a Federation? Could they perhaps look even further ahead with the hope of expanding this into a Central and East African Commonwealth? Is there not the possibility that this Commonwealth might become part of an African Common Market area to include Basutoland, Swaziland, Bechuanaland and Portuguese territories? The possibilities are immense with prospects of great advantage to all concerned.

19. Secondly, we must do all in our power to ensure that the Federation does not just disintegrate in a flood of mutual distrust, suspicion and even worse. Our task is to help the States of the Federation to work out some new solution to their problem which is both workable and acceptable. I am convinced that most people, of all races and in all three countries, would work together in a genuine attempt to find the right solution just as soon as they realised that each country is to be allowed to have its own sovereign government, free to choose on what terms and to what extent it should co-operate with the other two.

20. Here I come to a point on which I am in full agreement with Sir Roy Welensky. The future form of liaison must be worked out in Africa between the peoples who live in Africa and between responsible governments established in all three countries in Africa. Federation was not of African origin—its successor must be.

21. This does mean that some time must elapse before the new form of Commonwealth, or whatever it is called, can be worked out and during that time the present Federation may well be the best umbrella. But once it has been accepted that a voluntary form of association is to be worked out to replace Federation, then I do not believe the delay would be unacceptable to the peoples concerned or that it would prevent preliminary discussions starting now, even before there were responsible governments fully established in Northern Rhodesia and in Nyasaland.

22. What form should this new association take? I think the preliminary discussions could well be based on an idea drawing its inspiration from a combination of the British Commonwealth, the European Common Market and N.A.T.O. How it should work and what sort of international bodies should be set up to run those affairs which the countries might agree should be run centrally (such as defence, transport, power, posts, customs and perhaps even some industrial enterprises) it would be wrong to try to define or determine now. Many precedents would have to be studied, but the point of vital moment is that the answers must be worked out in Africa by those most intimately concerned. Their task would not be to work for political integration between the States, but for the maximum amount of economic integration which they feel is consistent with political independence.

London.

30th January 1960

Oral Evidence

D. L. S. NAIRN

CHAIRMAN: Will you please tell us first of all who you are?—A. My name is Douglas Leslie Spencer Nairn. I am very grateful for this opportunity of appearing before you. It was with some hesitation that I asked to do so, but I did so because having lived and worked as a farmer in Southern Rhodesia for seven years and followed that by four and a half years in the House of Commons, I have seen the thing from both ends.

My opinions are not those of any organisation or group, though I think they represent the views of many people who are not in any organisation. They are based purely on my own experience. I do not know if you have found signs of distrust or suspicion in the Federation: it is my opinion they are there. The first task is to remove the suspicions on the part of Africans and to minimise or remove them without arousing equally dangerous doubts and suspicions in the minds of the Europeans. Can this be done? I sincerely believe that it can, but only if as a preliminary step it is made clear to the peoples in each Territory that they are to be masters in the end of their own destinies. This means making it quite clear also that Federation can only continue as a permanency if each territory was to decide to become a willing partner. The general trend of newspaper comment seems to be that any pronouncement of this sort would be disastrous. To a very large extent big business takes a similar view. They seem to believe that if a firm stand is taken now, as it was with Western Australia, what they call these teething troubles will disappear;

but the problems in Australia are in no way similar to those in Central Africa, and the Australians themselves took very decided steps to ensure that the Central Africa problems never arose in Australia. So I entirely disagree with the view that a firm stand on Federation now will produce the peaceful answer. My own diagnosis of the problem is that these are not teething troubles but that it is a contagious and highly dangerous malady which, to a greater or lesser extent, has infected each state of the Federation; and this malady will have to be cured in each state individually before they can all three live together safely in one room.

The immediate problems in each Territory are so different, or in such different stages of development, that it is not possible at this point of time to have one solution under Federation which could hope to attract the support of the majority of both races for all three Territories. If we do not get that support then Federation will fail whatever we do. But in our attempts to boost up Federation we may well destroy all hopes of a multi-racial society in the future and the malady, instead of being cured, might well be passed from generation to generation.

On the other hand if each Territory is given adequate scope to evolve its own solution then I believe that race and colour can play a diminishing part in African politics, and in due course these Territories may come together in some close association acceptable to all three. But—and here there is a big but—if harmonious multi-racial societies are to be created, some country in Africa must take the initiative and the lead. For the reasons I have given in my memorandum I do not believe the Federation can give that lead. South Africa could have done so, but she chose an entirely different course and has gone right into the wilderness. Today there is only one country with the necessary experience and breadth of outlook which may enable her to give the lead, which is of such vital importance to the future of the whole of Central and Southern Africa. In my view that country is Southern Rhodesia.

I do not, however, think that will be possible; first because it has not the resources to man efficiently both the Territorial Parliament and at the same time to send representatives to the Federal Parliament and later on also to send men to one or two senates. If she is to succeed in giving this lead, Southern Rhodesia must be able to concentrate all her experience and her brains in this one great effort. They cannot be dissipated. On the other hand, what chance has Southern Rhodesia really got of giving an inspired lead if all the time she is first of all looking over one shoulder to see what is being hatched in Britain? We all know that some pretty peculiar eggs go into the Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office incubators, not to mention the eggs that go into the Conservative and Socialist Party machines, and I am not at all surprised that Southern Rhodesians are sometimes a bit worried about what they see hatched. And again she has to look over the other shoulder to see what is happening in the Federal Parliament. There, to my belief, all she sees are a lot of cuckoos' eggs; but I believe sincerely that a free, independent and fully responsible Southern Rhodesia could give that lead in racial harmony and co-operation which alone can bring peace to Central Africa and South Africa in the future. She will not follow either the policies of South Africa or the policies of the Congo. She has decided to travel along the middle of the road, and if she is given a fair opportunity to do so I am sure that is where she will remain until she has reached her objective.

One last point: it is seldom wise to make sudden changes, and never wise to do that in Africa. We from Britain have always found that gradual development brings most satisfactory results to our problems, and in Africa we are mingled with a people who dislike sudden changes just as much as we do; and on top of that they take a long time to make up their minds exactly what the change is all about. I have said that I believe drastic changes are required in the form of association which at present links the three Territories together, but I equally believe we should not try to bring about these changes overnight. It would be neither wise nor possible to do so. There is at present a Federal Government, and this Federal Government should remain as an umbrella for at least three years while the Territories work out in practice—and this is an important point—what sort of co-operation with and what sort of independence from each other they want. At the same time they can go on evolving their own form of society in the knowledge that they will be able to carry it through to maturity without interference from outside. Personally, while I think that the Federal Government should act as an umbrella, I do not think there should be another Federal election. If necessary its term of life could be extended without an election and vacancies filled by bye-elections.

What must be removed now, and removed once and for all, is the fear—unjustified but nevertheless real—that Southern Rhodesia intends to try permanently to dominate the two Northern Territories; and the fear, equally real, that the two

Northern Territories will try to dominate Southern Rhodesia and delay her political development. While these fears exist I do not believe that any real progress can be made.

CHAIRMAN: In what you have said about the desirability of postponing the determination of a final solution, you have in mind what is said in the Preamble to the Constitution about the inhabitants of the Territories desiring a change—if they do we can go ahead with it, and if not we cannot?—A. Yes, during this period of three or four years when they know they can be independent if they want to be, it may well be that with the change of atmosphere they might change their minds.

Q. Is it implicit in your suggestion that there should be an open right to get out of Federation if agreement is not reached at the end of whatever the period is?—A. Yes.

Q. And you suggest there should be a continuance in the meantime of the Federation as an umbrella. Is that a Federation without modification, or would you think it possible to consider modifications in the meantime which might make one or other of the parties reach final agreement?—A. I think modifications can well be made in the meantime, modifications in the powers of the Federation.

Q. That is what I meant, yes. Towards the end of your last paragraph about NATO and the European Common Market being looked at in connection with a final solution, you add suggestions on how it might work and that all sorts of international bodies might be set up to run these affairs; then you list what might be run centrally. Have you considered what economic functions ought to be centralised?—A. I have considered it but do not think I am in a position to make any recommendations. I believe firmly that it is something which should be worked out between the partners as to what they are prepared to give up, knowing all the time that if they are going to be viable, they must attract outside capital.

MR. HADLOW: As regards your suggestion that Southern Rhodesia should take the lead, would not the accusation of domination still be made, and made even more than it is today?—A. If she tried to take the lead within Federation, yes; but if she tried to set an example of what an independent Southern Rhodesia could do outside the Federation, no.

MRS. HUXLEY: You say a voluntary form of association should be worked out by the three Governments. Do you envisage any immediate changes in the Territorial Governments so that they would be more representative and therefore more able to carry their people with them if they did work out a form of association? In Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, did you envisage they should have immediate changes in the franchise which would result in an immediate increase on African representation before it is worked out?—A. Not necessarily. I believe the peoples in the Northern Territories would have more confidence in the Europeans, and therefore would be more prepared to co-operate with them in working out their future, if they did not have this fear of domination by Southern Rhodesia hanging over their heads because they are in a federation.

Q. Do you not think they would demand to make their own choice of a different form of government? I mean that they would not consider themselves bound by any agreement reached by the present Governments of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.—A. They would expect a great deal more representation before they would agree to being bound in a political organisation like Federation. I do not think they would be nearly so worried about being bound in an economic association which did not affect their political prestige.

Q. You would not envisage any changes in the franchise for the moment, as regards the Territorial franchise? You said you would not have another Federal election, so it probably would not arise for the Federal franchise, but do you think the Territorial franchise should remain as it is?—A. I am not in a position to say whether the Northern Territories should remain as at present.

MR. GONDWE: In the memorandum you submitted, in paragraph 7, you speak of the Africans in Southern Rhodesia as being more or less contented with their lot and that they more or less trusted the Europeans in that country and therefore the political set-up as it is at present in that country is satisfactory as far as the Africans in that Territory are concerned. Would you not say that as a result of the Federation their position politically speaking is better than it would otherwise have been if Federation had not been?—A. I would not deny that the fact that there has been a Federation has brought a greater realisation of the problem to the Southern Rhodesia Government. I am absolutely certain that that realisation would not disappear if they were now out of the Federation. They have taken their line and they will stick to it.

Q. I think you will be interested to know that most of the Africans who have appeared before this Commission have submitted that in their view, I am speaking of Southern Rhodesia, Federation should continue—in that it is in their interest—whereas on the contrary in the Northern Territories the reverse is the case. Would you say, therefore, that if Federation were

to go in Southern Rhodesia at least the Africans in that Territory would be worse off?—A. No, I definitely would not say that. I believe that the Africans at this stage would be better off because, if as I said there is a fear today that the Africans in the northern territories might combine to hold back Southern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia might be tempted to hold back their own Africans because of their fear of domination from the North. If that fear of domination from the North is removed, I think Southern Rhodesia have every incentive to help the Africans on as quickly as they can. That is my view.

Q. Paragraph 18: "First, we must face the fact that Federation, in its present form and under its present name, is never going to be acceptable to a large enough proportion of the populations concerned to have any chance of success." That is very true. You go on to say:—"We must admit that the experiment has not won over any African support to its side, but has unfortunately stimulated racial tensions."

Yes, in the Northern Territories that is true.

"This does not mean that we should make a blunt statement that Federation has failed, but it does mean that we should let it be known to the four Governments concerned and to the peoples in the Federation that we would be very ready to see them work towards some alternative form of liaison."

I cannot understand that, because in the first place you seem to say that Federation has not won over any African support but in the next breath you say that this does not mean that it has failed. Could you make it clear?—A. I did not say it has failed. I said we should not make a blunt statement that it has failed. It is not the same.

Q. Could you explain that. According to what you have said in the first place and in the preceding paragraphs definitely one would say that Federation has failed.—A. What I am saying really is I think a political tie up has failed, but I think an economic tie up voluntarily entered into could well succeed.

Q. Do you honestly think that an economic arrangement without political unity attached to it would be successful?—A. I do. I do not know whether you happen to read *American Life*, but in the last issue there was a very interesting article by King Hussein talking about Arab States and the need for them to get together. He emphasised in that that they must first work on the points of a common agreement and perhaps at the very end a political tie up might come about, but first of all you must start from the points of common agreement and a common interest.

Q. In which case you would advocate this arrangement in East Africa, the High Commission arrangement, where there is very little central control, politically speaking, but it is more or less an economic arrangement?—A. It is a matter for the peoples concerned to sit down in Africa and try and work out what they are prepared to give up and what they are prepared to run centrally. I think there are various precedents to be studied, not only East Africa.

Q. The last question comes under the last paragraph of your memorandum. You would like to see any decision as to the future of the Federation hammered out in Central Africa by local people, people who know the conditions there, by which you mean to exclude the British Government?—A. No. I think the British Government naturally have to take a part, but they should encourage as far as possible the getting of ideas from Africa rather than ideas flowing from here. Federation was exported from here to Africa, it does not work. If the British Government can attract ideas from Africa then I think there is a chance of building up something that could work.

Q. Do you think that is questionable?—A. Everything is questionable.

Q. I think you are aware, Mr. Nairn, that when you say anything that has to be discussed or decided upon by the local people in Central Africa, you mean by Europeans, because at present the African does not have any political effectiveness. Do you not think that such a decision that is to be taken locally would be suspected by the African?—A. If it were worked out by Europeans entirely, of course, it would be suspect.

Q. The Federal Government has only twelve African members out of fifty-nine. Supposing it came to a vote do you think they would carry the day?—A. You will never get anything satisfactorily as a result of a vote. It must be as a result of general broad agreement. I do not think these answers will be found by getting a group of people together and trying to vote on it, you have to compromise and work together until you get a broad agreement.

Q. That would not come to an end at all because the Africans would never agree to any agreement that is made locally. The British Government must be brought in, because the British Government is trusted implicitly by the Africans. I think any arrangement which you say will have the minimum co-operation of the British Government will never succeed in Central Africa.—A. I never said it should be the minimum

co-operation. It wants the maximum co-operation of the British Government.

MR. MOLSON: I am very much interested in your suggestions at the end. Are you familiar with the work of the Central African Council before Federation started?—A. It had no powers. Anything that is set up by agreement here would have to have powers.

Q. Your idea would be rather to build on the basis of that agreement to co-operate between politically independent Territories?—A. And a great deal more has been learnt in Europe and other places since then about these sorts of things.

Q. In fact, your main point, as I understand it, is to give as great political autonomy to each of the Territories as possible and to restrict the functions of the common body, whatever it may be called, to such economic common activities as they agree upon?—A. Yes, in the hope, naturally, although it may not ever materialise, that after years of economic co-operation everybody concerned may say political co-operation is equally easy and possible.

Q. But that by going back to that extent it would be *reculer pour mieux sauter*, it would have a better chance of making progress if you went back and enabled the thing to be done by agreement instead of being imposed?—A. Yes, entirely.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: Paragraph 14 of your memorandum where you suggest that in Southern Rhodesia there is probably a majority of Europeans who would be ready to agree that Nyasaland should be given the right to opt out, and lower down, "of course, as soon as that is accepted it is inevitable that the same right must be extended both to Southern and Northern Rhodesia". Could you help us in regard to that. We have heard it said quite forcibly that a state of affairs in which there was this future right to secede at some unspecified period would cause a great deal of uncertainty and unsettlement, it would encourage extreme nationalism and generally would be an undesirable thing. Can you say something in regard to that?—A. I do not think it would encourage extreme nationalism more than Federation has encouraged it. I think fears are the real thing which encourage extreme nationalism. If the fears of domination either of the South or the North by the other were removed, I think nationalism would decrease, not increase.

Q. During that period when there was this right to opt out you would like to see what you describe in paragraph 18—the four governments and the peoples concerned getting together to work out some alternative form of liaison. There is this difficulty, is there not, at the present time and in the immediate future as to who it would be who would represent the peoples in those Territories in those discussions?—A. There would be; but I do not think you would get the same feelings built up if the association, as I said, was going to be an economic association and not a political one. It is really fear of political domination that stirred up nationalism. I do not think that economic co-operation would. Any country, even if it wants to be fully independent politically, still wants to attract financial assistance from outside. If it sees that it is more likely to do so by being in an economic association with other strong partners, then I believe they would agree to that because it would not attract this fear which political domination does attract.

Q. Would that suggestion of that future possibility be sufficient to give the assurance that is required now to encourage these people to go on in that frame of mind?—A. I think so. I think if it was said now that the present Federal Parliament would not be re-elected, and if it was said that at the end of three or four years—I cannot make up my mind to the exact time—a new organisation would come into being and it would only be federation if it was asked for (and I think one should take the line that it would be). I think everyone would co-operate and try to find an economic arrangement which would still create confidence outside.

Q. It would really almost be a decree nisi?—A. Yes, but even those are sometimes withdrawn before the end.

MR. CHIRWA: May I ask the witness how he justifies his statement that Southern Rhodesia should take the lead or can take the lead in view of the fact that Southern Rhodesia has not been able to eliminate racial discrimination up to this time and also that there is no single African representative in the Legislature of that country?—A. Discrimination cannot be eliminated overnight. If you visited Rhodesia as regularly as I have—I left there in 1954 and have visited it regularly since—you will see that discrimination is going fairly rapidly and that Southern Rhodesia has set itself on a path which is diametrically opposed to that of South Africa. I do not believe for one moment that she wants, or that she could if she did want, to change that. She must go along that path she has chosen. The Europeans take a much more realistic view than they used to. At one time one asked Southern Rhodesians how long they expected to have an entirely European-dominated country and they said for the foreseeable future, and you said what is the foreseeable future—100 or 150 years. But what they say today,

not only one political party but both, is the foreseeable future is perhaps 25 to 30 years, until the next generation of Europeans have grown up, and the next generation of Africans have grown up, who will see the problems quite differently to the way we see them in this generation and they may well be able to find a satisfactory answer which is so elusive to us.

Q. But do you not think that the changes that have come about, the very gradual change that has come about in Southern Rhodesia in the way of racial discrimination, has been due mainly to the existence of Federation?—A. No, I do not. I said I agree Federation has had some influence. South African policy has also had some influence because people in Southern Rhodesia realise how crazy it is; so various things have influenced Southern Rhodesia.

Q. On the question of negotiation, that things must be done by agreement, if those Territories are self-governing Territories that implies you would like to see Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland having self-government immediately?—A. Not immediately. Personally I do not think they would demand the same extent of self-government so quickly if their fears created by the Federation and domination of Southern Rhodesia were removed. I believe that they have great faith in the British Government and the Colonial Office and that they would be prepared to have help from the British Government and the Colonial Office for a longer period if they were not in the Federation than if they were.

Q. Do you think that is possible now, in view of the fact that they have got on one side the Belgian Congo which is going to be independent in June and on the other side Tanganyika which is going to have self-government in October?—A. I think it is possible.

Q. You think Africans in Central Africa regard themselves as able to undertake those responsibilities?—A. It is not always the most able who makes the most progress. The less able sometimes comes to the top a little later on, but his slower development makes him the greater man in his time. I think that may well be the case in the Northern Territories.

Q. Do you think that is possible without disrupting the economy of the country?—A. I think it will disrupt it less than trying to carry on as at present.

Q. When you suggest that there should be an economic association have you taken account of the various political commitments which have been made by the Federal Government, loans from America, from the International Bank and so on?—A. I think they are all very complicated but I am sure if there is a will they can be worked out—and they can be worked out in such a way that provided there is economic co-operation no one will really lose confidence. In fact, confidence will grow if racial troubles begin to disappear. If racial troubles continue confidence will go inside the Federation.

Q. When you talk of Southern Rhodesia Government having a lead I think you suggested that the British Government should have nothing to do with Southern Rhodesia, they should be independent? If that is the suggestion, have you taken into account views expressed by Africans that they did not want their reservations to be withdrawn altogether without there being an amendment to the Constitution in which they should take part as members of the country?—A. Yes.

Q. What value have you given to those views?—A. I am convinced that Southern Rhodesia on its own would be very much more generous, and more rapidly so, than if she is held in this Federation which will gradually build up greater and greater fears. Do not forget that, although Southern Rhodesia dislikes and hates South African policy, if you go too fast and push them too far there is still a danger in two or three years' time when the present troubles have been forgotten a bit that you might push them towards the Union again, which would be completely outside the interests of any Africans. At the moment she is set firm on a path in the opposite direction. You want to do everything you can to encourage Southern Rhodesia to keep along that path.

MR. KATILUNGU: If I am not wrong, I think your interest is to see that the Federation continues but in a looser form?—A. If you mean by the Federation a political Federal Parliament, no. If you mean a Federal economic association without political power, I mean yes.

Q. If a Federation as you have said was the responsibility of the British Government, more particularly when she brought in Nyasaland which, as you referred to in your memorandum, did not intend to come in at the initial stage of the Federation, the question of importing Federation from Great Britain to Central Africa is one which had been resisted all along by Africans. Do you agree that the African opposition to Federation as an imposed institution is a correct opposition?—A. I do not think it is soundly based but it is there. It is something we have to accept. I believe that the progress of all might be better and greater and quicker under Federation. But I believe it is impossible now under Federation to remove this strong resistance and this strong antipathy to Federation which does

exist and unless you can remove it I do not believe we can find the answer.

Memorandum

P. D. HENDERSON and A. D. HAZLEWOOD

The Economic and Financial Effects of Federation on Nyasaland

This Memorandum considers the effects on the economy of Nyasaland of the Territory's inclusion within the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. An inquiry into this subject has been made by Mr. A. D. Hazlewood, Research Officer at the Oxford University Institute of Statistics, and the present writer. The results of the inquiry will be published in a forthcoming issue of the *Bulletin* of the Institute; but since this study is still in course of completion, it has not been possible to submit it to the Commission as a Memorandum of evidence. This Memorandum therefore takes the form of a summary statement of the main arguments and conclusions of the study, as the present writer sees them; the supporting evidence together with additional material, will become available when the study is published. The conclusions are presented under four headings. These are: first, the general economic effects of Federation; second, the redistribution of income between territorial governments; third, public capital investment in Nyasaland; and fourth, other economic aspects of Nyasaland's membership of the Federation.

(1) The general economic effects of Federation

- (a) The extent to which Federation as such has contributed to the economic development of the Central African territories cannot be precisely determined; but it is clear that the actual and potential benefits of Federation have been greatly exaggerated in most discussions of this matter. Some of the economic arguments for Federation are either invalid or unconvincing; and it is an error of judgment to think that economic or technical factors made the establishment of Federation inevitable.
- (b) So far as the effects of Federation on the rate of economic development of the whole Federal area can be ascertained, they appear on balance to have been positive. The main reason for this is that the level of government expenditure, both on current and on capital account, has been higher than it would have been without Federation. This may be attributed to the pooling of the revenues of the three territories, which has meant that the proceeds of the taxes arising from the copper industry have accrued to the Federation as a whole, rather than to the Government of Northern Rhodesia alone. In effect, the copper revenues have been used to underwrite Federal loans, both for Kariba and for other purposes; whereas without Federation they would have reduced or eliminated any need to borrow on the part of the Northern Rhodesian Government.
- (c) Any effect which Federation may have had on the rate of economic expansion over the whole Federal area would be felt, in some degree, in Nyasaland. The direct effects have probably been slight; but the pooling of revenues, under the present Federal fiscal arrangements, has the effect of making the prosperity of each of the territories more closely dependent on that of the others. Further, employment opportunities for Nyasaland workers in the Rhodesias would have been increased.

(2) The redistribution of income between territorial governments

- (a) The payments made from within Nyasaland to the Federal Government, mainly in the form of income tax payments and customs and excise duties, have been considerably less than the territory's estimated receipts from the Federal Government. (These receipts comprise the territory's share of Federal income-tax revenues, and that part of Federal current expenditure which can be regarded as benefiting Nyasaland). Thus the effect of the present fiscal system is to redistribute income towards Nyasaland. During the three financial years 1956/57 to 1958/59 inclusive, the average gain to the Nyasaland Government may be estimated at £4 million *per annum*. (The figure given in the Jack Report for this period, of £2.75 million, is definitely too low). This sum, small though it is in absolute terms, is large in relation to the total revenues at the disposal of the Nyasaland Government.
- (b) The fiscal gains made by Nyasaland are one aspect of the redistribution of government revenues which

has taken place at the expense of Northern Rhodesia. The Government of Southern Rhodesia has also gained appreciably. Thus the gains to Nyasaland have so far been the result, not of Federation as such, but of association with Northern Rhodesia. Only if the prior assumption is made, that Nyasaland could only have been linked with Northern Rhodesia by the establishment of Federation in its present form, can it be said that Nyasaland's gains are directly due to Federation. This assumption is of course political, rather than technical or economic.

- (c) If Nyasaland had in fact been associated with Northern Rhodesia alone, the gains referred to would almost certainly have been substantially larger.
 - (d) It cannot necessarily be concluded that if Nyasaland became a separate political unit again, the territorial Government would lose the full amount of its present fiscal gains. This would depend on the amount of external assistance which was made available. It would be unwise to draw conclusions about this from the territory's experience in the years before 1953.
- ##### (3) Public capital investment in Nyasaland
- (a) The increase in the current revenues at the disposal of the Nyasaland Government, which has occurred since Federation, has been an important factor in making possible a higher level of capital expenditure by the Government than would otherwise have been practicable. Without this improvement in the revenue position, the Nyasaland Government might have had to restrict its borrowings even if funds had been available for lending to it.
 - (b) The argument that public capital investment in Nyasaland has been higher, because of the higher level of borrowing made possible by the greater credit-worthiness of the Federal as opposed to the territorial Government, is open to question. In this context also the pre-1953 experience may be misleading, especially since the institution by the United Kingdom Government in 1959 of the system of Exchequer loans.
 - (c) In so far as the higher level of borrowing and capital expenditure by the territorial Government can be attributed to the improvement in its budgetary position, it must strictly be imputed to association with Northern Rhodesia, rather than to Federation as such.
 - (d) The Nyasaland share of total Federal Loan Account expenditure, over the financial year 1954/55 to 1958/59 inclusive, may be put at about 6 per cent. (Exclusion of expenditure on the Kariba project would increase the share to over 7 per cent.) In drawing up Federal plans for capital expenditure, there appears to be little attempt to give special consideration to Nyasaland because of its poverty and backwardness.
- ##### (4) Other economic aspects of Nyasaland's membership of the Federation
- (a) Since 1958 the Government of Southern Rhodesia has restricted the entry of foreign labour into the principal towns of the territory. The extension of these restrictions to Nyasa workers would be a serious matter for Nyasaland. Federal citizenship is a safeguard against such an extension; and this may perhaps be regarded as the one tangible economic advantage which Nyasaland derives from association with Southern Rhodesia.
 - (b) Federation has necessarily brought about a customs union and a common tariff for the three territories. Experience in other countries, both with unitary and with federal constitutions, has shown that this may work to the disadvantage of those regions which are least attractive to investors. There is reason to believe that this may be happening in the case of Nyasaland also. Tariff changes have been made to the detriment of Nyasaland consumers, and in the interests of industrial development in Southern Rhodesia. Further, the inability of Nyasaland to adopt an independent tariff means that no protection can be given against competition from Southern Rhodesian industry. This disadvantage of Federation could be offset if the Federal Government were to pursue a deliberate policy of fostering industrial development in Nyasaland. So far, however, this has not been attempted.

Oxford
29th January 1960

Oral evidence

P. D. HENDERSON and A. D. HAZLEWOOD

CHAIRMAN: Mr. Henderson, you are a Fellow and Tutor in Economics at Lincoln College, Oxford?—A. (MR. HENDERSON): That is right, Sir.

Q. And Mr. Hazlewood, you are a Research Officer at the Oxford University Institute of Statistics?—A. (MR. HAZLEWOOD): That is right.

Q. I would like to ask you as to whether this survey you have been undertaking has yet been completed? The memorandum was sent to us in January and you said at that time the study was still in the course of completion and therefore you had sent only a summary statement.—A. (MR. HENDERSON): That is correct. The study is completed. At the moment it is just about to emerge from the hands of the printers and we think it will very likely be in the bookshops by the end of this month.

Q. Would you like to add something to the memorandum? Would you like to expand in any way first or should we proceed to questions?—A. (MR. HENDERSON): I think the easiest thing would be to proceed to questions. Although this was drafted in January the final summary of conclusions which we put in at the end of our study, except in very minor respects, is identical with what is said here so in a way this still stands as the end result with nothing but very minor modifications.

Q. Could I ask how long you have been over this inquiry, whether you went out to the Federation?—A. We started work in England just under a year ago. We visited the Federation in July and August last year and we finished the last draft in April, so it took us about a year of which only a short time was spent in the Federation. Neither of us can really claim to be experts on the Federal situation or have a close acquaintance with Federal affairs.

Q. You visited the headquarters of all three Territories?—A. Yes.

Q. And we assume you had access to all official documents—A. Very much so. Extremely free access was given to us by all Territorial Governments and particularly by the Federal Ministries concerned. We got all the information we asked for, a good deal of which was entirely unpublished.

Q. It is based on information available to you up to that time, July and August of last year, or have you some subsequent information?—A. Some subsequent information but I imagine that if we did fly out tomorrow to Salisbury and went back to see the people to whom we had been talking we would in fact be supplied with some new figures and some which we have had to take as provisional in our final revised form.

Q. I would like to ask you a question on the second section of your memorandum on the redistribution of income between Territorial Governments. You say under 2(b) that the fiscal gains made by Nyasaland have so far been the result not of Federation but of association with Northern Rhodesia. I wonder if you could expand a little on that and particularly I would like to know the reason for your putting in "so far". Were there indications that the position might change?—A. Yes, indeed, the reason for putting in that was the result which emerged from the measurement we made of the extent of our redistribution of income as between all three Territories which as far as I know has not been attempted elsewhere.

Our object was to compute for each Territory the revenue payments which it made to the centre, the Federal Government, and for each Territory also what it in turn got back from the Federal Government whether in the form of its statutory share of the Federal income tax revenue or in the form of Federal current expenditure which could be held to be for the benefit of that particular Territory as opposed to the others. On this measurement you get for each Territory an out-paying from the centre and in-comings from the centre: the difference, the sum of all three Territories, comes to nought, gains and losses exactly outweigh each other and on our estimates of this which admittedly are by no means perfect, just the best we could do, Northern Rhodesia is a consistent loser, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland pretty consistent gainers and it is fair to draw a conclusion, I think, that up till now what gain Nyasaland has made can be traced, if you look at the whole operation of the fiscal system of the Federation, to the association with Northern Rhodesia and that, in fact, both Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia. I think that concludes the first part.

The reason we said "so far" is twofold, I think. One is professional caution and we are very aware of the fact that the results we have obtained are results which are based on past history. Besides that, however, there is a rather more concrete reason for thinking that the balance of advantage between the Territories may change. It has changed very

recently because of the fall in copper prices and other goods which has an effect on tax payments only after a certain lapse of time, so even in the current financial year the revenue contribution payable to Northern Rhodesia which comes primarily from the copper tax will still be low. In other words, our evidence except for one year 1958/59 relates to a period which on the whole copper was doing well and on the whole, therefore, the Northern Rhodesia share contribution to the centre could be held to be at least not unfavourable in relation to what one might expect over the future years. If we had had figures for 1959/60 then the Northern Rhodesia loss expressed as an annual figure would have become lower.

What has happened, I think, is that very recently the Northern Rhodesia share has fallen badly because of the recession, while the Southern Rhodesia share contribution to tax revenues has therefore risen quite markedly in the last two years. That has been an exceptional period, it is true, but if you take the whole period since Federation which comprises both good and bad years (from the point of view of Northern Rhodesia), there is a steady tendency which I think shows that tax contributions from Southern Rhodesia would rise, which tendency is likely to continue and, though this is only a guess therefore, we would expect over the next five to ten years, the share of Federal receipts contributed by Southern Rhodesia as opposed to Northern Rhodesia, would tend to rise.

Q. And the share of Northern Rhodesia tends to fall in proportion?—A. Yes, though in a particular year this tendency might easily be exaggerated or offset by particular development in the world copper markets and, of course, by the state of the Northern Rhodesia mining industry. May I amplify that in one respect?

When one judges which Territory is losing, which Territory is gaining, it is not enough to look at the revenue side alone. As I have suggested, we have tried to look at what the different Territories get from the centre as well as what they contribute to it and I think it is right to qualify what I say by making a point that in the circumstances in which Southern Rhodesia can rightly be expected to contribute proportionately more, one might possibly expect, though this is perhaps less certain, that its share of Federal receipts would also rise so that although Southern Rhodesia may be putting more into the common pool in future years, the possibility should not be neglected that it may also be getting rather more out. So it may be a considerable time—neither of us would like to speculate about that—before Southern Rhodesia became a loser net, if it ever does, and Northern Rhodesia a gainer net—(MR. HAZLEWOOD): It should be emphasised that the gain Southern Rhodesia gets is not only the share of income tax revenue as fixed by the Constitution but, of course, the Federal Government's departmental expenditure in Southern Rhodesia for the benefit of Southern Rhodesia as compared with other Territories, Southern Rhodesia's main gains are more.

Q. I thought you rather attributed this trend to the copper prices, the fact that Northern Rhodesia is now becoming less of a loser?—A. (MR. HENDERSON): Not quite. I am afraid I did not put that clearly enough. The present trend looking at the revenue contribution has been very strongly away from Northern Rhodesia on the Federal side; but that represents a major swing from the position of the early days of Federation when copper was doing particularly well. Now it is doing particularly badly. We guess, looking ahead, that over good and bad years together we shall get a position which is intermediate between these two, with Northern Rhodesia, still the main contributor for some time to come probably taking the average of good copper years and bad copper years, on the whole tending to be overhauled; but on the expenditure side, however, it may be the Southern Rhodesia share will rise there as well.

Perhaps if I can illustrate that: the reason we think Southern Rhodesian contribution is likely to increase is that our guess would be that the economic expansion of Southern Rhodesia may be faster than the other two Territories. There are reasons for that which we can discuss. That means the tax collected there is tending to rise faster and faster. On the other hand, suppose that economic expansion goes on, as it well may, with a larger expansion in Southern Rhodesia of the European population. Then, since the Federal Government is largely responsible for European services this may well mean a shift in the distribution of expenditure on things like health, education, towards Southern Rhodesia. Similarly, if you look at the taxpayer's side, the tendency has been with fiscal review commissions to pay some attention to the fact that a Territory's contribution is increasing when deciding how much they should get out of income tax so the possibility should not be neglected, though it remains only a possibility, that Southern Rhodesia might reasonably claim and possibly get a slightly larger share of the income tax receipts. We have to look at the picture, both the revenue side and the expenditure side, even to guess about what is going to happen.

PROFESSOR JACK: I am not quite clear, Mr. Henderson, what the scope of this inquiry is. You begin by saying your memorandum is concerned with the effects on the economy of Nyasaland. Then your next paragraph goes on to deal with the general effects of Federation. Do I take it from what you have said that your interest in the Federal structure is only incidental to the main inquiry?—A. That is correct, yes.

Q. So your inquiry is really concerned with the economic effect on Nyasaland of its incorporation in the Federation?—A. Yes, although as in the instances we have just been discussing, it may not be possible or desirable to separate that fully from a more general analysis of the effects on three Territories.

Q. Yes, but I do not want to be putting questions to you which you do not feel happy to answer. We are concerned with the wider issues. We are not just concerned with the narrow question as to whether Nyasaland has been a net beneficiary. What I want to get from you is what lessons do you think we, as a Commission, can draw from your investigation into Nyasaland?—A. That is not an easy question to answer succinctly. I would have to say, first, that as far as we have been able to summarise we have tried to do so here. If I had to summarise the summary I think I would say two things. One has nothing much to do with Nyasaland, but I think it is one of the conclusions of our study and one which is stated under the first section of our conclusions; that the view which was quite often expressed at the time when Federation came in was that for economic reasons Federation was inevitable or so desirable that non-economic considerations were of relatively minor significance.

Q. It is not vital to your argument but who argued that for economic or technical reasons Federation was inevitable if not desirable? Inevitable! Who advanced that?—A. I certainly could not quote an authority in which the word "inevitable" is used.

Q. You used it yourself?—A. I used it myself.

Q. Did anyone in your travels in the Federation use the word "inevitable"?—A. By no means, no, we did not, in fact discuss this particular aspect of it very much.

Q. All you are endeavouring to say is that some people exaggerated the economic benefit of the Federation?—A. Yes I think that is correct.

Q. We could drop the word "inevitable"?—A. Yes, I would be quite happy to do that.

Q. Your second paragraph, you go on to say the effects of Federation appear on balance to have been positive. I suppose you mean there have been benefits?—A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. You then go on to argue or dispute about expenditure, about the size of the benefit, but you are putting the view that economically Federation has brought less advantage, setting aside political questions?—A. Yes.

Q. Do you agree that there have been economic benefits derived from Federation?—A. Yes.

Q. You say the main reason for this is that the level of government expenditure, both on current and on capital account, has been higher than it would have been without Federation. Then you say this may be attributed to the pooling of the revenues of the three Territories. You say the main reason for these benefits has been the increased level of government expenditure. Have there been no other contributing factors?—A. Our judgment is that any other contributing factors have probably been minor ones.

Q. You have seen estimates of the amount of new capital investment in the years before and after 1953?—A. Yes.

Q. Have you seen any divisions of these figures as between the public and the private sectors?—A. Yes, we have seen some figures on that.

Q. You have no doubt seen this Economic Survey of Africa since 1950 (indicating publication to the witness) and there are certain calculations there which suggest that not merely has the amount of new capital investment increased but the proportion of it which was in the private sector has increased too?—A. Yes.

Q. Has that not been a contributing factor?—A. Yes. My answer to that, I think, would be that our judgment is that the private investment itself may have been quite substantially affected by the expansion in the public sector, so to speak. The initial stimulus has come from the public sector and the private investor has been favourably affected by that in two important ways. First, with the higher level of public investment which we judge to be in some part due to the fact of Federation producing better facilities and interest—transport, communications, power supplies, town facilities—this itself has no doubt improved the attractiveness of the Federal area as a field for private investors. But in addition to that the

higher expenditure which has been associated with this higher public level has increased the size of the internal market to some extent over what it might otherwise have been, we think probably would otherwise have been, and this in itself has also been an inducement to private investors.

Q. In your paragraph you merely refer to this thing you call "main reasons". You do not refer to the other facts at all. I just wonder whether this paragraph gives a fair picture of the reasons for this economic expansion of the whole Federation.—A. If I may just make this point, we were not concerned so much with the reasons for the economic expansion but were trying to guess to what extent the course of this expansion might have been different had Federation in this form not come about.

Q. What are the lessons you think that we as a Commission should draw from the results of your inquiry as embodied in the memorandum?—A. One is the one I have already mentioned. The second I would put in this way: that it is sometimes suggested—I have not got a quotation with me—that one very important reason for the continuance of Nyasaland in the Federation is that without it Nyasaland would not be viable. The argument is put in various ways. The argument is sometimes if it were not within Federation the economic condition of Nyasaland would gravely deteriorate. I think that what our study suggests is that this would not necessarily be the case, that Nyasaland would not necessarily lose financially by an alternative political arrangement which involved severance of this connection with Southern Rhodesia except, I should add, as we point out in the conclusions, in the important respect of the access of Nyasa workers to the Southern Rhodesia labour market.

If we look at the main fiscal gain which Nyasaland has been estimated to have made since Federation, if we just look at the financial arithmetic of the matter, this would have been just as great, possibly even larger, had there been a political unit which comprised simply the two Northern Territories of the present Federation and I think we should draw the conclusion that for this reason the economic future of Nyasaland cannot be said to be a decisive factor in one's judgment as to what exactly the future political boundaries and constitutional relationships should be in the present Federation. We would say, I think, that what ought to happen to Nyasaland or to the Federation in general was not for us to tell you at all, but we would be prepared to say that we should personally take issue with you if, for instance, you said that Nyasaland had benefited very considerably from Federation as such and would be lost or non-viable without it, without mentioning the important part which Northern Rhodesia has played in this.

Q. You do point out, I think, in paragraph 2(b) that the Government of Southern Rhodesia has also gained appreciably and I do not think there is any dispute about that.—A. No.

Q. But to some extent this depends on the proportions upon which the income tax receipts are divided between the three Territories?—A. It does.

Q. I think one should not confuse the effects of the fiscal settlement with the economic advantages of Federation as such. Suppose, for example, these proportions were radically altered. It could happen that all the fiscal benefits accrued to Nyasaland and both Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia were the losers?—A. Yes, certainly.

Q. That in itself does not affect the economic argument for Federation, does it?—A. No.

Q. I wonder if there is not confusion here between the effects of the fiscal settlement and the economic case for Federation, which may be something quite different?—A. If I have taken your point correctly I think it is true that we have done something which is in a sense not strictly legitimate. That is to say, we have done this sum on Territorial Governmental gains and losses and we have done it on the basis, of course, of the figures we could get. One could certainly argue that those figures might well have been different had it not been for Federation and so, to some extent, we are looking not only at the purely re-distributive aspects of Federation, but also perhaps at the more general economic consequences because these may affect the extent of the re-distribution, but in a sense we may be said to have done our measure of re-distribution by using that data in a way which necessarily takes account of that without attempting to measure the economic effects; but there is no alternative procedure.—(MR. HAZLEWOOD): I have no statistics about it with me at all but my recollection is that if one looks at the table of financial investment that is given in the statement on national income that was published last August in the *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, a Federal publication, private investment was contributed to a very large degree by the re-investment of profits and by depreciation allowances and this gives possibly a misleading impression of how important private investment is in the financial investment in the economy as a whole. It is not new capital as such but

re-investment of profits in the copper industry, and it is noticeable when the slump in copper price came this proportion fell heavily, and a much higher proportion was contributed by government borrowing and government finance generally than before.

I cannot substantiate this on the spot but I think the figures of private investment should be looked at in this light because of the convention that re-investment by companies existing in the Federation is taken as new investment and not merely as ploughing back. The problem is that you can either treat total profits of companies owned abroad as an export of profits abroad and then any new investment as new inflow of capital—this convention gives an impression that the inflow of new capital is much greater than it really is.

Q. Could I take Mr. Henderson back to the point about fiscal settlement? Have you come to any view as to whether there is a case for revising the proportions?—A. (MR. HENDERSON): No, Sir.

Q. In paragraph 3(d)—it is true it is not in connection with the distribution of the income tax receipts, rather in connection with the Federal loan account—you say: "In drawing up Federal plans for capital expenditure, there appears to be little attempt to give special consideration to Nyasaland because of its poverty and backwardness." The inference from that is that they should have taken account of the special quality. By parity of reasoning could you not make a similar scheme for giving Nyasaland a greater proportion of the income tax receipts? I wondered whether you had looked at that point at all?—A. I think one could say yes, but my own feeling—speaking very much as a non-expert, I spent only a very short time in Nyasaland, my views on this would be very tentative—is that there probably would be a case for that but perhaps a stronger case exists for Federal Government's responsibility for the services which the Federal Government itself controls, spending rather a higher proportion of what they spend in Nyasaland as opposed to the other Territories. I think a case could be made out for that. I think an increase in Nyasaland's share of income tax might perhaps be better justified if it were considered in relation to an increase in the Territorial share as a whole. But I am certainly not trying to formulate any definite recommendations on that, nor would I be prepared to be at all specific.

If I may refer back to the point on share of investment, I should like to expand just a little what we said here. I think the problem is one about which it is hard to be dogmatic for two reasons. First, there are at least two important criteria which one can use in judging the way Federal expenditure generally is distributed and particularly capital expenditure. One is profitable criteria which can apply roughly; one can look at Kariba and Shire or Kariba and Kafue. Another is what one might loosely call need. I think one's judgment on the pattern which Federal development expenditure has taken, and I think Federal current expenditure too, very much depends on to what extent one regards one or other of these criteria as important in relation to the other. In fact in our conclusions to the study we have re-worded this paragraph of uncertainty, a sentence which may seem trite, perhaps, on balance, saying any judgment on the inadequacy of Nyasaland's share of Federal loan account expenditure must depend on the criteria which one used, and we add that in the text in fact there is not a lot of evidence about how exactly these criteria would work out; but one can make a judgment in general terms. If one looks at the thing in terms of what will pay off reasonably quickly, then the bias away from Nyasaland has to some extent, perhaps not entirely, been justifiable.

If, on the other hand, one says to oneself, here is a Territory with over one-third of the total population of the Federation which is conspicuously backward in relation to the other two, then 6%, we suggest, certainly does not seem generous and as I say both approaches are possible. My feeling is to some extent both are necessary but the answer which one arrives at about this would depend on which one places the most emphasis on and I would certainly not like to say I do not personally think Nyasaland's share is a bit too low. But I certainly would not make any definite recommendation without a much longer visit to the centre of operations.

Q. I can well appreciate your desire for academic caution but unfortunately this Commission has to take a more positive view. In the last paragraph, 4(b), you say: "This disadvantage of Federation could be offset if the Federal Government were to pursue a deliberate policy of fostering industrial development in Nyasaland. So far, however, this has not been attempted." Do you think that this can be done effectively under the present constitutional set-up, or have you no view on that? Would you like to go back to the beginning of your paragraph? "Federation has necessarily brought about a customs union and a common tariff for the three Territories" and some more about experience in other countries. Are you suggesting to us that this customs union and a common tariff

is a good or a bad thing?—A. Neither necessarily. I think that depends on from whose point of view you look at it and exactly how it operated. I think that so far the effects of this alone on Nyasaland have undoubtedly and provably been unfavourable and one must take this into account as well as the still even more undoubtedly financial benefits which the Government of Nyasaland has received since Federation.

Q. What advice on the point would you give the Commission?—A. I think my own judgment at the moment, if I were the Commission, would be to advise the Federal Government to realise that the successful promotion of industrial development in Southern Rhodesia, which to some extent has been at the expense of the Nyasaland consumer, ought to go together with an attempt to steer a higher proportion of public funds towards Nyasaland and a really keen scrutiny of the possibilities of Nyasaland and the desire not to miss any opportunity of getting anything done that seems to be worthwhile.

Q. Just a bit of advice you think we ought to give, not any suggestion about a change in the Constitution or economic set-up?—A. No. I do not think one could surrender control of tariffs to the individual Territories, no. But it is a pretty well recognised principle of most countries where any degree of customs union does exist that the central Government does take a certain amount of regard to needs. The relative position is not improved as a result of a customs union with more advanced areas. Examples of this are extremely numerous.

Q. I do not know whether you are familiar with the reports of the earlier committees dealing with Federation, particularly the one of March, 1951?—A. Yes.

Q. You remember that that had something to say about desirability of Federation from the economic angle, but they did suggest, among other things, the creation of certain new institutions of which one was a development commission. That is something on which no action was taken. Do you think it would be desirable institutional arrangement to bring into the Federation in the light of your last paragraph here?—A. I had not considered the problem of machinery and I think that would be difficult for someone who has no first hand acquaintance with the way in which the machinery of government is operated but I think I would be inclined to suggest that in the present developmental planning machinery the Territories ought to be brought in as such with the drawing up of plans, and not just be an organ of co-ordination by the Federal ministry of the individual schemes of Federal departments but there should be explicit recognition of the Territorial interests, or representation of the Territorial governments. My main point is that the informal co-operation is pretty well developed but it might be a help to the position of both Northern Territories in this respect if, as I say, there was formal recognition of the interests of the Northern Territories in seeing that they get what they regard as being a reasonable share in developmental expenditure.

Q. But you have not thought of the machinery that might be used for that purpose?—A. No.

MR. TAYLOR: Mr. Henderson, I would like to take you back to your answer to the Chairman at the beginning. The Government accounts are kept on a functional basis and are not divided into expenditure by Territories or revenue receipts from Territories?—A. Quite true.

Q. How did you manage to get to the estimates that you have given us, what processes did you use?—A. Let me take the expenditure side first. I walked into an office in Salisbury and asked what information they had about this and we discovered, rather to our surprise, that they had extremely complete information about the break down by Territory of Federal governmental expenditure on current account. I have the information in tabular form here. In almost every case, with very minor changes of one or two items on their part which we ourselves suggested, we took their figures. All the data which we have about Federal Government current expenditure came directly from the Federal Treasury.

Q. Then do your estimates cover a quinquennium from 1954/55 to 1958/59?—A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Probably the same figures we have in front of us here produced from the same source.—A. Yes, I imagine so.

Q. It is revealed that Southern Rhodesia was a net contributor to the tune of £1½ m. in the fiscal year 1958/59, the year in which Northern Rhodesia was a net contributor of £5½ m., having fallen from £12 m. at the beginning of the quinquennium. They must, I think, be the same figures?—A. I think you are referring to the revenue side, to payments by the Territories to the centre.

Q. No, the same basis that you described. Payments by the Territories to the centre and receipts by the Territories both in the shape of their own share of revenue and Federal Government expenditure within their boundaries and the figures I have given are the differences between the in-put and the output.—A. I see.

Q. In 1958/59 Southern Rhodesia was a net contributor to the extent, in round figures, of £1½ m. Do your figures show the same group?—A. No, not quite. Our results, 1958/59, are based on provisional data only and may also differ from the data which the Federal Officials supplied you with because they will have used their own methods and probably better methods for estimating Territorial origins of revenue, we used our own methods and then we did not get the information from them. Because of those two facts there may well be a difference between estimates which we give and estimates they give and our estimate, in fact, is rounding off which is all one can do. We have no gain or loss for Southern Rhodesia in that year.

MR. TAYLOR: At what point of time did you walk into an office in Salisbury?—A. First in July, 1959.

Q. So that the figures for 1958/59 would be rather tentative at that time?—A. Yes, on the revenue side the figures were certainly very tentative. We were told that as regards the figures on the expenditure side there would be no more than minor adjustments needed. They were much surer on expenditure than revenue. On the other hand we could not have been much deterred by this because since we had to use our own methods on the revenue side—they had not done the work for us, shall I say—there was little more information we could have used than we have used.

Q. But it is unlikely to be as accurate as an estimate prepared in February 1960, from the same sources. I suppose the Federal Treasury provided you with your figures and provided us with ours?—A. Not quite. They provided us with all our figures on the expenditure side on the distribution of Federal current expenditure: on the revenue side they supplied us with a number of figures which were of considerable value in helping us to make our estimates of the territorial origins of Federal current revenue, but those estimates are ours and not theirs. I believe when we were there they had not got such a figure, though to be frank I should be surprised if their estimate was not better because they have better sources of information at their disposal and extremely able people working on it, but I would not like to give you a final judgment without being able to talk across the table with the chaps concerned and see their worksheets.

Q. Quite so. In paragraph 1(a) of your general effects—the point Professor Jack has made—you say it is clear that the actual and potential benefits of Federation have been greatly exaggerated. I know we must be careful of “*post hoc ergo hoc*” and so forth, but are you aware of any geographical area in which the actual economic rate of growth of any gross national product, of any other measuring rod of economic activity, has grown at a faster rate within a geographical area on this side of the Iron Curtain?—A. (MR. HAZLEWOOD): I would not be able to quote an example of an area where the rate of growth has been greater. What is more relevant is that despite apparent misconceptions, as far as I can see from the data originally published, the rate of growth before Federation was in fact somewhat greater than the rate of growth in the years since Federation. I am not saying that this has anything to do with Federation or not, but simply that from all the data of national accounts that I can find this is what I suggest.

Q. Might that not be because you have been spreading a given amount of butter over a larger area, and therefore you are bound to get a thinner spread?—A. No, this was the combined figure for the three Territories before Federation. Of course, before Federation the data are not nearly as good as after Federation, and it may be that the whole thing is due to inadequacy in the statistics; but so far as I have been able to see there is no evidence whatsoever for the fact that the rate of growth has been greater since Federation, except in S. Rhodesia. On a breakdown of the figures territorially, one finds the rate of growth for N. Rhodesia and Nyasaland has been slower since Federation, and faster for S. Rhodesia. For the Federation as a whole it has been slower.

Q. In paragraph 2(d), “It cannot necessarily be concluded that if Nyasaland became a separate political unit again the Territorial government would lose the full amount of its present fiscal gains. This would depend on the amount of external assistance which was made available.” What sort of assistance had you in mind there, Mr. Henderson?—A. (MR. HENDERSON): I would say primarily the British Government.

Q. In the shape of loans or grants?—A. (MR. HAZLEWOOD): I would have thought that either or both were a possibility. That is necessarily speculative, and that is why we said “not necessarily” and no more.

Q. We were told when discussing this in Nyasaland that charity of that kind was really no substitute for an equity interest in an expanding economy. Would you agree with that, or would you think that charity was just as good?—A. I would put it in a slightly different way and say that even if

the British Government assisted Nyasaland financially in such a way as to leave it no worse off if its political connection were severed not only with S. Rhodesia but N. Rhodesia as well—that if the British Government did this the main difference would be that this, as I have implied, would not necessarily or even probably be a continuing source of help: so far as one can see ahead there is no date on which the Nyasaland Government will not be gaining financially from the Federal connection or, if you will, the N. Rhodesia connection.

Q. I do not know if you have any knowledge of the process of extracting money from the British Treasury, but I believe it is very unusual to get any promise this year of what you are going to get next year. You seem to have taken that point too?—A. That is true, but it may be less true in some cases than others, as for example the recent case of Malta, or Sierra Leone.

MR. CHIRWA: What about Kenya?—A. Yes, and I imagine also, though I have not seen the figures, the same could be said of Cyprus. 1960 is not like 1952, and the British Government in general and the Colonial Office in particular have adopted a different attitude towards this.

MR. TAYLOR: My impression, reading your remarks, Mr. Henderson, is that you have under-estimated the value of private investment decisions in the private sector of the economy. A great deal of the investment and the growth of the Federation was undoubtedly due to private investment decisions. One of the things—though I am not saying it is desirable but it is the most visible and evident—is the rash of skyscrapers which has gone up all over Salisbury. There are other things, but that is one of the most striking and visible. Do you believe that as many investment decisions would have been made in the absence of Federation as have been made in its presence?—A. I think our answer to that would be—this is academic caution—that we do not, of course, know. Secondly we would think that the answer was that fewer skyscrapers would have gone up, perhaps noticeably fewer; and that over the Federation as a whole I think rather more skyscrapers have gone up than would have gone up in the absence of Federation. It would be misleading to judge on Salisbury alone, because if there was one city which stood to benefit it was the Federal capital and the capital of an expanding Territory.

Q. I pointed out that the skyscrapers were one visible symbol of investment decisions, but there were many other forms.—A. Yes, I take them as symbolic.

Q. In paragraph 3(d) where you say little attempt has been made, it appears, to give special consideration to Nyasaland because of its poverty and backwardness, I am sure you have studied the papers which emerged as a result of the London Conference on the Constitution in 1953 when a particular point was made in a section called “Tempo of Development” that something should be done to bring the level of the north up to something more approaching the level of the south?—A. Yes.

Q. In the first fiscal commission, after sums of money had been allocated to defray the cost of the various government services, in the functions which fell to them certain unallocated monies were put into the revenue pool: Northern Rhodesia to the extent of £2 million, S. Rhodesia £500,000, and Nyasaland £400,000: that was tax revenue for which there was no immediate need, and they could apply the revenue to capital purposes if they wanted to. Were you aware of that?—A. No.

Q. You will find that in Cmd. 8672.—A. That is the Fiscal Revenue Commission?

Q. In 3(b) you say, “The argument that public capital investment in Nyasaland has been higher because of the higher level of borrowing made possible by the greater creditworthiness of the Federal as opposed to the Territorial Government is open to question.” Would you be kind enough to enlarge on that?—A. Yes, the argument as quoted there is one which we have seen in a discussion of the fiscal benefits accruing to Nyasaland from Federation which I believe was prepared in the Secretariat in Zomba. Our feeling about that particular question we put as follows: the Nyasaland Government before Federation, it is true, was able to borrow very little. This is not, I think, only a question of its creditworthiness or lack of creditworthiness in the sense in which I would understand the term, but to the extreme pressure on the London market of colonial issues in post-war years. In other words, the fact that they only managed to raise one major loan before 1952 for general purposes, which I believe was the case, and that this took a very long time must be attributed not simply to their budgetary position—or however one interprets the term “creditworthiness”—or even to their inability to borrow on the London Market, but simply due to a rush on the market, and Nyasaland had to wait its turn. Also a good deal of public investment in Nyasaland is done by the Federal Government through its own departments for services for which it is responsible.

Q. In 3(d) where you come to the 6% argument, you are not in that 6% taking account of the factor you have spoken about, namely Federal Government capital expenditure on Federal Government functions?—A. Yes.

Q. You are merely taking Nyasaland's share of expenditure?—A. Yes, the loan account expenditure is another phase as distinct from the current expenditure: the Nyasaland share of the current expenditure is higher than 6%—if I have understood your question correctly.

Q. No, the Nyasaland share of public borrowings has been 6%: its own governmental share of public issues has been 6%. The point I am making is that on top of that 6% there has been capital expenditure for Federal purposes financed by the Federal Government's share of public issues, as, for instance, the building of a new hospital in Nkata Bay, or something of that kind. Does that fall within your 6%?—A. Yes, that is the 6% of Federal expenditure financed either from the revenue surpluses or from the Federal Government's statutory share of the Territorial Governments' external borrowing. So if you ask yourself what determines total public investment in Nyasaland, whether it happens by Territorial or Federal agency, then I think one should point out that it depends not only on how much the Federal Government can borrow where its creditworthiness is very much in point and clearly relevant but also on what Nyasaland gets as its share of the expenditure which the Federal Government finances out of its borrowings; in other words out of Federal Loan Account expenditure. This is an important factor which affects Nyasaland.

Q. Is your source of information there the same as in your revenue and expenditure?—A. Our source of information is through the Federal Treasury.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: With regard to 2(a), it rather appears as though you do not regard the £4 million per annum as a matter of any great importance, but have you knowledge of what has actually been done with that £4 million a year as compared with what could have been done without it?—A. We certainly did not intend to imply that we regarded this as being of small importance with regard to Nyasaland Government revenues. We said it was a large contribution.

Q. You pointed out that the benefits had been greatly exaggerated. One got the impression that the general tendency was rather to play down the value of it.—A. The "exaggeration" referred to an earlier point and not to the point of the £4 million mentioned in paragraph 2(a). In fact, if I may say so, our estimate of this, right or wrong and for better or worse, is very considerably higher than any estimate that so far has been given. In the circumstances we certainly would not be disposed to underrate its relative importance to the Nyasaland Government: if anything, in the light of estimates of other commentators, we have over-stated it, though we do not think so.

Q. In relation to all such matters as health and education and so on, £4 million in Nyasaland is a very vital matter indeed.—A. Yes. May I just make one point on this, if I can go a little beyond the terms of reference we set ourselves, I think it is the case that some of this expenditure—I am not criticising the position but merely making the point—some of the increase in expenditure has gone in fact to services which are either entirely or at least partly for Europeans; that some of it necessarily—and this is inevitable—has gone in ways which, though one would not deny their importance to the well-being of Africans, perhaps do not show up in ways that Africans themselves find obvious or easy to appreciate. If one looks simply at the very tangible things which one can reasonably attribute to the improved public finance position, the absolute sum involved—I agree it is relatively large—per head of the population, let us say, is certainly not large. I do not wish to commit myself to the judgment that it ought to be larger; but I simply say that I do not think it is surprising if I can express a non-economic opinion, that it is jolly difficult to find a Nyasaland African who is fully appreciative of the expenditure.

Q. But if you were in Nyasaland and you were told you would not get that £4 million, you would think it a serious thing?—A. It is true to say that any European or African who was responsible for the management of a public debt would certainly regard it as serious, yes.

Q. In 2(c) you make a positive statement that "if Nyasaland had been associated with Northern Rhodesia alone, the gains referred to would have been substantially larger." That more or less arithmetical statement is not a very helpful one.—A. No, in the arithmetical sense it is reasonably obvious in that any plausible assumption would show this; and we made this not because we regard it as having any political implication, nor to give positive advice to the Commission on this—far from it. We made it only because it had never been made before, and we thought it was a point worth making.

Q. But whether there ever would or could have been such a situation you do not express an opinion about.—A. I think, if I may say so, it would have been wrong for us to do so.

Q. It depends on the object of the exercise. Could you tell us what was the basis of this? How did you come to undertake this study—was it done for any particular purpose or organisation?—A. No, it was done as a piece of private research which was made possible by a private financial contribution which covered our expenses. It was made to a fund which my College in Oxford operates for the encouragement of research, and the expenses of the study, apart from some incidental expenses which were met from the College itself, were met from this. We went primarily as research workers interested in finding out the answers.

Q. You have mentioned your terms of reference once or twice. Could you tell us if they are substantially what is stated in the first sentence of your memorandum?—A. Yes, that is exactly it. The terms which we used more formally were to enquire into the economic and financial effects on Nyasaland the Territory's inclusion in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

PROFESSOR CREIGHTON: In paragraph 2(b), you say "the gains to Nyasaland have so far been the result, not of Federation as such, but of association with Northern Rhodesia." The only way I can see in which the general statement has been qualified is by the phrase "so far", and yet in discussion this afternoon, if I understand your statements correctly, you have suggested that the contribution of N. Rhodesia has at least to some extent been the result of rather abnormally high copper prices and that Southern Rhodesia's contribution has also increased; and we have documented that by the latest figures for this year. You have also suggested why S. Rhodesia's contribution is likely to be increased further in the near future. I wonder whether that paragraph gives an accurate description of your full views on this matter because at no other place that I can see in this document have those considerations been advanced.—A. May I just go over that point again? First, it is true that the early years of Federation were perhaps abnormally favourable from the point of view of Northern Rhodesia. It is also true that the year 1958/9, to which Mr. Taylor referred, was abnormally low and also that the current financial years of 1959/60 would be even more abnormally low. The tax paid by the N. Rhodesia Government in respect of profits earned by the copper mining industry relates not to its present price but to the price some 18 months before, so that in the financial year 1959/60 and also in 1958/9 the tax paid in respect of that would have been very much affected by the recession which began in 1957.

Q. I was thinking of your previous statement that copper prices were currently abnormally low.—A. No, I should have thought not. A lot depends on industrial relations in Chile and North America; but I should have thought this was not abnormal. 1959/60 is not an abnormal year for copper, but in the public finances it will be shown as having been an abnormal year for copper; so if we took a year which we could agree to, for the sake of argument, the early years of Federation up to and including 1957/8 were perhaps better than average for copper but the two years 1958/9 and 1959/60 have been worse than average, and the fact that they are average now will mean that the next one or two financial years will be closer to the average probably than any we have seen.

Q. Yes, but then you have also suggested you thought that S. Rhodesia's contribution would be likely to increase.—A. That is certainly the case, and that is the reason we put in "so far". That is in fact developed at considerably greater length. Let me put my view extremely crudely, if I may, and let us leave out any idea of any abnormally unfavourable years for copper. If you take Territorial contributions to total Federal revenue, including the whole of income tax, apart from Territorial surcharge, right over the years from Federation so far including 1958/9—so we are not getting too bad a spread—the N. Rhodesia and S. Rhodesia aggregate contributions, so far as we have been able to estimate, have been just below half. We would predict—without any great confidence—that if you take the good copper years and the bad copper years alike the S. Rhodesia share would tend to rise above the N. Rhodesia one. That is so in spite of the proportions being roughly something of the order of N. Rhodesia 49, S. Rhodesia 47: it might be N. Rhodesia 45 and S. Rhodesia 51—that sort of ratio. I attach no significance to it, but we think it is more likely than not to go in that direction. On the expenditure side the benefits which the Territories get, there are two things: one is income tax, that is Territorial income tax, of which the S. Rhodesia share is comparatively low. It is less than 40%. That is to say it is less than the S. Rhodesia share of contributions. If we look at Federal current expenditure as distinct from income tax, the S. Rhodesia share has averaged well over 60 per cent, which is of course higher than its share of contributions to revenue. Since current expenditure

greatly exceeds income tax, the average we get by taking the two together is much nearer 60% than 40% and consequently the S. Rhodesian share of the outgoings from the centre has been nearer 55 than 50% while its contributions have been just under 50. That is why it has gained. N. Rhodesia has lost not because its revenues have been much greater than S. Rhodesia's—that it not true—but because its share of the benefits coming out, shall I say, has been lower. So if we are going to say exactly what is going to happen to the gain or loss we must look not only at the proportion of contribution but also at the proportion of benefits coming to S. Rhodesia.

Q. I am looking now at figures for the four years 1955/6 to 1958/9, which range from nearly £57 million for the first of those years to £30.4 million for the last of them. In other words there is no suggestion of a constant and steady increase at all, which is what I thought you said earlier.—A. No, there are two points on that. First, the absolute figures tend to alter for all territories last year, because it was the worse year for public finance in the Federation so what we have to look at there is proportion, and what has happened—if our figures are correct, and I imagine they are based on closely similar data—is that in the first two years of Federation the S. Rhodesia share was about two-thirds. In the last two years it has been 63 per cent. I am not suggesting it was not going to rise in the future but from developments which themselves might be associated with higher economic expansion in S. Rhodesia might also contribute to increasing the S. Rhodesian share, and that is certainly a possibility which cannot be ignored.

Q. Your estimate is something that goes against both the relative and the absolute figures.—A. It depends on which way we take the comparison. If we take 1956/7 and 1958/9 there is no relative decline, but if we take the first two years and the last two years there is a slight decline. Whether one can read into these figures for the five years a tendency to decline, I would not like to say, though if you wish to put that interpretation on it I would not be in a position to say you were wrong, or even to produce evidence which cast serious doubt on it.

Q. The point I wanted to make was that I thought this particular sentence about the gains to Nyasaland so far having been the result of association with Northern Rhodesia and also the sentence on the previous page, "This may be attributed to the pooling of the revenues of the three Territories, which has meant that the proceeds of the taxes arising from the copper industry have accrued to the Federation as a whole rather than to the Government of N. Rhodesia alone". Those statements, not qualified as you have qualified them this afternoon, do they really represent your full answer just now?—A. No, it would be impossible.

Q. But since you have qualified them so extensively you might have gone a little further on that.—A. The extent to which you have qualified them is rather different from mine.

Q. I see. In 2(d) you say, "it cannot necessarily be concluded that if Nyasaland became a separate political unit again the Territorial Government would lose the full amount of its present fiscal gains." This may be a mere quibble, but the present fiscal gains are the present proportion of the basic income tax and, as Mr. Taylor says, is equated in the general political development programme in the country. It would certainly lose those, would it not? They go with the Federation and something entirely different is substituted.—A. That is true. It would certainly be entirely different.

Q. The suggestion is here almost that the fiscal gains would not go: they would go without any question.—A. If you put the question to me as positively as that I shall have to answer first—clearly I do not know and this is a matter of speculation: secondly that my personal opinion, which is worth very little as I am not an expert, is that no British Government could fail to make a substantial contribution to Nyasaland if that Territory became separate.

Q. My point is rather different. The present fiscal gains are settled by the Constitution and by the interest in the governmental programme, and those would certainly go. Something else would have to be substituted.—A. (Mr. HAZLEWOOD): Perhaps it should be phrased "would lose an amount equal to".

Q. Perhaps it is a small point.—A. Can I just add a point which has some relevance—our estimates are based on data of Nyasaland's contribution to Federal customs revenue, which is derived from the present tariff whereby goods from the rest of the Federation, and notably from S. Rhodesia, do not carry customs duty; but if the Federation were broken up and under the Nyasaland tariff duty was charged on S. Rhodesian exports as well as others, without any rise in the final cost to the consumer a greater amount could be derivable in terms of customs revenue than the amount we have used in our estimates, and therefore as a sum it would not be possible to put a figure on it; but it would be a sum to set against the loss suffered by the break-up.

Q. I am wondering what method you used to estimate the burden.—A. We have not attempted to estimate the burden as a global sum: that would have been impossible on the information available to us and impossible for anyone unless a special enquiry were carried out into the import and export structure of Nyasaland. What we did was to take certain commodities which, on general grounds and because it was important to consider statistics on Nyasaland when they were available—it is some years ago, we thought important to the African market, and to estimate the effect of the tariff changes of these items. We were particularly led to that because of things said to us in Nyasaland and because the only statement we had seen about the tariff was in the memorandum which was circulated in this country by Rhodesia House, based primarily on data assembled primarily for Professor Jack's Commission in Nyasaland previously which was primarily concerned with fiscal re-distribution. There was a passage to the effect that the general tariff had come down. When one looks at the tariff changes it is possible to see that a simple statement of that sort is not meaningful because the whole structure of the tariff has changed. One cannot say what the effect has been unless one looks at certain items of imports, and not only that but one looks at the sources they come from and their average values; and one should also be concerned with what groups or communities one is thinking about, because the tariff will be different in different groups. The Nyasaland tariff was a simple, non-discriminatory one which imposed either specific or *ad valorem* duties according to commodities. The Federal tariff has four columns, which discriminates according to source, but the four columns are departed from in some instances and some commodities which normally come under the "cheap" column and are from sources on the "cheap" column are taken, for some commodities and charged at a higher rate. This applies for instance to cotton piece goods. They are in fact taken out and column (d) and (g) rates apply to them. Also in many items there is a reference that the *ad valorem* or specific duty applies, whichever gives the highest yield, so merely looking at the *ad valorem* rates does not give one a true idea of what the tariff rates are. If we take the goods which used to come in from Hong Kong and India and compare now the rate of specific duty which is applied to the Federal tariff, the increase is very marked. One cannot go further than point to these instances which I think suggest that an inquiry into this matter would be desirable in order to find out what the impact of the tariff was, because from the available data one cannot really say more than that there is a case for investigation. As far as one can see the effects are strongly adverse, but one cannot put a figure on this without a more general inquiry into the pattern of imports and exports and consumption of different items.

Mr. ROBINSON: I am not an economist and so it is difficult for me to follow a lot of these arguments and discussions. I would be grateful if you would help me in a rather more simple way on the main point. I understand you to say you were charged by your College or through this particular grant to some organisation at your College to prepare a paper on the economic and financial effects of the inclusion of Nyasaland in the Federation. I presume this study would include both a study of the past seven years and also an appreciation of what is likely to happen in the future—would that be correct?—A. (Mr. HENDERSON): Chiefly the first.

Q. But if you are doing a study of these effects upon the country for general consumption the second portion must be of some importance. I ask you that question because we are not concerned with the past but we are very much concerned with the future. I would like to know from you whether you advise us, from the economic and financial point of view, if it would make no difference to Nyasaland if it was to secede from the Federation?—A. This is on the assumption that Nyasaland becomes a separate territory, a reversion to its former status?

Q. Yes, do you advise this Commission that after your study of the case, if Nyasaland were excluded from Federation and were to become a separate entity—the Federation was broken up and Nyasaland stood on its own—would it make any difference to its position in the future?—A. So that it would have in that case no connection with N. Rhodesia and S. Rhodesia? It would make a substantial difference, certainly.

Q. Would you say then it would be absolutely dependent on the charity of the United Kingdom?—A. May I choose my own form of words? What I would say is that the Nyasaland Government would be financially worse off to an extent which is extremely large in relation to what it would then have at its disposal, unless the British Government or some other source of external assistance came to its help.

Q. Then would you say not entirely dependent but dependent to the extent of £4.5 million a year higher than the one we have given, and to that extent it would have to rely upon a charitable grant to maintain its current position, let alone expand its services?—A. Broadly that would be so, yes.

Q. In your visit did you get any impression that large sums of capital were required to advance the well being of the people of Nyasaland?—A. That is a very difficult one to answer.

Q. In your discussions with authorities and government officials and other sources, did you get the impression that the present tempo of public expenditure was adequate for the needs of the people of Nyasaland?—A. Our impression, I think, was that certainly all those connected with the spending departments concerned felt they would like more and could use more, and more could be spent with considerable benefit.

Q. In other words much more was needed?—A. (MR. HAZLEWOOD): This was not a universal opinion outside Nyasaland. There was an opinion expressed in fact that if Nyasaland had any more resources it could not use them productively: but we have not examined that. Presumably this is one of the things which comes out of Professor Jack's survey. It is not what we were studying—a study of the general economy of Nyasaland.

Q. Dealing with the capital picture, you said you were not sure and had no particular knowledge on the subject but you believed the difficulty in getting capital loan funds for Nyasaland prior to Federation was that people had to queue up in the market here. Have you gone into the question of whether that was the case? Have you satisfied yourselves conclusively that that is the reason why Nyasaland did not get more money?—A. (MR. HENDERSON): I did not suggest it was the only reason, but that it was one reason.

Q. Have you any idea of the difference in capital sums that were made available in the seven years preceding Federation to the several Territories and those which they have been able to raise in the last seven years on the international market?—A. This is taking British colonies together?

Q. Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.—A. We have not got that, no.

Q. You see, I am trying to see why your colleague made a statement which I find very difficult to follow, and that is that the tempo of expansion in the Territories prior to Federation was at a higher rate than since Federation. I do not understand all these statistical arguments, but looking around the country and looking at the figures of actual loans which the Governments have been able to borrow in the international capital market and referring to the private injection of capital funds into the Federation, you say that is at a slower tempo than before Federation?—A. (MR. HAZLEWOOD): The answer is that all the statistics show that there was a slower rate of growth and illustrate the extent to which copper still dominates the economy—when copper prices fall incomes fall and the price of the national product falls.

Q. What do you use for making your statement? I am completely convinced at the moment that it makes no difference on what you have told us today whether Nyasaland continues in this arrangement or not, and I want to be absolutely certain that is what you are trying to tell us. One of the things you said this afternoon, as I understood it, was that the rate of growth of the Territories as separate entities was higher in the years preceding Federation than it has been since Federation. How do you judge that?—A. Of the Federation as a whole and the two Northern Territories, but not of Southern Rhodesia by itself.

MR. TAYLOR: In making that statement—have you sufficiently explained to Mr. Robinson—I take it you are taking the post-war years, say 1946/7?—A. Yes, a period of comparable length.

Q. Are you allowing the Commission to take sufficient note of the fact that the years 1946/7 to 1953 were years of continuous boom, whereas 1953/4 was the last year of a world recession and 1956/7 was similarly a year of world recession, and in 1956 the bottom dropped out of copper prices? The rate in the geographical area of the Federation was 13 per cent before Federation and only 9 per cent after, but the Federation as a geographical area is wide open to world influences. I hope you are not trying to let us infer that after Federation the rate of growth died down because of Federation?—A. Not at all, no. When I made the original statement to you about the rate of growth I specifically mentioned I was making no statement about it, but it was dominated by world economy.

Q. But there was a recession in 1953/54 and another one in 1957/58 which affected the growth of many countries, including the Federation countries.—A. The recession of 1953/4 would tend to minimise the comparison, to make the rate of growth before Federation smaller; so that works in favour of my argument and not against it.—(MR. HENDERSON): If I may summarise what I understand our position to be, in broad terms we would find it extremely hard to say what difference Federation has made to the rate of economic expansion but, as has been pointed out, taking the test of the national pro-

duct, which appears to have been lower since Federation, is not in the least indicative that it is due to Federation and that our guess—and it is really no more than a guess, not even a very well-informed guess—so far as there has been an effect which you can trace back to having Federation rather than having no Federation, this has been a stimulation and the rate of growth has been higher since Federation. If this is so it has probably been largely due to precisely the factor you picked out, namely the high level of public money.

Q. Has that by any chance anything to do with the improved creditworthiness of Federation in world markets?—A. I should have guessed it was rather the other way round, that the borrowing was made possible by the creditworthiness itself.

Q. Do you think the fact of Federation appealed to those people who lent money on the international money markets and made possible loans to what is now an entity to an extent very much higher than might have been the case if there had been no Federation?—A. I think one has to look at the type of loan. My guess and this is certainly a guess because we have very little information, is that insofar as it has had an effect I would have expected it to be positive.

Q. But that is about as far as you will go?—A. I will add that very material point that Kariba is a very big slice of this, and I presume you were taking that into account. So far as one can determine, looking at past history, if it had not been for Federation there would have been no Kariba but there would have been the Kafue scheme instead.

Q. Whom do you think would have financed that?—A. That I think would have been financed to a very much larger extent than was possible or desirable in the case of Kariba from the reserves of the Northern Rhodesia Government.

Q. Is that shown to be the case from figures at your disposal?—A. It is by no means so, but let me put it this way—partly because of the copper situation, the Northern Rhodesia Government was losing financially—let us say it was receiving back less than it was paying out to the centre. Had there been no Federation it would have been a very healthy financial situation. Northern Rhodesia would have had substantial revenue surpluses, I would have guessed, and on the strength of this together with revenue surpluses I would have thought it would get a direct loan from the British governmental institutions and from the Copperbelt as well—you may dispute this, but this is my guess—and there would not have been any substantial difficulty in financing the Kafue scheme. Had this been so, much more would have come from inside the Federation and less from outside, and the scheme itself would have been initially a great deal smaller and the amount of expenditure would have been considerably less than with the first stage of Kariba.

Q. You have ascertained those facts officially, have you?—A. Yes. I would not like to be held exactly to the figures, but instead of £55 million for Kafue, perhaps financed up to a third from inside, you had £80 million for Kariba, financed only to a very small percentage from inside the Federation.

Q. What percentage, do you know?—A. The Federal Government had to put up from its own revenue surplus or reserves only £6 million in the first stage, which I believe—the final figures have not come to my knowledge even if they have been published—has not had to be used because the first stage cost slightly less than was estimated.

Q. That is all the money that was used?—A. Yes, except for some which came from the copper companies.

Q. Do you know how much came from them?—A. £20 million.

Q. And what about the banks and the Chartered Company?—A. The Chartered Company was £4 million and the banks £10 million each. I would not call those alternative uses.

PROFESSOR CREIGHTON: Will the document or book that you are going to publish be published as the personal views of yourself and Mr. Hazlewood after research and investigation into this matter, or is it going to be published as a document related to Lincoln College, Oxford? Will it be a research work to be published to the world in respect of Oxford University?—A. No, it will be published in the form of a short separate book and in the *Bulletin* of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics, which is a research institute: but the *Bulletin* takes no responsibility at all, nor does my College.

Q. Would you see any cause to change any part of your paper as a result of this afternoon's deliberations?—A. I think, in view of Professor Jack's earlier criticism, I would take out "inevitable".

PROFESSOR JACK: That is a verbal point.—A. May I also say some of the points I have made this afternoon which do not appear here.

MR. TAYLOR: Would you see fit at all to revise the original text in the light of these deliberations?—A. (MR. HAZLEWOOD):

Do you mean the final study or the memorandum submitted to the Commission?

CHAIRMAN: You are saying this is very much of a summary and that much of what you have told us is an extension of it because it is contained in the survey.—A. The Professor and I may still be at cross-purposes on this. I do not know what my colleague feels, but I certainly do not feel at the moment that we would want to modify the text of the study in any specific way.

MR. TAYLOR: What was the actual rate of growth before Federation in Nyasaland?—A. (MR. HAZLEWOOD): Unfortunately I mislaid the figures for this section of our study and have not got them in my head, but whichever measure one takes of the national accounts and whether one takes it in current prices or constant prices—and one can only do this with one particular measure—it shows that, taking the base year on the one hand as 1954, 100, and on the other hand the year 1950, 100, the increase in 1958 is smaller than the increase in 1954.

Q. Of Nyasaland, not the Federation?—A. Of the Federation area of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, but not Southern Rhodesia.

MR. CHIRWA: May I know, as a layman, whether if Nyasaland left the Federation and remained by itself there would be any gain in the customs duties in view of the fact that it would have to charge independent customs, and also in view of the fact that products of Southern Rhodesia would depend to some extent on trade in that country?—A. I think there would be some increase, but as I said before I think it would be impossible on the information at present available to put any figure on that. The customs tariff has caused a switch in consumption in Nyasaland from imports from outside the Federation to Southern Rhodesian goods which come in duty free. This has come about with some of these commodities because of a rise in the tariff. This means that if a Nyasaland tariff were imposed without any further rise in prices there would be an increase in customs revenue. Put it this way: that cheap goods from Hong Kong, let us say, would come in and pay duty and in place of their goods free goods coming from Southern Rhodesia therefore the difference would take the form of a tariff contribution to the Government.

Q. But the customs duties on the goods from Southern Rhodesia would be borne. At present it is duty free?—A. There would then be a switchback that Southern Rhodesian goods would not be purchased but goods from Hong Kong, to take an example.

Q. There is another point. Did you find the amount of revenue that Nyasaland used to gain from customs duties before Federation and the revenue from income tax obtained?—A. Yes. I have not got the figures here to quote them but my recollection is that the allocation we were able to make of the customs duty derived from Nyasaland was really not much different from the customs duty that Nyasaland collected in the year before Federation which is rather surprising given the increase in the national income in Nyasaland but to what extent the figures were due to errors in data—it does require an allocation of customs revenue to find out how much derives from Nyasaland income, how much is due to errors, how much is due to the fact that Southern Rhodesian goods coming in duty free have replaced goods on which previously they paid out—we are not in a position to say.

Q. Could it not be said that the expenditure per head in Southern Rhodesia is much greater because of the salary structure of the European population which is much higher and if Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had a Federation between those two Territories naturally it would increase possibly the revenues of those Territories and at the same time increase the expenditure per head in those Territories? As you have said from our point of view a great deal of this money goes to Southern Rhodesia to maintain the European structure which has been imposed on that country. If that was done away with, this amount from Northern Rhodesia which is now going to Southern Rhodesia, could be used between Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland but in an economy which is lower than Southern Rhodesia and therefore it would tend to increase not only the revenues of those Territories but also the revenue earning of the African people and you would, I think, obviously have Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia earning more than in association with Southern Rhodesia.—A. (MR. HENDERSON): We only confine ourselves here to a very narrow statement which is that during these years it seems to be very nearly provable, certainly highly probable, that the Southern Rhodesian Government has gained on current account. If we then make what is a very questionable but I think the only possible assumption to illustrate this, we assume that there was a federation or political union which excluded Southern Rhodesia but in which in other respects the figures were the same for the two Territories then concerned, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. We simply made that assumption and saw

where it took us. Since Southern Rhodesia gained over this period, going through the procedure I briefly described, we are finding a formula giving back a union to the two Northern Territories apart from Southern Rhodesia, and if we do that then on almost any reasonable assumption about the division they are both rather better off and we simply refer to the fact that on any probable assumption about the size of revenue and distribution of expenditure between the two, Nyasaland would financially be better off. It does not follow, of course, as we have been discussing earlier, that this will continue to be the case for some time in the future though perhaps less than the early years of the Federation.

About the second half of your question whether in that case it would not be possible for a joint Government for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to increase the prospects of the prosperity of the two Territories if they were separated I am afraid I shall have to dodge that. But I think one thing that one could point to here which I think is possibly an argument in favour of this view, is that since the two Northern Territories would no longer have a customs union with Southern Rhodesia which appears so far to have benefited Southern Rhodesia rather than them, there would be the point that you have already referred to, that certain goods could be bought more cheaply from abroad than they are at present because of the tariff of Southern Rhodesia and there is the possibility, though it is an extremely hard one to weigh and impossible for people as inexperienced as us, that being able to control their own tariff might assist them in the process of industrialising themselves. But I would strongly emphasise this is a controversial point. I would only mention that as a possibility and the prospects of successful realisation are very much a matter for the judgment of those who know the Territories really well.

Q. On the question of borrowing the loans from the International Bank, I think that the Federal Government did get loans from the International Bank and another from the London Market. The argument is that was possible because of the creditworthiness of the Federation. If there was no Federation that might not have been possible. But is it not possible that the attitude of the International Bank since the rise of the African independent states, has changed and they are more prepared now to lend money to smaller countries than they were before? In the past they were reluctant to lend money to these Territories, but I think since the rise of the independent states in Africa there has been a tendency to lend money, and also the United States is inclined that way, apart from grants which one would expect Britain to make.—A. I do not think the policies of the International Monetary Fund have changed drastically. My impression has been that they are willing to lend money to any government, large or small, European or non-European, for a project which they themselves regard as worthwhile one, provided that they are sure of the administrative competence of that government and that government is sufficiently competent administratively for the success of the project not to be prejudiced and I think the policy in that respect has always been that and has not changed, I would say, subject to correction by Professor Jack.

Q. With regard to the British policy generally, subject to correction, my own feeling was that prior to the independence of India and Ghana, Britain was reluctant to hand out money to territories over a long period but the tendency now seems to be that there is a contractual understanding between Britain and each territory that becomes independent to allow capital expenditure on each government. Would you comment on that?—A. I think I would say that you are right but that this did not fully describe the position. I personally would agree that the attitude of British Governments towards external assistance, whether grants or loans of one kind or another, has changed over the course of years since the war and that since it would have been difficult to imagine in the early years after the war our demands being granted, the trend is certainly towards giving more aid on more generous terms and giving it, I will not say automatically, but with certainly less reluctance altogether. On the other hand, if we are taking Nyasaland as an instance I think a point which has to be underlined which was stressed by Mr. Taylor is that at the moment the Nyasaland Government does benefit fiscally but to an extent by Nyasaland local standards very substantially and this is something which one can expect to continue, not the same precise sum, of course, but which one would expect to continue year in, year out. The advantages are twofold. First, it is a surer source than any external assistance that one can see at the moment and secondly, as Mr. Taylor points out, it makes planning over a period of more than one year perhaps a rather simple operation. You might get grants from the British Government over a period of years as Malta has done or Sierre Leone appears to be doing now. You might get them for shorter periods for certain purposes. This is a question on which I would not be able to satisfy myself that the position was the same. You would have to ask what about five years of whatever the period is, what is going to happen to Malta in five years. They

may get some more money; they may need very much less and get what they need. It is not certain. The present Federal action does provide a source of fiscal gain, if you like, which does appear to be one with prospects of permanent continuance. I think that point is an important one, although I would not like to say how important. It depends on one's judgment of what the British Government will do.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.—A. May I add an earlier point which I feel I did not bring out as I should have. I think it should be made clear that the fact that economic expansion prospects in Southern Rhodesia are better is to some extent due to the fact that Federation has improved those prospects more than it has improved the prospects of the Northern Territories. One important respect it control on tariffs and on the whole new industry is naturally attracted to Southern Rhodesia so when one is weighing the Southern Rhodesia contribution I think it should be borne in mind, and I hope would be borne in mind in any case, that this rise is something to which in a sense the Northern Territories can claim a certain amount to have made an indirect contribution. I do not mean a financial contribution but their readiness to allow protection in the interests of what is in effect very largely Southern Rhodesian industry is something which should not be ignored when one is assessing the influence of Southern Rhodesia.

I think we can show that Nyasaland has suffered in this respect, if not in other respects by Federation. It is not an argument against Federation any more than it is an argument to say Southern Rhodesia has perhaps gained in this respect more than other Territories, but that a clear recognition of these gains and losses makes it easier to appreciate the need for a policy which takes into account fully in judging a proper division of Federation expenditure between different Territories, and that therefore the sums which we have done on this have to be considered in relation to the change in the relative economic prospects of the Territory since Federation and should be considered in relation to that change.

PROFESSOR JACK: We are not aware of that line of thought.—A. I felt I had not made my own point.

CHAIRMAN: It has been very good of you to offer yourselves to this questioning of your survey. We may have seemed to have probed rather a lot. I hope you will appreciate probing is our job.—A. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I will arrange for a copy of the survey to be sent to the Commission library, and if there are any points which any member of the Commission wishes to take up with either or both of us, we will be extremely glad to be cross-examined in more detail.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

Memorandum

SIR RONALD PRAIN

I wish to start by thanking the Commission for agreeing to hear evidence from me on their first day in the United Kingdom, and to apologise for not being able, for reasons outside my control, to appear before you in the Federation as originally arranged.

I realise that the Commission has now been at work for some three months, that you have in front of you another period of hearing evidence in London, and that you must have heard much of the same evidence over and over again. I will, therefore, do my best to restrict my own evidence to a space of 15 minutes, and not to repeat matters which you must be over-accustomed to hear.

I will begin by declaring my personal interest in the future of the Federation. I am a landowner in both Northern and Southern Rhodesia; I have a home in Southern Rhodesia. I have a direct and indirect interest in the mining industry, in which I have investments, and which provides me with my main source of employment.

I believe that for these reasons I have as much interest as most people of the Federation in seeing the orderly evolution of constitutional developments in those territories.

In addition to my private interest, I have a public position as Chairman and President of one of the large Mining Groups in that country. I have been for ten years the Chairman of the Board of the Rhodesian Selection Trust Group, and I have also been for seventeen years the Chief Executive of the companies in this group. My connection with this industry goes back thirty-four years; I have seen this industry grow since its first days and have been privileged to play a part in its development.

I therefore realise that what I may say to you to-day will probably be construed as representing the views of the Group of Companies of which I am Chairman. I wish therefore at the outset to say that I am not here to present evidence on behalf of our Companies. My Boards considered this point and came to the conclusion that it is impracticable, if not impossible, to

arrive at an agreed view on all the matters which are engaging the attention of your Commission, especially when it is realised that in our Group of Companies alone we have no fewer than thirty-one Directors. Some Directors also question the propriety of companies expressing opinions on matters which must inevitably have a political content to them.

I must therefore repeat that I am to-day giving purely personal evidence. It will be obvious, however, that much of my evidence and many of my views are based on my work in the public sector, and arise from the advice which I have received from various advisers in my public work. I may say here that I have for some time had special advisers who are in close touch with African opinion.

I have carefully read the Terms of Reference of your Commission, Mr. Chairman, and, in particular, the words "to advise the five Governments, in preparation for the 1960 Review, of the constitutional programme and framework best suited to the achievement of the objects contained in the Constitution of 1953, including the preamble". I interpret these Terms of Reference as meaning, not what one would consider necessarily the best theoretical set of circumstances, but what is in fact possible in practice to enable the Federation to continue.

We are dealing, as I see it, not with what we would like, or what we think would be best, but what we consider to be practicable. I am second to none in wishing that the present Federal arrangements had the general approval of the majority of the inhabitants, or that the Federal principle could have been implemented in such a way as to gain such general approval; but I realise from my many contacts with Africans and from advice from my race relations advisers that this is not the case. Changes are necessary if the Federation is to go on, and *a fortiori* if it isn't. We are concerned as I see it with finding a bridge between what are the minimum African demands for the continuance of the Federation, and what are the maximum concessions that Europeans will make for the same objective.

I would like to state here that I favour the principle of Federation and see great advantages which could be gained from it. But I realise that for it to continue some changes will have to take place, and I would like now to proceed to some of the points which I think are necessary to enable this to happen.

First of all, there can be little question to my mind that there is a widespread fear in the Northern Territories of the influence of Southern Rhodesia. The fact that I regard this fear as not altogether justified makes no difference to the fact that it is a real fear, which influences all African opinion north of the Zambezi.

Secondly, it flows from this that there would undoubtedly be psychological advantages if the capital of the Federation could be moved from Southern Rhodesia. At the same time I must say that I think that this would create some very big problems in the way of economic investment, and I do not personally entertain this as a feasible proposition.

Thirdly, it follows also I think that for the Federation to have a chance of maintaining its position it will be necessary, so far as one can generalise, to remove certain subjects from the Federal list and to put them into the Territorial lists. I shall have something to say about this later.

Fourthly, and perhaps more important than any of these points, it seems to me it will be necessary radically to alter the franchises in all Territories. In spite of what may be said to the contrary in public, there can be no question that African opinion to-day economic advances are not enough. Nations that have pinned their faith to or based their policy on this outworn conception have paid heavy penalties, as we can see to the north and south of us. I take it as axiomatic that whether the Federation is to be kept together or not, it will be necessary to give greater latitude in the Territorial franchises and, in the case of the Federation continuing, in the Federal franchise too.

African opinion will probably demand "one man one vote". I believe that this is not more than a superficial public cry, and that in fact African opinion in the Rhodesias will readily accept something less than this; and there are two possibilities which I think might not only satisfy African opinion but would, in my own opinion, be desirable developments at this point of time. The first is a franchise based on the test of literacy in English, which I think would be a sound principle though in practice it might yield an unknown number of voters. It might yield so many voters as to threaten the present efficient working of government while, on the other hand, it might not yield sufficient to achieve what is highly desirable, namely, that every parliamentary candidate should have to appeal if possible to as many Africans as Europeans. This leads me to the second possibility, which is so to devise the franchise as to yield an approximate parity of Europeans and Africans on the rolls. I am advised that this solution would

find ready acceptance among Africans in Southern Rhodesia. As I have indicated already, I believe it is essential that each parliamentary candidate should have to think of both African and European opinion in whatever statements he makes, both before and after election.

The fact that I have put emphasis on the importance of a considerably broadened franchise must not be interpreted to mean that I do not think the economic advance of Africans is also important. It is important not only for the continuance of healthy industries in this country; it is important because it will give Africans the feeling that they are sharing in the economic prosperity of this country. Most important of all under this head, however, is the desirability that no jobs should be debarred to Africans merely on grounds of colour. It will be more important to have no industrial or economic colour bar in these Territories than it will to have even greater economic advance in the form of higher wages while maintaining an industrial colour bar. I suggest that any contract containing a form of industrial colour bar should be made illegal under the Federal constitution.

Lastly, there is the more difficult psychological and human side of our relationships between races. While it is difficult for the European individual to understand exactly how he can contribute personally towards the greater dignity of the African, there can be no doubt that to the African mind this is perhaps the most important part of all. Yet it is not one that can be settled by constitutions or laws. It requires a radical change of outlook on the part of one race towards the other. Since this is not a constitutional matter, it is not one on which I shall spend more time, and I now return to the question of the transfer of subjects from the Federal to the Territorial lists.

I realise that I am using loose terms. The present Constitution in Appendix VIII includes a Part I, being the Federal Legislative List, and a Part II, being the Concurrent Legislative List, and does not include a specific Territorial List. However, I think that the Commission will readily understand what I mean by the loose terms Federal and Territorial Lists.

In retrospect, though it is difficult to find fault with the choice of subjects included in the Federal Legislative List, it does appear that for popular acceptance the result has been too much concentration of political power in the hands of the Federal Government. For the Federation to find willing acceptance with the majority of the inhabitants it now appears desirable that any review of the Constitution should aim at so adjusting the subjects between the Federal List and the Territorial Lists as to result in minimising the political power of the Federal Government while not weakening the economic power, a considerable degree of centralisation of which is not only desirable but was the main reason for the Federation of the Territories in the first place.

I do not propose to indicate to your Commission which subjects should therefore be transferred but will confine myself to the recommendation that the review of the Constitution should aim at transferring to the Territorial Lists such powers as have primarily a political content, and as bring Government into close contact with the individual.

I realise that some subjects are neither primarily political nor economic, or are equally charged with both contents. I should like as an exception to my self-imposed condition of dealing with generalities to refer specifically to the subjects of agriculture and education. At present these are on both Lists according to whether the subject deals with African or European agriculture or education, as the case may be. In my opinion, this is wrong for two reasons. In the first place it introduces an element of racial distinction which is something which we are trying to avoid in other spheres; and in the second place, the division of these subjects between two Governments could lead to a disastrous situation at the worst or an inefficient one at the best. I think, therefore, that both agriculture and education should come under one Government only. Ideally, they should be, in my opinion, on the Federal list; but since I regard this as being at present politically impossible, I think both subjects should be put exclusively on the Territorial Lists.

In parenthesis, when I speak of agriculture I do not refer to the specialist services or agricultural research which, in my opinion, should certainly stay on the Federal List. When I refer to education I refer to African and European primary and secondary education and not to higher education; the latter should stay on the Federal List.

I regard the general loosening of the present Federal association as an essential prerequisite to the continuance of Federation with the approval of the majority of the inhabitants.

Perhaps the most difficult of the subjects for consideration for transfer from the Federal List to the Territorial Lists will be that of the collection of taxes, other than Customs and Excise, and I must admit that after considerable deliberation I am still in two minds on this matter. If I dwell on this matter for a few moments it is only because I consider this to be a critical matter for consideration by the Commission.

At present the more lucrative taxes are collected Federally and then redistributed on a quota laid down by a Fiscal Commission. Basic income tax is distributed by the Federal Treasury, whilst Territorial surcharge is collected by the Federal Commissioner of Taxes as agent for territorial governments. I have taken the view for some time that African opinion does not accept either the principle of the Federal Government being the collector of taxes or the practical division of the pool. I have therefore considered whether it would be possible for taxes to be collected Territorially and then for the Territorial Governments to pay sufficient sums into the Federal Government to sustain those Federal services which, in looser association, will remain. The problem about this is that these services are not such as readily to permit of large annual fluctuations, and therefore they would constitute a fixed or standing prior charge on the revenues of the three Territories, leaving the Territorial matters to carry the main brunt of fluctuations in prosperity. Furthermore, I have asked myself whether it is a feasible proposition to expect, for instance, Northern Rhodesia to collect its own taxes and then to pay what might in some years be a large percentage to the Federal Government for services which are not always appreciated in Northern Rhodesia; furthermore the financial position of Nyasaland would pose a special problem.

On the other hand, the continuing collection of taxes by the Federal Government, with consequent redistribution to the Territories, may prove to be a serious deterrent to the acceptance of continued Federation, and the question before your Commission will be which is the least objectionable of two difficult courses. The problem, as I have mentioned, falls into two parts; first, how the whole cake shall be divided among one Federal and three Territorial Governments; and, secondly, who is to collect the cake.

On the first matter it may be of some comfort to know that this problem is not peculiar to our country. The question of the fiscal relations between the United States Federal Government and the individual States was the subject of a report submitted to the Secretary of the Treasury by a special and very distinguished committee designated to conduct a study into this very point some 20 years ago. I commend this report to the consideration of this Commission but will confine myself to-day to quoting from Pages 2 and 3 thereof, as follows:—

"An analysis of the history of the fiscal co-ordination movement in the United States, and of the experience in other countries, suggests that a pragmatic approach to the problems of inter-governmental fiscal relations is likely to be the most fruitful. The pragmatic approach does not exclude the necessity of some analysis of long-run principles and interests. However, hopes for a solution of the fiscal co-ordination problem, or for a comprehensive single plan for immediate adoption, are doomed to disappointment. Some scholars have rejected the idea of "nibbling" at the problem, bit by bit, as entirely inadequate, but it is this unspectacular method that promises most in the way of progress in what must be a co-operative venture. Indeed the preoccupation of the critics with gradiose plans for fiscal co-ordination may account for the rather low score of achievement to date.

"A federal system involves at least two layers of government, which necessarily draw upon the same economy for support. It is almost inevitable that no matter how carefully drawn a constitution may be, some overlapping and conflict will ensue. Each authority tends to guard its own sphere of activity jealously and to resent encroachment by the other.

"Under these conditions there can be no completely logical and clear-cut solution of fiscal problems. The united and uniform fiscal system of which some administrators dream is possible only in a unitary state. The best that can be achieved in a federal-state is a working compromise, even as the federal-state itself is, in its origin, a compromise."

I believe that in our circumstances it would be desirable in order to achieve the objects contained in the Constitution of 1953, including the preamble, if in the Constitutional review the Territories' share of the cake could be arranged on the generous side rather than otherwise.

As to who collects the cake, I believe on balance that if the share of the cake going to the Territories will be considered sufficiently generous, the cake can be collected as now by the Federal Government. I regard the size of the share to be more important than the method of collection.

In conclusion may I permit myself one more quotation. This is a quotation from The Report to the (U.S.A.) President, of The Commission on Inter-governmental Relations, dated June 1955; Conclusion of Chapter Four entitled, "Financial Aspects of the American Federal System".

"The strength of our federal system is no greater than the strength and vitality of the many governments which compose it. Fiscal capacity is both an essential ingredient of this strength and one measure of it.

"Agitation for fiscal readjustment between the components of the federal system is neither recent nor novel. It recurs with every significant expansion in governmental activity and, in one form or another, has been a continuing problem since the formation of the Republic. As the Commission has said so often in this report, a fundamental objective of our system of government should be to keep centralization to a minimum and state local responsibility to a maximum."

The fact that I believe changes to be necessary is due purely to the over-riding importance of achieving a solution which will be acceptable to the majority of inhabitants. If we are not prepared to make drastic changes, the penalty we may pay will be that of the Federation not continuing to hold together. I believe that this would be regrettable and that the consequences would be less favourable for both African and European inhabitants of the Federation than those flowing from a Federal association however loose. To those who will view with regret the loosening of the Federal ties I would point out what I believe to be a historical fact, that where federations elsewhere have started as strong federations they have tended to weaken; and where federation has started as loose or weak it has tended to strengthen. This would appear to show that a successful federation must be achieved as a result of trial and error and that the ultimate result must represent a natural rather than an artificial solution.

Unhappily, the term "Federation" has become hateful to Africans of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland because it has become identified with the prevention of African political development in the Northern territories. When terms for the continued association of the three territories have been freely agreed to, it is my opinion this association should be given a new name.

For those who agree with these views, I advocate courage, and caution against timidity. I believe our policy should be based on the philosophy of an earlier Duke of Montrose when he wrote:

"He either fears his fate too much
Or his deserts are small,
Who dare not put it to the touch
To gain or lose it all."

London

Oral evidence

SIR RONALD PRAIN

CHAIRMAN: Good morning. We are very glad to have you with us.—A. Good morning.

Q. I know in the circumstances you have not been able to supply us with a memorandum. I do not know whether you have any document you would like to put in or whether you would like to start talking about the problems?—A. May I have your permission to read the document?

Q. Yes, most certainly.—A. I apologise for any inadequacies, but it has been partly prepared in a dark room.

(The witness then read his memorandum.)

Q. While you are on the purely economic side you did make a reference to passages in two books. I wonder if you would just give us the description of them?—A. May I send the full reports to the Secretary?

Q. If you do not mind. There are just one or two things I would like to ask, one about the education of Africans. It is obvious not only from what you have said but from what you have said on other occasions you attach great importance to that. Do you think that large sums of money will have to be provided to bring the education of Africans further on quickly enough to reconcile them to the continuance of Federation?—A. I am not entirely familiar with the educational position in Southern Rhodesia or Nyasaland, my Lord. I know a little bit about it in Northern Rhodesia. There is a problem which I imagine may be applied to the other territories which is that the Government revenues are not in prospect going to be large enough to cater for the increasing demand if you want to have full primary education. It is a problem that our Companies have recognised with reluctance because we believe it is Government's job to provide education but we have admitted it is not really possible for Government to do that; so my answer, I think, is there will be very large sums required.

Q. And the Companies with which you are concerned have, in fact, undertaken some of that?—A. We are doing that together with some of the foundations.

Q. Still on matters of which you have experience from your Company, a good deal of evidence was given to us about the discrimination in effect between African and European workers, the fact that there is a quite different scale of salary or wage for the one and the other. Do you see any prospect of an improvement in that position?—A. Yes, I do. I am talking about the copper industry. I think that was your question, not industry generally. I do see, in fact, improvement in

industry generally. As far as the copper industry is concerned we are in the middle of some negotiations between the Companies and European mineworkers which, in fact, will continue late this week and next week which are designed to remove any discrimination whatever. I should perhaps say that the discrimination in principle was removed in 1955 when what used to be an exclusive White agreement became an agreement for workers filling certain jobs rather than based on colour, so the colour bar has been removed in principle since 1955 in that any African can have any job. But there are certain practical problems in implementing that principle and it is the object of the present discussion to remove those practical difficulties in implementing that principle. I think it will be difficult to reach agreement but I think it will be reached.

Q. You, I am sure, will accept this, that it would be from the political point of view a very desirable thing if something quite strong took place in the near future in regard to that problem not only in copper but in the other industries generally?—A. Yes, I agree entirely.

Q. You said something about movement of capital which might be psychologically or politically desirable but would involve difficulties. I gather at one time, in that businesses have settled there where the Federal capital is and where, upon the assumptions we are making, the Southern Rhodesia capital would remain?—A. Yes.

Q. Could you enlarge on the difficulties because it is a thing we ought to consider? Are you putting it as high as this: that it becomes impractical because of the economic changes which would be involved?—A. I think it becomes impractical. I do not think anything is impossible. I think it is impractical not only for the buildings, offices, that have been established in Salisbury but the many people who would be involved in that transfer of capital.

Q. Are you thinking of the Government and business people or people concerned in industry or the movement of the people in the Federal Government?—A. Both, because I think the main reason for business houses to have their headquarters in the Federal capital is to be near the Federal Government; if one moves I think the other will.

Q. You think the mere fact that the Southern Rhodesia capital remained there would not be the same attraction or would diminish it too appreciably?—A. I think it would mean that Salisbury would continue to grow but I think it would mean a tremendous new investment which perhaps the country cannot really afford in setting up a Federal capital somewhere else. I think very large sums would have to be involved in this.

Q. You would have to measure that against the eventual economic trouble if the Federal idea became scrapped, would you not?—A. Yes, I think you would. I think that is why it comes up for consideration at all, that on balance I am inclined to reject it as a pre-requisite to continued Federation.

Q. But you would recognise that the change of capital to somewhere outside Southern Rhodesia might have a considerable effect psychologically?—A. I think that is very true.

Q. You just touched on the name. Supposing the Federal structure were considerably weakened at the centre but remained a real unit, you would be in favour of changing the name?—A. I personally would, my Lord. I am quite satisfied with the name "Federation". I think it is somewhat of a difficulty in dealing with the problem. It might help things if the name were changed to something more acceptable.

Q. You said something about the agriculture and education, as to which department they ought to go in at the present time. Have you considered the matter from the other angle at all? What would be the irreducible minimum of subjects which would be essential to the continuance of a unit?—A. Yes, I did. I have to answer this at some length if I have your permission to do so. I did start by trying to suggest what the list should be and I gave up, because I came to the conclusion that there is nothing basically wrong with the present list. I think, if I may say so, whoever drew up the original list did a very good job. I do not think the difficulty is that the list is wrong. I think the difficulty lies in other directions which are not necessarily to do with constitutional lists. There are some changes such as those I have suggested which I think would be advantageous but when one looks over the Federal list they are mostly subjects which should be Federal in a properly working Federation. I think our real problems are not in the lists but in certain aspects. Principally on the question of attitudes between the races which I touched on and the franchises which I regard as the most important single matter affecting the future of the Federation. There again it is not a constitutional list matter.

CHAIRMAN: I think others will want to ask you about the franchise.

MR. CRAWLEY: I was not quite clear, Sir Ronald, when you were talking about franchise and you said that you would

like to see some arrangement which produced parity of Europeans and Africans, whether you were then talking about Federal franchise or Territorial one?—A. I was talking about Federal franchise but it would apply equally to the Territorial.

Q. You said that you thought parity of European and African would be acceptable to the Africans in Southern Rhodesia but would it be acceptable to Africans in the Northern Territories?—A. I can only express an opinion, of course, about Northern Rhodesia. I think it might at this stage, not as a permanent solution.

Q. In both Territorial and the Federal?—A. Yes, or the literacy test on which I have so many differing figures as to what that is.

Q. Do you feel the Federal and Territorial franchise ought to be the same?—A. I think so. I have no sound reason, I think, for saying so but I feel it does simplify the matter.

MR. CRAWLEY: Thank you.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: You spoke of the aim in so adjusting matters between the Federal Government and the Territorial Governments as to result in minimizing the political powers in the hands of the Federation while retaining economic co-ordination. I know what a difficult question it is, could you help us as to what you think would be the minimum political powers that would be required in order to give you the necessary economic control?—A. There again, Mr. Chairman, I tried to do that by devising my own lists. It is extremely difficult. That is why I was reduced to deal with generalities but each subject varies, of course, in its political or economic content or combination of both and my general recommendation is therefore framed in that way that, if possible, subjects of the maximum economic content should be kept Federal and in my opinion political content should remain territorial.

Q. In a broader way one of the things you would have to consider if you were thinking that out would be what would be the position of the Federal Assembly, the Federal Cabinet, the Federal Ministers and so forth, how are they affected in their approach to it?—A. May I say at once that I visualise the retention of the Federal Parliament. I am not thinking of an association as loose as the East African High Commission or anything of that sort. I am contemplating a Federal Government and Federal Parliament. I think that even with a re-shuffling of the lists there is a great deal left for the Federal Parliament and the Federal Ministers. I have not, of course, analysed it to say what Ministerial posts would be left and which should be abolished but I would not see a very great reduction in the amount of work to be done by the Federal Government. It is qualitative rather than quantitative change which would be involved.

Q. Would you contemplate the Federal representatives would be directly elected by the electors in the various Territories, not that they would be some sort of emanation of the Territorial Governments which would be a separate and independent Parliament?—A. Yes, that is right. There are many matters such as Foreign Affairs, External Affairs, and so on which while being political would obviously remain Federal in my view.

Q. In order to deal with those you must have some kind of Assembly to discuss them?—A. Yes.

MR. ELLMAN BROWN: I have two questions not directly touching what you have said; but your Company has advanced considerable funds for the development of the Africans in the Northern Territories to overcome poverty. With your experience would you say that the poverty in the Northern Territories, particularly in the Northern Provinces of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, is something that must be tackled urgently and tremendous attention must be brought about to increase the land husbandry in those areas, tremendous sums must be employed immediately? Would you say that you have done it in a small way to help the Government, only that is not enough?—A. Yes, I fully agree. I think it is a drop in the bucket what we have been able to do and yet by Rhodesian standards these are relatively large sums. In the Northern Province there were £2m. which is quite a lot of money by Rhodesian standards and it has meant even with that sum that the butter has been spread very thin. If one visits there one can see how you could need 10, 20, 50, 100 times more really to convert that tremendous area into something which we know in Southern Rhodesia. At the same time it is so much more than they have ever had before that there have been very beneficial effects on public opinion.

Q. The second question is do you think it is basic in what I call local government in the areas to uphold the power of the Chiefs and build on that? The actual position we found was that this was the policy in Northern Rhodesia but it is not the policy in Nyasaland. Would you say from your experience that would be the way to develop what I call the rural local government, Native Authorities and so on?—A. I think this is a very difficult question. Whatever we do I do not think

should be considered as a permanent solution. I think really the Chieftain system is probably outmoded by world standards and yet it still fulfils a most useful function. What you have mentioned is not necessarily true of the towns but it is true of backward rural areas so I think we have to envisage a time where you have the influence of the Chiefs maintained and sustained for quite a time. I personally cannot believe that is a permanent solution.

Q. On the question of law and order and the method and policy of the Police Force and the Boma messenger, would you feel that it was urgently necessary to so arrange the policy of the Police Force that they become the protector of the people rather than letting the Native Commissioners, District Officers and that Department look after law and order and only bring in the Police in serious cases where there is trouble? Would you say the system of providing law and order needs to be reviewed?—A. I do not think I know enough about the present system. I am talking now of Northern Rhodesia. District Commissioners do, in fact, have the police under them do they not? We have regarded them as one authority. I think you were distinguishing between them.

Q. There seems to be some confusion between the powers of the Boma messenger and the powers of Police in the Reserves and I was wondering whether you thought that would produce good law and order.—A. I think I cannot answer that question. It is outside my knowledge in the rural areas. I know the position on the mine which is a little different. I think I should not express an opinion on the other.

MR. ELLMAN BROWN: Thank you.

MR. TAYLOR: Sir Ronald, do you believe that the Federation can find from its own resources sufficient funds to be able to permit development of the Northern Territories or of African education without outside assistance? Do you believe, for example, that the size of the cake which is available to Government could be increased or further increased in taxation or do you see that the bigger cake which lies behind the national income increasing sufficiently for the Federation to be able to finance its development and if you do not see that this is likely to be possible, would you consider it proper that the Federation should receive outside assistance for the promotion of these aims?—A. My answer is that I do not regard it as a real possibility that we should be able to generate our own funds for this to the necessary scale. I think the present cake is one which should grow but I am afraid the requirements of the country are growing for political as much as for economic reasons faster than the cake. So my answer to your second question is I think it is not only right, I think it will be essential to generate outside funds. I think the Federation will have the ability to do that in the long run.

MR. TAYLOR: Thank you.

MR. GONDWE: Sir Ronald, you seem to advocate that you would like to see both Agriculture and Education coming under one and the same Government; but you seem to have gone further and said that as far as the specialist services are concerned you would like these to be under the Federal Government. Do you see or do you not see any difficulty in that whereby, say, agriculture is under a Territorial Government and the research and all these things are under the Federal Government, do you think there would be friction there?—A. No. I had to think about this in my capacity as chairman of the Agricultural Research Council but I would like to add I am expressing my own opinion only, not necessarily the Council's. I cannot see any conflict between having centralised services of research and having agriculture or education dealt with territorially. The Research Council Services, research generally and specialist services, deal with primarily scientific matters and I think you cannot have three bodies dealing with scientific matters. Rhodesia is a large country by geographic standards but it is a small one by scientific standards. You have to deal with the whole, not only Rhodesia, possibly the ecology of the surrounding Territories as well. Science I think can be dealt with non-controversially and should be dealt with by one central body, whether it is agricultural or any of the other industrial researches. I am quite satisfied there would not be conflict.

Q. In which case in your view it would be better if, say, agriculture were to be centralised, that is wholly to be undertaken by the central Government?—A. Yes. I did, if I may remind you, say ideally. I think it is essential to be under one Government and ideally it should be under the Federal Government. I went on to say I did not think that was possible for political reasons and therefore the next best was the Territorial Government.

Q. On the question of franchise you seem to have laid some emphasis on English as being the basis of qualification. Do you think that the economic franchise qualification is of the same importance as the English qualification?—A. I think I made it clear in my opinion that the franchise has to be broadened. It may not be possible to broaden it by using

economic criteria. I think you may have to go to literacy criteria. I did give considerable thought but I think it must be English.

Q. I think I agree with you there. We have had evidence from other sources that they would like to see the economic qualification being included. Do you think as at present, taking the African economic position, this would preclude most of them from becoming voters?—A. I think the time is coming when we have to get away from the economic qualifications.

LORD CRATHORNE: Could we come back to agriculture. When you talk about research you make that an exception. Would you put marketing in the same sphere as research?—A. I anticipated that question and I think you have got to deal with marketing piecemeal, not by a magic formula for all products. For instance I think the position of the African Co-operative Agricultural Growers round Fort Jameson is essentially something which should be dealt with locally. On the other hand matters such as the marketing of tobacco must be dealt with on a national basis so I do not advocate any special formula. I think each product must be dealt with on its merits where marketing is concerned.

MR. KATILUNGU: Mr. Chairman, Sir Ronald in his submission of evidence, referred to the point which my friend, Mr. Gondwe, has raised and that is English literacy. With your experience of the people in Northern Rhodesia, particularly those in mining industries, they are subject to political influence of the African nationalist organisations by the theme of "one man, one vote", and at the present moment the majority of African employees in mining industries are illiterate but some of these people get more than £300 per annum and the present franchise which includes both literacy and economic qualifications up to £300 per annum and upwards, what is your opinion about this group of very responsible men who on the one hand are subject to political influence by the theme of "one man, one vote", and I think they believe, in fact, in "one man, one vote", as they were entitled to do, are they responsible to participate in returning either to Federal Parliament or Legislative Council, the people to represent them? What is your opinion about this very important group of people which is subject to political influence which is very dangerous at this stage—should they be left out?—A. No. Perhaps I did not make myself sufficiently clear. When I said we have to get away from the economic qualifications I mean we have to get away from them as being exclusive qualifications. I think we have to have literacy as a qualification whether you have an economic barrier or not but I would certainly include those people who have economic value even if they have not got literacy. It is a short term problem because we hope our plans will be carried out, and everyone will be literate in the next generation; but I would certainly agree that those responsible mine workers earning more than a certain amount which is notably due to the responsibility they have should have a vote even if they are not literate.

Q. Have you any suggestion as to how it could work? On one hand you say "literacy in English", but you make an exception for one particular group simply because they have demonstrated they are being responsible in an undertaking like the mining industry on which the country has depended, do you have any suggestion how we could reconcile this kind of exception?—A. I have no formula with me. I can only answer it generally I would be the first to agree that African workers earning a certain amount which, by and large, denotes their responsibility should have a vote, not only in the mining industry but in other industries and professions, but my point really was literacy should be a qualification for the vote irrespective of economic considerations. In other words, all literate Africans should have the vote even if they did not have the money.

Q. I would like to ask a question on the economic advance for Africans to which Sir Ronald Prain referred. I think he indicated that economic advance for Africans is not sufficient. Would you associate yourself with the views that are expressed by African organisations in mining industries that any advancement which does not include technical education would be regarded as incomplete advancement?—A. Yes, I would.

Q. On the same point, in industries in our country one of the present arguments in favour of Europeans being paid more is that in the early days of the mining industry's development in our country some form of attractive action should have taken place, and that was more pay for those technicians who would be attracted to come down in order to develop industries, but for a few years now I think there has been development in education, particularly technical education for Europeans in the whole of the Federation. Of course, it excludes Nyasaland which country has been lagging behind, that we do understand. Most of the young Europeans today are educated locally as a result of which we have in industries young men who have taken technical education. Do you think this higher pay for Europeans, including expatriate remunera-

tion, would continue to be recognised and if so what will be the position in regard to Africans when they have taken technical education? Will they continue with the differences in pay regardless of equal technical qualifications? What do you envisage?—A. I would be very glad to answer that. It is an extremely important point. There is no question that one of our problems in the copper mines and nationally is that in the early days Europeans had to be paid a very big wage to go to the Copperbelt. There was a hazard element about health, as you know, and there was an expatriate allowance element, since there was no local talent; and despite efforts to get it recognised, today there are no hazards because the Copperbelt is a very healthy and comfortable place, and there is no need of an expatriate allowance because most of our people are born in Rhodesia. But in spite of that the high wage still applies to Europeans. In other words, this is one of the problems in Rhodesia—the high payment to Europeans of the lower grade, that is those in the easier jobs, not socially. Some European jobs are underpaid at the top end of the skill ladder, but there can be no question, as an objective observer, that Europeans at the lower end of the skilled ladder are overpaid. Our present negotiations are designed to de-rate those jobs so as to get rid of the two wage scales on the copper mines. We believe that the heart of the whole problem is not the underpaid African but the overpaid European, and if this is not settled it is going to create a great barrier to advancement. It would not be right to pay Africans at an exaggerated rate just because Europeans get it: the proper point of view of an economist is to reduce the European wage. That is a problem of the economic set-up in Rhodesia, the overpaid European.

MR. KATILUNGU: With your experience in N. Rhodesia regarding the political situation, which does affect the workers—I refer to this not because I have a direct interest in the workers in the mining industry but because we are the centre of attraction for all the urban population—because of this political situation development, and which is very much concentrated on the Copperbelt, the trade unions as such were subject to intimidation and threats of different natures, of which you have full information. This is due to the fact that the African nationalist organisations would be successful if they control the trade unions and use them for political struggle in order to achieve their own ends. That being the case, if Federation continued, do you recognise the fears expressed by the inhabitants of the two northern territories? If this kind of political influence continued and trade unions were controlled by politicians as such, regardless of any change that you suggested might come about by widening the franchise and so on, do you think that Federation would be successful at that time, when politicians began to control the trade unions and were able to smash them as well as take control of them? How would you satisfy these politicians if the suggestion is to widen the franchise—would you include those with economic responsibility in the franchise? Even the ones who earn little, the ones without economic responsibility, they are inhabitants of the country and they come to get employment in the mines. Do you not think consideration should also be given to them so long as they are able to pay their tax, which is £1 in the urban areas and less than that in the rural areas?—A. I am not entirely clear what the question is, and do not want to give a wrong answer.

Q. You have people in the urban areas who are subject to pay poll tax of £1 per annum: in the rural areas they pay less than £1.—A. Yes.

Q. When you consider the responsibility of the man, you have to consider those in the mining industry who are economically well-off, but what about these people who pay the poll tax in the rural areas; are they not contributing to the country, so that they should be entitled to vote?—A. I do not think personally there is a strong argument for them have a vote automatically just because they pay poll tax. I know the classic argument of "no representation and so on", but I would still stick to my idea that literacy should be the main qualification; and we should include as a temporary measure people with economic qualifications but without literacy until the educational system has caught up.

Q. What is your opinion regarding the African majority in the two Northern Territories' legislatures?—A. You mean the majority of voters?

Q. A majority of members in the legislatures.—A. I regard that as inevitable.

PROFESSOR CREIGHTON: You came to the conclusion after very careful consideration that the basic tax ought to be collected by the Federal Government, and earlier in your evidence, if I remember correctly, you worked out that it was essential that the Federal Government should retain a general control over the economy. You said you found it very difficult to draw up a list of economic subjects which the Federal Government ought, in your opinion, to retain; but do you

think this particular financial function, the power of collection of the basic tax, ought to remain with the Federal Government on the ground that it is essential to the basic control of the economy?—A. I came to the conclusion on balance that it should continue to be collected by the Federal Government but not for the reason you have given; merely because the alternatives are very difficult. After working out for and against, I came to the conclusion that it was difficult for it to be collected territorially.

Q. But that is not an overriding argument in itself?—A. No.

Q. In other words, the financial or economic control which you desire for the Federal Government could have been obtained without that collecting power?—A. Yes, it could. On balance I concluded that the Federal Government should continue collecting it. It strengthens my general view that it is one of the matters which should be kept centralised if possible.

Q. At one point you suggested generally that there might be a new name for the Federation. There are three names inside the Commonwealth, I suppose, which are used—Dominion, Commonwealth and Union. Dominion may have become unpopular because of its association with a certain status, and Union similarly because of its association with S. Africa. Commonwealth perhaps suggests a greater degree of intimacy than people in Rhodesia are inclined to agree with. Do you have any other suggestion?—A. I do not put forward a suggestion seriously, but there have been suggestions by other people such as "Central African Association". "Association" appears to find some favour.

SIR VICTOR ROBINSON: What do you mean when you use the expression "agriculture"?—A. I mean farming in its widest sense, animal husbandry, arable agriculture, fisheries, forests: the use of the land in its widest sense. I would perhaps exclude hydrology, which is sometimes included under an agricultural heading because some waters are common to two Territories.

Q. You mean politically it would be desirable that the Territorial Governments should regulate farming and lay down what maize may be grown, prohibit certain people from growing tobacco and allow other people to do this, that or the other?—A. With respect, what I meant was that in agriculture, whatever sense or definition we give it, everything should come under one Government. I think ideally it should come under the Federal Government but I do not regard that as a practical possibility. Therefore Territorial Government is the next best thing; but it should not be split as between African and European. That was my point.

PROFESSOR JACK: Might I first ask you a question which it may be impossible to answer? In view of the importance of the Copperbelt to the economies of both N. Rhodesia and the Federation, is it possible to hazard an intelligent guess as to the probable life of the Copperbelt?—A. I am willing to hazard a minimum guess of its life—which I have done publicly already—50 years.

Q. That is a minimum and not a maximum?—A. That, I think is quite impossible, if you want to be scientific about it. No mineral field is ever fully drilled till it is expiring. No one ever drills a complete field: it would take millions and millions and yield no knowledge for immediate use. You dig enough of a field to know that you have reserves, whether oil or minerals, to justify the installation of a quantum value of plant. In our case we have £250 million at today's value: we know we have enough ore to repay that. We do not drill beyond that, and I do not think you ever know the life of a field till it is about to expire, and at that point you explore and really know the limit of your field. The limits of the Copperbelt will not be known for many years—not in our lifetime—but I would hazard 50 years. That is an average: one of the mines has probably a life of 100 years.

Q. And you thought the proceeds of income tax distribution should err on the side of generosity to the Territorial Governments. Did you have in mind the division of the receipts which is written into the Constitution as at present should continue to be written so, or that some more flexible arrangement should be tried?—A. I see great difficulties in settling the size of the four slices of the cake. I think it would be presumptuous of me to say how it should be done, but I feel that after it is done if one or two of the Territories feel they have had less than a fair share it is a threat to the Federation, and it is a much greater threat to the Federation than if the Federal Government felt they had too small a share. That is the point I was trying to make. We are engaged here in trying to re-write a Constitution which will ensure the life of the Federation. It is most important that not one territory should feel they have been badly done by. That feeling has occurred in the past, as we know.

Q. Do you think the same feeling arises in connection with the distribution of the loan proceeds?—A. I am less familiar with that. I would hesitate to give an opinion.

Q. There are proportions written in for that, not the same proportions—A. I am afraid I do not know how that is done.

Q. In one of the earlier reports, the Report on Closer Association in Central Africa, there was a proposal that there should be a development commission for the whole of the three Territories. That recommendation was not taken up. Have you given any thought to the desirability of such a Commission for the whole of the Federation?—A. May I ask whether you mean a commission to decide on the development priorities and so on, or to do the loan raising?

Q. The loan raising presumably will be done by the Federal Loans Council; but it meant among other things that there should be a co-ordination of the development programmes of the three Territories. That I think has not been carried out in the sense in which the recommendation was originally made.—A. I feel it would be consistent with my general line of thinking that this question should be dealt with federally. I personally think it is a mistake—and I say so on a privileged occasion, though I have said so to people who are directly involved—there are different boards for the Territories today and that is a mistake. I would like to see this dealt with centrally. It is one of the main advantages of federation.

MR. HADLOW: You did say earlier on that the colour bar should be made illegal.—A. The industrial colour bar, an industrial contract containing any form of colour bar. I did not refer to other forms of the colour bar.

Q. You are quite confident that merely by passing a law that could be made illegal?—A. Of course you cannot ensure it in many cases by passing a law but I think you can in industry. I speak here with some experience: if there had been such a clause in the past it would have solved a great many of our present problems. Speaking personally, I would like to see the colour bar disappear in every form, but you cannot do that by legislation.

Q. It can only be done by higher education and increased contacts and so forth?—A. There are border-line cases where legislation might do the trick, but there are other cases where it would not. However, I think industry is one case where it can be achieved and it would be a great help.

MR. ROBINSON: I want to go back to this cake we have been discussing. You told us that the potential life of the copper mines is very considerable. Would you agree that the percentage of the cake contributed by the mining industry is also considerable? Do you believe that percentage is likely to remain very large for some years, on any normal basis of taxation?—A. Yes, I do. I think it is likely to remain large absolutely and large relatively. I think you were asking in the relative sense, relative to the country as a whole. It is not as large in the Federal context as it used to be. The contribution of the copper industry to the Federal net income is under 10% now. It is in N. Rhodesia that it is such an overwhelming proportion, but I would expect it to keep its present position, whatever it is, either territorially or federally for quite a long time, but would not expect it to go on for ever. There are two reasons: one is that I hope the rest of the economy will grow very much, and the other is that the mining companies' hope of making more money lies in more output. It cannot lie in more profits, because the price of copper has a definite ceiling these days while costs are constantly rising. I expect our profit margins in the mining industry to be reduced.

Q. I am left with the impression that, having considered this question of the collection of taxes, you reached the final conclusion that collection was less important than distribution. If we have responsible governments established in all three Territories, which we understand is the aim, as soon as reasonably possible, and the Territories were charged with the responsibility of collection of tax, would it not be possible for any one Territorial Government to torpedo the Federation or, if not entirely, certainly to gravely interfere with its working by a simple refusal to tax important industries like the mines for federal purposes or indeed, like the S. Rhodesian Government, shall I say, to effectively tax companies and industrial activity in a territory of that nature?—A. I agree. One of the considerations in my mind eventually, after arguing with myself about rejecting the Territorial approach—I felt bound to go through that process because the continued collection from Territorial sources is a political problem at the moment; but the other is a bigger problem in many ways.

Q. In connection with the mines, if we had responsible governments in the Territories, would you say that the nationalisation of the copper-mining industry, even if the Federal instrument had the right to collect taxes, by a Territorial Government could have a very serious effect on the Federal instrument?—A. Yes, I do think that.

Q. So in respect of any major national assets, do you think there should be any special arrangements regarding the right of Territorial Governments to nationalise them?—A. That is

the present position, of course, is it not? Mines are Territorial. I am not suggesting that should be changed.

Q. But do you think some special protection might be advisable for anything that might be declared, generally speaking, a national asset against nationalisation by a Territorial Government?—A. I should not be in favour of any effective legislation on nationalisation from anybody in the copper mines. I think that would be disastrous.

MR. MENZIES: On the question of the franchise, assuming that your basic franchise involved an African majority within the next 5 or 10 years in the Federal House, how would you regard that?—A. That would not deter me from putting forward the suggestions I have.

Q. Do you attach any importance to the writing of guarantees into the Constitution?—A. May I ask what guarantees you have in mind?

Q. Guarantees protecting minorities.—A. Yes, I do. I think this is an important point that has to be considered. A great deal has been written on this, some of which I have read, and I am still in two minds as to how it could be done most effectively but I must agree with the generality of the question. There should be guarantees written in for minorities.

Q. In the enlargement of the franchise, I take it there would be involved a re-constitution of the Federal Parliament, a re-distribution of the seats as at present with a majority of one over S. Rhodesia, or in other words should there be a greater representation from N. Rhodesia in the Federal Parliament?—A. I have seen many different suggestions on this. Personally I have very little view on this point. I must admit that when you started I thought you were going to talk about changing the shape of the constituencies, which would be inherent in trying to get parity of voters. I have a fairly open mind on how many representatives should come from N. Rhodesia and S. Rhodesia.

Q. But it surely would be inherent, would it not, in the enlargement of the franchise that there should be a re-distribution?—A. It would be inherent, but I have no suggestion as to how it should be done. If I might confine my answer to the very general I think an answer to the broadened franchise is the most important single point for the welfare of the Federation.

MR. McCLELAND: Reverting to the capital site, do you think there would be any merit in the suggestion that has been put forward that Salisbury should be retained as the administrative capital for the Federation and that the legislative council should be removed elsewhere? Would that perhaps resolve some of the economic problems you have in mind?—A. This is the first I have heard of this suggestion, but I think it has some merits for consideration. It would go some way towards dealing with what I call the psychological problem and also towards meeting the economic problem, which is the other side of it.

Q. Finally, would you give us an opinion: you have suggested that the franchise should be amended to enable a number more Africans to go into the respective legislatures. How do you think the European element of the population will react—how would S. Rhodesia react?—A. I think they are going to react very badly. This is one of the problems. If I might just make my position quite clear on this, I feel it is important to have more African voters for three reasons: firstly, I have indicated that if you can get parity of electors it would stop the politicians always having to think of one opinion and not two; secondly, it would be considered by Africans to be a great step forward and development arising from Federation. They would feel things are changing, whereas they feel at present that things are not changing very much, I think. Thirdly, from the European point of view it would be a great advantage to have Africans trained in the art of government and in the acceptance of responsibility. It is quite a different thing when you have to take responsibility for balancing a budget and passing laws from when you are just on the sidelines criticising. Events in Africa are moving at such a speed that it is in the interest of no-one more than the Europeans to get Africans trained in the art of government, both administrative and political. Some of the mistakes are going to be very obvious in the north where there are simply no trained administrators or politicians. I feel it is in the interests of the Europeans to see that, but it is going to be difficult to put across this idea of making concessions before they are forced on one in Rhodesia.

Q. You do not think the reaction might be so strong that it would in fact break up the Federation?—A. I do not like to think of the effects of not making the concessions in time. It is a difficult problem but it has to be faced: we have to try to make Europeans see that to make the concessions is the lesser evil of two difficult courses.

MR. CHIRWA: You have no doubt noticed that since the independence of the Belgian Congo was announced there has

been an impetus in the political demands of Africans of N. Rhodesia, so much so that today we hear Africans saying they would like self-government in October this year. Also, in view of the fact that there is bound to be a greater link and contact between Africans of those territories, because the Belgian Congo being free the door would be open for Africans to go there; and you might have read the announcement made by African leaders of the Congo only just about two weeks ago that their first duty is to give their assistance to the Africans in Central Africa to be free. Do you think that in view of these developments which are taking place so suddenly in the Congo it would be possible to delay any longer complete responsibility for Africans in N. Rhodesia without causing much disruption in the country, both for economic and governmental purposes? It has been suggested that we should have parity in N. Rhodesia with Africans controlling in the next 5 or 10 years. Do you think it is possible to do it now or to hold back?—A. I have never agreed that we have 5 or 10 years in N. Rhodesia for this. The events in the Congo have contributed to speeding up the tempo of events, but in my opinion even without these events, things might have been speeded up anyway. I believe it will not be possible or wise to defer further constitutional reforms in N. Rhodesia beyond the middle of next year. I do not myself subscribe to the first of October this year, but I think a timetable must be discussed and should be discussed next year.

Q. With regard to the old question of raising the revenue in the Federation, looking at it as a man who is not an economist, looking at the recently developing countries freed from Colonial control, some of them are not as rich but they are able to raise much more income out of their people than we are able to do in Central Africa, and one reason for that is said to be that you have a very low wages structure for Africans so that they cannot contribute—many of them, for instance, cannot pay income tax because they just do not earn enough money. If we are serious that we have to raise our revenues in Central Africa, is it not necessary that the whole question of wage structures should be re-considered so that a greater number of Africans can be brought into the income tax paying group? As long as Africans are kept on a low wage structure how do you bring them into this income tax paying group, which is necessary if we are to raise our own revenues in the Northern Territories?—A. I have long taken the view that future development of industry in the Federation will depend on the quick growth of an internal market, an African market, based on much higher levels of income for Africans; but it is a fallacy to think that can be achieved just by raising wages unless they are able to raise productivity. There is no magic wand, I suggest, to be waved just by paying everybody twice or three times more for doing what they are doing now. The biggest and quickest want—if there is one at all—does lie in the agricultural field in all three territories. If you could raise the African farmer's productivity from £50 a year to £100 a year that in itself—I stand to be corrected on the figures—is about a £25 million increase in the market right away; and that can be done by known scientific methods. We must revise our financial machinery by which known scientific methods can be put into the hands of Africans, and in particular it is essential to devise machinery whereby African farmers can acquire fertilisers on credit.

Q. Does that not raise the point referred to by Mr. Ellman Brown earlier—the fact that in Central Africa at present the Africans are very backward. Development is necessary and the only way to do it is to raise the agricultural standards, but it will be necessary for Britain, or perhaps America—at any rate the Western Powers—they must be approached and asked to make some substantial grants or loans to assist these territories to come up.—A. I agree. When the political issue is settled after a constitutional review and investors know where they stand that would be ideally the time for a very big injection of overseas capital into the Federation. We have to create the political atmosphere which will attract such an injection, because we shall need it. I do think that agriculture is the start of this, because it is only by raising the agricultural income that you can get a quickly-developing market and it is only when you get a financial market and purchasing power that you begin to develop more industries locally. Unless the African purchasing power is raised by some method I personally do not see the quick development of industries. You cannot create industries artificially, and when you look at the raw materials of Rhodesia on the one hand and at the requirements of the market on the other hand, you will find there is not a great deal more that can be done. It still pays us to import our manufactures rather than to produce our own. All that will change when the purchasing power and the market created by the African purchasing power is created.

MR. KATILUNGU: On the point raised by Mr. Chirwa dealing with the increase in earning capacity and spending power of Africans, you referred to the increased productivity in industries. Do you not think when mechanisation of employment in an industry takes place it is always expected that the

labour should have some benefit as a result of that mechanisation, which results in fact in the reducing of the numbers of labour in industry to a very small number, as a result of which perhaps the job which has been done collectively by 10 people now is done by 5—would that not result in increased earning capacity?—A. That is an awfully difficult one to answer. In countries like Rhodesia there is often an economic incentive not to mechanise: it is cheaper to employ labour than to mechanise. If you mechanise you may be creating more unemployment. The economists tell me there is no question, if you are faced with a situation where it pays you to mechanise but it would create unemployment it is better to go ahead and create unemployment. I am not qualified to argue on that, but I recognise this as a difficult problem. The Belgian Congo tried to solve this by deliberately refraining from a policy of rationalisation and mechanisation because they were afraid of

the employment problem that would arise if they mechanised. I would not like to say more today, because this is a subject I am actually studying, with a view to presenting a paper on this question. It is vital with Kariba coming in, and so on, and it is also vital to the mining industry—the national interests versus the narrow sectional interests. For instance, if we cut down a labour force of 30,000 Africans to 2,000 Africans by mechanising fully; we would make more money, but what happens to the Africans who are left out? That is the problem. I know enough about it to know there is no quick answer, but so far as the general answer goes, not for Rhodesia but for the world of economics, they say it is better to go ahead and mechanise and create more wealth for the country. Mr. Katilungu has raised what I think is a critical point for our country.

CHAIRMAN: We are very grateful to you.

LONDON

25TH MAY 1960

Memorandum

BRITISH COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

I. The long-term interest of the Council

The Council, which in this speaks also for the Conference of British Missionary Societies, has made public its concern for the Federation issue, and particularly the situation in the two northern territories, since 1952. It therefore welcomes the increased official recognition that serious problems exist, shown by the setting up of the Commission.

The primary concern of the Council has always been for good human and social relations between all people living in the Federation. This has led to a consistent emphasis on the indispensability of confidence between the races, and the growth of a truly non-racial partnership, if a viable Federation was to develop. In accordance with this view, the Council accepts the need for policies which will bring reassurance both to Africans and Europeans. With the help of a special Federation Sub-Committee, which incorporates a number of people with very considerable experience of the territories concerned, the International Department has sought to relate the basic concerns of the Council in a realistic and helpful way to the actual situation. What follows is based on seven points agreed at the last meeting of the Council. They are given in the Appendix in the form in which they were approved, with the appropriate resolution of the Council.

II. The continuance of the Federation

1. Although in 1952 the Council urged that the establishment of the Federation should be postponed for five years, in order to give time for African confidence to develop, it accepts that continuance of the Federation should at present be the aim of policy, for the following reasons:

- (a) This large-scale and courageous experiment in race relations is of enormous importance to the world and to the Commonwealth. Its success would signally help to solve one of the major problems of the contemporary world. Its too easy abandonment would be a source of discouragement. But if it were manifestly to fail to express the ideals which it is supposed to embody, its continuance would be a disaster. There is general need to intensify efforts rapidly to remove the colour bar wherever it occurs.
- (b) The drawing together of the three territories seems the most promising answer to the economic problems of the area, viewed in isolation. But the Federation as at present constructed is not the only way of meeting the economic needs, and the economic needs are not the only ones to be met. The Federation will only succeed economically if it can be made acceptable in other ways. The present Constitutional arrangements may require modifying in order to achieve this.

2. At the same time the Council believes that the continuance of the Federation is an issue which should be examined by the present Commission. The Federation was received by many Africans as an imposition. This is the first main reason why so much opposition attaches to the concept. Because of this, and because the consent of the governed must be gained if the Federation is to continue, Africans must be given an undertaking that at some point they will have the opportunity of signifying their acceptance of it or otherwise. Only thus will they come to feel that they have a vital share in it. Accordingly the Council urges that the two Protectorates should have the opportunity to opt out of the Federation at the end of an agreed period following the achievement of African majorities in their respective territorial governments. A hasty decision taken immediately

after accession to power might later be regretted. But a decision between five and ten years after this accession would be taken after some experience of responsibility and of the actual working of the Federation with Africans in that position, and after an opportunity to consider the alternatives in the light of the experience gained. Meanwhile we note with pleasure that H.M.G. are committed to maintaining Protectorate status and that they are clearly not going to give full independence to the Federation.

III. Making the Federation more acceptable

The second main reason for African opposition to the Federation is fear of continuing domination by the European minority. Since it is only very recently that a large section of European opinion in the Federation appears to have recognised that this could not be assumed, the fear is understandable. The following suggestions may be made:

1. Franchise and Constitutional Advance.

It would be reassuring if the extent of African participation in Southern Rhodesian politics were rapidly to grow. The reasons why Africans do not make fuller use of the political rights they now have would repay investigation. There can be no successful growing together of the three territories, unless Africans in Southern Rhodesia can look forward to a similar programme of political advance as in the other two territories. A similar increase in the extent of African political influence in the Federal sphere is required. An assurance that it is not intended to raise the qualifications for accession to the Federal voting rolls (except perhaps in accordance with the variation in the value of money, as provided in Section 20 of the Federal Franchise Act), would be valuable. Africans can only be expected to value a political framework in which they have a considerable stake. The 1960 Conference should produce unequivocal evidence that adventurous steps in this field are to be taken. It should be made clear beyond doubt that Africans will gain a rapidly increasing share in the political life of the two Protectorates.

2. The distribution of powers

- (a) The distribution of powers between the Federal and territorial Governments is closely connected with the extent of African political participation. To discover a balance which will bring maximum reassurance to all concerned is more important than administrative convenience. Clearly, suggestions in this field will be subject to the judgment of constitutional experts. Those here made rest on the general assumption that the present distribution of powers does not exhaust the possibilities of constitutional ingenuity.
- (b) It is sometimes suggested that certain powers should be transferred from the territorial to the Federal Government. This suggestion should be treated with extreme caution. If, for example the responsibility for law and order were so transferred, all pretence that the United Kingdom Government was the protecting power would have been abandoned. Insofar as the events of 1959 have revealed ambiguities which need rectifying, it will be preferable to strengthen territorial powers in this field. Similarly, to transfer the responsibility for land, and for its development, to the Federal authority would touch Africans at a most sensitive point, as well as contravening the Preamble to the Constitution.
- (c) The transfer of powers from the Federal to the territorial Governments would be much more conducive to confidence. School education of Europeans is in Federal hands, while that of Africans rests with the territorial Governments—an obvious hindrance to the

development of non-racial education. The responsibility of the territorial Governments for labour relations should be strengthened, since it can conflict with Federal responsibility for such matters as the health services and posts and telephones, and therefore for terms of employment for Africans in those industries. It would be a source of increased confidence, if greater responsibility for economic development rested with individual governments. They are now responsible for the development of industries, land-banks, co-operative societies and co-operative companies (unless they are over-ridden by the Federal Government). The functions might well be extended to include the formation of strong development councils for the two northern territories. The recently formed Industrial Development and Loans Board for Nyasaland is dwarfed by the new Industrial Development Corporation at Federal level.

- (d) It may be objected that there is not the necessary reservoir of ability to strengthen the territorial Governments alongside the Federal Government. This is only true if Africans are not trained and used. An expanded emergency training programme for Africans is urgently needed, even though this might involve some wastage among those initially selected. The administrative difficulties and extra cost may also be instanced. It may be doubted whether they are greater than the difficulties of the present arrangements.

3. The African Affairs Board

"The objective of policy in the Federation is to remove from each race the fear that the other might dominate for its own racial benefit. Until this objective can be achieved, a period of transition remains during which special arrangements in the machinery of Government must be made so as to ensure that no race can use either the preponderance of its numbers or its own advanced stage of development to dominate the other for its own racial benefit."

The above resolution, associated with the name of Sir John Moffatt, is exemplified in the African Affairs Board, of which he was formerly Chairman. But since the last election, a majority of the Board's members have belonged to the governing Party, and there has been little confidence in its independence. The Board should be reconstituted and made more effective. Some of its members could be drawn from outside politics, or nominated by the Protectorate Governments.

4. Moving the Federal Capital

A Federal capital located in the capital of Southern Rhodesia can hardly avoid being an object of suspicion. Its removal outside Southern Rhodesia, though difficult, can fairly be required of those who are most keen to take the continuance of the Federation for granted.

IV. African representation at the conference

No Conference findings are likely to carry the support of Africans who are not adequately represented, by leaders whom they trust, at the Conference itself. The United Kingdom Government has agreed that when it comes to determining whether or not the inhabitants of the Protectorates wish to continue under British protection, in terms of the Preamble to the Constitution, the two territorial Governments would not be considered sufficiently representative. A similar willingness to use extra-governmental African leaders should be evinced, in choosing those who participate in the 1960 Conference. In doing so, a genuine cross-section of African opinion, whether or not it is thought to be mistaken, should be represented.

V. The cruciality of the 1960 conference

The 1960 Conference will not succeed unless it results in massive reassurance to Africans. The Council is not unaware of the Prime Minister's statement that

"The British Government will certainly not withdraw its protection from Nyasaland and Rhodesia in the short run, and in the long run our object is to advance these territories to fully responsible government. Then they will be able to dispense with our protection and stand entirely on their own feet as components of the Federation. When all the units are in a position to agree, and are agreed that British Government protection is no longer needed—then, and only then—can the whole Federation go forward to full independence and full commonwealth membership."

The Council has also noted the Prime Minister's elaboration of this while in Africa, on 13th January 1960, when he is reported to have said that "We do not regard its will as expressed until it has reached real self-government—before it can be said that the people in Nyasaland have the machinery to express their will through an elected Government of some kind."

In the present crisis of confidence, which affects relations between Africans and the United Kingdom Government, such

assurance will be tested against specific actions and policies. These include the willingness of the United Kingdom to contribute to the solution of the economic problems of the Protectorates. The more completely the Protectorate responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government are discharged in 1960, and the more the outcome of the Conference achieves irrevocable rights for Africans, the more conviction will such words carry for the future.

20th January 1960.

Appendix

At the meeting of the British Council of Churches in October 1959, it was resolved:

That the Council gives general approval to the approach of the Department to the issues raised by the impending Conference to review the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

- All reasonable efforts should be made to maintain the unity of the Federation in whatever form may be most acceptable.
- Territories should have the opportunity to opt out of the Federation at the end of an agreed period following the accession to power of a predominantly African Government (perhaps five or ten years). Meanwhile Protectorate status must be maintained and full independence for the Federation is ruled out.
- Since the 1960 Conference might well be the last occasion on which the United Kingdom Government will be able or willing to exercise directly a significant influence on the future of Central Africa, it is important to ensure that as a result of the Conference as many Africans as possible, for whom the United Kingdom Government has protectorate responsibilities, should be ensured freedom from domination by European minorities.
- Law and order should continue to be a territorial responsibility.
- Land should remain a territorial responsibility.
- One aim of the Federation should be non-racial schools.
- A cross-section of African opinion should be adequately represented at the Conference.

Supplementary Memorandum

You may be interested to see the resolutions about Central Africa which were passed at the half-yearly meeting of our Council last week—they are as follows:—

- The Council welcomes the following re-affirmation made by the Prime Minister in Lagos in January 1960:

"The Government of the United Kingdom has made it clear—abundantly clear—that we will not remove the protection of the British Government to either of the northern territories—Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland—until it is clear that the expressed wish of these people is to enter into a full and independent federation."
- The Council welcomes the evidence provided by the policies being pursued by the Colonial Secretary, including the release of Dr. Banda, that rapid constitutional progress is envisaged for Nyasaland, and welcomes the reduction of tension which his recent visit to that territory has produced.
- The Council, noting that there has recently been a further marked diminution of confidence in the federal structure, believes that bold steps in constitutional progress for Africans in Northern Rhodesia, no less than in Nyasaland, are urgently needed even before the forthcoming constitutional review.

We shall look forward to discussing this matter with the Monckton Commission when it sits in London.

London
25th April 1960

Memorandum

LONDON MISSIONARY SOCIETY

A. F. Griffiths—Overseas Secretary

I am instructed by the Africa Committee of the London Missionary Society to express to the Advisory Commission the support of this Society for the Memorandum dated 20th January 1960, submitted by the British Council of Churches.

The London Missionary Society has been at work in Rhodesia for one hundred years, and through its missionaries, and its Church connections, as well as its educational institutions, is in close contact with the peoples of the Federation.

The Society is in agreement with the Memorandum of the British Council of Churches, and does not seek to submit separate evidence on its own behalf.

London
2nd March 1960

Oral evidence

BRITISH COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

Rev. R. K. Orchard

Rev. N. C. Bernard

Rev. A. R. Booth

Rev. Canon G. W. Broomfield

Rev. E. Rogers

Rev. D. A. Keighley

CHAIRMAN: We are grateful to you for the memorandum with the Resolutions attached, and also for the April Resolution of the Council dated 25th April. Is there anything you would like to say at the outset?—A. (THE REV. R. K. ORCHARD): There are one or two things I would like to stress on our behalf. I would like first of all to remind the Commission that the concern of the British Council of Churches is with the churches it represents and their missionary agencies and for all the people of all races living in the Federation. The British Council of Churches has been concerned with discussions about the Federation since before it began. This concern has been because it desires that constitutional and political arrangements should further and not hinder understanding, and that fear and mistrust which spoil men's lives should be removed. It is out of that concern for men of all races in their lives as a whole that our concern for Federation arises.

The Commission has received a memorandum setting out the views of the British Council of Churches. This memorandum was prepared some months ago and since then a good many events have taken place. Our information on and contacts with the Federation have underlined the urgency of some of the points made in it. We referred to African opposition to Federation, one of the main reasons for which, it is suggested, is that they regard Federation as having been imposed on them; they fear Federation as a means of continuing European domination.

Since that memorandum was drafted African opposition, in our view, has increased and intensified. We believe that Africans in general regard Federation as a major obstacle to the political advance of the African people within its bounds. This view may or may not be justified, but its widespread existence seems to be an inescapable fact of the world-wide political situation.

We remarked that the consent of the governed must be gained if Federation is to continue, and urged the importance of rational constitutional advance in the Territories, with an opportunity on the part of the African majority to opt out. Since then, in our judgment, the situation has become more grave. It seems that only by such recognition of what political power means to the African peoples here, and a recognition of their essential manhood and in the safeguarding of their interests, can there be any possibility of a peaceful and orderly transition to a new day in Central Africa.

Events in neighbouring territories underline the urgency. The impact of the Belgian Congo's independence on 30th June, and that of Tanganyika in September on the peoples of the Federation is likely, in our judgment, to be considerable. The great bulk of African opinion will not be prepared to consider the revision of the Federal structure or any alteration of inter-territorial links until Africans hold effective political power in the territories and so can negotiate any new arrangement with the freedom that comes from effective political strength.

This suggests that if the Federation is to continue steps will need to be taken in regard to the Federal franchise to secure a massive, and irreversible majority of Africans in the Territories. If there is such a constitutional advance in the Territories and not in the Federal Government then it will be an inescapable conclusion that the Federal Government is in fact an obstacle to African political advancement. Similarly, if there is any transference of power as between the Territorial and Federal Governments it should be, in our judgment, from the Federal Government to the Territorial Governments. Transfer of powers from the Territorial Governments to the Federal Government will lead to the same conclusion being drawn. Whether, if the Federal Government then becomes a government unmistakably elected by the inhabitants of the Territories, it would secure the consent of the governed is a political prophecy we are not able to make, but it seems clear that by such steps as these the Federal Government should express the ideals it is supposed to embody.

Finally, it seems that rapid constitutional provision to provide for African majorities in the Territories seems to be, in present political circumstances in Africa and the world, the essential immediate step. It is the only step which, so far as we can see, offers any hope of a peaceful transition to a constructive future for all the inhabitants of the Territories. It is because it seems to offer that possibility for all the peoples in the Federation that we are concerned that the step should be taken. Those are the points we would like to underline in the present circumstances.

Q. I understand perfectly what you say about the desirability, for these political reasons, of getting a rapid advance in African representation in the constitutions of the Northern Territories. So far as S. Rhodesia is concerned, you will recognise that whatever may be desirable it is less easy to agree changes. There are different constitutional positions. It does not mean that something cannot be recommended, but it is not easy.—A. Our memorandum rather differentiates between the two.

Q. As regards what you call "opting out", you will also have considered the difficulties in the way of doing that, arising from the desire of many people to reach some certain conclusion from which it is possible to go ahead. For instance, from the economic point of view it has been suggested that uncertainty makes it more difficult to get the economic assistance which is necessary, from one source or another, to enable these Territories to go forward. But you have balanced that, on the whole, you think?—A. That is our judgment. We are not unaware of the importance of the economic factor, but we think that it is dependent upon goodwill and the consent of the governed, and without that the social and political conditions are not likely to be conducive to economic progress.

Q. You spoke about the franchise just now. You have given us the general conclusions and the reasons why you think franchises ought to be so devised as to lead to greater representation of Africans in the Territories. Have you thought out the details of this?—A. No, it would not be right to say we have gone into detail about the franchise. We have discussed it, but did not feel that our competence lay in the realm of constitutional law.

Q. Of course, there are some broad political problems, as distinct from the way they are dealt with—as, for instance, how the Territories would best be represented at a centre. You deliberated, but did not reach a conclusion?—A. That is so.

Q. I rather wanted to see what it was that carried you all. In Section III 2. of your original memorandum where you argue against any transfer of responsibility for law and order from the Territories to the Federal Government, you say in that case "... all pretence that the United Kingdom Government was the protecting power would have been abandoned". That is the main reason that led you to believe that?—A. Yes.

Q. In Section III 2 (c) dealing with education of the Europeans, which is in Federal hands, you point out that the education of Africans rests with the Territorial Governments, and say that is not consistent with a non-racial approach. Have you thought out what you would do about that? Do you mean that you would transfer the whole of education to the Territories, both African and European?—A. Yes, Sir. The balance of our judgment would be in that direction. Our main concern was that the administrative arrangements should be such as to make possible non-racial education and not hinder it.

Q. If you are going forward to that ideal you would have to consider how you would introduce it. Have you considered at what stage you would first try and get multi-racial schooling—secondary stage or primary stage?—A. (THE REV. BERNARD): I realise the difficulties in this one. This was put in here to show that one of the hindrances in the present set-up is that there can be no experimentation, because one is controlled by one Government and the other by another Government. The practical difficulties are very great at the primary level, but we know of certain people who are willing to experiment along that line. They cannot do so at present with the hard and fast separation of Territorial and Federal.

Q. Some people have suggested that because of the different stages of advancement of the European and African children at the primary stage, you would have to begin a bit later.—A. My personal opinion would be that you cannot begin before the secondary, but there should be machinery by which people who wish to begin earlier will be able to do so.

Q. But you take the broad line that unless they are both under one hand you cannot do it at all? Now you talk about the health services in a way which would lead to the assumption that they should be Federal. You say that "The responsibility of the Territorial Governments for labour relations should be strengthened, since it can conflict with Federal responsibility for such matters as the health services and posts and telephones, and therefore for terms of employment for Africans in those industries". I know of course that these services are at present run from the Federal centre.—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): We were not so much concerned with health services as to ensure that there would not be any conflict between matters handled by the Territorial Governments and the Federal Government, because it would make advancement in labour relations difficult.

Q. You only use the point as an illustration of the present set-up?—A. Perhaps I might say that all these items in the "Distribution of Powers" at the foot of page 2 were given as illustrations of the type of problem we felt needed consideration rather than those on which we felt we wanted to take a strong or positive line.

Q. In the same paragraph you say that it would be a source of increased confidence if greater responsibility for economic development rested with individual governments. Have you considered the possibility that it might be desirable for there to be an economic centre, which would have to have some powers to enable it to act. If that were so would it be essentially the responsibility for economic development which you would want to rest with the Territorial Government?—A. (THE REV. ROGERS): Looking at it purely from the economic point of view and the external view, the sensible way would be for centralised economic development, but the position is at present that it is regarded as one of the major weaknesses or potential dangers of Federation within the Territories and particularly by the Africans, and consequently in some measure by Europeans. There is a sense in which the political pressures are so strong that the economic argument is largely ignored. What was in our minds—at least I think so, because our people are not as good at economics as they might be—is this matter of increased confidence and increased trust. You might very well be able to move from territorial responsibility to a freely negotiated measure of common enterprise once you have your confidence established.

Q. Dealing with the African Affairs Board in paragraph III 3. you say the Board should be re-constituted and made more effective. We know the criticisms made of the existing set-up. It would not worry you, I suppose, if instead of the African Affairs Board some quite different steps were taken in the constitution to protect minorities?—A. (THE REV. CANON BLOOMFIELD): It seems to some of us that it was a very great pity that there was talk about the abolition of the African Affairs Board because that, to Africans, looks like sweeping away one thing which was put forward as a safeguard for their interests. I think myself, as a lot of us do, that the African Affairs Board might be greatly improved and made more effective, but it seems very important that it should not be an abolition of the Board but a development of it. If it were to be put that way round then the change would not be regarded with so much suspicion by Africans.

Q. We have had a good deal of evidence to suggest that the African Affairs Board has come under so much criticism that as long as what was to be put in its place was demonstrably more satisfactory from the point of view of protection of minorities it would not matter what form it took. You would not agree with that?—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): I think we would be very happy with any arrangements which safeguarded minorities and that perhaps we would now, since this document was drafted, rather want to emphasise the safeguarding of minorities rather than the African Affairs Board.

Q. You say something about moving the Federal capital. There was a suggestion made to us that it might be possible for the administrative centre to remain where it is established, but the assembly, or whatever takes its place, should be moved outside Southern Rhodesia. Would that in part meet what is really a psychological objection?—A. I think it certainly would in part. It is the psychological symbolism, as you say, of the capital which concerns us. It depends a little on what is meant by the administrative centre. If people from the other Territories have to go to S. Rhodesia on administrative business then it may also provide a certain psychological fear, though less than if the Legislative Assembly is also in Southern Rhodesia.

Q. You have described the 1960 Conference as crucial, and you say, "The more completely the Protectorate responsibilities of the U.K. Government are discharged in 1960 and the more the outcome of the Conference achieves irrevocable rights for Africans, the more conviction will such words carry for the future". Would you tell us what you mean by "irrevocable"?—A. It is possible to have franchise arrangements with certain qualifications which can be subsequently changed. That we would not regard as an irrevocable right. But it is possible also to transfer the reality of political power in a way that cannot really effectively be reversed except by some such major crisis as a war. It is the latter we had in mind.—A. (THE REV. KEIGHLEY): There may be a certain ambiguity about the word "discharge". We were not suggesting that the protective responsibilities should necessarily come to an end in 1960 but that they should be fulfilled in the part Her Majesty's Government play in the Review of the Constitution.

Q. When you say "discharge" you mean fulfil or carry out. You would contemplate that anyhow until the Territories become self-governing there should remain the protection of the United Kingdom Government in the north?—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): Yes.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: On a point of information, you said it was your view that African opposition had increased since your original memorandum was put in. Could you tell us the basis of that memorandum and what sources of information you have, together with any steps you have taken to ascertain the facts necessary for you to make that sort of statement?—

A. The sources of information are primarily the missionary societies associated with the churches in the British Council of Churches, of which there are some with considerable experience and contacts in all three Territories of the Federation. Through them information comes to the missionary societies' headquarters with fair regularity, and missionaries returning on furlough come with a fair amount of information from contacts on a local level. Recent events, besides the accumulation of that kind of information, include the return to this country of a secretary of a Christian Council, and the visit to the Federation of three members of our Federation Group, which studies these matters on behalf of the British Council of Churches—four members of the Federation Group in the last six months.

Q. Are there any particular points within that recent period you spoke of that have been brought to your attention?—A. (THE REV. ROGERS): I have most recently returned. I was in the Federation almost at the same time the Commission was there. One very significant change I have noted for myself within Northern Rhodesia in particular is the whole complex reaction to the political development in the Belgian Congo and, of course, in Tanganyika. This seems quite definitely to be hardening the opposition almost as though there was an unformulated feeling that there was a chance to get something. I do not think that many knew what they really wanted, but it was a feeling that Federation was in the way more evidently and obviously than before. This was not a carefully-drafted political party manifesto or even carefully-guided political thinking; it was the sort of reaction I got when speaking to someone like a lay preacher in an African Methodist Church, or even the women in the women's meetings—which is quite significant.

Q. Would you feel that something positive ought to be done in order to counteract that tendency?—A. Some definite way of moving forward, yes, Sir.

MR. ROBINSON: The leader of the delegation started off by saying the Council of Churches was concerned with all the inhabitants of the Federation, and I must say that when I read this document I got the impression that there was very little in it about the Europeans, Asians and other minority groups about which you make recommendations. There is one particular point I had in mind (to which the Chairman has already referred) which arises where you talk about the African Affairs Board being re-constituted and made more effective. The general emphasis seems to be that your Council is concerned in a massive broadening of the franchise, a take-over by African governments in the territories, but you do not seem to have given very much study to safeguards and what can make such a change acceptable to the European section of the community. I would like to ask whether you, as a Council of Churches, are concerned with the Federation remaining a permanent multi-racial community, or are you concerned to see it as an African state or group of African states in the future with certain minority groups living there, not as of right or as part of any contractual arrangement, as it were, but just as a minority group of people? What is your conception of the future of these countries?—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): First of all I would like to say that we have felt, particularly since certain recent visits that our members have paid to the Federation, increasing concern for the European and, to a lesser extent, the Asian sections of the community. We would like to give a good deal of further study to what can be done to assist their transition to the future. We have not yet had an opportunity to give that study and therefore we did not feel able to express any very definite views at this stage, except to say that this concern was fully amongst us. Secondly, our hope is that, whatever the constitutional framework of the Territories in Central Africa may be in the future, those countries will have a non-racial community. This seems to us to involve power in the hands of the majority, and it may very probably involve safeguards of some kind or other for minority groups within the country, particularly in the initial stages of the future. But our concern is for a non-racial community in Central Africa.—(THE REV. BOOTH): The British Council of Churches has moved a little bit from its original thinking of a multi-racial society, which was the concept that dominated the Federation, to a non-racial society in which the question of race begins to fade and people get votes because of their qualifications and so on rather than because of this racial concept. But we are now aware, as we were not six months ago, of the very real human problem, particularly of the unskilled and semi-skilled European community who are not there through any fault of their own, so to speak, but who are there and not part of the whole set-up. There seems to be a group there whose

economic situation is bound to be severely prejudiced in the future, and it may be that from outside the Federation some sense of responsibility may have to be aroused for the future of these people.

Q. I understand from what you have been saying that you feel the time has come to examine the position of the European now, together with the Asian and other minority groups, which is very encouraging. I judge from what you have told us that by and large, your Council bases its whole approach to this question on the doctrine of consent. You feel that the vast majorities of the peoples in the various Territories must consent to the arrangements and must have acceptable governments, and a normal democratic process used to arrive at the consent. We have some evidence—which is important evidence—in certain parts of the Federation that if we move rapidly in that direction, as you suggest, there might possibly be inter-tribal warfare; the creation of political dictatorships might be attempted as we have seen elsewhere; and there might be economic chaos if the process was very rapid. Assuming that those events take place following upon a rapid changeover in the Federation, would you still advise us to recommend in those terms?—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): This is a point to which some of us at least have tried to give some thought, because we realise the gravity of it. The consensus of opinion amongst us would be that any policy, in the present state of Africa as a whole and particularly in Central Africa, is fraught with very great risks and that you cannot have a policy which does not have a considerable element of risk in it. In our view the risk attached to a rapid political advance amongst the majority of the population is probably less than the risks attached to endeavouring to take a slow and cautious pace of development that will be resented and resisted by the large majority of the population. We think that the pace of political events is such that there is not time to wait for Africans to be acceptable on European terms, so to speak, and that they have to be accepted on their own terms, even though we indeed recognise the risks involved in that. The problems connected with the preservation of order in the community in the process of transition weigh upon our consciences. Also we feel the utmost concern and sympathy for those who have the responsibility for taking decisions in that field, but this seems to us the way in which the likelihood of outbreaks of violence will be least, and therefore it is the way which seems to offer the best way for an orderly transition towards the future.

Q. Within your various churches in the Federation, do you practice non-racial policies and, if not, is it the intention of your members' churches to do so in the future?—A. I think it would be true to say that all the churches represented in the British Council of Churches seek to have church structures which are non-racial in the sense that their membership is open to all members of the community, and that the holding of office within them is by choice of the best person rather than on any racial ground. This does not mean we would expect there to be completely non-racial worship in all the congregations throughout the Federation tomorrow, because of such questions as language and, of course, the right of people to worship God in their mother tongue. But it means that in the leadership of the Church the effort is made towards non-racial character and that in the courts of the churches the same non-racial character is sought. Of course, this can only be done fully with the consent of the governed within the churches also and therefore its pace must, to some extent, be determined by the rank and file of members of churches who, of course, are not immune from or above the pressures of current social practices in the Federation.

Q. It is a gradual process?—A. Yes, but some of us would hope it would not be too gradual.

SIR DONALD MACGILLIVRAY: Would you tell us what are the implications in the short resolution passed by the Council last month, that in which the Council expresses the view that bold steps in constitutional progress for Africans in Northern Rhodesia, no less than in Nyasaland, are urgently needed even before the forthcoming constitutional review? Did you have in mind that there should be changes in the constitutions of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland decided upon and given effect to before there was a review of the Federal Constitution and, if so, what would be the advantages of the considerable delay which would be involved in the review of the Federal Constitution?—A. Yes, Sir, it was the Council's view that if possible there should be these constitutional advances before the Constitutional Review Conference, for two main reasons. I have already indicated one, that we believe the chances of serious consideration amongst the African sections of the community of any new arrangements within the Federation would be improved if these arrangements were negotiated by people who were elected representatives of their communities. The second one concerns African representation at the Constitutional Review Conference itself. It is important in our view that representatives of the

African sections of the community should be considered by the communities to be validly their representatives. We do not readily see any other way of securing that other than that they should be elected by the normal democratic process.

MR. CRAWLEY: How long would you be prepared to wait for the Africans in the south, in Southern Rhodesia, to be represented at this conference?—A. There is, of course, a sort of debating answer to that—that the Constitution provides that there shall be a constitutional review not less than 7 and not more than 10 years after its inauguration.

SIR DONALD MACGILLIVRAY: Have you made any estimate of the time it might take to bring into being new governments and new constitutions in the two northern Territories, having regard to the fact that in Nyasaland there have so far been no elections and delineations of constituencies, which would inevitably take time before you can have elections?—A. (THE REV. CANON BLOOMFIELD): I do not think we feel ourselves specially competent to deal with the constitutional machinery, but what we were frightfully keen on was that there should be Africans at the Constitutional Conference who have the confidence of large masses of the African people out there. We do not know the best way in which that can be done, but we think it would be extremely important, and it would make all the difference if there were Africans there who had the confidence of other Africans.

Q. And to ensure that you think that considerable delay would be justified?—A. (THE REV. KEIGHLEY): We recognise that the bringing into force of new constitutions in the two territories with which we are chiefly concerned would take several months at least, and possibly more; but if people were charged or irrevocably committed to the process of carrying that out and were already doing so, that would signally help the amount of confidence there was. It would not necessarily mean the total completion of the process, but that the governments were beginning to carry it out.—(THE REV. BOOTH): The problem in the two Northern Territories is quite separate from that in Southern Rhodesia.—(THE REV. BERNARD): There must be on the stocks in Zomba, if not in the Colonial Office, a blue-print of what was intended, otherwise I cannot see why Lord Perth was coming to see into these matters. Therefore, from the point of view of Nyasaland, I do not think it should take time.

CHAIRMAN: First of all, on the debating answer, it is "not more than 9 years", but on the reality and substance of the thing, it does necessarily take time in a territory where there have been no elections in the past to set up machinery, however much one may agree with it on principle, within a very short period.—A. (THE REV. ROGERS): I would like to make one point on this: the "considerable delay" has to be interpreted. It surely would not mean, as it were, starting as and from the report of the Commission. It would be a matter of two or three years at the outside, not a decade or more.

SIR DONALD MACGILLIVRAY: I was thinking that two or three years represented a considerable delay in Central Africa.

LORD CRATHORNE: But the blue-print will not bring those very important people to the Conference, the Africans—that is the danger.—A. (THE REV. BERNARD): That is the problem we have been urging on the Government of Nyasaland for quite a number of months now. Even though the blue-print is there, my own view is that people from Nyasaland would find it extremely difficult to carry their people with them unless they were the elected representatives. On the other hand it might give a very different tone to the Review Conference if these men were the elected representatives.

MR. MOLSON: Do you think in any case it would be extremely difficult for any representatives of Nyasaland at the present time, however popularly elected, to go back on the political propaganda which has been conducted for the last ten years? I fully appreciate the weight of the argument of getting the consent of the two Northern Territories to any new constitutional arrangements that are made and do you not think that one could get most of the benefits of that by reserving to each of the territories the right of secession under the new Constitution? Would it not be more likely that if they felt, at some time in the future when they had had more experience of the working of the Constitution, they would then have the right to secede that they would not be anxious to exercise that right at the present time?—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): That leads us almost into a prophecy about the future. I personally think that might be the case. The important thing seems to me to be the constitutional advance in the Territories, not only for the sake of discussing the future of the Federation but for its own sake, so that by being accorded this obvious recognition of their manhood and this obvious advance of their political future, African opinion might be given more confidence and more trust in its own future within the total life of Central Africa. This is, I think, an urgent step which needs to be taken, if I may say so, irrespective of the Constitutional Review Conference and the date on which it happens.

SIR DONALD MACGILLIVRAY: What was in your mind when you spoke about an emergency training programme for Africans being urgently needed? You said "There is not the necessary reservoir of ability to strengthen the Territorial Government". I suppose you had in mind the training of Africans for service in the Territorial Governments, and also the training of Africans for positions of responsibility filled normally by people who have had some university training.—A. Yes.

Q. Could you explain how this emergency training programme might operate? Would it be an expansion of the university training given at Salisbury?—A. We thought of something rather more radical than that, in the sense of training people for administrative responsibility within government on a larger scale than would be possible by a rapid expansion of a university. The scheme would be of an emergency character, which would risk taking people with lower qualifications than would be required by a university, and would be prepared to face a considerable degree of wastage during the course, in order that out of that somewhat extravagant but urgently needed programme there might be at least a considerable increase in the number of people with a reasonably good qualification for carrying on the administrative processes of government.

Q. The effect would be that you could cut down the period of training necessary in a university perhaps from 3 to 4 years to 1 to 2 years. But would there not still be the problem of the material coming forward for that training so that unless there were a considerable number coming out of the secondary schools you would really save very little?—A. If the essential qualification for admission were not necessarily solely an academic one, but one that also took into account experience, proved trustworthiness, and ability in some walk of life other than government administration, this might expand the reservoir.

Q. Do you insist on some basic standard like School Certificate?—A. (THE REV. ROGERS): Some of it might be planned on the pattern of the British teacher training scheme just after the war or on the very successful (so I am told) Nigerian programme of government training.

Q. But such training would not get very far unless it was accompanied by a considerable increase in the number of school-certificate recruits coming out of the secondary schools.—A. Yes, we agree this is supplementary to the normal education programme, not a substitute.

MR. HADLOW: The franchise has been mentioned several times this morning. Do you propose that the Federal and Territorial franchises should be the same, no matter what was decided about the franchise?—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): I do not think we have specifically considered that particular issue.

MR. GONDWE: In view of what you have just told the Commission about there being mounting opposition on the part of Africans to Federation (and, of course, even at the time you submitted this memorandum it was already apparent), do you think the continuance of Federation would be accepted by Africans at all, even with all the suggestions you advance here? Do you think that would make it more palatable to them? Do you think Africans would be convinced that Federation could continue and that it would be in their interests?—A. I think we would want paragraphs 1 and 2 of the section headed "The Continuance of Federation" to be read together. Paragraph 2 reads: "At the same time the Council believes that the continuance of the Federation is an issue which should be examined by the present Commission. The Federation was received by many Africans as an imposition". Then the reasons for the opposition are discussed. Since the memorandum was drafted, our emphasis has come to rest more on the second paragraph than the first—on the African opposition rather than on the continuance of Federation. If I may add my own view on this—even with the changes here outlined in the Federal structure the chances of the Federation being acceptable to African opinion are slight, but there is perhaps just the possibility that if it were demonstrably a government that was responsible to the will of the majority it might be accepted. In my own judgment, the possibility of that is slight.—(THE REV. BOOTH): I would like to add one point on that. The whole point of our submission is that in our view there always was a case to be made for the Federation, which was an economic case, with arguments such as that a fragmented territory could scarcely support a university and so on; but that dream is now almost impossible to fulfil except on some very radical conditions, and that is why we have made some submissions. Even though the thing may still not be acceptable to Africans there is an outside chance, worth having a shot at.—(THE REV. CANON BLOOMFIELD): It also seems that the most important dream of the Federation was that it provided a possibility of people of different races being willing to co-operate and respect one another. It was a dream of the races coming together in real

partnership and friendship. That was the major thing in the minds of a lot of us, and I think we all feel that the outlook is not hopeless, but that the chance of it coming about now is not very bright. We still hope and pray that it might.

Q. Though you say you are not competent to give us any suggestions as to the constitutional advances of the Territories, may I refer to Section III (i) of your memorandum where you say that in order that the Africans in the Northern Territories should be convinced that Federation would not be a threat to their political advancement, the Southern Rhodesia Government should perhaps take steps to allow Africans to sit in the Legislative Assembly there. What method would you make or devise which would persuade Europeans in Southern Rhodesia to agree to Africans sitting in the Legislative Council, because as you know, responsible government was accorded to Southern Rhodesia in 1923 and it is now 37 years since that country has been self-governed and a common roll was then established which meant that eventually Africans would sit side by side with Europeans in the Legislative Assembly, but nothing of that sort has happened. What would you devise as being the method which would persuade the Europeans in that Territory to allow Africans to sit in the Legislative Council? Because that would demonstrate to the Africans of the Northern Territories that there was nothing to fear—and that is the main cause of their opposition to Federation.—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): As I have already said, this is the sort of question to which we want to give much more thought. My own feeling is that an answer might be found along two lines, one that might be called an educational effort, to invite Europeans to consider the events that are taking place in other parts of Africa and to ask themselves the question of what kind of future they envisage for themselves in the light of the large-scale events which are taking place both in Africa and in the world as a whole. There is perhaps a tendency amongst all of us to think only in terms of our immediate surroundings and immediate environment, and we need an encouragement to lift our sights a little and put our own situation in a proper perspective.

Secondly I think this is really bound up with the question that arose earlier about the provision of such safeguards both constitutional and economic which would help to provide a certain sense of security because none of us is secure in this nuclear age, but a certain sense of hope about the future for the European sections of the community in Southern Rhodesia. This means, I think, some kind of economic provision as well as some kind of constitutional provision of the nature of a Bill of Rights.

MR. CRAWLEY: May I return to the question of delaying the Conference which seems to me rather important. If I have understood your opinions correctly it is that the review of the Federal constitution should be delayed until the Northern Territories have a great degree of self-government,—possibly up to two or three years. But that, of course, means that the Federation as it now stands would have to continue through that period, and in view of your own evidence that opposition to Federation is increasing all the time is it not possible that however presented, such a delay would lead to grave misinterpretation and greatly increase the tension?—A. (THE REV. ROGERS): I should judge that the probability—and we can only speak in terms of probabilities—would lie in the other direction. If the reason for the delay were in order that the Northern Territories should have a more direct representation of Africans I have the feeling that that would be regarded by them as a justifiable reason. At present some of them feel that the review is being hurried to the earliest possible moment, and it is the speed with which things are being done that disturbs them much more than any thought of delay.

Q. Do you really feel that if Africans were appointed to the Conference as to the Kenya Conference, where they played a very full part, that it would really make very much difference in the eyes of their people that they had not been elected beforehand?—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): I think that question turns, does it not, on the method by which they are appointed and the kind of persons who are selected for appointment and the problem has seemed to some of us to be how you pursue this process of selection for appointment without making it appear that the African representative who is selected for appointment is, in fact, someone who has become the instrument of the dominant European minority.—(THE REV. CANON BLOOMFIELD): Is there any possibility, Mr. Chairman, that the representatives might in fact be representatives of the different congresses?

CHAIRMAN: I think that raises some constitutional points on the interpretation of Article 99 of the Constitution but you can give this a practical twist, if you like, by saying that supposing that the Government of Nyassaland were to include Dr. Banda among their representatives, would that affect your view?—A. (THE REV. BOOTH): Might I add one note on this. It is felt that Africans should feel that their representative is really

being taken seriously, but it is also felt that the representative himself must be in a position where he has to live with what he decides upon. From both angles it appears very difficult to get responsible African participation in any other way.

MR. TAYLOR: I would like to hark back to Rev. Bernard's point at the beginning of the evidence that under the present set-up it was not possible to have an experiment in multi-racial education at the secondary school level. I am sure these gentlemen know the present system for giving grants to mission schools in Northern Rhodesia. Grants in aid are paid by the Government to missionary societies—I am more or less quoting from the official record—sufficient normally to cover the full cost of the teaching staff together with the cost of teachers' and pupils' equipment. There are a number of specific supplementary grants for purposes such as purchase of sports equipment, equipment for domestic science and craft work equipment. Provision is also made towards cost of management. On top of that grants are paid in respect of part of the cost of boarding pupils which is not recovered from parents, and finally a grant of 75 per cent. of the capital cost of approved buildings. There may be some constitutional obstacle to that system being applied to missionary schools at secondary level. I am advised that there is some doubt about it. But if that doubt were removed, if it were possible for the Territorial Governments to make these grants, and for the Federal Government to combine in a similar system a grant aid for multi-racial secondary schools do you think that the missionary societies would be prepared to make such an experiment at the secondary level?—A. (THE REV. BERNARD): Mr. Chairman, I think that it is very difficult for me to advise Mr. Taylor on behalf of the missionary societies, but what we are after is that there should be the freedom to do that. May I say there has been in Blantyre quite a considerable discussion on this between people of different races, and we were told that it was just out of the question. It could not be done.

Q. I do not think that it is out of the question. For example, the only constitutional question which seems to arise is whether the Governments can financially support the cost. I should say there is nothing in the law to prevent any private institution from financing such a school whatsoever. There is nothing in the law which says that black boys and white boys cannot go to school together.—A. Mr. Chairman, is that correct? We have always been led to believe the other way, that African education is absolutely a matter for the Territories and that other education. . . .

Q. The answer to that lies in the fact that African education in Northern Rhodesia, for example, is largely conducted by the missionary societies which are nothing to do with any government.—A. It is laid down in the list, I am quite sure it is.

Q. It is only a matter of what the Government can do for itself. I do not want to enter into an argument about the present position. But if there are any disabilities and if those disabilities were removed would then the churches be prepared to make this vital social experiment in the running of multi-racial secondary schools?—A. I think some of them would.—(THE REV. CANON BLOOMFIELD): Some of them would. I am the General Secretary of the Universities Mission of Central Africa which is a missionary agency supporting the Anglican Church in Rhodesia and Nyasaland as well as in other parts, and in other parts I know that steps in that direction are being taken. I am quite certain that the Anglican church in the Federation would be very anxious to move in that direction.

Q. Thank you very much. The second question. Do you consider that everything that ought to be done in your opinion with the Federation to promote the happiness of its inhabitants can be done and can be supported from the financial resources of the Federation by itself? If you do not think that, do you think that there is a moral obligation on anyone else to contribute towards the cost, and if so who is that anyone else?—A. (THE REV. BOOTH): Mr. Chairman, if my boss throws that one to me, I must ask whether it is true of any part of Africa that it can get on without economic capital investment from outside? In the sense it can get on perhaps, it will still be there in fifty years' time, but it will not be doing very much. If you ask on whom does the obligation lie for financial assistance from outside, there is the obvious point—I do not know whether this is the answer which is being fished for—that unless the country can attract in the ordinary way investment from outside, it will lose a great deal. Some of us in the churches have been pressing very hard, as with other people, that this is another of the cases of under-developed countries for which the British Government will continue to have a responsibility, as well as things like world banks and so on. You need to attract them and fit in with their conditions. But beyond that I am not quite sure what the point of the question is. Does that cover it?

Q. No, it does not quite cover it. The question of investment and the question of capital assistance are only part of the answer. In these poor countries very often one of the worst

things you can do for them, in my opinion, is to give them a capital grant which is not accompanied by a similar grant to cover the recurrent cost of operating whatever that capital grant is supposed to construct. It is like giving a poor man a Rolls Royce and telling him he has to buy his own petrol. It is that sort of grant that I am trying to draw you upon and whether such grant should be made—let me be frank—by the United Kingdom Government which is the protecting power?—A. You mean continuously as, for instance, underwriting the Nyasaland budget?

Q. Yes. How far does the desire for assistance find expression in concrete form?—A. That is the \$64,000 question about the wealth of undeveloped countries—how on earth to put capital into them in a way that becomes self-productive and does not end up in Cadillacs and all the rest of it. I must admit I do not know the answer.

Q. There is one final question. In the expressions of African opinion which you have heard and which you say have hardened in the last six months or so did you discern any evidence of intimidation of people who have held contrary opinions or in fact no opinions at all?—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): I think it is only possible for us to speak for ourselves because it is a question of fact. The people whom I met on a very brief visit to the Federation certainly did not give me any evidence of having been intimidated. They were admittedly people of a degree of education and capacity for leadership and they had most emphatically their own views on the kind of questions we have been discussing this morning. They stated them with boldness and with frankness, and I did not see any evidence of their having been intimidated or coerced into views they expressed to me. That is not to say there was not any such intimidation in several sections of the community with which I did not have contact.—(THE REV. ROGERS): There were frequent references in Nyasaland to intimidation, without very much specific evidence that could be accepted as I was not there for very long. There was one place where I am pretty clear on it and know the people involved. I would ask not to be pressed too far on this because of the confidential background to the story. It was quite clear there was planned intimidation around Lusaka.

PROFESSOR JACK: Would Mr. Bernard subscribe to that view?—A. (THE REV. BERNARD): I always feel there is intimidation everywhere in many different forms. I could not say coming from Nyasaland that there is no intimidation.

Q. Would you say whether it has increased or not?—A. Sir, I left at the end of December. I do not know what you have in mind—if you are thinking of any specific case.

Q. Have you any reports about the position in the Northern Province?—A. Yes, I have.

Q. Do they provide evidence that there has been an increase or not in intimidation?—A. I would say that a man has to be courageous to stand up against the bulk feeling if he states his political views which are in opposition to the majority.

Q. Have the churches or missions been embarrassed in any way by acts of intimidation?—A. The church on the field decided it would require to transfer one missionary, but the church considered that there were sufficient reasons for that to be done.

Q. Have the church or the missions ever had occasion to denounce the acts of intimidation in their area?—A. I take it, Sir, that statements are in the hands of the Commission from Livingstonia Mission on that sort of thing? Or were the documents not presented to you by the church?

MR. MOLSON: What Church?—A. The Livingstonia Synod of the Church of Scotland.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: Perhaps you know they refused to co-operate with us in any way, so we could not very well get those.—A. I am terribly sorry. This is not really to do with this delegation. You will realise I am in rather a difficult position as you are going to meet the Church of Scotland representatives.

PROFESSOR JACK: I asked the question because of your own experience in Nyasaland.—A. I think in that emotional set-up one has got to be a man of courage to stand up against the normal flow. It was a curse word to be called a Capricorn at one stage at a certain school in Blantyre. That you could say is intimidation and I take it, therefore, I cannot deny that there is such a thing.

SIR VICTOR ROBINSON: Is this training scheme designed to train Africans as civil servants or for ministerial rank in the Government or both?—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): Our concern on that point in regard to the emergency programme was for civil servants rather than ministerial posts.—(THE REV. CANON BLOOMFIELD): Some of us feel it is a very great pity indeed that African civil servants are not allowed to take part in politics because such a large proportion of the educated and able Africans are in the civil service, and we wondered whether it would not be possible that they should be free to take part in politics.

Q. Did you contemplate the grant of self-government to the Northern Territories almost at once? You remember you said you wanted a massive broadening of the franchise so that more Africans could get on the rolls and so forth?—(THE REV. ORCHARD): There is a considerable sense of urgency amongst us. I do not think the British Council of Churches has ever gone on record as saying "at once". Speedily is the kind of word which has been used.—(THE REV. BOOTH): Might I ask Mr. Orchard whether it is not true that on the whole the Council is looking for a transfer of political power to an African majority, rather than self-government, in something like two years or so.

Q. Then if that is done I take it you mean that the electorate will elect the Government. That will be the Government, and in Northern Rhodesia it will oust the Colonial Office. It will form the Ministry and be the Government?—A. Yes.

Q. I gather you contemplate the same sort of thing in relation to the Federal Government, that the Africans will elect the Federal Government in that way, so that in a matter of three or four years perhaps or less the Ministers of the Federal Government will all be African. That is the sort of policy you want to see adopted?—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): No, the Ministers would be elected by the majority. It does not necessarily follow that they would be Africans.

Q. But as I understand your broadening of the franchise it means that the Africans will have the majority on the electoral rolls almost at once, and I should think that it is almost a certainty at first that the Africans will win all the seats in Parliament and therefore will form the Government under the present set-up.—A. (THE REV. CANON BLOOMFIELD): I do not think all of us by any means would wish for an African majority on the electorate almost at once. We should not be united in thinking that should come almost at once but it should be the objective.—(THE REV. ORCHARD): This is why I used the word "speedily" as I think it represents as fully as I can the consensus of opinion amongst us.

MR. CHIRWA: Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Chairman of the Council of Churches whether they have really studied this problem, because it seems to me there is a conflict in this document. On the one hand you suggest that there should be consent to the Government, and you then make suggestions which you think should bring about that consent, and yet on the other hand you tell us that there is increased African opposition to Federation. How can you reconcile those two? You go on to say you believe that Federation should continue in some form or another, you tell us there is increased opposition to that Federation, and you say there must be consent by the Africans. Can you explain whether it is possible to do all those things in view of what you have said?—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): I am not sure whether there is a contradiction between saying that the future of the Federation depends upon it securing the consent of the governed and in saying that at the moment it is not securing that general consent and then suggesting that certain steps might enable it to secure that consent. This, I think, is the line of this memorandum. I do not think we would want to say that if these steps are taken we can guarantee that the Federation will then secure the consent of the governed, and I think that since this document was drafted we would be even more doubtful whether it was likely.

CHAIRMAN: As you have carefully said in your evidence you think this is a slender change, indeed one of you I think has said it is the last chance.

MR. CHIRWA: This memorandum was drafted about six months ago and events are moving very fast, not only in Central Africa but in the whole world. Do you think in view of what you have said and from what you have seen, that it is possible that that consent would be obtained?—A. I do not think we would be agreed in the British Council of Churches to say that it was impossible. We have said that the chances in our judgment are slight but it would not be, I think, appropriate for us to say it is impossible at this stage. That is a very final and decisive word which is perhaps not very appropriate in a political discussion where the art of the probable becomes of great importance.

Q. My next question is with regard to the basic objections of the Africans which I think have not been outlined in this memorandum, and which I think that you should consider. I do not know whether we can fruitfully discuss the question of Federation without really discussing what are the basic objections to the present Federation amongst the Africans in the Northern Territories; and I think that once we get to that point then we must find a solution to these basic objections if a solution can be found. Mr. Gondwe has pointed out that the Africans in all the Territories objected to the fact that there is no African representation in Southern Rhodesia Parliament and felt that that would apply to them. When the question was put you had never considered it, so I do not know how you can make suggestions without facing the basic objections which are fundamental. If you believe that Federation must continue then you must face the basic objections and find a solution to

them. If that solution is not found then I think it follows that your argument that Federation should continue becomes difficult.—A. I think I would like to make it clear that we are not concerned with the continuance of the Federation. We are not desirous of defending a political arrangement in Central Africa. We are concerned that whatever political arrangement should emerge from the present discussions should conduce to the best welfare possible for all the inhabitants of the Territory and the greatest degree of trust and confidence between them. It would certainly not be our desire to defend the Federation as the only way of securing such welfare and such mutual trust and confidence. These were some of the ideals with which it was launched. Some of us hoped that it would fulfil those ideals and would thereby secure the confidence of all the inhabitants of the Territories. Our present impression is that it has not succeeded in doing this. It is not our desire to defend its continuance if it does not succeed in doing the things that we want to see done.

Q. Has the Council of Churches considered the difficulty that in some of the statements that have been made by the Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, he has said that he would not like to see African Nationalist Government in Northern Territories? Are you suggesting that there should be a broadening of the franchise which would return members who would be Nationalists? Your idea is that there must be increased African representation. You would have Africans in the Northern Territories who are demanding self-government now. Do you think that you can find a way to reconcile these statements, have you pondered over them?—A. (THE REV. ROGERS): I think we have for very long and very anxiously considered that element. One of the difficulties in which we have found ourselves is that we are representing our judgments to your Commission, my Lord, as a Commission to review the Federal Constitution. It was evident as we were proceeding thinking both of the consent of European and African that the nearer we move to the probability of African consent the further away we moved from the European consent.

CHAIRMAN: That difficulty has not escaped us.—A. But we had to emphasise what we do honestly believe, that here is, in essence, a magnificent experiment in racial relationships and our own Methodist Church in the Rhodesias has in this past January gone out of its way to bring under the affectionate review the African as well as the European. It is not only European intransigence that is the difficulty, there is a measure of African intransigence which is equally invalidating what seems to us a desirable end. But when we reached the dilemma we very carefully hand it back to you, Sir.

MR. CHIRWA: This is a supplementary question to the one which was raised by Mr. Crawley. You are suggesting that the conference to review the Federal Constitution be postponed in order to give time to make the necessary changes which you have suggested in the Northern Territories, and that conference should possibly be postponed for about two or three years. Have you considered that if you have increased African majorities or, say, if you give African majorities in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, on the present propaganda of anti-Federation you are bound to have in the Legislative Council motions, perhaps resolutions saying that they want to get out. Does it follow that if you say now Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland must have African majorities the members returned will be African Nationalist members? Are they likely to give up this attitude against Federation, and if they are not willing to do so is it going to be possible for the Government, for the administration in those Territories, to carry on? Is it not a fact that the fundamental thing is the Federation and that must be so? If you suggest that Africans must have majorities now the Africans who will be returned to Legislative Councils will be African Nationalists, and obviously they must vote against Federation. Does not it follow if you are going to give them a broad franchise?—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): I think that is true. Postponement of the Constitutional Review Conference was envisaged only to allow time for those constitutional changes in the two Northern Territories to take place. As soon as they had taken place presumably the Constitutional Review Conference would then take place so that there would not be a considerable period after the emergence of an African majority in the two Northern Territories before the Constitutional Review Conference. But those two things would happen, the second immediately after the first, not with an interval between them.

Q. But you follow the trend of development that Mr. Macleod has outlined. He has said that he does not see that Northern Rhodesia can have changes at the moment; on the other hand, that he is prepared to give Nyasaland some advance? At least there are those two different directions?—A. Yes, I see, that is a reason for not delaying the Constitutional Review.

MR. CHIRWA: Thank you.

MR. KATILUNGU: I would like to ask a question on the African Affairs Board. I think it was emphasized that it should

be improved and made effective. In your experience and with information available from your resources, what do you think is the most important in any constitutional set-up, particularly when we deal with the Federation in Central Africa? The securing of the majority of Africans in the two Northern Legislatures or the improvement of the African Affairs Board? Which of the two safeguards would be best, and in which Africans would have full confidence?—A. (THE REV. BOOTH): It seems to me that if you think the African Affairs Board reshaped is going to satisfy African opinion without political advance, that seems to me illusory, but if you think of political advancement to the African the function of the African Affairs Board becomes somewhat different. It becomes a human rights commission or something like that. It is a general piece of machinery for safeguarding the rights of those who feel themselves likely to be in trouble, and I should guess that African political advance means that the function of the Board becomes somewhat different. But if you were to say which becomes the more important I think our view would be that in the present situation you could not hold African political advance by offering instead of it certain kinds of constitutional safeguards.

Q. Do you not think that if after broadening the franchise the Africans were to secure the majority in the two Northern Territories the question of the African Affairs Board would automatically die away and that the most important point that will arise will be in the safeguarding of the minority?—A. Agreed.

Q. You dealt with the question of African representation. I attach great importance to this point. I do know that the Commission is fully aware of this question but I am trying to find out from you. You tried to point out the way in which we could effectively secure this African representation at the 1960 Conference so-called. In 1952, at the initial stage of the Federation, Africans at that time, with their political organisations which were only congresses, both in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, were not invited to send representatives to the Conference in London. The only people who were invited were the African representative Councils in both Territories. Do you think that if the Governments concerned suggested that at this forthcoming Conference the political parties in both Territories should be invited to send representatives this would be the most effective way of dealing with the problem?—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): I am not sure, Mr. Chairman, that we would feel very strongly as to the right machinery at a given moment. Our desire would be that the representatives of African opinion should be acknowledged by the African community to be genuinely their representatives. They should not be selected in such a way as would make them subsequently appear to be instruments of the minority. Moreover, on their return from the Constitutional Review Conference they should carry a measure of responsibility for carrying out its recommendations. These are the three things that we would wish to see secured but I do not think we would want to be very emphatic as to the right methods of securing those three things.

Q. When you deal with the question of African representation, have you considered the importance of Native Authorities at such constitutional discussions to be of equal importance to that of the political parties?—A. We have done.

MR. ELLMAN BROWN: You did mention that your main concern was the welfare of the people. On the assumption that the Territorial Governments were given more power, that the Federal Government was fundamentally in control of the economics, of the economic unity of the whole Federation, on the assumption that that would be the best way to overcome weakness and help the welfare of the people as a whole, would you still oppose Federation, or that type of Federation, if what I call the political leaders for their own aggrandisement opposed it? I am keeping on the Federal side mainly economics and external affairs. If the functions that affect the daily lives of the people were transferred back to the Territorial Governments, if there was a reasonable advancement of political aspirations of the African people in those Territories, and at the same time the advance of an economic whole and the encouragement it gave by raising the standards of living of the people were proved to your satisfaction, would you still oppose the concept of Federation if, in fact, the political parties in those two Northern Territories opposed it for political reasons?—A: I think, first of all, that we have appreciated the significance for the welfare of the people of an economic union of some kind—the greater economic unit. Certainly we would not want to oppose an arrangement which produced that. We indeed, I think, would desire to encourage some African political leaders to think a little more constructively about the future in economic terms than they at present seem inclined to do. An obstacle in the path of their doing so, I think very understandably, was that they said political power first and then we will consider the economic arrangements.

I cannot now speak for the Council as a whole. I myself have certain doubts in mind about strict separation of Government concerned with the day to day life of the people

which is not also concerned with the economic life of the people. A good deal of my daily life, unfortunately, is very heavily involved with economics and whatever determines the level of income tax, for instance, has a very considerable impact on my welfare. So I have a little hesitation about this very sharp cleavage between Government in the Territories concerned with daily life and something in the centre, some Government, if I understood rightly, in the centre which would be concerned only with economics. I think there would be considerable tension between the two, though I can see that you could have Territorial Governmental development, and the free negotiation after some form of political majority rule, of some kind of customs union. But that is not perhaps the same thing as a Government concerned with economics.—(THE REV. ROGERS): May I have a brief word on that. I think if what is being suggested is a looser association, a looser Federal association with much stronger Territorial powers, with considerable African political advancement, possibly also with the consideration of the right to opt out after a period, I should say that all parties would be wise to look on that very carefully. But somehow I do not think that they will, that is the difficulty.

Q. My point was framed to you as leaders of the community there. It is important that these things are put across, they have never been put across before, the concept of Federation, the real benefits of it. Would you as leaders, if you saw that was reasonable, try to encourage it?—A. We should be prepared—I should personally—to set it forward. We do not live and die by the concept of Federation. The very word itself has become so loathed it might be needed to be revised, but looking to something of the type you had in mind I think that would be a reasonable step forward. But again I very much doubt if there is enough reason left in the irrationality of politics in Central Africa.

MR. MCCLELAND: Your memorandum seems to be based on the assumption that the mass of African opinion, is, in fact, in support of an alteration of the franchise so that the African can quickly obtain dominance in the Territorial Governments. There is a substantial weight of African opinion that while being opposed to Federation is opposed at the same time to any thought of self-government. In fact, it is afraid of political power passing into the hands of what it looks upon as extremist leaders. Have you given any consideration to that opinion, and if you have do you think it strong enough to be ignored?—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): I think it is certainly true we have given consideration to it, and in some ways it seems to us likely that the longer considerable recognition of an African demand for political rights is delayed the more extreme the African leadership is likely to become, and that therefore, this is, so to speak, the last opportunity for a massive transference of power to leaders with whom it would be possible to hope that there could be feasible, constructive and orderly policies developed. If it is delayed it seems likely that the leadership is likely to be pushed into more extreme positions or else to be rejected in favour of more extreme leaders. I would not be able to estimate the extent of African opinion in favour of not having transference of political power to African majorities. I do not know whether any of my colleagues would dare to estimate a guess as to the extent of that. My own impression is that it is a minority.—(THE REV. BOOTH): That is the impression I have very strongly. Even when you talk with African political leaders they are much more conscious of being pushed to an extreme position than they are of trying to enthrone people who are not too keen to go on. That seems to be a dilemma of the African leader.

Q. It has been suggested as well that the mass of African opinion is not politically conscious. That the support that is given to political leaders today is a support that is gained largely by intimidation. Generally the mass would, in fact, support the more conservative element, that is a form of Government that existed prior to Federation?—A. (THE REV. ORCHARD): My own view about that is that if by "politically conscious" you mean the reading of party political programmes, the answer is no. But if you mean having a shrewdness in human relationships, the assessment of the factors that are at work in any given concrete situation, the sizing up of the merits or demerits of individuals, then I would say the mass of African opinion was politically conscious. I think they have had a great deal of experience of those kind of politics in the pattern of life that belonged to a former day, and that experience stands them in pretty good stead in dealings with the abstract terminology of political life.—(THE REV. ROGERS): Perhaps if I could take up that first point from my own personal experience there recently. I was there primarily for religious gatherings and meetings with people, not specifically on political questions. Invariably in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, much less so in Southern Rhodesia, these people who were not political leaders, who were not overtly politically conscious, were talking politics inside four or five minutes. It seems to be something driven out of them in almost the last six or twelve months.

MR. ROBINSON: Was this in the tribal areas or urban areas?—A. Pretty generally both, even in the remote mission stations where I did not anticipate it.

Letter

PROFESSOR M. GLUCKMAN

Dear Sir,

29th January, 1960

Please submit this letter and the attached memorandum to the Commission. I should be glad to appear before the Commission to substantiate my analysis further, if invited to do so.

The memorandum summarizes the conclusions of the considerable research which has been done by officers of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute of Social Studies in British Central Africa, and I submit it partly to draw the attention of members of the Commission to that research. A list of main references is given at the end of the memorandum; and I would also recommend that the Commission consult, if it can obtain copies, two essays on the same subject, which are at present in press. One is Professor J. C. Mitchell's Inaugural lecture ("Tribalism and the Plural Society") as Professor of African Studies at the University College of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. The second is a chapter on African political movements by Dr. W. Watson, Senior Lecturer in Sociology in Manchester University, to be published shortly in *New Deal in Central Africa* (ed. by Colin Leys and Cranford Pratt, published by Heineman).

I myself lived and carried out social-anthropological research in N. Rhodesia from 1939-1947, when I was a Research Officer of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, and for six years its Director. During that time, I carried out a full study of the Barotse on which I have published extensively, and, in collaboration with Government Officers, shorter investigations among the Mazabuka Tonga and the Lamba. I worked among Africans in Livingstone. Previously, I had made an intensive study of the Zulu of Natal after growing up, and being trained in anthropology, in South Africa. In Northern Rhodesia I worked closely with many Government Officers, including His Excellency the Governor the late Sir John Waddington; and I was appointed to two Government Commissions. Thus for eight years up to 1947 I had intimate personal acquaintance with Africans, with Government Officers, and with many European inhabitants and their leaders in Northern Rhodesia. I, of course, worked through historical and administrative records on Central Africa, and indeed on those of South Africa, and other parts of Africa.

My personal knowledge of Central Africa stops in 1947, but since I returned to England in 1947, for two years as Lecturer at Oxford and for ten years as first Professor of Social Anthropology at Manchester, I have been closely associated with the work of thirteen social scientists in Central Africa, and I have kept closely in touch with developments there.

I have submitted this memorandum in my professional capacity as a social anthropologist, in the hope that the analyses of social life by my colleagues and myself may help the Commission in its work. But I ought to make clear to the Commission that apart from this professional and objective analysis, I have of course as a former citizen of Northern Rhodesia, and as a present citizen of the United Kingdom, my own political and moral judgment on events in Central Africa. I felt that the decision to federate the Territories when the vast majority of the African inhabitants oppose it was unwise and unfair to them, and that it was a risk against the bias of the facts. I still believe this, even if there have been economic gains. These views as a citizen do not affect my professional analysis, which tries to take account of all facts. Lest it be assumed that my political views do bias my professional judgment, rather than the other way round, I may be forgiven if I state that my professional reputation has not been affected by these views, which are well known. The following facts show this. When I was Director of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute I drafted the research plan for the extension of the Institute's research under grants from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund and other sources, and this plan was awarded the Wellcome Medical of the Royal Anthropological Institute. I have also been awarded the Rivers Memorial Medal of the Royal Anthropological Institute for my field researches. I have been invited to deliver the Frazer Lecture at Glasgow University in 1952, the Josiah Mason Lectures at Birmingham University in 1954, the Munro Lectures at Edinburgh University in 1958 (and now again in 1960). I am about to go as Visiting Professor to the Australian National University in Canberra, and on the way there to Delhi University and a University in Japan, and shortly thereafter as Visiting Professor to Brandeis University, Massachusetts. I was appointed a Research Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, California, and I was unable to accept Visiting Professorships offered me at the following American universities: Yale, Cornell, California, New York. I was, with a French colleague, chairman of the social-anthropological

seminar at the Fourth International Congress of Sociology at Stresa in 1959.

I am a member of the Human Sciences Committee of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, since my Department also carries out research in British factories.

The argument of the enclosed memorandum was presented by me as a lecture at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in the *D'Etudes Africaines*, vol. i (1960). I also presented the argument, since it is of great importance, to an International Seminar organized by the International African Institute at the East African Institute of Social Studies at Makerere College in January, 1959, where it was accepted by the social scientists present there. The Proceedings of the Seminar are in press.

Department of Social
Anthropology and Sociology,
University of Manchester.

Memorandum

PROFESSOR M. GLUCKMAN

African political advances and the survival of tribalism
in British Central Africa

During the last twenty years, fourteen members of the staff of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in Northern Rhodesia have studied both tribes and urban situations in British Central Africa. In this memorandum I discuss some of the results of these researches. I concentrate on describing how we see the persistence of tribalism into modern times, in spite of the industrial revolution which has produced such great social changes. Our main argument is that in the rural areas membership of a tribe involves participation in a working political system, and sharing domestic life with kinsfolk; and that this continued participation is based on present economic and social needs, and not merely on conservatism. On the other hand, tribalism in towns is a different phenomenon entirely. It is primarily a means of classifying the multitude of Africans of heterogeneous origin who live together in the towns, and this classification is the basis on which a number of new African groupings, such as burial and mutual help societies, are formed to meet the needs of urban life. In both rural and urban areas, these affiliations to fellow tribesmen have to be analysed as they operate alongside new forms of association, such as Christian sects, political pressure groups, and economic groups. These new groups are clearly more important in the towns than in the rural areas. Persisting loyalty to a tribe therefore operates for a man in two quite distinct situations, and to a large extent he can keep these spheres of activity separate.

The whole problem of "tribalism" and "detrribalization" has been obscured for many years by a fundamental fallacy in analysis. Both Government administrators and missionaries have tended to think of, e.g. an African miner in the new copper mines, as being the same man as he who left his tribal home a short time before. They therefore considered that the African tribesmen who came to the towns were undergoing a process of "detrribalization", in which they were changed; and change here usually meant being spoilt. Worse than this, in the towns, away from the control of their chiefs, they fell gullibly into the arms of agitators. Most British administrators, and many missionaries, considered that Africans who tried to form trade unions or political associations, and Europeans who tried to help them, were subversive, corrupting the simple and honest tribesmen. I myself found that this attitude had persisted among administrators in Northern Rhodesia as late as 1947. I remember an intelligent Labour Officer, in the Department responsible for the relations between European employers and African labourers, telling me that things would be better if the Northern Rhodesian European Mineworkers Union went out of existence, and the problems of European mineworkers were handled by the Labour Department. Such administrators had failed to read the lessons of the last two hundred years of history, which show that modern industrial towns have everywhere produced specific types of associations arising from the needs of urban life, and hence that we must expect these associations inevitably to develop in Africa. It is important to remember that the British administrators have come largely from upper-class and professional middle-class backgrounds, and hence knew little about the problems of industrial society. In Africa, they lived and ruled in vast rural domains, and the traditions of a paternalistic government looking after simple tribesmen developed there. I met no administrator who was acquainted at firsthand with the problems of industrial life in Britain. All newly appointed administrators served their first years on rural stations, and thus were indoctrinated with the tradition that towns and mines were almost excrescences in an Arcadian tribalism, where the decent natives were exposed to a process of weakening "detrribalization".

These doctrines were never, of course, explicitly formulated, but they ran like a thread through the approach of administrators to the problems of modern life, until the end of the War, and perhaps the advent of a Labour Government in Britain, brought some change in approach though not, I consider, a radical enough change.

This same type of reasoning appeared in the early work of anthropologists on these problems. Our anthropologists, like our administrators, were reared on the rural tradition of the tribes. For them, the tribe was the "zero-point", the start from which people changed as they came under urban and other Western influences: hence the starting-point of analyses was the original tribe and the original tribesman.¹ Correspondingly, when some anthropologists began to study Africans in the towns, they saw the problems to be studied as those arising from the adaptation of a tribesman to urban conditions and formulated these in terms of a process of "detrribalization" which had to be analysed and measured as the tribesman slowly changed.

The fallacy in this approach is that it assumes that each African's behaviour, and capacity for industrial and political action, is determined by the extent to which he personally has undergone a process of change and education; and it underestimates the extent to which the new situations in which Africans find themselves influence those Africans' behaviour. The general conclusions of social anthropology, sociology, and political science should lead us to expect that pressures and interests within the new situations will move Africans to respond to those situations, and their capacity for new forms of actions and association is determined by these situations, and not by their own inner personal developments. Therefore, as later studies have shown we must approach the study of African towns dominantly by regarding them as towns: in short, the fact that Africans now live, for longer or shorter periods, in towns, will influence their behaviour far more than the fact that they come from tribal homes and cultures. An African townsman is a townsman, an African miner is a miner: he is only secondarily a tribesman. That is, I would anticipate that as soon as Africans assemble in towns and engage in industrial work they will begin to form social relationships appropriate to their new situation: they will try to combine to better their conditions in trade unions, and so forth. Of course, these Africans continue to be influenced by many factors arising outside the urban situation: the rapid growth of the towns and their own inexperience of towns, the constant movement of African labourers between tribe and town and between towns, and the tribal culture and life from which they come, as well as customary linkages and hostilities between different tribes. But even these tribal influences operate now in an urban milieu, and not in a rural milieu. In a sense every African is detrribalized as soon as he leaves his tribal area, even though he continues to be acted on by tribal influences. He lives in different kinds of groupings, earns his livelihood in a different way, comes under different authorities.² He walks on different ground, for roads and pavements may be paved; he draws his water from taps and his food from stores; etc., etc. He is ruled now, not by District Commissioner and chief, but by District Commissioner and municipal authority and location superintendent and European manager. In our view, therefore, it seemed essential to start analyses of town life by saying that the moment an African crossed his tribal boundary, he was "detrribalized", outside the tribe, though not outside the influence of the tribe. Correspondingly, when a man returns from the towns into the political area of his tribe he is tribalized—de-urbanized—though not outside the influence of the town.

The first study of a British Central African town was by the late Dr. Godfrey Wilson, first Director of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, in the mining town of Broken Hill.³ Wilson formulated some of his main problems in terms of the changes in behaviour of African town-dwellers, according to the length of time they had resided in the town. His study is penetrating and important, but I consider it was still dominated by the tribal outlook I have been describing. My colleagues who followed Wilson in making studies of Rhodesian towns have

¹ See essays in L. P. Mair (editor), *Methods of Study of Culture Contact in Africa*, Memorandum XV of the International Institute of African Languages and Culture, 1943 (here only I. Schapera and M. Fortos took the point of view I shall advocate). The view I am criticising emerges clearly in B. Malinowski, *The Dynamics of Culture Change*, Yale University Press (1946); cf. my critical essay, *An Analysis of the Sociological Theories of Bronislaw Malinowski*, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper No. 16 (1948).

² See M. Gluckman, "Seven-Year Research Plan of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute", *Human Problems in British Central Africa* (The Rhodes-Livingstone Journal), No. 14, December 1945.

³ *An Essay on the Economics of Detribalization in Northern Rhodesia* in 2 parts, Rhodes-Livingstone Papers Nos. 5 and 6 (1941 and 1942).

approached these from the opposite point of view. That is, they have started their analyses on the assumption that they are dealing with town-dwellers, many of whom come from tribes and retain ties with these tribes. Here perhaps the most important books are Professor Mitchell's *The Kalela Dance*⁴, and Dr. A. L. Epstein's recent book on *Politics in an Urban African Community*.⁵

One main theme of Epstein's study is an analysis of how, during the growth of a copper-mining town, typical urban associations and industrial groupings ousted European attempts to work with authorities based on tribal affiliation. I summarize this history fairly briefly, and will then draw out some of the sociological implications which have been analysed by Mitchell and Epstein. When the copper-mine at Luanshya was established in the early 1930's, Europeans provided the managerial and skilled working force: the heavy labour was performed by thousands of Africans from tribes spread over British, Belgian and Portuguese territories. The mine, like many industrial enterprises in Europe's industrial revolution, had to provide both order and some social services for this heterogeneous population. Government's resources were not adequate for these tasks, and in any case both European and African mine-workers dwelt on the private property of the mine. The mine provided houses for Europeans and Africans, hospitals, recreational facilities, institutions to distribute food to the Africans. The Africans were housed in a vast compound under a Compound Manager (later called African personnel Manager). He was responsible for the housing and welfare of the Africans, for dealing with their working conditions and complaints, and for maintaining order among them and settling their quarrels. In this work he was aided by African clerks, mine police, etc. Faced with thousands of Africans of different tribes, the mine officials, reasonably enough, thought that it would be wise to deal with them through representatives of the tribes as groups. Therefore the Compound Manager instituted a system of Tribal Elders. They were given special houses. His idea was that the mine management could communicate with its African labourers through the Elders while the Elders in turn would inform the management of the wishes and complaints of their tribesmen. In addition, the Elders would see to the welfare of newcomers to the mine until these were allocated houses or found friends, a most important duty in a system of migrant labour with men moving constantly from tribe to town and back again, and between town and town, and between jobs in each town. Finally, the Elders acted as judges in the small disputes that arose between men, and between men and their wives. The Elders together constituted a Council. The people themselves welcomed this institution. Meanwhile a similar system was established in the Municipal Location which had grown up in the town, distinct from the mine's compound.

Most of the Elders or Tribal Representatives, chosen by the Africans themselves, were fairly closely related to the royal families of the tribes concerned. The authority system of the tribe was projected into the urban, industrial sphere.

This system of administration worked fairly well until, in 1935, there were major disturbances throughout the area of the Copper Belt. These disturbances arose out of African demands for better pay and working conditions. A strike began in two other mines, and the Superintendent at Luanshya asked his Tribal Elders what would happen in Luanshya. They assured him that there would be no disturbances there. The Superintendent asked the Elders to go among the miners and calm them, but one of the Elders, a senior man, was driven away from a meeting and accused of being in league with the Europeans. A mob stormed the Compound Office, and the Elders had to seek sanctuary within it. Clearly they had neither influence nor power within the strike situation. Yet after the disturbances, the Elders resumed their previous role. By 1937 there were some forty accredited Elders on the mine, and Epstein says that "the system of Tribal Elders operated satisfactorily in the main, and was appreciated by the mass of the people". (p. 36).

I have space only to touch on Epstein's analysis of the background to this development. He stresses the tribal background of the Elders—their frequent affiliation with the families of chiefs, their acquaintance with tribal customs and values, their skill in adjudicating in disputes, and so forth. Yet, in a way paradoxically, they came simultaneously to be associated with the European mine management. During the strike they were driven away as in league with the Europeans. Two important elements in their positions have therefore to be stressed. First, as tribal representatives, whose authority was based in the political system of the tribe, they had no connection with the situations in which African miners worked in the mine itself.

⁴ Rhodes-Livingstone Paper, No. 27 (1956).

⁵ Manchester University Press for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1958. See also his publications on the work of African Urban Courts, cited in his bibliography.

Here the workers were organized in departments and gangs within which tribal affiliation was irrelevant; and it was in this situation that common interests had brought the miners to joint action in the strike. This was industrial action, and here tribal divisions and allegiances did not operate. So the Elders lacked all influence over the workers in this situation. But, secondly, in the administrative system the Elders had become representatives of the mine itself, in dealing with its workers, and hence when those workers came into conflict with the mine, they regarded the Elders as enemies. When the strike had ended, the Elders could resume their former role.

This position changed slowly until a second series of strikes broke out on the Copper Belt in 1940. There were disturbances, with shooting of miners, at Nkana mine, but none at Luanshya. At Mufulira mine a strike Committee of seventeen men was set up to negotiate with the management. At all mines, the authority of the Elders was rejected, and the strike committee at Mufulira was the beginnings of a new regime which was to oust tribal affiliation as a basis for handling industrial matters among African miners. For eventually after the War, the British Government sent out trained trade unionists to help Africans form trade unions. The development of trade unionism was present among the Africans themselves, but it was now encouraged by Government policy. Eventually, the African Mineworkers Union emerged as a powerful organised, industrial union throughout the mining towns of Northern Rhodesia, negotiating with the management. As its last step on the way to power, the Union insisted that the Tribal Elders system be abolished, for the trade union leaders saw the Elders as a threat to their own authority, and as a means which the mine might use to oppose them. A referendum was held among the miners: 85% of the 35,000 miners voted, and of these 97% voted for abolition of the Tribal Elder system. The trade union had finally ousted the formal organised power of tribal representatives from the industrial field, though later I will describe how tribal affiliation continued to influence trade union politics.

The story of developments which Epstein gives for the municipal compound is similar, but not so clear cut. He suggests that the monolithic structure of the mine with its centralised power over the working, residential, etc., lives of the workers, provoked the response of a monolithic African trade union, also catering for many aspects of the miners life, and unable to tolerate any rivals. On the other hand, the municipal compound is inhabited by the employees of many different employers in various trades, by domestic servants, by independent tradesmen, and so forth. Hence there has been less pressure to combined action by Africans in trade unions, and less possibility of their organising thus. Nevertheless in the municipal compound also, developments have been similar to those on the mine. The authority of Tribal Elders, outside of the settlement of small disputes, has been steadily ousted by bodies including better educated and more profitably employed Africans, who have less connection with families of chiefs and who are more permanently settled in the town. Secondly, wherever the Government has set up administrative councils or even courts to help it deal with the heterogeneous African population, a spontaneous opposition has developed in the urban population itself. The two processes have worked together, for the Government's policy has been based on the use of tribal affiliations, while the educated Africans have been insisting that leaders in the towns must be acquainted with urban ways of life, and need not be guardians of tribal custom. But here the position is far more fluid than on the mine.

Epstein goes on to point out that the dominance of the trade union did not eliminate tribal allegiances within the industrial field. To some extent, they have ceased to be so significant in industrial matters where the Africans are opposed in their interests to the European mine officials and management. But in matters between Africans, tribal affiliation is important. Thus elections within the union for official posts in the union have to some extent been fought on tribal lines: other tribes complained that the leadership was dominated by the Bemba tribe. And, at the other end of the scale, Nyakyusa tribesmen from South-West Tanganyika talked of forming a separate Nyakyusa trade union though in practice they joined in a general strike. Epstein explains that the Nyakyusa are so far from home that during a strike they do not get support, as Northern Rhodesian tribes do, of food from their rural homes. In addition, they are mostly without their wives, so do not have women to cultivate gardens for them as additional support. But it is in the struggle for power in the leadership that tribal allegiances have most significance.

Nevertheless even here it is not straight tribal hostility and loyalty that are operating. During the early years of the mine, the posts open for educated Africans were largely taken by Nyasalanders, for the educational system in Nyasaland was earlier established and better than in Northern Rhodesia, and

by Barotse, who were similarly advanced.¹ The Nyasalanders had also early gained mining skill by going to work in Southern Rhodesia mines. Finally, Bemba, who are the nearest powerful tribe, had filled many of the minor authoritative posts on the mine. Hence while many Africans see the struggle for leadership on the mine in tribal terms, this covers a struggle between groups of different skill. After the firm consolidation of trade union's power, a dispute began with the mines and the European trade unions not only for better pay for Africans, but also for the opening of better paid posts demanding higher skill. Hence the issue emerged, whether the union was to press for a few highly paid openings for a few well-educated Africans, or for much better all-round opportunities for the mass of relatively unskilled labourers. Out of this struggle, a new and militant leadership, more representative of the labourers, won many union elections. The struggle reached its climax when the mine management opened new skills to Africans and put them on a monthly salary, instead of payment by ticket of work done. It also insisted that they join a new and separate union, formed by salaried Africans and led by a Barotse. The old union came out on strike against this move; and eventually the Government, holding that this was a political strike, arrested sixty-two trade union leaders and deported them to their tribal areas.

The significance for us of this strike is that it brought into the open the emergence within the African urban population of affiliations based on what we can call "class principles". In the most recent struggle for leadership of the union, and in the formation of the new union, we see that there has emerged among the Africans a division of interests in the industrial field. As soon as the trade union had consolidated its power against the potential rivalry of old tribal leaders, its members split apart in pursuing independent interests.

The division on class lines has what Dr. Epstein calls a "pervasive" effect. It spreads into many institutions. For the ideal of a Europeanised and civilised way of life is the ideal which the Africans now follow. Professor Mitchell has examined the effect of this situation on the Kalela dance. His analysis is based on the interpretation of how the general social situation influence the structure and actions of a single dance team. The Kalela dance is a very popular dance on the Copper Belt. It is danced by teams of Africans who come from single tribes. During their dances they mock other tribes, by alleging, among many unpleasant habits, that they have loose, and even perverted, sexual lives. Thus on the surface the dance proclaims proudly the virtues of the team's own tribe, and derides other tribes. Yet the members of the derided tribes attend the performance and laugh as loudly as any at the salacious wit against themselves. Mitchell was struck by the fact that despite this surface of tribal competitiveness, the dancers had named their hierarchy of officials after the hierarchies of British military or civil dignity. Moreover, the dancers did not wear tribal dress: instead, they were dressed in smart and clean European clothes, and they had to maintain their tidiness and smartness throughout the dancing. This was insisted on, although the dancers themselves were mostly unskilled, and poorly educated, labourers. From this point of view he interprets the dance as reflecting the aspirations of all Africans after a European way-of-life, or civilisation, and he shows from other data how the values implicit here form a prestige scale for all Africans. But, he argues, these unskilled labourers are not striving through the dance to participate in the European part of Central African society: this is cut off from them by the colour-bar. They are striving in the dance to associate themselves with the new African elite. Mitchell shows that in political activity, such as the African opposition to the establishment of the Central African Federation, Africans of all classes and tribes (except the Barotse who are protected by special treaty) united against the Europeans. Internally, they are differentiated on a class scale, which people are striving to ascend. This is one marked trend in the towns, and it seems clearly distinct from tribalism.

Yet the dancing-team is a tribal team, deriding other tribes. Its action have therefore also to be related to a persisting significance of tribal allegiances in the towns. Here Mitchell works out that tribalism in the town operates as a primary mode of classifying the heterogeneous masses of people whom a man meets into manageable categories. With his fellow-tribesmen he can converse, and he shares their customs and way-of-life. In practice, Mitchell discovered that there was far less tribal inter-marriage in the towns than is usually assumed, so that a man marries the sisters and daughters of his fellow-tribesmen. More than this, by the use of social distance scales, Mitchell found that all the many tribes in the towns were grouped into several limited categories by other Africans, and that specific institutionalised modes of behaviour had developed between various tribal categories. Thus he discovered that joking relationships between tribes in this region

¹ See also McCulloch, M. *A Social Survey of the African Population of Livingstone*, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper No. 26 (1956).

had developed in modern times, and were not, as previously thought, traditional. Mitchell thus stresses that tribes in towns form categories by which people group one another, and this categorisation determined a lot of action in casual as well as intimate relationships. Both he and Epstein stress that in domestic situations, where as we have seen most marriages occur within tribes, tribal custom and practice are effective, though much modified by the demands of the urban situation.

In short, to understand the persistence of tribal links in the towns we have to assess their significance in relation to dominant forms of association, which are produced by the demands of the urban and industrial situation. The people live in towns, as workers, and they associate here in terms of common interests which override tribal divisions. But tribal loyalties may influence the internal politics of these urban associations, and political struggles in these associations may, from historical accident, be cast in tribal terms. In leisure activities and in casual intercourse tribalism, in various categories, forms a basis for classifying people. Tribal allegiance and custom dominate in the sphere of domestic life, so far as the situation allows. And in many towns, though not in the Copperbelt, associations of mutual help, funeral societies, etc. are based on common tribal affiliation. But class relationships are becoming increasingly important and, in Epstein's words, pervade every situation.

Epstein stresses that there are many inconsistencies in these developments, for in the urban areas, Africans associate for several different purposes: to run a home and raise children, to be entertained with friends, to work and improve status, to achieve political objectives, etc. Different principles of social organisation may be effective in the various areas of relations. Hence a trade union can oust Tribal Elders, and with them tribal authority, from the town, without affecting tribalism as a category or even loyalty to a tribal chief in other situations. Let me stress, too, that this situation is not confined to Africans. Tribalism acts, though not as strongly, in British towns; for in these Scots and Welsh and Irish, French, Jews, Lebanese, Africans, have their own associations, and their domestic life is ruled by their own national customs. But all may unite in political parties, and in trade unions or employers federations. Tribalism in the Central African towns is, in sharper form, the tribalism of all towns.

These urban studies all emphasize that tribal associations in these towns do not dominate political life. Tribalism is not an organised set of political relations. Here modern urban tribalism differs radically from tribalism in the rural areas. In the rural areas, under British rule, each tribe is an organised political unit, with a complex internal structure. At its head, in Central Africa at least, there is usually a traditional chief, with a traditional council of elders, and a system of villages and other political units. For here it has been Government policy to rule through the tribal organisation. Government has thus lent its powerful support to the continued working of the African tribal political systems, as systems. We may also say that continuing, and in the sociological sense conservative, loyalty to chiefs has been important here. Moreover, since the new industrial and urban political associations develop in the towns, they only affect tribal allegiances indirectly. But we also consider that the tribal system in the rural areas serves new needs of tremendous importance to the modern African.

All Africans now want to earn money. They must have money to pay taxes, and they want it to pay for clothes and other European goods, and for schooling and other welfare services. A few of the Central African tribes have been able to earn this money by selling crops and fish; most of them migrate for longer or shorter periods to work in European enterprises, mainly in the towns. But they consider that they have little security in their industrial life. Housing as well as sentiment makes it difficult for them to rear children there; till recently, they could not own houses, which were tied to jobs, and this situation is only slightly changed; there is no provision for unemployment, sickness and accident compensation is very low; there is no provision for work by, or care of, the old, and there are few pensions, and those there are, are small. The insecurity of town employment is constantly brought home to them. All tribal areas have tales like the incident recorded by one of my colleagues, who, when working on the Northern Rhodesian bank of the Zambezi River, one morning saw men appear on the other bank—the bank of another Territory. One of the men shouted for a canoe, and they were brought across. It was a policeman, repatriating an old blind man. He had left the tribal home thirty years before and never communicated with his kin: now, old and disabled, he was brought back to it, to be supported by whosoever would accept responsibility or feel pity for him. And finally all Africans remember the great depression, when the mines closed and thousands of them returned to their tribal homes—as millions of Americans were

absorbed back into eking a living on the land in the same crisis. Industrial and urban life offers little security to the vast majority of African labourers, and for this security they cling to their land in their tribal homes. They mostly want to return home, and look forward to it, but in addition this security of land is an ever-present need in the total field where they make their living.¹

We must think here of these tribesmen who get their money by going out to work as earning their total living in two widely separated areas. Basically they depend for security on the land, and many of them leave their wives and children to get their subsistence from the land. Here the old must live. Hence Watson says of the Mambwe on the borders of Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia, that they raid the towns for money. If the tribesmen are to exploit their land and to raid the towns, they have to spread their economic activities very widely, and if they are to do this successfully, they need to co-operate with others. In short, there needs to be a group of kin, some of whom go out at any one time to earn money, while others remain at home and cultivate the soil and care for cattle—as well as wives and children. Some tribes seem to achieve this organised deployment of men more successfully than others, for a complex of reasons which Dr. Watson has examined, but which I cannot set out here for lack of space. Other tribes are markedly unsuccessful. But all turn to the land for ultimate support.

Land here is not an individual item of land which a man owns for himself and by himself. For he secures his rights to land in two ways. First, as a citizen of the tribe he is entitled to some arable and building land, and to the use of public pasturage, fishing waters, and wild products. Secondly, in all tribes except those who shift their gardens widely and have an abundance of land, he gets right to land from membership of a village and a group of kinsfolk. That is, a man's rights to land in the tribal home depend on his accepting membership of a tribe, with all its obligations. He holds land as a Barotse, and not a Lunda, and the tribe jealously safeguards these rights. Under Bantu systems of land tenure, which we may summarise as pre-feudal, the chief has to distribute land to his subjects, and he often does so through a complicated social hierarchy. I examined the development of land-holding in all the Central and Southern African tribes, and found that in no case, as land got scarcer and hence more valuable, had chiefs expropriated to themselves an unreasonable quantity of land. Instead, they had in various tribes, as pressure on land increased, steadily legislated to safeguard the fundamental right of every tribesman to some land. Thus the first step, taken e.g. among the Ngwaketse in Bechuanaland, was for the chief to take power to commandeer land allocated to a subject which he was not using, for distribution to the landless. Then the chief took power to take over for the landless people, land which had lain fallow for a certain period: you will see that when this is done, the cycle of land degradation has begun. The final step is seen in Basutoland, where each family is restricted by law to 2½ acres. People get around these laws by various devices, of course, but the trend of development in the view of both the leaders and the mass of the tribe is clear. Every man who is a member of the tribe has a right to live and support his family on the tribal land.

I am sure that honest fellow-feeling and sympathy and justice have contributed to this legislation. But in addition those who remain behind have an interest in the work of those who go away to the towns, for they bring home the money which the people require. In a way, those who stay at home hold the land as security for support in money from those who go out to work. And those who go out to work pass money to those who remain, in payment for this security. So that they get security by their continued allegiance to the tribe, for they hold land from the chief in return for loyalty and support. Hence they adhere to their chiefs; and as they adhere to the chiefs, they accept with the chiefs, for the rural areas, the organized system of tribal political relations. Very few tribesmen wish to overturn the tribal political system as such, though new interest groups, and new elites, in the tribes may struggle for power in tribal councils. With acceptance of the tribal political system goes acceptance of many customs and observances built into that system.

In tribes where land is worked in co-operating groups of kindred, or where kind organise their departures to town as I have described before, security in holding of land also involves acceptance of kinship obligations, and with these of many other parts of the tribal culture.

It is for these reasons, as Dr. Watson has demonstrated brilliantly in his book on *Tribal Cohesion in a Cash Economy*

¹ The two works which stress this problem most for the region are: W. Watson, *Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy*, Manchester University Press for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (1959), and M. Gluckman, *Essays on Loth Land and Royal Property*, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper No. 10 (1943).

and his essay in *New Deal in Central Africa*, that the proposals for Federation focussed African opposition in rural areas so sharply on fears for the security of their tribal lands. The land is deeply involved in their whole present-day situation of life.

We suggest, in short, that tribalism persists in the rural areas because of Government support, and because the tie to tribal land is of the utmost importance to a man. With this tie goes acceptance of the tribal political system with its culture, and of its smaller constituent groups with their culture. In short, tribalism in the rural areas consists of participation in a highly organised system of social relations, based strongly on the chief's rights as trustee for his people over the tribal land. Dependence on land and the social relations arising from this dependence, give modern Africans many satisfactions they cannot find in urban life, and also security against the vicissitudes of industrial employment. Tribalism in the towns is not such an organised system of political and other social relations. In the towns, specific urban-type groupings and industrial associations develop, and have ousted the attempts of Europeans to transplant African tribal authority systems to deal with urban-industrial problems. But tribal linkages and hostilities affect the struggles within these new forms of association, though sometimes they cloak struggles based on other principles. Tribal ties and attachments still dominate domestic life. And tribalism is a most important basis for grouping people into categories, which determine how a man treats those whom he meets casually. Some associations emerge in which fellow-tribesmen band together to help one another. But class linkages are also beginning to pervade the life and the culture of the new towns. In all these respects, African towns differ only in degree from any town, anywhere in the world probably. In crisis, common interests arising from industrial and urban association seem steadily to overcome tribal ties and divisions.

To some extent, though developments in urban and in rural areas affect one another, as I have shown, the specific associations of each may exist independently. Tribal Elders were ousted from the mines by the trade union, yet the leaders in this move treated a visiting chief with respect—until he tried to intervene in an industrial dispute. The Africans' lives are partly dichotomised, and they live in separate compartments—like other men. But there is a mutual influence, which I have not space to examine.

I want to stress that I have here been summarising the results of sociological research in British Central Africa. In other territories—British, South African, Belgian, French, or Portuguese—developments have been different, though I think similar trends are observable wherever there is a powerful body of European settlers. In West Africa, the basic rule that social situations determine action applies, but the situation has not tended to produce strong political or religious movements against the Europeans. Legislation and Government action in the Union of South Africa against the formation of trade unions by Africans has been very severe, as it has not in Northern Rhodesia, though even in the Union the movement to form African trade unions could not be blocked, since it arises inevitably from African interests in the modern situation. On the other hand, it is clear that tribalism, and allegiance to chiefs, in Ghana have changed their significance radically since Ghana became independent.

Conclusion

If our analyses are correct, it seems to me that certain serious misconceptions are built into Government thinking on Central African problems, in the United Kingdom and in the four Central African Governments. These misconceptions arise from an inadequate appreciation of the extent to which African social and political development is determined, not by education or individuals, but by changes in the social situations in which Africans find themselves, as individuals and as collectivities. The most serious political mistake that can arise, is to underestimate completely therefore the speed with which political developments can occur, even while the pace of education of individuals is slow, if the internal situation in Central Africa, and the general situation in Africa and throughout the world, themselves alter quickly. I must admit that though I myself started from this premiss. I was astonished at the speed of African political advance between 1947, when I left N. Rhodesia, and 1953. The proposals to establish the Federation clearly created a situation which accelerated developments markedly; and the existence of Federation continues to exercise pressure on Africans in several different directions. But the main direction is clearly to oppose the Federation. Some efforts to come to terms with this must be made, and it must involve changes in political and social structure: the education and persuasion of individuals is now too slow.

I have felt it my duty to submit this lengthy memorandum in order to try to bring to your attention the considerable, but

usually overlooked, analyses which have been made of African political developments in Central Africa. I hope that our research may help to clarify the background facts, and developments, and bring out the misleading twofold significance of tribalism; and thus that this research may lead to decisions which will reduce strife and enhance co-operation between the peoples of British Central Africa.
29th January, 1960

Oral Evidence

PROFESSOR M. GLUCKMAN

SIR CHARLES ARDEN-CLARK: Would you like to stress any points in the memorandum you have submitted?—
A. I would like to make it clear that it was 1947 that I left Northern Rhodesia, as I said in my covering letter; since then I have been engaged in supervising the work of officers of the Rhodes/Livingstone Institute there, of which I was formerly Director.

My memorandum covers chiefly what we have learned about Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. We had two workers, anthropologists, in Southern Rhodesia, but they have not written on the problem of modern developments, so in this sense I know little about what has happened internally in Southern Rhodesia except that developments there have taken a somewhat different course from Northern Rhodesia. Since we have done a very substantial body of work, I wrote the memorandum and have come to give evidence in the hope that I can draw the attention of members of the Commission to this work since, as far as I can see, nobody at all responsible for policy ever looks at it. We are often accused of being in an ivory tower, but it is not we who put ourselves there.

In looking at the present and probable future developments of the population it is very easy for government officials, European politicians and, I suspect, African political leaders to be misled from surface indications, because one naturally thinks of the African working in the mines and the Africans living in the towns as being continuing personalities of the tribal past in which they have grown up. Tribalism and tribal relationships are very strong still, especially in the towns. In fact, Professor Mitchell considers that at the moment they dominate other incipient class divisions. He says in his paper on the Kalela dance, which I referred to in my memorandum, that one finds unskilled African labourers expressing hostility to clerks and other better-educated Africans; but this is determined largely by the fact that certain tribes such as the Nyasaland tribes and the Barotse were earlier educated by missionaries and became earlier skilled in industry: a lot of the antipathy is tribal. They are very mixed up, so that on the surface one sees in the development of African political life strong evidence of the persistence of tribalism and its continuation.

Generally, the line that has been taken by most observers is that in some centres tribalism is conservative and must break down with modern development—this is the line all historians have taken about this problem. I think this is, in a sense, very sensible and a very reasonable conclusion to draw from surface facts, if one does not look underneath. What our work has shown quite conclusively is that if one is thinking of modern Central Africa one has to think of two quite different types of tribalism. That in the towns consists of people being sorted into categories which grow more and more comprehensive as many of the different tribes are grouped together by their fellows. This is quite different from the existence of organised tribes in the rural areas, where the whole basis of land holding, the whole running of political life, is organised in terms of tribal relationships which continued in the past.

It has shown that in the towns people are grouped on the basis of common tribal links and common tribal respect, that they can, as Mitchell's figures show, marry within their tribes and that their domestic life is controlled by their own tribal customs but that here this kind of tribalism is no different—although it may be sharper because it is more recent—from the tribalism of which I am so well aware when I am doing work in Manchester—Welsh, Scots, Irish, Lebanese, all combine to marry within themselves. Certain kinds of religions are associated with different sections of these populations, just as certain missionary sects are strongest among certain tribes. These have some effect, but not the dominating effect that the linking of people together in terms of their common interests as workers, neighbours or employers, which are independent of national or ethnic origin.

We think that a very important element in the continuance of tribal relationships, of continuing loyalty to the chief and to kin, aside from sentiment which cannot be neglected, is the great insecurity of African life in the towns, the inability of most of them to buy property, to invest in the house, furniture, and to look forward to growing old in the towns and raising their children there, and to be guaranteed security in their old age. Ultimately they are compelled, through their everyday

experience of what has happened to men who are old or injured and have to go back to the tribal areas, and from their memories of what happened in the great depression, they are compelled to look back to the land for security; and as they look back to it they accept with that the tribal political system, since they get land from the chief, and adherence to their kinship grouping. This keeps tribal culture going.

In 1943 I surveyed developments in all the tribes in South and Central Africa and found that in every case the tribal legislation emphasised the right of all subjects to some land. As land got short, measures to deal with the situation took the form of a series of steps by which the chief first took over by legislation land he had given to people—which previously he could not have taken away from them under tribal law. Secondly, as land got shorter, he allowed a shorter period of fallow than the land would sustain, in order to be able to get more land to give to his subjects. Ultimately the development which occurred is most strongly shown in Basutoland, where every family is entitled to only 2½ acres.

Proposals to introduce legislation of this kind were being put forward in Barotseland in 1947 and in the Mazabuka Tonga district in Northern Rhodesia, to take two examples. We see this arising because Africans were rural in the past—and it is very difficult now for them to establish themselves as urban industrial workers—while at the same time they had to go into the towns to get money for taxes and certain other purposes which they wanted. Since these are the same people, moving between two kinds of tribalism, it seems to me fairly reasonable—even if one puts people's motives at their highest all the time—that this should have led to a misconception of what has actually happened. The chief misconception, and the one in terms of which I framed my analysis, as I hope to help the Commission, is that the pace of African political development is to be set by the education of the total population as a whole series of individuals. People are regarded as ready for political advancement when the majority of them are educated, literate, and can understand the details of the complicated franchises, and so forth; whereas the lesson my colleagues and I draw from this—and which is to be drawn from English history—is that people's development is determined by the situations in which they find themselves and the pressures which are brought to bear upon them.

If I may criticise some of your distinguished predecessors in Commissions, they said that Africans were not ready for trade unionism when they were working in industry: but the whole history of modern Europe and America has shown that workers are going to get organised, and it is just a question of whether they will do it properly or with violence.

On leaving in 1947, I would never have expected African political organisation and the development of parties to have reached the stage it did in 1952/3, when, for example, I understand that the Nyasaland chiefs walked out of a meeting called by the Secretary for Native Affairs to explain the Federation to them, passed a vote of "no confidence" in the Nyasaland Government and a motion of loyalty and adherence to the Queen. I would not have believed that could happen in five years. I can only conclude that Federation in itself was a situation which accelerated the speed of African political development and unity at a pace that one could not have expected. It has been affected by the pace of development in Malaya, Ghana, and so forth, which the Africans know about and which raise their aspirations, so that the pressures and fears of the situation, plus the raising of the aspirations, created a position in which even loyalty to the Queen which they had started with disappeared, and they were solidly united against the Federal proposals—solidly for a time, because movements of this kind are always liable to break up.

I would like to make just one point which should have been made in my memorandum. I would not like it to be overlooked. I think we ought to look more carefully at this conception of African political leaders as being, in the phrase of one district officer in Northern Rhodesia, a discriminating intelligentsia, representing no one but themselves; and we should look at the nature of a political party like Congress. My own experience of discussing political problems with government officers in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was that they worked with a kind of phantasm of an ideal of what political life in England is like. There was first the assumption that all men will come to the same sensible conclusion; but I find that in a university, working with a lot of highly educated people, they frequently come to take up opposite views on a subject. So literacy in itself does not necessarily lead to the right decision, because one or other of us must be wrong, although we may be tolerant of each others opinions.

There is also the idea that there is in England an enlightened electorate in which everybody takes an interest in politics. Democracy would break down if this really happened, I am sure, because if every person in the country was watching issues all the time and writing letters to their Member of Par-

liament, the system would choke up. The truth is that politics in this country are run by small cadres of people. Fortunately we have so few major crises: it is only at times of elections that more attention is focused on politics.

With organisations like the African Congress, their strength cannot be gauged by their membership. They consist of a scattered number of mostly educated people of high levels of aspiration, interested in politics, who on specific occasions are able to mobilise support from the mass of the population, as they did over the boycotts which were organised in Northern Rhodesia of shops and post offices and so forth, and they were able to organise on an almost unanimous scale in protest against the Federal proposal. There was only a very small number of people actively taking the lead. And again, the support for African Congresses can be under-estimated seriously unless we always have the comparison in mind of how many people turn up for Labour Party meetings in this country, though it mobilises 12 million odd votes. Except at election time, how many people take an interest in politics or read political speeches; yet in a crisis as there was over Abyssinia in 1936, and other issues masses of people on either side can be mobilised. This is the position with Congress. It is true that when they mobilise in this way, as Dr. Epstein showed, all sort of divisions enter into their ranks. There are divisions in any political system, but more sharply in such undeveloped political struggles. Leaders struggle with aspiring leaders because of personal animosities, and very often, as in some of these boycott campaigns, the whole thing collapses as a fiasco; but what seems to be clear is that, provided the issue is one which touches the mass of African peoples, their resentments and fears, any of the Congresses can pull together a tremendous amount of support. So that in some sense these educated Africans may only represent themselves in some situations. But from the discussions of Africans on the mines it seems clear that where there was a big problem facing the union—such as more all-round wages, or the opening of more skilled posts—this may have split the union, because there are obviously divisions in the African population. But, as Mitchell says, while specific issues of this kind, this split between the unskilled labourers and the educated Africans can come into the open and lead to a sharp division as it did in the history of the African Mineworkers' Union in Northern Rhodesia, on most issues that one might call the "middle class African", to use Lord Malvern's term, is a standard of aspiration for the Africans to look to rather than to Europeans, from whom they feel cut off, to set them forward on the march to civilisation of which the most uneducated Africans are now talking.

They are also tremendously proud of their emerging elite, and this is why, for example, in South Africa when a municipality decided to shut down African dairies because they sold polluted and contaminated milk at too high a price to the Africans and the municipality supplied cheaper milk, and better milk, the mass of the African population broke up the scheme. The same thing happened when the South African municipality closed down eating houses run by Africans and put up their own establishments; the reason being that the Africans, perhaps quite sensibly, think they have to produce their own businessmen and their own intellectuals if they are to get on in the world.

One has to recognise that there are these deep divisions in the African population due to differences of education and differences of tribe and also of occupation and wealth; but, because of this complexity, one cannot always see the tremendous links forged between them as regards their common aspirations and the way in which the illiterate look to their better-educated fellows to lead them forward. This is a mistake that may have the gravest political consequences and has, in the past history of Europe, had the gravest political consequences, particularly when the elite are restricted to a limited number of privileges. In France it led to the Revolution.

I think that is more or less what I would like to say on the factual side: I shall be happy to answer any questions.

SIR CHARLES ARDEN-CLARKE: You mentioned boycott campaigns. We have had some experience of that in our recent travels. In the rural areas, in the Northern and Central Provinces of Nyasaland, there was a pretty effective boycott of the Commission. We have heard it said that the effectiveness of the boycott was almost entirely due to the intimidation of a few people by politically ambitious African leaders. What would be your comment on that?—A. This must, of course, be in the nature of a guess.

Q. Quite, but you have described to us various motives and divisions which occur in the African communities and so on.—A. I would have expected from what I have heard that the boycott would be something like all strikes and boycotts, there are always a number of people who, for various reasons, want to start a boycott and who are intimidated morally int-

accepting a policy with which they do not agree; and there may be an even smaller fringe which is afraid of physical violence against them; and perhaps an even smaller fringe which is threatened with violence—I do not know. When the same argument was brought forward at the time the proposals for Federation were advanced I had six colleagues working in Northern Rhodesia, and none of them struck any instance of intimidation. Although they thought that if the Capricorn Society had sent Africans this might have led to violence, they found no evidence of intimidation.

Q. Would you say that for a boycott to be effective it must have the backing of the majority? Would that be a correct interpretation of what you say—A. I would not say that always. I do not know what the position in Cyprus was, but one can imagine a well armed group like EOKA, prepared to pour petrol on people and set them on fire and so on, which they did, could terrorise a hostile population into some kind of agreement; but I would not have thought this was operating at the moment in Central Africa. An account of Lord Attlee's attempts to interview a chief was published in a book by a former European civil servant, and his finding was that all the chief would repeat was, "We are opposed to it." He would not give any reasons. I gather from the report that he came to the conclusion that the chief was rather ignorant and stupid; but one has to face the fact that, faced with a very complicated set of proposals which had been drawn up by the equivalent people of what I have to speak of as "the other side"—constitutional experts and lawyers, trained staff of the Colonial Office and the Territorial Governments—it would have been foolish, I think for the Africans to enter into any discussion of the details of the Federation, because they could have been tied up in knots completely, and from what my colleagues tell me this is why they took their stand on an uncompromising refusal even to discuss it. It is very easy to be tied in knots by somebody who knows a lot of facts you do not know and who uses a lot of phrases. I have some doubts as to whether the Africans were wise, from their own point of view, in refusing; I think one of the great tragedies was that when the final proposals were discussed, the Colonial Office did not offer Africans the money to employ independent experts, so that they could have gone into any conference armed with as many experts as the Government had.

Q. You are expressing a deep-seated feeling that they are not prepared to support any rationalisation?—A. They are afraid they will be caught in the nets because they know, on the whole, they are not so well-equipped to argue about the implications of Federation and about Nyasaland's economic development or non-economic development, etc., as the people who will be questioning them.

MR. MENZIES: Does that apply to the boycott of the Commission, or are you going back to the time of Federation?—A. I was actually referring to the original time of Federation and guessing that is one of the reasons for the assertion, "We won't have anything to do with the Federation."

Q. You do not suggest that the boycott of this Commission was based on that consideration, when we heard hundreds of highly representative Africans who were not actuated by that fear at all? Do you apply that to the boycott of this Commission?

SIR CHARLES ARDEN-CLARKE: My original question did refer to two specific areas in Nyasaland where the boycott of the Commission was effective. I was trying to get the reactions of the Professor as to what he would think about it from his knowledge.—A. I said I was guessing.

MR. MENZIES: I just want to test your guess, because you are dealing basically, I take it, with the African character—you are trying to interpret the African character in its tribal significance and individually. If you suggest that was the motive for the boycott of the Commission in certain parts of the Federation, why should it not have operated in areas where we got very full evidence from the Africans. That is, throughout Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia?—A. I do not know what areas were involved, of course.

Q. And also in the southern areas of Nyasaland.—A. It is only a guess, but I am sure that this is what motivated this chief in his discussion with Lord Attlee, that he did not want to be trapped into a discussion where he could not follow the technicalities; and so all he would do was to reiterate his opposition.

LORD CRATHORNE: Could I turn to the final part of your paper under "Conclusion", where you say you were surprised at the speed of the Africans' advancement between 1947 and 1953. You go on to say that the main direction of this advance in political thought is clearly to oppose Federation. Then you go on, "Some effort to come to terms with this must be made, and it must involve changes in political and social structure. . . ." Could you just tell us what you have in mind on that?—A. This is again a private opinion and not

based on facts. I myself would have thought, and have always thought, that the decision to establish Federation in the face of determined African opposition was unwise. It is quite clear that in a population which is so divided, whatever policy is followed big risks are taken; and this seemed to me to be the wrong risk. The position now being as it is, I think that there are only two possible course of action which have any hope of reducing bloodshed—avoiding the kind of situation which has developed in South Africa, that is really what I mean—and one is to restore to the territorial governments considerable powers and even possibly the re-establishment of the old Central Africa Council; or alternatively that such tremendous concessions must be made immediately to the Africans, politically and industrially and educationally, so that the opposition to Federation has a chance of being converted into support. One thing which does seem clear is that a continuation of the policy of gradualness will provoke more and more situations such as that in 1959, with increasing bitterness and therefore ultimately increasing bloodshed. I would not suggest that bloodshed and difficulty are going to be avoided either by giving up Federation or making big concessions to the Africans, because unfortunately all political steps lead to trouble of some kind except in a pretty united population which we have in Britain; but unless something really radical is done, and unless either the demands for independence in the northern Territories—Southern Rhodesia is in such a different position—unless these were granted with very much more African power in the legislatures, and unless the same thing happens in the Federation, I think the whole situation must conduce more and more to the opposition which developed out of its birth.

When I was in Northern Rhodesia during the war there was really a tremendous fund of loyalty to Britain, with less to the Northern Rhodesia Government and the Nyasaland Government. I found the exact opposite when I was working in South Africa, where the loyalty was towards the local official, working against the Government. It seemed to me the government officials were less liberal than the Colonial Office policy, whereas in South Africa the local policy was more liberal than government policy, for obvious reasons. But there was this tremendous loyalty, and this was virtually destroyed within six years; so that whereas in 1953 the Nyasalanders were pleading for the right to remain attached directly to the Queen and to remain under the Colonial Office, by 1959 a lot of their spokesmen—I was myself in the chair at a meeting when one man said, "We don't want the Union Jack any more." They had wanted it six years before as a symbol of protection. But to regain that position it seems to me that secession is the only hope, but there is a way of regaining loyalty if tremendous concessions are made and the policy of gradualness is abandoned. Of course, I would not deny that a government represented by a majority, with enough weapons, can remain in power for a very long time—but at a cost of Sharpeville after Sharpeville. Speaking for myself, I would have equal blacks and white, but I would have the whites elected by Africans and the Africans elected by whites, to make sure I got moderates. Some means must be worked out of trying to get people's votes so cast that each has an interest in the representatives from the other racial groups, with whites being responsible to African voters, but really to all African voters. Because I would also say that a 100 per cent. franchise—or at least 100 per cent male franchise—is essential. On this I can only say from my own experience that I have lived among the Zulu for a year and a half in South Africa, and among the Barotse for 13 months, and I have been with other tribes. These people have a pretty shrewd appreciation not only of their own interests, but of what is possible to be done for them. I do not think the introduction of a universal franchise will lead to demands which will immediately shatter the state, any more than it has done in Britain; because speaking of the Labour Party, as the common man gradually develops, in fact, our Party gets weaker and weaker because the majority of people put before themselves a limited level of aspiration: they get so far and most of them do not want to go further.

The alternative is that you cut the poor and illiterate off from all sources of political power except violence, and in practice it is the poor and illiterate who need the vote much more than the rich and the educated. I take my own steps, for instance if I feel hurt over something: I know newspaper editors; I have contacts with the Government and colleagues in universities; I use all sorts of contacts to redress the position. But the poor and illiterate have only got the vote. If you cut them off from that you have cut them off from any means of influencing decisions which affect their day-to-day lives. You compel them to go to violence, and the proof of this, I think, is recent world history. Marx predicted revolutions in Germany, America and Britain—all the highly industrialised countries—but the countries where the revolutions have actually taken place have been Russia, China, Chile, Mexico, Spain,

Italy on the verge of it, the whole of Eastern Europe, India and Indo-China. Countries with a big peasant population are the ones which obviously present the revolutionary situation; and I think the reason is the slow extension of democracy and the feeling that the only thing you can do is use violence, whereas in developed industrial countries everybody has some small say in what is done about his interests and the interests of his children. From what I and my colleagues know from living with African tribesmen, they are very sensible people and intelligent on basic issues. They do not really need an elaborate education to work out where they stand.

Mr. MENZIES: Would you only give the vote to men?—A. I think on the whole I would be probably in favour of extending the vote to women, but this is something which, if it is to be given to women, should be discussed with African leaders, because this may start up troubles in the tribal system.

Q. But you would go beyond literacy—you would not require that?—A. No. I think a lot of the stability that has come to India has been because she did not worry about literacy.

Mr. CRAWLEY: I think I understand your point that the political advancement of Africans does not depend on literacy, but you advocate "one man one vote" for males, and we had very extensive evidence of intimidation, not only to our own witnesses, but petrol was thrown over an African woman just before we arrived, and I would say it was extensive wherever we went. We had first-hand evidence of that all the time, so you are faced with the possibility, or probability that adult suffrage for males may result in a tyranny at least as great, if not greater than, the sort of tyranny which the Africans may consider white domination to be. We also undoubtedly had evidence that there was considerable opposition to the African parties, but, this being rather different, did not go to people who were likely to retaliate and to be violent in their turn. It seems to me to be a problem of first of all evaluating how great these two bodies of opinion are; and secondly, if you wish to try to give expression to the more moderate and more conservative body of opinion among the Africans, how are you going to do it and at the same time grant a much greater freedom of expression to the nationalist? Have you any comment to make on that?—A. I do not know what the evidence for intimidation is—is this from people who have said they have been intimidated?

Q. There was no doubt on that at any point.—A. The point is, intimidation in itself arises from the situation. The adult population is full of resentment and feels there is little hope. I think that the liberal extension of political rights would immediately create a situation where the possibility of intimidation is reduced. Of course, it is never eliminated—but there is a risk in this certainly. There is a risk whatever course is taken in so difficult a situation. I can only say that the whole of the country where I worked—Barotseland at the time comprised 300,000 people—was run by one company of police stuck away in the centre through the Native Authorities. There were no difficulties in controlling them. District Commissioners have managed these populations for years, kept them loyal, they fought in wars and I do not think it is the populations which have changed so much as the situation. So, while there is always a risk, I think that changing the situation or granting adult suffrage will reduce intimidation and will also mean that it will get small minority groups who are trying to organise themselves and go in for intimidation. Where the population is against them it is much harder for them to keep going.

Q. Have you or your colleagues come across the opinions which were stated by some people to us, that opposition should not be allowed? More than one African Nationalist leader who when pressed by us made it quite plain that opposition to their policies, had they power, would not be allowed to exist.—A. I have had no reports for the last four years because we have had nobody going out. Again I think this is possible, as anything is possible in these situations, but the risk of it is tremendously reduced in a more liberal regime. It is hard to tell. I do not know whether you would agree, Sir Charles, about the position in Ghana. After all, these are artificial units drawn in Europe on a map, and once the so-called struggle against Colonial power is won the tendency for tribalism to re-assert itself is very strong. This may not happen in Northern Rhodesia. This might start up and produce other conditions. Once the struggle is won, allies always break apart unfortunately; and if considerable political and industrial gains were won by the Africans one would expect, however large the unit in opposition, however small the fragment in the Colonial Office, that many of the leaders who are now saying they will not tolerate opposition would shift their ground, because they would no longer be united under pressure from above. The other thing that one would expect would be that, in a situation in which considerable numbers of leaders are arrested, the tendency is always for leadership to move to the more extreme people, because those are more moderate than the ones who are arrested and perhaps released or those who, out of fear that they will be the next to go, are also rejected by the

population. This situation will be changed, I think; but I would not deny there are enormous risks. Whatever we do there will be tremendous risks to be taken, because, after all, you have risks with the white population.

Mr. KATILUNGU: You dealt with the question of collective action in a situation similar to that which is happening in Central Africa, and you referred to the point that an action which deals with a national issue can be taken, and very successfully, without depending on the membership of that particular organisation, referring to National Congress in this case. Mr. Menzies has referred to what has happened in Northern Rhodesia. We had heavy evidence concerning the boycott which was conducted by United National Independence Party and African National Congress. The result was we had many Chiefs and individuals, some belonging to these political parties, coming forward to give evidence to the Commission. What is your psychological observation why this kind of action took place: that Chiefs and a considerable number of people did not listen to the declaration of boycott of the Commission, but came forward to give evidence? Could you direct us as to the psychological aspect?—A. I do not think I could. I do not know anything about it. I think I could say here, to continue an answer to Mr. Crawley's question, that all the evidence we have worked out on sociology shows that the most hated enemy is the renegade—even more than the heretic, certainly much more than the open enemy—the renegade and the traitor. Where you have a situation in which heavy pressure, and this is what holds it together, despite derision, anybody who breaks away from what is thought to be a policy will be treated as a renegade. I think this explains a lot of threats of violence, and even violence, against people who go against the policy of a group such as the Africans are now; but if the pressure were removed it would break up. Obviously, in a place as complex as this, it is not surprising that there are people who do not conform to a policy put out by an organised political party. What I was saying about the African National Congress was that if an issue which touches the mass of the population is raised, then you only need people scattered to turn out groups; these group turn into mobs and create violence. This did not occur in the original discussions on Federation, but it was on the verge of it. My colleagues on the Copperbelt were convinced if an African had come along and spoken to the Capricorn Society, since the greatest insult at that time was to be called a Capricorn, this might very well have led to a mob attack; these are the explosive situations which one wants to avoid. But the whole position must be very different. After all, the country has been under an emergency for a long time. In 1953 the whole population rallied, and Congress broke up immediately Federation went through. They could do practically nothing. The shock was very heavy. As you know the Mineworkers' Union gave up the cause as lost, and joined the National days of prayer. Being realists they had, in fact, negotiated. The situation is now very different, because refusing to give evidence to the Commission is quite different to opposing Federation. It may not be an issue where Africans and the Chiefs feel deeply enough to unite on.

Q. You think the reason why is when you refer to the few African intelligentsia said by some people to be influencing the situation; the mass of the people being carried without proper thinking?—A. No, not without proper thinking.

Q. I think I should just refer to what has happened in relation to what you have said. In our trade union movement we do not have all the people joining, but when we come to claim for pay and unexpectedly we take strike action, then everybody is on strike, not because they are members, but because we are dealing with an issue in which they are interested collectively.—A. Yes, except it is more marked in the case of your union, because after all the Africans live in single townships in the mining areas. They come and meet the trade union branch; it is organised and you have one narrow specific issue. It is much easier to call them together on an industrial matter like that. What is interesting in this connection is that during the 1935/40 troubles on the Copperbelt the troubles were avoided at Mufulira. The first trade union was elected with a strike committee of 17 and when threats were made to set fire to an African clerk's house these 17 were made responsible. These men were elected to make trouble in the strike, the tribal authorities being rejected. They kept essential services going.

Mr. CHIRWA: One final explanation to this attitude of mind which seems common in this country, that the leaders of thought seem to have a spirit of resignation towards the African in Southern Rhodesia. Because if you are going to solve the question of Federation obviously you cannot ignore the Southern Rhodesian situation. Either you solve the Southern Rhodesian situation, or we leave out Southern Rhodesia and there is no Federation. I want to find out from the witness why does he think Federation can go on if the

Southern Rhodesian position is not solved? Let us say things stand as they are. You have no African representation in the legislature in Southern Rhodesia and the colour bar goes on in Southern Rhodesia and you do not have Africans as civil servants in Southern Rhodesia, that you have these two differential rolls in Southern Rhodesia and so on; do you really think that you can basically solve the question of Federation unless you get down to these problems, because what is the cause of these troubles we have got? If Southern Rhodesia was like Northern Rhodesia they would avoid these troubles, but because of these things which exist in Southern Rhodesia the Africans say as long as these things exist, our own future is insecure because these things apply to us in the Northern Territories.—A. I would just say that Southern Rhodesia is in a different position, because Southern Rhodesia, as far as Britain is concerned, is almost fully independent. I cannot imagine a situation in which this independence can be taken away either peaceably or forcibly. Southern Rhodesia can dictate to men and women in terms of its own government, and, if the people who elect that government decided to withdraw from the Federation, Southern Rhodesia has its own problems, whereas I feel that the only scope for manoeuvre in the present situation is partly with the British Government, and partly in a way with the Federal Government. I think the Federal Government would have itself, as well as the Northern Territories, to make tremendous concessions to the Africans. If this happened and Southern Rhodesia followed suit, as she has in a way, she would have her own problems to face. There have been developments in Southern Rhodesia which are better than developments in the Union. The alternative for Southern Rhodesia is to go more and more to a policy like the Union. One cannot tell why concessions have been made. Some people say in order to mislead public opinion in Britain, but Southern Rhodesia will then have to face these problems if they were faced in the Northern Territories. I do not see how in practical political terms there is anything one could say about Southern Rhodesia except that it is virtually independent, and that the Southern Rhodesians must solve this problem.

Q. If you go from there would you not say that it is wrong to have Southern Rhodesia in the present Federation? —A. I do feel that in offering to federate the two Northern Territories with Southern Rhodesia the British Government destroyed a wealth of loyalty and affection which had been won, not only by missionaries in that area, but by District Officers and by a number of settlers and so on, and this destruction can be to some extent still remedied. They destroyed the possibilities of building up again a society that one hopes is emerging in Tanganyika. I feel it is too late for anybody except the Southern Rhodesians to solve this particular problem. That is why I differentiated.

Q. When you talk of making these advances, I do not know what you really imply by that. In view of the developments which have taken place in the Congo, where the African will be virtually independent in June, and Tanganyika where Africans will have self-government in October, do you think that anything that you do for Africans in Central Africa short of that would satisfy them?—A. I just do not know.

Q. Do you think that they would be satisfied to see their friends in Tanganyika, whom they were training, getting self-government before they do? Do you think they will be satisfied with anything less than that?—A. I really do not know the answer to that. The Congo seems to me to be in a very peculiar situation. As far as one can make out, the Belgians, having suppressed all political advance far more than the British did, suddenly decided that either Africans are going to kill us, or we kill Africans, or Africans are going to kill one another, and from their point of view it is better they should kill one another; and they pulled out without any preparation. The interesting thing is that this middle-class policy of Lord Malvern is Belgian policy, and this has led to greater hostility than the British policy. The people have gone the opposite way. One would hope that, if the Africans were really granted tremendous political concessions, they would see that in the end they had to come to terms with the Europeans living there. The Europeans in the end would have to accept some fall in the status of living. I do not think the difference would disappear, but we know from other examples where Britain has withdrawn and granted substantial political concessions that there has been a revulsion of feeling in her favour as in India, Ghana and Nigeria; so one would hope that something like this would happen.

Q. When you say political advancement, what degree do you mean? Do you mean self-government?—A. No, I would have thought continuing metropolitan oversight, but parity at least in the Federal Legislature with a possible franchise worked out so that every African, Indian or European member is responsible to all sections of the electorate; an African majority in Nyasaland and I would have thought a majority of Africans with official balance of power in Northern Rhodesia

where you have to deal with a very militant European minority. In the Federal Legislature, which is much less concerned with small details of relations between the races, which the races will have to work out, I would have thought parity between representatives whether white or black.

MR. MENZIES: On that point, how would you propose to form your cabinet in the Federal Parliament with parity of representation?—A. I am afraid this is right outside my field. This is the field of my colleague, Professor Mackenzie of Manchester who was on the Kenya Constitution.

MR. CHIRWA: Is he coming before us?—A. I do not think so.

MR. KATILUNGU: You said that when these substantial political advances are given to the Territories comprising the Federation, the British Government should continue to exercise her protection as well as her rights over the country. How long would you suggest that would take after the first political advances had been made?—A. I would not put a period to it. I would say that this must depend on developments, which is again right outside my field.

Q. The reason why I asked this question is that a good deal of evidence had been coming forward criticising the continuation of the British administration in Central Africa, and it is alleged that as a result of the British Colonial Office continuing to exercise her administrative powers in Central Africa there has been a division of African loyalty; instead of the African looking forward to the Federation as the centre of their Government they look to the British Government as well. This has resulted in the strong opposition to the Federation. Do you think even if the Colonial Office withdrew, and the Federation had its full independence that this would change the African opposition and re-establish loyalty to the Federation of Central Africa?—A. I would not expect this, no. It was certainly not the result of giving independence to South Africa. When I was in Zululand the Zulus said they owed no loyalty to the South African Government. They had been defeated by the British, they had surrendered to the British. The British had unilaterally handed over to the Natal Government. They were not children, and the British Government had no right to transfer its treaty rights with the Zulu to another Government without consulting the Zulu. No only did they state this, but when the Prime Minister, General Hertzog, came to speak to them nobody would answer him when he spoke. The Native Commissioner called on someone to answer him who said "Who is this? We do not know this man. This man is not of the country who defeated us. He is of a different country."

MR. MENZIES: A very healthy view.—A. I think so. On the other thing, I would have said that one of the crucial things to win the African's confidence is to restore the British Colonial Office. I do not think you can now have the District Commissioner as a kind of Prefect, such as you had in France. In local government the officials must come from Britain. In 1947, I think, when I was in Barotseland, Sir Roy Welensky and his party were putting forward this argument then against the British officers, that they had no stake in the future of the country. After their service they returned to Britain. In order to meet this, the Northern Rhodesia Government offered farms on special terms to retiring British officers so that they could say, "We do have a stake in the country." I heard this matter discussed in the Barotse National Council, and they said that the odds against us are weighted as it is, because the British officer does not spend his leisure time with us. He plays golf and cards and goes to sundowners with other whites as he has to be friendly with them, and they exert pressure on him to act in ways which are inimical to our interests. At least he goes home on leave every three years and resumes contact with Britain, and when he ultimately retires he goes to Britain. If in future he is going to be a partner here he has an interest in keeping our wages down and has an interest in maintaining certain land divisions. This is quite true, because I know a Native Commissioner who said, "If you raise wages in the mines we have to pay more for our domestic servants". So I would have said that the restoration of the expatriate officer and adviser was something that, since they have to be with us as against the local recruit, contrives to hold the balance between locally recruited Europeans and locally recruited Africans for some time at least in the hope they will reach a *modus operandi* a way of living together. I would have said this was essential. I think this is an example of how half-illiterate people can see implications of what is apparently a very small decision.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed. We are most grateful to you.—A. May I give you my best wishes in my turn.

Addendum to oral evidence

PROFESSOR GLUCKMAN

Since I gave evidence to members of the Commission on

May 25th, I have had the opportunity to think over one question which I felt unable to answer. I hope that I may supplement my evidence with a letter.

I had told the Commission that I thought that a bold gesture to the Africans might convert the widespread opposition to the Federation into support, and I suggested that in Northern Rhodesia this would require parity of Africans and Europeans with the balance of power held by officials from Britain, but I thought parity in the Federal Parliament was also essential. Mr. Menzies asked me how I would constitute a Cabinet in these circumstances, and I said that this was outside

my province. I have since had the opportunity to discuss this problem with colleagues; they have drawn my attention to the fact that it is not essential to have a Cabinet which is directly a part of the legislature. There are many systems where this does not occur. I would like to suggest to the Commission that some deviation from the British "norm" might be constituted. In this connection, I hope I may take the liberty of suggesting to the Commission that it itself consult Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie, who has much experience in this field, and probably also Professor Ely Devons of the London School of Economics, who has given a great deal of thought to this kind of problem.

LONDON

26TH MAY 1960

Memorandum

G. H. BAXTER

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: The future

Any attempt to chart the future of the Federation is rendered difficult both by the unprecedented circumstances and by the fact that such diverse currents of opinion and of feeling, both in the Federation and outside, have to be taken into account. A view however must be taken; for we are already in 1960 and, by the time that the review conference due to begin this year has come to an end, momentous decisions will inevitably have been taken.

2. About ultimate aims, there is a much wider degree of agreement than is commonly supposed. True, there is an element which seeks forthwith to put everything on the basis of sheer numbers, and so achieve "black domination"; and there is also an element which, owing to fear of such a development, seeks to perpetuate and enlarge such political preponderance as the Europeans now exercise, and so secure "white domination". But, by and large, it is increasingly the case that the white voter accepts the position that political power is not to be the prerogative of one race, that the franchise must continue to be open to those of all races on equal terms, and that it will be only a matter of time (as more and more Africans exchange their primitive tribal character for that of citizens of a modern state) before there will in fact be more Africans than Europeans on the voters' rolls. This position, with its implication of constructive co-operation between black and white, is accepted also by many intelligent Africans, and will undoubtedly be much more widely so accepted when it is realised that the policy of "partnership" is being sincerely pursued.

3. There is no discernible end to the process until the whole of the population has had the opportunity of attaining to such minimum standards as may be prescribed for the franchise. This will no doubt take a long time; nevertheless the fact should provide a reconciliation between those who as a matter of principle believe that adult suffrage ought to be the goal and those who, looking round on the population as it is now, view with horror and dismay the idea that political power should be handed over to people not at all equipped to judge the merits of policies but liable to be entirely swayed by any irresponsible demagogue.

4. Within what constitutional pattern is this process to operate? Are the three Territories to remain linked together in the Federation as we now know it, or is there to be any fundamental change in its nature, content, or composition? A reference will be made below to the widespread anti-federation feelings that have been aroused, especially among the Africans of Nyasaland; but it is not really open to doubt that, in the best interests of the population as a whole, and of the Africans in particular, something like the present degree of linkage and co-operation should be maintained, even though there might be significant changes of detail.

5. It is the fashion in some quarters to disparage the "economic" benefits which federation has brought, especially to the less highly developed parts of the area, and to imply that these can be thought of as something in isolation, unconnected with the true advancement of the population. This is a complete error. If ever the great mass of the Africans are to have better education, a higher standard of living, a steadily improving level of culture and of social life, worth-while citizenship and genuine representative institutions, these can only come—directly or indirectly—as the result of economic activity and material prosperity.

6. The "secession" of Nyasaland is, somewhat irresponsibly, mooted in some quarters; and, if that were allowed to happen, there is no reason why similar pressure should not arise for some other portions of the Federal area to be carved off to become "African states" no longer federated together. Not only would these areas then be foredoomed, as far ahead as one can look, to comparative stagnation and backwardness, but a mortal blow would have been struck at the whole great and

vital ideal of finding a working basis for a multi-racial state within the Commonwealth: the racial curtain would have been irrevocably drawn across the African continent—"white supremacy this side" and "black supremacy this side".

7. No one who takes anything but a superficial and short-sighted view can possibly contemplate that any such state of affairs should be the aim in view. The pattern to be ultimately aimed at must be on the lines sketched above. There would be the three constituent Territories, each maintaining its individuality, and each administered in most of the important internal aspects by its own Government, responsible to its own legislature. For purposes of common effort, in spheres where that is mutually beneficial, they would remain federated together, the Federal Government and legislature having responsibility and authority within those spheres. All four legislatures would be based upon mixed electorates which would be continually growing as a higher proportion of the population reached the stage of being able to accept the basic responsibilities of citizenship.

8. It is, however, easier to indicate the goal than to agree upon the path and the stages by which it should be reached. The problem is intensified by the severe climate of opposition, to federation as such, which has been engineered by spokesmen of the African Congresses in the Northern Territories, especially Nyasaland. When the ordinary African is constantly having it dinned into him that all his actual or potential troubles are due to federation (a word which would otherwise be little more than a word to him), and when any of his teachers or leaders who might say anything to the contrary is restrained by threats (and not idle ones) that he and his family will be injured or their house burned down, it is small wonder that the Devlin Commission should have had to record that most of the Africans of Nyasaland who appeared before them were opposed to federation; and small wonder too that none of them seems to have given any relevant reason for this attitude.

9. But however misconceived and irrational this opposition may be, and by whatever dubious means it has been fostered, the resultant fears and suspicions are real things which will somehow have to be allayed if there is to be that basis of internal trust and co-operation on which alone a great nation can be built. Here is the phenomenon of a mass of people distrustful of something they have not understood, something that has been cunningly misrepresented to them. They need to be brought to see, for example, that they are still in all essentials governed and administered by the Territorial authorities; that the main impact of the Federation as such on themselves is to make possible the continually more abundant provision of such things as schools and dispensaries (of which they already show their appreciation by flocking in ever increasing numbers to take advantage of them); and that, so far from their Territory being "under" the Federation, the latter belongs to and is run by the representatives of all three Territories.

10. This is a formidable task, but its achievement is essential for the good health and progress of the Federation. It will require a concerted effort by the Federal and Territorial Governments and by the United Kingdom Government. A special contribution also can be, and one hopes will be, made by the Government and legislature of Southern Rhodesia. By their legislation in industrial and other spheres they have already begun to make significant inroads on the pattern of racial discrimination which is a legacy of their past; but they have yet to face the need for sweeping away, in one stroke, the rigid system of residential segregation whose continued retention mortifies their friends and provides ammunition for their enemies. Though the logical connection may be obscure and indirect, nothing else could so profoundly affect the attitude of northern Africans towards membership of the Federation.

11. Another potent ingredient in the stimulation of confidence would be the character and pace of developments in the constitutional and electoral fields. These, which should of

course also be justifiable on their intrinsic merits, fall to be considered next.

12. The Federal, Southern Rhodesian, and Northern Rhodesian systems all provide for a "qualitative" franchise, the qualification depending on factors of means and education. This should continue to be the case, and any new scheme for Nyasaland should be of a like character.

13. The two-tier feature, whereby there is a class of "special" voters with a qualification lower than considered intrinsically justifiable, is to disappear by stages in the Northern Rhodesian system, as the spread of economic and educational progress should gradually render such a provision unnecessary. A similar modification might well be introduced in the other systems.

14. Then the qualifications themselves should be closely overhauled, for the purpose of lowering them to the utmost extent possible without letting in a flood of those so politically immature as scarcely to comprehend the nature and purpose of an election. In approaching this operation, common-sense and practical politics dictate that regard should be had to recent developments elsewhere in Africa, particularly in neighbouring Tanganyika. In Northern Rhodesia, besides the means and education tests, there are alternative qualifications available for ministers of religion, chiefs, African headmen and councillors, and certain categories of long-service pensioners. Any attempt might well be made, in all four electoral systems, to find other classes of persons engaged in educational or other public service or in tribal or local administration who could be classified as automatically eligible. The result should stand scrutiny from the standpoint that no appreciable body of people should be disfranchised unless plainly not yet ready to wield the vote. The benefit of any doubt should go in the direction of wider enfranchisement.

15. The qualifications for the Federal roll should almost certainly be the same in all three Territories. Ideally, those for each of the Territorial rolls should be uniform with them. But it may well prove that the difference in circumstances of the three Territories, and the exigencies of achieving in each of them a politically tolerable result, will over-ride this desideratum.

16. Side by side with the settlement of the qualifications, some means should be found of conveying reassurance that the process will go on until all, or virtually all, of the population will be eligible for enrolment. A timetable of fixed dates would obviously not be applicable. One possibility would be to invite an independent group of statisticians to work out, on the best data available, the probable course of the spread of increased incomes and educational attainments, and the consequential figures of eligibility for the vote which might be expected to arise, year by year, in the light of those probabilities. Thus the trend would cease to be merely a matter of guesswork or individual prophecy, and would be given as solid and impartial a foundation as possible. Those who measure everything by the yardstick of communal advantage would be able to discern approximately how soon, in the case of each legislature, Africans could be in a majority on the electorate. But the hope is that, even before that comes about, the process—already begun—of Africans joining the same political parties with Europeans would have led to political divisions following non-racial lines.

17. Turning now to the structure, status, and relationships of the Federation and the Territories, these matters will be the main concern of the 1960 Conference, which is likely both to reach conclusions about any immediate changes and to lay down a programme for the future.

18. There will be scope for some transfer of responsibilities as between the Federal and Territorial "lists", in the interests of efficiency or even perhaps to satisfy understandable prejudice. For example, since the long-term aim is to have a common system of education for European and African children, the opportunity might be taken to give the Territories charge of all education below University level. But a glance at the existing lists will show that on the whole they are allotted on sensible lines, and no wholesale transfer of responsibilities could reasonably be recommended. The relationship between Federation and Territories should of course remain as at present, viz. that the Territories within their own field of subjects should be in no way subordinate to the Federation.

19. As between Westminster and the Territories, a further devolution of responsibility might well be made. There still exists a right for the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to prevent the passage into law of any Bill passed by the Southern Rhodesian legislature which discriminates against Africans. Over a long period of years there has never been any occasion (whichever party was in office in the United Kingdom) for the exercise of that power, and it is about time that it should be abolished. In Southern Rhodesia nowadays—without any prompting from the United Kingdom—the whole trend of legislation (though to many the process seems unduly

slow) is in removing existing discriminations. In the case of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which should more and more assume the image of independent states within the Federation, there is good reason why the Colonial Office should pass over to the local authorities a completely free hand, in matters of purely local concern, save only where the United Kingdom's responsibilities towards the African "protected persons" are engaged.

20. But the aspect on which the greatest attention has been, and will be, focussed is that of the Federation's own status and powers. It already possesses nearly complete independence. The Federal Prime Minister has repeatedly made plain that he neither expects nor will ask for the attainment in 1960 of "Dominion status", which would presumably require the elimination of virtually all limitations. The joint governmental declaration of 27th April 1957 stated that the conference "will consider a programme for the attainment of such a status as would enable the Federation to become eligible for full membership of the Commonwealth." This agreed undertaking could be fulfilled by examining what situation would probably need to exist, to support the attainment of such a status, and the means and stages by which that situation might be brought about.

21. What can and should be done meanwhile may be summarily set out under three headings—bearing in mind that from now on the Federal Government and legislature will be responsive to an electorate becoming increasingly multi-racial in composition.

22. First, whatever is possible towards giving the Federation a more assured position in the world should be done. For example, membership, in its own right, of international bodies should be promoted; and (as was promised in 1957) Parliament here should be asked to enact that the Federal legislature shall have power to legislate with extra-territorial effect.

23. Secondly, the Federation has already reached such a stage of constitutional development that it would be unthinkable (except at the request of the Federal Government) for the United Kingdom Government to initiate, or the United Kingdom Parliament to pass, any legislation to amend or repeal any Federal Act or to deal with any matter within the competence of the Federal Legislature, or to amend the Federal Constitution. This position should be formalised. Parliament here should forego formally (as in the case of the self-governing Dominions) the power to legislate on Federal matters except at the Federation's own request; though it should in present circumstances preserve the power of veto on constitutional change.

24. Thirdly, active consideration should be given by the United Kingdom and Federal Governments, in consultation with leaders of opinion, to ascertaining whether in place of the African Affairs Board any equally effective, and more generally acceptable machinery can be devised for the purpose of satisfying all concerned that, so long as Africans are in fact in a minority on the electorate, there will be an appropriate check on legislation unfairly disadvantageous to Africans getting on to the Federal statute-book.

25. This programme is not spectacular; and it is right that no spectacular change should be expected at the present stage.

London
20th January 1960

Oral Evidence

G. H. BAXTER

CHAIRMAN: I expect there may be something you would like to add to the memorandum?—A. I would like to briefly supplement this in one particular. The memorandum I have put in proceeds on basic assumptions which are not really stated there, but which seem to be the fundamental requirements of the situation, and these are the two things: in other words, the continued linking together of the three territories in an organic way which enables them to face the world as one entity and to meet their common problems with greater strength, and the greater increase among the races in the area of what, for want of a better name, is called by the misleading term of "partnership". Those are not only essential requirements, but each is dependent on the other for its success. That is the underlying thesis of my thought and of the paper, which goes into greater details and suggestions for immediate and subsequent action.

I would also like to say a few words about the impact of the development of affairs in the Federation on public opinion in this country. That is a matter to which for several years I have myself given very close attention; and I have no doubt that members here are all aware of the situation; but a commission proceeds by the evidence that is before it, and I thought this was possibly a suitable moment to get something on record on that subject. The fact is, as I think is well-known to all students in these matters, that public opinion in this country has poured out upon it a torrent of misrepresentation,

partly based on ignorance and purposeful mischief, however well-intentioned, and as a result there has been created in the public mind in this country a sort of image of the Federation and in particular of the Governments of the Federation and of Southern Rhodesia and of the Europeans who live in the Federation, which is grossly at variance with the facts, and which tends to colour the attitude of the ordinary man, even though reasonably well-informed in this country towards any suggestion in regard to the public affairs of the Federation. That stems from two very different origins: the first is the normal and perfectly natural tendency of newspapers to give their public things which are more startling and not very normal—because nobody reads a newspaper for day after day simply to learn that “Mr. Jones was perfectly well yesterday, as he has been for the last five years”, whereas if something becomes wrong it is news. Secondly, there undoubtedly exists what might almost be called a conspiracy of people who are well-intentioned but determined to put the worst possible construction on everything that happens in the Federation, particularly if it can be made to seem the work of what are called “white settlers”. Those two interact, so that the first creates a very favourable soil for the second. There is nothing more I would like to add as regards evidence in chief.

SIR DONALD MACGILLIVRAY: In paragraph 19 you say “In the case of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which should more and more assume the image of independent states within the Federation, there is good reason why the Colonial Office should pass over to the local authorities a completely free hand, in matters of purely local concern, save only where the United Kingdom’s responsibilities towards the African ‘protected persons’ are engaged.” How would that, in fact work? Would you say that certain subjects should be the concern entirely of the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia Governments and must not be subject to the Secretary of State’s control and not be the subject of questions in the U.K. Parliament?—A. Yes.

Q. Other subjects should remain under the control of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and therefore there should be responsibility to the United Kingdom Parliament?—A. That was what I had in mind. I realised there might have to be some rearrangement of the contents of subjects in order to ensure that a division by subject could be devised which had that effect.

Q. Something on the lines of the proposals made a few months ago by Sir Arthur Benson in *The Times*?—A. I think so, yes.

CHAIRMAN: In paragraph 10 you talk about the changes which you think should be made, and I marked this passage as regards the contribution you thought Southern Rhodesia ought to make—“they have yet to face the need for sweeping away, in one stroke, the rigid system of residential segregation whose continued retention mortifies their friends and provides ammunition for their enemies.” Do you attach importance to the segregation as being one of the major feelings of deep injustice?—A. My impression certainly is that the existence of that is one of the greatest and certainly one of the most real of the arguments which are and can be used, particularly to and by Africans in the Northern Territories to justify their feeling that Southern Rhodesia is not a country they want to be associated with. Speaking of doing this in one stroke, there is something to be said for a rather dramatic gesture which can catch the eye—if a thing like this is done gradually it easily escapes notice and has not the same impact.

Q. You go on to deal with the franchise, and at the beginning of paragraph 15 you say “The qualifications for the Federal Roll should almost certainly be the same in all three Territories”. You suggest it should be the same for all purposes?—A. Yes.

Q. Which of the areas of possibility do you favour yourself as a basis for qualifications for all purposes? You see, there are various different qualifications which are now in force.—A. The qualifications, although they are applied on a somewhat different pattern, are the same in Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia: they each have two tiers which, except for very slight differences, have the same qualifications. I certainly meant to suggest, and I think I have done so here, that I would favour the elimination gradually over a period of the system of having two different tiers; but as to where the line should be drawn I do not pretend to be able to say precisely. After all, I have never worked in Rhodesia in the field, and all I feel justified in saying is that the lines should be so drawn that, while not bringing in those who are obviously incapable of exercising the right sort of judgment, every effort should be made to draw it so that it would bring in everybody else.

Q. Yes. Now in paragraph 18 you say that opportunity might be taken to give the Territories charge of all education below university level.—A. Yes.

Q. Do you regard that as important with a view to getting away from segregation of the races for many purposes?—A. I feel that is bound to come, and I have merely suggested that if at the stage which is now approaching us there are going to be some readjustments, this is one which might very well be justified at this time.

Q. And now, for the purposes of the note, would you be good enough to tell us your own experience in or about Rhodesia?—A. Certainly. My original career was in the India Office, in which I had a considerable amount to do with working out the Government of India Act of 1935 which, though not so named, was in fact a great federal instrument. When the transfer of power took place in India I became Assistant Under-Secretary in the Commonwealth Relations Office; and after an interval our connections with Central Africa, so far as were dealt with in the Commonwealth Relations Office, came under my superintendence. I took part in various confabulations when Ministers and others came over to talk about the possibilities of constitutional advance; and I think it might be worth saying that I took the initiative myself which led to the setting up of an officials conference which was, rather surprisingly, allowed its head in this political field and produced a report which, also rather surprisingly to us, had to be published. So we took most of the decisions, except that the statesmen and the electors would be in a position to say “yes” or “nay” to them. That is really how the Federation itself got shaped. At that time I myself became convinced of the need for associating the Territories together, as much in the interests of the Africans as of anybody else. As a senior adviser I went through the various operations which ended up in 1953 in Federation becoming an assured fact. Since I retired in 1955 I have taken a great deal of interest in the Federation and in particular what I call its spiritual reputation, and have devoted myself very largely to trying to assist in that matter. I eventually became the operative member of what is called “The Rhodesia and Nyasaland Committee” in London, an independent body which exists to try and do that kind of thing; but of course I am not appearing here as a member of that body but in a personal capacity.

MRS. HUXLEY: Just two points: in paragraph 18, to which the Chairman has referred already, you say there is scope for some transfer of responsibilities, and you instance education. Do you feel there is any scope in the health situation, which is one of the things we have heard evidence about. Some people feel that could or should be transferred to the Territories. Have you any views on that?—A. Yes, my own feeling about that, without a very close knowledge, is that health is probably more efficiently run as a Federal matter; but if it became a bone of contention or if it were thought desirable that there should be some specific or substantial transfer there is no reason why it should not be run as a Territorial matter.

Q. You do not think it would be weakening to the Federal Government?—A. I think it would be weakening, but not fatally.

Q. You say that whatever the reason for the fears and misconceptions they are real fears which have to be allayed. In view of that, do you feel the proposals that you make at the end of the paper to do away with most of the restrictions on the independence of the Federation might increase the fears and apprehensions of the peoples in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland?—A. I tried to make these suggestions at the end fall short of proposing independence.

Q. But do you not feel African opinion might take it as meaning independence, and that would make the fears worse?—A. I admit there is a risk of that, but I think it should be taken in order to avoid undue misconception taking root.

LORD CRATHORNE: Am I right in thinking you had a great deal to do with the drafting of the Preamble?—A. Yes.

Q. Could you help us about that? First of all in general terms, what conditions do you feel should be fulfilled to come within the provisions of the Preamble? In other words, in what circumstances do you think the willingness of the populations concerned to go forward with Federation will be accomplished? You cannot have every individual in all the three Territories agreeing. What was your conception when you drafted it?—A. I do not think there was any clear view in anybody’s mind as to the method by which it could be done; but it would be fair to say that we have no difficulty at present in acknowledging that the consensus of opinion in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia is against Federation. We do not need to take a plebiscite to find that out. My own feeling is “when felt the consensus was obviously in the opposite direction: that is the rejection of the protectorate status”.

Q. It does not mean that but a removal of the protectorate status?—A. And, of course, anything that has the effect of amalgamating the Territories in a unitary form within one state.

Q. In the last sentence of the Preamble it says, “When those inhabitants so desire, to go forward with confidence towards

the attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth." When you drafted that, what did you mean?—A. There has been a lot of misconception about the Preamble. Most of it was put in, in order to allay the possible apprehensions of the African population. This one was put in, in order to meet the natural aspirations of the Southern Rhodesian and Northern Rhodesian Europeans that the inception of the Federation might mean a fatal set-back to their hopes that they would be members of a Dominion within the Commonwealth. So there is a real significance in the fact that the previous paragraph is phrased in the way that nothing shall happen unless the inhabitants want it—there is a promise that it shall not happen otherwise. In my mind, that distinction was intentional, and it was approved by such intelligent people that there can be no doubt it was present in their minds too.

Q. It is really dealing with the Territory of Southern Rhodesia, is it not?—A. In effect, yes.

CHAIRMAN: And when it says not "if" but "when" the inhabitants so desire, what importance do you attach to that phrase?—A. "So soon as they desire it"—I am not sure I have got the significance of the question.

Q. As I understood it, you were saying to Lord Crathorne that the second part of the Preamble was put there in order to meet the wishes and the other requirements of the Europeans in the north, and where it appears to say in this second part "to enable the Federation, when those inhabitants (which are the inhabitants of the Territories) so desire, to go forward with confidence towards the attainment. . . ." I was wondering what significance you attached to the phrasing. You must tell me if I am wrong, but it is not saying that "if they do not object you can take any steps you like": it is saying "when, if they desire, you can take steps." Did you mean this was solely designed to be something purely to encourage Southern Rhodesians and Europeans in the north?—A. I would paraphrase it by saying that when the time comes that the inhabitants—which does not mean only the white inhabitants—wish, they will be at liberty to start along the pathway that leads towards Dominion Status, as it was called then.

Q. And would you agree to a paraphrase that "it shall not go forward towards that end until the inhabitants desire"?—A. It is the fact that it does not mean that which I was trying to bring out in answer to Lord Crathorne. It was generally taken as meaning that, but it seems to me the distinction is quite a clear one—the distinction between the two paragraphs.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: Following up Lord Crathorne's question, I gather you claim the paternity, to some extent, of Federation?—A. I would not quite say that: I have been called the godfather.

Q. To some extent. Do you take credit or claim responsibility for the word "partnership"?—A. The word "partnership" was already in existence as defining or describing Colonial Office policy in regard to relationships between Africans and other races in both East and Central Africa; but we adopted it in our own Report merely for want of a better one. I do not like the expression myself, because it seems to imply that the two races should remain separate entities and enter into a sort of league together, whereas what we had in mind was that it should be an inter-leaving, whether a man is black or white.

Q. Would you not agree that it is just about as ambiguous a term as you could have?—A. I agree it is an ambiguous term.

Q. And has it not caused a great deal of the trouble?—A. It may have: I would not disagree.

Q. It means different things to different people: a word means what you want it to mean.—A. There is a great deal in that.

Q. As regards paragraph 18, it looks as though you are suggesting the whole opposition to Federation has been something which was started by agitators on the spot. I do not think you can mean that, can you, because if you remember what was said at the time in the debates of both Houses you will find that it was said at the time there must be acceptance of the fact that there was very substantial opposition—both Lord Salisbury and Sir Oliver Lyttelton said that—but that it was hoped it would die away as time went on. That has not happened.—A. No, as an historical fact, every kind of good thing which the colonising policy has brought into our African territories, whether health, education, land services, law and order, has been resisted by the African tribes, who later on came to value these things highly. They are naturally resistant to new ideas, and it was supposed on reasonable grounds that, as Federation was not a thing which touched them directly, if it was properly explained to them it would be accepted.

Q. Does your knowledge of the matter enable you to agree or disagree that, contrary to what you hoped and expected at that time, the opposition has increased instead of decreasing?—A. As a matter of fact, that is so.

Q. And is it not true to say that—no doubt with the best of motives, intentions and hopes—in fact Federation was

imposed?—A. Yes, in exactly the same sense as health and education were imposed, or as the missionaries imposed the Christian gospel.

Q. It could not be said at that time that there was the consent of the inhabitants, but it was hoped it would come in time?—A. Yes. I think it would be fair to say that our position as protecting power implied that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were governed by a Civil Service system.

Q. And after a certain length of time, if the opposition has not died away, you have to come to some kind of decision as to whether you can secure it by force and take some measures which will secure more consent?—A. Or really by the dissemination of truth.

Q. But you therefore agree that some kind of positive action is required? It is not sufficient to say, "If they don't like it they can lump it, and we shall see that they do".—A. I wholeheartedly agree with that.

SIR DONALD MACGILLIVRAY: Could I go back to the matter of the Colonial Office passing over a number of subjects. Would you say, as the Preamble now stands, that the Colonial Office would be entitled to do that, whereas Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should continue under special protection from Her Majesty's Government so long as they so desire, and "those Governments remaining responsible (subject to the ultimate authority of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom) for, in particular, the control of land. . . ." In addition to the control of land it mentions political development in the local territorial fields. With the Preamble as it now stands, do you think the Colonial Office could say that these are subjects which no longer can be under the protection of Her Majesty's Government and for which Her Majesty's Government will hold any responsibility?—A. I am assuming there are groups of subjects as regards which it will be possible to do that without any derogation from the protection of the African. If there are not, then this suggestion falls to the ground.

Q. Could you not give an indication of what subjects could remain the responsibility of the United Kingdom, particularly control of land and territorial and political development?—A. And what is commonly called native administration would obviously come within that sort of sphere. In my view, I would say African education would come within it, but there are things which are material matters like roads and bridges—that kind of thing—in which it is a mere impediment and obstruction to have to take orders from Whitehall. I really do not know sufficient detail about the administration of Northern Rhodesia to be able to particularise.

Q. I am not quite clear how it would be done—by an Order in Council, which states these were subjects for which Her Majesty's Government was no longer responsible?—A. Would it not be a delegation of powers by Order in Council? The constitutional arrangements are made by Order in Council in any case, are they not?

MR. ROBINSON: I would like to go back to this conspiracy in the United Kingdom that you mentioned earlier on. Do you think that if any scheme was worked out which might appear suitable to the Governments concerned, those who participate in these matters in due course, if that scheme has to be accompanied by a major propaganda effort within the Territories themselves in order to inform public opinion of all races as to the intentions—do you suggest that anything similar should be done in the United Kingdom? How are you going to deal with this "conspiracy"?—A. First of all, I would like to withdraw that rather colourful word: I would not like to be held to it. I think undoubtedly that a great effort will be needed, and it is a very difficult effort. It is far easier for people to write flamboyant stuff which does not always necessarily make mis-statements, but merely takes it for granted that certain things which are not true are true. You can put a smear in half a dozen words which takes a whole column to disprove, and it is an extremely difficult matter. My own experience is that there is no doubt that the image of Federation is fouled and muddied in the minds of a large number of people. It will be a difficult matter to clear it up.

Q. If you were writing this Constitution today and not 7 years ago, insofar as 7 years ago you were a party, presumably, to the arrangement whereby a number of subjects were allocated on a racial basis—that is to say African education remained territorial while European education was Federal, and European and African agriculture were also separated—would you think that circumstances have in any way changed, and would you recommend to the Commission that those divisions should continue?—A. I would not recommend it, and by and large I do not think I would have recommended it 7 years ago. I may have had something to do with the hatching of Federation, but I did not have the last word. It was done by a great many people in conclave together. It is an anachronism to have that kind of division coming in, as it is with the voters' rolls.

PROFESSOR CREIGHTON: This goes back to the question Mrs. Huxley put earlier. In paragraph 20, the first sentence says, "But the aspect on which the greatest attention has been, and will be, focussed is that of the Federation's own status and powers." Could it be said correctly that this greatest attention has in fact been focussed by a minority, that is to say by the European minority principally, and not even by that minority completely but by a section of it, headed principally politically by the U.F.P.? One wonders whether the elements of subordination or the remaining British controls are as important as to justify this inference in the recommendations you have made. That is the question I should like to ask. Mrs. Huxley has already inquired whether there is not a great risk in putting this forward so confidently. It could be said that one part of your memorandum advocates a great extension of the franchise, which presumably is for the satisfaction of the African people; and, perhaps as a counter-poise to this, you advocate an expansion of Federal powers with the intention of satisfying the European section. In actual fact, would not that particular grant prejudice the settlement so greatly in respect of African thinking that it would be extremely dangerous to advocate it at this stage?—A. I follow the question. There is one small point—I would disclaim any belief that an increase in the franchise is to be regarded as a kind of "bonne bouche" for Africans, because I do not subscribe to the view that such things as the franchise are like Sunday School prizes to be handed out. One should frame one's electorate in the way best suited to get the best results. That is an intermediate point, but as regards what I said in the memorandum as to the greatest attention being placed upon it, I thought that was the main subject-matter which this Commission is considering: it is considering what, if anything, is to be done to alter the constitutional arrangements made in 1953. I did not, and do not, by any means believe that this is the most important thing in the Federation under present circumstances.

SIR CHARLES ARDEN-CLARKE: In paragraph 14 you suggest the qualifications for voters should be closely overhauled for the purpose of lowering them to the utmost extent possible without letting in a flood of the politically immature. The other day some of us heard the thesis put forward that it is of the greatest importance that the poor and uneducated, in other words the politically immature, should be given the vote, as that is the only constitutional means they have of expressing any opinion. Most of them are endowed with a certain measure of common sense in the matter of their village affairs, and it was said that by depriving them of the vote you thereby deprive them of any constitutional means of expressing themselves and provides a fruitful field for the political agitator, and an increased likelihood of a recourse to violence. Would you care to comment on that thesis?—A. Certainly. First of all I would subscribe to the view that the poor and potentially oppressed are very deserving of proper protection from whatever electoral or other system one has, but I do not think that experience establishes that conferring votes upon them is necessarily a good way to protect them. I may say, for example, that when I was in Nyasaland last year I talked with a good many leading people, including among others Dr. Hastings Banda, shortly before the Emergency broke out in Nyasaland. I was questioning him, and he is a man who, if you had a universal franchise in Nyasaland, would be likely to be elected to power, about how he would view the probability—in fact almost the certainty—that if Nyasaland went outside the Federation it would be cut down in its resources and therefore cut down in education and all the things that can be brought by prosperity. It would not be right for me to give an account of the conversation, but it is fair to give you my own impression, which was that he did not really care. He did not dispute what I said: and that is what you often find with the man who is thrown to the top by the people—he does not necessarily care whether they are looked after or not. I do not think that is the way to go about looking after people. With our rather paternal method of government as regards the people in the colonies, this is based upon the belief that their wellbeing is best served not by doing things when they possibly do not understand the ins and outs of the problems, but by other people doing it for them.

MR. KATILUNGU: In paragraph 5 you refer to economic benefits which have been brought to the Africans as a result of the establishment of Federation in Central Africa. With your experience, would you specify what you think to be the economic benefit that Federation has brought to Northern Rhodesia that would not have been achieved without Federation, not only to Africans?—A. That is a shrewd question, because it would probably be found in the last resort that up to the present time the great improvement so far as it has come to the benefit of Africans, has been mainly in Nyasaland. One can only say that when the biggest puddle is filled up there will be something left over for the others. There is no doubt that the Nyasaland Financial Secretary himself produced the

evidence over and over again that the expenditure in Nyasaland on housing, health and education has been trebled, and that there have been improvements in other ways, and there ought to be still more to come. Relatively speaking, however, the others have not benefited to the same extent, and maybe Northern Rhodesia has not benefited at all—I do not know.

Q. You will appreciate when a statement of this nature is made it would be a sweeping one without qualification as you have now given it. You also mention that the question of African education should be improved as a result of the establishment of Federation. Am I correct in saying that the Federal Government, as far as African education is concerned, has no influence whatsoever in any form to improve African education as such, since African education is not a Federal function?—A. That is my belief.

Q. In the same paragraph you refer to representative institutions which you say improve the standard of living of Africans and make them worthwhile citizens, and that Federal result of the economic activity and subsequent prosperity. Representative institutions themselves can only come as a direct When you refer to representative institutions I think you are dealing with the economic position in relation to these institutions, but you can only refer to institutions that are responsible for the improvement of the economic standard of living of the African people; and the trade unions . . . —A. May I interpose, because I think I may have been misunderstood? What I mean is so long as we have a qualitative franchise in the country more people will get the vote if there are more who have better jobs, better incomes and better education. All these things cost money, and therefore economic improvement leads to more people taking part in the political life of the country, the electorate.

Q. I misunderstood you. Are you trying to tell us the political institutions are responsible, or have direct responsibility, for improving the economic standard of living?—A. In this case I am saying it the other way round, that an improvement in the economic standard of living means that more people satisfy the qualification for a vote, and eventually one hopes the standard will go up sufficiently so that the whole population will satisfy the qualification for the vote.

Q. You do not think it may be achieved by an individual country if the economic activity improves and more industries are achieved?—A. I think it could be, but I suggest the experience of the last six years makes one believe that the Federation, with its larger scope, can bring about a more rapid improvement in economic prosperity which will spread over the population as a whole and that it would be slower if the three Territories were each to pursue its own course.

Q. Is it not true that whatsoever economic development might take place in any country, when we come to countries like those in Central Africa, where you have two groups of people—those living in the rural areas and those living in the urban areas—most of the benefits accruing from the economic development can only be enjoyed directly by those who are in industry as employees, rather than those in rural areas?—A. There is that natural tendency, but I think it has been found in the Rhodesias now that the ability to absorb people in the urban areas from the rural areas, and therefore to take away what you might call surplus population from the rural areas, is making possible more economic sizes of farms; and it will provide the possibility that those in the rural areas in the long run will be better off than they were before.

Q. Surely so far as the Federation functions are concerned, they have no direct connection with their own area?—A. Not directly.

Q. That is the responsibility of the central government. I would also like to seek your opinion, looking at the Central Africa Federation in relation to territorial government and the members of the public, what is your opinion, if there is to be any re-distribution of the Federal and territorial functions? When you take into account the political set-up at the moment and the relationship between the territorial government and the public, would you say that law and order should be Federal and not Territorial?—A. Territorial.

MR. ELLMAN-BROWN: One question: when Federation was brought in in 1953, there was an instruction from the Colonial Office that the officials in the Territories were neither to press it or give any line at all. Was that in fact an instruction from the Colonial Office and, if so, what was the reason for it?—A. I have never seen their actual instruction, but the statement has been frequently made. If I knew the reason for it, I could only have acquired it during public service and could not in that case say: But as a matter of fact I do not know the reason. It might be taken from the public utterances of some of those who were in government service then that it can be taken as an attitude towards the necessity for securing the concurrence of the majority of the Africans in everything that was done which to them seemed to be inconsistent with

giving any sort of guidance; and, of course, most of those concerned had little or no experience of the relationships which exist in such countries between district officers and the Africans.

Q. In view of the paternal attitude of the district officers, would you say that was a mistake?—A. I would say so, and I myself did what I could behind the scenes to get it counteracted, but it was too late.

MR. CHIRWA: In the whole of this memorandum you seem to discount the African opposition. You do not seem to regard it as important at all that Africans are opposed to Federation. Do you think you can still impose Federation if Africans do not want it? Do you think that in 1960 you can do what was done in 1953, impose it against their wishes?—A. I tried to set forth, as one of the important requirements in my mind, that the attitude should be countered by every possible means, but it is worth mentioning that the Devlin Commission, which cannot be supposed to have been excessively prejudiced in favour of the powers-that-be in Nyasaland, recorded that large numbers of Africans appeared to give evidence before them for no other purpose than to say they objected to Federation, and that it was the cause of all their troubles. But there does not seem to have been any instance where anybody gave any coherent reason for that, and the only two grounds mentioned by the Devlin Commission in connection with observations of their own are matters which are totally irrelevant to whether there was a Federation or not. I think that supports the contention I have tried to bring out, that to a very great extent the opposition is something artificial which has been engineered.

Q. But supposing the Africans just do not want it, though they do not give reasons—how are you going to overcome that barrier?—A. I am afraid the proverb that "Truth is great and shall prevail" is not always practised, but we hope truth will find a way through.

Q. Federation has been going now for seven years, and the evidence is that the opposition is increasing. Truth is abstract: Africans believe that what they say is true, and you believe that what you say is true. However, my question is that you have emphasised the benefits which you think Nyasaland has got from Federation, but would it be fair to say that Southern Rhodesia has benefited perhaps more than Nyasaland has done as a result of Federation?—A. They have benefited, I think, in different ways. So far Southern Rhodesia has had the greater benefit from new industrial development springing up in the country, but Nyasaland has certainly benefited relatively more in those fields I have already mentioned—health and African schooling—and in proportion stands to gain more in those spheres. It would be my hope that any industrial development also will find a way to go to Nyasaland, with the great resources of the Federation behind it, and that the development of water power—which will obviously come in due course from Nyasaland's own water supplies—will follow and light industries will be started, so that in due course the country will no longer be merely one of farmers and a few fishermen.

Q. So that from your own point of view you think that the development has taken place in Southern Rhodesia—you would say that Nyasaland has benefited more from Federation than Southern Rhodesia?—A. I think it has brought one development in one direction and another development in another direction, but the ordinary Nyasaland Africans, who cannot find industrial occupation in their own country and like to go to Southern Rhodesia and may benefit from obtaining greater skills and higher wages, as time goes on, may find that these become obtainable in Nyasaland as a result of the coming of Federation.

Q. Do you think it would be possible, even if you wanted to, to maintain Federation as you wish it unless there was a very drastic change, which Africans would accept; and if they do not accept it, do you think it would be possible to maintain Federation in spite of all your good wishes?—A. I think it has to be made possible. The alternative is so terrible.

Q. Is it not a fact that since the last seven years there have been nothing but disturbances in Central Africa as a result of Federation, leading to death? At the last disturbance we lost 50 people in Nyasaland.—A. It is a disastrous thing, but I do not think it would be reasonable to compare Central Africa with the rest of the African continent, and say that there has been greater disturbance and trouble in that area than in the rest of Africa during that time; nor that it is all attributable to the inception of Federation.

Q. What would be your view of the idea that Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia should have self-government immediately, the African demand now? Would you object to that?—A. I should think that would be very inopportune and unsuitable.

Q. Do you think that those Africans are less advanced than the Africans in Kenya and Tanganyika?—A. I think that

Northern Rhodesia should in no very long time have its independence within the Federation, but I do not think that that should be confined to Africans, but all those who are capable of exercising electoral action.

Q. What about Nyasaland?—A. The same there. Probably rather a longer period there because at present you have only a small number of Europeans there. It would be unthinkable to hand over the authority of the country to that small handful of Europeans. There are not very many Africans yet who are well qualified to exercise a vote. I should think for some longer period there is no doubt that Nyasaland ought to have to put up with the controlling hand of the Colonial Office.

Q. Do you think then that your views can be reconciled with those of the African nationalist leaders in both Territories?—A. Probably not.

MR. KATILUNGU: On the question raised by my colleague, Mr. Chirwa, regarding African opposition, I do not think I did get your correct answer, or did not like to pursue it. You said that African opposition to Federation was artificial, if I understood you well?—A. Yes.

Q. By that you meant there is opposition by the masses of Africans which is engendered by the few, is that correct?—A. That would be my contention.

Q. Few politicians?—A. Yes. That is the broad picture of the situation.

Q. If, for instance, the few African politicians might use agitation and so on to persuade the masses of the Africans to follow them, is that not sufficient proof that they have achieved their objective?—A. It depends how it is done. I saw a report the other day of three or five people who were convicted of beating up somebody or setting fire to a house, I forget which it was, and one of them stated in mitigation, I suppose, of his offence that he tried to get people to join the United National Independence Party voluntarily but had not been able to, and so was obliged to resort to methods of that kind. By that sort of method it should be possible to create a large political party. I know that is not what you would do so I can say it without offence. It is important what is the method by which one's political adherents are recruited.

Q. As far as intimidation is concerned which we know is prevalent in Central Africa today, has it not been there in 1953 and 1954, all the period since the Federation?—A. I think that is true, not at the beginning.

Q. Was opposition not as strong as it is during this period of Federation?—A. I think it probably was, a great deal of it, but I think it was of a different character in those days, I should have thought, though I was not there very much. From the observations that I have been able to make there was a lack of understanding, and this seemed to be a new thing which was resisted for that reason, and those who became political leaders saw in it a threat to the possibility of their own advancement and naturally they tended to resist in that way and to rally resistance behind them. I think that would be a fair way to look at it. Obviously there was a great deal of resistance and opposition right from the beginning and the growth of intimidation in order to keep the pot boiling is more recent.

Q. What would you say on the part of the Native Authorities in Northern Territories who have genuinely, regardless of opposition and regardless of the boycott of this Commission, come forward with sincere evidence and spoken in glowing terms of what they felt about the Federation, would you say they were intimidated?—A. Not necessarily. I am quite willing to believe that there are people who genuinely think differently from what I think, quite honestly.

Q. Would you regard then the Chiefs' opposition to Federation in any form too artificial to attach great importance to protection by Her Majesty's Government? Is that artificial?—A. I do not say necessarily, I can well believe there are many cases where it was not due to intimidation, certainly.

Q. Would you answer my question? If the Chiefs were genuine and sincere in coming forward to give evidence in any form, perhaps in opposition—assume there is intimidation—would you say their opposition is artificial, apart from that of the politicians referred to?—A. No, not if it was their own genuine opinion, honestly formed, no.

Q. How are we going to overcome this confusion and misunderstanding when a group of people expressed an opinion, and particularly in the case of Africans, are we to regard it as ungentle or artificial? Would you help me to understand? Are you telling me in Great Britain all the people have equal knowledge of political implications, equal to those who are sitting in Parliament?—A. I wish they had.

MR. MCCLELAND: Mr. Baxter, just to clear my mind on this one, in reply to Mr. Chirwa I think you did suggest that if the opposition to Federation was so intense in Nyasaland that no matter what we did they were still opposed to it, they would

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nevertheless be compelled to accept Federation—that is what I read into your reply—how do you compel a nation to accept something it does not want except by enforcing it by, say, introducing a police state?—A. I have not really tried to meet that eventuality which is perhaps the crux of the whole thing. I have not suggested that they would have to be compelled at all costs. On the other hand I should be very far from admitting that because of such opposition as there is, it ought to be dropped. The greatest endeavours obviously ought to be made at all costs to secure an acceptance of the fact that the association of the three Territories together is really for the benefit of them and it is only untruth that can produce any opposite conclusion.

Q. I think we accept your reason, Mr. Baxter. But if we do reach that stage in the country where the people say we do not want it, no matter how good it is for us, where do we go from there?—A. It seems to be an impasse.

Q. Would you think in terms of a looser form of association then?—A. I do not know quite what is meant by looser form of association; but if it means something rather like the Dominion Party are recommending, what they call the Central Africa Alliance?

Q. No, let us say something on the lines of the High Commission.—A. I should have thought that would in a sense have the disadvantages of both sorts, that it would still make the mal-content Africans feel that they were linked with partners that they said they did not want. On the other hand, the area would not be facing the world as one entity, and there would be no sort of common fixation of policy.

MR. McCLELAND: Thank you, Mr. Baxter.

MR. MOLSON: Mr. Baxter, in paragraph 19 you deal with the matter about which I have been seeking more information, and I am sure you can throw some light on it for me. You say there: "There still exists a right for the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to prevent the passage into law of any Bill which discriminates against Africans. Over a long period of years there has never been any occasion (whichever party was in office in the United Kingdom) for the exercise of that power, and it is about time that it should be abolished." Responsible self-government was granted to Southern Rhodesia in 1923?—A. Yes.

Q. Has this power been exercised since 1923?—A. To the best of my belief it has not. It certainly has not in all the time that I was aware of, or recently, but the reason why it has never been exercised has been explained more than once in Parliament and I think is one that is creditable to all concerned and that is whenever any measure which might conceivably attract the use of the power has been considered by the Government of Southern Rhodesia they have taken prior consultation with the Secretary of State in London and if the fears that it would be interfered with turned out to be justified between them they have so tinkered with whatever the proposal was that in the form in which it was eventually cast into law no objection from the Secretary of State's point of view remained.

Q. I do not know whether the word "tinkering" with it is wholly happy.—A. Perhaps it is not—an amendment perhaps I should say.

Q. That is exactly what happened in the case of the Federal Government about the alteration in the franchise and the Constitution which resulted in the Native Affairs Board being over-ruled in the matter. Would you not agree that that had a very great deal to do with the increase in the African distrust of Federation?—A. I suppose in a sense there are three questions there. In the first place I must demur to the suggestion which no doubt is just a brevity by saying that the African Affairs Board was over-ruled. Constitutionally the African Affairs Board was not there to recommend whether anything should be law or not, but to say whether before becoming law it should be pronounced upon by the United Kingdom Government and Parliament. That is what they were there to do, as they indicated in their own reports, there was no question of over-ruled them. The matter was referred to the Secretary of State and in certain cases to the United Kingdom Parliament. If they decided that the law in question should be enacted then the Board was not over-ruled but had performed its function and discharged it. There is no doubt that what happened at that time did create additional dissatisfaction in the minds of many Africans.

As to whether there is any impropriety in the settlement which I only know about by hearsay beforehand, I think the comparison with the Southern Rhodesia story is not quite apposite because in the case of the Southern Rhodesian safeguard, the safeguard was applied by the Secretary of State and it was quite fair and reasonable on all grounds that he should be asked beforehand whether he would apply a certain thing or not.

In the case of the Federation a safeguard was supposed to be applied locally by the African Affairs Board and I can see myself it might be thought it was in some ways contrary to the intention of it to go beforehand and make sure if the African Affairs Board did produce a recommendation it would not be attended to. If it was known on what ground they were going to oppose it I should have thought there was no impropriety involved that an attempt should be made to clear it away beforehand, and in that case it would have been best even to inform the Board that that was the case. We have found out it is no good your saying so and so, that that will not convince the authorities in London, but I do not know exactly what happened there. I agree it did cause initial dissatisfaction.

Q. I am very much obliged to you. May I go back to Southern Rhodesia? You point out that this power of disallowance has not been exercised since 1923. In some of the evidence we have had a list of discriminatory legislation, of which the most striking is the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, which you will remember did take away the right then existing for Africans to buy land in the European areas. Do you not think that these powers have, in fact, proved very disappointing for the Africans seeing that the instructions to reserve for the ratification of Her Majesty's pleasure of these discriminatory measures have, in fact, never been disallowed?—A. I should say these things happened many years before I had anything to do with Central African Affairs but I have very little doubt that the Land Apportionment Act was pronounced upon by the Government of the day and it is reasonable to assume that it was discussed in advance in order to see whether the provisions were such as could be approved by the Secretary of State in London. Of course, the Act is not a single-pronged measure; it is a two-pronged measure and the primary purpose of it really was to protect the African population against what has happened to them in so many other parts of the world. Native Authorities having their land cheated from them or bamboozled from them by Europeans. The greater part of the Act is concerned with ensuring that there shall be a substantial amount of land which Europeans cannot get their hands on.

Q. That is chiefly the Native Reserves. That is not provided for in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. That is already provided for in the Constitution of 1923.—A. I am sorry. I may be lumping the two things together.

Q. They really are separate. There was a period of years between 1923 to 1930 when Europeans could not buy land in African Reserves but Africans could buy land in the European areas. I think it is important to keep those two points separate. That is why technically the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 was clearly discriminatory.—A. But I had occasion a year or two ago to look at the Land Apportionment Act as a whole. It is a consolidated thing and I found that undoubtedly there is a great part of it devoted to protection of the African land. I do not carry this sufficiently in my head but I am sure when you go *in camera* your colleague, Sir Victor Robinson, will be able to tell you more clearly than I can what is in it. I am a little bit unsure. It is undoubtedly the case that that Act, had it come forward fifteen years' later would have had to be framed in a different manner. The attitude both in Southern Rhodesia and in Whitehall was probably different in 1930 from what it would have been after the last war.

Q. I am very much obliged to you.—A. That is my own personal opinion.

Q. May I refer you to a sentence further down in paragraph 19: "In the case of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which should more and more assume the image of independent states within the Federation, there is good reason why the Colonial Office should pass over to the local authorities a completely free hand . . . save only where the United Kingdom's responsibilities towards the African 'protected persons' are engaged."

Do you not think that if your recommendations accepted that it could be very natural for the Africans in the two Northern Territories to fear that when that step was taken it would result in their losing the protection of the Secretary of State in much the same way that you agree that the Africans of Southern Rhodesia were unable to rely upon that protection after the Constitution of 1923 was introduced?—A. I tried to answer part of that in answer to Lord Crathorne. I think that there is a risk of that and I personally attach relatively little importance to this suggestion so that if it was likely to have in any remarkable degree the effect which you mention personally I should throw it out of the window.

MR. MOLSON: I think you would be very wise to do so.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Baxter, for the help you have given us and the time you have given to us. We are very grateful.—A. Thank you very much indeed for hearing me.

Written Evidence

SIR CONRAD CORFIELD

Reprint of an Article by Sir Conrad Corfield in *The Sunday Times* dated 31st January, 1960

Wrong Tack in Africa?

(Sir Conrad Corfield recently returned from a visit to Central Africa and Kenya)

The cry of "one man, one vote" has become almost as hypnotic for "Colonial Africans" as was the shout of "Ghandi ji-ki-jai" in India before the British withdrew. And not only for Africans. Europeans and Indians throughout these emergent countries are obsessed by the question of the franchise: and, of course, to Western politicians it is vastly important as the foundation of their own careers. Is this obsession justified?

In recent years it has become a commonplace that parliamentary democracy on the Westminster model is unsuitable for export. Yet the conclusion is drawn that those who are to be privileged to adopt this system need a longer period of training to qualify for it. Presumably, a system admitted to be unsuitable will become the opposite, provided there is enough delay; and meanwhile the recipients will welcome the inferiority and frustration inherent in delay until they gratefully receive a form of government which contains within itself the seeds of its own decay. Surely a logical person would conclude that the system needs to be modified so that it can safely be exported.

Why did the United States separate the Executive from the Legislature? Why has the French Fifth Republic moved further in this direction? Why has Dr. Nkrumah clipped the wings of the Ghana Legislature? Why have the Sudan and Pakistan thrown the system overboard for the time being. Why has Ceylon discussed executive-committee government? Why has Indonesia spoken of guided democracy? The writing on the wall is clear.

In all these cases the main question at issue has not been the franchise. It has been concerned with the control exercised by the Legislature over the Executive. Nor is this surprising for the fundamental feature of the Westminster model is not the franchise but the responsibility of the Cabinet to Parliament. Adult male franchise is a comparatively recent development in our history.

By modifying the fundamental feature of Cabinet responsibility to Parliament President de Gaulle has restored the financial stability and international position of his country in less than two years. By overthrowing it and working for an alternative President Ayub Khan has restored good government in Pakistan with the consent of the governed. By putting it into a strait-jacket Dr. Nkrumah has secured unity and established confidence at home and abroad. In the light of these facts, what right have we to impose on emergent countries a system of government which embodies that feature, and to hand over power until such a system can be implemented?

Perhaps the time has come to relearn a lesson from the indigenous systems which Western democracy has hitherto either emasculated or replaced. They were ancient, but not necessarily backward. The Ruler or Chief sits in conference with his counsellors. Everyone can attend and air his views. Discussion is not limited: and when the voice of the people has been fully expressed, the Chief makes the decision. Since the consent of the governed is essential, the people's views are given full expression: the decision has been made in full conclave; the people are content.

Human nature changes little. In Africa it remains very human. What then do its peoples really want? I suggest, first of all, a chance to express their views fully through their representatives: hence the mystic claim to one-man-one-vote. Secondly, an assurance that among those who make decisions will be Africans who know their people's minds and can see that their views are given proper weight. Thirdly, freedom from intimidation, which can best be assured if their rights as citizens are advisory and the responsibility for decision rests elsewhere.

Someone will say that in a multi-racial country, such as Kenya and the Central Africa Federation, the African politicians will never accept any system except the full Westminster model. Of course they won't! Under this system, with the Executive chosen from the Legislature, based on a wide franchise, and responsible to it, these politicians can look forward later if not sooner, to 100-per-cent power: and once this has been obtained they can modify the system at will in order to remain in power.

The modifications they make will almost certainly follow the pattern of recent history, i.e. strengthening the Executive and making the Legislature advisory: that is to say the pattern which they will have rejected in the first instance. The only difference will be that the power will still be theirs, whereas acceptance earlier would have meant sharing it. Is

not, however, sharing the power exactly what our aim should be, if we are not to break faith with our friends, black, brown and white, who have laboured to build civilised countries out of primeval jungles?

Some may object that an advisory Legislature is bound to become intransigent. That surely depends on the responsiveness of the Executive and the nature of its personnel. The Legislature would attract a great deal of publicity, which the Executive could not ignore, since the consent of the governed remains the basis of all government. Moreover, advisory chambers are not necessarily intransigent, if the House of Lords is any criterion.

Others may ask how it is possible to contemplate a despotic Executive, which is not to be responsible but only responsive to a representative body: there must be some control. Certainly there must, and there are many methods available. For instance, the Executive could be removable by a vote of No Confidence if passed in the Legislature by a majority of each community represented therein. There could also be a Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution, a breach of which could be tested by any citizen before the Courts. There could also be a Privy Council or Constitutional Council, comprised of independent persons of all races, which could be given the power to hold up any discriminatory legislation.

If the modifications to the Westminster model fail to work, it is better to have a Constitution breaking down than an administration collapsing, with all the misery and bloodshed which that involves. Moreover, a wide franchise and a fully representative Legislature can be conceded without creating despondency, if the Executive is protected from undue pressure: and such a Legislature will allay existing frustrations.

Experience also shows that, once the prospect of complete surrender is ruled out, there are many of all races who will gladly accept the alternatives. Co-operators, of whom there are many concealed under the cloak of intimidation, will be encouraged, and extremists made to face realities. With confidence restored, capital re-attracted and development promoted there will be greater economic prosperity to be shared by all: and, if the modifications do not work well, changes can be made, based on sober experience and not on suspicion, ignorance and fear. For such changes if they succeed, other emergent nations may very soon be profoundly grateful.

Oral Evidence

SIR CONRAD CORFIELD

CHAIRMAN: In one of the memoranda I have been looking at I think you did give some account of your own background?—A. No. I have not submitted a memorandum. What I would wish to do, Mr. Chairman, is to amplify *The Sunday Times* article which I understand gave rise to this invitation.

If I may be allowed to amplify my general contention it is in backward countries (backward educationally in its widest sense) and in countries containing permanent minorities (especially racial minorities) it is impracticable to maintain stable government and steady development, if the Executive is fully responsible to a Legislature based on a wide franchise. A wide franchise is, however, essential because it has been introduced in other backward countries and refusal is considered an insult; and refusal jeopardises the general consent of the governed without which no Government can be secure. Unless, however, a brake is applied to the franchise, no Government on the Westminster model in these countries can be stable. Until, therefore, general education and political experience justifies a change, and perhaps not even then, the simple majority of a widely representative Legislature should not be given full power.

I am confirmed in this view by the first step taken by the present Colonial Secretary, when he decided to embody the emergency powers in the ordinary law of such Territories. I see in the Press that these details have been questioned by the British Section of the International Commission of Jurists, but the basis of that step seems quite clear to me, that there are certain definite aspects of government in these Territories which cannot safely be subject to the will of the Legislature. That is the amplification of my contention.

In the Rhodesias and the Federation the problem has been temporarily met by conceding the common roll, but limiting the franchise. These qualitative limitations have already caused some, and will continue to cause more, irritation; and even if they can be maintained, their importance as a brake will rapidly diminish with expanding education and commerce. As the majority will of the Legislature is apparently deemed at present in those Territories to be the inevitable objective, they must look forward to eventual African control over the Executive. The time factor and its influence on the colour complex can be argued, but the odds are that as the African vote increases, more stringent qualifications are likely to be

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mooted. Irritation and disorder will then increase and how can the general consent of the governed be maintained in such conditions?

In Nyasaland, no commitments towards accepting the majority will of the Legislature have yet been made in the Territorial Constitution. The way is open, therefore, here to a different line of advance, namely, to a widely representative Legislature to which the Executive is not fully responsible.

Perhaps I may repeat what everybody knows very well but I would like to summarise it.

In this connection the experience of emergent countries and that of France since the last War is pertinent. It is easy to criticise the Presidential rule of Dr. Nkrumah under his new Constitution, but the general consent of the governed seems at present assured there. Field Marshall Ayub Khan's "basic democracies" on which we questioned him the other evening is in its infancy, but it appears to have general support. The achievements of President de Gaulle's Fifth Republic are certainly notable.

All these have concentrated on providing, in Dr. Nkrumah's own words "firm, stable and popular Government" through making the Executive less susceptible to the simple majority will of the Legislature. I think the dangers inherent in this kind of modification can be exaggerated. One can establish dictatorship under the façade of full parliamentary democracy. Is there not a chance that, if the façade was built nearer to the real needs, the chances of dictatorship would be less?

How about the details of such a constitutional façade? Here I think there is great danger in setting up "cockshies". I recall the Simon Commission, Volume I and the Simon Commission, Volume 2. Volume I narrated the history, stated the problems, and suggested principles. It was a best seller of that year, including all novels. Volume 2 made detailed proposals. It was torn to pieces. I suggest with all humility that if you lay down the objective and declare the principles, nearly everyone will applaud. If you frame the structure, every pundit and every so-called nationalist will fall on it like a pack of wolves.

It seems to me that Presidential Government is the most suitable objective. Dr. Nkrumah rightly says "there is an African way of doing things"—or shall we say there is a non-Anglo-Saxon way of doing things.

The Rhodesias and the Federation appear to be at present committed to the Westminster model as an objective. The opportunity for recommending an African objective seems at present to be limited to Nyasaland, which brings the problem perhaps outside the scope of this Commission. But would it not solve many Federal problems if the points were switched in Nyasaland in such a way that the general consent of the governed could be won? Is this practicable? The reply given to me during my recent visit was generally "It was a few years ago, I doubt if it is now. But it's worth trying because the alternative is anarchy".

I would like to suggest that under a presidential system:—

- (a) a widely representative Nyasaland legislature could be conceded at once and would allay African frustrations;
- (b) a stable executive would encourage the Indian and European minorities, and
- (c) a real share in the executive power would consolidate African moderate opinion.

The resulting stability would attract capital and ensure material progress and, still more important, practical experience of how this system works might be of the greatest value to the other Territorial Governments and the Federation in their future constitutional development.

If I may now enter into some details you will probably ask as a nominated Governor must take the place of an elected President for the time being, how can an Executive (appointed by him and not wholly responsible to the Legislature) be made acceptable? Can this be reasonably provided through the Federal Constitution?

During my recent visit to the Federation I framed suggestions for a Constitutional Council, some of which have, I understand, been incorporated in the United Federal Party evidence. I believe such a Council can provide whatever control is required over a semi-responsible Executive, provided it has equal representation of the two major communities with an independent Chairman appointed on the recommendation of the Secretary of State concerned. This Council could advise the Governor-General and the individual Governors in regard to their Presidential functions. The racial balance would, I believe, create confidence. So would the link with Her Majesty's Government which would continue until the stage had been reached for independence.

Since the genesis of suspicion against the Federation lay and still lies in European domination from Southern Rhodesia,

it seems most important that the headquarters of the Federation should be removed from Salisbury. The original intention was to move it outside Salisbury. Other Federations, such as Australia, have had to build a new Federal capital. The Indian Government's move from Calcutta to Delhi is analogous. The new capital of Brazil, I think, is appropriate. The problem is still important for the West Indies Federation. I believe the psychological reactions involved are fundamental. You doubtless have already had suggested to you that the plateau outside Livingstone would be a suitable site.

I am no constitutional pundit, and if members consider my views too amateur I shall not be surprised. But, I am quite sure that if the Commission produces detailed proposals to be attacked—instead of lines of advance to be followed—the value of its labours will be largely lost.

It has been argued that under an independent regime constitutional safeguards are useless: but this deduction has usually been made from the history of regimes where the simple majority will of Parliament has been deemed paramount, principally that of South Africa, where the simple majority enabled the Senate to be packed, thus by-passing the entrenched provisions. Does it necessarily apply to constitutions with adequate entrenched provisions and regimes where government does not depend on a simple parliamentary majority? I have no doubt you have already seen Professor Cowen's "Constitution-making for a Democracy" which develops that in more detail.

It has also been argued that it would be fatal to suggest that a Constitution different from the Westminster model would be more suitable for emergent countries, as this would be looked upon as an insult to inferiors. This was certainly true before the last War. In fact, Mr. Leo Amery suggested it in the thirties to the Indian politicians and they reacted with a howl of fury. I myself, being very junior in the late thirties, prepared a Constitution for an Indian State based on this principle and when I sent it to Headquarters it was treated as an indecent suggestion.

But the history of the last decade in emergent countries had not then been written. We should surely now be humble enough to learn from these countries and, when the time comes to fill in the details for the future Federal Constitution of Central Africa, why should not the experience, even if not the help, of those countries within the Commonwealth who have tried variations, be accepted, so that there would be no question of imposing an inferior model from Whitehall?

In regard to extending the franchise under a Presidential form of Government, I am often asked whether I would support "one man, one vote". Actually this slogan does not alarm me. From what I have seen at close quarters in four Elections in this country, the voters are more inclined to choose people rather than policies. Even a savage can recognise leadership as well, if not better, than someone bemused with a little education. I recall what George Matinga told me in Blantyre. He said: "I know many good men who have experience and wisdom, but no education. Is their view to carry less weight than that of inexperienced young bounders who have learned a little English?"

I made certain suggestions for voting by acclamation which may already have reached you in some modified form and which enable everyone to take a share in choosing their representatives without conceding "one man, one vote."

Because I said in my *Sunday Times* article that African politicians would not accept any system except the full Westminster model, my thesis was treated as inapplicable to Africa today. If, however, it was made clear that power would only be transformed to a more suitable indigenous system, the politicians would have to decide between:—

- (a) Taking a real share of power now (and this share could perhaps be larger with a mainly advisory legislature), and
- (b) Continuing a struggle which might well keep them in the wilderness, if a moderate African element was meanwhile freed from intimidation.

Much depends on how the idea of Presidential government is put over. If a definite directive was given from Whitehall to the administration and all its officers and the details left for settlement on the spot, I believe a large measure of African agreement could be secured. I was assured in Blantyre by two politicians, African politicians, that it was this kind of government which the African politicians would introduce. But, of course, after secession and independence. When I asked how their financial deficit would then be met they replied with a bellow of laughter: "Well, we do not suppose Britain and the U.S.A. will be less generous to us than to the others".

Q. Sir Conrad, I am sure you will appreciate that we might wish to deal only with general principles. However, the task laid on us includes a framework and a programme and therefore we have to look at it a little more closely before

we finish. As I have understood the article and what you have been saying to us today you are recommending an approach which means that the Executive, to use your own words, is not responsible but responsive to the Legislature?—A. That is it.

Q. That means it is not wholly responsible to the Legislature. I wondered if you had thought in any greater detail in relation to the present problem, the degree to which its responsibility to the legislature would be diminished?—A. This was in relation to Nyasaland. If the Executive is not to be responsible, though responsive, to the Legislature it cannot wield arbitrary power and must be answerable to some outside authority, and I suggested that might be dealt with in the instrument of instructions to the Governor and Constitutional Council. The instrument should provide that though the Governor would be free to nominate the whole Executive Council he would be obliged to appoint not more than a certain number of officials or less than a certain number of non-Africans. If Ministers are selected from the Legislative Council they might, as in France where separation of power has been successful, resign their seats. In making all appointments the Governor would naturally be influenced by the support which his nominees could expect from the Legislature.

As regards the actual machinery, no Bill should become law until it has been submitted to the Legislative Council for consideration, except Bills relating to the maintenance of law and order and to the financial stability of the Territory and the Federation. Any amendments suggested by the Legislative Council would be examined by the Executive Council before the Bill was submitted for assent. But it would be open to the Executive Council to re-submit an amended Bill for consideration by the Legislative Council who could only approve or disapprove. Nothing would prevent accepted Bills from being referred to the Legislative Council (that is, ones for maintaining law and order, financial stability) for discussion if the Executive Council so desired, and nothing would prevent the Legislative Council from passing resolutions on any subject affecting the welfare of its territory, such resolutions not to be binding on the Executive.

Q. In the non-accepted cases where the Legislature did not accept the first Bill and it was upon the Governor or the Executive to put down a Bill or send back the first again, supposing then the Legislature was against it, what would happen?—A. They could only disapprove of it entirely and the Executive would then decide whether it would pass that law or would amend it still further. If they decided to pass it, they would have the right to do so. Then would arise the question of the extent to which the Ministers who were dealing with the question in the Executive Council were going to maintain their influence over the Legislature—because if it was a very contentious point some of them might resign, and the Governor would have to appoint a certain number of the community to his Executive Council. Naturally that would have a check on going completely against the will of the Legislature, unless the Executive thought it essential.

Q. Why I ask you about non-accepted Bills is this: of course it is a familiar point that matters dealing with law and order might be something which the Executive would be allowed to handle in spite of the opposition of the Legislature; but do you think that the leaders of African opinion in Nyasaland would accept the limitations put upon the powers of the Legislature in regard to ordinary Bills?—A. I am suggesting that if the share of power in the Executive Council was sufficiently attractive, that might in effect be more attractive than that which would be subject to the majority will of the Legislature.

Q. Are there any steps which ought to be taken to secure that share in the Executive field?—A. By instructions to the Governor as regards the appointments, and naturally, as I have said, in making these appointments he would be influenced by the support which they could obtain, as he would not wish to have a complete difference of opinion between the Executive and the Legislature unless he could avoid it.

Q. It would really be what we have seen with the President of Pakistan, that the President or the Governor would have the ultimate power in his own hands?—A. Yes.

CHAIRMAN: I just wanted to bring that out before any questions were put.

SIR CHARLES ARDEN-CLARKE: In this set-up would the Governor have any reserve powers of veto or anything like that?—A. I would say that that was unnecessary if you had agreed to the Constitutional Council; but he would exercise control over matters in which there was discrimination and also in so far as it was necessary to exercise control from Whitehall and the Constitutional Council. Of course, this would only last for the period until the election of the President. With a presidential system it would be accepted in principle that when the Governor ceased to be appointed it would be an elected President as in other African countries.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: May I ask you first of all—the Governor of whom you have spoken—what would he be Governor of?—A. I was referring to Nyasaland there.

Q. Only Nyasaland?—A. Yes.

Q. What about the Federation?—A. The Governor-General. If you have a Constitutional Council for the whole Federation it might be possible to have a single one functioning for the Federal Government and the three Territories, or you might have a Constitutional Council which had three panels, a panel for each Territory, but sitting in a body for the Federation.

Q. Would your Governor of whom you were speaking as having definite directive from Whitehall on certain matters be Governor of the Territory, not a Governor of the Federation?—A. That is right.

Q. Then this involves really complete destruction of the Federal Government as such?—A. I see no reason why the Constitutional Council should not have its controlling authority with regard to the Federation embodied in the Federal Constitution. Have I made it clear?

Q. Yes. I was thinking this was one reason why you rather felt obliged to say that Southern Rhodesia would never accept a state of affairs in which there was an all-over Governor of the Territory.—A. I think Southern Rhodesia would probably dislike it.

Q. You could not very well make them accept it, could you?—A. Not unless they realised that it was going to lead to a maintenance of the Federation which was otherwise going to break up. In fact, I am pretty sure that Sir Edgar Whitehead would not like it.

Q. Is it not rather difficult from the constitutional point of view at the present stage of development of Southern Rhodesia, to force anything like that on them against their will?—A. I think it is quite easy to justify. You have your African Affairs Board which has to be replaced by some body, some constitutional provision. It seems to me that its powers dealing with discrimination could well be dealt with by a Constitutional Council.

Q. May I ask this: what is the real function of your central Government in so far as there would be one under your scheme?—A. The Federal Government would remain as it is, hoping that it would learn something from the form of presidential government introduced in Nyasaland.

Q. There would be a bit of pull between the Federal Government in its new set-up and the Territories. There would be a certain amount of competition, would there not?—A. More than at present?

SIR LIONEL HEALD: I should rather have thought there would be.

LORD CRATHORNE: Would you not have to have a completely new kind of Governor-General at the centre, a new system altogether?—A. The Governor-General is at the moment under certain control from Westminster. I am suggesting that a Constitutional Council established and located in the Federation could carry forward what is necessary of that control without causing so many heart burnings as in the past, and with a closer knowledge of local affairs. It would create very much more confidence because of its equal racial representation, with a chairman appointed on the recommendation of the Secretary of State.

PROFESSOR CREIGHTON: Simply in order to get a little more clarification, am I right in thinking that your suggestions are designed exclusively for Nyasaland except in so far as your belief that the Constitutional Council might have three divisions which would be applicable to the three different Territories? That is the only change you propose in the Federal Constitution, is that correct?—A. I would have the Constitutional Council embodied in the Federal Council.

Q. That is your only change in the Federal Constitution?—A. Quite.

Q. And the other proposals are designed exclusively from that?—A. Because the two Rhodesias are already on railway lines where you cannot switch points at this stage without further experience.

PROFESSOR CREIGHTON: I simply make this point because I thought my fellow Commissioners were in doubt about the matter.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: I am much obliged.

PROFESSOR CREIGHTON: I have only one question, and that is in respect of the voting of the Budget. Is that something you would regard as an ordinary Bill and therefore subject to discussion and possible rejection or amendment by the Legislative Council, or is it something under the exclusive control of the Executive Council?—A. I said the financial stability of the Territory. I meant it to be as wide as that. That is to say, they would have to show that this affected the financial stability and not a question of the policy as regards, say, tax on bookmakers

Q. But the budget would certainly have to be included in that?—A. Yes.

MR. ROBINSON: Do you not think, Sir Conrad, that the Europeans in Southern Rhodesia, when they come to realise that the consequences of the present policy, if pursued to its ultimate end, will mean an African majority in due course would welcome your Constitutional Council if that position is made quite clear to them?—A. I would not put it that way. I should say that they would welcome any separation of the Executive and the Legislature. The question I asked when touring round always was, "Do you anticipate an African majority," and they said, "Oh, yes." When pressed it was very hard to find out exactly what they anticipated. But if there is any feeling of reserve on that point in Southern Rhodesia, then I am sure that fear is only going to be reduced if you can show the set-up is going to be stable. Now, as has been made clear, I do not see how you can make that change at present, but on the common roll with a qualitative franchise there is time to consider how a form of presidential government works in Nyasaland. Therefore, in the years before that fear of the Europeans is realised, you might be able to introduce a change in the Constitution which would maintain the stability. It is, after all, what the European wants.

Q. Would you apply that same thinking both to Northern Rhodesia and the Federal Government?—A. Yes. Based on experience, not on fears.

Q. You talk of election by acclamation, dealing with Nyasaland. What have you in mind when making that suggestion? Would it be a system of electoral colleges that would elect persons to the Legislature or would it be some other arrangement?—A. What I suggested, and I was told that this would be readily understood and could be adopted under Nyasaland conditions and would ensure the selection of a very stable element, was that every taxpayer would be included in a group of not less than 300 and not more than 600, the convenor to be appointed by the Native Authority, who would meet and choose a person to go on the electoral roll and exercise the vote on their behalf. That is to say, a new form of qualification for the electoral roll. That would bring about another 1,000 or 1,200 voters immediately on to the electoral roll. It would give everybody a say in the form of an indaba, the persons to be selected having to face the audience. You would get a more stable person to exercise the vote and get training in exercising the franchise without swamping the electoral roll.

MR. GONDWE: This question of strengthening the Executive Council and making the Legislature advisory is rather difficult to understand. What you mean is that the Legislature, if it is going to be a Legislature at all, should it decide to make a law, that law will not be effective until the Executive Council does approve it?—A. There would be certain matters which would be the same as they are at the moment, such as emergency powers in which the Executive, the Governor and his Ministers, decide to take action and do not consult the Legislature. In the past you have had to declare an emergency before doing that. Now in most of these Territories the emergency powers have been put into the ordinary law of the land, and that is the case where the Executive decide to take action without consulting or winning the approval of the Legislature. All I am saying is that in that area in which the Executive should be entitled to take such action in order to maintain stability, the difficult period of change should be enlarged—not that the Legislature should be made completely powerless or that the Executive should not be responsive to what it says, votes and discusses.

Q. According to your article in the *Sunday Times*, you put the Legislature down as advisory.—A. I thought I was very careful to say "mainly advisory", but that certainly was my intention. It is a focus of the wishes of the people. I am saying that is the kind of thing which is being thought of in other countries.

Q. I think this Commission had something of a similar nature to this idea of yours in Nyasaland, whereby certain politicians were advocating an Executive Council which, of course, would be nominated. But in their case they said that members could be drawn not only from the Legislature but even from outside. How do you think of that yourself? Am I right that these members will have to be nominated from the Legislative Council?—A. I should hesitate myself from putting in any instrument of instructions that the Governor was limited in choosing whoever he was appointing as Ministers, whether they were members of the Legislative Council or not, but I think there is a great deal to be said for such people when appointed not remaining in a Legislature when it is mainly advisory, because, I think that would put them in an awkward position.

Q. Under this system that Executive is chosen from the Legislature, that is how you put it down here?—A. That is the ordinary way. Westminster model.

Q. Supposing some of these Executive members were chosen from outside the Legislature, the fear on the part of the European politicians in Nyasaland was that if the Governor were to choose the members of the Executive Council from the Legislature he was bound to choose reactionaries, that is people whom they would not trust at all?—A. I may say that if I was a Governor the first thing I would do in such a situation would be to choose people as Ministers who would have the maximum influence with the Legislature—otherwise you are continuously going to come up against trouble. I mention that as one of the essential points.

Q. I would agree 100 per cent. with you there.—A. In fact that is the only way in which you seem to get a bargain. So much of politics is a bargain. You say to your African leaders now here is a chance of a very big share of power under a different system which gives stability. Will you have that, or will you go on agitating for 100 per cent. power which may not come, because we think that a lot of moderate Africans are going to come in on this basis.

Q. As I view it, if you leave out the so-called Nationalists you are making them more extreme and they may even wreck the Government, whereas if you bring them in, they will feel they have a responsibility to their country and therefore they would become more moderate.—A. I would accept that entirely but, of course, you would have to get some sort of guarantee that they were going to accept these positions, not to destroy the system, but to support it.

Q. I think history bears me out there.—A. Once you have got that kind of understanding it seems to me you would strengthen the Executive enormously and you would save yourselves from the continuous troubles between Executive and Legislature under this system.

MR. MOLSON: I am very much attracted by the ideas that Sir Conrad has put forward and if I probe him with some questions it is in order to try to see exactly how it is going to work in the conditions as they exist in Nyasaland. The first point is this: where you have a Legislature and an Executive completely independent of each other you frequently have a conflict between the two. You have that even in the United States of America where they are both popularly elected. Does that not present a serious difficulty?—A. That is why I think you must have something like a Constitutional Council to deal with special matters which are likely to give rise to that conflict.

Q. If there are these difficulties in the case of an independent democracy like the United States of America, is it not going to be very much more difficult to persuade African opinion to accept it in a Colony or a protectorate like Nyasaland. I think it was Professor Berrydale Keith who, when talking about development in the Colonies, said an empanelled Executive and a popularly elected Legislature are a device for creating friction, making it insoluble. That has been our experience in the Colonies. How do you think we are going to avoid it if we introduce this idea into Nyasaland?—A. That was quoted to me by the Rector of Exeter as being quite fundamental. I do think first of all we have to be sufficiently humble to accept some of the experiments that are being made by emergent countries—Dr. Nkrumah, President Ayub Khan, and others, thinking on the lines of those who have got democracy. They are trying to work out this kind of variation. Is it not sounder to follow those kinds of variations and develop them than to say that our experience has been when introducing, generally speaking, the Westminster model that it has given rise to these irreconcilable conflicts. I do not think that the conflicts need be insoluble if you have a Constitutional Council framed like this and if you can get what has been suggested there, the co-operation of leading Africans taking a share in the Executive.

Q. As a Westminster politician I am more than half convinced by your argument against exporting the Westminster model. What I am chiefly concerned about is whether, since it is so fashionable, it will be possible to get African Nationalist opinion to accept something which is not fashionable. Do you not think there is a very great difference between the thing being introduced by a popular National leader like Dr. Nkrumah and its being put over by the Colonial Office or the British Government here? Will it not be regarded as foisting off a second-best on them?—A. I think there is a danger, and I think the putting it over is one of the most important points, but the people I met out there gave me to understand that if there was a definite lead given to officers serving under the administration that this was the line of advance, they could still put it over to moderate African opinion provided they would make it clear that they were not going to be left subject, in due course, to intimidation.

Q. Thank you very much. That is all I want to ask you about Nyasaland. I am most interested in the idea. May I put something to you about the Federal Constitution? I wholly accept the desirability of having a stable Government

and I think, Sir Conrad, you recognise that it would be difficult at this juncture to go completely back on everything that has been done seven years ago. Do you think that there is something to be said for having a Federal Legislature elected by the three Territorial Legislatures and do you think that the effect of that might be to provide a more responsible Federal Legislature and one which would not be so likely to overturn the Federal Government?—A. My first reaction would be that that would be even less likely to be acceptable to Nyasaland than any other proposal. It is based on the assumption that we are trying to build up a Legislature to which the Executive should be responsible, and anything which builds that up still stronger I would be against.

Q. You would agree in the case of the Federal Government you could hardly go right back on what has been done over the last seven years?—A. Not yet.

Q. But at some time in the future?—A. When there is more experience of the presidential system as suitable to these countries.

MR. MOLSON: Thank you very much indeed.

MR. KATILUNGU: In your proposed system for Nyasaland, the method for returning members of Legislative Council, I think the suggestion seems to apply only to Africans, because you referred to taxpayers—between 300 and 600 to an electoral college. I think by this you mean an escape from the claim for one man, one vote. If the method that you suggested through which members of Legislative Council would be returned, that is on the part of Africans an electoral college of taxpayers, what method will apply to Europeans in Nyasaland whereby they would be able to return members of Legislative Council? Will the same method as applies to Africans apply to Europeans?—A. I think the minorities of Europeans and Indians are almost entirely limited to the urban areas and you would have to have for the time being at any rate urban constituencies which would give the two minorities—the Indian is, of course, larger than the European population—a chance of exercising their influence on the representative from the urban areas. Your representatives by acclamation would, of course, be confined almost entirely to the rural areas. In the urban areas you have your more educated African with more wealth. They would get on to the common roll in the urban districts.

Q. In other words you are suggesting that in the rural areas today in your system we should forget all about the present political parties such as Malawi Congress, Congress Liberation Party, regardless of them having influence and membership in the rural areas, and even members under the system you propose. At the same time you say in the urban areas these political parties should operate. How are you going to work that successfully in a country like Nyasaland?—A. I do not see any difficulty in voting by acclamation for a person put up at the meeting convened under the authority of the Native Authority, that person could be a nominee of any of these political parties and, if they had sufficient influence openly with the whole body of people collected there, they could get that man put on the electoral roll and if they had sufficient influence they would get an extra 1,000 votes at the next stage on the electoral roll. I do not think it would be unfair.

Q. It is your conviction, I think, as a result of your experience that African politicians in Nyasaland really could accept this kind of scheme at this time of their political development?—A. All I did say was that I met a number of them saying that is exactly the system we would like—but after secession and independence.

MR. KATILUNGU: Thank you very much.

MRS. HUXLEY: Could I ask about two points? First of all, just to clarify this presidential system, the present suggestions you are making are an interim government, are they not, until such time as independence will be achieved which may not be very far away; after that you say the Governor will be replaced by an elected President?—A. That I think should be the stated aim.

Q. Rather on the American line? Would you have a system of regular elections?—A. I would say on the lines of colonial countries rather than America.

Q. Would you have an arrangement for regular elections over so many years?—A. I think Nkrumah has done these years and it seems to be a good start.

Q. Do you think there would be any way, if you got a Nationalist leader in, which would be very likely, of preventing him from scrapping the share idea and contracting out of the Constitutional Council?—A. That is the point I was trying to make. You would have to be able to assume you would really get reasonable co-operation before making an appointment.

Q. You say you do not really want to change the present Federal Government except in so far as to introduce this

Constitutional Council to replace the African Affairs Board. Do you think, in view of the opinion in Nyasaland as to the regard in which Federation is held, the hatred of it, that it would be wise to make no changes; that you would not get any rational opinion in Nyasaland so long as they felt the present system is being maintained?—A. I am afraid that I did not go into the question of the division of the Federal and Territorial subjects, and I am unable to say whether any changes in that respect would assist in reducing the suspicion of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland of the Federal Government. If that is possible it is perhaps well worth doing. I do think that with a more moderate African element looking forward to a major share of power it is quite possible that the attitude and suspicion of the Federation will be reduced.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: Surely your objection in principle to Parliamentary democracy in Africa must apply to the whole concept of Federal Government just as much as it does to Territorial Government?—A. Yes. When an engine has got on to a certain railway line you have to be very careful not to switch the points too hard in case it goes off the line altogether.

Q. If you have two trains running on the same line at the same time it can be very awkward.—A. I thought they were one train with different carriages.

MR. CRAWLEY: You rather ignored Northern Rhodesia. There seems to be evidence that the feeling in Northern Rhodesia is at least as strong at this moment as in Nyasaland. You really think you could make this experiment confined to Nyasaland alone?—A. I only spent five days in Lusaka and I am very chary about saying anything about the outlying parts, but I do think that this voting by acclamation is the kind of thing that might well be extended to Northern Rhodesia, might allay a lot of frustration and I do not think would do any harm to stability. But to change the Constitution fundamentally seems to be out of the question at the moment.

Q. The crux of your problem seems to be the reply the Africans gave you; they would like such a system after independence. Is it not inevitable that any such scheme with the political climate at the moment is bound to be regarded as a device for maintaining European domination if nothing else?—A. I think that is impossible to say. Until you make a decision it is extraordinarily difficult to judge the effect of a decision on people's thinking. From my experience of India, once a decision is made that we are proceeding on a certain line, there are a number of people who would be prepared to change direction if they knew it was a definite decision. I said if we can only put it over that we are changing direction to something more in keeping with what they themselves would ultimately wish for.

Q. I would not have thought we carried the Indian National Congress with us very far.—A. No, because we are still in this old system, the Westminster model.

MR. CHIRWA: May I ask who were the Africans you met in Nyasaland, apart from Mr. Matinga? Did you meet some members of the Nationalist organisations?—A. One was Mr. Chirwa, not Orton Chirwa, and the other was J. L. Banda and besides George Matinga, one or two others, I cannot remember their names. Those were ones whom I met in Blantyre.

Q. I am asking this question because you seem to be convinced that those Africans would support this scheme you are suggesting. I think you should be aware that Mr. Matinga does not at present belong to the African Nationalist organisations.—A. Yes, he made that very clear.

Q. So you are aware even if he himself believed in that view it would not be supported by quite a number of people?—A. I did not discuss that actually with him. What I discussed with him was the question of giving the vote to a more stable element, not necessarily educated, and that was the only point he made. It was the other two gentlemen who said that this kind of presidential system was what they would like and considered more suitable under Nyasaland conditions. I do not know how much weight that carries, it is for you to say.

Q. He did underline they would first of all like independence to take their own decisions?—A. Yes.

Q. But your scheme presupposes it should come in before independence?—A. They did not say that if we introduced the scheme of presidential government without secession and independence they would support it, no: I did not wish to suggest that. They merely said this was the kind of system they would like to see and would approve of as part of secession and independence.

Q. Do you not think there is a difference between your suggestions and the comparison you are making with Nkrumah? Nkrumah is responsible to the electorate and not necessarily to the government. He is elected on a popular vote and, having been elected, is responsible to the people who elected him.—A. He has carried the people with him, yes.

Q. Now this scheme of bringing people into the Legislative Council who are themselves elected by the method you have suggested, have to go to the elected council, and then they lose touch with the people. If they are going to be responsible to the people and go back and report, do you think they will lose touch?—A. I am suggesting this system would meet with a large measure of support and might well get a majority consent of the governed. I stated originally that no government can be stable without the general consent of the governed.

Q. When people are fighting for independence it is usual that reactionary people are first elected and come into the legislature.—A. Yes.

Q. And now if these people come in and you have made no change at the centre of the Federal structure . . .—A. No change at the Federal centre.

Q. Yes: would they be able to support the Governor in his Federal policy?—A. I think it is quite possible that when you are bargaining with the African members whom you wish to appoint as Ministers under this form of what I call presidential government, you would have to also bargain with them regarding changes which they would consider advisable in their position under the Federal Government.

MR. KATILUNGU: Did you investigate the possibility of mis-interpretation when you discussed the question of presidential government as to whether the president would be an African in place of the Prime Minister which they are claiming now?—A. I do not know, but I did my best to explain it. I thought Mr. Chirwa was very intelligent.

MRS. HUXLEY: Would there be any basic objection to the first president being an African, thereby securing African support, and presumably having some reserve powers if there was still a Governor? Would it be impossible to start off with an African president?—A. If he was prepared to accept a system of instructions such as I was suggesting, under the control of the Constitutional Council, I do not think it would be impracticable.

Q. It would make all the difference between acceptance and rejection?—A. Yes.

MR. GONDWE: Did you discuss this with certain European politicians in Nyasaland as well as these people?—A. Yes.

Q. What were their views on it?—A. They were rather attracted, though I say it myself.

MR. McCLELAND: On a point of clarification, in reply to Mr. Katilungu I think you said in the urban areas elections would be conducted in the normal fashion, on a roll, with constituencies?—A. Yes, that was the suggestion I made.

Q. Whereas in the rural areas there would be in fact universal suffrage because everybody who paid tax would have the opportunity of nominating somebody. In the urban areas there would be a common roll. What about the franchise qualifications for that common roll?—A. You could still start with the Federal qualifications.

Q. So it would mean you would get a portion of the inhabitants of the country qualified to vote under certain conditions, and the other portion with an entirely different set of conditions?—A. Certainly, because the urban population, generally speaking, has reached a higher standard of development.

Q. But you understand the urban population in the majority is African?—A. Yes, but it would not necessarily be the majority on the common roll.

Q. So you would disfranchise a large number of Africans in the urban areas?—A. Except that the vote by acclamation is only to give one man part of a vote, one-five-hundredth of a vote.

MR. CHIRWA: What is the reason for singling out Nyasaland for this particular situation?—A. Because it struck me that Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia were already committed to certain lines of advance, whereas in Nyasaland there was an entirely open field. I think the Colonial Secretary has made that clear: if it had not been for the Emergency, discussions would have taken place earlier, and they are now going to take place in July. There is a chance of experimenting in the right direction, whereas there are certain commitments in the other two Territories which would only bear change, as I see it, when you have very much more experience.

Memorandum M. W. HARRIS

The whole of my evidence will be based on the fact that I went out to Rhodesia at the time when the British Government was encouraging immigration to that Country and recommending Business-men here to make investment in the Colonies.

I did exactly this at the end of 1947, when I purchased a more or less derelict Garage business at Umtali and have since built this up to something of which I was justly proud. This pride has turned to apprehension in recent months, due to the

apparent lack of support which the Government seems to be giving to the European Settlers and Immigrants, and I fear that my investment is in jeopardy.

26th May, 1960

Annexure

Reprint from "Commonwealth Calling" November 1957 Issue
"An Adventure in Umtali"

By R. Speller

It is well known that the initiative and adventure of the British business man contributed largely to the creation of the Commonwealth. Today, of course, it does not present quite the same proposition as it did to the early traders, but with the vast development programmes and extensive cultivation of new territories by the individual governments there remains boundless opportunities for the pioneering spirit.

One London business man who discovered this to his own satisfaction is Mr. M. W. Harris, who is now, himself, an excellent example of Commonwealth enterprise.

Mr. Harris is an expert in all forms of transport, and the chairman of a well known group of transport specialists in this country. In 1946, due to the difficulties involved in obtaining sufficient new vehicles to meet his expansion requirements, he turned his attention to the latent possibilities of the Commonwealth. After due consideration, the country that appealed to him most was Rhodesia. Forthwith he made arrangements to tour the country for the purpose of finding a suitable location.

Experienced eye

In 1947 he covered no less than 14,500 miles by road making extensive enquiries, viewing and assessing the business possibilities of each community, big and small, on his itinerary. It is to his credit that the confidence he had in Rhodesia and its future finally decided him on a town which, on the face of it, was not an ideal choice from the point of view of its history of mushroom firms.

But the experienced eye of Mr. Harris quickly saw, as did the other men who contributed to the expansion of Rhodesia, that the natural wealth of the country was the finest insurance for the future. It was with some satisfaction, therefore, that the town of Umtali was his choice.

Gateway to Eastern Rhodesia

Umtali is a medium sized community surrounded by beautiful mountainous country and is the gateway to Eastern Rhodesia. It is within easy reach of the sea and, at the time of writing, a new road to Beira is nearing completion—140 of the 200 miles are now tarmac. The development in the eastern districts which surround Umtali is steady. It is an area which is not affected by booms and depressions. This is due to the fact that to a large extent it is a farming area. In recent years there has been considerable forestry development, which means that eventually the Eastern District will produce thousands of tons of timber—at the moment practically all soft wood is imported. This alone will make a very considerable difference to Rhodesia's economy. It is generally believed that in time the timber business will be far more important than that of tobacco. Wattle planting (for tanning) commenced early in 1946 and has been increasing every since. The Tanning factories are now working at full blast and this business alone means the employment of vast numbers of Europeans and Natives. There is also a Jute factory which employs some 1,500 Europeans and Natives, and is also making an important contribution to Rhodesia's economy. Many other trades are establishing themselves in the area, but there remains ample opportunity for growth and the setting up of business, especially in the more easterly districts.

Rapid development

Besides its rapid development Umtali itself is considered to be one of the most beautiful places in all of Rhodesia and is famous as a tourist centre.

Perhaps this last fact along with the new road to Beira, although it could only have been in the embryo stage at the time, favoured Mr. Harris's decision on Umtali. For in 1948 he acquired commanding premises and established a comprehensive garage service with showrooms for the sale of Vauxhall cars, which are very popular in that country.

With strong support from the local community the showrooms sold no less than one thousand vehicles in four years. For a town the size of Umtali this was no mean achievement. The servicing side of the business became quite inadequate for the volume of trade.

Consequently, in 1952 he was faced with the task of having to find bigger accommodation for his Rhodesian enterprise. In this endeavour he was once again reminded of the vastness of the land. Unlike a similar undertaking in this country, the problem of space was comparatively non-existent. He bought

the site of an old company of wagon builders which was little more than a few tin huts with dirt floors. On this he built one of the biggest and most magnificent garage buildings in the whole of Africa.

Confidence in the future

It was at the inaugural ceremony that Mr. Harris was shown the good will and respect for the Britisher that every Rhodesian shares. Two photographs show him being congratulated by Mr. A. E. Hough, Sales Director of General Motors South Africa Ltd., and the reception which took place in the show-rooms of the new establishment being well attended by local inhabitants. At the ceremony the Mayor said "Surely no business man who is doing good business can embark on a project, which absolutely radiates confidence, without himself having that same confidence in Umtali and the Eastern Districts. Let me say you are not alone here. My fellow councillors share that same confidence with you".

Others can profit from this pioneer's venture in Rhodesia. It is a country of rapid growth and untold opportunities. No ambitious young man with a will to work should hesitate about emigrating to the Federation, the scope is virtually unlimited.

Perhaps the last word should be with Mr. Harris who says "Nearly ten years have passed since I established the Rhodesian branch of our business. I would be very pleased to pass the not inconsiderable knowledge and experience I have gained to any of your readers who might be interested in setting up in business, particularly in the Eastern District.

Oral Evidence

M. W. HARRIS

Mr. Harris said that he had decided to give evidence as a result of a talk which he had had with Lord Robins. He had been feeling anxious about the state of his investment in Rhodesia, and also had fears for the interests of his friends. He had had no time to prepare a written memorandum.

He then referred to an article in "Commonwealth Calling" (reproduced above) which had described Mr. Harris as a pioneer—excellent example of Commonwealth enterprise. Mr. Harris then spoke from notes on the following lines:

He had "explored" South Africa and Rhodesia in late 1947, when the British Government was encouraging emigration of Commonwealth Countries, and when the Commonwealth Countries were themselves seeking the encouragement of Britishers to invest in those countries.

He decided, after travelling fourteen and a half thousand miles of the country, to establish a Motor Sales and Repair business in Umtali and was able, by virtue of his experience, to introduce modern techniques etc. The business quickly expanded, and between 1948 and 1954 he had invested about £100,000 of his own capital. He built new premises on a site which was nearly four times that which was previously occupied. This building alone cost £75,000.

Up till that time development had been helped tremendously by immigration. Every new family and business which became established in the area wanted cars and commercial vehicles. There was confidence in the country and trade was constantly growing.

As a result of the decrease of confidence indicated in this country towards the Federal Government, a nervous apprehension was growing, which resulted in a cessation of immigration and the sabotaging of confidence amongst the Europeans in the Territory. Business had slumped and he was having difficulty in keeping management and staff satisfied. Previously development in workshops had gone hand in hand with the immigration of British Mechanics. Now of course there were very few who were emigrating, and quite a few Mechanics had left the Country.

He felt apprehensive about his investment and thought that the sooner the British Government made clear its complete support of the Federal Government the better for confidence to be restored.

Mr. Harris explained that after his reconnaissances in South Africa and Rhodesia he had wished to become an immigrant to Southern Rhodesia, but had not done so because his wife so much disliked the heat.

His worry also about his management and staff was connected with the fact that his managers took a share of profits, and if the profits were decreased they naturally got a smaller share and became discontented. He had not set up his business in Umtali purely for the sake of Rhodesia. Nevertheless he was concerned about his friends and about the Rhodesians whom he had come to like, and about their future. Some of his friends had now left the country. Indeed, more skilled mechanics were now leaving the country than were going into it.

He had been expressing his personal views. He felt strongly that the Government in the United Kingdom had failed to show confidence in the established and elected Government in Rhodesia. Those people had been many years in the country, and knew its problems, and in the witness's opinion they had done an excellent job. He had been associated with the country since 1948, and had seen tremendous improvements. These improvements particularly related to conditions of service and education for the natives. The Government there was capable of doing a good job of work if they were left to themselves. If that were done, everything would work out well. But things must take time and should not be rushed. He felt that one of the bastions of the Commonwealth was possibly going to break down and that made him worried about the political side. The Government in the United Kingdom should show its confidence in the Government of the Federation. If that were done, it would make his investment worth while.

In reply to questions, Mr. Harris made the following additional points:—

- (1) Confidence in Rhodesia had begun to decline in 1956. He was accustomed to visit Rhodesia whenever required, and had been out three times in eighteen months. But he had not been there for two years. He knew that confidence was diminished from the regular and almost daily reports which he received from many business people in Rhodesia. The root of the trouble was the lack of confidence by Her Majesty's Government in both the Federal and Southern Rhodesian Governments. He was not able to make any judgments about Northern Rhodesia. But he had been originally happy about the Southern Rhodesian Government, and later about the Federal Government which would be operating as a larger unit.
- (2) He did not attribute the lack of business in Rhodesia merely to a general world wide recession. Generally he had found that Rhodesia followed closely behind Great Britain, financially and in every other way. That had been the case two or three years ago. Since then the United Kingdom had been riding on the crest of the wave, but conditions were not the same in Southern Rhodesia owing to the lack of continued confidence by the United Kingdom Government in the Federal Government. As soon as this lack of confidence was removed he felt sure that trade would go ahead.
- (3) He then gave certain confidential instances of the attitude of motor firms to prospects in the Federation which he asked to have omitted from the record.
- (4) He wanted the British Government to say that it had full confidence in the Federal Parliament and Government, and to give that Government one hundred per cent backing, while leaving it alone; and then to look again at the situation in, say, ten years' time.
- (5) The newspapers and Members of Parliament had been out to the country and returned with ridiculous stories, giving the impression that the Europeans had no right to be there, and that the natives were fully able to run the country. But he himself knew that partnership was the only hope for the future. All would be well if the Federation were left to its own devices. He confirmed that he meant that full independence should be given to the Federal Government.
- (6) He was not a politician, but his own commonsense told him, and from what he knew, that the Africans in the Federation had had a "fair crack of the whip". Every African there could achieve the vote provided he attained the necessary standard of education. He compared the situation in Central Africa with the industrial revolution in the United Kingdom. It took a long time before people became interested in political matters, or worthy to cast the vote. In Central Africa, unlike South Africa, there was no colour bar, and there was opportunity for Africans to take part in politics provided they achieved the necessary education. It would be dangerous if the Africans were put into power before they became educated.
- (7) Faster progress for the Africans could only be achieved by better education and by the United Kingdom voting more money for that purpose. Everything should be done to advance the Africans, but that could not be rushed. The Africans in his employment could be compared with youngsters. They were capable of repetitive jobs, and of taking messages, but were unable to think things out for themselves. However, the opportunity for their development was being provided, and must be increased. In the Federation itself, the Government could not do more than they were doing at present. On the present franchise there would eventually be some Africans qualified for the vote, though at present they

had no understanding of it. They were like a flock of sheep and would do just what they were told. He was speaking of the great majority: the educated ones were very few.

- (8) At the review of the Constitution he would like the balance of powers and other matters in the Federation to be left as they are at present.
- (9) He personally saw no danger of force having to be used to maintain the Federation. If the United Kingdom Government were to give full confidence and support, the Africans as a whole would accept the situation. The Africans generally were happy with their lot though he could not speak for Nyasaland.
- (10) He agreed that there was a school of thought in Rhodesia in favour of union with South Africa. But the majority of Rhodesians including himself were against it. They were very British, and there was a very marked loyalty to The Queen expressed in public feeling. But Rhodesians might now lose faith in the United Kingdom unless the United Kingdom Government put its faith in the people who had been elected to govern out there.
- (11) He had visited Portuguese East Africa two years ago, and the natives there had appeared to him to be happy.

But the Portuguese would not stand for any nonsense. He would not like to see the same conditions in Rhodesia as prevailed in Portuguese East Africa. He had only mentioned Portuguese East Africa as another point of contrast similar to South Africa.

- (12) If the Federal Government could run things in its own way, partnership could be developed without any hardship to the Africans; but it would have to be a gradual process. He compared this with the bloodless revolution which had taken place in the United Kingdom over the last 40-50 years. He believed that the position in Rhodesia was similar.
- (13) In summarising his evidence the witness emphasised that, given confidence from the United Kingdom, and more encouragement for educational facilities, the Africans in the Rhodesias would become more content. He did not think that the Africans really wanted the Europeans to leave the country. But he thought the process of advancement must be gradual, and that in time there would come an equality of Government as between natives and Europeans. He considered that many Europeans were as much natives of Africa as the Africans themselves.

LONDON

27TH MAY 1960

Memorandum

SCOTTISH COUNCIL FOR AFRICAN QUESTIONS

The Aims of the Scottish Council for African Questions are:—

- (1) To strengthen and further the best traditions of Britain's policy in relation to Africa, especially with regard to the moral and legal obligation to safeguard the rights of all communities against domination by any minority or majority.
- (2) To promote in Scotland a fuller understanding of the rightful aspirations of the peoples of Africa.
- (3) To promote in Britain policies ensuring the economic and social development and the equitable political rights of all communities in Africa.
- (4) To assist peoples in Africa in their struggle against unfair discrimination and inequality of opportunity in their educational, economic and social progress and to foster in all non-self-governing territories responsible forms of self-government.
- (5) To encourage practical projects of development which will provide a living experience in Africa of economic, social and political co-operation, in the true sense of the word, amongst people of different races.

Introduction

On 24th November 1959 in the House of Commons Mr. Macmillan announced the appointment of the Monokton Commission with the following terms of reference:—

"In the light of the information provided by the committee of officials and of any additional information the commission may require to advise the five governments, in preparation for the 1960 review, on the constitutional programme and framework best suited to the achievement of the objects contained in the constitution of 1953, including the preamble".

Of the 26 members only five are Africans, and of these five, three draw their income from government sources. The five Africans are (1) Mr. G. H. Habanyama, chief councillor of the Gwembe Tonga native authority in Northern Rhodesia (Federation); (2) Mr. Simon Sigola, chief of the Ndebele people (S. Rhodesia); (3) Mr. Lawrence Katilungu, president of the African Mineworkers Union (N. Rhodesia); (4) Mr. E. K. Gondwe, education officer in the Northern Province (Nyasaland) and (5) the Rev. Father Henry Chikuse, a mission school manager in Nyasaland. Father Chikuse has now resigned his membership.

The Terms of Reference

1. and 2. We note that when Mr. Macmillan announced the terms of reference in the House of Commons he stated that the terms would cover the whole field of the redistribution of powers in either direction between the Federation and the three territorial governments and he thought this covered other forms of association besides federation. We interpret this as meaning that the Commission is free to consider the question of secession, and we urge, for reasons later adverted to, that they should do so. Whatever be regarded as the proper interpretation of the terms of reference it is we believe an undeniable fact that, as the Devlin Commission reported, many

Africans desire secession. If the British Government are blind to that fact, we submit that that is no good reason why the Commission should shut their eyes to it. So to do is to run the risk of largely stultifying the work of the Commission. As we understand it the Commission is, by its terms of reference, not merely a fact finding but a policy framing or suggesting body.

Immunity of Witnesses

3. It is a striking comment on the present condition of affairs in the Federation that the question of the immunity of witnesses requires to be discussed at all. It is intolerable that in any British territory witnesses appearing before a government-appointed Commission should be in any doubt as to whether, if they give free expression to their opinions, they may suffer imprisonment or fine. Even if a guarantee of immunity is eventually given it is difficult to understand the ineptitude of the British Government in failing to make up its mind on this issue before announcing the appointment of the Commission. If it had done so, and announced immunity for witnesses, at the same time as the appointment of the Commission, it might have substantially reduced the distrust of Africans.

Evidence by Detainees

4. Mr. Macmillan stated that African opinion of all shades would be fully heard and objectively recorded by the Commission, and that the Commission would be free to visit the prisons and detention camps. In our view this latter concession is largely meaningless. The leading African politicians at present in detention camps must be released before the Commission arrives. To pretend that detainees, however courageous they may be, can speak with complete freedom and give authoritative evidence is difficult to credit. They have been in detention camps since March 1959. Even if they have been able to keep themselves in part abreast with developments by reading the press, as to which there seems doubt, they have been unable to indulge in those day-to-day contacts with their supporters, which are essential to enable them to gauge the sentiments of their followers. In December 1959 it was announced that Dr. Hastings Banda, and the various political organisations in Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia, would boycott the Commission. But if the detainees were released before the arrival in Africa of the Commission is it absolutely certain that this attitude would be maintained? Even if it were, if the detainees were freed and allowed to indulge in legitimate political activities, the Commission would be more able to judge of the trends of African opinion, than if the detainees continue to be kept in detention camps.

The Question of Secession.

5. We submit that the Commission should consider and advise upon this question, or that, as a bare minimum, it should make it plain that in its view it must be discussed at the 1960 Review Conference. It is essential in discussing this issue to bear in mind what happened in 1952-1953. We believe that in 1952-3 the Africans in the two protectorates were solidly opposed to federation; that they were perfectly able to comprehend the basic issue involved; that the British Government were unable to point to a single representative African organisation which favoured federation; and that the British Government in spite of all this chose to impose federation against the

wishes of the Africans. It is well to bear in mind that the British Government announced that it would proceed with the proposed federation if, but only if, a plebiscite of the voters in Southern Rhodesia showed a majority in favour of it. A referendum was duly held in Southern Rhodesia in April 1953 upon a voters' roll which contained a mere handful of Africans. In the referendum 25,570 votes were cast in favour of federation and 14,729 against. No referendum of either black or white was held in the two protectorates but the Legislative Councils of these two territories, in which the Africans members were in a very small minority, voted in favour of federation. In other words the British Government allowed the fate of four million Africans in the two northern territories, whose interests they were pledged to protect, to be decided by 40,000 Europeans in Southern Rhodesia.

This highly discriminatory act does much to explain the distrust of British intentions now so widespread amongst Africans in the Federation. We believe that the dislike of federation amongst Africans so far from abating since 1952 has increased and that in Nyasaland to-day, in the words of the Devlin Report, opposition to federation is deeply rooted and almost universally held, and that even among the chiefs, many of whom are loyal to the Government and opposed to Congress methods, the Devlin Commission had not heard of a single one who is in favour of federation. In 1953 federation was imposed upon the Africans against their wishes. If in 1960 the British Government refuses to allow the issue of secession to be discussed nothing will dispense from world opinion the fact that the British Government claims the right to drive four million people into a federation against their will, and thereafter to hold them there by force. Such a policy must inevitably lead in the end of the day to armed violence, because freedom is as dear to the African as to the European. When that day comes we think it improbable that the Federal Government will have the resources to cope with the situation. If that be the correct view are British troops to be called in to shoot down Africans guilty of the crime of fighting for their freedom? We believe that the present policy of the British Government does not have the support of the British electorate and that it denies the whole basis on which our Commonwealth of Nations rests, and must and does arouse the dislike and disapproval of many of its members.

6. There is no constitutional reason why the 1960 Review Conference should not discuss secession. Speeches made in parliament in the course of debating the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federation Act 1953, which authorised the making of the Order under which the Federation was set up, in law are not relevant to the interpretation of the Act, the Order, and the Annex to the Order which contains the Constitution. Article 1 of the Constitution reads "The Federation shall consist of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland . . ." Article 99 of the Constitution provides for a review conference between 1960 and 1962 "for the purpose of reviewing this Constitution". Article 99 does *not* read "for the purpose of reviewing this Constitution, with the exception of Article 1."

7. But it is not enough that the 1960 Review Conference should merely discuss the question of secession. We submit that the Commission should advise the five governments of the need to announce *before* the 1960 Review Conference is convened, that if, after that Conference has done its work it is clear that a large body of African opinion still desires secession, then a democratic method of testing African opinion should be adopted and applied. In our view one obvious method is to hold a plebiscite on the issue of secession both in Nyasaland and if desired also in Northern Rhodesia. If it be said that the machinery for a plebiscite does not exist we disagree. Even in these faraway territories no one can escape the attention of the tax-gatherers! If means can be found of levying a tax on the African the same machinery can be used to hold a plebiscite of all taxpayers. We appreciate that this would exclude African women, but we accept that qualification, although if means can be found of allowing African women to vote so much the better.

7a. We reject out of hand any suggestion that the Africans of Nyasaland are incapable of grasping the central fact of federation viz. the entrenched predominance of the European element in the federal legislature. Scores of thousands of Africans living in Nyasaland have worked on labour-contracts in Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa, where the Europeans enjoy complete political predominance. They have seen with their own eyes, and reported to their fellows in Nyasaland, the degree of racial discrimination practised in these two countries, and they are determined not to remain in a federation which is also dominated politically by the European.

7b. Even if the 1960 Conference should propose reforms so radical as to result in the termination of the present European political predominance at a stated date we do not think that it is morally defensible to deny to the Africans, after due consideration of these radical reforms, the right to opt out of

the Federation if they so wish. We feel that a promise made before the 1960 Conference begins that the protectorates may be allowed to opt out, plus radical reforms proposed by the 1960 Conference, are the most likely way of securing a continuance of the Federation based, not on force, but on consent. If we are wrong in this view, then we believe that plebiscites should be held in the two protectorates. Plebiscites were rightly held in Togoland and the Cameroons. Why then should it be wrong to hold them in Nyasaland and N. Rhodesia?

Federation is not Inherently Objectionable

8. We desire to stress that the Scottish Council for African Questions has never opposed federation as such. Like the Church of Scotland it has consistently opposed the view that federation can properly be imposed against the wishes of the Africans. The Scottish Council believes that the continuance of federation can only be justified on the bases (a) that it commands the support of a majority of Africans in each Protectorate and (b) that Africans command a much greater representation in the Federal Assembly. We are aware that it is frequently maintained in certain quarters that federation has brought economic benefits to the two northern territories which are the direct result of federation. We do not see how it is possible to prove such a proposition and feel that it must remain a matter of opinion. But even if it could be conclusively proved that federation had brought substantial economic benefits, we do not accept a standard of values which argues that economic benefits must prevail over the wishes of the Africans. We suspect that if Eire were a part of the United Kingdom it might be to its economic advantage, but we respect the right of Irishmen to prefer freedom to wealth.

Chapter Two: The Federal Constitution

9. We turn now to the question of the constitutional programme and framework referred to in the Commission's terms of reference. We recall the words of the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons on 22nd July 1959 when he said:—

"The Government would not withdraw its protection from these two territories (of N. Rhodesia and Nyasaland) in the short run, and in the long run the policy would be to advance them to full responsible self government. Then they will dispense with our protection and stand on their own feet as components of the Federation. When all the units are in a position to agree and did agree that protection no longer was necessary then, and only then will the whole Federation go forward to full independent membership of the Commonwealth."

Commenting on this speech the *Manchester Guardian* in its leader of 23rd July said that Mr. Macmillan "made it clear, not only that there is no question of advancing the Rhodesian Federation to Dominion status as a result of the 1960 talks but that this would not be done until the Protectorates of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia have reached the stage of full self-government in their internal affairs".

This speech of Mr. Macmillan's must be read along with the speech made by Lord Home the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in the House of Lords on 27th July 1959 when he said that an African fear was that powers shed by the United Kingdom Government would be assumed by the Federal Government and the word domination had gained common currency in Nyasaland. But he said that was not the conception. Power would be transferred not to the federal government but to the Governments of the two northern territories themselves which would become more and more representative of the Africans. The ambiguities of these two speeches are dealt with in paragraph 14 *infra*.

10. These two speeches must be contrasted with the interview given by Sir Roy Welensky in Salisbury on 30th December 1959 (see *Scotsman* of 31st December 1959). According to this press report Sir Roy said that at the 1960 Conference he would:—

- (1) demand the abolition of the British Government's right to veto federal legislation and that the Colonial Laws Validity Act (which prevents the passing of legislation repugnant to the laws of Britain) should no longer apply to the Federation;
- (2) ask for the abolition of the African Affairs Board and its replacement by some body which would protect the interest of all races in the Federation.
- (3) urge that it was essential to destroy the belief that the Federation could be broken up;
- (4) urge the need for a clear cut programme for Nyasaland towards a responsible form of government within the Federation.
- (5) state that before the Federation made a formal claim for full membership of the Commonwealth there must be a greater degree of equality in the status of the three territorial governments which would involve a steady transfer of power from London to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland which would probably take some years.

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Newspapers are notoriously pressed for space but we doubt whether if Sir Roy had urged the need for much greater African representation in the Federal and territorial legislatures, as a matter of immediate urgency the press would have failed to report this.

The Preamble to the Constitution

11. The Preamble reads in part :
"And whereas Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should continue under the special protection of Her Majesty, to enjoy separate governments for so long as their respective peoples so desire"

We are aware that in law a preamble has not the binding force of a section within an act or a constitution itself and we therefore welcome, what, in view of the Commission's terms of reference, we take to be an admission by the British Government that it is morally binding on them.

12. Since 1953 the British Government has been repeatedly asked to state what interpretation it places upon the phrase "for so long as their respective peoples so desire" and it has consistently failed to answer this question. The speech of Mr. Macmillan on 22nd July 1959 unhappily did nothing to clarify this point. If this phrase is to be interpreted as meaning that the method followed in 1953 is to be repeated, then we believe that such a method will be a flagrant breach of both the spirit and the letter of the preamble. If a motion to end protectorate status is to be submitted to the legislative councils of the two territories as at present composed then again we believe it will be a breach of the terms of the preamble. We feel strongly that it is necessary for the British Government to make clear at the 1960 Conference that it will implement the preamble either (1) by holding a plebiscite of all taxpayers when it feels the time is ripe for this or (2) by publicly declaring that the issue will not be put to a vote in the two legislative councils until such time as (a) there are in the Northern Rhodesia chamber as a minimum at least as many elected African members as official and elected European members and (b) in the Nyasaland chamber a majority of elected African members. Only by a declaration in these terms we believe will African fears be dispelled and the memory of the 1953 method be exorcised.

13. Mr. Macmillan's speech in July 1959 constituted an important change of attitude and was, a general election being in the offing, perhaps influenced by the strong opposition in many quarters in Britain to further concessions to the federal government. But it would be a dangerous mistake to attach too much importance to this speech.

The Transfer of Powers

14. It is plain from what has been said in paragraphs 9 and 10 *supra* that Sir Roy Welensky is anxious to see the transfer of powers from the Westminster parliament to the legislative councils of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and that Lord Home is willing to concede this. Is the aim of increasing the power of the European settlers not being achieved by using indirect instead of direct methods? In this context the crucial questions are (a) when (b) to whom and (c) on what conditions? On these questions the British Government remains silent. We feel that there must be no transfer of powers from the Westminster parliament to the two legislative councils until such time as these chambers are composed in the manner suggested in the preceding paragraph. But this alone is not enough. On what conditions are these powers to be transferred? Are they going simply to be added to the Concurrent Legislative List being Part 2 of the Second Schedule to the Constitution? If this is the intention, then the federal legislature will have equal rights with the territorial legislatures to make laws in relation to these powers and in that event, if there is a conflict between the federal act and the territorial act, in terms of Article 34 of the Constitution the former act will prevail. It is surely essential to provide that if any powers are to be transferred, it is on condition that they shall be exclusive to the territorial governments, and shall remain so, until all the inhabitants of the protectorates by a majority have freely declared their wish that protectorate status should end.

The Delegations to the 1960 Conference

15. You are required to consider the Constitutional programme and framework best suited to the achievement of the objects contained in *inter alia* the Preamble which desiderates "the security advancement and welfare of all the inhabitants" of the Federation. We can imagine no persons better fitted to speak about what will be likely to achieve the security, advancement and welfare of the Africans, than Africans who represent broad currents of opinion in African society. In terms of Article 99 of the Constitution the delegations to the 1960 Conference will come from the United Kingdom, from the Federation, and from each of the three territories and will be chosen by their respective governments. If the 1960 Conference is to secure the confidence of Africans it is essential that the delegations from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should in the case of the

former contain at least fifty per cent of Africans, and in the case of the latter contain a majority of Africans. It will be useless to send Africans who are unrepresentative. We believe that the choice of the African representatives should be made in two stages. In Northern Rhodesia a panel chosen from the chiefs, the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress, the African Representative Council and perhaps the African Trade Unions, should submit a list of names to the Governor whose choice should be limited to that list. A somewhat similar method might be followed in Nyasaland. We hope that the Commission will feel convinced of the necessity of impressing upon the British Government the need to ensure that the delegations from the two territories will contain both an adequate number of Africans and Africans of a representative character.

16. We appreciate that there is a strong likelihood that Africans will again decide upon a policy of boycott of the 1960 Conference, and perhaps justifiably so. It is precisely to forestall this danger that we urge the imperative need to allow the 1960 Review Conference the widest possible scope and to ensure an African delegation both adequate in number and truly representative.

17. But if the Africans agree to co-operate they must go into the 1960 Conference fully prepared. We therefore suggest that the British Government should make available at once funds to pay for any expert in constitutional law from Britain or elsewhere whom the Africans care to choose to advise them before and during the 1960 Conference.

Composition of the Federal Assembly

18. Article 9 of the original constitution read "(1) The Federal Assembly shall consist of a Speaker and thirty-five members made up as follows that is to say—

- (a) 26 members (in this constitution referred to as 'elected members') of whom 14 shall be elected in S. Rhodesia, 8 in N. Rhodesia and 4 in Nyasaland;
- (b) six African members (in this constitution referred to as 'specially elected African members') of whom 2 shall be elected in S. Rhodesia, 2 in N. Rhodesia and 2 in Nyasaland and
- (c) three European members charged with special responsibilities for African interests'

It was clear that this Article gave to the European minority an overwhelming predominance in the federal assembly. Article 10 of the original constitution gave (except with regard to the first general election) to the Federal Legislature powers to make laws as to who could stand for election; qualifications and disqualifications for registration as a voter; and the registration of voters. Article 97 of the original constitution also gave the Federal Legislature power to amend any of the provisions of the Constitution "provided that any bill for the amendment of this constitution . . . (a) shall not be deemed to be passed unless at the final vote thereon by the Federal Assembly it receives the affirmative vote of not less than two-thirds of all members of that Assembly and

- (b) if passed, shall not be assented to by the Governor-General but shall be reserved by him for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure".

As the Europeans had more than a two-thirds majority the Constitution ensured that a constitutional bill could go through even if all the African members were opposed to it. It is difficult to imagine a Constitution better calculated to secure a permanent European predominance.

19. The amending Act of 1957 passed by the Federal Assembly increased the membership from 35 to 59. The number of specifically African members was raised from 6 to 12 but no attempt was made by the Federal Assembly to increase the percentage of purely African members and decrease the overwhelming European predominance. The stranglehold conferred by Article 97 upon the Europeans remained untouched.

20. Briefly the Constitution Amendment Act 1957 provides that members of the Federal Assembly will fall into three groups. In the first group there are 6 members of whom 4 are elected exclusively by Africans and 2 are Europeans appointed by the Governors of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia respectively. The second group consists of 44 members whose race is not specified of whom 24 are from S. Rhodesia, 14 from N. Rhodesia, and 6 from Nyasaland. The third group consists of 9 members whose race is specified: it consists of 1 specially elected European member and 4 elected African members from S. Rhodesia and 2 elected African members from each of N. Rhodesia and Nyasaland. As a result of the 1957 Act there are now 44 Europeans and 15 representatives of the Africans in the Federal Assembly.

21. The Federal Electoral Act of 1958 was passed by the Federal Assembly. This Act covers the election of 53 out of the 59 members of the Assembly. It provides for two voters' rolls, a general voters' roll, and a special voters' roll: no person

may be on both rolls. Voters in the general roll may vote for persons standing for election to the Assembly who are in the second and third groups mentioned in paragraph 20. Voters on the special roll can only vote for members of the assembly who are in the third group mentioned in paragraph 20.

22. To gain admission to either roll three qualifications are required (1) the applicant must be at least 21 years of age (2) be a citizen of Rhodesia and Nyasaland or a British Protected Person and (3) be able to speak, read, write in and comprehend English. Thereafter the qualifications for the General Roll and the Special Roll differ. Voters on the General Roll must satisfy one of five named conditions. One of these conditions is that a voter must have an income of £480 per annum, or ownership of immovable property valued at £1,000 plus the completion of a primary course of education at a school in the Federation or a scheduled country. Voters on the Special Roll must satisfy one of two conditions viz. (1) have an income of £150 per annum, or immovable property valued at £500 or (2) have an income of £120 per annum and have attained Form II in secondary education. The African Affairs Board certified the Federal Electoral Bill as discriminatory but in spite of this it was approved by the Westminster Parliament. According to the Report of the African Affairs Board (January 1958) the Board believed that the average income of Africans in employment in 1956 was approximately £70 per annum, the average income of all adult Africans being of course much lower. In 1956 the average European income was about £1,100.

23. The Scottish Council respectfully agrees with the view expressed by the African Affairs Board that the Federal Electoral Bill discriminated against the Africans. We believe that the result of that Act strengthens European predominance in the federal assembly and demonstrates the danger inherent in Article 10 which permits a Federal Assembly which is overwhelmingly European to fix the qualifications for registration as a voter.

23a. In the Federal Assembly as at present constituted S. Rhodesia has 29 members, N. Rhodesia 19 members, and Nyasaland 11 members. In other words S. Rhodesia has almost half of the 59 members, although it has barely one-third of the population of the Federation, and amongst the S. Rhodesian members African representation is very small.

Reform of the Assembly

24. It is essential to increase the percentage of Africans in the Federal Assembly. In the first group (referred to in paragraph 20 *supra*) in the Federal Assembly the 2 African elected members from each of N. Rhodesia and Nyasaland are elected by a system of electoral colleges working up to the African Protectorate Council level. We urge that group one should be re-formed and should consist exclusively of Africans 12 from each of the two northern territories elected through the system of African electoral colleges, and 12 from Southern Rhodesia elected in a manner to be determined but elected exclusively by Africans. If group one consisted of 36 African members the total membership of the Federal Assembly would be raised from the present 59 to 89 and it would mean that the Europeans would no longer enjoy their present automatic two-thirds majority. We do not regard such a limited reform as in any way ideal, nor one which should prevail for any length of time, but as an interim measure, and as one which could be properly pressed upon the Europeans.

Reform of Voters' Roll

25. The present voters' rolls confer an undue advantage upon the Europeans and must be regarded in the context of the current climate of African opinion in the African continent and the federation as indefensible. We urge that it is essential to declare now that the ultimate goal is a common voters roll open to all persons over 21 of whatever race to come into force in an appointed year. We suggest the year 1972 in view of the steady growth of African nationalism. But it is essential to take into account both the question of experience and the legitimate anxieties of the European settlers. We therefore advocate an advance by stages. It may be that in the first place a common voters roll should be prepared to come into operation in five years' time the conditions of entry to which would be (1) the payment of direct taxation of at least say £1 per head and (2) the ability to pass a reasonable and standard literacy test in English or in a vernacular. So far as (2) is concerned the possession of a prescribed school certificate might be sufficient proof. In theory there is much to be said for the retention of a simple literacy test. We believe that the reforms suggested in this and the preceding paragraph should form part of the written constitution. We hope that the Commission may feel able to favour reforms along these lines.

Creation of a Second Chamber

26. If federation is to be retained it must be on the basis of consent, ascertained by democratic methods. The continuance of federation would we submit, call for consideration of

the question of a second chamber. If reforms along the lines suggested above are agreed to they must be adequately buttressed. If only more limited reforms are agreed to, it is still desirable to provide means of adequately safeguarding both Europeans and Africans from present and future fears in regard to domination by the other race. In the light of experience since 1953 we decline to accept the view that either the African Affairs Board or the Westminster Parliament can be regarded as adequate safeguards. We urge that serious consideration be given to the creation of a second chamber which by law shall contain an equal number of European and of African members. There is much to be said for taking note of the recent experience of Tanganyika and requiring each federal constituency to return to the second chamber one European and one African member both elected on a common roll which would require each member to bear in mind the views of all races. Subject to the reforms outlined in paragraphs 24 to 26 *supra* being first implemented, we feel that the creation of a second chamber on the lines above suggested would be of great value and should form a permanent feature of the federal constitution. It should be embodied in the constitution that all bills seeking to amend the constitution must first be introduced in the second chamber and that they shall not be deemed to be passed unless and until in that chamber either (a) a majority of European members and a majority of African members voting separately have approved the bill or (b) a majority of those voting, irrespective of colour, have approved the bill. We are opposed to a two-thirds majority rule, as placing too much emphasis on conservatism. If a constitutional bill failed to pass in the second chamber it would not be permissible to present it to the Assembly. We believe that a second chamber so constituted and so operating would go far to overcome the mutual fears of both Europeans and Africans which at present bedevil the situation in the Federation. Each state of the U.S.A., whatever its population may be, is only entitled to send two representatives to the Senate. One of the purposes of this arrangement was to dispel the fears of certain states that their state rights would be unduly interfered with or that they might be overwhelmed by more powerful neighbouring states. This composition of the Senate seems to have stood the test of time and the basic idea might be adapted to an African context. We have considered whether, if the African Affairs Board is retained, and it certifies a Bill as a differentiating measure, instead of following the procedure laid down in Article 75 of the Constitution, it should not instead be dealt with by the Second Chamber in the same manner as that suggested above for constitutional bills. While there may be much to be said for such a course, we are persuaded that politicians always remain politicians whatever the colour of their skin and wherever they reside. We have therefore suggested in paragraph 28 *infra* an alternative method for dealing with differentiating bills. We appreciate that there is force in the view that a second chamber might render the continuance of the African Affairs Board unnecessary. But there is also something to be said for the view that there is room for both bodies. If no second chamber is set up, weak though we think the African Affairs Board is, so far as affording protection to the Africans is concerned, it is better than nothing at all.

The African Affairs Board

27. In 1952-3 the Scottish Council was not convinced that the African Affairs Board would in fact afford any real protection to the Africans. Nothing that has happened since 1953 has caused us to change our minds. In 1957 and 1958 the African Affairs Board reported, in our view rightly, that the Constitution Amendment Bill and the Federal Electoral Bill were differentiating measures. In spite of that these Bills were approved by the Federal Assembly and the Westminster Parliament. At Westminster the issue was debated along purely party lines. In view of all this it may seem illogical to say that we think that on one view there is a case for the continuance of the Board, though subject to certain reforms. The Board does perform an invaluable service in that it can make representations in relation to any matter within the executive authority of the federal government, and has also both the right and the duty to scrutinise both bills and statutory instruments and declare them differentiating measures if necessary (Article 71). In other words the Board acts as a permanent watchdog, a function which we believe to be essential.

28. In our opinion the weakness of the present position arises after the Board has reported a Bill as a differentiating measure. In this connection we must remember that unlike the United Kingdom the Federation has a written constitution. Moreover in Article 71 (2) that constitution gives a precise definition of what a differentiating measure means. This being so we believe that once the Board has reported a Bill as being differentiating the Bill, if passed by the Federal Parliament, should go, not to London, but to the Federal Supreme Court, with perhaps a right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. If the Federal Supreme

Court found the Bill to be differentiating that would be the end of the Bill and it could not become law.

29. We suspect that more differentiation may in fact take place in the executive than in the legislative field. If the Board has reason to believe that a certain executive action, whether proposed or in force, does differentiate in the sense of Article 71, the Board should have the right to examine, to make representation to the prime minister, and to lay a report thereon before parliament. If all this produced no result what then? We are ignorant of the intricacies of parliamentary procedure but we dare to advance two proposals for consideration. Firstly the Report should require to be laid before the Second Chamber to be debated and voted upon, and perhaps if a majority favoured the view set out in the Report the Executive would be required to cancel the executive action taken. Alternatively the Board should have the right upon the basis of its Report to call upon the Government to justify its executive action as non-discriminatory before the Federal Supreme Court. We are aware that this latter proposal, in British constitutional practice, is a novelty, and may be more akin to the Conseil d'Etat in France or the Ombudsman in Scandinavia. But what of that. The Federal constitution is full of novelties.

30. Article 67 provides that the African Affairs Board shall consist of three Europeans and three Africans who must all be members of the Federal Assembly. The Chairman is appointed by the Governor-General from among the members of the Board. The chairman has both an ordinary and a casting vote. It is plain that the main purpose of the Board is intended to be to safeguard the Africans against differentiations to which Europeans are not subjected. This being so it is surely desirable that there should be an African majority. We yield to no one in our admiration of the splendid work done on the Board by men like Sir John Moffat and the Rev. Andrew Doig. But both these men have resigned from the Board, and in view of the way the Board has been treated, and the public attacks upon it by Sir Roy Welensky, we doubt whether in future it will again attract Europeans of such distinction. Moreover we doubt whether it is wise that the Board should consist exclusively of members of the Federal Assembly, in view of the pressures, both direct and indirect, to which all members of parliament are subjected.

31. We suggest that the Board should in future consist of nine members instead of six and that only two of them, one African and one European, should be members of the Federal Assembly. We think the Board should consist of five Africans and four Europeans and that of these four Africans and three Europeans should be chosen by the Governor-General after consultation with representative African and European organisations. We believe further that all members of the Board should be paid a salary and should serve for a term of five years.

Transfer of Powers

32. In the Second Schedule to the Constitution Part 1 sets out the matters in regard to which the Federal Legislature alone can make laws. Part 2, the Concurrent Legislative List, sets out the matters in regard to which both the Federal Legislature, and the territorial legislatures, have power to make laws. Where there is conflict between a federal law and a territorial law Article 35 (1) enacts that the federal law shall prevail. In Part 1 of the Second Schedule there are a number of items in regard to which we believe that the Commission should give serious thought as to whether they should not be transferred to the exclusive jurisdiction of the territorial governments.

Immigration and Emigration

32a. One of the items in the Federal Legislative List is immigration into and emigration from the Federation while among the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List are deportation and the control of the voluntary movement of persons between territories. In 1954 the Federal Legislature passed an act to regulate the entry of immigrants into the Federation and to prohibit the entry into the Federation of undesirable persons. Among those classified as prohibited immigrants by this Act are persons who from information received from any Government through official or diplomatic channels are deemed by the Governor-General of the Federation to be undesirable inhabitants of or visitors to the Federation. In this matter the Governor-General acts upon the advice of his Executive Council. It was in the exercise of these powers that the Federal Government deported from Northern Rhodesia Mr. John Stonehouse, a member of the British House of Commons, who had been told by the Governor of Nyasaland that he would welcome a visit from him; it was in the exercise of these powers that the Rev. Tom Colvin, a missionary of the Church of Scotland in Nyasaland, and a known champion of the Africans, when home on leave in Scotland was told that he would not be permitted to re-enter the Federation. When it is remembered that Britain is still ultimately responsible for the two Protectorates, we

submit that it is intolerable that any member of the British Parliament should be deported from these territories, or that any reputable and responsible British citizen should be denied admittance thereto. When the American Government, acting within its right, raised the tariff on woollen goods the British Government protested energetically and publicly. We recall, without admiration, that the British Government made no public protest in the cases of Mr. Stonehouse, Mr. Colvin, and others.

33. Unless there is a radical increase in African representation in the Federal Assembly we urge that questions of immigration and emigration should be transferred to the exclusive jurisdiction of the three territorial governments. No one has a greater interest in the question of immigration than the African, and he could and should enjoy a major voice in its decision. We believe that in the two protectorates the Africans fear, perhaps quite unreasonably, large scale immigration and that it would do much to lessen their distrust, if this became a territorial matter. If it be said that immigration requires an overall view to be taken, this can be attained by setting up an Immigration Council with an equal number of representatives from each territory, but subject to the provision that any decision would only be binding upon the territories which voted for it.

Deportation

34. This is a matter presently upon the Concurrent Legislative List. We contend that it should be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the territorial governments. In the case of the two Protectorates this would mean at least some degree of control by the Westminster Parliament.

Venue of the 1960 Conference

35. The ultimate responsibility for the future of the two protectorates rests upon the British people. This being so the 1960 Conference should be held in London so that it will receive the maximum possible publicity in the British press, and the British electorate will hear the voice of the Africans, and see what the United Kingdom delegation is doing.

A Revived Central African Council

36. It is alleged that federation has conferred a number of economic benefits upon the three territories. We are not convinced that most if not indeed all of these benefits could not have been achieved without resorting to federation. In East Africa where there has been no resort to federation, the territories have gained much through the medium of the High Commission. We hope that the Commission will give thought to and report upon the question of whether a similar organisation might not meet the needs of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland without the continuance of an enforced federation. We know that before 1953 there was a Central African Council in this area. We rather suspect that the will to make it a success was lacking in some quarters, and further that its life was too short to prove whether it could meet the needs of the situation. A revival of and strengthening of this body should be considered.

January 1960

Oral Evidence

SCOTTISH COUNCIL FOR AFRICAN QUESTIONS

Mr. Sinclair Shaw, Q.C.
Dr. Kenneth Little
Mr. Charles Morrison
Rev. Fergus Macpherson

CHAIRMAN: Mr. Sinclair Shaw, I think you are chairman of this party?—A. (MR. SHAW): Yes.

Q. Would you introduce the members of your party?—A. Yes, on my left is Mr. Charles Morrison who lived for a number of years in West Africa and who is the Assistant Principal of the Dundee College of Education. Next to Mr. Morrison is the Rev. Fergus Macpherson, who was a missionary in Nyasaland until recently. On my right is Dr. Kenneth Little, who is Reader in Social Anthropology at Edinburgh University and who had paid recent visits to both British and French West Africa, and who also knows the Sudan. I myself happen to be a Q.C. and was born in the Cape Province, but as I left the Cape Province before I became adult I do not share the views of many of the people in the Cape Province, including Dr. Shepherd.

Q. Dr. Shepherd is unfortunately not here, but he has the memorandum, and he will have the advantage of seeing the evidence later. Now I notice your memorandum was written as long ago as January, and you may wish to add something to it before we begin with questions.—A. I do not frankly think so. Some of the paragraphs have clearly been overtaken by events.

Q. Then, if you are content to begin from there, I have one or two matters to ask about. In paragraph 8 of your memorandum you say, "We are aware that it is frequently maintained in certain quarters that federation has brought

economic benefits to the two northern territories which are the direct result of federation. We do not see how it is possible to prove such a proposition and feel that it must remain a matter of opinion." Would you agree with me that though, of course, the existence in degree is a matter on which opinions can differ, it is a matter which one ought to look at in evidence and try to form an opinion of one's own?—A. I respectfully agree.

Q. I wondered whether you and your colleagues have formed any conclusion.—A. I think we can say two things: that we look forward with interest to the report, which we understand will come out very shortly prepared by two well-known economists, Mr. Henderson and Mr. Hazlewood, because we feel it is most desirable that there should be a report from an obviously independent source.

Q. We have had the advantage of having them here.—A. We claim that we took some part in inaugurating that inquiry, because we did not consider that evidence submitted by officials on that matter would be sufficiently independent.

Q. So on that matter you really refer us to what Mr. Henderson and his colleague said to us, and you do not want to add anything specific?—A. Yes, I would like to say this: we differ entirely from the view that even if it were proved—which we hold to be impossible—that great economic advantages have come to Nyasaland, in particular, as a result of Federation, those economic advantages must be awarded higher priority than the wishes of the Africans.

Q. Speaking for myself, I certainly want to be sure that you agree with this: that if economic advantages are proved they ought to be taken into account but not as a decisive factor?—A. I agree, and we also feel that a great many of the alleged advantages have been those which have accrued rather to the Europeans than to the Africans.

Q. In paragraph 15 you deal with the delegations to the 1960 Conference, and the question I wish to ask is also connected with paragraph 24 about the reform of the Assembly. I understand what you are saying is that if the 1960 Conference is to be successful it must be representative of true African opinion in the north, among other things?—A. Yes.

Q. And you say in paragraph 15, "In Northern Rhodesia a panel chosen from the chiefs, the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress, the African Representative Council and perhaps the African Trade Unions, should submit a list of names to the Governor, whose choice should be limited to that list". It was my understanding—correct me if I am wrong—that the African Representative Council is no longer in existence.—A. (MR. MORRISON): I believe it was disbanded a month or two ago.

Q. So that when we come to look at this we have to remember that is so, and the Councils which led up to that have also gone now so we have to think of something else; but the point one has to look at is that the people should be representative of the Africans as a whole.—A. (MR. SHAW): And the people on the list should be chosen by Africans and not civil servants in the Government of Northern Rhodesia. They should submit a list from which the Governor should select otherwise we should have no confidence in the African delegations being representative.

Q. Would you go as far as to say that the Government Departments should not appoint delegates to this council except from such a list—not merely that representatives on that list should be included, but that no one else should?—A. (DR. LITTLE): I think it is most likely that the Government would think of names the Africans have not already thought of.

Q. But is it suggested that the Government is confined to the list submitted by these bodies?—A. No, I would say let the Government submit names.

Q. Going back to the end of the sentence I have just quoted from paragraph 15, it states "... whose choice should be limited to that list". Do you subscribe to that?—A. (MR. SHAW): Yes, for this reason—if you allow the Governor to go outside that list Africans may be chosen, both in numbers and quality, who do not command the support of the broad currents of African opinion.

Q. I gather you are not a wholly united body on this subject. May I ask Dr. Little whether he agrees with that?—A. (DR. LITTLE): I should take the view, as I have already said, that if names are mentioned which are outside the list but which have the support of these African groups, that is good enough; but it should be independently in terms of such consent of African groups.

Q. You see, looking at the Constitution in this connection, Article 99 points out that the conference is to consist of delegations from the territories, etc., and from United Kingdom "chosen by the respective governments"; and I appreciate you were saying there must be representative Africans and a list of this sort might help towards it.—A. (MR. SHAW): I do not

think selection from a list by the Government would contravene the terms of Article 99.

Q. Now regarding paragraph 24, the reform of the Assembly, you speak in the second sentence thus: "in the first group . . . in the Federal Assembly the two African elected members from each of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are elected by a system of electoral colleges working up to the African Protectorate Council level". That Council was the body in existence at the time your memorandum was prepared?—A. Yes. I am not aware personally whether in Nyasaland this body has also been abolished.

MR. GONDWE: It is not there now.

CHAIRMAN: It is important to get these facts straight; in the same way if I may look back for a moment, I think it is paragraph 7 where you talk about a referendum which is to be held before the 1960 Conference. Are there not substantial difficulties in arranging for a referendum in Nyasaland at the moment?—A. That, I think, must remain a matter of opinion. I can see no reason why Africans who above all stand to benefit from a referendum should so conduct themselves as to make the whole question of a referendum impossible. It seems to me the so-called difficulties in the way of holding a referendum are a mere governmental or administrative excuse.

Q. Before we judge whether it is an excuse or a reason, I should be grateful to know whether the gentleman who has had experience in Nyasaland thinks there is no chance of a referendum in the immediate future?—A. (REV. MACPHERSON): I would agree with Mr. Shaw, because I am convinced, after my 13 years in Central Africa, in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, that there is a body of commonsense and good will which would respond with dignity to the abolition of such a thing as is suggested here. I would not anticipate those elements of breakdown; they would only come in a situation and the emergency situation.

Q. I will put it this way: I can understand your feeling that difficulties may be encountered unless an opportunity comes at the appropriate stage for the inhabitants of Nyasaland to express their views, whatever they are. What I am really questioning is the practicability and the desirability under present circumstances of a referendum at this stage.—A. (MR. SHAW): May we draw your attention to paragraph 12, where we say the Governments should announce before the Review Conference is convened that if, after the Conference has given its decisions and if African opinion still desires secession, then there should be a referendum. That perhaps meets your difficulty.—(DR. LITTLE): From my own experience in West Africa, I am familiar with Sierra Leone very intimately, where the literacy, judged by the proportion of people attending school is, if anything, lower than in Nyasaland, and, as you know, Sierra Leone is promised its independence next year, and elections have been held for some years there—if it is possible there, I do not see why technically it is not possible in Nyasaland.

Q. Within what period do you think we could have a referendum in Nyasaland?—A. Tomorrow, figuratively speaking. Why not?

Q. One must face the fact that the thing has to be arranged. They have not had an election in Nyasaland up to now. You have to have some basis upon which it could be done. Do you think it should be sufficient for it to go to people who pay taxes?—A. It is done in other territories. Why not in Nyasaland where, if anything, the level of literacy is somewhat higher than that in countries where it is held? The difficulties are not insuperable though they are bound to be there.—(MR. SHAW): And I would again stress the point—what possible advantage is Dr. Banda going to secure by stirring up trouble which would prevent the holding of a referendum? If everything we have been told by African friends is true, the result of that referendum is a foregone conclusion and Dr. Banda has everything to gain in having a peaceful Nyasaland where a referendum may be held.

Q. Most of you must be familiar with present-day conditions in Nyasaland. Do you think there is anything to fear at this moment as regards intimidation against those who wish to record their decision?—A. I notice Dr. Shepherd was strong on intimidation, but we have good memories and we recollect that intimidation came from both sides.

Q. Are you expecting it from both sides in the future?—A. I hope the Monckton Commission will be an important factor in seeing there is no more intimidation.—(REV. MACPHERSON): I honestly do not think that intimidation will be a serious issue. I imagine there will be little bits of intimidation here and there where you get more petulant spirits, but I lived in Nyasaland through the Emergency and I am quite sure, having lived in the Northern Province, that intimidation has been gravely exaggerated and that in this kind of situation, with a public proclamation that here was something the people were asked to turn their minds to and do, and with propaganda

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much better and more honest than was given with regard to the preparation for the Devlin Commission, for instance—which grievously worried us in Nyasaland—I am convinced this could be effective and it could possibly be passed much more happily than in other parts of Africa at the moment.

Q. In paragraph 27 you deal with the African Affairs Board. If I understand it correctly, you are saying that the matters to which their attention should be most directed might be executive rather than legislative.—A. (MR. SHAW): With respect, no. I feel that both functions are equally important. We all know that you can do things by executive action which are discriminatory. I think the African Affairs Board must be a watch-guard both in regard to executive action and legislation.

Q. What sort of executive action have you in mind?—A. This answer is not perhaps quite within the framework of the definition of a differentiating Bill. We think there was an instance some time in the last few years when certain privileges were given—I am taking a hypothetical case because my memory is not as good as it ought to be—European boy scouts, or something of that kind, which were not extended to African boy scouts. I mean by that the expenditure of Government money, and I see no reason why there should be discrimination of that nature. It seems to me that is precisely one of the things the African Affairs Board might direct its attention to. As you know, one of the Articles in the Constitution specifically lays it down that the African Affairs Board shall consider this sort of thing.

Q. Yes, I was not endeavouring to criticise, but paragraph 29 begins by saying, “we suspect that more differentiating may in fact take place in the executive than in the legislative field.” I wondered what sort of things you had in mind.—A. From this distance it is much easier for people like ourselves to learn about legislative discrimination than about executive discrimination.

Q. Hence my desire for enlightenment. In paragraph 28, still on the African Affairs Board, it says, “This being so, we believe that once the Board has reported a Bill as being differentiating, the Bill, if passed by the Federal Parliament, should not go to London but to the Federal Supreme Court, with perhaps a right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council”. Now there must be, I suppose, some differentiating Bills which would be, if not desirable in themselves, not necessarily objectionable.—A. Theoretically at least, I think that may be so; but as you know this is a written Constitution and it now defines a differentiating Bill, and I just refuse to believe a Judicial Committee of the Privy Council would have taken the same view of the two measures which the African Affairs Board declared to be differentiating as the British Parliament.

Q. I can understand that. What I really meant was that it is not questionable whether, if more is wanted apart from an interpretation or answer to the question of whether a thing differentiates, and if it is necessary to go into the question that in spite of its being discriminatory, it might be desirable for the thing to go through, that might not be a good subject for the Federal Supreme Court if the matter was not in fact harmful to the common good?

Q. It is difficult to postulate that in advance as a certainty. I am only asking you because we have all had some experience of cases in which judges are put into positions where they have to deal with political points, and as a general practice it is not a thing we want, is it?—A. (MR. SHAW): I think not, but I reiterate that in these semi-political fields I have greater confidence in a Judicial Committee than the British Parliament.—(REV. MACPHERSON): It seems to me that in a multi-racial society so many of life's issues become political that might not in a mono-racial society; and secondly, supreme courts in other federation situations do deal with issues that have a political touch to them.

Q. I am just trying to find out whether you thought there was anything in that. There are a good many people who think that the African Affairs Board could be replaced with advantage by some other scheme, either powers in the Constitution, or a Bill of Rights of a Second House or a Constitutional Council: but you think the African Affairs Board should itself suffice?—A. (MR. SHAW): It seems to me if it is specifically charged with these functions, to keep a watch for legislation or executive differentiation, it fulfils a function that nobody else would do continuously. There might be spasmodic objections, but the very fact that this body is in being makes the executive wary where otherwise it might not be. It would have to have the necessary finance to argue its case before the Federal Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee. I do not think you can leave it to any other agency which may be set up.

Q. Then if it is right that there is more reason to suspect difficulty from executive rather than legislative action, do you think the review of executive action might pose more directly

the difficulty I was putting about the functions of the Supreme Court as a judicial court?—A. I think that may very well be so, but we have suggested that there is an alternative to going to the Federal Supreme Court, namely that the report be laid before a Second Chamber. That might mean difficulties which I confess had not occurred to me previously, but they might be substantial ones.

Q. There is one other matter: in paragraph 32 under “Transfer of Powers” you deal with some points which cover deportation and that type of question. Have you formed any views about some of the other matters which are now in the legislative concurrent list, for instance health?—A. I do not think we have, as a body. As an individual, I would say without any hesitation that it is most desirable that transport services should be a Territorial responsibility and not a Federal responsibility, because we know it has been repeatedly said in regard to Kenya that roads and railways have always been developed primarily in the interests of the Europeans; and I think it is a very real risk if they remain the sole responsibility of the Federal Legislature composed as it is today.

Q. But apart from any problem of its composition, is there anything in the view that transport services which run through the whole of the area comprised in the Federation should be a Federal subject?—A. I see no reason why there should not be a Transport Council with equal representation from each Territory. I think it would achieve something. There is a Postal union broadly on this line, and why not a Transport Council on those lines for the Federation?

Q. Have you considered the division of education as it is now between Federal functions and Territorial?—A. I had the privilege of listening to Dr. Banda in Edinburgh, and he made it plain that, not having had any but white politicians for many years, he was determined for Nyasaland to have a University of its own. I feel higher education should not remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Parliament: it might very well be Territorial. I am talking about higher African education.

Q. Just for clarification, in paragraph 33 you say, “We believe that in the two protectorates the Africans fear, perhaps quite unreasonably, large-scale immigration and that it would do much to lessen their distrust if this became a territorial matter.”—A. It would do much.

MR. TAYLOR: Referring to a point you made earlier, Mr. Chairman, in paragraph 8, where the witnesses state their opinion on the proposition that economic benefits have been derived from the act of Federation. At the end of their paper this statement appears in connection with the establishment of a Central Africa Council, “In East Africa where there has been no resort to Federation, the territories have gained much through the medium of the High Commission.” I wonder if they can help us there, because we have done a little research into the working of the East Africa High Commission, by telling us what sort of benefits one can expect to derive from this Commission?—A. I have always found it extraordinarily difficult to apprehend what the work done by the High Commission exactly is and where its powers begin and end; but it seems to work to the satisfaction of the people in those territories and, if that is so, why should not something of the same nature work in Central Africa where we believe, perhaps quite wrongly, that the great mass of Africans are opposed to the present set-up?

Q. That is my point really. It is working, and we did not seem to have any complaints about it, but what I am anxious to find out are what are the economic benefits which are associated in such a manner by the existence of a High Commission? Can you give any example at all of some benefit which the East Africa High Commission has conferred upon Kenya, Uganda or Tanganyika, because it is possible, if you can give us some examples, the same might apply to the Rhodesias and Nyasaland?—A. Speaking from memory, my impression is that the High Commission does a great deal in regard to the co-ordination of transport services, and I should have thought good transport services were vital to rapid economic development.

Q. That is the sort of economic benefit you are referring to?—A. No, that is just one that springs to mind. Though I have read about it long ago I do not pretend to recall all the matters, though I think there is a substantial list with which the High Commission deals.—(REV. MACPHERSON): There are simple things like postal and customs unions, which I could imagine being covered by a High Commission set-up. There are economic advantages which most of us see, and they are not small things—that there should be a freedom from customs restrictions between the neighbouring territories.

MR. TAYLOR: Possibly we do not see economic benefits in the same way.

MR. MOLSON: You are suggesting the co-ordination of

transport is one of the advantages derived from the East Africa High Commission, but I thought I heard you suggesting that transport should be made a territorial subject in the case of Central Africa.—A. (MR. SHAW): Surely you can have both? You can make it both a territorial responsibility, as I think it is in East Africa, and at the same time have a High Commission with representatives drawn from each territory in order to work out schemes of co-ordination.

MR. MOLSON: In East Africa it is in fact under the High Commission and not under the Territories.

MR. TAYLOR: I was saying that we do not probably see economic benefits in the same way. The phrase to me means a material advance in wealth or capital inflow or borrowings abroad—something of that kind—whereas the economic benefits you discern in this kind of council are the promotion of co-ordination in government policy and liaison at government level. Those are the benefits you are talking of?—A. No, with respect, I would suggest any possible beneficial result from the economic point of view. We are not satisfied that under the present composition of the Federal Assembly an objective view is taken of the needs of each of the territories. If you had something like a High Commission or a Central African Council with equal representation from each of the three territories, then I think inevitably a much more objective view of it would be taken and it would be said "Well, Nyasaland is lagging behind in this particular respect: we must, before spending any more money on some other project, do something about this state of affairs in Nyasaland."

Q. I see. Now in paragraph 24 you speak of the reform of the Assembly and you suggest that group one, which is referred to in paragraph 20 where the Federal Assembly falls into three groups, should consist of 12 Africans from the three territories, making 36 in all, and that the total number of the Assembly should be increased from 59 to 89. If my arithmetic is right, in your reformed Assembly you would have 45 Africans and 44 Europeans. It is rather important that we should know where the overall majority lies here. I take it at the moment in group one you have six, according to your own paper; in group two 44, in group three you have 9; and if these are added together you get 59, which is the present case. In the reformed group one 6 is deleted and 36 substituted; 44 remains 44; and 9 remains 9?—A. Yes.

Q. That adds up to 89. Group one, 36 are entirely Africans, and of group three, nine of whom are Africans and one a European appointed to represent Africans, so that the total division of the Parliament would then be 45 Africans, if we include the European elected to represent African interests as discharging his functions honestly, and 44 European. So you have a majority of Africans. In that event, why do you go on to plead for the retention of the African Affairs Board?—A. Let me point out that the people who will elect group three are predominantly Europeans.

SIR VICTOR ROBINSON: You want to get rid of the special representation of 15 and substitute for that 36 Africans?—A. No, what we had in view is that it is essential to break the present stranglehold conferred by the Constitution, under which Europeans have always enjoyed more than a two-thirds majority, which means that any Constitutional policy can go through although the African representatives are solidly against it. I do not think, with respect, that in regard to group three, as you know the general voters have a right to vote for group three as well as for group two; and the general voters today are overwhelmingly European. I think the chances are that group three would be represented by Africans who were less liberal, shall I say, in the neutral sense of that word, than if there was direct representation by Africans alone.

Q. In other words, there are Africans and Africans?—A. I have no doubt that human beings are divided by temperament into two classes, irrespective of the colour of their skin—those who are temperamentally conservative and those who are not.

Q. But if there seems to be some doubt as to whether the majority in the House lies in the way I have described it—I will put it this way—if there was an overall African majority would you still press for the retention of the African Affairs Board?—A. Yes, I would because we think there are on the Commission more than one distinguished politician, but we know that politicians are subjected constantly to pressures that the rest of us are free from; and I think the African Affairs Board would be more likely to take a free and unpressured view of whether a Bill or any executive action was differentiating than politicians, at whatever level, would.

Q. In the circumstances which I have postulated, would you think there was any need for a European Affairs Board?—A. I see no reason why there should not be a European Affairs Board theoretically. At the moment I can imagine no need for it whatsoever, because Sir Roy Welensky is more than capable of representing the minds of the Europeans without any outside assistance.

Q. Do you perceive any need to work towards the creation of a truly multi-racial state in Central Africa, or one in which you have Africans or Europeans?—A. We would not be here otherwise.

MR. ROBINSON: I would like to start off by asking you about your Council, because we must know what weight to put on your evidence, and as a stranger here I am not really acquainted with the background. Are you a church council, how are you made up, what is your membership and how do you elect your executive?—A. We sent to the Secretariat on two occasions a number of leaflets which summed up our aims.

Q. Yes, I have your aims in front of me and I will go back to them in a moment; but I would like to know if you are a church council.—A. We are not affiliated to any political party and we are a purely secular organisation. We have no direct contact with any church at all.

Q. What is your membership?—A. Quite frankly, I cannot tell you off-hand, because we have no paid secretarial staff at all, and we are dependent entirely on our voluntary officers. I think the last figure I could give you, which would be approximately accurate, would be between 300 and 400, but since then we have established several new branches, and frankly I do not know what the membership is at present.

Q. How is the executive elected?—A. We have branches in a number of Scottish towns. We have a local executive in each town and that local executive elects certain of its members to the central executive and the central executive elects its own officers.

Q. So you are a group of 300/400 Scotsmen interested in matters, as you have outlined here, concerning a number of African questions. By way of preamble to the main question, I read with interest your reference to some of our African colleagues on this Commission, when you said "Of the 26 members only five are Africans, and of these five three draw their income from government sources." What was the reason for the inclusion of that comment?—A. Because we think frankly it is quite wrong that people who are in part financially dependent on the Government for their salaries—we think they may be less independent than Africans who are not so dependent.

Q. But you have no particular evidence, or at least you are not suggesting that you have any evidence at your disposal that any of our African colleagues might be so?—A. I just do not know. I should have thought that, human nature being what it is, it is inevitable that that fact must play some slight part in their general make-up.—(DR. LITTLE): I do not know if the speaker has any first-hand knowledge of the Colonial situation. It is very difficult to operate the ruling of people who are illiterate, but I think it is fairly clear that people in Government service in the Colonies are under greater pressures than civil servants in this country would be from the point of view of voicing political opinions, even when called upon to voice such opinions in their political capacity.

MR. CHIRWA: The Council will remember that it was Mr. Gondwe who represented the Africans at the Victoria Falls Conference, and it was he who objected to Federation, although he was a Government employee then.—A. May I say at once, Sir, that these terms of reference were put on for the guidance of our members when we were discussing this draft memorandum; and I, at least, certainly felt that it was most regrettable that when the Monckton Commission was appointed only five of its members should have been Africans, because it seemed to us to chime with what has happened consistently since 1952—the gross under-representation of the Africans in the Conferences of 1952 and 1953, in the Federal Assembly and now in the Monckton Commission.

CHAIRMAN: Will you forgive me for saying that probably some of us here, at any rate, take more exception to the criticism of the likely fair-mindedness of our African colleagues, with whom we have worked for several months, than the failure of the Government to which we do not belong.—A. Sir, we do not suggest that any of your colleagues are not fair-minded: we merely point out that some of them are not as financially independent of the government as others.

MR. ROBINSON: You have no reason therefore to wish to change this reference here?—A. (DR. LITTLE): No, it is a sociological consideration and not a moral one.

Q. Could you tell me what part your Society took in inaugurating the Henderson inquiry?—A. (MR. SHAW): I said we took some part. In the conference we had two years ago—we have an annual week-end conference of our Council—we considered that in view of the conflicting statements being made about the economic benefits of Federation, it might be possible to have one or two entirely independent economists making an inquiry into this position. I will not weary you with the various steps that we took towards this end, but we had a

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great deal of assistance from the very able young economist in Edinburgh University, who did a great deal of what I might call the preliminary work in trying to find people who might undertake this work while we tried to consider how it might be financed; and as you know these voluntary organisations are very frequently overlapping, so that we discovered quite late in the day that the African Bureau had been working along these lines. I do not know whether they were ultimately responsible for the appointments of these two gentlemen or whether they gave the initial impetus, but when we discovered they were doing this kind of thing we decided to leave it alone.

Q. So it is really the Africa Bureau, who took over from you at this stage, or you handed it to them?—A. That is a polite way of putting it. We thought they could do it much more easily in London than we could.

Q. What I would like to ask you about is this: in your main aim you talk about safeguarding the rights of all communities against domination by any minority or majority, and in reading your aims one gets the impression that you are much concerned with all the peoples of Africa. Now in reading your memorandum I do not see any reference here to what you consider the interests of the minorities, the Europeans and the Asians. Has your Council given consideration to the interests of these people at all, and to the place you can see for them in the future society of Central Africa?—A. In compiling our memorandum we kept in mind that there were limits to what we could expect the Commission to read. We were aware that most of the African leaders were in jail; Sir Roy Welensky and his friends were not in jail, so they could express very clearly their views in Britain and in their home Territories and to you, as the members of the Monckton Commission. Therefore we saw no need to duplicate what Sir Roy Welensky was already advancing. I cannot, with respect, accept your suggestion that the Scottish Council in this memorandum have given no thought to the protection of the European minority, because when we advocate the Second Chamber we specifically say it should be composed equally of Europeans and Africans, and that no constitutional change can be made unless it has a majority (a) of the Africans and (b) of the Europeans in the Second Assembly.

Q. But the Second Chamber would have no power to check completely the activities of the First Chamber, as you have made your proposals here.—A. We do not suggest that the Second Chamber would necessarily check any constitutional measure which, in the view either of Europeans or Africans, was likely to create a position of dominance for one race or the other.—(REV. MACPHERSON): Might I add to what Mr. Shaw has said? It seems to me the proposed membership of the legislative body whose figures were mentioned by Mr. Taylor just now certainly does not ignore the interests of people who, in terms of counting heads, are a very small minority of the population.

Q. There are not any other terms in which you consider human values?—A. Yes, but I would say that the only use the legislative body had was to represent the vast majority of the population. Dividing people racially—and the tragedy of Federation is the dividing of people racially—is not unfair to the interests which I myself know are part of the life of the land. It seems to me this is something which holds within it a possibility of peaceful development for the sons and grandsons of those people who have made their home in Africa, but who are not racially of African stock. I see no real happiness for them, and I think I speak for the Council, if something is continued in which there is not an opportunity for representative expression of the interests of what we call the indigenous peoples.

MR. GONDWE: Following upon Mr. Robinson's question about the Second Chamber, paragraph 26, there is this sentence which says that it should be embodied in the Constitution that all bills seeking to amend the Constitution must first be introduced in the Second Chamber and that they shall not be deemed to be passed until in that chamber (a) a majority of European members and a majority of African members voting separately have approved the Bill, or (b) a majority of those voting, irrespective of colour, have approved the Bill. I am not quite clear about this and would be glad if you would clarify it—when you say "a majority of Europeans voting separately"—A. (MR. SHAW): If I may take sub-section (a) first, if that were to be the procedure, if a Constitutional Bill were introduced into the Second Chamber after being debated, there would be two votes. First of all the votes of the Africans, voting as an ethnic group, and secondly the vote of the Europeans; and unless there was a majority in each group the Bill would not be passed.

Q. Yes, but I should like to know why it is that you should have these members of one group voting separately if they constitute one body.—A. You see, we suggest an alternative, namely that it should be a simple majority of the Chamber,

voting as one. I think the reason we put that in is that we hope that, having learned to work together in the Second Chamber, within a reasonable period of time, divisions of opinion would not follow racial lines, but that there would be the broad division I have already referred to between Liberal and Conservatives.

Q. On the same question, I do not know whether this is the practice elsewhere where there is a Second Chamber, where Bills are first taken to the Second Chamber?—A. It is quite common in this country. I speak subject to correction by the Chairman, but I think Bills are frequently introduced into the House of Lords here, just as a time-saving procedure, before they go to the Commons.

SIR DONALD MACGILLIVRAY: I have one question on your paragraph 33 where you urge that the question of immigration and emigration should be transferred to the exclusive jurisdiction of the three Territorial Governments. Rather lower down you suggest there might, however, be an Immigration Council so that an overall view can be taken. Do you have in mind that there should be then established immigration barriers between the three Territories?—A. Would that necessarily be involved in the change we suggest here?

Q. If you did not have immigration barriers it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to enforce immigration policies if those policies are to be effective.—A. I see. It had not occurred to me.

Q. It would involve immigration barriers between the three Territories with all that implies?—A. Yes and no. I may be wrong but I should have thought that the pass system is in effect an immigration barrier already and the immigration barrier, instead of being confined to the African, might be extended to the European.

Q. I do not think the pass system does amount to anything like an immigration barrier.—A. It comes not very far short, I suggest.

Q. You would apply an immigration barrier between the three Territories?—A. I should see no reason why there should not be. It would be a minor inconvenience compared to the major fear which the present situation constitutes in the minds of the Africans.

Q. It would be an inconvenience—I am not sure how many people regard it as a minor one. But that is your contention?—A. Yes.

MR. CHIRWA: I wanted to refer to paragraph 15, where you talk of the choice of African delegates to the 1960 Review Conference and you make certain suggestions there. Suppose a suggestion was made that the various political organisations in both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, both Europeans and African organisations, should send their own delegations at government expense? For example, something on the lines of the Kenya delegation, the difference being that Kenya Executive Council members were popularly elected by the people themselves. Suppose that these people who came represented their organisations. In Nyasaland you would have Malawi, I presume Dr. Banda and others would go; Congress Liberation Party would send their own chairman. Northern Rhodesia would have African National Congress and the United National Independence Party. Suppose that was done, that they represented their parties which are nationalist parties and the Europeans sent their representatives through their own organisations like United Federal Party, Dominion Party, would you object to that arrangement? Do you think that would be adequately representative? Do you think that would be adequately representative of African opinion?—A. I think it would represent the main strains of African opinion.

Q. That does not bring in the chiefs, but I think that the chiefs, of course, would be selected.—A. In paragraph 15 we do suggest that the chiefs should be amongst the bodies who would arrange a list for submission to the Governor.

Q. Yes, I see that. You raise in paragraph 17 the question of constitutional adviser or a lawyer to advise the Africans. Were you suggesting that the Government should pay that?—A. Certainly.

Q. Suppose the Government did not agree to pay?—A. (REV. MACPHERSON): We would be very sorry.—(MR. SHAW): I do not think it would be easy to defend such a position in the House of Commons because if my recollection is correct this arrangement has already been applied in other African Territories.

Q. I should like to get a clear view of what you have in mind in paragraph 8 where you talk of African representation. Federation must enjoy the confidence of the majority of the African people. Do you have in mind the idea that the Federal Assembly should be composed of a majority of Africans or that it should have equal representation of both European and African?—A. It depends whether you are talking about the lower house or the upper house.

Q. I am talking of the lower house.—A. At the moment there is no second chamber and I myself feel that there must be a steady change in the franchise to allow far more Africans to vote, and if that change was brought about, not in some never-never time, but within the next five or seven or eight years, then inevitably the Federal Assembly would become far more representative of Africans than it is today. If you had something approaching a "one man, one vote" system eventually.

Q. According to you, you think that Federation should continue but under changed form?—A. On two assumptions, that it is clearly the will of all the races within the Federation, and secondly that the Federal Assembly accurately reflects the majority position of the African population.

Q. You must be aware from what you have written in this memorandum and what you have read that if your suggestions were carried through, Southern Rhodesia would not accept them?—A. So what. If Southern Rhodesia does not like it, she has already said that she may leave the Federation. If Southern Rhodesia claims the right to secede I would no more deny that right than I deny the right of Nyasaland to secede if she wants to.

Q. You have raised the question of economic benefits. I think that there is conclusive evidence that Nyasaland does get from the Federal Government some £3 million per annum. How that is spent is a matter which one would not like to discuss. However, I think there is conclusive evidence that Nyasaland does get £3 million.—A. Is there any reason why, looking to the fact that we are still protecting her and that we spend far larger sums than £3 m. on other British Colonial territories, that £3 million should not come from the British Parliament instead of the Federal Parliament?

Q. That was the question I was going to pose because according to your suggestion, if Southern Rhodesia had to opt out and decided they would not remain in the Federation, Nyasaland would lose £3 million, so to speak, and where does Nyasaland get the funds to advance its own inhabitants?—A. I think there is a very simple answer to that. If Nyasaland was governed by its own people they have a drive and an energy to apply which it is impossible for Britain to apply because Britain has so many other calls on her attention and I have never yet seen anything which convinced me that given adequate political powers the people of Nyasaland cannot within a period of years make themselves self-supporting. Far poorer countries, like Denmark, for example, have done so, and certainly with a lot of technical assistance, but you can get that from the United Nations if necessary. I do not believe for one moment that you cannot live off your own.

MR. CRAWLEY: Are you suggesting that before the Europeans reached Nyasaland the Nyasas showed greater energy and powers of development than they have since?—A. Of course not. I would not dream of making such a suggestion. I am merely saying that the Church of Scotland has laboured in Nyasaland for many years and today the United Nations has all kinds of agencies which did not exist before and which can go and give the Nyasa people those technical skills and advice which they will certainly need for a period of years.

MR. CHIRWA: Would you comment on this question? Suppose a suggestion was made, which has been made from some quarters, that there was no political association between the three Territories, but an economic unit should be arranged which could provide the economic advantages to the three Territories. What would be the attitude of the Council to that?—A. I should say with great respect that would be a matter for the people of the three Territories to decide. If you broke the political link it would be for them on their own free hand to decide what economic links they wanted to build up.—(REV. MACPHERSON): If I may add, Mr. Shaw has amplified again what is the premise, the basis of all that we have come to say. Simply that we are convinced that the peoples of the Territories concerned must be consulted and there must be a way of testing representation and we say this not theoretically but out of the sad experience of the last seven years which Mr. Chirwa knows so intimately himself, of course.

MR. ELLMAN-BROWN: You keep on referring to seven years. What about the twenty-three that went on before that? What sort of development went on then as compared with the development in the last seven years? Is it not fair to make a comparison?—A. Those of us who lived in Central Africa and had the kind of outlook and criteria of judgment that I myself have, almost hoped against hope that we would see in terms in the life of the common man the economic advantages of Federation. I have said Mr. Gondwe knows this well too. In education itself in Nyasaland during the years when I was Principal of Overton Institution of Livingstonia, I have heard over and over again the statement that we can have no further increase in budget, no further capital expenditure on building of schools because of the present strains on the finances of the

land. The common man, whether an Englishman, Scotsman or Nyasalander, judges what is spoken by all politicians in terms of things like that. We have grieved that what was spoken of as though it was absolutely axiomatic as the economic advantages of Federation were not things which ordinary folk like myself and so many of my African friends could see, that the hospital in Limbe, for instance, was, I should say, a great disappointment to many of us because it does not appear to bring, in fact, a declaration of multi-racial living in a complex society and therefore that by way of approaching an answer to the question put to us, economic advantages would certainly, I am sure, have been something that we would have presented to people thinking in day to day discussion if we had seen them and when I say we would have seen them I am speaking as a representative of the Church of Scotland and the Church of Central Africa (Presbyterian). I say that because discussion about such affairs was very common on Central Africa. If political literacy is to be measured by the way people speak when they are going about their daily work, selling petrol in Cairo Road, Lusaka, selling curios, I would say there has been an amazing amount of political literacy among the indigenous people of Central Africa. So far as discussing football and social events, it was what Welensky or Chirwa or Dauti Yamba was saying that I heard so often discussed by groups of people who met together. I would certainly have done everything I could to point out where economic advantages existed because objective economics is the final criteria of human happiness. We are not materialists in that sense, but we recognise that economic well-being is very definitely part of the good life.

Q. Are you suggesting that there has been no advancement, no development in Nyasaland as a result of Federation at all?—A. No, Sir, but I would say that it is extremely difficult for us to say this and this and this is a direct result of Federation and could certainly not have come otherwise. For instance, a little maternity clinic at Deep Bay was declared to be a direct result of Federation. Those of us who have lived in Central Africa before Federation knew that such things were appearing slowly throughout the country, and they continued to appear slowly through the country after Federation. It is extremely difficult for us to be convinced of this as an argument acceptable to the common man for economic advantage. While we accept the indisputable fact, which I believe is turned out by the Jack Report, that more money has been available to Nyasaland from the Federal Treasury, one wonders sometimes quite honestly where exactly it has been applied, and why also it has not been applied with greater skill and statesmanship to show its benefits in terms of the life of the common man.

In answer to the question which I have been answering in this long preamble, it seems to me that the whole premise of a delegation such as ours today is that we are concerned, though Mr. Shaw has described us as a secular body, with issues which are generally labelled moral; and we believe that the people of Nyasaland, like the African people of Northern Rhodesia, had to a great extent a warm regard for the protecting power. I think that has been shown again by what I believe was the welcome given to the Queen Mother at Mzuzu in the Northern Province of Nyasaland. It did not surprise me that the welcome should be good, because I have never found basic anti-British feeling in Nyasaland. But looking to a protecting power which had again and again defined through her representatives in visits to schools and colleges and provincial councils and elsewhere her objective in protecting Nyasaland, I think, would have a right as a protegee to expect that the same protecting power which has given £12m. to Nigeria and some considerably vaster sum to Cyprus and so on, would be able in terms of world finance to raise the wind to maintain Nyasaland's development, while working as intensely as possible for the awakening of the economic interests of her people and the harnessing of her economic development. But I am sure it will not be harnessed until they are happy about where their country is going, and I think the situation in West Africa underlines this.—(MR. SHAW): May I supplement this?

Q. I just want an answer to my question.—A. You said that you should compare the last seven years with the previous twenty-three. The answer to that is surely that in the previous twenty-three years, as in fact there is today, it was a Colonial Office Government in Nyasaland. You must compare what has been done in the last seven years with what might be done in Nyasaland by a Federal African Government, whose single objective was to increase the economic wealth of their country. When you consider the number of British Colonies around the world, the Colonial Office Government simply cannot have that degree of concentration that an African Government in Nyasaland ought to be able to achieve.

Q. You do admit that there have been advantages?—A. Certainly I think there have been advantages. Whether those advantages, as I said before, are primarily for the benefit of the African or for the European seems to be a matter of doubt. I just do not know.

MR. WOODROW CROSS: We have only heard the witnesses speaking of the Africans in Nyasaland. I should like to ask if they are indifferent to the fate of nearly 3 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia?—A. No, certainly not, Sir. I think the basic approach that we have endeavoured to set out in this memorandum is that Africans and Europeans alike have a right in each of the Territories to be fully consulted on their future. If the Africans in Northern Rhodesia want to leave the Federation, then I cannot see why it is wrong for them and right for Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Q. That is Northern Rhodesia you said. I was referring to Southern Rhodesia Africans.—A. (REV. MACPHERSON): In answer to that, I would say that the premises of our whole argument here would apply equally to the Southern Rhodesian situation, and they are that there should be representation of the peoples which is something that is consonant with those basic rights that we stand by.

Q. As it stands at present, if Federation was made so that the Southern Rhodesia Government would not accept the Federation as you propose—if Southern Rhodesia seceded—you have to think of the 3 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia.—A. Yes, Sir. But I would suggest, with respect, that it would be the duty of all of us, and certainly of any such pressure group as perhaps we represent, to speak and continue to speak on behalf of the peoples. If we felt that there was an injustice in the alliance of powers in Southern Rhodesia we would have to speak accordingly.

LORD CRATHORNE: Mr. Shaw, on a point of clarification, might I refer to your paragraph 5. Towards the end you have a curious sentence: "We believe that the present policy of the British Government does not have the support of the British electorate . . ." Exactly what do you refer to?—A. (MR. SHAW): As you know, we have no machinery of plebiscite or referendum in this country. It is an expression of opinion, but I do not believe that the British people, if this issue were placed before them in a referendum, would ever agree to a situation in which the British Government used British troops in order to enforce Federation against the wishes of the people.

Q. In fact, that paragraph 5 refers to a specific event of 1953 and it is an expression of view of three or four hundred citizens, however distinguished, north of the Tweed who take that view?—A. Why not?

Q. You put it here as a definite statement.—A. We believe—we do not say it is—we say believe.

Q. Three or four hundred people north of the border.—A. (REV. MACPHERSON): Might I say in all fairness, because this does apply to an answer Mr. Shaw gave earlier to Mr. Robinson, though there are so many paid-up members, as it were, we have reason to believe that when we have taken a matter to a public meeting there is a very considerable response of interest. It may be different south of the border, but it is certainly so north of the border.

Q. May I come to a specific point on your paragraph 26, that is in regard to a Second Chamber. I am interested as to what is really in your minds as to its composition and how we get it. You say you feel it should contain an equal number of European and African members. That is quite clear and definite, that is your view. You refer us to the Tanganyika model. What is your view as to how that Second Chamber is to be created? Is it going to be nominated? Is it going to be through a Federal electoral roll, or perhaps would you have a different election altogether from that for the Federal Assembly; or will it be representatives of each Territory nominated by their Legislatures, or indeed by their Governors?—A. I think it is a little difficult to answer that without making reference to the conditions on which people are entitled to vote, but I think that plainly this Chamber ought to be elected. That is the first point. Secondly, it must be elected on a basis of voting rights which would secure that the Africans are enabled to vote. I will not say everyone, but we have already suggested taxpayers as a possible level.

Q. That was for the plebiscite?—A. No, I think it was literacy we suggested, a simple, standard literacy test, and I would stress in English or their own vernacular, because, as we know, at present in order to gain admission to the roll, an African may be literate in his own language and he is still debarred from voting. That was a matter on which you will remember the British Parliament decided there was no discrimination.

Q. And it would be really a fresh election and it would not be from the Territories as Territories?—A. No. I do not see why there should not be Federal constituencies with an adequate Federal franchise roll.

MR. MENZIES: The Council makes no reference whatever to any proposal Constitutional guarantee to protect European minorities in the event of African domination. Do you not think that is a desirable thing?—A. With great respect, I

do not agree with you. I think our proposal to have a Second Chamber with equal representation of Africans and Europeans is designed expressly to give protection to both races against possible domination by the other, because we fully appreciate and sympathise with the anxieties which Europeans living in the Federation must inevitably have. They may or may not be rational, we do not know, but we have no doubt they entertain them, and it was with that idea in view that we proposed this Second Chamber with parity of representation. That this Second Chamber alone could pass a Bill to change the Constitution, I think would be a very great safeguard for both races.

Q. By parity of reasoning you would not want an African Affairs Board? You do concede it is possible there should not be a continuance of the Board in view of your Second Chamber?—A. We put that forward as an alternative, a reference to the Second Chamber. But you know, I am a lawyer and one is attracted to the idea that a judicial body should decide on a Bill.

Q. With your Second Chamber in which you have equal representation, no provision is made for a President, I notice. I do not know where the President is to come from on your proposition, that is a side issue. You have not provided for a President of the Senate; you have provided for equal representation of the races. Surely in that case there is sufficient protection without having the exorcism of an African Affairs Board?—A. No, I think that is taking an unduly high view of the courage of politicians. They are subjected to immense pressures, which are extremely difficult for human beings to resist; both from the party whips and other sources.

Q. You are adopting the Westminster method of Parliament. Surely we do not have these exorcisms in that system, an African Affairs Board and so forth?—A. We think the African Affairs Board can be made to play an important and independent and, perhaps one may say, judiciary role. I think there is room for both, but I am quite willing to concede that it may be that the better way would be to confine this to a Second Chamber constituted as we suggest.

Q. And your Second Chamber is not confined to amendments in the Constitution, although you refer particularly to that, it is a review chamber?—A. I see no reason why it should not be, provided it was made clear that the Second Chamber, and the Second Chamber alone, would deal with Bills to alter the Constitution.

Q. It is the normal chamber which has that expression?—A. Yes.

Q. On the question of the franchise, you are prepared to have a very broad franchise for the purpose of plebiscite to determine whether Federation should continue. For the destruction of the Federation you are prepared to have that practically, a very wide franchise?—A. Sir, I slightly demur to that way of putting it. We were told and we read often that it has been said in Parliament that the objections to a plebiscite would be this: that you would have to invent machinery to carry it out. We do not accept that, because every male African pays tax, and if you have got the machinery which enables you to gather tax, why should not that machinery be used to take a vote?

Q. Thank you. My question is this. Why did the Council lose its courage when it came to the question of the voters' roll? Why not, if it is good enough to have that basis of qualification for the destruction of the Federation, why should it not be good enough to carry out a voters' roll?—A. I see no reason why we should not have it on that basis, but as I told you we put forward this proposal in view of the people's objections made in Parliament and elsewhere that there was no machinery available. It was to demonstrate what we thought was the incorrect way of making this suggestion.

Q. If it is good enough to have that basis of voting qualification for the destruction of the Federation, why should you not carry it over into your proposal in paragraph 25 for the reform of the voters' roll? Why should you not have the same qualifications for that purpose instead of these special qualifications that you speak about?—A. We would not object to that for one moment, but we are very certain that the European members of the Federation would. As we are not entirely divorced from reality we put in paragraph 25 a method of dealing with the situation which some at least of the Europeans in the Federation might accept and which public opinion in this country, I think, might very well accept.

MR. KATILUNGU: I would like first of all to know from Mr. Shaw whether you are in favour and you do accept sincerely that partnership policy for Central Africa was the right policy for a multi-racial society?—A. Partnership, if it means equality between the races, yes. Partnership, if it means what we think it does mean today, the obvious predominance of the European angle, no.

Q. But if partnership was incorporated in the way you think it should, it is affording equal opportunity to all the

people in the education field, in political participation and so on?—A. If it accepts the vote for all people in the three Territories, certainly; we say it must be acceptable to them, otherwise it is morally wrong. (REV. MACPHERSON): Might I suggest that either you have to resort to apartheid, or else you have to resort to removing one section of the population on multi-racial grounds, or else you have to resort to partnership in the true sense of the word.

Q. If partnership means what you interpret—equality for all in Central Africa—and that was, in fact, practised by the people in the Federation, you would still go ahead suggesting, as you have done in paragraph 24, that representation in the Federal Parliament should be racial, or would you accept the method which is practised today, that no one member of Federal Parliament or local Legislature Council would be returned to these two Legislatures by a racial electorate rather than the joint element of both Europeans and Africans?—A. (MR. SHAW): We deplore any kind of racial representation. The only reason we put in here about 59 is that it is a temporary stepping stone which we would hope would lead us to “one man, one vote” irrespective of colour or religion.

Q. I hope you had the privilege to discuss this with Dr. Banda during his recent visit to England. In so far as your suggestion of an electoral college of so many, do you think he indicated he accepted this kind of interim measure?—A. I frankly did not discuss this with Dr. Banda when I entertained him. I should think he would not approve of this.—(REV. MACPHERSON): If I may add with respect, again and again in Nyasaland Dr. Banda, before his detention, said that what was asked at that time was an African majority—experience, as he said, in jumping into the river and learning to swim.

Q. In so far as your memorandum is concerned, Mr. Shaw, you are not, in fact, condemning the Federation as such. Neither do you consider it impracticable except that you would like to see improvements made to meet African demands.—A. (MR. SHAW). We have no objections to Federation, and if those improvements were made we would see no reason for breaking it up.

Q. Regardless of improvements that you have suggested having been made by the Government, the African politicians in Central Africa, particularly in the two Northern Territories, continue to oppose Federation even if you give them equal representation. What would be the opinion of the Scottish Council at that stage?—A. We would say that if they demonstrated by democratic means that their views were shared by the majority of their people, then they must have the right to secede—because otherwise you are imposing Federation by force.

MR. GONDWE: Democratic means—how can that be certain?—A. You may remember that they had a general election some years ago in India in which 90 million people voted, most of whom were illiterate, and the Press in this country was almost unanimous in its praise of that general election and of the successful methods used to bring home to the electorate the issues involved. I say that if these leading African politicians are offered the chance of a plebiscite, then their claims to have the backing of their people will either be proved or disproved.

Q. You seem to have said earlier on that you thought that a plebiscite or referendum could be held tomorrow if possible?—A. No, Sir.

Q. Somebody said it.—A. Mr. MacPherson thought so and I personally would agree with that, but our memorandum says that after you have had your 1960 Conference then you should hold the plebiscite.

Q. In which case you mean to say that machinery should first be created whereby plebiscite or elections would be held?—A. No, Sir, we say the machinery is there waiting to be used. You have all got to pay your taxes in the Federation just as we have here. The tax collector can get to you, he can send you a plebiscite form quite easily.

CHAIRMAN: Your tax-paying would be the qualification?—A. Precisely.

MR. GONDWE: There should be some people who should compile a list of all the taxpayers in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland before you can hold a plebiscite?—A. (REV. MACPHERSON): These lists exist in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Q. Yes, they do exist.—A. Therefore they do not need to be compiled.

MR. GONDWE: But they want collating.

SIR VICTOR ROBINSON: Your proposal in paragraph 25 to the effect that the right to get on the voters' roll should be in effect the fact that you pay tax, that literacy—practically everybody is literate now in English or vernacular—would mean an immediate swamping of the white electorate, I think?

—A. (MR. SHAW): We suggest, of course, with the school certificate: it might be primary school certificate.

Q. What sort of education would that be—Standard VI or less?—A. (REV. MACPHERSON): There is the standard school certificate at Standard VI level in those countries but there would be a prescribed one to be laid down. We were not prescribing on this point.

Q. You were not. But earlier on you said one man, one vote in 1972—in the same paragraph.—A. (MR. SHAW): Yes, but we suggest that you might approach that goal by taking these preliminary steps.

Q. And in twelve years' time one man, one vote?—A. Yes.

Q. Which would give the African electorate predominance in all the elections?—A. Well, Sir, why should not they have it?

Q. I am just saying it would, and that would mean you have a black Government, they would form the Cabinet?—A. I think that might very well be so.

Q. Would you describe a law such a Legislature passed as discriminatory if it was in these terms: all farmers should pay a wage of £50 a month to all their labourers—would that be discriminatory?—A. (REV. MACPHERSON): The Commission sent out under Sir Patrick Devlin made reference to something which some of us in the Church of Scotland were putting into practice—what he believed was the simple basis of working partnership. From our experience in what I would like to say very emphatically that when the people to whom we have gone have shared with us on an equal basis responsibility in our work we have not found that they have simply said things of that kind, but instead they have shared responsibility with us for the well-being of the community in which we have lived. I think this is one of the lessons which will have to be learned now, because if it is not learned now the swamping will certainly come later.

MR. CHIRWA: Has your Council given any consideration to the training of Africans in the Civil Service? You are talking of Africans having equal responsibility; but have you considered the methods and means by which the Africans can be trained to acquire that responsibility?—A. (MR. SHAW): In this memorandum we do not say anything about it.

Q. In your discussion you referred to it.—A. I can see no reason why Africans should not be trained for responsibility in exactly the same way as people in this country are trained.—(REV. MACPHERSON): Might we say too that, though I say this personally, I am sure my colleagues would agree with me, we would commend very much what training has been begun by, say, the Nyasaland Government in certain spheres of work, and the Northern Rhodesia Government too. We regret that the quantity has been small, but we commend what it has done and personally I would very warmly commend the whole policy of the present Director of African Education in Nyasaland in regard to the view he takes that things must be done with a sense of urgency to equip with the necessary administrative skills the people of the land. We should not recommend the starting of the new processes but simply resumption of processes that have been begun and most tragically through the events of the past years slowed down.

Q. Your Council has shown a great deal of concern over the Africans in Nyasaland. You seem to be concerned mainly with Nyasaland as far as one can judge. That being the case, I thought you would also have considered the question of how you want these people to be trained, because if you are talking of people taking over responsibility naturally you must give them training.—A. (MR. SHAW): I think we took it for granted. We have seen it happening in West Africa rapidly. The one thing we would hope would be greater rapidity. The longer you dam it up the shorter time you give yourself to do the training, until finally you are turning out one-year trained people when you would gladly have given them three years. I think the Commonwealth scheme is going to be a very great help if the Government accept people for training in all sorts of lines, not merely in the Civil Service, but business as well.

Q. Has your Council considered making available some of the facilities in Scotland?—A. I am very glad that the College in which I am concerned has admitted Nigerian students. The applications have been dealt with in London. We have not had Central Africans routed to us, but I am sure we would give our help, any help we can.—(REV. MACPHERSON): We would put on record our appreciation of the European Colonial servants in this field of sharing experience with African learners, and also put on record our appreciation of the British Council's scholarships and arrangements. These have been smaller than we would have liked to see, but have definitely been the beginning of a stream, such as some of our young people from Northern Nyasaland coming over for training, where there is older culture.

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MR. MCCLELAND: Where you have a limited amount of finance, would you support a policy where that finance is devoted to training the few up to a high standard or is used to give training to the mass to a lower standard? Thinking in terms of getting executives trained who might be able to come in and act as African Civil Servants.—A. Is the question about finance? What finance, and is it finance held in Government Exchequer?

Q. Finance available for education.—A. You are not thinking of business training?

Q. No. We are thinking in terms of people being trained to come into the Civil Service if we have an African Government.—A. I have suggested, with respect, and I think that this is very widely suggested in Clutton-Brock's book "Dawn in Nyasaland" when you have two societies together and one appears to be in the terms of reports of expert commissioners under-developed and the other over-developed, there is considerable place through the redistribution of money through taxation and the greater flow of money for the total welfare of the community along such lines as the questioner outlined. MR. MCCLELAND: That does not quite answer my question.

CHAIRMAN: The question was this: assume that there is an amount of money available, for reasons good or bad, to which purpose would you direct its use—to training a mass a little way, or a few a long way for the purposes of administration of the territory?—A. (MR. SHAW): Surely, Mr. Chairman, the longer term, wise course is to train a few, because they will later fertilise the mass.—A. (REV. MACPHERSON): The present Director of Education in Nyasaland stresses, and I think very rightly, the place of local authorities in the carrying of the burden of primary education and also, of course, in Nyasaland, contrary to Northern Rhodesia, we have fees for schools and I think it is the opinion of many of my African friends that it is not a bad but a good thing. Secondly, if local authorities and local interests bear more and more of the responsibility for primary education, where, as in a typical district, 3,500 out of 4,000 children eligible for school are actually at school at the lower primary level, it seems to me that the special concentration of Central Treasury should be upon the post-primary where the watershed is to tragic in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland today.

MR. ROBINSON: Paragraph 32(a), under immigration and emigration. I would like to ask you whether the examples of Mr. Stonehouse and the Rev. Tom Colvin are the only two cases that you can think of where reputable and responsible British citizens have been denied admittance to the Federation in the past seven years?—A. (MR. SHAW): There was Fox-Pitt, I think, and Michael Scott. Mr. Faber has just been deported, a member of the staff of the University College. There may be more. I cannot recall them offhand. Certainly those.

Q. Assuming that those are the numbers, which are approximately five, do you think this power has been exercised unreasonably?—A. I would never agree with anybody that a member of the British Parliament in whose trust the protectorate lies should be denied a right of access to that Protectorate and it seems to me, and I speak just for myself, it reflects the greatest discredit on the British Government that they failed to protest publicly and vehemently when Mr. Stonehouse was deported.—(REV. MACPHERSON): Particularly when His Excellency Sir Robert Armitage had expressed a welcome to Mr. Stonehouse to visit Nyasaland.

Q. I would not wish to examine the merits of your statement, but I accept it on its face value. Let us leave Mr. Stonehouse out. Do you think that the power has been used unreasonably? For example, have you gone into all these cases? Do you know whether the Reverend Tom Colvin was refused entry purely for political reasons or do you think there might be a possibility of moral or other reasons involved?—A. I do not know what lies behind that question.

CHAIRMAN: You may give the answer to us which may be more convenient for us to have.—A. It was surely for those who debarred him to give publicly their reasons for doing so. As far as I am aware they did not do so and I can only tell you that Mr. Colvin, who is known to many of us in Scotland, is not a man on whom any kind of moral slur can be thrown.

MR. ROBINSON: Was he not invited by the Federal Government?

SIR LIONEL HEALD: The Federal Government offered if Mr. Colvin wished it.—A. (REV. MACPHERSON): I was a member of the committee who dealt with this, and the answer to that was that Mr. Colvin was assured that the reasons were personal reasons, and therefore he asked for a personal statement about them. He was told that the answer would only be made publicly in the Federal Parliament. It appeared to the committee of which he was an agent in Edinburgh that that was an impossible view, and therefore it was agreed to record the Church of Scotland's full confidence in Mr. Colvin and to

drop the matter at that stage.—(MR. SHAW): I should have thought the case of Mr. Colvin in many ways is even more disgraceful than the case of Mr. Stonehouse.—(MR. MORRISON): He was left under a slur by this curious method of denouncement and saying we will tell you in public.

CHAIRMAN: We have heard what you say about that, and you will excuse me if I am not prepared to continue it any further. Any other questions?

MR. CHIRWA: On this question on paragraph 25 where you are suggesting that a common voters' roll could possibly start in twelve years, do you think that would be acceptable to the majority of the Africans? It is the basic idea that you must have agreement of the people. Do you think Africans in Nyasaland would accept that?—A. (MR. SHAW): I think that question would have to be directed to Dr. Banda and his colleagues. We merely make a suggestion here because obviously you have to strike a mean between the demands of the Africans, whether they are right or wrong, and the fears of the Europeans. We are merely putting forward a suggested date, 1972, in order that you may train up the Africans.

Q. In view of what has taken place in Tanganyika, for instance, where you have a very broad, almost common, voters' roll, and in Kenya recently, do you think it is reasonable to suggest that? I believe that when you wrote your memorandum it might have been reasonable, but do you regard that as being reasonable in the light of recent developments?—A. (REV. MACPHERSON): What has changed the situation so much since we wrote this memorandum is what many of us feel is the outstanding statesmanship of the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Iain Macleod, and the fact that he has suddenly given a feeling of movement and imagination to many who are worrying about the tragic situation in Africa. Secondly, I feel from my own experience in Africa that if people believed there was the guarantee that they were not going to be swamped, which would be just fear, they would be relatively happy about it: whereas in a situation in which they have been threatened so blatantly by Sir Roy Welensky, regardless of the protective articles of the Colonial Office, they have been in a state not of hope but of despair. I do not think this would be followed by a violent reaction. I think, instead, the reaction of many level-headed people would be, "We are in the way and we have a guarantee and our protector has given this guarantee". And I think that means a great lot in Central Africa.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for your attendance and your help.—A. (MR. SHAW): May I on behalf of our Council thank you very much indeed for giving us this opportunity of coming here and attempting to defend our memorandum.

Memorandum

K. B. DUBE

Africa is today constantly in the news; in the Union of South Africa there is some blood shed and in Togoland there is some rejoicing over the newly won Independence. In my opinion there is a great deal to learn from the political evolution of the territories now occupying the Union of South Africa, before the 1910 Union and what is now happening there. The political evolution in Togoland or Ghana say, gives us another picture of African political evolution on the basis of that of the Union of South Africa, because I feel that this will not bring Peace and Prosperity to Africans and the World. The Constitutional of Southern Rhodesia, a member of the above Federation, does not show great differences from the Constitution of the Union of South Africa, in that it has the underlying principle that the European is there to direct the African and to give him the political evolution suitable for him. I find this to be interpreted in the Draft Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and it is my sincere belief that unless very sweeping reforms could be devised in the Constitution the multi-racial experiment will not materialise. *To this I wish to add that at the first Federal elections the electorate (c. 80% non-Africans) supported fully a policy of working with the Africans and not apart from them. This means that the electorate rejected the alternative policy of separation, segregation or apartheid, but agreed to residential and social separateness as a general principle to which there would be a few exceptions. Both Africans and Europeans would have to have a common loyalty to the Federation known as Rhodesia and Nyasaland.* (Huggins). The general principle of residential and social separation with a few exceptions has been followed during the past 7 years: the Southern Rhodesia Prime Minister, Mr. Whitehead, speaking at a Press Conference in Salisbury on January 29, listed conditions under which his Government would co-operate in the review of the Federal Constitution. He demanded among other things that the remaining reservations in the Southern Rhodesia's Constitution should be removed. He also demanded that the Federal Government should remain in civilised hands. This condition related to the federal franchise. I think the record of the

Federal Government and the pronouncements by such persons as Mr. Whitehead and other Government leaders do not convince me that the European in Central Africa is ready to face the real political evolution of Africa.

2. I do not wish to consider the details of the political development since Federation, but would like to make it clear that it is my impression that the majority of Africans and Europeans in Central Africa are ready to work together as a nation, for the prosperity and security of their country. In my view the problem in Central Africa is not that of Nyasaland or Northern Rhodesia or Southern Rhodesia remaining in the Federation, but it is one of the different races joining hands and realising that they have to share the wealth and poverty of their land together as a united people.

3. I reject the principles of the Draft Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as expressed by the electorate at the first Federal Elections, and I do not find the achievements of the present Federal Government to have been anything short of the wishes of the electorate.

4. For the 7 million people of Central Africa where in my opinion the prime factor of every sensible man would be to raise the standards of living of the masses by training technicians, health authorities, training people in local government and sending young people overseas to enable them to broaden their views so as to be better equipped in their work in this our fast-changing world. On these finer points, the general principle of social separateness ranks in the forefront in the Minister of Education, Minister of Finance, Foreign or External Affairs or better said among Cabinet Ministers. I have personal experiences with regard to my advanced Education both with the Southern Rhodesia and Federal Government. There is nothing agreed, and there is hardly any reliable information for the public on the above.

5. I could write to great length on the failures of the Constitution, but I feel I would like to make a few suggestions for your consideration.

- (a) A common voting roll and an expanded franchise that would raise the number of eligible African voters in the Federation to a million-and-a-half. Qualifications to be worked out but not on present lines.
- (b) A new Cabinet in which Africans are promised several ministries. 4 Ministries which need African guidance badly are Education, Labour, Health and Social Welfare and Agriculture.
- (c) A scheme to train judicial officers such as Magistrates, local government officials, Africans as well as Europeans to share equally in this. This would go along with the drastic revision of the Federal Civil Service Commission.
- (d) The reservation of lands for Europeans and Africans has got to go. Judicial safeguards for those who are immigrants up to date of passage of the Constitution and reasonable compensation to be made to those found to lose money as a result of such a change. This would mean that Southern Rhodesia and her Urban Areas Act, etc., would also have to fit herself in line with others.
- (e) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations (Dec. 10, 1948) says:—"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." (article 9) "Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the border of each state." "Everyone has the right to leave any country including his own, and to return to his country" (article 13).
- (f) Atlantic Charter. The president of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Third, they respect the right of all people to choose the form of Government under which they will live, and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

Fourth, they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security.

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hinderance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air operations continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments Signed. August 14, 1948.

6. Sirs, I think if we are going to be successful in creating a multi-racial community in Central Africa, there cannot be any compromise on the type of Constitution needed to guide the men who may be asked upon to take up the task of running the Government. I feel that what I have suggested above would give the people of Central Africa a chance to show the world that people of different races can live and work together. The economic development and such matters as investments and immigration are matters which do not and should not be in our way, there will be people immigrating under all circumstances, but unless we conduct our affairs of Government in a true democratic manner there are unavoidable external circumstances which as extreme African Nationalism, Communism and many other problems which I feel we ought to avoid by trying to admit our failures and correct them as it may be too costly if we wait too long. There is a set of men in Central Africa both African and European who if called upon to govern would do so. But I think the men who are at present governing need to be guided and advised to take serious account of such declarations as the United Nations declaration of Human Rights and the Atlantic Charter because these are documents which provide us with the best means of solving our problems.

"Nothing is settled forever unless it is settled justly" (Lincoln).

Heidelberg
Western Germany

Oral evidence
K. B. DUBE

Mr. Dube said that he was a Southern Rhodesian African who was born on Mount Selinda. He was studying medicine in Germany, where he had been for five years, and he hoped to qualify with a German degree next year. He wished to return to the Federation, but he did not know whether the degree he was taking would enable him to become a registered practitioner there. Prior to going to Germany he had taken teacher training courses at Mount Selinda and Tigenkloof in the Union of South Africa. He had received no bursary or state assistance in pursuing his studies, but had been helped by private people.

Speaking of his memorandum, Mr. Dube said that we were all human and all made mistakes, and that the same thing had happened with the governments in Central Africa. He saw no reason why all the inhabitants of the Federation should not live in harmony with one another, and he thought that this could be achieved if a positive lead were given by the governments. He suggested that the Commission should recommend that all available agencies interested in human relationships should be persuaded to enter the Central African field. The young people of that part of the world lacked information and knowledge of the world outside, and he was not by any means confining his remarks to politics. He said that he got frequent inquiries from young Southern Rhodesians who wanted to branch out.

Mr. Dube felt that unless the political power in Central Africa was placed in the hands of the Africans, it was unlikely that the African youth of the country would ever be able to achieve the advantages of outside contact to which they were entitled, and here he quoted from the Annual Report of the Federal Ministry of Education for 1958, which showed that while there were 476 grants and scholarships to non-African students there were only 44 for Africans. The young African in the Federation had to be educated, but he was educated

poorly, and he should not have to be content with what the witness termed "book learning". He must get out and make wider contacts and ensure that his education was not only for himself, or even his people, but aimed at benefiting the country and wider world. True happiness, he said, could only derive from such an approach.

The witness criticised the manner in which scholarships and grants were awarded in the Federation, and said that this was a matter that was dealt with entirely by civil servants. Against the figures that he had mentioned, what hope was there for Africans, with the franchise as it was at present, would they ever be able to take a lead in the affairs of the country? He wanted to see an African Students' Scholarships Board presided over by an African, and as far as augmenting funds of any such Board were concerned, he suggested that the Governments should introduce machinery which would enable voluntary contributions of a shilling a month to be made by every working African.

Later in his evidence Mr. Dube referred to a particular case of a young African who wanted to attend the Natal University. He could not do so because of a ban on Africans entering the University, and similarly he could not enter any universities in the United Kingdom, because his qualifications were not high enough. Mr. Gondwe, one of the Commissioners present at this hearing of evidence, confirmed this, and went on to say that 44 was the total number of Africans in the Federation who could be found to take up the scholarships. He, Mr. Gondwe, said he was a member of the Scholarships Board, and that they had found that the qualifications of only a few of the African applicants measured up to the necessary standards, but all who did qualify had been given scholarships. He agreed with Mr. Dube that depending on one's personal view, it was possible that the qualifications might be too high, but he did not necessarily subscribe to this himself. Mr. Gondwe said that the real problem was that there were not enough secondary schools for Africans, which were very necessary. The witnesses' response was that 44 African students gaining scholarships for higher education was absolutely inadequate, and, he asked, "where do we go from here?" He said that he did not know what the Constitution of the Scholarships Board was. It was explained to him that there were very few, if any, civil servants on the Board at present.

Continuing, Mr. Duke thought that as far as possible an impetus should be given to Africans undergoing professional and technical training courses, and he said that subject only to the payment of their fares, fifty could be placed in universities in Germany tomorrow. He criticised the Federal Minister of Health, who was in Britain recently looking for doctors and nurses. Why, he asked, had he not suggested to each university in the United Kingdom that they should take on a scholarship basis even one medical student? He had no doubt that most, if not all, medical schools would have been prepared to do this at their own cost. Mr. Dube said that the manner in which the Federal Government dealt with this matter must be the subject of the Africans' judgment on

partnership, particularly in view of the fact that even Africans with money were required to deposit as much as £200 for repatriation expenses before they were allowed to leave the country for overseas. The witness added that the West German Government had embarked on a programme to help Africans. The Government were getting money from industrialists in order to further their commerce in Africa. He said that 29 Nigerians were brought over to Western Germany in 1959.

In connection with his reference to discrimination in Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Dube said that he was totally opposed to it. He said that he had undertaken social work in South Africa where he had studied the Urban Areas Act. He had then gone to Salisbury and found that urban legislation there was very much akin to that in the Union. Added to this was the tendency in Southern Rhodesia for personnel to be imported from the Union. He wanted to see the Land Apportionment Act repealed, and if this went out he was not afraid that Europeans with their financial dominance would tend to buy up all the land at present reserved for Africans. He said that the racial groups had to live together, and it was best that racial groups should feel that they were kneaded together now. For his part he saw sweeping reforms, and what he wanted was full democracy in the country, as represented by the House of Commons, that is to say, the franchise had to be widened very considerably.

In reply to a number of questions, the witness said that the underlined words in the first paragraph of his memorandum were a quotation of something said by Sir Godfrey Huggins. His use of the term "reject" in paragraph 3 referred to the rejection of what Sir Godfrey Huggins had said during the first Federal elections.

Referring to paragraph 5(a), the witness commented that the 1½ million African voters he had mentioned would not in effect outvote the Europeans because these would be responsible Africans of the Federation, and as such they would vote for the best man, be he white or black. If he had favoured the idea of "one man, one vote" the figure he would have used would have been five million African voters out of the total population of approximately eight million, and not only 1½ million.

Dealing with paragraph 5(d) of his memorandum, the witness said that he did not infer that this would mean that the people in the native reserves would have to leave. He did not think for a moment that Europeans would wish to buy up the land in the native reserves. Quite apart from that, the suggestions he had made from his paper were such that would be respected too by responsible people. He said that morality had some place in all this, and that those of goodwill would prevent the wholesale purchase of land by ill-intentioned people.

Mr. Dube made a plea that those members of the Commission from the Federation should, on returning to their country, consider starting something in the educational and cultural fields for the benefit of young Africans.

LONDON

9TH JUNE 1960

Memorandum

C. T. LEYS

1. The following remarks are confined as far as possible to constitutional and political possibilities, rather than questions of what is right or desirable. The present facts of the situation in Central Africa are very well known to the Commission and my general interpretation of them, for what it is worth, is available to the Commission in the chapters which I have contributed to *A New Deal in Central Africa* published by Heinemann,* an advance copy of which was placed in the Commission's library.

2. Events in Africa since the 1959 emergencies appear to have narrowed the choices which are open to the parties to the forthcoming conference on the review of the constitution.

3. It is clear that the government of Nyasaland cannot be continued for much longer without a substantial increase of political power being given to the Africans. If this does not occur both administration and economic development are likely to become impossible. The cost of maintaining government by force would be prohibitive even if a good case could

* Mr. Leys informed the Commission that he wished also to submit certain sections of this book as evidence. The sections in question were the following:

Part I (Chaps. 1 to 3) pp. 1-39.
Part IV (Chaps. 9 to 12) pp. 98-137.
(Chaps. 17 and 18) pp. 180-200.

be made for it on other grounds. In the circumstances—a popularly supported nationalist party (the Malawi Congress Party) and very small European and Asian minorities—a significant increase in African political power will inevitably involve a major step in the direction of making the government responsible to the African population. Once this step is taken, however, further steps become inevitable, because such a government will depend on the support of a public which expects such further steps (i.e. steps towards full self-government and independence). From this it follows that Nyasaland cannot be kept in the Federation unless the Africans of Nyasaland wish it. It is plain from the speeches of Dr. Banda that if he remains leader of the nationalist movement under these conditions he will choose secession from the Federation, and the mass hostility in Nyasaland towards federation will evidently oblige anyone who is the nationalist leader to take the same attitude, whatever may be the rational arguments which might be adduced against it.

It seems, therefore, that the removal of Nyasaland from the Federation ought to be regarded as inevitable and that the only problems of policy which arise in connection with Nyasaland concern ways and means of making the transition orderly and peaceable, and of finding guarantees for economic progress and for making sovereign independence a reality. In particular I believe that attention should be focussed on the following needs:

- (a) the need to provide grants and loans from the United Kingdom (similar to those provided for Sierra Leone) to

ease the fiscal problems which Nyasaland will face on becoming separate and independent ;

- (b) the need to provide an emergency civil service training scheme to create an adequate African administrative class for the civil service. The Togo Republic's training school seems to offer the most promising sort of solution to this problem, which is of course not at all confined to Nyasaland ;
- (c) the need to negotiate with the nationalist leaders sufficiently attractive terms to retain substantial numbers of overseas service officers for a transitional period ;
- (d) the need to negotiate a commercial agreement between Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia covering *inter alia*
 - (i) Nyasaland migrant workers in Southern Rhodesia
 - (ii) Southern Rhodesian exports of manufacturers—especially textiles—to Nyasaland.

4. The possible effects on the other territories of Nyasaland's departure from the Federation are a matter of speculation. But the possibility that such an example might be sufficient to make the Africans of Northern Rhodesia ungovernable unless Northern Rhodesia also seceded is not the only ground which makes it seem likely that the separation of Northern Rhodesia from Southern Rhodesia is inevitable.

5. Whatever the details, five main alternatives to simple separation of the two Rhodesias (Northern Rhodesia's government becoming responsible to the African population) present themselves:

- (a) To maintain the existing Federation, in respect of the two Rhodesias, with effective European control at both the Federal and territorial levels (including Northern Rhodesia's territorial government). This seems highly unlikely to be a stable solution because although African opposition to federation has been less solid in Northern Rhodesia than in Nyasaland, political feeling has grown stronger and presents a serious threat to stable government unless the sort of crisis which a decision of this sort would create can be avoided.
- (b) To maintain the existing Federation, in respect of the two Rhodesias, with the Northern Rhodesian Government effectively responsible to the African population, but with a separate Federal electoral role, or an unequal division of seats between the two territories, which would still give effective control to Europeans at the Federal level. This seems even less feasible than 5 (a). The creation of a Northern Rhodesian Government responsible to the Africans implies the emergence of a strong nationalist leadership, at least initially, and it is not realistic to assume that such leaders would be content to leave a large measure of control over Northern Rhodesia (via the Federal legislature and departments) in European hands. If they were, they would be quickly replaced by others who were not. Such a solution therefore seems unworkable.
- (c) To maintain the existing Federation in respect of the two Rhodesias, with not only the Northern Rhodesian Government, but also the Federal Government (in so far as it was responsible to Northern Rhodesian electors) responsible to Africans. Both major European political parties in Southern Rhodesia have taken up positions which make it virtually certain that this would be unacceptable to the Europeans of Southern Rhodesia.
- (d) To retain a federation of the two Rhodesias with very much reduced powers at the centre, with a Northern Government responsible to Africans, and a Federal Government responsible to Africans in Northern Rhodesia and still to a mainly European electorate in Southern Rhodesia. If the powers at the centre were small enough this might conceivably be acceptable to Northern Rhodesian nationalist leaders (in view of the less extreme hatred of federation, and greater preoccupation with the substance of political power, which has characterised Northern Rhodesian nationalism in the past, as compared with Nyasaland nationalism). For the same reasons it might also be acceptable to Southern Rhodesian Europeans and it might even be possible for Nyasaland nationalist leaders to accede to such a union (under another name than federation) at some future date.

The difficulty which lies at the heart of this solution, however, is economic. It is hard to see what incentive Northern Rhodesian nationalist leaders would have for remaining in any union which continued to distribute Northern Rhodesian copper revenue in favour of a still mainly European-controlled Southern Rhodesia ; yet without this redistribution, it is hard to see what major incentive Southern Rhodesian Europeans have for maintaining the Northern Rhodesian connection.

- (e) To revive the Central African Council or perhaps create a High Commission on the East African model, from which a closer form of union might or might not grow by popular consent at a later date. But this is in effect a solution which amounts to separation, with inter-territorial agreements between independent governments and joint machinery for dealing with common interests.

6. The choice therefore seems to lie between 5(a) and 5(e), or indeed between 5(a) and mere separation of the two Rhodesias. 5(a) implies proceeding towards an independent Federation, in respect of the Rhodesias, with the existing balance of political power between the races essentially unchanged. For reasons which are now widely recognised it would evidently be extremely difficult and, in the current African and international context, unwise to endorse the internal *status quo*, which is what this policy would amount to. This being so, it seems wisest to concentrate on the practical problems concerned with separation, and to seek a constructive solution within these limits.

7. These practical problems are not all the same as those which arise in connection with Nyasaland, although the problem of building quickly a Northern Rhodesian African administrative service is very similar. The fact that the two Rhodesias share a common railway system, and a common source of hydro-electric power, among other things, makes the case for seeking to create interterritorial machinery to administer them a strong one. Moreover Northern Rhodesia's copper revenues should be capable of sustaining a development programme without special grant aid from the United Kingdom. But the real difference from Nyasaland lies in the position of the European community, and I believe that a realistic approach to its problems will have to include

- (a) travel and small capital grants to assist the re-settlement of any European who wishes to emigrate from Northern Rhodesia ;
- (b) securing special political arrangements for Europeans (e.g. reserved seats) for a transitional period, if the leaders of the European community desire it ;
- (c) securing the inclusion in the Northern Rhodesian constitution of a Bill of Rights and safeguards for the independence of the judiciary ;
- (d) financial intervention to secure European farmers against capital losses through a fall in land values.

8. The consequences for Southern Rhodesia of separation are also a matter of speculation, but among the main possibilities are:

- (a) a drop in the capital inflow to Central Africa as a whole (caused by political uncertainty), which would mean a loss to Southern Rhodesia especially (because of the concentration of secondary industry in Southern Rhodesia) and Salisbury in particular (as capital of Southern Rhodesia, and even more as capital of the Federation) ;
- (b) loss of revenue originating in Northern Rhodesia which is currently spent in Southern Rhodesia ;
- (c) the threat of a loss of markets in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland if these territories sought to build their own industrial base behind tariff protection ;
- (d) an excessive burden of services for a European population which has grown at a faster rate than Southern Rhodesia would have been able to sustain on her own resources.

If these effects were pronounced, a serious recession would seem to be implied for Southern Rhodesia unless strong counter-measures were available.

- (e) loss of political confidence among Europeans sufficiently severe to produce a popular demand for joining the Union of South Africa.

In view of the long tradition of independence among the European population of Southern Rhodesia, and the recent deterioration of the situation in South Africa, the last possibility (e) remains highly unlikely. Nonetheless it is the most serious threat confronting all races in Southern Rhodesia and economic intervention by the United Kingdom to assist Southern Rhodesia's adjustment to separation from Northern Rhodesia offers a most important possible means of averting it.

The problem referred to in (c) is a long-run problem which is in any case implicit in the virtual inevitability of the independence of Nyasaland. In this case it has been suggested (see 3(d) above) that there is room for a mutually advantageous agreement between Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia which the United Kingdom Government should seek to promote. Northern Rhodesia, however, unlike Nyasaland, does not give Southern Rhodesia hostage in the shape of a large migrant labour force, and arrangements to secure at least an interim "open door" in Northern Rhodesia for Southern Rhodesian

goods might well call for further intervention by the United Kingdom (e.g. special grants for the promotion of industries in Northern Rhodesia which would complement Southern Rhodesia's, rather than be competitive and call for protection). The problems referred to in (a) (b) and (d), on the other hand, are essentially problems of adjustment and here financial aid to the Southern Rhodesian Government by the United Kingdom has an obvious job to do.

9. In conclusion I would like to emphasise three assumptions which underlie the foregoing argument, which suggests that the most constructive task facing the review conference is to work out the practical basis on which the territories of the Federation could resume independence with least damage to their political and economic fabrics. These are:

- (a) that partition of Northern Rhodesia, involving the transfer of the line of rail and the copperbelt to Southern Rhodesia, is inadmissible;
- (b) that Europeans in Central Africa have a strong interest in bringing to an end forms of government which cannot win the support of the African populations;
- (c) that the United Kingdom has a strong interest in a peaceable and lasting solution, to which it should be ready to make a very substantial economic contribution.

Oxford

16th May 1960

Oral Evidence

C. T. LEYS

Q. We are very glad to welcome you this afternoon. You have been kind enough to give us first of all paper and also to refer us to the book in which you took a part—"A New Deal in Central Africa" (see footnote to memorandum above) I may be asking you one or two questions on other peoples' contributions; if you want to disclaim responsibility, do. There are one or two things I would like to start with. You are a Fellow of Balliol?—A. Yes.

Q. Tell me about your knowledge of the Federation Territories.—A. I spent inside a year in Central Africa of which far the greater part was in Southern Rhodesia, in 1955/56.

Q. And you have qualified yourself by reading as well?—A. I cannot claim any first-hand acquaintance since 1956.

Q. The first point I want to ask is on page 175 of the book. Part VI—it is not your bit—line 4:—

"A statutory Commission, not a Bureau of Race Affairs at the beck and call of the government, should be instituted to deal with matters of race discrimination."

It should be an independent body, etc., and be provided with a constitution embodying powers and modes of procedure. That is in the passage dealing with race discrimination. It has been suggested to us by a number of witnesses that we ought for the future not to be looking merely at discrimination against the Africans but, as things develop, against minorities in general and to the protection of those minorities. Have you thought of the statutory Commission in relation to that or is it just to replace the African Affairs Board?—A. To replace the African Affairs Board, you say?

Q. Yes.—A. No. I think it was thought of in more general terms; very much more so, certainly as an institution which could very conceivably be of great value, for example, to the European population of Northern Rhodesia or indeed to Asian communities and indeed any other minority group but I think the model that Dr. Chidzero probably had in mind would be the Commission set up by municipal governments in the United States to deal with each province. I do not know whether this was his whole document.

Q. In regard to safeguards of this kind we have not only been urged to look after all minorities but also to put in a Bill of Rights or something of that sort, setting out some of the things from which they ought to be safeguarded and that also you have considered, I think?—A. Yes, in a later chapter.

Q. The next point about which I want to ask you is on page 191—"Between now and the Conference there is much that can be done to strengthen Britain's position at the discussions." First, about international opinion and then—"Constitutional changes can be introduced into Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia before the Conference so that the governments of these territories will be more fully representative. It would be a valid ground for deferring the date of the Conference that such changes can only be satisfactorily made if there is more time available."

One of the things that has been pressed upon us is this: you look at the Preamble to the Constitution: the part of Nyasaland or Northern Rhodesia in the Federal Constitution which is independent or becomes independent is dependent upon the expressed desire of the inhabitants and no doubt some

such considerations were viewed in this passage. I have in mind your later paper. Supposing that independence were recommended by stages and it was said, here are the steps which we think ought to be taken to make the governments of the Northern Territories more representative; supposing in the meantime steps were taken to make the Federal structure perhaps more attractive or less unattractive to the African population, would you consider a possible solution could lie in our recommending that these steps should be taken in the Northern Territories and that there should be, when representative government has been achieved, an opportunity for the Northern Governments to decide whether they would stay in or go out?—A. I think that the difficulty will need such a solution which is partly constitutional and partly political. What I am thinking of is this. It does not seem to me easy to recommend changes, for example, in respect to Nyasaland which move at all in the direction of making the government more responsive to African opinion which does not in effect create African self-government with or without special minority representation. The political difficulty might well be that once you have such an internal system the pressure on the African leaders in Nyasaland to take Nyasaland out of the Federation, regardless of what other programme you were to recommend to go along *pari passu*, might prejudice this part of the programme. Even if this were not the case, however, I do see a separate difficulty. This might or might not be recommending changes in the basis of representation at the Federal level for the two Northern Territories. If these went hand in hand and in the same direction as the changes that you envisage stage by stage in the Territories then I foresee difficulties at the Southern Rhodesia end; that is to say, if the Southern Rhodesia Territorial Government were not constitutionally changed at the same time. If you do not then I foresee extreme tension between the African leadership which is being given a free rein in respect of Territorial matters in the Territories and the representation which these Territories would still be getting in the Federal Assembly, and therefore, the Federal Government. It does seem to me one cannot divorce one from the other even over a relatively short run.

Q. I was not meaning to prejudice the question of representation in the Federal Legislature nor was I assuming that one would make changes in the Southern Rhodesia Constitution very easily. But I was suggesting there might be something to be said for not discarding such advantages as there were in the Federal structure without giving an opportunity for the Northern Territories to express what seems to be implicit in the Preamble—a desire one way or the other. Do you think politically there might be?—A. I think if the way sought for doing this were to seek to get the Territorial Governments of the Northern Territories elected on a much wider franchise and essentially responsive to Africans—the point I am trying to make could best be expressed by saying I should need to know, to give an intelligent answer, what was meant by stages. If all that is being proposed is that the governments of the two Northern Territories should be based on the basis which would make them responsive to African opinion at one go and that they would then be, as governments, given an opportunity to decide their future association with Southern Rhodesia or each other, I foresee no difficulties of an obvious character in the Northern Territories, presuming we could make this change, although I do foresee difficulties in Southern Rhodesia and from the Federal Government. But if it is proposed that governments, effectively responsible to African opinion, should be created by a series of stages spread over a number of years at the end of which there would be ones responsive to African opinion which would be given the opportunity to make this decision, then I do foresee difficulties and tensions in their relationship to the Federal Government in the meantime.

Q. I just wanted to get your reaction to that. On page 200 you come to deal with the essentials of a new deal. At the bottom of page 199:—

"The problem is to find the minimum that will suffice. The essential minimum which will meet the case in 1960 is that there should *initially* be as many Africans as Europeans on the Federal roll."

You make it plain in the rest of the chapter that this is only a transitional idea but that is the least you think will do for the time being. Then a little later on you deal with the problem. Page 203. You point out on Territorial representation that territorial populations. Then you point out that the ratios do not reflect territorial economic contributions and somewhere you make a suggestion—the device of two member constituencies. Had you got those two things in mind together? Initially there should be as many Africans as Europeans on the roll and that there might be a device of two member constituencies? I was wondering if you had the device as a means of securing the point you made earlier?—A. I think the answer is no to that but it would not rule out the possibility. I think the proposal to have two member constituencies with a reserved seat for any race you wished to protect—we

had in mind the European community—would not necessarily involve parity of representation over the whole territorial area. It might be that you wished to have a minority race represented in a minority block in the Assembly and the Tanganyikan experience would suggest this might best be achieved with the system of cross voting with racial seats. Although this is rather separate from the other issue, the point of which was to say the essential feature of the franchise change must be numbers involved rather than an attempt which, I think, has so far been abortive to discover some qualitative basis.

Q. I think I personally would like to look up the answer and find some method of reaching the answer which is what I think you are suggesting for the time being. Had you thought out how it would be or just "this is how the thing would go for equating"?—A. To be perfectly frank, Sir, I think that this is a proposal which would be a starting point for negotiation. This was worked out last summer and the situation has evolved considerably since then but if one makes some fairly large assumptions about the readiness of the leaders of the African nationalist movements in the Northern Territories to endanger the Federal structure, from this starting point then I think one could begin to talk of details. The point we wished to say here was it was no good starting beyond any point short of this and I do not believe it is beyond the point of ingenuity of the Federal Civil Service to find out.

Q. That answers my question I am only trying to get some things clearer from you. In the memorandum which you put in, you did consider a number of alternatives which might be looked at as solutions to this and several of them involved federation (excluding Southern Rhodesia) between Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and maintaining the existing Federation in respect of the two Rhodesias—that comes in to several solutions. Do you think that there would be any real likelihood of Northern Rhodesia accepting a solution with just themselves and Nyasaland?—A. If you mean by Northern Rhodesia the adult population of Northern Rhodesia, no.

Q. You do think in a different sense it would be acceptable?—A. I think it is quite clear that the majority of the European electorate in Northern Rhodesia now would be content with such a solution. My impression is they would be happy with such a solution, given the existing Federal structure and basis of representation. I am not unaware of tensions which exist between European populations of Southern and Northern Rhodesia but my strong impression is that the European population of Northern Rhodesia would not be unhappy to continue in the Federation as it is, but without Nyasaland.

Q. A certain number of witnesses have given evidence which suggested to me at any rate there was not much in it for Northern Rhodesia, if losing the support of the whole Federation they were tied up with Nyasaland alone and had to make contributions from their present copper revenues to Nyasaland.—A. I am sorry, there is some confusion here.

MR. ELLMAN-BROWN: There is some confusion here. I think the witness thought continuing with Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia was your question.

CHAIRMAN: I beg your pardon. It was my fault.—A. All my answers would be different.

Q. It is only the idea by which the Federation of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were the component parts, that would be possible, would it?—A. I do not see clearly the stages by which this would be reached. My supposition on this would be, to be a reality, such a union must come from the agreement of Governments in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland which are representative and in effect, if not *de jure*, experienced. I do not myself see that much good is going to be done by attempts of this country or other interested parties to try to prepare a baggage arrangement for the union of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. That is my personal opinion.

Q. The question you thought I was putting to you does arise in your paper, the two Rhodesias being linked together?—A. Very much so.

Q. And your view about that?—A. My view about that is this is the heart of the problem. It appears to me that we ought to consider as virtually inevitable the departure of Nyasaland and the question, therefore, arises of the other possibility. What kind of a government the Rhodesias shall be under, particularly Northern Rhodesia and in the case of Northern Rhodesia this immediately raises the question of the relationship between Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia under any kind of political union and my feeling here is it is very difficult to see a government in Northern Rhodesia, a territorial government, which is responsive to African opinion agreeing to continue in any federation which did not give Northern Rhodesia at least a half share, and that is say Northern Rhodesia Africans, in all control over the Federal

Government and it is equally difficult to see Southern Rhodesia staying in such a Federation.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, I follow that.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: We have read this book of yours with great interest, I am sure all of us have, and found some extremely interesting and stimulating ideas in it, but I hope you will not think me discourteous if I ask you some questions really to elucidate the relationship between the book and the memorandum because of a rather difficult situation. You said some of this book was written last summer but it has only just been published so if I, as a member of the public, wanted to know what Mr. Leys' views were on the subject I should look at the book. If I look at the memorandum would it be unfair to say it has a very different point of view?—A. It would, I think, be unfair, yes.

Q. Can we see why it is unfair? I find it very difficult. In your book on page 199 you have the essentials of a new deal and you lay down new guiding principles of policy and so forth. Now we find there is no suggestion that you want to see the break-up of the Federation; still less do you recommend it. You do, in fact, go into the various things which could be done to improve the prospects of the Federation continuing and on page 210, you say the alternative would be for Britain to resume full powers of government but make it quite clear, I would have thought that that is not what you are recommending when we look at your memorandum. You will find there that the only question of policy which you think the Constitutional Commission ought to consider or, as I understand it, we ought to consider, is simply the question of breaking up the Federation. They cannot both be the policy, can they? Which is it?—A. I do not think it is a conflict such as you suggest. We put forward the first set of proposals down to page 210 in the book as possible bases for continuing Federation and then page 210 we speculate as to the possibility of getting acceptance for our proposals. Primarily because of scepticism or uncertainty, if you prefer, about the possibility of getting the present leaders of the Federal Government and also of the Government of Southern Rhodesia to agree to such terms, we then go on to specify the alternative and I would say and put it to you that since last Autumn it has become increasingly clear, particularly as a result of events in the two Northern Territories and a speech by Sir Edgar Whitehead which will be familiar to you, that the chances of our proposals being accepted have, I should say, very severely diminished. In my memorandum I tried to make it clear at the beginning that I am attempting to deal as far as possible solely with the realistic situation as it has, in fact, developed since the Emergency of last year and I am frankly very much more pessimistic now about the chances of Federation continuing on the basis that we propose in the book. I would like finally just to say this: that basis is put forward as a basis which would be consistent with the declared objects of Federation as we thought they were understood by open-minded people in this country in 1952/53, and as I say, I am moving from book to memorandum, from the question of desirability and perhaps of political morality, largely to questions of what is now practical given the very severe narrowing of choice which events in Central Africa appear to me to have induced on the situation.

Q. May I put it as it seems to me. My trouble is this: anyone buying this book today, and it has only just come out, would think that what you were recommending were these interesting things at the end of the book. They would not know that in the memorandum you say virtually all that is a complete waste of time. Do you really think it is a waste of time?—A. I do not think it is a wasted exercise in that I think it is very important to state what were the practical implications of continuing Federation on the 1953 understandings. I think that is worth doing as a matter of good faith. If the British Government were serious in intending Federation to serve these various purposes it should now state what would be the terms in view of the changed situation on which it should continue. I might say if it is a question of speculating about what the British public would do, that the first review to appear of the book assumed that what we recommended in the book was the break-up of the Federation on the basis that the conditions laid down on page 210 were to any realistic observer of the Central African scene, not fulfilled.

Q. What review was that?—A. The leading article in the *Manchester Guardian*.

Q. Perhaps the wish is father to the thought. I would have thought, I must say, it is a little difficult for us to know exactly what weight to attach to your views which we follow with great interest in view of the fact that in the book you talk about essentials of a new deal, the guiding new principle of policy to do so and so, and then you come to various headings under which you deal with that. Now when we read your memorandum you say here quite definitely, if you just look at it, "It seems, therefore, that the removal of Nyasaland from the Federation ought to be regarded as inevitable and that the

only problems of policy which arise in connection with Nyasaland concern ways and means of making the transition orderly and peaceable". Let us be frank about it, it is inconsistent.—A. I hope I am being frank in saying your question is perverse. It is perfectly plain to me. There is no inconsistency in suggesting that the British Government ought to put forward a proposal and the proposal would be consistent with the standpoint of the British Government. Nonetheless it seems to me I am perverse in putting forward my views as to the present reality of the situation to a Commission such as this.

Q. Leaving out personalities for a moment on what is, after all, a matter of opinion, will you kindly assume that we are approaching this matter from the standpoint, what is the best possible thing for the future of Federation? Under those circumstances would you say your essentials for a new deal are relevant or irrelevant?—A. I would certainly say they are relevant on the basis I have explained.

Q. Really what your memorandum is is a rather pessimistic judgment as to the future impracticableness of the possibility. The memorandum does not really deal with the thing on its merits at all.—A. I do not know what you mean as dealing with it on its merits.

Q. The proper constitution which should be given to Federation in accordance with the principles you yourself have stated in order to achieve the object you want to see. That is not breaking up, is it?—A. I am sorry if I appear to you to be grudging but it seems to me the Commission is faced with a situation which is changing all the time. I am not here today to recommend to the Advisory Commission what, if I were speaking to British citizens, I would recommend to the British Government.

Q. I am asking you to recommend what you recommend we should do.—A. I am not here to do that.

Q. You are not prepared to give us your advice?—A. No. I am here to put my point of view on the situation as it has developed and to see for what it is worth whether the assumptions and deductions embodied in my memorandum stand up.

Q. You are not prepared to give the Commission your advice as to what we should do?—A. Yes. I do not think that I am here to advise you what you should say. I think I am here to present a point of view.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: We are not talking about your position. I was merely asking whether you were prepared to give us your advice or not. Never mind, I am very sorry.

MR. CRAWLEY: May I ask you the reason why you take a much more pessimistic view now? Is it because of the increase in violence and intimidation generally in the two Northern Territories in the last few months?—A. Partly, yes. I think this is particularly true in the case of Northern Rhodesia but more generally I think that is a question of the perspective in time. I think that one can now see more clearly in particular the solidarity of opinion in Nyasaland since the emergency. It was still very unclear in the summer of last year what the significance of public opinion in Nyasaland of the emergency might be.

Q. Obviously intimidation is undesirable. It is not necessarily an indication of an increase of feeling. It could be an indication merely of efficient political organisation. What importance do you attach to the increase in intimidation in relation to the political climate as a whole?—A. I am inclined to see it as the product of frustration of the middle ranks of leadership of the United National Independence Party. I am inclined to think that the views recently expressed by Kenneth Kaunda on that subject are probably correct. They are probably sound.

Q. You mean you think it is an indication that his following is increasing?—A. No. I think it is very difficult to measure the violence as such. I think that there has always been, certainly in certain areas in Northern Rhodesia, the strong following for the more promising, most militant of the independent African political organisations. What I think violence suggests is perhaps the Congo example is appealing to the younger and less responsible members of the Party. In general they can get support for it because of the general feeling of frustration that the situation is not moving as their leadership has promised it would.

Q. Do you feel that if it was made clear that African responsible Governments were coming in the Northern Territories, including Nyasaland, within a few years and I mean full responsible, and if, at the same time, as the Chairman said, the right to secede was acknowledged when they became fully responsible, do you feel that that might affect the climate of opinion, and that their leaders might take a more deliberate view of an altered Federation?—A. I think if they could feel confident that what was promised in the future would come about, and for this I think you would have to have fairly substantial earnest of it straightaway, I think this is a very plausible

speculation. I am sorry—you said Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland, or just Northern Rhodesia?

Q. Yes, and Nyasaland.—A. About Nyasaland I am sceptical. I feel there is opposition there. I feel it is virtually impossible for any leader even if he believed in advantages in Federation for which it would be worth hanging on, it would be really very, very difficult for him to commit himself. I do not see any evidence that there are such leaders who do believe that there are advantages in Federation which it would be worth retaining. But even if there were I feel the situation there would make his life precarious as a political leader.

MR. JUSTICE BEADLE: Could you do one without the other? You said you thought given an earnest of that undertaking and given the right to secede you might do it in respect of Northern Rhodesia, but not in respect of Nyasaland. Does not that rather conflict? Your memorandum points out if you allow Nyasaland to go it will have such a tremendous repercussion on Northern Rhodesia that you will have to let Northern Rhodesia go as well.—A. I do not actually say that. It is possible: I do not know what evidence we could get either for or against that position. I do not think anything I said to Mr. Crawley does imply that one could advance one Territory without the other. I think it is a separate point I am making in my memorandum and that concerns what would happen if we assume, as I do, that Nyasaland will become separate from the existing Federation. I am sorry if I have crossed two lines.

MR. CRAWLEY: Did you come across any evidence that the Africans in Northern Rhodesia desire union with Nyasaland?—A. Have I personally?

Q. Yes.—A. No.

Q. You think there is any such evidence?—A. I do not know.

MR. McCLELAND: You look upon Nyasaland as a key to the whole problem. If we could reconcile the Nyasaland view or we could overcome the opposition do you think there would be a reasonable chance of getting the Federation to work?—A. In the sense that the Nyasaland Nationalist movement appears to be more irreconcilable even than the Northern Rhodesia one, I agree.

Q. Assuming that we could get it to agree that it should continue in some form of Federation, do you think that the opposition and the tensions in the other countries—they exist among the Europeans as well as Africans—could be overcome and Federation could, in fact, successfully work?—A. Put it this way: I think any assumption you make which can, so to speak, envisage reconciliation of Nyasaland will be strong enough to enable you to make the same assumption about Northern Rhodesia.

MR. MOLSON: I would like to ask the witness about two points which he has not developed as fully as I think they should be developed in his memorandum. In paragraph 5 (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) he has set out very clearly and in a very interesting way various courses of action which might be taken and in (d) he writes this:

"If the powers at the centre were small enough this might conceivably be acceptable to Northern Rhodesian nationalist leaders."

"For the same reasons it might also be acceptable to Southern Rhodesian Europeans and it might even be possible for Nyasaland nationalist leaders to accede to such a union (under another name than federation) at some future date."

Let us leave out for a moment Nyasaland about which I understand Mr. Leys to be very pessimistic. He says that the difficulty which lies at the heart of this solution is economic. But it really is such an inviting course that I do not quite know why he has not dealt with it more fully. Would he care to develop it a little bit because it is an attractive idea?—A. Develop the difficulty?

Q. I would rather you developed the possibility rather than the difficulties. The difficulties will speak for themselves.—A. There are a number of ways you could reduce Federal powers. Proposals have been circulated in Central Africa and elsewhere for the transfer back to Territorial Governments of a number of powers exercised by the Federal Government. Health services have been an issue. I have not thought about it further than in terms of transfer back of powers. An alternative to the re-transfer of powers would be—and this is separable from that idea—to move effectively to a confederation instead of federation. This really is implied in 5(e) where I mention the possibility of a High Commission. Essentially one can talk of loosening the Federation, or reducing the centre in terms of effectively transferring all powers of the Federal Government to some central body that would retain the final authority over them. I was thinking mainly in terms of reducing the powers. I think this is the thing which has most appeal to people as a solution for Central Africa and the

difficulties seem to me not to be great until one comes to talk about economics and here I find it very difficult to overcome the fact that the hard core of the economics of Federation has been the fiscal transfer and as I say here I do not know whether I should try to explain that any more. I think it says it about as clearly as I can. I find it difficult to see the Northern Rhodesia nationalist leaders being content to stay in the Federation, the effect of which was to continue to tax the resources of Northern Rhodesia on behalf of the European controlled Southern Rhodesia. Conversely, if this were not the case, although there are some tangible advantages in independence and tax revenue from the copper mines which rebounds from Southern Rhodesia being linked to Northern Rhodesia, I do not think they are strong enough to overcome what I think we would have to anticipate, which is the fairly strong political reaction away from union with Northern Territories, if this sort of reconstruction were being undertaken among the European population of Southern Rhodesia.

Q. It would mean it would still retain its market for their secondary industries which is extremely important?—A. It is important. When I used the words "major incentive" I had in mind subsidiary incentives of that sort and also of the sort which are involved in the joint operation of Kariba and things of this sort though I should not have thought that a major incentive. I do not know, but my feeling is it is not as efficient. I doubt if it would be a sufficiently major incentive. Sir Edgar Whitehead offered it to the electorate as a reason for staying in some sort of Federal relationship with Northern Rhodesia. What I envisaged would be an atmosphere of sharp reaction against the people in Northern Rhodesia. I do not feel committed to that view, it is very speculative.

Q. You say that you feel that your paragraph 5(d) is closely connected with your paragraph 5(e) and I was also very much interested in your paragraph 5(e). Therefore I was rather disappointed when you began paragraph 6 by saying that the choice lies between 5(a) and 5(e), whereas I should have thought 5(d) might have been kept in as a choice, and then you say, indeed, 5(a) and mere separation of the two Rhodesias. Why do you dismiss so lightly the idea of a Central African Council or a High Commission on the East African model? Would that not go a very long way to preserving the undoubted economic advantages of having the three Territories or, since you wholly despair of Nyasaland, the two Territories together. I do not wholly despair as yet. Does not your paragraph 5(e) suggest that way in which there would be a real hope of preserving the economic advantages of a single common market for this great expanding area, the advantage of a diversification of sources of revenue and at the same time give to the different Territorial Governments an opportunity for their own independent political development and might not that prove to be acceptable to African nationalist opinion?—A. Yes. I do not dismiss it. I am sorry if I gave the impression that I dismiss it. When I say "or indeed between 5(a) and mere separation" I wrote that to indicate that I think the possibilities involved in (e) will depend on the way in which, if that is what you are aiming for, *de facto* the separation from the two Northern Territories and each other from Southern Rhodesia is engineered. I think whether you can work (e) will depend on the climate of opinion prevailing in the Northern Territories and Southern Rhodesia after *de facto* separation has been brought about. I think it is very difficult to separate any sort of proposal which implies the sovereignty of the three Territories having been restored to them from a consideration of the political atmosphere which would ensue.

I agree with you, if I may say so, that there would undoubtedly be, for example, common services, communications of various sorts, which it would be very desirable to have joint machinery to operate. This seems in the logic of the situation.

Q. Why do you talk about *de facto* separation? It would be perhaps a loosening of the Federal bonds and as you have yourself suggested there might be a different name for it. It might be called an association or something of that sort; but surely it is very much better to relax the bonds and still keep a common customs boundary round the whole thing and income tax collecting in a single organisation; posts and telegraphs and the railways all run together, all run as a single unit? Why do you call that *de facto* separation? I am anxious that as far as possible each of the Governments shall enjoy political autonomy, but most of these economic things have not got a very great political content in them. Could we not persuade African nationalists to agree to remain in an economic association of that kind? Do you despair of that?—A. I do not despair of parts of it. The distinction, I think an important distinction, would need to be drawn. I think some economic arrangements have important political consequences for the relative welfare of the Territories, an others seem to me to have mutually more or less equilibrating effects. Let me distinguish between customs and joint services such as air

services. Clearly there are overheads to be saved by operating a joint Central African Airways system which runs between the Territories, and there are efficiencies of other sorts to be gained in that way. When it comes to customs I think it has been very clearly demonstrated in Henderson and Hazlewood's book on "Economics of Federation", a country like Nyasaland which is poor in relation to the other two Territories may stand to gain a great deal from coming out of a customs union. It may be that there are serious losses. I am not saying these cannot be compensated for by other economic means. The evidence seems fairly strong. I think leaders in Nyasaland, even if the political climate allowed them to make these comments and one would hope it would, might well hesitate before agreeing to joint machinery which involved another customs union which obliged them to buy produce in Southern Rhodesia which is protected by Federal tariffs. They would have to buy at higher prices than they could buy it from outside unless there is also diversion of capital to compensate for these higher prices. In other words, I do think there are political snags involved in some of the purposes for which one might evolve this.

What I had at the back of my mind in making a distinction between *de facto* separation and *de jure* separation is the distinction, the orthodox distinction between federation and confederation. Under a federal system presumably the new Territories do not have the right unilaterally to amend powers, to opt out of this or that arrangement, whereas under arrangements we are discussing now they have, and to that extent, even though a number of functions were centrally administered, they would be centrally administered on sufferance by the Territorial Governments. So although the fiscal effects might be the same, the Civil Service might be concentrated in different areas, in some central area to administer services, and there would be, I think, important political distinctions between that and Federation.

Q. I follow that. It does seem to me that you do not seem to attach any very great economic importance to keeping the three Territories together in a single unit in one common association and I should have thought that it was quite obvious that poor as Nyasaland may be and is compared with Northern Rhodesia that the consequences of breaking up the economic area would be to make the poverty even greater despite what I know you recommend, the almost unlimited largesse which is to come from this country for the benefit of white as well as black people out there. Do you not feel it really would almost certainly have a very serious effect upon the standard of living of all three Territories if Federation were broken up without the common banking, common transport, common communications and so on being preserved?—A. No. I do not think I have had this argument proven. It may be the case. But I am sufficiently impressed by some work that has been done by qualified economists on this problem to think that we have taken for granted too many aspects of the economic problem. I think it is absolutely clear that an independent Nyasaland will face a very serious fiscal shortfall, and I do not think there are any two ways about that, but whether the fiscal benefits which Nyasaland has gained have outweighed the number of losses, whether there are net gains, it seems to me to be unproven.

MR. TAYLOR: Mr. Leys, your book has been published at a time when a great deal of interest in the affairs of Central Africa is evident in the United Kingdom and, of course, it has been sponsored by a body of people held in the highest academic esteem. While it may not excite any great surprise that economists come to different conclusions on a similar problem, it is nevertheless, I think, quite important that the facts upon which they base their arguments should more or less be agreed as true facts. When you were in the Federation did you receive any official assistance in the collation of your sources of material?—A. Yes.

Q. And of course you had access to unpublished sources as well as published sources?—A. Official sources—I do not think so.

Q. But you found no great difficulty in unearthing what you were looking for?—A. No, I received much co-operation.

Q. If you refer to one or two parts in your book, I would like to get your assistance please. On page 134, in the middle of the page, speaking of the troubles in Nyasaland you say—"It was not a movement confined to the ignorant; 34 out of the territory's 35 African graduates were imprisoned." As far as the information that we have at our disposal is concerned there are not anything like 35 graduates in Nyasaland. Our information is that there are only nine altogether at the present moment. How, for example, did you discover there were 35 graduates in Nyasaland?—A. Press reports. These were not contradicted by the Government.

Q. Of course, lots of people have not time to make corrections of all the mis-statements of fact which appear in popular newspapers. Now on page 104, about half-way down

you say "Peasants from countries like Italy and Greece have been recruited to come and be trained for these jobs". I believe you were out there in 1955 and 1956, and I am sure this is what you are referring to. There was a considerable recruiting drive going on to get operatives for the railways in particular, and your statement is quite correct; but did you not feel that in the interests of academic accuracy it would have been desirable to have gone on and pointed out that in the following year, 1957, only 40 Italians came into the country for all purposes and that in 1958 only four came in, and in 1959 only one came in? In other words, the recruiting drive was a once and for all exercise, designed to get an economy over a post-war "hump" of a physical shortage. In your opinion, would it not have put the thing in better perspective if this had been pointed out?—A. Opinions could differ on that, I think, Mr. Taylor. The central point here is perhaps a fair one nonetheless. We know this was a once and for all drive: the fact remains it was a drive to recruit at enormous expense—I do not think this is a heinous thing, but merely use it as an example of the length to which sometimes the Government was forced to go, and I give the Government all credit for making, at times during this period, efforts to get conditions with the railway unions changed. Negotiations were going on, I know, and I refer to it here.

Q. There are one or two other points of a similar nature I would like to make. On page 112, near the bottom, you are speaking of the two nominated unofficers, and you say "... they are no longer there to represent African interests, and one is African and the other European." Do you know that in fact that person is an Asian: A Mr. Mistri?—A. That is an error. I will take your word for it.

Q. I assure you it is right. These are points you may like to take care of in a second edition.—A. I am grateful to you.

Q. On page 116 you attribute to Sir John Moffat, after the Federal election of November 1958, a verdict that the African Affairs Board could no longer even be considered "an impartial or independent body". Sir John Moffat did not seek re-election in the 1958 contest, and the verdict there attributed to him in point of fact came from his brother, Mr. Rob Moffat. If you wanted to use a Moffat name, Sir John is rather better known than Rob. On page 190 there is a footnote (No. 2) in connection with the view that the provision for this review was an opportunity for seeing whether there was any merit in a federal concept or not. You say in the footnote. "This was admitted in the House by the Secretary of State in 1953, though he was quick to deprecate any discussion of divorce proceedings while the marriage was being arranged, but see, *contra* Hansard: 24th March, 1953, col. 679." Above that you quoted in full the opinion which one sees there. Now in point of fact the quotation which you refer to in the footnote as merely *per contra*—and which the majority of readers in the United Kingdom or elsewhere will not bother to check—reads as follows (and this is Lord Chandos, as he is now):—"I emphasise that this conference, the 1960 Review, is not to decide whether Federation has succeeded or failed or whether it should be abolished or continued: nothing of the sort. It is a conference to make such alterations in the detailed working of the Constitution as experience in its work has shown to be necessary during this decade, the first decade of its life." I am suggesting that it would have put the whole thing in better perspective if the two quotations had appeared on the same page.—A. That is arguable.

Q. But one gets the impression on reading your book that the points you bring to notice are those which fit in with an hypothesis from which you start rather than being a critical analysis of something which leads you up to an opinion. And on page 106, talking of the University, you say, "The chief weakness of the College is the small proportion of African students (36 out of a total of 168 in mid-1959) and this is due to the grave inadequacy of African secondary education." Now the Federation came into being at the end of 1953. If the very first act of the Federal Government, or of any of the governments, had been there and then to have created an African secondary school, or more than one African secondary schools, none of the output of these schools could possibly have been found in any university at the time you are quoting. It takes time to build a school and to put pupils through it, so that whatever defects there are in the level of African secondary education cannot be attributed to Federation, though the implication is there that it is through a defect of Federation. It just takes time.—A. I do not think you will find it is suggested that that is the case—that this is a defect of Federation.

Q. No, you do not say that it is.—A. But I do not even imply it. I do not see why you should say I do.

Q. I turn now to your chapter on economics, but I will not put many questions on this because I gather that Professor Barber is responsible for that section of the book; but

I would like to ask you one question on a general section on pages round about 78-81. I think the conclusion will be sufficient to make the point (page 81)—"The scale of the recent drive for industrialisation suggests that the Rhodesias seek an economic future which will permit settler supremacy to adapt to new economic circumstances." Is there really anything very odd in any under-developed country, whether one with white settlers or no white settlers, in seeking to follow and promote a policy of rapid industrialisation? Would not Ghana, for example, be doing the same thing; and would not Nigeria be doing it before now? Has it necessarily any connotation with the presence or absence of white men?—A. If you like to take this sentence out of context, of course, you are entitled to do so but it does not seem to me to bear at all on Professor Barber's argument, which was that the scale of industrialisation attempted was being carried out at the expense of possible alternative uses of capital funds which, from the welfare point of view and given the population structure of Central Africa, and particularly given the agricultural problems which are created in part by land division would better serve African interests; this was a fair conclusion. I think one would need to argue in economic terms on the basis of possible alternative uses for the capital that is being put in. If one looks to West Africa one can see a different shape; not the total but a different shape. But the point is whether marginal expenditure on industrialisation in these territories would not reflect a different concern for the African population such as you get there.

Q. Let me put it this way: to go back to a very simple explanation of the drive for industrialisation, the Government's own avowed reasons for doing this is to find jobs in the future as well as in the present for the increasing number of Africans and Europeans, the increasing population of the country, that will not be able to find jobs on the land. Do you discount that as being a reasonable explanation? You do not think it is necessary, or that it is true that the desire is to find jobs for people?—A. Oh, I think it is true.

Q. And you think it is important?—A. It has its place. Of course it is important, but it is a question as to whether it is the only argument which should have its place in economic policy. I myself, for what it is worth, differ to some extent from Professor Barber on the degree to which he thinks and I think that the social implications of economic policy are foreseen at a fully conscious level in Government planning in Central Africa. He makes it a more conscious process than I myself believe it is, but I do not choose to argue with him on the economics of it, which I am not qualified to do.

Q. There are one or two other points in this section I would like to mention, but in view of what you say I will not do so. One final question: Central Africa has a wealth of photographic material, most of which has been well collected. What particular conclusion prompted you to choose the picture of a burnt-out village as the frontispiece of your book?—A. I do not quite see the implication. In point of fact I thought there was a wealth of photographic material, and I was astonished at the dearth of it in Central Africa. I am sorry to have to differ, but I was given great assistance by the Central Office of Information and the High Commissioner's Office. The point of that picture—which incidentally has a curtailed caption about which I am sorry—is that it was a village burnt during security operations in Nyasaland, and it poses a question....

Q. It is a village burnt out in the emergency operations. It is not the sole example of intimidation which you produce in your book.—A. Intimidation by whom?

Q. Of Africans by Africans.—A. No, it is not.

CHAIRMAN: Would you tell us about the caption?—A. The caption should have been "Burnt-out village during security operations".

MRS. HUXLEY: One question about your paragraph 7, in which you deal with the position in Northern Rhodesia, which you say differs from Nyasaland because of the European community. In (a) you say that an approach to the problems would have to include travel and small capital grants to assist the re-settlement of any European who wishes to emigrate from Northern Rhodesia; and you go on to mention other forms of assistance. It seems to be an argument that when once a multi-racial country acquires an African government it becomes an untenable place for Europeans to live in other than those employed by the Government. Is that in your mind? Do you think the Europeans ought to get out and the Government ought to help them, if the Federation breaks up?—A. No, quite the contrary. My view is that, provided the movement towards African-controlled government is executed with sufficient skill, Europeans have a very important role to play. It seems to me they have a lot of privileges, solid rights and expectations which were held out to them before they came to Central Africa, which they ought to have secured. On the other hand you have some Europeans whose position

under the sort of changes in the law which one can envisage taking place would become untenable; and these people will have to face a choice. There are people holding jobs which will be precarious from a European point of view, unless they are prepared to hold the job and take a lower wage for it. There is some evidence of emigration from Northern Rhodesia: it has been rather higher than has been the case over the past few years. It may be due to different causes. Certainly I understand that in Kenya there is considerable unhappiness and uncertainty, and people are talking in terms of re-settling elsewhere. I myself deprecate this and hope it will not happen. I hope that measures of the sort I suggest here might themselves contribute to stabilising the situation particularly where it is important to preserve the feeling of security the European will have: he may be torn between leaving at once or later. I think it is tremendously important. You should give people enough backing so that they feel their backs are not against the wall. Anything that would ease the atmosphere would be good.

MRS. HUXLEY: I suppose there would be a fund set up in this country to buy out the Northern Rhodesia farmers, if they wished to be bought out.

MR. ELLMAN-BROWN: You said earlier that the economic advantages of Federation to Nyasaland were not proved in your view. You go on to make a general statement that if Nyasaland was allowed to secede you must follow the example of Sierra Leone as regards giving financial assistance. Have you worked out what that assistance is likely to be?—A. I have not. If you assume that there is an annual short-fall in the first year of independence of £4 million, which appears to be the best estimate so far then, if Nyasaland is to make any changes at all in her present social services or level of taxation, it appears to me—although there are certain opinions on this—that if you assume the level of social services held constant for the transitional period. . . .

Q. Which is impossible, surely? Do you not agree that one of the biggest problems up there is poverty? Do you know who is responsible for that?—A. I would say that Colonial Office before 1956.

Q. And now.—A. It appears to me the transitional policy on a substantially larger scale than Sierra Leone of direct financial aid to this country is necessary. A contribution to Nyasaland's capital inflow has to be provided, whether it is done from this country or Southern Rhodesia or channelled through various institutions. It appears one must envisage a much larger-scale fund than the £7½ million provided for the next five years to Sierra Leone, and in the long run—and there is going to be a long run involved in getting Nyasaland to the point where she can sustain some of her own development—the source of this fund will need re-consideration. I do not delude myself at the moment in thinking this can be done on the basis of £5 millions down.

Q. The poverty is so appalling and the problem of converting a subsistence economy into a cash economy is so urgent for the whole of Central Africa. Do you not agree that to give Nyasaland a chance a minimum of £10 million a year is necessary, together with the shortfall in current inflow?—A. I am just not enough of an economist to know what minimum capital outlay is necessary to provide a basic economy: I just do not know.

Q. I have studied your proposition 5(d) in your memorandum as to a weakening of the centre, as you call it. From a political point of view, in this proposition which you put forward, where do you put the basic tax, under which power?—A. I do not put it anywhere. This is one of the powers about which the whole difficulty arises. One of the difficulties, as I see it, at present is not who would raise the taxes but in what proportion they are to be distributed to what agencies: that is to say the Territorial or central Governments. Political difficulties seem to me to arise under precisely this, in the kind of disparity in the types of governments you would get, for example, in Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia.

Q. With a weakened central government, would you put tax as one of the powers of the central government, to maintain the financial powers?—A. I would not myself put this anywhere. I am merely listing the possibilities and trying to ask whether there is a foreseeable political course which you could describe as a reducing of powers at the centre. My difficulty arises over this very point you raise.

Q. You say if you do not place fundamental controls of the fiscal and the customs at the centre then you would not have a Federation anyway.—A. Well, you could have one if there were changes which did not transfer the major control of the economy to the centre, but it is much less powerful; and clearly federation can dwindle to the point when it is merely an association for a certain purpose.

Q. I was trying to see where your concept of 5(e) and 5(d) really took us.—A. I do not know if you would accept it as a definition of Federation, but the Central Government,

in respect of the powers it has, must be autonomous and able to operate direct on the individuals of the constituent Territories; and there is no reason why it should not do this in respect of, let us say, the health services or post offices, but of course there are political peculiarities in a government with such attenuated powers calling itself sovereign and acting autonomously. There are federations which are rather like that, but I agree that it is federation in a different sense of the word and in practice from what we have at the moment.

MR. KATILUNGU: I would like to know whether, during your stay in the Federation, you happened to be in Northern Rhodesia and, if so, for how long?—A. One month.

Q. Were you on the Copperbelt?—A. Yes, for part of that time.

Q. Did you ever meet some leaders of the African mine-workers?—A. Mr. Kaloma.

Q. Before the Emergency?—A. Yes.

Q. In your book, on page 104 you refer to the Copperbelt situation during the Emergency, and you say that the leaders of the African Mineworkers' Union were arrested and banished to remote areas. You went on to say that the leaders of that Union were replaced by the Government, with the support of the Government. Did you get this information from the Government or from anybody else.—A. I am not sure I understand the question. Are you saying the present leaders of the A.M.W.U. do not enjoy the support of the Government? I say they do.

Q. I do not know what you mean by "support of the Government".—A. By comparison with the previous leadership, which was removed and detained.

Q. Would you be surprised to learn that because you had another side of the situation which took place immediately after the Emergency—would you be surprised if somebody told you that the old leaders who were there before the Emergency, some of those who survived, are still the leaders of the Union?—A. No.

Q. Would you say their retention of leadership had been a matter of support by the Government?—A. I think the retention of the main direction of the leadership has been, and the leadership which took over after the Emergency undoubtedly required the support of the Government.

Q. Are you then trying to say that the industrial revolution which took place then was the first in the history of the trade union movement?—A. Certainly not.

Q. In such cases where such industrial action was taken, if leaders for instance were imprisoned, do you not think the organisation should continue and other leaders take over?—A. In some cases.

Q. In most cases: if somebody is imprisoned, what happens?—A. There are plenty of examples to the contrary. Each case must be dealt with in its detail.

Q. I am very sorry that you did not have the full information from the people themselves rather than as a matter of guess. I think you were aware that immediately after the Emergency in 1956 a commission of inquiry like this one was appointed to investigate industrial conditions. If you have read that book, do you agree that the evidence submitted to the Commission would agree with the passage I have referred to in your book on page 104?—A. It was not concerned with the leadership subsequently installed, of course, but only with causes of unrest. I do not think there is really a discrepancy between those.

MR. CHIRWA: If you ponder over the present developments of the link between United National Independence Party and the African organisations, and you also ponder over the statements of the leaders in the Congo, their first thing is to work together through African organisations in Rhodesia and assist them. Where do you suggest that Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia could possibly run together?—A. I have seen references to them. I have not read the full statements and I have not pondered them.

Q. What conclusion do you come to? Do you think that in the light of these developments it is possible for Southern Rhodesia to remain in the Federation?—A. Even without these further factors it would be very difficult. I think I make my feelings clear on this. It depends, I feel, on how much importance you attach—it really boils down to a question of the willingness of the Government in Northern Rhodesia, whether Federal or Territorial, to resist extra-constitutional forms of pressure which may be brought to bear, that is to say lying outside present political channels providing for representation through representative processes. All the sorts of factors to which you draw my attention presumably would intensify the mood of militancy and raise the morale of the United National Independence Party and its supporters, and make them less ready to accept any compromise in the target of independence which they have set

themselves. Whether these would in fact be sufficient to make it impossible to keep Northern Rhodesia in association with Southern Rhodesia seems to me to depend on the balance of physical powers, in the last resort, and—more important—on the determination on both sides.

Q. Did you know that there are Bemba tribes both in the Belgian Congo and in Northern Rhodesia? They spread between both Territories.—A. Yes.

Q. Then your suggestion, which was brought out in replies to questions put to you, that it might not be possible even to maintain economic union—suppose there was no political association at all, but there was an economic union, do you think there would be any leaders willing to co-operate and at the same time to get the people behind the idea?—A. I feel this is a very difficult speculation. As I said before, I think it is something one cannot provide for in advance, but if one wished it to happen one could try so to contrive the independence, which you are assuming as taking place for the purposes of this question, that the atmosphere was as favourable as possible to those leaders. For example, if you have to go through violence to achieve independence—and there are countries in Africa who have done this—it leaves a legacy of bitterness and unreadiness to co-operate and hostility towards the people identified as “the enemy” which may take many years to overcome and make it impossible to achieve success; but if it can be done smoothly then anything is possible. The classic contrast is between Tanganyika and Kenya. I am now talking about purely internal conditions; but there are possibilities in Tanganyika while it is impossible to be optimistic about possibilities in Kenya.

Q. Suppose it was possible to give, say, immediate control to Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and then allow them to decide for themselves whether they wanted Federation or not, do you think that would possibly ease the situation?—A. You say if it was done immediately?

Q. Yes, I am suggesting immediately. Suppose there was an immediate handing over of power to African nationalists and you asked them to remain in Federation and let them take their own decisions about it within a certain period of time, do you think there would be any chance of the present Federation continuing, with modifications?—A. I just do not know. You just asked me if it would ease the situation. This I think it would do: but my own guess, for what it is worth, is that you would not get Federation accepted in Nyasaland. About Northern Rhodesia, I do not know. But these are very personal opinions, and I do not know how one would achieve greater certainty.

Q. Did you meet Dr. Banda and Kaunda when you were in Nyasaland?—A. No.

Q. You know about Chidzero?—A. I have seen Dr. Chidzero.

Q. You published the book together?—A. Yes. I did not see him before I came here, but I see him quite frequently: we work in the same University.

Q. Would he subscribe to those views?—A. I would not like to commit him on that.

Written Evidence

CHURCH OF SCOTLAND—I

Extracts from the Church of Scotland's Report on Central Africa, presented to the General Assembly, May 1959, by the Special Committee on Central Africa
The 1960 Conference

It is now definite that representatives of the five Governments will confer next year on the subject of changes to the Federal Act.

Most Europeans in Central Africa regard the 1960 Conference as the occasion when Dominion status can be demanded and obtained. This is the expressed view of the United Federal Party which governs the Federation. They would, of course, be prepared to erect other safeguards for Protectorate status in the north, but the main argument of this Report has been that once the main functions of government have been alienated there is no effective method of operating entrenched clauses, preambles or special watchdog committees from a distance. The Africans in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia (plus a growing element in Southern Rhodesia) regard this Conference as the testing time to see whether Federation is to continue or not. They fear the severing of Colonial Office protection.

“(The Africans) got a Federation they opposed and feared, but they also got an undertaking that the next stage in constitutional advance—Dominion status—would not take place until the majority of the people agreed to it. This guarantee was in the Constitution. The people of Southern Rhodesia accepted it in a referendum and therefore it was doubly binding on them. . . . The Africans opposed Federation five years ago and would oppose independence now for the same

reason—they consider their future is made less secure. But the difference is that while it was possible for us to go ahead with Federation in spite of African opposition, for Dominion status this is not so.”

(Sir John Moffat, *Rhodesia Herald*, 23rd November, 1958.)

Considerable ammunition is provided to extremists on both sides by the cry that the Federation's future is a matter of “party” politics in the United Kingdom. The Committee is of the opinion that stronger efforts should be made in this country to achieve a bi-partisan approach on the main issues.

This Committee feels that the scope of the agenda of this Conference will be crucial and should include a fearless examination of the possibility of the refashioning of the present Federal structure along lines that will go further to meet the criticisms of the Africans, especially the inhabitants of Nyasaland, than anything suggested in official circles since 1952. Indeed the nature of the agenda may well determine whether the Africans of Nyasaland will boycott the Conference or not. The Committee also feels that there should be adequate and proper representation of Africans' opinions.

The Committee is convinced that the granting of Dominion status without the consent of the majority of the people would be premature and dangerous.

Appendix I.

Statement of the Synod of Blantyre of the C.C.A.P. concerning the present state of unrest in Nyasaland—March 1958

(a) Preamble

We believe it is at all times a duty of the Church to express its views on the affairs of society and in all humility to pronounce what it believes to be a Christian judgment on matters affecting the life of the people of this land. To remain silent would be a betrayal of the Church's faith in Christ as the Lord of all mankind by whom our lives individually and corporately are judged and by whom alone they can be well ordered. In observing this duty of the Church we are pronouncing the view of the majority of the Church's membership, while scrupulously preserving the rights of minorities to differ from these expressed views of the Church and retain all rights of membership.

We do not believe that the Church should take sides in party politics or lay down political programmes, but this must not prevent it from expressing views on matters concerning which political parties have views. This should not make it possible for any one political party to say that the Church is either in support of, or in opposition to, that party.

It is therefore because of the strong feeling expressed by Synod concerning the state of the country at this time that this statement has been prepared and is issued by the authority of Synod.

(b) The Present Unrest

This Synod is deeply concerned at political developments which have taken place in Nyasaland since Federation was instituted and the effects of these upon the people gainsaying that Federation imposed against the will of the majority of people here has produced a deep and widespread feeling of unrest which is like a poison among the people, destroying race relations and leaving bitterness and hate where trust and love prevailed before. In 1952 Mr. Welensky said that once Federation was introduced the fears of African leaders would prove by experience to be unfounded. This has not been the case. Fears for future security and political stability have increased and in many cases are proving to be well founded. The fact that only a handful of Africans are in active support of Federation shows the complete failure of Government to convince the people by word and deed of the value of Federation. It is untrue to say that this unrest is confined to the educated Africans; it is found in every village. The people may not be politically articulate or active (they have no means of being so, due to the weakness of political party organisations), but they see Federation making Nyasaland like Southern Rhodesia or South Africa. Almost every family has at least one member who has worked there. They don't want that kind of white domination, race segregation, and discrimination here. These are the effects of Federation which they feel and see most clearly and all their fears expressed in former years against Federation being instituted are being realised. No amount of increased wealth to the country can balance these spiritual matters and settle these deep feelings of unrest amongst the people. In Nyasaland good race relationships were a reality before Federation began; they are now being destroyed.

(c) The Causes of this Unrest

Many factors are working together to produce this unrest. Some are large political issues which, while they are of vital importance for the future, do not necessarily impinge upon

the life of the people at this present time. But other issues do affect the people directly and immediately, although sometimes subtly. We would point to such factors as the following:—

- (i) There is a quite new attitude to Africans amongst Europeans—particularly newer immigrants—which has its origin in South Africa and Rhodesia. Federation has encouraged increased European immigration. Likewise the replacement of Colonial Civil Servants with Federal Civil Servants with “a stake in this country” is viewed with the utmost alarm. It would seem that large numbers of Territorial Civil Servants have refused to accept Federal terms when offered them and are being replaced by men with a basically different outlook. Likewise the knowledge that Government administrators have been ordered to commend Federation to the African people is destroying trust in District and Provincial Commissioners. The old boast that Nyasaland is a land without colour bar is no longer true.
 - (ii) The increase in Special Police activities and the widespread employment of police informers, directed against essentially law-abiding people whose only offence is their attitude to Federation, is creating contempt for the law as such. Such incidents as the following could be multiplied: schoolchildren are questioned concerning their teachers, prominent visitors with known liberal views have been followed round the country, Europeans have been asked to report on the activities of their colleagues, sermons are the subject of special police reports, reputations are viciously maligned with no possibility of answer or regard for the truth, no public meeting can be held without informers or detectives being present. These developments are very keenly resented here.
 - (iii) Other bitter fruits of Federation are similar restrictions of civil liberties which particularly affect Africans, such as the continuance of Emergency Regulations preventing the free association of persons in public meetings without a police permit (often difficult to obtain in time for adequate publicity to be given). Freedom of speech, freedom of meeting, freedom of movement are all being seriously restricted without real cause.
 - (iv) The hatred and racialism expressed by all sides in the Legislative Council makes sorry reading in this country and is a real expression of the present state of tension and unrest.
- (d) *Particular Political Affairs which focus this Unrest*
- (i) The Constitutional Amendment Act and the Federal Electoral Act have both been passed against vehement opposition by Africans and others. This Synod deplors the introduction of these measures against the expressed will of the majority of people here, especially in view of the overriding of the views of the African Affairs Board, the only constitutional safeguard for African rights. The passing of this legislation has opened a new stage of bitterness, and hostility. Even the African Affairs Board will be weakened in its representation of real African interests, in view of the fact that its membership will in future be appointed from those who, in majority, have been elected by Europeans.
 - (ii) *Dominion Status.*—The Preamble to the Constitution declared that the people of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should continue to enjoy separate government under the protection of Her Majesty for as long as their respective peoples so desire. It is difficult to understand therefore how the Federal Government can demand and work for Dominion status in the near future. This is the cause of one of the greatest fears amongst Africans. They see their country becoming a “Native Reserve” on the South African pattern and various statements made by European political leaders have aggravated this fear. There can be no possible doubt about the view of the majority of people in this land—they want Protectorate status to continue at the present time.
- (e) *The Tragedy of this Situation*

Nyasaland became and has remained a Protectorate by the free choice of chiefs and people. Christian foundations have been firmly laid. Trust and goodwill have been established between Africans and Government officials, missionaries, traders, and settlers. Respect for law and the justice of British rule has been built up. There was a common assumption that British protection would continue until the indigenous people were capable of and took over the government of their own country. Education was aimed at raising up a body of responsible political opinion. African Congress was recognised and encouraged by Government.

Federation has reversed all this. It is now widely felt that Nyasaland has been betrayed by the United Kingdom. The greatest tragedy, however, is the failure of the Federal and Territorial Governments to realise the potentialities and opportunities present to-day. There is a new spirit abroad which, if harnessed, could become a mighty force for good and progress. Too often this is described as “black nationalism” and is looked upon as something to be feared and, if possible, destroyed, or at least hindered.

As a Synod whose affairs have been in mainly African hands for many years and who are now well-nigh completely independent in control of our own affairs, we feel the keenness of this tragedy of neglect in national affairs.

This awakened spirit can also become, when wrongly used, a force for evil, with tragic results.

(f) *Synod's Position*

Synod is aware of the need for moderation and careful speech in these difficult times. Sometimes, however, to say nothing is to deny the truth. Synod therefore feels it urgently necessary to say that it is unanimously opposed to Federation as it has been seen in practice over these years. We see no hope of a peaceful, and righteous, future for all the people of this land (whatever be their race) under the present form of Federal Government. It is not for us to say what the alternative should be—whether independence with its possible financial disabilities, or some new form of Federation, or a complete Statement of the Synod of Blantyre of the C.C.A.P. concerning revision of the present form, or some other course. What we do say is that no political scheme can succeed which does not take full recognition of the equal worth of all men in the sight of God and plans to build a just society on that premise. While the present situation continues it is likely that extremists will gain more and more support simply because moderate opinion is not considered. Hate and greed for personal privilege increase rapidly and know no racial bounds.

(g) *Synod's Appeal*

- (i) This Synod appeals to Christians of all races in this land, and to its own members in particular, to strive by every means in their power, to help understanding between races, and to build a peaceful, righteous society. The Church has the secret of living together at peace—we must show it in our own life together, and by our real love for all men.
- (ii) This Synod appeals to the people of Scotland through the Church of Scotland, to remember their ancient links with the people of this land, and consider their political responsibilities towards us as exercised by the United Kingdom Government.
- (iii) This Synod appeals to all with authority in this land to take heed of this unrest before worse befalls. We feel that radical remedies are required and must be planned and brought about quickly in order to establish social peace with justice.

CHURCH OF SCOTLAND—II

Introduction

It was the Committee's hope, in its first report, that the issues would have a common appeal free from party interest: that Federation would not be carried a stage nearer Dominion status without the consent of the inhabitants: and that at the 1960 Conference reversion by a Territory to Colonial Rule, however regrettable, would be open to discussion.

Since that report was signed, disturbances have occurred so publicised that they need no recounting. In the light of our obligations, strengthened by so many communications addressed to the Church by the Courts of the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian, by missionaries, by Synods, Presbyteries, Congregations and individuals, we present this Supplementary Report.

We welcome recent assurances by the Secretary of the Colonial Office that no steps toward Dominion status will be taken without the consent of the inhabitants and that the Preamble to the Federal Constitution will be honoured.

We still hope that the issues may be kept above party, but we are convinced that, to prevent a partisan political approach in Great Britain, there are factors to be faced.

Until the Devlin Commission reports on the recent disturbances restraint in comment is proper. But the Committee respectfully request that this restraint be observed by all. For instance, Government Statements at home and in the Federation have cumulatively assaulted the public mind with the imminence of massacre. This has been claimed to justify the imprisonment without trial of hundreds of detainees. Almost equal publicity is given to the probability that none of these detainees will be brought to trial. Many of them are known intimately to some members of this Committee, are themselves members of Mission staffs, graduates of eminence and

friends of moderation. It is impossible to identify them with plans for massacre.

So long as the record stands at no Europeans seriously harmed but 53 Africans killed, so long as no kind of evidence is made public of the Plot, so long as no kind of assurance is given that open evidence will ever be led, the Church at home must retain its doubts regarding the extent of the massacre plot, and especially the relationship of any plot to the vast majority of the detainees. The Church cannot conceive of any possibility of a return to normality till the detainees are either released or condemned in open trial. The Committee are frankly embarrassed at the official assertion of the U.K. Government that the decision, for or against the ultimate prosecution of the detainees, is in the hands of the Justiciary. They find it impossible to believe that such decisions are unaffected by political considerations.

It is considered cogent to summarise other aspects of the present situation which we are bound closely to observe. If we are not to abrogate our pledged duty, as citizens and churchmen, to continue our protection of the Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, so long as they desire it, the following developments in the Federation and the Territories, in their light and shade, are to be noted.

A. The Federation

The Federal Government has taken some steps to allay the fears of Africans and extend the area of inter-racial co-operation on equal terms. For example, separate entries in Post Offices are now being abolished: there is no more racial segregation on railways or air services: a Race Affairs Office has been functioning for some time: and an African Chief Information Officer will take up duty in Rhodesia House, London, in the middle of the year on the same conditions of service as his European predecessor, thus demonstrating to this country that the Federal Civil Service is open to people of all races on the same terms.

It is clear, however, that these late and limited concessions can co-exist with an indefinite postponement of the real sharing of power between the small white minority and the emergent African middle classes. Such concessions hardly make up for the fact that partnership will continue to yield to the paramount policy of European leadership and control as long as the United Federal Party rules the Federation. This has been made plain many times by their spokesmen who frequently criticise African nationalist movements which are growing outside as well as within the Federal territories. The small numbers of Africans who voted for Federal candidates in the recent elections show that this is clearly recognised by those whom the Government is seeking to convince.

We regret that, in the view of the Committee, the Federal Prime Minister hardly fosters partnership in the Federation—as a bi-partisan possibility in the U.K.—by his irresponsible statements. He states:—

“... We realised that we would inherit with Nyasaland a legacy of neglect over many years, a legacy of mishandling and a legacy of illwill engendered in part by persons in the U.K. including a bunch of politicians.” (From his speech in the Federal Assembly on 7th April 1959.)

“I venture to say that far more has been done in the five and a half years of Federation than was done, for example, in the previous sixty years of British rule in Nyasaland.” (Article in *The Central African Examiner* of 25th April 1959.)

Further, he continues to make vague threats of independence under certain conditions:—

“... I have no hesitation in saying that in certain circumstances we would ‘go it alone.’ I am not prepared to detail what those circumstances would be, but I think rather than put up with some of the attitudes that have been expressed towards us, particularly in the light of our record and what we have done in certain circumstances, we would go it alone.” (*Sunday Mail* of 5th April 1959.)

The end-effect of such statements from one occupying his high position is to increase the pressure for Dominion status, to antagonise Africans in the North and to exacerbate the party political conflict over Central Africa in Westminster.

Nevertheless, the most serious recent development in the area of Federal politics has been the absorption of the African Affairs Board by the United Federal Party. On the Board of the first Parliament there were two specially appointed Europeans, one specially elected European, and three specially elected Africans. The Board was at that time composed of four independent members (two Europeans and two Africans) and two Government members (one European and one African). But now the only independents on it are Mr. Robert L. Moffat, younger brother of Sir John Moffat, and Mr. J. L. Pretorius, a Dutch Reformed missionary from Mkhoma in Nyasaland. The other members all belong to the United Federal Party.

Mr. Moffat said during the debate on the Speech from the Throne that the Board could no longer be regarded as independent or impartial and that the U.F.P. members would have to consider their party loyalties in any measure coming before them.

B. Southern Rhodesia

The Southern Rhodesian Territorial Government has in recent months and weeks made fresh efforts to restrict the social colour bar and put partnership into effect over greater areas of its industrial life.

The New Industrial Conciliation Act makes it possible for Africans to be legally recognised as employees and to join Trade Unions. The latter will be of a non-racial character.

Limited house-ownership is now possible for Africans in some urban sectors.

The Liquor Laws have been changed so as to extend to Africans the same privileges as have traditionally been enjoyed by whites.

There has been a slight relaxation of the pass-laws in some rural areas.

These steps are welcomed. It is all the more regrettable that the Government of Southern Rhodesia has increased African fears and suspicions and antagonised liberal opinion all over the world by passing the following acts:—

The Native Affairs Act Amendment lays down that no person shall hold, preside at or address any meeting in reserves or tribal areas at which more than twelve Africans are present, without the permission in writing of the Native Commissioners. Anyone contravening this section may be fined up to £100 or put in jail for up to one year.

Any African who is insolent to any officer of the Southern Rhodesian or Federal Government or who is guilty of “contemptuous behaviour” towards any Government officer may be fined up to £50 or spend six months in jail. It is also an offence for an African to make any statement or do anything which is “likely to undermine the authority of any officer of the S. Rhodesian or Federal Government or to bring such officer, or any such Government Department, into disrepute or contempt.”

The Unlawful Organisations Act.—This Act, with a life of five years, still gives unusually great powers to the executive in relation to the judiciary and greatly restricts basic human rights like that of free assembly. It bans, amongst other organisations, the Southern Rhodesian National Congress which had an inter-racial basis as Mr. Guy Clutton Brock’s membership demonstrated.

The Preventive Detentions (Temporary Provisions) Act provides that people arrested under the S. Rhodesian emergency regulations may be detained at the Governor’s pleasure but that their names must be published from time to time in the *Gazette*. A review tribunal under a Judge or retired Judge will be set up. It will be composed of a magistrate, a Provincial Commissioner and an ordinary Commissioner. This court will inspect reasons for detention. Detainees represented by counsel will be able to appear before it. Its proceedings will be in private and will not be published. The tribunal’s report and recommendations will be laid before the Governor whose decision will be final. The Governor may restrict people to a certain area. He must review all detention and restriction orders every twelve months.

The charge is as follows: “... being concerned in any activities which in the opinion of the Governor are potentially dangerous to public safety or public order to such an extent that their continuance might necessitate the declaration of a state of emergency.”

It is important to recall that this restrictive legislation in S. Rhodesia is still within the purview of the United Kingdom Parliament. The Southern Rhodesian Constitution Letters Patent (1923) provide that the Governor shall reserve for Her Majesty’s assent Bills which *subject Africans to conditions, disabilities or restrictions to which Europeans are not also subjected*, unless he has previously received instructions about the Bill in question through a Secretary of State or unless the Bill contains a clause suspending its operation until Her Majesty’s pleasure is known. We trust that these powers have not become a dead letter.

C. Northern Rhodesia

The Scottish people’s present preoccupation with Nyasaland should not obscure the basic importance of Northern Rhodesia as the real test of Britain’s desire to uphold Protectorate status. Like Nyasaland, N. Rhodesia was not conquered. Its peoples sought our protection. Our moral and constitutional relations to it are of the same order as those that bind us to Nyasaland. “If the imposition of federation on Nyasaland is wrong, imposing it on Northern Rhodesia is more so: the fact that this Protectorate is relatively wealthy and contains 80,000 Europeans (instead of Nyasaland’s 8,000) is a source of future

strength for it, and must not be made an excuse for abandoning its African inhabitants to European supremacy on the Southern Rhodesian pattern." (Dr. C. T. Leys, Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, in *The Spectator*, 6th March 1959.)

On 20th March a very important territorial election took place in N. Rhodesia.

Population: 2,100,000 Africans, 75,000 Europeans, Others 8,000.

Those entitled to vote were: Europeans, 20,566. Africans, 7,617. Asians, 2,051.

The point of view put before the electors by the United Federal Party was well illustrated by Mr. Geoffrey Beckett—one of its most respected and responsible candidates—who said in a meeting at Mazabuka: "The British Government's right to impose policy and legislation in N. Rhodesia is the absolute canker at the political heart of this country." (*Central African Post* for 13th March 1959.)

The structure of the new Legislative Council is:—

- 12 Ordinary urban seats (on an almost wholly European electorate);
- 2 urban African seats (Europeans voting for Africans);
- 6 Special rural seats; 2 rural European seats;
- 6 Officials and 2 Governor's nominees. Total: 30.

The election results were as follows:—

United Federal Party: 13 seats. Central Africa Party: 3 seats. Dominion Party: 1 seat. African National Congress: 1 seat. Independents: 2 seats.

In one other constituency no valid nomination was forwarded.

In another no nomination of any kind was received.

The United Federal Party failed to obtain an absolute majority by three seats. Nevertheless, their leader, Mr. John Roberts, immediately laid claim, on behalf of his party, to all the six unofficial seats in the Executive Council. (This Council, the real source of policy, is composed of four officials, six unofficials, and the Governor.) Four days later the Governor, presumably after consultation with the Secretary of State, offered ministerial appointments to six unofficials, five of whom are U.F.P. members. (The Colonial Secretary has yielded where he did not need to yield.)

The British Government's power of control and interference, even in the Territorial Government of one of its Protectorates, is now delicately balanced on a knife edge. The retreat of the Protecting power and the rapid growth of the power of the United Federal Party, mentioned in the First Report of this Special Committee, have continued not only unchecked but accelerated. Sir Roy Welensky's party, which is responsible neither to Westminster nor to Whitehall, has been given virtual control of the Cabinet of the key Protectorate. The group who control the Copper Belt control the political as well as the economic destiny of Central Africa. This also means that the United Federal Party may have the dominant influence in three out of the five Governments which will be represented at the 1960 Review Conference.

The time has come for the United Kingdom Government to re-assert its influence.

D. Nyasaland

In Nyasaland, after a series of disturbances, the Governor declared a state of Emergency of 3rd March and proscribed the Nyasaland African Congress and associated bodies. Widespread arrests of Africans were made. Some of the detainees were transferred to Federal prisons in Southern Rhodesia.

Southern Rhodesian reservist troops, police from Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika and European Special Police of Nyasaland were put into action to assist the Nyasaland Police. Disturbances occurred at various places throughout the Protectorate. Some buildings and installations were damaged and road blocks constructed. In clashes between the security forces and groups of Africans, 53 Africans were shot dead. There were no European fatal casualties.

In the first three months of this year almost 1,000 Africans had been arrested for activities of a political nature.

On 23rd March, a Colonial Office White Paper was presented to Parliament concerning the State of Emergency and containing allegations of a Plan for Violence including murder, prepared by some of the Congress leaders. A Commission of Inquiry was appointed, under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Devlin, to enquire into and report on the causes and course of the disturbances in Nyasaland.

By 22nd April conditions in Nyasaland were quiet. Collective fines were imposed in some districts because of the damage done. In Mlanje district this was estimated at 30s. per head—the same as the annual tax and approximately equal to the average monthly wage.

The Territorial Government has recently introduced a Bill which gives the Police wider powers of arrest, entry and search.

The Penal Code has also been amended to allow Courts to impose heavier sentences. It is now unnecessary to prove in a Court that a citizen has been put in fear of a breach of the peace by an illegal assembly, or frightened by a riot. It is sufficient to prove that the unlawful assembly is likely to frighten a citizen or that a riot is likely to terrorise. The maximum sentence for rioting has been increased from two to five years' imprisonment.

A Bill has been introduced to amend the Children and Young Persons' Ordinance. The Courts may now, for the first time in the history of Nyasaland, sentence a male child or a young person to corporal punishment—six and twelve strokes respectively.

Comments

(a) The trouble that has occurred since the completion of the Report underlines one of its main points, that the Africans of Nyasaland are strongly opposed to the Federation, and emphasises the need for government with consent.

The time has passed for working with nicely balanced arrangements relating the Colonial Government, the European inhabitants, and the African population. The time has come for a daring and creative transfer of power to the African people. (See First Report, Appendix III.)

(b) No political solution can be effective without reconciliation. Attacks have been made in the Press on the Church of Scotland Mission and the C.C.A.P. This is to be regretted as it makes more difficult the Church's task of reconciliation, and it is the Church which must be the main agent in building up relationships of trust and understanding which have been seriously damaged if not destroyed.

Conclusion

In conclusion we would make three general comments:—

- (a) We trust that the over-all policy of the U.K. Government is not to discount and submerge nationalist sentiments. Nationalism is afoot all over the world. It can alternately be judged sympathetically as essentially the awakening of a people to a consciousness of their human dignity or it can be written off as sedition. If the latter judgment stands, a form of peace and order can be imposed for a shorter, or even a longer, time. But, beneath the apparent peace, racialism is inevitably engendered. To sow the wind will reap a whirlwind.
- (b) The fostering of human dignity is not only written into The Charter of Human Rights; it is an indissoluble component of the Gospel that we preach. It is right that where economic advantages have accrued to the black people by their partnership with white people—as undoubtedly they have—full prominence to it should be given, as an advantage that will continue to accrue from that partnership. But it is essentially a leaf out of the Communist, and not the Christian, notebook to harp on this as the primary, almost the sufficient, justification of constitutional constructions. The African—and is he wrong?—gives priority to the preservation of his human dignity. Adequate evidence, in deed as in word, of a like priority in the minds of the United Kingdom and Federal Governments is what he waits for. Convinced of that he would be still ready to embark on partnership.
- (c) The Committee in their seeking to report realistically re-assert their conviction that a policy of Racial Partnership is yet possible of achievement in Central Africa.

THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND—III

The General Assembly's Special Committee Anent
Central Africa

Report to the Commission of Assembly, October 1959

The Rev. G. F. Macleod—Convenor

The Rev. K. MacKenzie—Secretary

Scope of this Report

It is constitutional practice that the Commission of Assembly confine their deliberations to a statement from the major Committees of the Church. Clause 6 of the Deliverance passed under this Committee's Report at the General Assembly of May 1959, however reads:—

"The General Assembly empower the Committee (anent Central Africa) to report to the Commission of Assembly regarding ongoing developments and empower the Commission to act fully in their name in any matter relevant to the Committee's remit."

2. This unusual Deliverance was permitted lest, by merely annual reporting, the Assembly was prevented from timeously commenting on a situation presently in process of very rapid development. Your Committee therefore here endeavours to

keep the Assembly advised of the latest developments. In doing so it is at pains none the less to keep its report brief and to postpone reporting on many matters which have already taken place until the General Assembly of May 1960. Further, as the Deliverance specifically empowers the Commission to act fully in the name of the Assembly, your Committee trust that such issues as are raised may be open to debate at the Commission.

The Devlin Report

3. In reporting to the Commission of Assembly, we do not intend to canvas all the aspects of a Report (Cmnd. 814) which, in the words of Dr. T. R. M. Creighton, late of Makerere College, very many will agree to designate as "one of the great documents on colonial affairs". Your Committee still hopes that the solution of the problems of the Federation will be kept at a bi-partisan level and not be allowed to descend to party political considerations. Both in the United Kingdom and in Nyasaland the Government's handling of the Report and the resultant situation received bi-partisan criticism. Some Press organs of the Right were more outspoken than the organs of the Left in regretting that the British, Federal, and Nyasaland Governments chose to acknowledge only a section of the facts elicited by the Devlin Commission. The Report generally supports the interpretation of the situation given by almost every visitor, anthropologist or missionary who has been in Nyasaland recently in contrast to the interpretation so constantly given in recent years by the Federal and British Governments. In words taken from *The Spectator* the Devlin Report "reinforces the case put disinterestedly enough by the Church of Scotland and rejected by the Federal authorities".

4. Your Committee has paid attention to the Dispatch (Cmnd. 815) from the Governor of Nyasaland in reply to the Report. We note with satisfaction his desire to return to normal conditions but cannot find in his Dispatch what those conditions are or how the return is to be made. Your Committee, confirmed in its previous belief that there was in fact no massacre plot, do not fail to note that none the less the Devlin Commission felt that the Nyasaland Government was faced with a choice either "to act or to abdicate". Accepting this, your Committee had to ask by what process this serious situation had occurred. They still feel that the pressures which came to such an ugly crisis in March 1959 can well be accounted for by the refusal of Government to take seriously the continuous warnings regarding the extent of the opposition to Federation since 1953. When therefore a state of emergency was declared, a grave series of unfortunate disturbances occurred resulting, among other things, in the deaths of 52 Africans.

5. It was the hope of the Committee that the general trend of the Devlin Report might lead to just such a daring act of reconciliation as was adumbrated in their Report to the Assembly in 1959, with such concessions as the release of all detainees against whom no personal accusation could be brought and a new Constitution in Nyasaland to restore the faith of the African people. The Committee greatly regrets that no reaction of the Nyasaland and British Governments has in fact been in a contrary sense.

6. We must report that a continuance of the emergency regulations, according to our information from every sector, is not likely to subdue the minds of the African people or to make them more amenable to further developments in Federation. The words of one missionary, written since the Report, we believe would be subscribed by all. He writes, in effect, "Africans feel caught in a cleft stick. If they protest by word, let alone by act, it will be said by Government, 'You see what a dangerous situation we have prevented'; but if they remain acquiescent, it will be said by Government, 'There you are; see how quiet they are, now that the ringleaders are detained and Congress is proscribed!'"

7. Summarising the position, the Church of Scotland since 1952 in effect has been persistently pleading, "Only move towards Federation with the consent of the Africans." The Government, with equal consistency, said in effect: "No. We will proceed with the Federal solution without African consent because we feel sure that when the economic and other benefits are apparent and a review takes place the African people will have been brought to see the benefits of Federation."

8. The Committee believes that this course, undeviatingly pursued by Government, has simply not succeeded.

The Committee is convinced that if this course continues to be pursued undeviatingly into the Review Year an even worse situation must develop.

9. We wish to place on record now at this present time that, should the situation worsen in this sense, we shall be averse to any interpretation that it has been caused by subversive elements or racial excesses. The Committee therefore continues to plead for the release of Dr. Banda, of all per-

sonally innocent detainees and for a more liberal new Constitution for Nyasaland before the Review takes place.

10. In the light of this general statement the Committee now reviews two issues that seem to be related—viz., the Interim Constitution for Nyasaland and the question of the detainees. Recent Constitutional Changes in Nyasaland.

11. The Special Committee reminds Commissioners of the background notes on pp. 12 and 13 of the first Report and Appendix III to that Report. It will be remembered that the General Assembly earnestly recommended to Her Majesty's Government that effective power be given to the African community in that land, admitting the possibility of an African majority in the Legislative Council.

12. The following constitutional changes were proclaimed as Royal Instructions at Zomba on 24th August in accordance with statements made in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 22nd July:—

- (i) The number of African seats on the Legislative Council will be increased from five to seven and the number of official seats will be increased from twelve to fourteen. The number of unofficials who are not Africans will remain at six. The officials will have a majority of one. Thus, although the Africans will have a majority of one over the other races on the unofficial side, they will still be a minority bloc within the chamber.
- (ii) Two Africans will be appointed to the Executive Council. That Council will still retain its Government majority and two European unofficials.
- (iii) The life of the present Legislative Council is being prolonged beyond May 1959, when it would normally have to end. "It is hoped that in the event such period will not greatly exceed one year." Obviously, this is the Council which will be concerned with the Review Conference.
- (iv) The two members of the Legislative Council who are the subjects of detention orders by the Governor have had to vacate their seats. The Governor will nominate two in their place. Thus four out of the seven African members will be nominated by the Government.
- (v) There will be no elections before the 1960 Review Conference.

13. The Special Committee draws attention to the fact that these changes fall far short of what the General Assembly pressed for. There is no African majority in the Legislative Council. Although there is some increase in the number of Africans in the chamber this is being done by Governor's nomination but from the point of view of African confidence the important thing is the number of new members elected as representatives of their people.

14. We deeply regret that there will be neither an extended franchise nor an election in Nyasaland before the 1960 Review Conference. The pent-up feelings which produced the recent tragic events were, we now know on clear evidence, largely caused by the belief that matters would be settled next year above the heads of the people. There is nothing, we regret to record, in the Royal Instructions to assure them that this will not be so and that they will have a really influential voice in the Nyasaland delegation which will join the other Governments in making constitutional changes about the future of their country next year.

The Nyasaland Emergency

15. Section 10 of the Deliverance of the General Assembly read as follows:—

"The General Assembly feel that the continued detention without trial of Africans in Nyasaland will make future reconciliation extremely difficult, and request Her Majesty's Government to take steps to have these detainees brought to trial in a Court of Law or released immediately."

16. The Special Committee noted that on 18th August it was announced in Nyasaland that on that date 539 detainees were still being held. Since the declaration of the emergency on 3rd March, 1,322 persons have been detained, 649 have been released, and 134 have been convicted.

17. It is our opinion that the emergency regulations should be lifted now. In view of the importance of affording to Africans an outlet for political organisation within the Constitution the Committee urges the Government to take the risk of releasing Dr. Hastings K. Banda subject to satisfactory assurances. The indefinite holding of Dr. Banda and others without bringing them to trial has been condemned by world opinion, is contrary to British justice, and is bound to maintain and increase feelings of distrust among the population.

The Advisory Commission

18. The General Assembly of 1958 was concerned that the issues of the 1960 Review Conference should not be prejudged. It is therefore fitting that we should take note of the Advisory Commission which was announced by the Prime Minister of

the United Kingdom in the House of Commons on 21st July of this year. It will have the following terms of reference:—

"In the light of the information provided by the Committee of Officials and of any additional information the Commission may require, to advise the five Governments, in preparation for the 1960 Review, on the constitutional programme and framework best suited to the achievement of the objects contained in the Constitution of 1953, including the Preamble.

19. The Premier also gave the structure of this Advisory Commission:—

The Chairman—from the United Kingdom;

Six Privy Councillors—members of the U.K. Parliament, including three from opposition parties;

Six independent members, of whom four will be chosen from the U.K. and two, we hope, from other Commonwealth countries having experience of the working of a federal constitution;

Four to come from the Federation as a whole, to be proposed by the Federal Government;

Three from Southern Rhodesia, to be proposed by the Southern Rhodesian Government;

Three each from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. (Of the thirteen members drawn from Central Africa, five will be Africans and none will be the members of their respective Governments or Legislatures.)

20. The Prime Minister said that the first meeting would take place in London in the autumn to plan the programme, that it would ascertain the views "of all kinds of different people"—including detainees—and that it would amongst other things be prepared to listen to arguments for the secession of any Territory from the Federation. The Commission will spend considerable time in Central Africa. The Government hopes that it will also have a function of "Education and conciliation."

21. During the short debate on this theme the British Prime Minister made a statement about the evolution of democracy in Central Africa which the Special Committee anent Central Africa welcomes and to which it attaches great importance. Mr. Macmillan said:—

"... I would say that while the Legislatures of the Northern Territories are constituted in their present stage to conduct their ordinary affairs they would not be more than one element in the machinery which might be devised for the purpose of obtaining the views of the inhabitants." (Hansard, Vol. 609, No. 151, Col. 1079.)

22. The Special Committee recognises that this Advisory Commission, led by Lord Monckton and containing six independent members, might afford a means by which the different interests in Central Africa and in the United Kingdom might be brought closer together. We would certainly, however, have preferred a British Parliamentary Commission on account of the United Kingdom's high protecting role over two-thirds of the area of the Federation and a comparable proportion of its population. To fulfil this end adequately it would surely have been necessary to include in a Commission of twenty-six more than eleven United Kingdom members of whom only six were Members of Parliament. We note that the Government of Southern Rhodesia and the Federation, both of which are at present controlled by the United Federal Party, will nominate seven out of the thirteen Central African members. These members from Central Africa will outnumber any other group.

23. We believe that the way in which the Advisory Commission will set about its work is of the utmost importance. Until a much greater measure of African goodwill is obtained no Commission or inquiry can successfully prepare the ground for the 1960 Review Conference. (Open signs of criticism have already appeared amongst Africans on the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council.)

24. Will the small group of five Africans be acknowledged as genuine spokesmen for their fellows when so many of the indigenous political leaders of Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia are still under detention? If the Commission is to achieve its purpose it must not only listen to but also carefully weigh the representations of Africans who are critical of the Governments. Above all its report should be genuinely preparatory and its work should not prejudice the Review Conference of 1960.

September 1959

Deliverance

1. The Commission of the General Assembly accept this Report from the Special Committee anent Central Africa.
2. The Commission of the General Assembly instruct the

Clerks to send this Report immediately to the Governments concerned.

Oral Evidence

CHURCH OF SCOTLAND

Representatives: The Rev. K. MacKenzie

The Rev. N. C. Bernard

CHAIRMAN: We are glad to welcome you here this morning. We have had a document from you recently since your General Assembly met in Edinburgh in which you say that with reference to your two pieces of evidence already submitted, the General Assembly's Special Committee anent Central Africa have drawn attention to the fact that at the recent meeting of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland it was decided that the proposed Deliverance should be referred back to the Special Committee for further consideration when the Monckton Commission's report has been published. This decision means that the Special Committee anent Central Africa cannot, in giving oral evidence to the Commission, discuss the document called "The 1960 Review Conference."* They can, however, discuss the document entitled "Report to the Commission of Assembly October 1959", together with the recommendations contained in sections 6, 7 and 11 of the proposed Deliverance.† I only mention that at the outset so that my colleagues might have it in mind when they come to ask you questions.

The first section to which you draw particular attention is in reference to the African Affairs Board and I was going to put this to you. It has been suggested to us by a number of witnesses that what will be wanted in the future will be not so much an African Affairs Board as some safeguards inserted in to the Constitution which will look after the interests of all minorities. Does that have your approval?—A. (REV. MACKENZIE): Our Committee has not discussed that. We have not discussed the possibility of a council of racial affairs because of the more fundamental consideration of whether or not the Federation continued.

Also, as you will have seen from our early document, we are rather concerned about the place of any such safeguard in any Federal scheme. We would find it very difficult to recommend the erection of any safeguards.

Q. What I was really drawing attention to was the section of the proposed Deliverance—"In the event of Federation being retained the African Affairs Board . . . be continued in a stronger form". What had you in mind?—A. We had in mind it would have a stronger connection with the Government of the United Kingdom and that the electorate within the Protecting Power should have a more direct connection with it. In this connection I think it is fair to say that one part of the document on the Review Conference of 1960 recommends that it be connected to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and that it be removed from the contentious field of the Debates in the House of Commons where it is not so easy to approach the matter objectively.

Q. Does that assume that in all cases of racial discrimination which this African Affairs Board is designed to protect there is no likelihood or possibility of the discrimination in particular instances being politically desirable? There are elements of discrimination which I could assume that everybody would object to, let us say more people would object, but there are elements introduced where discrimination may be useful. I can imagine a stage at any rate—I do not say now—for liquor discrimination. Would you regard it as suitable that the Judicial Committee should have cognisance of questions which were not merely a question of law?—There is discrimination, but whether that discrimination is advisable— you see the point?—A. I am sorry, I do not follow.

Q. It is one thing to say that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and I do with all respect agree—is as good a body for determining a question of Constitutional propriety as any, but if the question is involved whether what is done (a) is lawful, and (b) is desirable, there are those who question whether a judicial body is the right tribunal to settle it.—A. It may not be.

* Not reproduced.

† These sections read as follows:—

6. The General Assembly urge that, in the event of Federation being retained, the African Affairs Board, or some similar structure, be continued in a stronger form.

7. The General Assembly, while recognising the advantage of some form of association between the three Territories, re-affirm their conviction that no scheme should be retained or developed which does not rest upon the consent and co-operation of the majority of the inhabitants irrespective of race.

11. The General Assembly urge strongly that the delegations from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to the Conference reviewing the Federal Constitution should be such as will be recognised by the African people as their genuine representatives.

Q. That is a point, you see it?—A. Yes, thank you.

Q. You have not really looked at the wider proposition of some provision for all minorities independently of what is done for Africans, that has not been considered yet?—A. No.

Q. I pass to the second thing, that is the General Assembly recognises the advantage of some form of association, reaffirming their conviction that no scheme should be retained or developed which does not rest upon the consent and co-operation of the majority of the inhabitants irrespective of race. That in a sense draws one's mind back to the Preamble to the Constitution in which references are made to the desire of the inhabitants before further steps are taken. I wanted to see just how you put his. One could understand this view, could one not, that it might be very desirable that nothing should continue to be which would not have a chance of receiving the consent or co-operation of the majority of the inhabitants in the long run. Can you conceive a situation might arise in the Federation, or some such structure which would go on with alterations to make it more attractive to the majority race, that if time passed before the final decision was made and an opportunity was left for affirming or rejecting Federation by the component parts you might tolerate the difficulty about consent for the time being?—A. In the light of our analysis of the 1951/53 period of debate I do not think that we would recommend that it be left in that flexible way, while, of course, acknowledging that it would be nothing short of perfectionism to expect the overwhelming agreement of everybody for any system.

Q. What you are looking for is the majority wish of the inhabitants genuinely expressed?—A. Yes, and we feel that that could be ascertained with difficulty but in as much as the 1960 Review Conference is planning for the 1960's, quite a long period of time, it is worth seeking to build on that foundation.

Q. If you were looking at Nyasaland alone it seems possible rather than to attempt to bring into being some referendum or something of that kind in the circumstances which we know exist there, you might go ahead as long as there was a right to the inhabitants when they have gone further forward to self-government to opt out.—A. I will refer that to Rev. Bernard who knows Nyasaland more intimately than I do. (REV. BERNARD): As far as I know I do not think the Church of Scotland has really gone into that point fully so I can only speak personally on that one. I have believed myself that that option would be a wise one. The problem is to get that accepted at the present time and that is why some of us, as you know, have been pressing for the Territorial change to come first where there is a greater representation and where I think then you might well take it that on a wider franchise you could take the majority on a wide enough franchise that would meet the needs of the Preamble.

Q. I was assuming that. The basis of my question was that you would deal with the Territorial advantages first and in order to satisfy the Preamble you would hope to see stages reached by which representative Governments could be said to come in, in the instance I took in Nyasaland. What I was suggesting to you was if that order of events took place—I am not saying whether I agree with this, I am trying to test it—if that order of events took place and then there was the option in or out, that might meet the difficulty of the Preamble?—A. I would personally feel it would but it would all depend on the width of your franchise and those who had a say in it. I do not agree it should be everybody in the Territory.

Q. I realise you were giving a personal view. It is not fair to ask you for more. The third thing to which you refer is this: "The General Assembly urge strongly that the delegations from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to the Conference reviewing the Federal Constitution should be such as will be recognised by the African people as their genuine representatives." In article 99 it says the delegations from the Territories shall be "chosen by their respective Governments". Of course we have heard that it is not suggested or proposed that they should just be delegates of the Government in power. What you are urging is this, that whatever else is done, there should be adequate representation of African points of view from the Territories, not exclusive, I take it?—A. (REV. MACKENZIE): Exclusive in a racial sense, no, certainly not.

Q. They have really got to include people if I understand this, so that the resulting delegation will be regarded by the African people as genuinely representing them?—A. Yes.

Q. Even although it is to represent all people you want to be sure they at least are represented?—A. Yes.

PROFESSOR JACK. Rev. MacKenzie, you will appreciate that we are very much concerned in this Commission with what you might call the climate of political opinion in Central Africa and you, of course, have emphasised the importance of

consent which means that you are also concerned with this climate of opinion?—A. Indeed, Sir.

Q. Would it be correct to say that your Special Committee receives reports from missionaries and ministers in Central Africa regularly and that your views are based to a considerable extent at least upon these reports?—A. No. We have no regular connection in that way. But we have consulted from time to time with missionaries on furlough. In fact, we have no missionaries on furlough on our Committee but we have been co-opting them as observers from time to time.

Q. That is the only contact you have with these missionaries?—A. No, I would not say that. We have consulted with Sir Gilbert Rennie, the High Commissioner for the Federation. We have also consulted with Mr. Baxter of the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Committee.

Q. These are not missionaries.—A. These are not missionaries.

Q. I was asking whether what you refer to as the only contact which you had with missionaries in the field, that is to say when they were home on furlough, you did not receive regular reports from them?—A. No. These reports go to a different Committee of the Church of Scotland. They go to the Foreign Missions Committee but the Foreign Missions Committee has members on the Special Committee Anent Central Africa.

Q. You would not know then whether the missionaries in the field are unanimous in their views?—A. As individuals we can offer opinions very quickly on that.

Q. I do not know whether Dr. Bernard could say?—A. (REV. BERNARD): They are not unanimous.

Q. Is the difference of opinion acute, would you say?—A. On what issue, Sir?

Q. May I come to the question of intimidation, for example, because I find singularly little reference to intimidation in any of the documents that have been put into us by the Church of Scotland. Would you say from your experience that intimidation is widespread particularly in Nyasaland?—A. I think it is true all over, Sir.

Q. But is it important in your view?—A. Wherever you get fear of any kind then you get a form of intimidation.

Q. Does it affect what I call the climate of political opinion?—A. Can Professor Jack define that a little more?

Q. It is broadly speaking the views of the majority of the inhabitants?—A. I would say that the majority of the inhabitants as far as I have seen them have a certain view: those who are prepared to stand against that may find it very difficult.

Q. Have you much knowledge of the extent to which there have been acts of indiscipline in schools and missionary colleges in Central Africa?—A. I have the reports of what happened after the Commission visited Northern Rhodesia. For instance, I was on the board of Blantyre Secondary School and I know the position there at the present time. That is the climate. I take it, of political opinion among youth.

Q. These acts of indiscipline have not just occurred in recent months, have they?—A. No.

Q.—Is this a problem which worries you as a leader of the church?—A. Yes, Sir, I think it does. Here again I am not speaking for the Church of Scotland but I feel if you look at the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian, it is facing at the moment a very big issue of which I am aware by correspondence which I have had in the last week. I think it was shortly after you gentlemen were there or just before your arrival certain things took place at Livingstonia, such as throwing stones at certain houses. The Committee of the Church has met and is recommending that certain action be taken both against students concerned and one or two members of staff who were involved, and that action, I understand, is to come before the Synod very shortly.

Q. Has the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian taken any similar steps in the past?—A. Yes, Sir. In 1959 whenever the Emergency was declared it put out a statement which was given a good deal of publicity. I do not know if it is in the hands of the Commission at all?

Q. I have not seen it.—A. I have only one copy. In the name of the Synod, Livingstonia, Church of Central Africa Presbyterian. "We call upon all the people of this country and upon all our own members in particular to seek solution to the problems in Nyasaland without hatred, strife, destruction or violence which the Church unequivocally condemns. We call upon all the people of this country and upon our own members in particular to share in the urgent tasks of rebuilding confidence and understanding in the life of this Protectorate. We call for recognition of the serious and widespread concern of the African people over the political situation in Central Africa since the imposition of Federation, which concern we consider to be well-founded. See our statement of March, 1958.

We call for a clear guarantee that the way will be open in Nyasaland for advancement towards democratic self-government within a stated period under which government the rights of minorities shall be safeguarded."

Q. And that is what you take to be a denouncement of the acts of intimidation and of indiscipline in the schools and colleges?—A. It is seeking solution without hatred, strife, destruction or violence.

Q. Has the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian been associated with other religious denominations in denouncing these acts?—A. I do not know any other church which has denounced them.

Q. That is what I mean.—A. I do not know any. I know the Christian Council met last month and has set up a committee representative of all the churches to meet with certain political leaders to discuss the whole matter. That committee has not yet met. I know that from the minutes which have just come in.

Q. Could I put it in a slightly different way? Are you satisfied that the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian has taken a strong enough line in relation to these acts of intimidation and indiscipline?—A. (REV. MACKENZIE): I would question, Sir, if we in Great Britain have the moral title to denounce intimidation in Central Africa in the way that we are being requested to in certain places. You have got the point about the autonomy of the Nyasaland Church. The Church of Scotland does not control that church in the way that it did only two or three years ago, either by direct edict or strong advice. It is related to this church just as the Presbyterian Church in Australia is. It has that separate autonomy. But our interpretation of intimidation commends the statement, surely, that we made in 1952 and 1953. That is that whenever you get the introduction of an unwanted constitution there is bound to be within any society a response against it. If within that society you have democratic instruments plus a certain cultural inheritance, individualism and liberalism, perhaps the response will be a peaceful one of debate and public discussion and maybe of non-violent response only, on the lines of Mahatma Gandhi. But if a detested suggested constitution is imposed upon a society which has a different moral outlook, say the Covenanters in Scotland, and they are strongly against the Government of 1688 or, say the Carbonari in Italy in the 19th century, then the response is bound to take a different expression, both from the angle of social psychology and also from the angle of political agitation and that is the setting of our interpretation and that is why in our reports you find no reference either to the illiberal attitude of certain Europeans reported in the Rhodesian Press or to the intimidation.

Q. Would that mean that having regard to that setting which you have described that some of this intimidation might be condoned?—A. I would use the word understood with some historic perspective.

Q. No more than that?—A. No, I would say wherever violence occurs it is the duty of the Government to take steps to deal with it, and it is the duty of the church always to declare that anything that is violent is against the spirit of Jesus Christ. But to select this expression of what is a responsible society to an introduction from outside it and to attempt a major interpretation upon it, I would not like to support.

Q. Could I come back to Dr. Bernard because, as I understand the distinction, he is a member of the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian.—A. (REV. BERNARD): No. As the Secretary in Edinburgh of the Church of Scotland I was never a minister of the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian because I had a regional responsibility in Northern Rhodesia where that church is not . . .

Q. That is a matter of organisation I do not understand.—A. I did not hold the church authority, I was not subject to its courts.

Q. I happened to hear you preach there.—A. I was resident in Blantyre.

Q. Could I come back to my original question as to how far you think that these acts of intimidation and indiscipline have affected the expression of African opinion in Central Africa?—A. I think that is extremely difficult to answer, but I may say that intimidation has been used against people who would have stated the same political opinion, say, before this Commission, as, if you like, the Malawi Congress would have done had it come before you? You must not take intimidation to mean that a man who has been intimidated has been intimidated because he would have spoken against the majority voice of that Congress.

Q. No, but I take it that intimidation if it is widespread may prevent a great many people expressing an opinion at all, whether one side or the other?—A. Yes, that is quite so. I think it is quite possible.

Q. Would you say that there may be a considerable body

of African opinion, especially in Nyasaland, which has not been expressed because of intimidation?—A. That is extremely difficult to hazard. I have no way of assessing that except that no matter where one goes in Nyasaland you come round to this: people may not express it to a group like this, but they will express their views to people they know—I do not know if District Commissioners came before the Commission or people like Mr. Ingram, the Secretary for African Affairs, who would be able to say more from the whole country what the Government with all its ability to channel such opinion would be able to assess more than I could. I do not know if Mr. Ingram came before you, but he is the sort of man who is in touch with this opinion and would be able to say more about it than I can.

Q. Would you say the Church of Central Presbyterian has itself suffered from intimidation and therefore prevented from expressing views which it might otherwise have expressed?—A. I do not think that is so, frankly. I can say, for instance, that at a recent Synod certain action took place in the church in Blantyre and the church on Monday immediately protested to the Malawi Congress. I think one member of your Commission knows what happened. The church immediately protested to the leaders of Congress and expressed not only the Church's regret but their condemnation of the use of a church for the purpose for which it had been used by these people.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: Did you say that the Church of Scotland has not the moral authority to condemn the burning down of houses of political opponents whether it is in Edinburgh or Timbuktu?—A. (REV. MACKENZIE): Surely it has that authority and has done so, but this is a somewhat different issue.

Q. I am much obliged.—A. It is a question of interpretation.

Q. A previous answer of yours might have left that impression. I think you would be sorry.—A. I am sorry if I gave that impression but I was thinking of the National Days of Prayer during the war when the Church of Scotland was asked by the Government to offer prayers for victory of our arms in certain situations and did so. I am thinking also of situations in the armed forces in which many of us were involved in which we took part in acts which from other points of view could be looked upon as that type of pressure.

Q. It was only the words "moral authority" which seemed a little unsatisfactory to me in that connection. In your view should a branch of the Malawi Youth League be allowed to be founded and encouraged to be founded in a primary mission school?—A. No, I would say if it is a partisan political organisation then it should not be.

Q. You are not aware that that has occurred?—A. I am not aware. In Northern Rhodesia the Church has transferred all its schools to local education authorities and as you probably know in a short time all schools will be taken from the Church of Scotland. That is a policy laid down quite a long time ago.

DR. SHEPHERD: Has Professor Jack finished, Mr. Chairman?

PROFESSOR JACK: Yes.

DR. SHEPHERD: I would like to put one or two questions. First, Mr. Bernard has referred to something that happened in Blantyre. Was that protest made to the Malawi people on the Monday morning made by one individual with the authority behind him of the local Church Committee or was it simply his own protest?—A. (REV. BERNARD): It was not simply his own protest. He is not only the minister of that congregation but he is also the Assistant Secretary of the Blantyre Synod. He had discussed the matter with his colleagues; as Dr. Shepherd knows, we have no episcopals or anything like that and that is the group which acts, the Secretary and the two Assistant Secretaries, and after discussion with them he went himself in person.

Q. What did he protest about?—A. The fact that they entered the church, not to worship God but obviously to make a protest if certain things happened.

Q. Which was the presence of a member of the Monckton Commission who was not there?—A. I think it is obvious what the answer is.

MR. MOLSON: Not to those who were not there.—A. Yes, certainly because a member of the Monckton Commission . . .

DR. SHEPHERD: Who was not at the service?—A. He was not at the service therefore they walked out when they saw he was taking no part. They did not make any protest, they just walked out but the Minister felt this was a matter which had to be dealt with immediately.

Q. I think Mr. Chairman, we ought to know just with what authority both Mr. MacKenzie and Mr. Bernard speak. May I ask how long were you, Mr. MacKenzie, in Central

Africa as a missionary?—A. (REV. MACKENZIE): From the close of the war until 3½ years ago.

Q. Which was a total of?—A. Total of just over ten years. I have been in Nyasaland and then went to Northern Rhodesia in 1948.

Q. And Mr. Bernard?—A. (REV. BERNARD): I went to Nigeria in 1930, left in 1946, back again in 1949 to 1950. From 1950 I am just home from Nyasaland.

Q. I think the Commission should know how long the service was. It is 3½ years ago since you left Nyasaland?—A. (REV. MACKENZIE): Yes, we, of course, are not testifying here on the basis of that experience, but in the name of the Committee and as you know it was quite on the cards that people who were not in Central Africa might have come.

Q. Might I ask why the reports that your Committee furnished to the General Assembly, and there are five of them altogether, did not give a place to the doubts of missionaries? Would they not support the Committee's viewpoint?—A. First of all these doubts were not communicated to us and secondly those of us in the Committee, 1958/59, knew that these missionaries were very much a minority and that also that group of missionaries was a group that found itself against the stream on many other policies as well, such as educational policy, evangelism, relations with the Church of Missions and so on, so that we were aware and still are that the majority of missionaries particularly support the general line of our reports.

Q. Should the minority position of missionaries not also have had some indication made in the reports?—A. I do not think so because after all we were receiving evidence from many other people and were in touch with some other groups and the Foreign Missions Committee is the body, as you know, which connects with the reports of missionaries.

Q. May I ask did Mr. Sinclair Shaw, Q.C. have anything to do with furnishing the material for these reports?—A. Nothing whatsoever. But, of course, we have from time to time made use of public statements by members of the Scottish Council for African Questions and we have referred at least on one point in a number of obvious ways to the African Affairs Board, to a report that was very well known in Scotland.

Q. You did not hold office in both bodies?—A. Yes, I am a member of the Scottish Council for African Questions. I joined it when I came back from Africa but I have not played any part in, shall I say, generating high policy within the Scottish Council for African Questions. I think it is very fair to say that a large percentage of the members of the Scottish Council for African Questions are members of the Church of Scotland—invariably.

Q. But there is no official connection?—A. No official connection whatsoever. Now that you mention it I think I can say clearly that there is no office bearer in the Scottish Council for African Questions who has played any important part, but inevitably there is that personal link in terms of discussion and experience.

Q. I found the phraseology in certain documents from them and from you bore very close resemblance on occasion.—A. Yes.

Q. You have a deep interest in the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian?—A. Not so direct now. I am not Church of Central Africa Presbyterian and it was and is now the United Church of Central Africa (Rhodesia) which is a union of London Missionary Society and Church of Scotland. I last worked in Church of Central Africa Presbyterian in 1948.

Q. Your Committee has no special concern with the doings of the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian?—A. Indeed; but also in the Southern Rhodesia Presbyterian Church and also in the Church of Barotseland and other groups as well.

Q. Did you give any information to the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian that you as a committee were to give evidence to the Monckton Commission?—A. No, but that would, I take it, have come automatically to them through the report of the Commissioners of the General Assembly. In other words, it is not the job of the Secretary of the Special Committee Anent Central Africa to correspond with any church in Central Africa within the Church of Scotland direct. That is the job of the Secretary of the Foreign Missions Committee.

Q. I know but I am thinking of personal connection.—A. No.

Q. As a Committee you did not advise the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian that they should give evidence?—A. No, we did not advise for or against.

Q. Did you not think you should do that with your interest in them?—A. Not really because, after all, it is only recently that they received autonomy and just as with the case of the Paris Mission and the Church of the Cameroons, the mother body, so to speak, is at this stage particularly sensitive about

not giving the impression of steering or guiding anywhere. (REV. BERNARD): I am not sure when Dr. Shepherd says the Committee which Committee he is meaning.

Q. The Central Africa Committee, the document we are considering.—A. Yes. I should say that the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian, having seen Press reports but not yet having received this document which has come to your hands from the General Assembly, is thinking that it should have been consulted by the Church of Scotland before it came here. So there has been no contact at all—that has just come in the last few days. (REV. MACKENZIE): And there will not be: in the next period of the Committee's existence all that correspondence will go through the General Secretary of the Foreign Missions Committee.

Q. I want to ask you both: you know that there were adverse comments in the Devlin Report on the Church of Scotland?—A. No, Sir, on the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian by my reading of the Devlin Report. I thought the Commissioners were very careful on that point. They commented on the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian, not on the Church of Scotland.

Q. Are you quite sure?—A. I looked it up.

Q. The Duke of Hamilton asked this question last October and the reply was that there was no space in the Committee's Report to refute these charges.—A. Yes, but, of course, it was not the Church of Scotland.

Q. I think we will both look that up.—A. I looked it up deliberately.

Q. In paragraph 9 of the Report to the Commission of the General Assembly of October last year there is a statement:—

"We wish to place on record now at this present time that, should the situation worsen in this sense, we shall be averse to any interpretation that it has been caused by subversive elements or racial excesses."

Do you think that was a wise statement to make?—A. Yes, Sir, I do and it coheres with the interpretation I was seeking to present to Professor Jack about analysis of the origins of victimisation, intimidation and violence.

Q. Was that not saying to the extremists in Nyasaland you can go ahead, we will defend you?—A. I grant you that that would be, shall I say, a logical deduction to be made from it and possibly danger could arise from it; but we felt at that time and still feel that it was important to put it on record at that stage in the evolution of events in Central Africa.

Q. You do not think you were giving them *carte blanche* to go ahead with any extreme measures they wished?—A. I agree there was a grave risk. I must say I agree there was that risk and yet we felt it was important; these events do not just happen, so to speak, accidentally.

Q. In the same report to the Commission in October last year in paragraph 22, you say:—

"The Special Committee recognises that this Advisory Commission, led by Lord Monckton and containing six independent members, might afford a means by which the different interests in Central Africa and in the United Kingdom might be brought closer together."—A. Yes.

Q. That, I think, was something to be commended, that you put that in, but why had you no reference at all in this years report to the Monckton Commission?—A. Because so many people were saying everything is *sub judice*, the Monckton Commission is sitting, the evidence is being given and there was no further new development, apart from the Constitution, that we had to report; but you will recall that in February we did report to the Commission of Assembly that we were presenting evidence to the Monckton Commission, which decision had not been taken as early as that stage.

Q. Do you not think that you should have had some reference to the Monckton Commission in the report to the Assembly this year?—A. We felt that that would come better at a later stage. There was some discussion on it but we felt the appropriate time would be later and then, of course, we were also worrying about whether we would comment, if we were to give a kind of considered study of summaries. We did a summary of the bigger reports, the Ridley Report, notes on the Jack Report and also the Committee had worked on the opinion of Mr. Andrew Mwentá and his appeals in London. But there had to be a line drawn somewhere and we thought the Monckton Commission is one of the big factors that still will be proceeding.

Q. But at one of the Committee meetings about the end of January some reference was made to the Monckton Commission and a member said: "Why bother about it? The thing is dead". Were they not influenced by that point of view?—A. That was a minority point of view and the member still holds it, but the majority of the Committee feels other-

wise, that there is a promise in the Monckton Commission, which we mention in paragraph 22 and everything is to be gained by co-operating with it, but the member in question still has that view.

Q. In this report to the Commission in October you had two Deliverances at the end of it?—A. Yes. There was one which was amended. In Section 2, on resolution in the Commission, it was agreed to add the Monckton Commission.

Q. There was, of course, a vote on this question of the Deliverances in the Commission?—A. Yes.

Q. Which showed that there was a swing in the other direction in the Church as compared with the Assembly of last year?—A. I do not think one can deduce much from it. A large number of people do not normally come to the October Commission Assembly, the people who come to it are very often senior people with higher posts in the Church and there is a different complexion.

Q. But in the Assembly of last year there were only 50 who opposed your Committee's Deliverance, there were 50 out of 700 or 800. But in October there were 98 who opposed your Committee out of a body of about 270. Was that not a sign that there was a swing going on in the Church?—A. You are saying more than 50 voted against us in May and there were quite a number of abstentions given.

Q. Fifty was the number given.—A. I have heard senior churchmen discuss this and draw different conclusions. I would not like to generalise on it.

Q. Then in the March Commission document you had no Deliverances at all.—A. No Deliverances whatsoever because of the fact that people felt the next Assembly was very near and probably not many people will go to that Commission and it will be injudicious to press, shall I say, a dying body to make a major policy statement.

Q. Of course there is a different point of view here. In the Report to the General Assembly, May 1959,* your Committee says:—

"Federation was introduced in face of considerable opposition and apprehension on the part of the African population. This opposition was vigorous, persistent and, on the whole, well informed. We base this not only on the testimony of many responsible Africans, but on that of considerable numbers of missionaries, anthropologists, and administrators."
—A. Yes.

Q. At the same time you admit that the missionaries were simply those who came on furlough?—A. No. This is 1952/53, Sir. This is the introduction of the Federal Scheme.

Q. Taking the above statement, how do you reconcile it with the statement of the Church and Nations Committee, a much bigger, more representative body, which in 1955 said "The General Assembly note with interest that the Federation having been established in Central Africa there seem to have been comparatively few signs of active opposition and that already the economic benefits of the new structure of Government are beginning to be appearing"?—A. The comments are on two different periods, of course, but there were members of the Church and Nation Committee present on our Committee when this other statement was drawn up.

Q. But you have the statement that Federation was introduced in face of considerable opposition and apprehension on the part of the African population in 1953. In 1955, looking back on the two or three years, the Church and Nation Committee say that the General Assembly note with interest that Federation having been established in Central Africa there seem to have been comparatively few signs of active opposition and that already the economic benefits of the new structure of Government are beginning to be appearing. Is there not a contradiction between these two?—A. I would say it is a statement of developing process. I myself went back to Northern Rhodesia about the middle of 1952 and from 1952/53 there was very strong opposition voiced to the proposed Federation in the African Representative Council and in the Provincial Councils and throughout the villages and at many public meetings in the Copperbelt. In April, 1953, there were strikes on the Copperbelt, as you will recall, and the Queen's Coronation was boycotted by the mission station at which I myself was present and at several other mission stations. But I would say that in 1954 and 1955—I was resident in Northern Rhodesia then—the opposition seemed to subside somewhat. There would seem to me to have been a greater measure of African acceptance but I find it difficult to analyse that acceptance. There was an element of 'wait and' in it. That is how I view it. As you yourself have said these are two different Committees but with a significant enough membership to give us continuity and the Church and Nation Committee was smaller than our Committee.

* This Report has not been reproduced in full, but extracts have been reproduced as Written Evidence I above.

Q. But the body itself was much, much larger.—A. Yes.

Q. In the Report to the Assembly of May, 1959,* you say:—

"Considerable ammunition is provided to extremists on both sides by the cry that the Federation's future is a matter of 'party' politics in the United Kingdom."

In other documents you have expressed the hope that this would become a bi-partisan matter in United Kingdom politics. Do you think the Committee itself has done much to forward a movement that would keep it out of party politics?—A. I would say within the limits it has done a fair amount. It probably could have done more. In its protest to Government it has worked alone. The British Council of Churches has found itself in a large measure of agreement with the Church of Scotland. The British Council of Churches has kept on repeating this request in public.

Q. There may be differences of viewpoint there. I found in the report far too many references to the Labour Party to which your convener is deeply attached.—A. I think I ought to explain that I myself investigated the party affiliations of our Committee members and I discovered that a vast majority belong to the Conservative Party, that two of them are members of the Labour Party. Others have no strong affiliation, but you are correct in saying that the convener is a noted Socialist and that has perhaps been a problem in our general communication in the church because there are large numbers of well meaning people in the church who do allow their value of judgments to be determined by that symbolism before the arguments come out.

Q. In your latest report to the General Assembly of this year† one might almost say that the bulk of it is dealing with a political programme that you would favour for Central Africa, is that so?—A. In terms of amount of material that is so. The fundamental point made goes beyond that. In other words, the material you mention is less radical material, it is the more technical material.

Q. But it is laying down a political programme.—A. Making suggestions, yes, as has been done earlier in our church.

Q. I think it was quoted this morning, the statement of the Synod. In March 1958 the Synod of Blantyre said in a statement "We do not believe that the church should take sides in party politics by laying down political programmes". Do you differ from the Synod in that respect?—A. What is meant by political programmes, the proposals by parties in debate, whereas the structure here is something that up to date both the Opposition and the Government in Great Britain have accepted, that is to say Federation in principle. Therefore we felt we were in a position of including a move of conciliation, when instead of just saying 'no scheme without the consent of the people' we put forward some recommendations that might interest all parties in this country and in Central Africa and we found no individual party in Central Africa that has at least drawn up its material in that way. So I would say that this is a different category.

Q. You published in your report to last year's Assembly the statement of the Synod of Blantyre?—A. As an appendix, yes.

Q. Of the varied replies that were made to this statement why was no notice taken of these in the pamphlet?—A. For several reasons. The only one which has ever come to our notice was one which Sir Gilbert Rennie printed later on. When we read that we felt that it would not in any way help forward the debate by putting it side by side with this other document. Secondly, it was a very important church document which many people were speaking about in the Church of Scotland at that time but which they did not have the opportunity of seeing.

Q. But there were three individuals in Central Africa who replied to this statement and their replies brought a lot of publicity. Did these never come in your direction?—A. If you are thinking of the statement published in the *Nyasaland Times* of July 1958 . . . ?

Q. Yes.—A. Then we did see it much later than July, 1958. It was never presented officially to us.

Q. Has that not been one of the weaknesses of your Committee, that you have never published what went against your own point of view, whether it was a quotation from a missionary or any other source?—A. That may have been a weakness, I do not know, but we did not conceive it as our job to an information centre for the Church of Scotland, especially when the Church of Scotland was being subjected to a crusade or at least a strong propaganda move from the High Commissioner's Office. You will know, Sir, that even as

* See Written Evidence I.

† Not reproduced.

‡ See Written Evidence I.

early as the end of 1958 the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Committee and certain notable individuals had been communicating with outstanding individuals in the Church of Scotland and then throughout 1959 a fair amount of Federal Government money, time and personnel was spent in seeking to change the mind of the Church of Scotland. There are other more fundamental ideological elements that one would have to discuss also in this. Is it possible in a situation like that to be completely objective? Obviously we seek to be objective. Can any man be truly objective within the setting of this discussion? Obviously we all should seek to be.

Q. But do you not think that in the Assembly last March there was a feeling in the Assembly that vital information had been kept back from the Church that you should, in a more objective way, have put forward?—A. Again this is a matter of interpreting a majority of 18 out of 100 voters, plus the fact that we were opposed in the Assembly by a person of your eminence, Sir. I would not be able to sort out the reasons for that.

Q. I do not think you can put too much on the majority of 18, because the year before the common figure given was 700 or 800 against 50. This tremendous swing on the part of the Church I contend was purely due to the fact that the Church felt now that certain vital things had not been communicated which should have been communicated.—A. It may have been so, but there are many other factors which I submit would have to be taken into consideration in order to interpret both Assemblies.

Q. But you must also remember the reluctance of Scotsmen to change their opinions.—A. I think in the minutes of the Assembly there have been certain changes on other issues.

Q. You know the story of the Scotsman who said, "Lord, mak' sure that I'm aye richt for Ye ken I never change my opinion." It was a tremendous swing-over, and to say simply that there was a majority of 18 is not just taking account of that tremendous swing.—A. You see, the material which was on the same lines as last year's report went through without even a division. The material which was postponed was material which was of a more technical and less radical nature.

Q. Why did you give so little space in your reports to the level of advances in the Federation during the past few years? You gave very little space to that.—A. Well, we have given a fair amount; but fundamentally one must say that we were not concerned just with the social colour bar. We feel that even if the social colour bar were to be removed completely you would still have the main problem in Central Africa—this question of the sharing of power—and our discussion has consistently followed this argument of the sharing of power.

Q. Yes, you make a slight reference, but it is very inadequate, I think. You refer in your report, the Supplementary Report of 1955, to Mr. Brock and say that membership of the Southern Rhodesia National Congress shows the inter-racial basis of the organisation. Can you tell if any other Europeans, apart from Mr. Clutton-Brock and his wife, were members of this body?—A. We have heard of others who would have been members if they had been allowed in, but I have no knowledge of any others who at that time were members. There is doubt about the wife: somebody claimed in my hearing a few months ago that she was a member. I do not know.

Q. Do you not think this is claiming too much to say that this is an inter-racial organisation, when one possibly and his wife are members?—A. It comes in contrast with the constitution of the Southern African National Congress, which we were told by Professor L. Harris not long ago excludes whites.

Q. In South Africa, not Rhodesia?—A. Not the Zambia, nor the African National Congress of Northern Rhodesia.

Q. You do not think this was a case of one swallow being taken as making a summer?—A. You could apply the same argument to the Federal Information Officer in the Strand, Mr. Lawrence Vambe.

Q. You have published these reports in the past two years as separate documents. Are you publishing this year's report as a separate document in the Deliverances of the Assembly?—A. Well it has been postponed.

Q. Most of them have been separately published.—A. These are parts connected with most of the report, so we are postponing deliberation of it.

Q. But you are not publishing as you have done in the past?—A. We very well may, but we cannot at this stage, inasmuch as we have to, shall I say, keep silent on 75 per cent of it. I would draw your attention to Section 5 of the Deliverance which has been deleted meantime.

Q. Do you not think it would be better to publish the thing as you have done in the past, just after the Assembly, saying that is what the Assembly did?—A. Excuse me, may

I say it was published at the Assembly and a small number were published afterwards: most of the 6,000 copies were in circulation before the Assembly.

Q. But you did publish it with the Deliverances in the past?—A. Yes, but you see our difficulty.

Q. No, I do not.—A. It is that we have, I suppose, to continue to study the sections about Territorial and Federal matters pending publication of the Monckton Commission Report. It may very well be that, with such a large issue, many of these will be changed. That is all I can say on that, but I can answer your other question: if anything is published it will contain an extract of the minutes above the Clerk's signature.

Q. There seems to be emphasis on *if* anything is published.—A. Sir, it was your intervention which prevented it being published.

Q. One other question. It has been suggested to me very seriously that my speech in the Assembly should be published as a separate pamphlet by your Committee. Do you think there is any chance of that being done?—A. I think it is very improbable they would agree, Sir. I do not know, but I suppose it could.

PROFESSOR CREIGHTON: I would like to put a question simply for clarification. As I understood it, Mr. MacKenzie made a statement to the effect that a fair amount of money was spent by the Federal Government, in an attempt to change the mind of the Church of Scotland. Is that an accurate statement?—A. It is an accurate statement, and one which I would stand by.

Q. By what departments and in what ways?—A. The amount would be the cost of at least 4,000 copies of the pamphlet "Why not be fair?", of which 1,400 were put into the lobbies of the Members of the Assembly during the Assembly, 1959, together with the expenses of the travel of one information officer up to Scotland and within Scotland—to Edinburgh, Glasgow, East Kilbride, Perth—together with visits paid by the High Commissioner himself to the Aberdeen Presbytery of the Church of Scotland, to the Perth Presbytery of the Church of Scotland, to a committee or informal meeting at the Edinburgh Presbytery and to an informal meeting at the Glasgow Presbytery, and one meeting at a church in Arran. You will find that, Sir, in the columns of the *Scotsman* and *Glasgow Herald*—they contain more accurate information about the itineraries concerned.

MR. KATILUNGU: From what one could read from the documents you have submitted to the Commission one could conclude that you are in fact not against the principle of the Federation of Central Africa, as such. Is that correct?—A. That is so: as a method of association between the territories.

Q. On what issues do you regard the Central Africa Federation? Would it be on economic principles, political principles or social principles? Out of these principles, on what basis would you like to see the existence and the continuation of the Federation of Central Africa?—A. I would say first of all, it should be accepted by a majority of people of all races, that would seem to be a necessary pre-condition, basing these on analogies throughout the Commonwealth—in Australia and Canada, and so on. On economic counts I am not so qualified to speak. I would define any Federation roughly as (1) where you increased borrowing powers; (2) you attracted more capital; (3) effected certain economies; and (4) you have a more complementary economy. For example, if tea was hit in Nyasaland the copper mines in Northern Rhodesia would keep going, and *vice versa*. There are other economic arguments as well, but these, to a layman like myself, would seem to be cogent arguments in favour of federation. With regard to political arguments, I would say one of the fundamental ones is on the hinterland between politics and the realm of cultural institutions; and the institution of a federation brings different communities of different heritage and different movements into a face-to-face communion which they would not normally have in separation. For example, I think that many of the economic benefits of Federation are found in the Iron and Steel Community in Europe—at least I have heard one economist argue that way when you have inter-territorial separateness—but the Iron and Steel Community does not have the added benefit of the cultural exchange and communication of people and habit that federation could bring.

Q. So on those points you have described and in relation to other federations in the world, you would like the Federation to exist in Central Africa, and to continue, if the consent of the people was obtained?—A. Indeed, Sir, we would.

Q. In the Report where you deal with the 1960 Review,* you regard it as being vitally important.—A. That is the First Report, I think. Yes, we are very concerned and exercised about this critical Conference.

* See Written Evidence I.

Q. You then deal with considerable ammunition being provided for extremists, and so on, and you come to the question of representation.—A. Yes.

Q. You have referred to the probability of boycotting the Conference.—A. Yes.

Q. Do you regard the present boycotting of this Monckton Commission to be helpful insofar as the African political claim for full participation in the government is concerned? Do you think in fact the boycotts have helped the African to put their case before this Commission which is making recommendations in regard to the review of the Constitution?—A. Both as a western man and as a member of the Church, I feel that a boycott is a very negative approach to anything, and also on account of my own heritage of middle-class people in Great Britain: we do not feel in favour of boycotting, as say an Irishman in Eire would, so that there is a natural resentment to the very idea of boycott which rises up within me on account of the society in which I have been brought up. On the other hand, I fully understand why many Africans react in this way, because I have encountered the same thing so frequently in church sessions in the northern and central province of Northern Rhodesia, in purely ecclesiastical relations. I, as a western man, would seek, in dealing with another group, to continue to argue and seek to persuade them to my view, whereas my colleagues in the U.C.C.A. did not think of it that way at all. They thought of it more on the Old Testament lines of "Come ye out and be separate, oh my people"—there is a strength which comes from separateness and a weakness which comes from any kind of involvement. I found this response time and time again: one sees it in Nyasaland very clearly, when Dr. Banda, for example, argues that he can help the Africans in Southern Rhodesia more from an independent Nyasaland outside Rhodesia.

Q. However, you said it is a negative approach and therefore you would regard it is unfortunate?—A. Indeed, I would, yes.

Q. In this same document, you view this 1960 Conference as of great importance, and you would like to see some form of African representation at that conference?—A. Indeed, Sir.

Q. Supposing you were serving on this Commission and you had to make some recommendations in regard to this kind of representation, which you very much stress to be of vital importance, what would be the method of choosing delegates to attend this constitutional review conference with a view to satisfying all the sections of the community in Central Africa as a whole? What would be your proposition, and how would you do it?—A. Well, we have given some thought to this and we now feel very frustrated and very confused because of the recent decision by the Government of Northern Rhodesia in dissolving the African Representative Council. One sees in one direction the reasons for this. With the new constitution in Northern Rhodesia there is now a kind of extended set of qualifications, an extended franchise, and a step has been taken towards the introduction of democracy on a wider scale; yet surely it was premature to dissolve the African Representative Council of Northern Rhodesia. It was one body where the older rulers of the people, plus many of the younger African politicians, met each other and the representatives of government as well. So that my answer a few weeks ago would have been to recommend the fullest possible consultation with the main political bodies in the territory, including the three provincial councils in Nyasaland and the African representative councils in Rhodesia. I can no longer make that recommendation, but I can say that any delegation which did not have on it a substantial representation from the Malawi Congress Party in Nyasaland or the United National Independence Party in Northern Rhodesia would be a delegation to be regarded with suspicion in the minds of many Africans.

Q. In that respect you would not regard the existence of the African Congress Liberation Party in Nyasaland as a part of Congress?—A. I would very much hope they would be represented, but my knowledge is limited. I would not look upon them as being so *en rapport* with the feelings of very large numbers of Africans throughout the provinces.

Q. Are you aware that in the two Northern Territories there are a very big number of Africans who in fact do not belong to any of these political parties?—A. Indeed, yes.

Q. Do you think they are represented then, even if representatives attended from the Malawi Congress and the Independence Party, for the simple reason that they do not agree with the policies of those parties and as a result do not belong to them? How would you think of them?—A. I find it difficult to answer that. That is a very important and difficult question. I would want to do a lot more study on it than I have done up to today.

Q. In the same paragraph you refer to the claim by the

European politicians that the forthcoming conference to review the Federal Constitution is a hope for them to achieve dominion status.—A. At that time: it was near the end of 1958.

Q. This kind of information did not come to you at that time through your church missionaries rather than the other way. How did you obtain such information?—A. The Federal Hansards and the Hansards of the debates in the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia, plus the columns of newspapers like the *Rhodesia Herald*, *Livingstone News*, *The Nyasaland Times* and the *Central Africa Post*. They certainly communicated that impression, but I do know that even at that time Mr. Rob Moffat expressed doubts as to whether this was a valid evaluation of the mood of the European population—even after he saw it in print.

Q. Dealing with these issues, you consider the importance of Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia, but your last paragraph reads: "This committee feels the scope of the agenda of this conference will be crucial and should include a fearless examination of the re-fashioning of the Federal structure along lines that will go further to meet the criticisms of the Africans, especially the inhabitants of Nyasaland."* Are there any special reasons why you particularise Nyasaland in this paragraph?—A. I only meant that I myself pleaded for more attention to be given to Northern Rhodesia; but at that time you will recall that to this country there were coming very ominous reports about what might boil up in Nyasaland. That was what they felt. Secondly, they felt it would be rather dog-in-the-manger to speak so quickly of Northern Rhodesia when it was on the morrow of a new constitution; because it was in December 1958 that Mr. Lennox Boyd in the end agreed to the retention of two Africans in the executive council, and we felt that to begin quickly on top of this new constitution and to open up the question of Northern Rhodesia's basic structure would not be very responsible. But you will see that not very long afterwards we sought to correct the unbalance to which you draw attention by saying that it was ill-advised of the Scottish people to be too preoccupied with Nyasaland. They should not allow their support and concern for that country to cause them to forget that Northern Rhodesia was in the same constitutional position as Nyasaland.

Q. Going back to the question asked by my colleague on intimidation, I think you said that you did not have full knowledge of the recent developments in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, in relation only to the amount of intimidation in those two territories, in order that the politicians should get full support of all Africans. This intimidation has extended to children. Would your Church take any disciplinary action against any group of the younger people who are being used by African politicians in either intimidating other Africans or taking part in the processions or in any political demonstration—those who belong to the schools that you run, as a Church?—A. I can only speak from what has happened within my knowledge. I remember the very difficult situation in 1953. I can say, for example that we refused to take on to our staff teachers who had a report in the Copperbelt to the effect that they had incited, outside school hours and outside the premises, other Africans to strike in April, 1953. We refused to take them on to our staff. I also remember instructions going out to managers of schools about encouraging teachers not to enter or participate in politics in the schools. I could mention five or six other illustrations of this kind of thing.

Q. My question was would your Church take disciplinary action if it found the young people who are now in your missionary schools participating in political demonstrations such as processions and such acts as intimidating other Africans?—A. I am very confused, you see, because we handed over all our schools in Northern Rhodesia to the local education authorities and in a period subsequent. . . .

Q. Not in Nyasaland?—A. No. I would like Mr. Bernard to deal with that part of it; but subsequent to the action I have mentioned there was introduced a unified African teaching service where, I think, clear provision is made in the code for the kind of situation you mention.

Q. But political developments have now had a serious effect on schools, not only in Northern Rhodesia?—A. Indeed. (REV. BERNARD): Yes, the schools were closed at the time of the Emergency, because such things took place; and certain teachers—though a fewer number than I expected—were dealt with in consultation between the Government and the Church. I should think with regard to children taking part in demonstrations, it would depend on the nature of the demonstration, would it not? I think it is laid down—I am not speaking with

* See Written Evidence I.

† See Written Evidence II—Section C, Northern Rhodesia.

certainly about this because I think the Northern Rhodesia code for teachers in politics was changed slightly, giving them the ability to take more part; that was considered by the Director of Education in Nyasaland because of a complete cleavage in the Education Advisory Committee. Whatever was decided, as regards the conduct of teachers, most definitely affected what has happened in the schools; but the rule is, as I understand it, that matters like that are dealt with in consultation between the proprietor and the Government.

Q. However, if it is a political demonstration, would you agree to the government taking no action at all against those people?—A. They should not take part, certainly, in political demonstrations. That is one of the troubles.

SIR DONALD MACGILLIVRAY: You are no doubt aware that the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian decided not to give evidence to this Commission, and indeed indicated that visits to any of the missions by members of the Commission would not be welcome. There were several explanations of that position. It might have been that the Church did not want to be involved in political matters, or that the Church had been intimidated, or that it was partisan and wished to indicate solidarity of view and approach with a particular political party. Have you any knowledge of what really motivated the Church in that decision, not to give evidence to us and to boycott us? (REVEREND MACKENZIE): No, I have fragmented reports from different parts of the Church, but I would not like to say. (REVEREND BERNARD): You are meaning purely the Livingstonia Synod?

Q. Yes.—A. The document which I read this morning was one which I thought the Commission would see. May I therefore try to interpret what happened. I am not saying these things you have mentioned did not come in with a certain measure. The position, as I understand it, was this: I think you will all know we had certain discussions with the government about the negative value of boycotts, and these things were taken very much to heart by the executive committee of Livingstonia Synod. It felt it had no new evidence to give to this Commission, but it was willing at that stage to present to you this and earlier documents which were presented, especially that presented to the Devlin Commission. This is a question which seems to me to be one of wording only, but it is quite important. I understand that letter was sent to the Commission and that a reply came back, saying that the Commission would welcome the willingness to give evidence. That was read to the next meeting, and what they said was that they were not prepared to give any new evidence on this but that they were only prepared to go and discuss the previous documents. They had nothing more to say other than what they had said before. Because of that, therefore, they replied, I think, that they were not prepared to give evidence to this Commission. Possibly people like myself are partly to blame for their not appearing because, realising the situation in a certain sense, I should have communicated to the Commission the dilemma of the Church; because though it is true that certain letters and telegrams were later addressed, my own feeling is that the majority of that committee—I am not saying the whole of it—would have stood by their original intention, which was to put these things before the Commission.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: You are suggesting the thing was a misunderstanding, but would you be surprised to know that those of us who were there in the immediate neighbourhood of the Mission were actually told they did not wish us to pay even a personal and friendly social call? Do you not think that was different? That was no misunderstanding.—A. No. It was a most unfortunate thing, and I blame myself partly. At that point it was a misunderstanding, I am sure. I regret there were a lot of things which happened later to the Chairman of the Committee and to others.

SIR DONALD MACGILLIVRAY: In Section 11 of the proposed Deliverance you talk about delegations from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia being generally representative of the African peoples. Just why do you specify Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia? Is it not as important that delegations from Southern Rhodesia should also be representative?—A. (REVEREND MACKENZIE): We deliberately excluded them from the Report. It is very important that they should be representative. Our argument is concerned with the question of protectorate status—all that the people in Scotland are really entitled to do. We cannot interfere.

Q. So one cannot read Section 11 by itself?—A. No, and that is also relevant to the other Report where, very obviously, a train of reasoning should be carried on into Southern Rhodesia, where the Church is doing a lot better for their people than we are for ours.

MR. GONDWE: You say the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian is autonomous. You mean it is independent of the Church of Scotland now?—A. Yes.

Q. When you were asked whether it still had an interest in the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian, I think the answer was in the affirmative? Do you have any liaison with the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian?—A. Very much so, through the Foreign Missions Committee of the Church of Scotland, but not through the Committee which draws up these reports.

Q. Then that must mean that whenever anything is done by that Church which appears to be not very Christian, as Christianity is understood, it does exercise your mind as well?—(REV. BERNARD): I have on my desk at the moment received yesterday, a 5 page document, a report on Chikanga and his activities. I think you will realise this is the sort of thing we are interested in. We do not interfere, but we receive these reports and we offer our advice.

Q. May I take it that you have been offering advice to that Church ever since it became autonomous?—A. Yes.

Q. I think you are aware that the Church of Central Africa as at present constituted is still in its infancy and the Church of Scotland, though it might say that it has weaned that young Church, has still a certain amount of moral responsibility towards the Church of Central Africa up to a point?—A. Well, Sir, we certainly offer advice and we send our members of staff to work within that Church from this country. We supply a certain amount of money too. We do not dictate what they are to do, but I think you can take it that any information we receive, by advice or letter from the Church, is considered by the Foreign Missions Committee of the Church of Scotland—not this Committee which drew up this report. I mentioned the Chikanga issue to show you the sort of thing that comes in.

Q. And you have no doubt heard what happened to certain members of the Commission who visited that area?—A. Yes.

Q. Has the Church of Scotland expressed any regrets or has it communicated to the Church of Central Africa its concern about what took place there, especially when it affected the Moderator of the Church of Scotland?—A. I think the answer to that was that it was felt—we have written and said we regretted what happened there, but if you mean have we sent apologies to the people involved, it would not be right for us so to do.

Q. Because that Church is self-governing and therefore you cannot interfere in the internal affairs of that Church?—A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Bernard said that the leaders of that Church do not agree with most of the things that the Malawi Congress Party is doing now in that country and they do not associate with that organisation.—A. I do not think I said that: I said from my own experience of that—I know the senior clerk of the Synod who is in this country at the present time—though a great number of members of that Church would agree, if you like, with the long-term aims which have been expressed, they might not agree with what Malawi is doing. The view of the Christian Council, as I understand it, is that all the churches together should make these things known to the Malawi Congress; and the Livingstonia Synod has appointed its representatives to that Council.

Q. Would you say the Livingstonia Synod itself is, up to a point, an ally of Malawi? That is a sweeping statement to make, of course.—A. There are many who are members of the Malawi Congress, but I do not see. . . .

Q. Even amongst the ministers?—A. I do not think there are many ministers. I know there are some, but I do not think there are many.

Q. Whilst we were in that area as a Commission, one of the ministers did stand up after the service and tell his congregation that none of them should appear before this Commission and that instruction had come down to his congregation from the Synod of the Church of Central Africa.—A. If he said that, it did not count.

Q. But that is what he said.—A. I think I know the gentleman referred to. I do not agree with him. I think he is wrong, but I understand what he had gone through.

Q. That is why I am asking this question, you see, because as a member of that Church myself I am very much concerned indeed. I feel that is not what the Church should mean. We do not like all the things that are done by the government in Nyasaland. The Malawi Congress Party does, shall I say, criticise the Government of Nyasaland or the Government of the Federation. Any thinking person would agree with that organisation insofar as the criticism is constructive, but when it comes to the lower level whereby a lot of intimidation takes place and people fear for their lives, something ought to be done by the Church.—A. All I have said is that I know of these matters which take place; I know that a committee has met, and members of the staff as well as pupils are to be dealt with. I think it is also fair to say of that Church that a

certain statement which Dr. Banda made at the end of one of his addresses—the famous one at Mlanje—“If the gods of the Christians will not assist us we must turn to the gods of our ancestors”. I was asked by the Ministers at Livingstonia to find out if that is so. If it is then there is no question of Dr. Banda entering this Church again. So they do take notice of these things.

Q. I would just like to seriously ask the Church of Scotland not to pull out of the Christian work in Central Africa altogether. They should exercise some moral influence over the African ministers in that area. I say this because one day while I was a member of this Commission, one of the missionaries came to my office and said the Synod of Livingstonia had decided to give evidence and he had persuaded the African members of the Synod to appear before this Commission: but when we went back, what happened? The Synod had reversed its decision. These are things which make some of us a bit afraid of the future of Nyasaland, especially when the Christian Church does not help to build up a real Christian character amongst the people.

MR. ROBINSON: I would like to refer back to the question of the climate of public opinion raised by Professor Jack. As I understand the position, you are in process of relinquishing your control over the Church in Nyasaland, if you have not already done so. You have done so in Livingstonia, but not completely in Blantyre—is that right?—A. Yes, it happened in January.

Q. So for the purposes of my question am I to take it that the Church of Scotland now has no direct representation in Nyasaland?—A. Organisationally, no. We have our members of staff there, and the fact that we finance certain things.

Q. So you now send out members of your Church and ministers to work in the service of an organisation over which you have no policy control?—A. (REV. MACKENZIE): The same as the Church of South India.

Q. Yes: I am not criticising, just commenting. That is the position, is it? And when you send people out do you inquire whether they are persons whose political views agree with those of your governing committees of the Church of Scotland, or do they go out as members of any political party—conservative, labour, communist?—A. Not communists.

Q. You would not have ministers who were communists or fellow travellers?—A. No, we can say neither communists nor fellow travellers. There was a statement in the *Scotsman* a year ago making it quite clear that the Candidates Sub-Committee, which is different in personnel from this Committee and most of the Foreign Committees, does not take them. The Candidates Sub-Committee is a very interesting one of Christian headmasters and doctors and people like that.

Q. You have really no administrative control over the Church in Nyasaland. You send your servants to work in the Church in Nyasaland. If you found that these persons were engaging directly in political activity there, in the schools or in the Church itself, would that cause you in any way to withdraw them or recall them from Central Africa?—A. This is a very difficult subject. In the schools the situation would be different. There is nothing laid down by law.

Q. If you, as a Church, found that your ministers, who are presumably engaged and controlled by you, which you are sending out to Africa to work under some other person's control, were engaging in political activity in the schools or missions or the Church itself, would you cause them to be withdrawn from their mission?—A. (REV. BERNARD): I could not answer it as widely as that.—(REV. MACKENZIE): The difficulty is that we may let ourselves in for the criticism of controlling the Church by money. The Church of Scotland pays the salary of certain personnel, and I take it that the argument would run on the lines of “We know we do not control the person: he is under you in Nyasaland: but unless you tell him to behave himself we will cease to pay him”. It is that sort of bedrock reality which would be behind it if the two Churches could not agree. But I think both Churches would consult on that and I would pray and hope that some agreement would be arrived at, so that you would not get the European Church and the indigenous Church in clear collision.

DR. SHEPHERD: It is not the case that certain missionaries home on furlough recently worked at the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian, but these men are not wholly in agreement with their political views and therefore should not be sent back?—A. (REV. BERNARD): That is entirely wrong.

Q. It is not only one.—A. You mentioned Northern Rhodesia, and I say categorically no.

MR. ROBINSON: Nyasaland?—A. Again the answer is that a section of the Church—and they put their reasons on paper—were not in favour of this man's return. The court above that, the Synod, said it did not really accept these reasons and they wanted the answers from the man on leave. The

answers were sent back and the Synod in Blantyre said, “Of course he will return.”

DR. SHEPHERD: Which means this man goes back, knowing there has been a discussion about it?—A. No, Sir: it is not purely political.

MR. ELLMAN BROWN: Would you agree that one of the greatest problems in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is poverty—all-in poverty?—A. It is a very great problem.

Q. Would you agree that it is the duty of the Church to try and help the welfare of all the people?—A. (REV. MACKENZIE): Indeed, and I had that in mind when I was replying to Mr. Katilungu about increasing the borrowing power of the area and also to make the whole area less vulnerable to a world depression.

Q. Would you agree then that we have to get a balanced approach, and not only a political approach but an economic one, towards the poverty?—A. No, I could not agree with you in that simple way, I would stress very strongly that there are very cogent economic arguments, but it would seem to me that it depends in a larger measure on more goodwill amongst the people than we have known in the recent past, because money can be misspent.

Q. So you would say the work of this Commission is entirely political and not to help the living standards of the peoples in Central Africa?—A. I would say that what the Prime Minister indicates . . .

Q. I would like you to answer my question. Do you think the balance in Central Africa is not only political?—A. I would say it is not only political and not only religious.

Q. You think we ought to work together in trying to raise the standards?—A. Indeed.

Q. Why have you not reported that, and why have you not helped the Governments to achieve that object?—A. But that has been reported.

Q. Forcibly?—A. As forcibly as possible, and if I may say so, more in perspective. You cannot do good to people against their own wishes. The Africans are not masses to be developed.

Q. On that theory then, you would rather see poverty remain?—A. No, I do not think that is a logical deduction. I agree both can be made, and I would remind you of the White Papers Cmd.8234/5, supporting the fiscal Federal scheme, where there is an exposition given of traditional British colonial policy, which is that there will be a development not only of health and wealth but also of social and political life as well.

Q. You do not think that the Church needs anybody to try and assist in explaining to the peoples some of the benefits?—A. Of a particular federation?

Q. There might be economic difficulties. There might be other advantages. I have never seen any statements of yours that really tried to help the situation.—A. May I come back to another point that the people have almost been blitzed with an enormous amount of information on these benefits and my impression was in 1955/56 that they were rather tired of hearing them.

Q. That does not support Dr. Shepherd that everything that is bad has been highlighted, the aims and objectives have been rather pushed into the background by your church?—A. It is rather this: if we took your line seriously. . . .

Q. On balance that is all.—A. If we took that line seriously it does mean the Marxist ideology that once people see the benefits around them in terms of better schools, better hospitals, bridges, agriculture, then there will be a re-casting of their personal approach. Our interpretation of human nature is different from that—that it is possible and we know in recent history it is factual that certain communities have chosen a way that is immediately a way of poverty.

CHAIRMAN: I suppose to put it in a sentence what you say is you recognise that there may be strong economic arguments but they are not conclusive?—A. Indeed. I would like to underline very strongly what I said to Mr. Katilungu. They are not conclusive and I would refer to the statement at the end of the General Report where I think that point is made quite unambiguously.

Q. You made it at the beginning and the end.—A. Yes, at the beginning too.

Q. We have to recognise it is there.—A. Indeed.

Q. I think there are no more questions, are there? Thank you very much for your attendance and the help you have given.—A. We would like to thank you, Sir, very warmly indeed for receiving us and for being so patient with us and I should also like to thank all those who posed questions. While we may differ in respects we honour them.

[A booklet entitled *Why not be fair?* giving comments by The High Commissioner in the United Kingdom for the Federation of



Rhodesia and Nyasaland on The Church of Scotland's Special Committee's Report on Central Africa, dated May 1959, was also circulated to the Commission. This document has not been reproduced but copies are obtainable from Rhodesia House, London.]

Memorandum

RT. HON. THE EARL OF SELBOURNE

The best recent short analysis of the Central African problem that I have seen is from the pen of an American Professor, (of all people!) Dr. Stephen Enke, entitled *Favourite Fallacies about Central Africa*, which was published in the *Central African Examiner* of April 9th, 1960.* In it he examines some of the principal ideas that are current in the United States and in the United Kingdom, about Central Africa, in a quite short but masterly article. I would commend it to the attention of the Monckton Commission.

I first visited Rhodesia in 1907 when I was a boy of 20 staying with my father who was then Governor of the Transvaal and High Commissioner of South Africa.

At that time the Africans went about almost naked. The men usually wore nothing but a pair of cut short cotton khaki trousers and the women wore an apron of beads. (I remember a Greek trader in the Bush explaining to us that the feminine fashion in beads changed from year to year, just as regularly as the Paris fashions for more sophisticated clothing). The children ran about stark naked.

Everywhere we were received with the utmost cordiality, friendship and gratitude, because the Africans' memories were still recent of what Rhodesia had been before the Union Jack was hoisted. One has only got to read the diaries of such missionaries as Livingstone, Knight, Bruce, etc., or travellers like Mungo Park or George Grey, to learn of the chronic warfare that had been going on in that area for centuries—warfare characterized by indescribable brutality, the like of which has not been seen since, until the recent rebellion of Mau Mau. The fighting tribes continually raided the weaker tribes, carried off their womenfolk and cattle, and slaughtered everything else. In some parts the prisoners were sold to Arab slave traders, and by them shipped to Arabia from ports like Dar-es-Salaam, whenever they could elude the British Navy. This apparently had been going on ever since the human race appeared.

Added to this, disease and famine were chronic, and the toll of human life taken by lions, leopards and other wild animals added to the sufferings of these miserable savages. It was no accident that the population of Central Africa in many parts was very sparse.

Since then I have repeatedly visited Rhodesia, and have watched the continued increase of prosperity on the part of the Africans. The condition of Africans today is very different from what it was 50 years ago. The Missionaries have brought the Christian religion and elementary education, and today about .0001% of the Africans have graduated at Universities in Europe, South Africa and America. These gentlemen (some of whom are quite intelligent) are naturally inclined to think that it would be much nicer for them if they governed the country instead of the white man.

Rhodesia has been exceptionally fortunate in the British Statesmen who have governed the country. Lord Malvern, Sir Roy Welensky and Sir Edgar Whitehead, are all men of exceptional calibre, and, in my view, they have tackled the extremely difficult problem of African advancement in the right way. Having been a "professional politician" all my life, I have naturally studied the problem as closely as I have been able. The Rhodesian approach to the problem is diametrically the opposite to that of Dr. Verwoerd, which is pure Krugerism—which we fought and won the Boer War to abolish. It accepts the dictum of Cecil Rhodes "Equal rights for all civilized men". The difficulty in individual cases is to decide when a man or woman is civilized. This cannot be tested accurately by mere ability to pass examinations, or by property qualifications, but the Rhodesian Statesmen have followed both lines of approach. I believe that so far as such rough and ready methods of assessment can go, they have extended both the Federal and the Territorial franchise to Africans just as fast as, (if not faster than) the African has been able to follow. It is beside the point to complain that the pace has been slow. The reason for this does not lie at the door of Rhodesian Statesmen, it lies at the door of History. You might as well complain because a boy of 10 was not 6 ft. high. This would not be due to any mistake by Mr. Macmillan or Mr. Gaitskell, but because he had not been born before 1950. He may attain 6ft. one day, but it is not in the power of politicians to make him grow faster than Nature ordains.

* Reproduced as an annexure to this memorandum.

On the question of Nyasaland, I should say that undoubtedly the great bulk of African opinion is anxious to see Nyasaland separated from the Federation. Whether it would be wise or right to accede to that desire is another matter. In my view the Federation has already brought immense benefits to Nyasaland, and it would be wrong to interrupt the good work, simply in response to ill-informed clamour. I should also deplore any step that weakened the Federation. The Federation under its present leadership stands for the great ideal of Racial Partnership, and on the success of that policy depends the whole future of Africa.

It might, however, be feasible to accord Nyasaland some measure of local autonomy. I would suggest that the wise way to do this would be to transfer certain subjects to a Nyasa elected assembly. We might start at the roads, and if that proved to be a success, it could be extended to schools, etc. Progress in those departments would not be as fast as it has been under the Federation, but such a plan would have the advantage of introducing the Nyasas to the elements of the problems of self-government.

In regard to the Franchise, I would suggest that we could not do better than to go back to Rhode's dictum—"Equal rights for all civilized men". Whether a man was civilized or not should not depend on any educational or property test, but on the judgment of an impartial tribunal, which might well be appointed by the Imperial Government, with the terms of reference that every Nyasa who could satisfy the tribunal that he was civilized, should be entitled to the vote. The tribunal would have to visit his home and interview him, and see how he brought up his family, and make a judgment, taking all factors into consideration. If a candidate was rejected, his case could be reviewed again after a period. Such a procedure may seem elaborate and lengthy, but it would have the inestimable value of laying the foundation well and truly.

There is no short-cut to Democracy. It took the English over a thousand years to attain their present degree of complete self-government and freedom, and I do not know of any case where any people have attained an equally satisfactory solution in less time. The fact that the formula, "one man one vote", has been demanded for Central Africa by people like Dr. Banda and Mr. Mboya, only serves to show how unfit they are to be entrusted with the destinies of their nations. British wages earners did not receive universal suffrage until 1930, although they had by then generations of experience in the management of Friendly Societies, Co-operative Societies and Trade Unions. And to regard such responsibilities for people whose grandfathers were savages is, surely, unrealistic.

The history of the twentieth century is strewn with the wrecks of attempts to introduce Anglo-Saxon democracy into countries of quite different temperament, and quite different history. That is what has happened within our lifetime in Russia, in Germany, in Italy, in Spain and in Portugal. In every case it has ended in dictatorship, and if the same experiment were today tried in Central Africa, it would inevitably also end in dictatorship. We can already see this going on in Ghana, where Dr. Nkrumah locks up his political opponents without trial, just as gaily as does Dr. Verwoerd.

Left Wing opinion apparently does not find anything shocking about Dr. Nkrumah but is horrified at Dr. Verwoerd. I can't see that the colour of the gaoler's skin makes much difference to the person who has been locked up!

Africans, naturally, do not like being governed by Europeans, just as, no doubt, Britons disliked being governed by the Romans, or the Saxons by the Normans, but it was very fortunate for their descendants that neither of them succeeded in obtaining "freedom".

The modern African will shout for "freedom", without having the least idea what it means or involves. Africans vary as much in intelligence and education as Europeans, from the professor to the gangster. The great majority of Africans have no real conception of Democracy, or what freedom means. This gives the .0001% quasi-intelligentsia, and especially men like Dr. Banda who have Demagogic gifts, their opportunity. It also gives the Soviet Government their opportunity. By taking and training men like Jomo Kenyatta, and feeding the Bandas and Mboyas on communistic propaganda, they find tools to sway the 90% of semi-primitive Africans in the direction of Communism.

If Nyasaland were given independence today with universal suffrage, we should undoubtedly very soon have a dictatorship by Dr. Banda, inspired and financed by Russia. In other words, we should be forwarding the Movement which NATO exists to resist. Is that what our Left Wing idealists want?

There is no short-cut to Democracy.

May 1960

Annexure

by the RT. HON. THE EARL OF SELBORNE

Reprinted from *The Central African Examiner*

April 9, 1960.

Favourite fallacies about Central Africa

by Dr. Stephen Enke

Dr. Enke is Visiting Professor of Economics at Yale University and economics consultant to the Logistics Department of the Rand Corporation, of Santa Monica, California. He paid a three-month visit to the Federation in 1958-59, at the end of which he prepared a detailed report on a number of aspects of the Federal economy, extracts from which were published in The Examiner of January 31 last year. His chief conclusion was that, if the Federation is to maintain White and Black incomes at present levels in the years ahead, outside investors (among whom he classed the Northern Rhodesia copper companies) must be induced to put £50m. a year in the Federation.

In the article on these pages, Dr. Enke outlines the political conclusions he has drawn from his studies of Central Africa.

Changes are occurring fast in Central Africa—perhaps too fast—and largely because of opinion in Great Britain and the United States. If government by “Westerners” soon ends in the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, the Belgian Congo, Angola, Moçambique, Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda, it will not come from African masses uniting against the white man in their midst, sabotaging his enterprises, and attacking his families. Even Mau Mau did not drive the Europeans from the White Highlands of Kenya, and so far this skilful exploitation of bestial superstition remains unique. Rather will it be because Britain, Belgium, and Portugal have responded to pressures in the West. The white man will not be driven out of Central Africa so much as his “home” governments will withdraw their support and so cause his exodus.

Western public opinion—and particularly “liberal”, intellectual, articulate opinion—feels guilty about the white man in Africa. In Britain the Labour Party positively dislikes “white settlers”, usually of the middle and upper middle classes, who have escaped the “welfare state”. And in America there is a tendency to judge conditions in Africa in terms of the negro problem in the United States. If these are mistaken attitudes, some very wrong and irrevocable decisions may be made in the next few years, decisions that will not advance the African but will weaken the position of the West.

These decisions will have to be made by people who have mostly never been in Central Africa. Their ideas will inevitably stem from the one side they have heard “Europeans” who live in Central Africa, like most pioneers, are far too busy to write articles or lecture in the United States. Few of them realize that their future—and that of their employees incidentally—is being determined thousands of miles away by more vociferous people who often know their subject superficially.

Each country has quite different problems

The first mistaken idea is that Africa exists as a useful concept for policy discussion. Africa is an enormous continent of great natural and social diversity. The Sahara desert cuts the continent in two more effectively than the oceans separate North and South America. The Mohammedan Arabs, north of this desert, are mostly oriented on the Mediterranean and have been part of European history for thousands of years. Within sub-Sahara Africa one must distinguish areas that have been permanently settled by Europeans (such as Southern Rhodesia) from those where Europeans live and work temporarily before returning “home” (such as Nyasaland). It is also important not to confuse regions in which the white minority is fairly large (about one in four in the Union of South Africa) and where it is much smaller (about one in 100 in Uganda).

West African natives, through the African slave trade, have had centuries of contact with the outside world. Although contiguous, job advancement is significantly different in the Belgian Congo from Northern Rhodesia; in the former, Africans drive railway engines and act as tellers in banks, while in the latter the European trade unions have jealously guarded the better jobs. Sub-Sahara Africa also tends to be culturally different, at least in the towns, those of Portuguese East Africa being markedly different from towns in the Union of South Africa for instance.

Topography has also diversified Africa. Along the “cool crescent” of high land running from Southern Rhodesia into Kenya, the country is relatively open and the nights often cold. These two factors for many centuries deterred Africans from living there but attracted European settlement.

For all these reasons there are very few things one can say about Africa that will not be true of some part but untrue of other areas. If “Europeans” in Africa know better

than to talk about North and South America as an entity, perhaps it is time that white people in the Americas stopped passing generalities about Africa. Certainly the problems of Central Africa—a heterogeneous concept in itself—must be solved differently from those of say Ethiopia or the Union of South Africa.

African racialism—not nationalism

A second fallacy concerns African “nationalism”. There really is no nationalism in Africa in the usual sense. An even more inept historical confusion is to think of Africa in 1960—with various areas gaining something called “independence”—with Europe in 1848.

“Nationalism” in Europe sprang from a feeling of unity. It came from a sense of common language, history and religion. The Italians came to feel like Italians because they sensed their differences from Austrians and French. The concept of a country had meaning, too: Italy was where Italians lived.

Almost none of this is true of Central Africa. Nigeria cannot be defined as where Nigerians live; its borders were arbitrarily established in the last century by Europeans. If Dr. Banda exhorts Nyasas to see to it that Nyasaland can be “free”, it is not so that a distinctive culture can survive un-threatened.

The politically distinguished territories of Central Africa, such as Northern Rhodesia, the Belgian Congo, or Uganda, contain numerous tribes with different languages. Tribal feeling, while breaking down among the urbanized, is still strong. The Central African native, unlike some of the Zulus, is almost without a history. Nor do African tribes have long associations with specific localities. Until Europeans brought safety to the bush, Central African villages were frequently moved, sometimes for food but often from fear.

However, if nationalism does not exist, tribalism endures in the bush and racialism is increasing in the towns. In the rural areas a man is not, say, a Northern Rhodesian but a Bemba, or a Lozi, with his own language; but in a town like Ndola he will talk Chikabanga and may have come to think of himself, thanks to the white man, as a black African. It is racialism and not nationalism that the African politician must exploit if he is to attain power.

Little resemblance to the Negro question

A third misconception is that black and white race relations in Central Africa are something like the negro problem in the United States. But the “Central African African” is much closer to primitive savagery than is the American negro, and he is only three generations removed from slavery. In comparison, the American negro is so well educated, urbanized, and civilized that, apart from his colour, he resembles white Americans far more closely than his African cousins. Solutions of the negro problem in the United States—not always easy to discover and apply—are often not applicable to Central Africa because the “Central African African” is an entirely different sort of person.

The American negro is now civilized, except perhaps in a few rural parts of the South. Most negro children attend schools of some kind; in later life they will use, and so remember, the reading, writing, and arithmetic they learned there. They speak and understand the language of newspapers, movies, radio, and television. At the very worst, through these means, they have access to ideas and facts beyond their home and job. The American negro has long lived within a Western culture, even in the South, and in the North and West he has experience of democratic politics and some understanding of government. Over half the negroes in the United States now live in or near towns. Negro women have become emancipated.

Most Central Africans live in huts in the bush. The men tend cattle; the women cultivate, cook, and carry. Because the women do most of the work they have value, either as a “wife” to buy or a daughter to sell. In the bush, unless there happens to be a mission not too far away, there will be almost no opportunity to learn to read or write. Knowledge tends to be limited to personal experience and rumour. Superstition is rife.

Only for the fraction of Africans who live in townships, near the white man’s cities or mines, can ignorance be lessened a little, for there are the schools for children and the evening classes for adults. For Africans who can learn to read their own language, there may be a small paper printed in his vernacular. But for those who can learn English, the radio and films become intelligible, and through books and magazines they have access to a larger world. For the time being, and for only a fraction of the African population the only way to civilization is through the towns and schools.

In the United States the white and black races have long been living alongside one another. Moreover the negro has almost always been a minority. Inevitably he has acquired many of the “civilizing” features of the dominant culture

within which he has lived. But most African natives have not had these opportunities. Permanent white settlements are recent and still rare in most of Central Africa. The first Pioneer Column did not enter Southern Rhodesia until 1890 and some Copperbelt towns have existed little over 25 years. Vast expanses of Central Africa are entirely uninhabited by "Europeans".

In Central Africa, unlike the United States, the white man is a drop in the population bucket. In a territory like Nyasaland he is one in many hundreds, not only as regards the colour of his skin, but as a person. He is an exception in having a formal education and civilized values. He is likely to be a senior Government official, a professional man, or a farmer or businessman with a considerable investment that he is managing. He is almost never a semi-skilled employee. Thus, unlike the negro in the United States, the African tends not to be in economic competition with the "European". This means that—except on the Copperbelt and in other limited fields of employment such as Rhodesia Railways—there is little of the bitterness that exists between "poor whites" and negroes in the Southern States. The economic roles of the two races in Central Africa are essentially supplementary. Neither can prosper and advance without the other.

The myth of economic exploitation

A fourth fallacy concerns the supposed economic exploitation of African labour through low wages for long hours.

Although wages for African labour in Central Africa are low, compared with wages for negroes in the United States, it is perhaps more relevant that they have been continuously increasing both in money and real terms. And as regards hours, a great deal of African labour does not work for a set period but is assigned a given task, so that it is not uncommon to see underground mineworkers or field labourers drifting home long before the end of the formal shift or work day. Most significant of all, in those areas where there are reliable statistics *per capita* incomes of productively engaged Africans are rising relatively faster than those of economically active "Europeans".

But what is the range of wages in Central Africa and how are they determined? The lowest paid work is field labour, where wages and rations cost the farmer about 3s. 9d. a day—double what they were a few years ago. The best paid work is in the copper mines, where the cost to the companies of wages, rations, housing, and welfare is a little under £1 2s. 6d. a shift on average. Field labour wages in prosperous territories such as Southern Rhodesia are often too low to attract local Africans and many farm workers there are migrants from more backward areas, such as Mozambique.

At the other extreme, wages paid to Africans on the Copperbelt are considerably above the level required by the market; evidence of this is the seven-year average length of service, the 36-year average age of African employees, and the large number of dependents supported by each job-holder.

Wages in Central Africa—with the exception of the Copperbelt mines—result from ordinary demand and supply forces. There is no forced labour and contract labour rates are supervised by paternalistic Government officials. In part, wages are "low" because most Africans can still offer only muscle and sweat and require close and constant supervision by a "European". The skilled Africans—automobile mechanics and underground blasters, plumbers and carpenters, cooks and teachers—are still a minority. Sometimes this is because "European" trade unions will not accept African apprentices; but this restriction does not apply where an African is the employer, perhaps operating a garage or building on contract. Lack of even an elementary education, accentuated by the desire of most "educated" Africans to have clerical jobs, explains the paucity of skilled manual workers.

The most important factor of all is that there are not enough entrepreneurs, with capital and management, to provide all the jobs that are sought by Africans who want "European" style goods. These can be bought only with money. Theoretically, apart from small tax payments, most of the population could live on the Reserves or in the bush and ignore the money economy of the "Westeners". But too many of them have seen or heard of bicycles, store clothing, shoes, flashlights, cigarettes, sewing-machines, soap, and all the rest of it. These can be acquired only by selling cattle or crops for cash or—which is practically more important—by working in the white man's economy for a wage.*

But who can offer jobs? Only a few exceptional Africans have the drive, efficiency, and capital to establish themselves

* In those cases where whites and blacks do the same work, the African typically gets a much lower wage; this kind of discrimination, based on the existence of non-competing labour groups, is analogous to the lower wages often paid women in Western countries for doing the same job as men.

in business and offer paid employment to more than a few workers. Large-scale employment can be provided only by "Western" capital under "Western" management. Sometimes, as in mining, this is direct investment with absentee ownership. But in agriculture—tobacco, tea, maize, and the like—a "white settler" usually provides the local management and the risk capital. Thus, the "Western" pioneer in Central Africa—by paying wages and producing perhaps for export—is in effect enabling African employees to obtain manufactured imports.

It is not an accident that Africans are materially best off, and have superior educational and health services, in those areas of Central Africa that have the most "white settlers". The contrasts between Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia are a good example and well-known to Africans. Many Africans "vote with their feet" and migrate many hundreds of miles to work or visit in the white-settled areas.

But, just as in the American west a century ago, Europeans will not live in Central Africa and develop it unless there are economic opportunities. There must be some prospect of profit, which, in view of political uncertainties and high transport costs, means that natural resources and labour must be "cheap". In time, as these productive agents are increasingly put to use, their prices will rise. This sort of transition, although called exploitation by some, is the traditional pattern of economic development.† The wages of Africans in Central Africa may appear "low", as compared with the United States, but this is a cause and not an effect of economic development.

Who "owns" the country?

A fifth fallacy is that South and Central Africa "belong" to black Africans. It is allegedly "their" country and the white man is viewed as a sort of trespasser. This principle of the preclusive ownership by race majority is one that cannot seriously be supported when its implications are understood.

It should be remembered that many "natives" in Central Africa are white. Most of the highveld, along the "cool crescent" was very sparsely populated before the advent of the white man. African tribes lacked adequate clothing for the cold winter nights on the plateau and there was more security in the thicker vegetation of the lowveld. Many of the tribes in the highveld were recent refugees from Zulu aggressions under Chaka.

During the second half of the last century, most of Central Africa was still very underpopulated. Tribal wars, hunting accidents, and medical superstitions took care of population growth all too well. Much of the country was and still is relatively "empty". The population density was probably not very different from that of the American Indian around the Great Lakes at the end of the eighteenth century. For a variety of reasons—not entirely to the credit of "European" Americans—the Indian population decreased. In Central Africa, Africans have really been "protected", and not least from his fellow African, so that, even though medicine has penetrated the bush slowly, his numbers have now increased. But even today the population of Northern Rhodesia, for example, is only about 6 per square mile.

The area "taken up" by "Europeans" is a small fraction of the total region. White settlement of itself has not created a land scarcity for the black Africans. It is also often forgotten that, in many of the territories administered from European capitals, land cannot be bought freehold by white settlers but must be leased with the approval of the protecting power.

And in what sense can the buildings, streets, and utilities that comprise places like Salisbury, Léopoldville, and Nairobi "belong" to the black population of Central Africa? The sole contribution of Africans to their existence has been that of paid labourers on their construction—and they wanted the work badly enough to walk several hundred miles for it. A city like Salisbury, the site of which 70 years ago was a bare and uninhabited plain, is entirely the result of "Western" enterprise.

Any argument that the real wealth of Central Africa should belong to the black population is racialism at its worst. It is analogous to the Nazi expropriation of Jewish property in Germany. In some ways it is as though the "European" population of North America were to deprive all orientals and negroes of their real capital because they were minority races.

It is undoubtedly galling for the few educated and sensitive black Africans to see, over the fence, white Africans running the best farms, living in the best houses, and enjoying the best amenities. But these "Westeners" did not take them from anyone. They created them—and frequently in their own

† The negroes of the Southern States are better off because northern capital took much of the nation's textile and shoe industries there; in rather the same way the Africans of Central Africa have benefited from the inflow of foreign capital and white immigrants.

generation. And fortunately the unsophisticated bush African feels far too removed from the white man to suffer from envy.

Finally, white pioneers in Central Africa are not trying to force their culture on Africans. It is the emerging Africans themselves who want to have the things of the white man and be like him. To an amazing extent this is already beginning to happen in Central Africa. However, if the African is to continue to be westernized, he must have "Westerners" in his midst. In fact, so scarce are human talents and social capital that the greatest need of all Central Africans, black and white, is more immigrants of Western culture.

Freedom from what?

The sixth fallacy is that "freedom" can be legislated. Mr. Mboya shouts for *uhuru*—from the "white settlers" of Kenya. Dr. Banda demands *kwaca*—from the white colonial officials in Nyasaland. And the "Europeans" of Rhodesia demand independence—from Westminster and Whitehall. But there are other freedoms, too, that the inarticulate majority of Africans may want more. What are some of these other freedoms?

In many respects "freedom" for the individual lies within himself. Freedom from the most awful superstitions—which sometimes compel Africans to do terrible things—comes from Christian education and scientific knowledge. Freedom from disease and malnutrition, for most bush tribes, must come through technical field services and "Western" knowledge. More "freedom" for the individual includes a multiplication of economic choices and increasing recognition of these alternatives. "Western" development has provided this kind of freedom. In contrast, the Central African of fifty years ago lived in an almost choiceless world.

The establishment of law and order by colonial and "settler" governments has brought freedom from fear in Central Africa. Until three generations ago, tribal raids offered a risky but exciting chance to get slaves, women and cattle. But predatory economies, in which tribal energies go to seizing or holding existing wealth instead of creating new income, are usually cruel, harsh and miserable. Today, also, the witch doctor no longer "smells out" victims to be impaled and dismembered. Tribal life may be duller but the individual is a great deal safer.

Political "freedom"—which is a new concept vaguely understood by ordinary Africans—is being demanded by a few extremely clever and ambitious black politicians. Some of them have secured a good education in Britain. Some of them have returned with the removal of white "domination" as their mission. Others have sought to practise as doctors or lawyers, have unfairly been rejected by their "European" social equals, and so have turned to agitation as a means to power and position when the white man has gone. These men have almost nothing in common with the ordinary African. In fact—so long as they are black—the strength of their following depends on how European in dress and manners they have become. (Dr. Banda has forgotten his native language and has had to use interpreters.) Shrewd and capable, they see no reason why a few two-eyed black men should not live like kings in a native country of the blind.

The specific demands of this new generation of African politicians are universal suffrage, representative parliaments, and (given these two) independence from outside "mother" governments. It is no accident that these demands have more meaning to "liberals" abroad than they do to ordinary Africans in Africa. Statesmen, educators, and publicists in Britain and the U.S., unless they know a lot more about Africa than is common, can usually be expected to react favourably to such demands.

But these goals are largely incomprehensible to most black Africans. In the vernaculars there is not even a word "to vote", for this concept in the Western sense is unknown. The separation of legislative and executive functions also is an abstract distinction beyond most ordinary Africans. Small wonder that the new African politician, in addressing Africans, seldom does more than define "freedom" as "Africa for the Africans", which to most Africans means more land, less work and taking over what the white man will leave behind.

At the present state of social development in Central Africa—and largely because there is no large and influential middle-class of black businessman and landholders—universal suffrage would almost certainly lead to personal dictatorships by a few political leaders.

Their power would depend on mob support in the towns. Very few trained Europeans would work for a government which denied civil liberties to its political opponents and was not answerable to a freely elected parliament. And there are not yet enough educated and civilized black Africans to con-

tinue one-half of the present activities of government in the region. In all probability the authority of the "city" government in the far bush would atrophy while economic decay began in the towns. The evolving African middle-class would not be safe in its possessions and the Asian traders would be in danger of their lives. Many of the more important freedoms that have been won so painstakingly would soon be lost.

What neither African politicians nor "white settlers" sufficiently understand is that real freedom for the black African—including more social, economic, and political advancement—is not something that can be enacted into being. African advancement, as in the past, can only come from the gradual eradication of superstition through education, development of social capital as well as economic capital, and extension of racial understanding. "Freedom" for the African, in its fuller sense, is not something that a few greedy white men can withhold or that a few altruistic "Europeans" can legislate. It is something for which both races must work together—originally as parent and child, now as teacher and pupil, and eventually as equals.

Test of civilization—not of race

The seventh, final, and basic fallacy is that "Western" democracy is suited to Central Africa in the mid-twentieth century. Certain political institutions—such as universal suffrage and representative government—are not universally applicable irrespective of population quality. These institutions evolved slowly during centuries of industrial progress and growing enlightenment. Even in Great Britain, the home of parliamentary democracy, adult male suffrage did not come until the end of the last century while universal adult suffrage was attained only after the first world war. Switzerland, one of the stoutest democracies of Europe, has recently again denied votes to women. One of the greatest periods of economic development in Western Europe, that of the nineteenth century, occurred at a time when far less than one-quarter of the adult population voted.

History suggests that, as an alternative to mobocracy or dictatorship, democracy depends for success on circumstances rarely found in backward countries. It is necessary that (1) voters have some minimum of formal education, emotional balance, and moral courage; (2) the population is not through religious or racial differences in a state of undeclared civil war; and (3) there is some common economic interest, language, or history to provide a sense of homogeneity. Also necessary are a free Press and radio, safeguards against arbitrary and prolonged detainment, and protection of minorities in their lives and property. That many of these conditions are lacking in Central Africa is more due to historical destiny than to human recalcitrance.

However, a way to a not entirely hopeless future is indicated by the multi-racial experiment, now little over six years old, in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Here every "civilized" adult has a vote. "Civilization" depends on a combination of education and income—the more education, the less income being necessary.

When 99 per cent. of the black population was lacking almost any attribute of civilization, there was some justice in denying the vote to a black population that already enjoyed the advantages of being protected by the Colonial Office of an impartial overseas government. Certainly it was more reasonable then to accept or reject adults as voters according to race than—as is done even in some "democratic" countries today—according to sex. However, with the advance of the African, social and economic, rather than racial, attributes have become the basis of voter qualifications in the Federation.

It will be some time, however, before a majority of the adult population are sufficiently "civilized" to become voters. During the transition to full democracy there will be anomalies: for example, a civilized black African voter can hardly remain a protected person, unable to buy liquor and subject to pass laws. In the interim it may be necessary to establish three legal classes: (1) black residents who are not citizens, and alone are protected persons; (2) adult citizens, black or white, who qualify by residence, education, and income to vote; and (3) unnaturalized whites, who are not citizens and hence cannot vote, and who by virtue of race cannot be protected. In this case "naturalization" comes not from local nativity but from demonstrated qualifications. It is the step to citizenship. Having taken it, the black adult loses the advantages and disadvantages of being a protected person. Once a citizen, like the white man, he has the vote.

Social, economic, and legal status tend to be associated in practice. This is just as well. An "emerged" African citizen, if no longer able to claim the benefits of protection, must be presumed a social equal of Europeans when it comes to such things as hotel accommodation and restaurant services. In fact,

social, rather than racial, criteria are already applied in many parts of Central Africa.

The lesson to be learned is that equal people should have the vote but that the vote does not make people equal. Western democracies extended the suffrage as—and not before—economic development and public education brought most of the adult population up to a minimum standard of citizenship.

In Central Africa today “one man, one vote” would mean mobocracy or dictatorship, weakening of law and order, and economic decline.

The long-term plans of Nikita Krushchev

Few people recognize that—although their long-term objectives differ—Western “liberals”, leading black African politicians and the Soviets all have the same immediate goal for Central Africa. For all of them, the present objective, in each “colonial” territory, is to establish within a few years a black African State. “Liberals” see this as the first step to full democracy. The African politician works for this as a way to personal fulfilment and dictatorial power. The Soviet Union realizes that this sort of “independence” may subtract the area from the economy of the West and eventually reorient it upon Communist Asia. Each of them has a different view of what will happen after “freedom” has been attained.

The African National Congress has frequently revealed by its actions that it is more interested in creating incidents than it is in relaxing tensions and advancing ordinary Africans under “other” auspices. The Congress has worked against agricultural and veterinary reform and against African voting. Most instigated attacks are on the persons and property of black Africans who support the Government, and so oppose the Congress; few are against “Europeans”, although these attacks make the headlines.

The Congress leaders are far too shrewd to imagine that the end of colonial administration will bring representative government rather than their own rule. However, they know that the struggle for power will not be decided in Africa, but in European parliaments and by public opinion in the West. Accordingly they must be delighted when the Soviets trumpet against “colonialism” and they hear the answering echo from certain Western writers and lecturers. However, being strong willed and ambitious men, the Congress leaders will not knowingly serve Russian *long-term* interests.

It is inconceivable that the Soviets do not have a strategy for Central Africa. It is too large and populated a land mass to be ignored in the cold war. Unfortunately, many people have been lulled by the present inactivity of the Kremlin in this area, not realizing the importance to the Soviets of remaining inconspicuous for the time being.

What are reasonable Soviet objectives and tactics for Central Africa? The ultimate aim is probably to remove all “Western” influence and reorient the region upon the Soviet Union. The more immediate and negative goals are to end “colonialism” and to deprive the West of certain important minerals. Central Africa is an important exporter of copper, lead, zinc, cobalt, chrome, asbestos and other strategic minerals. Western Europe is as dependent on Central African copper as it is on Middle East oil.

The easiest way for the Soviet Union to cause a decline in strategic mineral exports is to destroy good government, by agitation for or attainment of premature democracy. Production must decline if the management and technical skills of “Westerners” are withdrawn, if African workers are robbed of their wages and have few imported goods to spend them on, and foreign capital does not maintain its real investments in the region. Even apparently unsuccessful political agitation for “freedom”, if it includes enough terrorism, sabotage, and chaos, can destroy the economy and so serve Soviet policy.

American and British “liberals” confidently expect that Central African leaders will rule independently of foreign powers, and that economic development will continue, once government under Western influence has terminated. What may be possible in India they expect in Central Africa. But if history teaches anything it is surely that weak peoples of primitive culture cannot be prosperous, except under the supervision of another country, and cannot remain independent without the protection of great nations.

Withdrawal of Western control and management from Central Africa would be an enormous propaganda victory for the Soviet Union. Eastern Europe, China, parts of the Middle East and South-east Asia have all been “lost” to the West during the past 15 years. Another major debacle, and the remaining uncommitted peoples will recognize what appears to them to be an irresistible wave of the future, while “our” world will come to comprise only the Atlantic community.

America, Britain and their allies cannot afford to lose

Central Africa from their sphere of influence. In 1970, when we look back on some of the irrevocable decisions of 1960, how irresponsible will they seem?

Oral evidence

THE RT. HON. THE EARL OF SELBORNE

SIR CHARLES ARDEN-CLARKE: Would you care to enlarge on your memorandum?—A. There is nothing in it you do not already know. I can call myself a professional politician: I have been in politics all my life and have also had the opportunity of knowing Southern Rhodesia from outside.

Q. Would you like to elaborate any particular points?—A. No, except when I said that Anglo-Saxon democracy had been introduced into other countries, and cited Russia, Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal—they are all countries of a very advanced civilisation, or some of them at any rate—whereas I think in Central Africa you have a very small minority of educated and able men, and the great bulk of the population is very primitive indeed. There is a tremendous range of difference in culture and civilisation which, to my mind, makes the idea of giving universal suffrage so dangerous.

Q. You regard universal suffrage as the distinctive feature of British parliamentary democracy?—A. No, I would not say that. It is the present stage at which we have arrived. Of course we considered ourselves to be a democratic country long before there was universal suffrage. In the 18th century, Englishmen were proud to boast of their freedom and constitution, but there was a very restricted franchise.

Q. Would you like to tell us what you regard as the distinctive feature of a democratic government—of an Anglo-Saxon government?—A. I should say the ability to compromise. The English have a great gift of compromise, and it is that, and the fact that we are a very homogeneous nation, that has really made for the success of democracy in this country. But when you come to a country like Germany, the Germans have no idea of compromise at all. There you have a state of affairs where one who has the power imposes his will on those who have not the power—the same is true of the South African Dutch.

Q. You said in your memorandum with regard to the franchise that whether or not a man was civilised should not depend on any educational or property test but on the judgment of an impartial tribunal, which might well be appointed by the Imperial Government.—A. Yes.

Q. That is rather similar to the Portuguese *assimilado* system. In Portuguese territories, although the number of *assimilados* is very small over the years, they have the same system of a committee, I think; and a welfare officer is sent to any applicant's home to see if he fulfils the qualifications of civilisation, as laid down by them.—A. I did not know that.

Q. I wondered if you had formulated in your mind any qualifications for civilisation?—A. It is very difficult to define, of course. It does not depend on wealth or education. It really depends on how you behave and how you bring up your family.

Q. If such a system were ever to be proposed to, and win the support of the Africans, they would have to have some idea of what the qualifications for being regarded as a civilised person must be. You have given us two negative qualifications: it does not necessarily mean being educated or wealthy.—A. It all depends on your standard of behaviour.

Q. For example, under the Portuguese system a man must have a modicum of education—I am not sure I have got this altogether right, but it will do roughly for my purpose—and he has to be a Christian. His children, if any, must go to school, and he has to live in a European fashion. Those are the kinds of qualification. I wondered if you had listed any forms of qualification in your mind.—A. No. But you have to have qualifications similar to the Portuguese.

MR. CRAWLEY: In spite of your views about equal rights for civilised men being rather difficult to define, you would presumably envisage some sort of franchise existing at the present time. Are you in favour of the present franchise, or would you be prepared to see it broadened at all?—A. I do not really feel I know enough to express an opinion about that, but I do not like these rough and ready tests of property qualifications and education qualifications. The tribunal is a test: that is what it comes to.

Q. But we have had property qualifications in our own history which in their time worked quite well.—A. Our franchise really just grew. It was originally confined to freeholders—you had freehold land worth 40s. a year and that

would give you a vote. It was not till 1832 that the franchise had any semblance of being democratic.

Q. Would it make you nervous to see the franchise broadened to allow many more Africans, many of whom, as you say, are civilised and well-mannered people although they cannot talk English, included?—A. I said it all depends if they are fit for it. If they have the right degree of civilisation, they certainly should have the franchise. I should have thought the present franchise was about as good as you could have.

Q. Supposing the franchise was retained as it is and it was clear that the opposition to it and to Federation was going to lead to violence, and increasing violence, would you still try and maintain Federation by force?—A. What do you mean by violence? It is very easy for a man with demagogic gifts to start a riot. You have to distinguish between that, and real public opinion: you have to have a people who are capable of a public opinion.

Q. Would you not say that all riots anywhere are due to a few people who can exploit public opinion—they are always promoted by a few people who manage to exploit a large number?—A. Yes, and of course every case varies. There has to be some discontent before you can have a riot. I do not think you ought to alter the franchise just in response to a series of riots.

MR. MENZIES: My Lord, I think it may be taken from your memorandum that you are a supporter of Federation?—A. Yes.

Q. Despite the inherent defects or disabilities that you find against the constituents in Central Africa and their incapacity or their inexperience in the matter of compromise and so on.—A. Yes.

Q. But you still think that Federation is a proper system?—A. I think it has brought great benefits to Rhodesia.

Q. Starting from there, you make a concession, I think, that it would be feasible to accord Nyasaland some measure of local autonomy?—A. Yes.

Q. Just what had you in mind? You go on to speak of certain matters which might be dealt with.—A. Yes, I would like to start with those subjects of which the inhabitants have knowledge, such as the roads and schools. I should proceed very gradually. You cannot go too fast. You have to proceed on a process of trial and error as we did in this country.

Q. But under the present Colonial Office government, as you find it in the northern territories, there is that power to deal with African education. They also deal in large measure with roads—all roads outside inter-territorial roads. They still have a very large field of legislative power today.—A. Yes: I think it is a question of judging how well those have worked. If you think the system has worked well and can be extended, then I should do so.

Q. When you say "a greater measure of autonomy" you do not mean to increase the legislative power under the Federation?—A. In Nyasaland?—I should extend it gradually.

Q. And would you improve the African representation in the legislature in Nyasaland?—A. Yes, under those conditions for this limited field.

MR. ROBINSON: I am very interested in your reference to NATO and the international picture that you paint of Africa marching along the road to being dominated by Russia. Do you believe that this is likely to occur if you hand over power too quickly? Do you believe it is likely to occur in the Congo?—A. Yes, I do indeed, in the Congo.

Q. And elsewhere in Africa? What do you think NATO can do about it?—A. Well, I am not thinking of what NATO can do, but we ought to prevent this type of situation developing. If you have a dictatorship financed by Russia, you are going a long way towards Communism, because Russia is a form of dictatorship. There is no democracy in Russia: we all know that.

Q. And you believe that is one of the great dangers facing Africa at the present time?—A. I think it is a danger you might easily run into if you gave too wide a franchise and the people who have the vote do not know how to use it. They would elect some leader such as Dr. Banda, and what he wants is money from somewhere. He will get it from Russia at once: he could not get it from the West.

SIR CHARLES ARDEN-CLARKE: Following that up do you know anything about Ghana? We hear much about Ghana going a bit communist. They have a dictatorship, or alleged dictatorship.—A. All I can say is that they do exactly the same sort of thing as the South African Government does, and that does not seem to shock a lot of people. I find it shocking.

Q. You seem to be connecting dictatorship almost automatically with communism.—A. Communism is a form of dictatorship. Hitler was not a communist, but there was not much difference between Nazism and communism.

Q. Not in techniques, no.—A. The Germans used to have a proverb—"what is the difference between Germany and Russia?" The answer was, "It's colder in Russia".

MR. HABANYAMA: My Lord, do you not think there is equal danger that if you did not give enough attention to African demands at the present moment that the Africans, in their struggle to get what they want, may look somewhere else for help at some stage when they are frustrated?—A. Yes, but I should say they would be making a big mistake if they did, it is the technique of the Russians: to promise everything to people who have not got what they want, and they get a great following in all countries in the world.

MR. JUSTICE BEADLE: Lord Selbourne, it has been suggested to us that the franchise among the Africans should be widened, and that the basis of the widening should be the number of additional Africans that come on to the roll, not the qualifications of the individual voter. In other words, the basis must be a lowering of the franchise to such an extent that it will enable another 100,000 Africans to get on the roll. I take it you would not approve of that basis of the franchise?—A. No, it would be putting the cart before the horse.

Q. Is it not possible to reconcile your views with those we have had advanced in evidence by quite a distinguished constitutionalist that by adopting the principle of a dual roll, as they do in the Federal Constitution now, until such time as you have a sufficient number of Africans with high qualifications to get on the ordinary roll, you should lower considerably the qualification on the lower roll in order to enable them to get adequate representation. What would be your attitude to that?—A. I think it would depend on the powers they have. If they confine their representatives to purely local questions, I should think that would be quite healthy. If we tried to entrust them with powers on which the electors are not really in a position to judge or form a sensible opinion, then it would be making a big mistake.

Q. Under the Southern Rhodesia system, although you have two rolls, for the purpose of voting they all vote for the same candidates, and there is the qualification that the lower roll cannot exceed a certain percentage of the special roll. In the Federal system the two votes are separate for different candidates, but in the Southern Rhodesia system they all vote for the same candidates.—A. I should have thought the Federal system was the better one. I would prefer that, but you know all these things depend on how they are worked. For instance, the constitution of Mexico was the same as the United States, but the history of Mexico has been very different from that of the United States simply because one was worked in an Anglo-Saxon way and the other in a Latin way.

Q. Our difficulty is that both these systems are so new that we cannot judge from experience which is likely to work the better. From your knowledge of Africa, would you think the Federal system would work better than the Territorial one?—A. I should have thought so.

LONDON

10TH JUNE 1960

Memorandum

THE IMPERIAL TOBACCO COMPANY
(of Great Britain and Ireland), Ltd.

As you will be aware, my Company operates tobacco leaf

buying organisations in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. We also have substantial forestry interests in both countries.

2. We commenced operations in Nyasaland in 1908; and in Southern Rhodesia in 1927.

3. In this current year (1960) we expect to spend some £10,000,000 on tobacco leaf purchases in Rhodesia (about 50 mn. lbs.) and some £750,000 on leaf purchases in Nyasaland (about 7½ mn. lbs.). These figures exclude the operating costs, amounting to a further £750,000 per annum, of our General Manager's office in Salisbury and of our two leaf handling Branches at Msasa, Salisbury, and Limbe, Nyasaland. The Branch at Limbe handles, in addition to our own purchases, some 10/11 mn. lbs. a year for other companies.

4. Our capital investment in the Federation (at original cost) now amounts to some £3,000,000. This figure includes our investment in Forestry—some 12,000 acres, saw mills to deal with the timber produced, as well as the handling factories themselves. It also includes expenditure of some £600,000 on our African housing schemes at Msasa and Inyanga in Southern Rhodesia and at Limbe in Nyasaland.

5. Numbers employed by us at the seasonal peak in 1959 were:—

	<i>S. Rhodesia</i>	<i>Nyasaland</i>	<i>Total</i>
European	120	60	180
African—Regular	775	860	1,635
—Seasonal	1,505	2,815	4,320
TOTAL	2,400	3,735	6,135

The great majority of the Africans whom we employ in Southern Rhodesia are Nyasas. Many of them come to us year after year for seasonal employment in the handling of our tobacco purchases.

The greater numbers employed in Nyasaland are required partly because of our grading operations at Maone Estate for the Agricultural Production and Marketing Board, partly because of the greater use of manual labour in stemming the leaf and partly because of the fact that a variety of activities such as forestry and the preparation of timber for cask manufacture are carried on there.

6. We do not think it within our competence to offer views to the Commission on detailed constitutional changes. We wish, however, to make the following general observations:—

- As a Company we have, we believe, shown our concern for the welfare and advancement of both the Europeans and the Africans whom we employ, wherever we employ them. Whatever shape the future constitution of the Federation may take we shall continue to have that concern.
- We strongly believe that the conception of a gradually developing multiracial partnership in the Federation offers the soundest framework—both economically and in terms of labour relations—for our future activities.
- On the particular question of Nyasaland—where, as in Southern Rhodesia, we are one of the leading industrial concerns—we believe that the agricultural and industrial development of the country will best be served if Nyasaland stays within the Federation. On economic grounds we find it difficult to see anything but disadvantage to Nyasaland in secession.

So far as our own activities are concerned, any barrier which made more difficult the employment of a large number of Nyasas at Msasa would be an embarrassment. It would also be regretted, we think, by the Nyasas—who have shown that they appreciate the good conditions of employment that we provide.

Further, in relation to our forestry activities, it is important that we should be able to move timber freely from Nyasaland to Rhodesia.

In our particular field of interest—the purchasing of good quality tobacco for the U.K. market—we consider firstly that the Nyasaland growers of flue-cured tobacco have much to gain from a continued close association with Federal research into cultural practices; and secondly that all tobacco growers, European and African, stand to benefit from Federal efforts to explore fresh markets.

In general, we believe that the first requirement for Nyasaland is an intensive programme of better land husbandry. This would require the expenditure of large sums of money over a period of years, but if such expenditure began to provide a progressive agricultural economy it would pave the way for a wider establishment of secondary industry and would be abundantly worth while.

Bristol
20th May, 1960

Oral Evidence

THE IMPERIAL TOBACCO COMPANY

(of Great Britain and Ireland), Ltd.

LORD SINCLAIR

in his capacity as Chairman and in his personal capacity.

CHAIRMAN: Lord Sinclair, we have received a memorandum from the Imperial Tobacco Company which we have had circulated and have read. I understand you are here not only as representative of the Company this afternoon but also in your personal capacity and that you will make a supplementary statement to the memorandum?—A. Would you like me to start? It follows from what the Chairman has just said that what I had in mind to make, if it was agreeable to the Commission, was a statement in two parts, the first in amplification of this very brief memorandum put in by the Company and in that, of course, I will be speaking as representing the Company, and the other presuming to offer a few personal observations and in that I will be speaking purely in a personal capacity. I have not put in a memorandum to supplement this because I conceived that perhaps the Commission had had their fill of memoranda by this time but for the sake of coherence I will, if I may, speak from notes and I will be very happy to leave a copy of those notes with the Secretary if that would suit the Commission.

Q. Thank you.—A. May I start by a brief word of personal explanation. I do not pose and I hope the Commission will understand this—I do not pose in any way as being an expert on these problems. My actual experience of the three Territories comprising the Federation is really limited to three visits, all since the war, in 1952, 1956 and 1959. My knowledge of Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is somewhat less limited than that in as much as the Company for which I have worked for rather over forty years has had a substantial industrial stake in these countries—in Nyasaland since 1908 and in Southern Rhodesia since 1927. Each year one of our Executive Committee, our Leaf Manager or his deputy, some members of the management of our Manufacturing Branches all spend several weeks in each of those countries; our engineers and accountants pay occasional visits and again each year the head of our African organisation or his deputy and some of their colleagues come over in the off-season to this country. So that over the years we have been, I think, in close contact with some aspects of the social and economic problems, at any rate in those two Territories.

If I may then start by way of amplification of this memorandum I would like at the outset to make it clear that the Company as such expresses no views upon the political questions involved. We take the stand that as long as tobacco of suitable quality and price is produced in those countries, we want to continue not only to buy some of our supplies there but to maintain our own plants for packing, stemming and re-drying; to do what we properly can to further the interests of the tobacco growing industry; to provide good working and living conditions for our own employees; and in the doing of those things to make a contribution to the economic advancement of the Territories concerned. We hope to continue to be able to do that whatever form of constitution may apply—provided, of course, that order is maintained and general conditions are tolerable.

I recognise that some members of the Commission are no doubt already pretty familiar with the tobacco industry but for those who are not perhaps I might say a little about it with a view to perhaps making clearer the application of some of the facts given in the memorandum to the general problems before the Commission.

This business of the tobacco growing industry in Central Africa, after a good many vicissitudes, has succeeded in overcoming, or at least substantially neutralising, some of the natural difficulties of the soil and climate which the cultivation of the Virginia flue-cured type of tobacco has to face in that country. The quality of the best leaf produced there has improved greatly in the last thirty years, and particularly in the last five or six years, and there is every reason to anticipate further improvement in the average quality. For the sake of the Commonwealth and because of the desirability (for balance of payments reasons and on general grounds) of not having too great a preponderance of supplies from North America we (and, I believe, the other manufacturers in the United Kingdom also) would like to see the industry in the Federation thrive. It is, of course, true that the financial stake we have there, considerable though it is, is really a small factor in relation to the importance to us of maintaining quality to suit our market which is, of course, in the case of the Imperial Tobacco Company, the United Kingdom one. It is also true that, if from

circumstances beyond our control Central Africa for one reason or another ceased to grow suitable tobacco, the necessary supplies could be obtained elsewhere, but as I have already indicated that would be a necessity we should very much regret.

The relevance, I think, of what I have been saying as regards the tobacco growing industry in the Federation lies in the fact that most of the manufactured tobacco is a highly important revenue producer throughout the world and particularly, I am sorry to say, in this country, and quality is therefore very important. The great bulk of the tobacco grown in the Federation is exported and it is, I think, second only to copper in value as an export, although it is perhaps a poor second, it is second in value to copper. Flue-cured tobacco of the Virginia type is the major part of that export. Incidentally, as the African's standard of living rises I think more and more the African will be smoking flue-cured tobacco in the form of cigarettes. Up to date flue-cured tobacco has been, not only in Africa, but in America as well, a crop that is pre-eminently a white man's crop. The capital investment in equipment, curing barns, irrigation, etc., is a high figure per acre. Even with the best farmers the occasional poor crop is inevitable with a consequent strain on capital resources and close and skilled supervision is continually necessary. I do not mean by this that the African never would be able to produce flue-cured tobacco without European supervision. What I do mean is that only even if there were no restrictions at all it is inevitable that it would be many years before that could happen on any considerable scale and any deterioration in quality meantime would prejudice the future of the industry in the Federation.

I think perhaps I ought, if I may, to say a few words about other types besides flue-cured. There is dark fired, Burley and sun-cured, varieties which are coarser leaved, not so delicate, and which do not require flue-curing in barns. They are types which the African can produce with much less skilled supervision. About 30 million pounds of that class of tobacco are produced a year in Nyasaland and mostly as a cash crop by Africans. Nearly all of it is exported, to the benefit of that country's economy. But owing to the universally downward trend in the consumption of pipe tobaccos the prospects for expansion in those types is not encouraging. There is also a small quantity of Turkish type tobacco grown in Southern Rhodesia and that is not flue-cured either. Its increasing production by Africans is a possibility but one must recognise that the total quantity of all these types—at present 31/32 million compared with 200 million of flue-cured Virginia type tobacco—is small.

The conclusions, I think, from that are firstly tobacco is important to the economy of the countries that comprise the Federation. Secondly, its value can be maintained only if in quality and price it can be competitive. Thirdly, that in turn requires experience, skill, capital and continuing research into improved cultural practices. Fourthly, even with the utmost willingness on all sides to assist African progress in agriculture, with improvements in land tenure conditions, perhaps a better understanding particularly in Nyasaland of some of the safeguards that exist already, with considerable development of the class of master farmers and so forth, it will still be at best a long time before an appreciable quantity of flue-cured tobacco can be produced by Africans; and if the industry meantime is to survive in the areas where it at present thrives and if it is to develop in other areas, European experience and supervision and capital, and the kind of help that only in the nature of things can come from Federal or centralised research, are essential. Please understand that in saying that I am in no way criticising the Territorial Departments of Agriculture nor failing to recognise the African's ability to learn. But I am simply trying to stress the fact that the transition from subsistence farming to this kind of operation is not easy and if it is attempted too rapidly could bring disaster to the industry.

Mr. Chairman, that is all I think I would like to say by way of amplification on this memorandum of the Company. If when I have finished there are any questions on that part I would only be too happy to try to answer them.

Coming on to what I might say in a purely personal capacity, I must repeat again the obvious limitations of my experience and I hope anything I say will be taken with that fully appreciated by the Commission. But one cannot have the kind of interest that I have had in those Territories and affection for them, if I may say so, without forming some views on some of the problems.

May I say at the outset that I believe in multi-racial partnership as the basis on which the political, social and economic advancement of the Africans in these Territories that comprise the Federation can best be secured and on which the greatest

contribution of those Territories to the Commonwealth can be made.

Secondly, for so far as I can see, economic and therefore political independence for Nyasaland is not practicable and for Nyasaland, association with the Rhodesias is far better than association with East Africa.

Thirdly, although I would not consider myself competent to say whether any and if so what loosening of the political ties binding the Northern Territories to Federation may be necessary, I agree with the point which no doubt has been made many times to this Commission and which was, I think, emphasised in the memorandum which was submitted by the Joint East and Central African Board, that independence in the Federal sphere is not necessarily incompatible with a continuation of Protectorate status for the Northern Territories. In fact I think I would say, because it might save time, that I do find myself personally very much in agreement with the memorandum from that Board as a whole.

May I try to emphasise a little what I feel and in doing so I am afraid I must make a few statements that are very much the obvious, no doubt have been made many times before, but they are necessary, I think, if one is to develop anything of an argument.

The reality of partnership cannot be obtained overnight. The great majority of Africans are still a long way from being politically conscious in the sense of being able to form a reasoned view on political issues, and being still in the main illiterate can be exploited by the agitator. Therefore, the process of attainment of political rights must be gradual and there is no practical alternative, as I see it, to some kind of qualitative franchise. That, of course, must sound elementary, yet surely ways must be found of convincing the Africans that under the existing Constitution, or any proposed modification of it, the road to the attainment of full political rights is not barred, and that a general raising of the standard of living is practicable. I accept that in the present state of things it is very difficult to carry that conviction. But it surely must help if the Africans can be convinced that the Europeans are determined to make partnership a reality and the more evidence there can be of real progress towards partnership on the social and economic front, the better chance of carrying conviction of the reality of political advancement.

It surely is axiomatic that partnership implies safeguards for all the parties concerned. Its achievement is only possible on the basis of the maintenance of order and reasonable stability. Yet I would judge that it has no chance of being accepted as a goal unless continuing and perhaps accelerated evidence can be given of the determination to make it a reality.

I suppose that to those who can appreciate the political difficulties which have faced both the Federal and Territorial Governments since 1953 the progress towards partnership can be seen to have been considerable. The Commission, I have no doubt, have got a good deal of factual evidence on that point.

But it can be made to appear to have been disappointingly slow. And in the present highly emotional situation any pinpricks that remain can assume great significance. If there still are, as I think to the Africans and to some Europeans there appear to be, pinpricks suggestive of discrimination for the sake of discrimination they should be removed. The impression I have is that there still remain some pass laws which might with advantage be modified; discrimination against Africans in hotels, restaurants, etc. could be substantially relaxed. I know there are some difficulties about residential discrimination but I am sure there is some scope there too and generally I believe that improvements in urban and peri-urban African housing are very urgently required.

I think that industry generally—and not as I am afraid is the case now, exceptionally—should seek ways, wherever the nature of the work permits, of bringing on Africans to positions of responsibility, and then be prepared to promote on merit regardless of colour, even if this clearly opens up the possibility of an African eventually being "over" a European. This is going to happen from time to time in the Civil Service and in the professions and if industry believes in partnership it must be prepared to put it into practice where the circumstances warrant it. The opportunities of doing this kind of thing, of course, are rare at present, and book learning and ability to pass examinations do not of themselves supply qualities of judgment or leadership and I suspect that the practical application of what I have been saying is hardest of all in the factories. Yet one must believe that there are some Africans who naturally have or can acquire qualities of judgment and leadership which on top of technical and theoretical knowledge will fit them for positions of responsibility.

I expect the limited extent to which this kind of promotion has so far occurred is due, not so much to any lack of goodwill, as to a natural fear of making a mistake. In the early days, particularly, a few promotions that turn out badly can do incalculable harm. It is natural for any manager to want to be as near certain as possible that the first few are all successful.

It is easier for some firms than others to do this kind of thing. I know some firms who have their own selling organisations, for example, successfully employ Africans and Asians as sales representatives alongside Europeans. Naturally, of course, to start with they call only on African or Asian customers, but if partnership is a reality some of those chaps with experience behind them are going to go much farther.

It is not, of course, possible to generalise on this. It is not a matter for legislation. As I see it, it is rather the cultivation of an attitude of mind and a belief in the force of example. And when there is the will to do something of this sort, taking some trouble to find the African who is likely to repay and take full advantage of the opportunities that may arise can be well worthwhile. To take one example, I think the best products from an institution such as the Bernard Mizeki Primary School, which as you no doubt know is primary in name rather than in fact, because it has taken different pupils up to 16 and 17 years, but it has been followed by a secondary school on the same principle, the best products of that sort of institution will have already developed qualities of character and leadership by the time and are therefore the kind of suitable material, but the flow of that material is only just beginning.

I know it is easy to theorise on this and there are obvious dangers in going too fast but I hope that industry itself will find ways of accelerating the pace.

May I say in conclusion just a word about Nyasaland. Professor Jack's exhaustive survey leaves no room for doubt that short of mineral discoveries and exploitation of the possibility to which exploration so far has given no favourable indication, Nyasaland cannot be self-supporting. It also shows that the country has derived appreciable benefits from Federation and that given further public and private investment and the conditions of security and stability prerequisite to such investment, further improvement is possible. The standard of living of the great majority of Africans in Nyasaland is deplorably low. One cannot look for any immediate substantial considerable sums from Federal funds over and above the considerable sums now being given, but if there is to be any hope of conditions of security and stability there I feel that Her Majesty's Government—perhaps in special cases with help from the World Bank or the International Finance Corporation—must find funds to help finance such things as the Nkula Falls Hydro-Electric Scheme or the development of the Lower Shire area, the Polder Dam scheme, if that is favourably reported on, and generally give material assistance to agricultural development. All that, of course, assumes that there still exists some economic ties between Nyasaland and the Rhodesias. If Nyasaland agriculture can be put on a better basis the standard of living can be raised. And then in turn there is some hope for the establishment of secondary industries. That, perhaps, amounts to very little more than an endorsement of what Professor Jack has already said but I do endorse it and I would add the rider that until the political future is settled for some time ahead and the economy receives greater stimulus from public funds which to some extent underwrites the political future there is little hope of new private investment in that country.

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, I think the central theme of all that I have been trying to say is that subject only to such constitutional and electoral changes as may from time to time be considered necessary, and sudden and major changes of that character must tend to undermine external confidence, the advancement of the Africans and the achievement of multi-racial partnership depends upon economic progress. And the core of the problem seems to be can the constitutional frame work preserving at least the essentials of Federation be such that responsible leadership, European and African, can hold the mass of the African population long enough for the point to be reached where grievances having been removed the majority of Africans have come to appreciate the advantages of stability and the reality of partnership.

Mr. Chairman, I am afraid I have taken too long.

Q. Thank you very much, you have not taken too long. May we perhaps ask you a question or two?—A. Please.

Q. I would like to ask you a question on the first part, as you said, the amplification of the Company's memorandum and indeed tie that up to what is said in the memorandum. It relates to what you have just been saying about economic development in Nyasaland. In the memorandum paragraph

6(c) it states on the particular question of Nyasaland—"We believe that the agricultural and industrial development of the country will best be served if Nyasaland stays within the Federation."—When you said that the agricultural and industrial development of the country could best be served, do you mean by the country Nyasaland or the Federation?—A. Nyasaland.

Q. Nyasaland itself?—A. Yes.

Q. You think that the agricultural and industrial development of Nyasaland could best be served if Nyasaland remains in the Federation?—A. Yes. It goes on to point to one or two examples. For example, the advantage of federalised or central research which is really possible under Federation. As regards tobacco the Federal Research Department has done a very good job indeed in the last five or six years, is doing a job which will be of immense help to Nyasaland and even if in the future as perhaps from many points of view one would hope the Territories have a large measure of autonomous self-government in such fields as agriculture under some general co-ordination I think that could be of advantage to Nyasaland, the Federal link. Does that answer the question?

Q. Yes. No one, I think, would question that since Federation there has been great industrial expansion in the Federation but some have suggested to us that without Federation industries which have come to the Federation, but to the Southern Rhodesian part of the Federation, might have come to Nyasaland, but all the industrial expansion or most of the industrial expansion has been in Southern Rhodesia. It has come mainly because there has been the wider market in the Federation for goods produced in the Federation but the advantages were seen by industry in their establishment in Southern Rhodesia rather than in the Northern Territories and it is suggested that if it had not been for Federation perhaps some of those industries might have come to the Northern Territories rather than the South.—A. I would not have thought so. Perhaps I ought to limit my first answer to Nyasaland. There has not been, nor without Federation would there have been as far as I can see, such a development of a market for secondary industries in Nyasaland. I believe the Nyasaland economy, poor though it may be, has developed better with Federation than it would have done if Nyasaland had been entirely on its own.

Q. Could I ask one other question: it does not directly arise out of what is stated in the memorandum. What would be the effect on your Company if the Federal capital was to be removed from Salisbury and situated somewhere in the Northern Territories?—A. I cannot see any.

Q. It would not have any effect. Have you any headquarters in Salisbury?—A. The headquarters of our African organisation is in Salisbury. It would mean, of course, if the Government centre was moved to the Northern Territories that the Minister of Agriculture would be that much farther away, for example. It would not mean that the Research Department, Research Station would remove; that would still remain there and the occasions when we have meetings with Government or Government officials are pretty few and far between. I could not honestly say it would make any real difference. That is not to say I am advocating it.

CHAIRMAN: No.

MR. McCLELAND: I was interested, Sir, in this remark you made about industrialists being encouraged to give opportunity to the African who was coming out of the rut. In your own Company I observe you have 180 Europeans employed. I presume they are general administrative and executive staff?—A. Yes. Of course that includes quite a number of tobacco buyers, trained buyers.

Q. In your own organisation what opportunity is being given to the African in the executive field?—A. I realised, of course, I was inviting that question: in what I said and I think to be perfectly honest our results up to date are certainly not startling. (The remainder of Lord Sinclair's answer was off the record).

MR. McCLELAND: Part of the problem you find is opposition you get from European staff?—A. No. We have not attempted anything which has aroused opposition and I think it is natural to expect generally that you would have a certain amount of opposition when you get to the point of putting an African over one or more Europeans. We have not quite got to that point yet. On the other hand I think in the loyal, well organised Company which has a tradition you will get the European even to respect the judgment of the management and to take that and I think we have got to come to that. That is quite an honest, personal opinion. I think it is very difficult but I think it is going to come.

Q. My last question, Sir: your Company was established

in Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia a long time before Federation came about?—A. Yes, in 1908 in Nyasaland.

Q. Are you suggesting had Federation not come along that your Company would not have developed to the extent which it has?—A. No. I would think it very difficult to maintain that. You mean our Company in Africa would not have developed?

Q. Yes.—A. In Nyasaland and Rhodesia would not have developed?

Q. Yes.—A. You realise that our function there is merely buying and handling the tobacco. We are not ourselves selling the tobacco. The economic climate of the country makes only a marginal difference to our particular operation provided, as I say, there are order and stability and tolerable working conditions generally. Had we been manufacturing and selling tobacco then, of course, I think one would say that the economic benefits which Federation has brought to the area would certainly have improved the position. Have I made that point quite clear?

MR. MCCLELAND: Yes, thank you, Sir.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: As a matter of information could you just help us in regard to the question of the growing of Virginia tobacco by Africans? We know at the present time there is none.—A. No. That is so in Southern Rhodesia. In Nyasaland, of course, there is the Musunga, you probably heard of it, which is quite promising but that is under very close European supervision and the capital is being found for it.

Q. It is to get it quite correct. You did speak of restrictions. There are no legal restrictions on the growing of tobacco?—A. In Southern Rhodesia I think it is one of the reservations, I do not know whether it is technically right to call it legal restriction or not but I think it is reserved.

MR. ELLMAN-BROWN: I do not think so. The only restriction is the quota of the tobacco industry itself.—A. There is no reserve on it; I am sorry if I am wrong in using the word "restriction". It is not, in fact, grown in Southern Rhodesia by Africans; it is grown to a small extent by Africans in Nyasaland.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: I am much obliged. You did rather indicate, I think, that care would have to be taken that the standard of Virginia tobacco was maintained. Of course it would not necessarily affect anyone outside if the Africans produced Virginia tobacco which was not good enough quality because they would be unable to sell it, therefore it would not be a question of damage being done to the industry.—A. Not if the conditions were such that the existing European farmers were able to continue and to grow the tobacco that is required. I was really thinking of a condition of things which resulted in a substitution, the conditions being so changed that some Europeans went out of business. I am sorry I did not make that clearer.

Q. The other point was this: with regard to this question of African advancement, as you have told us, and of course as we know from experience, there are a number of very important organisations like your own which are very keen on promoting that but it is the fact, is it not, that there is difficulty with the European trade unions generally on that subject?—A. I really cannot speak on that. I have not met it myself. I think if one hears there are difficulties it is obvious that there must be in the early days; to start with the contention that equal pay for the job must be given and not gradually approached but must be given *ab initio* is always a very difficult one to implement because if you are really keen on African advancement the chances are although he is doing a particular job he is not doing it quite so well and even if the system is payment by results it is difficult to get complete approximation or commit yourself to complete approximation. Here I am talking generally and theorising because it is not our practical experience.

Q. It has been suggested to us it would be possible to increase the Africans' standard, in fact increase their payments, without necessarily increasing the Europeans' and bring them up more to their level; do you think that is a practical thing to do?—A. You mean doing the same job, perhaps not doing it quite so well, the same kind of job?

Q. Yes. One objection which has been raised is this: some people have said, of course if the Africans go up, Europeans will have to keep the differential.—A. I do not think that makes sense. I think you have to go gradually.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: Thank you very much.

MR. CRAWLEY: Lord Sinclair, at the end of your personal views you summarised the problem but supposing your ideal and gradual programme of African advancement does not satisfy African opinion, and that position increases, would you

be prepared or would you feel that it was possible to continue to impose Federation by an extended use of Emergency Powers or would you feel that would undermine the stability.—A. I think that is very difficult for a person like myself to express an opinion about. There is such a wide range of possibility envisaged in that question. The extent to which the exercise of Emergency Powers would be necessary, the period over which they would be necessary, experience would have to show. I would be very sorry and loath to see the possibility of a continuation of something like the linkage that exists being jettisoned for reason of the fear of the difficulties of maintenance of law and order. I mean, it sounds in a way a cold thing to say, but I think the realities of the advantages are such that you are justified in taking some risks. I do not know at all—I have not the experience, as you know, to make an opinion of this sort worth while—but I think if the African can be shown—and I am sure there are some African members of the Commission who have said something very like this—that we really mean what we say about partnership, that we are going to have it and you act firmly when there is intimidation or violence, uncalled-for violence, and you can be firm on that, well then I think there is a chance of the great body of Africans appreciating that we do mean what we say and that this is not only wishful thinking but it is founded on something better than that, I think. Is that a fair answer?

Q. Yes, thank you.—A. It is a difficult one.

MR. ELLMAN-BROWN: Lord Sinclair, I am very interested in your views that we are really going to develop Nyasaland in particular, and that a tremendous amount of development work must be undertaken which at the moment is completely beyond the financial capabilities of the country itself.—A. Or even the Federation.

Q. I believe that it is urgently necessary to bring the standard from subsistence to a cash economy. But in our travels there we found great reluctance of the Africans to westernise themselves, in a very short word. But would you say that the only way to break down these native customs, matrilineal customs, was to encourage with all the supervision that was possible and necessary, the Africans to do these things themselves, to try and get them to raise the standard of living by themselves becoming able to administer these land husbandry schemes that you have got in Southern Rhodesia? Is that not the best way of trying to get them to overcome this?—A. I certainly think it is one of the best ways and what I said about master farmers is merely an example of that same kind of thing because that is one way of breaking away from some of the traditions that are in practice and seem to beget primitiveness, if that is the word.

Q. Following that, watching development in the countries to the North and seeing the appalling poverty of Nyasaland and the people in the Northern Territories there, would you say quite firmly that it is the duty of the controlling power urgently to provide these funds almost immediately if we are going to succeed in multi-racial harmony? Is it the only way to begin to raise the standard of living? We can industrialise. We can give them more employment there but we must start in Nyasaland basically in what I call the agricultural field?—A. Yes, I agree with that. When you say basically in the agricultural field, of course that does not exclude power such as the Nkula Falls which needs funds from outside, which is a Federal Power Board scheme, nor would it exclude the Polder Dam scheme. Certainly I agree with you. In fact that is necessary. That is what I tried to say.

MR. ELLMAN-BROWN: Thank you.

MR. GONDWE: I would like to ask the witness one or two questions. The first one is this: he has said in the course of his memorandum that the independence of Nyasaland is impracticable?—A. Economic and therefore political independence I said.

Q. I thought you meant independence as such, political independence?—A. I said economic and therefore political independence, as I see it. I do not think you can have political independence without economic viability in effect in practice.

Q. It is questionable.—A. I think that is what I did say.

Q. I do not think I would agree with this at all, that all these so-called independent countries are economically viable, all of them. In fact, the word "independence" itself is a misnomer. I do not think there is any country which is independent as such. I think all countries are inter-dependent. Therefore I think it would frighten the people of Nyasaland to defer gaining independence only in that way; it is inadvisable. We see this point with countries more and more, but that alone is not the sole reason why she should not attain independence. Thank you very much for that. I go on: you say something about political franchise.—A. Qualitative, I said.

Q. And not quantitative?—A. Qualitative, I said.

Q. In which case you would say that quantitative franchise was not quite as desirable as qualitative—by that I mean means qualifications?—A. Yes. I meant certain means, intelligence, and other qualifications were in the present circumstances essential because the great majority are not, as I said as yet politically conscious in the sense of being able to form a reasoned judgment. But one hopes to see the number qualifying under the qualitative franchise continually increasing. That is really what I meant.

Q. Yes, I see your point. In which case you are against one man, one vote?—A. Certainly; straightaway I think that makes nonsense.

Q. In which case you say countries that have that sort of franchise now are not properly governed?—A. Not necessarily, no. That would apply to this country.

Q. This would apply to this country.—A. I think perhaps all of us from time to time may move a little too fast in the extension of the franchise and perhaps in this country we moved a little fast at some stage and I would hesitate to say we are too fast now.

MR. GONDWE: Thank you.

MR. HABANYAMA: May I ask you, Sir, if I understood you properly, whether you would support the idea of the Federation getting independence in its Federal sphere?—A. I was quoting there from the memorandum of the Joint East Africa and Central African Board and they talked of independence in the Federal sphere being not incompatible with Protectorate status. I think that was the phrase I used, the phrase they used in their memorandum. They were not, as I understood it, there talking about dominion status at all. They were talking about the relationship of the individual Territories to the Federal system as a whole. That I think was the context and that is what I understood it to be. I was not expressing a view on dominion status at all.

Q. I think I understand that but in your view would you support that idea of Federation to gain independence in its own sphere, not dominion status?—A. This is perhaps wasting the time of the Commission because my opinions are of not much worth on this. But as I see it in any linking that we call, for the sake of argument, Federation now there must be certain things such as justice, defence, security, communications, power which are essentially the responsibility of a Federal authority. Within that or alongside that you can have an increasing and considerable degree of home rule, so to speak, in the individual Territories, when you come to such things as agriculture, education, housing, health; perhaps to a certain extent there may be some co-ordination in the Federal authority and some means under which the Government officials in the three Territories and the Federation themselves together form a single service, they can be moved about from one country to another which is a great advantage, I think, in agriculture and so forth if you still have a large measure of domestic control by the Territories themselves of the functions, for example, agriculture. Was that the kind of answer you were seeking?

Q. Not quite.—A. I am sorry.

Q. If I could explain my difficulty, it is this: this Federation is very much feared by most people and anything in the form of independence whether it is in a Federal sphere or dominion status would increase the fear in the African's mind. I am just wondering: would you support that idea and if so would you think that the Africans would, in fact, understand the difference between the independence in the Federal sphere and dominion status and do you think that if that happened it would, in fact, bring stability which you have mentioned in your memorandum and also in your speech this afternoon?—A. I will try to answer that. I think on the first part of the question you said did I think that the African would understand and appreciate that independence within the Federal sphere . . . ?

Q. Independence within the Federal sphere would mean that in those particular subjects in which I suppose the United Kingdom would have no say and to that the Africans would object very strongly.—A. I do not think Protectorate status is used in that connection. It is by way of a reassurance and a continuation of the present state of things as regards ultimate assurance to the African population of the Northern Territories. I do not think Protectorate status means continuous interference by the Government in this country with, say, the agricultural work of Nyasaland. I do not see why there should be difficulties in reassuring the Africans who are interested.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: Could I help on that: it is the idea of the Federation itself through the Federal Government having independence in the Federal sphere, I think that is what is intended; that if you give something more to the Federation

than it already has, that is going to increase the African fears?—A. Yes, that is a matter on which Mr. Habanyama is much better able to have a view than I am as to the extent of the fears that would cause or create.

Q. I think perhaps he is anxious as to whether you yourself are advocating that the Federal Government should have more power than they have now?—A. I do not know enough about it to have a view on that. I was not advocating that.

MR. CHIRWA: But do you not think that if your ideas were followed—I gather you believe that this idea of gradualness is the right one—that things must go slowly?—A. Up to a point: not for the sake of going slow, far from it, but some things must go slowly, I think.

Q. But the Africans must be given opportunities, whether they are in the economic field or political field.—A. Yes.

Q. But these opportunities must be given slowly?—A. I think that would depend. I would hate to generalise on that. I could imagine if there was suitable material available there could be a substantial increase in African representation on legislative bodies; I do not know. But if there was suitable material available in one or other of the two territories, provision is being made for that. If I may say so, to the amateur and the outsider like myself, the experiment started last year in Nyasaland of making two Africans under-secretaries of ministerial posts—it was an awfully good one. In a comparatively short time they will have very valuable experience but there are so few people, as yet, with experience, as I understand it. I do not advocate going slow for the sake of going slow. In the industrial sphere, as you know, it is jolly hard to find people in the factories or offices at present who will clearly stand out on their merit and compete with the Europeans: but it is going to come.

Q. Would you be surprised to know that there are some Europeans in Southern Rhodesia today who think there are quite a number of Africans who, if given the responsibility, could do as much as Europeans are doing but they have not been given the opportunity to do those jobs?—A. I think it does, but I cannot speak for the whole of industry though. I think I would be quite justified in saying we have not got in our organisation any African who feels he has not got a fair chance of showing everything of which he is capable. I would believe that to be true. I think probably people are slow, as I said, to make the ultimate experiment, and I think a good deal of that slowness is natural enough, because they do not want to make mistakes, believing that mistakes made in the early days could do great harm eventually. I think there is an increasing degree, but you know how limited my experience is on that part of the country, so you may discount that. However, I think there is an increasing degree of good will among the employers and managers in Southern Rhodesia.

CHAIRMAN: You do not think that some employers are rather conservative in the matter and do not want to take many risks?—A. Of course there are. There are undoubtedly some employers like that, but that is not peculiar to employers.

MR. CHIRWA: I do not know how much contact you have in Britain with the Africans who come here from other territories—I am now thinking of Central Africa—but what you should know is that the world has become very small and there are many Africans (they call them coloured people here) who have been sent out from these territories which are becoming free. Now we do get occasionally some Africans from Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland who come out here. Those people are the bearers of the news of what they see, either by correspondence or word of mouth, and they go home and tell their people that friends from Sierra Leone and Ghana and so on are already in Britain and training for certain things. The result is that the Africans begin to say that because these people are getting training they are able to go back home and do much better than before. These same companies which operate in Southern Rhodesia or Ghana or Sierra Leone—any country which is moving towards independence—are deliberately adopting a policy of giving opportunities for learning, whereas when these same companies operate in Central Africa they make excuses and say the Africans are not capable: but they never give them the same opportunity that they would give to Africans in the other territories I have mentioned. Take, for example, Lever Brothers. They operate a great deal in West Africa. They bring people over here to train them and send them back to their factories where they get high posts, but they will never bring them from Central Africa, though they bring Europeans. Do you think Africans are blind not to see these things, that this is due to the fact that you have this different policy of allowing Europeans to come for more experience, so that the bigger jobs must go to Europeans?—A. It is a long question and a big subject, but may I say in the first place, Mr. Chirwa, that as regards those Africans from the Federation who come

over here—I mean in the company—I personally see them individually. I personally try to see Africans from the Federation who go to Bristol University and the same in Nottingham University. We have factories in both towns. Very often they are coming on a special mission. This is not from the point of view necessarily of recruitment of those individuals, but merely because they are human beings with an interest in the territory in which we have a considerable interest, and we like to keep in touch with them. I think a number of people do that too. On the question of the employment of the African with academic qualifications going back in the same territory, I am not sure if I followed that altogether. (I do not wish to be quoted on this, but) I understand in Salisbury—as perhaps some of the members of the Commission will know—a particular firm has an arts graduate employed on statistical research. He is a statistician, and they have, without any difficulty or question, made him a member of their management. He works in a managerial capacity.

Q. Yes, I know him.—A. Well, that is the company that you mention. I hope that is not going to be an entirely isolated incident. We have not got that sort of operation in Africa. Our operation is the relatively simple one of the handling of tobacco. We buy tobacco; we are not trading there, so we do not have a statistical organisation or that kind of thing. But we have health services; we have research laboratories, and I hope that in our research laboratories we will find somebody who will come forward. Of course, the opportunities in some companies are not quite the same as in others, but I hope that in the ordinary management we will find eventually somebody who will come in, in that way.

MR. CHIRWA: What I was trying to bring out is that it is not really that the Africans in Central Africa are not capable of doing what Africans are doing elsewhere, but it is that they are not being given opportunities. I will give you a very brief example. I come from Nyasaland myself, and many of our people work in Tanganyika. In Nyasaland we have never advanced as those who went to Tanganyika have advanced, and the result has been, as you know yourself, that they are frustrated and unhappy. Do you think that as long as these policies continue things must be done slowly because Africans have no experience? Where are they going to gain experience if opportunities are not given to them? Is it the fault of the Africans or the fault of the policy, and if it is the fault of the policy, where are we going to bring Africans in, if you are going slowly?—A. Is it not very much a question of time in this case, not because of wanting to go slowly but because of the enormous numbers there are to whom improved educational facilities have got to be given, and all the time of education, I would have thought, and the extent of it, but greater extent than any reasonable improvement in general conditions can hope to match with employment? That is one of the great difficulties that seems to exist, and it is not anyone's fault that it does not. We are improving the standard of education, I would have thought, and the extent of it, but carrying quite a considerable financial burden in the process of doing it. There is enormous expense involved. From the point of view of getting the best Africans, the experiment, if you can call it that, such as the Bernard Mizeki School I referred to, can make a great contribution.

Q. I agree. Let me put this last question. You say this is not a matter of policy, but do you know yourself that there are Africans who are trained here in Britain and they go back to Central Africa and get less pay than the Europeans who have got the same qualifications as themselves?—A. No, I did not know that. Would you say that is matter of rule? Do you think that universally happens? I think it is really a question of deciding whether the job can be done in all respects equally well. I would suggest those who feel that African remuneration is being held back simply for the sake of holding back are quite wrong. That would be my judgment: it is my honest opinion.

Memorandum

THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY

The Chartered Company has witnessed and participated in great changes during its life of seventy years. For thirty-three years it bore the burdens of government administration because the peoples inhabiting its territories were not yet capable of undertaking those tasks. Its very success in laying the foundations of stable government brought forward the time for its surrender of those responsibilities. Prophets of gloom in 1923 predicted that the infant colony of Southern Rhodesia with only 32,000 Europeans would go bankrupt and founder. The prophets of gloom were proved wrong.

2. Relieved of those duties the Chartered Company turned to the development of its commercial interests. Encouragement of mineral prospecting by powerful groups with the best

technical services led to the discovery of the great deposits of copper-bearing ore in Northern Rhodesia. Thus was laid the foundation for the possibility of future economic growth. The financial problems, anxieties and vicissitudes which had to be borne in transforming virgin forest areas into modern industrial centres at the time of the world depression 1930/2 should not be forgotten. The doubters were again discomfited. But the large scale mining of copper-bearing ores did not bring immediately a surplus of wealth enabling desirable social services to be provided. The revenues of the three territories in 1938 were:—

Southern Rhodesia	£3,514,032
Northern Rhodesia	£1,593,504
Nyasaland	£ 842,626
Total			£5,950,162

Resources were still meagre and education could not be provided for more than a few. Governments of that time could do no more than what was within their means. Nor would it have been possible politically for the United Kingdom Government, harassed with massive unemployment at home, to have asked Parliament to vote subventions on any large scale to Colonial governments to supplement their limited resources.

3. Prosperity first came to these under-developed territories through the devaluation of sterling in 1949. Mining and industry expanded as their profitability increased. That expansion generated demand for public transportation and commercial services and enabled the capital required for those purposes to be serviced. The creation of a larger unit by the association of the three territories in a Federation in 1953 appeared to establish political stability. As a result tens of millions of external capital were attracted because the climate for investment was considered favourable. The territories prospered.

4. Once again success has brought forward the demand and the need for change. Consider, for example, the amounts spent from revenue in Northern Rhodesia on African education: £41,000 in 1938, £278,000 in 1948, and £1,914,000 in 1958. It was lack of resources, not lack of goodwill, that retarded progress. Yet today both the Rhodesias are within sight of providing at least primary education for all children except those in the remotest areas.

5. Unless they are subsidised from external sources, governments have to keep within their revenues. This is an inexorable law which no amount of agitation will alter. Enlarge the economic base and you can expand social services. If the sequence is reversed the result may well be a contraction in the economic base.

6. The production of copper in 1948 was 214,000 long tons; in 1960 it is at the rate of 550,000 long tons. This has been the principal, but by no means the only, generator of increased wealth. Consider the effect on the revenues of the governments:—

	1948	1958
Southern Rhodesia	£13,602,085	£19,722,826
Northern Rhodesia	£ 6,715,517	£19,117,853
Nyasaland	£ 2,048,732	£ 5,450,818
Total	£22,366,334	£44,291,497
Federal	...	£56,350,715
Total		£100,642,212

7. The foregoing is a story of success in the economic sphere, with a fivefold increase within ten years. The fact that that progress has not been accompanied by equal advances in the political sphere does not detract from it. Because of it new opportunities open up. There is little satisfaction to be gained from sharing a small bun when there is a chance of sharing a loaf and the prospect of another fivefold increase in the near future. By all means have change and political advancement, but without destroying the generator of further wealth.

8. It is with this object in mind that the Chartered Company submits a few suggestions for the reconciliation of the interests of different sections of the population.

A. *Non-racialism must be reflected throughout the structure of public affairs.*

9. The corollary of this principle is that government departments, whether Federal or Territorial, should be responsible in their sphere for providing their particular services to all races. Under the 1953 Constitution agricultural and educational services (other than Higher Education) have been split on the basis of race.

10. It is suggested that the system operated in the United Kingdom in the field of education should be copied. Under such a system the administration of education and agriculture within each territory would be under the Territorial minister. Part of the funds for his ministry would be voted by the Federal Government, which would set uniform standards throughout the three territories through a common inspectorate. This would facilitate the promotion of officers within the service to any of the three territories, thus improving their prospects, aid recruitment of the best material, and ensure that the ministry in the poorer territory was as well staffed as in the richer territories. Joint Advisory Councils might be created so that policies could be co-ordinated between the three territories and the central inspectorate.

11. As the standards of Africans are raised, teacher training colleges and agricultural training institutes could be integrated on the model of the University College at Salisbury as part of higher education. Research and marketing should be a responsibility of the Federal Government.

B. *Western standards shall be maintained*

12. The corollary is that Africans must be provided with opportunities to reach those standards through technical training and academic education. The African must be assured that his children, if willing to exert themselves, and able to benefit from secondary education, will enjoy the opportunities which were not open to him for lack of facilities. The European must be reassured that, if the African is provided with the opportunities for advancement, promotion will depend strictly on merit and not on colour.

C. *Qualified Franchise for the Common Voters' Roll*

13. The corollary is that the African must be satisfied that whatever the agreed qualifications may be they will not be raised against him. They should be of such a nature that he can be confident that those of his children who attend secondary school for the prescribed period will qualify. Provision should be made for a stated number of older people, representing their tribes, on a roughly proportionate basis to their numbers and chosen by them, who for lack of facilities when they were children had no chance of attending secondary school, to be nominated to the Common Voters' Roll. The object should be to provide that all candidates standing for election should have to seek the support of substantial numbers of electors of all races.

D. *Economic Development*

14. Widespread industrial development will be required to absorb the rapidly increasing number of educated Africans emerging from the enlarged school programme who can no longer be provided with land in the Reserves. An imaginative two-pronged overall plan is required; internal self-help and external assistance with capital mobilized through international agencies.

(a) *Internal self-help*

15. An expanding consumer market might be assured by an increase of ten per cent a year for ten years in African minimum wages in all public services, commerce and industry.

16. Unless the cost of living increases, there should be no need for increasing basic European rates of pay. This proposal would, therefore, help to reduce the gap between the two rates of pay, would go far towards doubling African standards of living within ten years, and would bring pressure on employers to train Africans to become more productive workers which they will increasingly be able to become as their educational standard rises and they acquire new skills.

17. The enjoyment of steady improvement in his earnings will be evidence to the African that he can gain more by co-operating in a non-racial society than he could achieve by himself. His productivity will undoubtedly rise so that the effect of this proposal on costs should not be excessive. Should it set up inflationary pressures corrective steps might have to be taken by controlling certain imports. Australia has shown that this problem can be kept within bounds by acceptable controls.

18. To balance this increase in standards of living in urban areas African Tribal and Native Authorities should undertake to double agricultural production of cash crops within their areas within five years. For this they may have to be assisted with increased advisory services and fertilisers at subsidised rates. They alone can apply the pressures without which the rural areas will prove to be too heavy a drag on the economy.

19. It would be of the greatest benefit to the territories if a nitrogenous fertiliser factory were to be established in the Federation in the immediate future.

20. In the field of mineral prospecting approximately £1 million a year is being spent in Northern Rhodesia by Prospecting Companies searching for additional ore deposits. The two

Copper Groups and the Chartered Company might undertake, on completion of current technical studies by the end of 1961, to finance the development of proved large scale copper mines such as Chambishi and Baluba.

(b) *External financial assistance*

21. Central Africa has a total population of only about 8,000,000. It has great latent wealth for development. The experiment of getting its peoples to co-operate together and share in that development is of crucial importance to the future of Africa, to the British Commonwealth in particular, and to a much troubled multi-racial world.

22. Thanks to the success of the Federation capital has been mobilised to finance the Kariba power scheme, to expand and modernise the Railways, to improve road, air and telecommunications, to provide public utility services in all the major urban areas, and to overtake a great part of the building requirements both public and private.

23. All this progress coincides with a realisation in the Western World that under-developed countries require massive assistance. The Federation has proved at Kariba that it has the ability to execute large schemes. Many things remain to be done, they can and must be done with assistance where necessary from international agencies. The foundations exist based on which a great leap forward is possible in industrialisation.

E. *Political Stability*

24. Political stability, once people have become politically conscious, must ultimately rest on consent. African fears are that they will be blocked from attaining a fair share of political power. European fears are that a premature transfer of power may lead to political and economic retrogression and that the minority could not be adequately safeguarded once the majority rule.

25. It is for the Monckton Commission and the constitutional conference of the five governments to provide guarantees designed to dissolve these natural fears of both parties.

26. The problem appears to be how to give Africans a larger share in the responsibility of governing the two Northern Protectorates, when there is no body of Africans with business or administrative experience to be the receivers. A period of transition is required. During that period of transition could not representatives of traditional Tribal Rulers and Native Authorities be brought in to take over certain responsibilities at the centre, not merely in their tribal areas. This could be a temporary measure. Later Africans would choose whom they would wish to replace those traditional rulers. That choice might be different from whom they would choose at this moment when the issue seems to them to be how to wrest a share of power from Europeans.

F. *Public Service*

27. Whatever the recommendations or the plan may be, the Chartered Company cannot lay too great emphasis on the importance it attaches to the maintenance of an able, impartial body of public servants. It takes great pride in the traditions laid down by the civil service it founded and by the British South Africa Police. These services are now open to all races. As countries grow up the public services have to be manned more and more by citizens resident in those countries, even if recruited in certain cases from overseas.

28. Africans will gradually fill more and higher grades in the civil services.

29. They would not want to serve outside Central Africa but it would be attractive to them to be eligible to serve on promotion in any of the three territories. This would also be desirable to ensure uniform standards. Some system might be evolved under which officers above a certain grade would form a pool under a central Public Services Commission and become available for service in any Central African territory.

30. First class public servants will serve African or other ministers so long as they are men they respect; so long as promotion in their service is on merit; and so long as they are backed up if they do their duty. But they will not serve if there is a failure to enforce law and order.

G. *Law and Order*

31. No Government can long continue which fails from whatever motive to maintain law and order. Nowhere is this more true than in Africa where the African is quick to recognise whether those who govern are prepared to enforce the law and protect the people, nor can the officials and the police be expected to carry out their duties unless they receive full support from their governments.

32. The greatest weakness of the Federation at the present time is the failure of the Colonial Office to support and

strengthen the administration in Nyasaland, and to a lesser degree in Northern Rhodesia, in its efforts to keep order. No police force, such as the Nyasaland Police Force, can be expected to maintain its morale if it becomes the object of hostile criticism which has been proved by the Southworth Report to be without any substance. Nor can a small Police Force provide training facilities comparable to those available to a larger force. The Commissioners will have noted the differences in standards and morale between the three territorial forces. Without disturbing their identity or independence as territorial forces a joint Advisory Council and Central Inspectorate might ensure uniform standards and policies.

33. The continuation of the Federation and indeed of civilised government in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland will depend on whether it is found possible to devise the means which will enable the police to act with confidence and to ensure that not only order will be enforced but that active steps will be taken to deal with intimidation.

34. It must be made manifest that violence, thuggery and intimidation will be suppressed. Your colleague, Mr. Katilungu, who has expressed robust views against violence, would, we believe, confirm that it will only be manifest in African eyes if action is taken against the extremist leaders whose inflammatory speeches lead nonentities to commit excesses.

35. We are well aware that this question raises problems which have so far proved to be intractable and it is not our intention to go beyond expressing the view that it is fundamental and that without a satisfactory solution little progress can be made in developing the Federation in other spheres.

Conclusion

36. The Company welcomes the advancement and progress of the African peoples and fully supports the policy of the Federal Government that the Federation should become a multi-racial state. This policy is indeed the logical development of its own policy. There are two conditions which in our view are essential to success. In the first place it should be civilized and secondly it should be efficient, which means that there should be no lowering of standards. Men and women must rise on their merits and not because of their colour.

37. The creation of a state comprising different elements is not an easy task in any circumstances, but it is no new experiment and in the course of history it has been accomplished in the past provided there has been the will, the time and enough patience. It has generally come about because there are mutual interests which have in the end over-ridden all other adverse factors. In the Federation the difficulties are, of course, great and a challenge to the understanding and wisdom of both races, for one of the partners represents an old civilisation while the other, who is of a different colour, has only recently emerged from barbarism. Moreover the problem is complicated as industrialism has already made its impact on the African agrarian communities of the Federation, and this process cannot be reversed if an expanding population is to earn a living. Over a large part of the Federation multi-racial communities are already in existence, and the development of the country depends on the partnership of all races who have established their homes in Central Africa.

38. It is unrealistic to draw comparisons between what has been happening in Africa and other parts of the world, and to compare like with unlike. The grant of independence to West African States, to the Sudan and indeed to India, is in a different category from the problem of the Federation. In these countries there was never a settled European population. In the Federation there are two responsible Governments and a settled European population whose leadership in every field has created a modern state capable of immense expansion. The Company therefore dismisses from its mind any policy which may lead to the dissolution or serious weakening of the Federation as in its view this is neither desirable nor practicable.

London

8th June 1960

Oral Evidence

THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY

P. V. Emrys-Evans and H. St. L. Grenfell

CHAIRMAN (SIR DONALD MACGILLIVRAY): I should like to refer to Paragraphs 10 and 11 of your memorandum, where you suggest that the administration of education and agriculture should be Territorial subjects, though in agriculture you suggest that research and marketing should be controlled Yes.

Q. You have also proposed, in order that there should be

uniform standards throughout the three Territories, that there should be a common inspectorate, a Federal service?—A. Yes.

Q. Are you thinking in terms of education there or also for agriculture?—A. We thought of both.

Q. The extension services would presumably be Territorial?—A. Yes, but it would try to co-ordinate the level throughout the whole Federation. (MR. GRENPELL): I think we felt that if possible you want to have reasonably uniform policies which you are only going to get if you bring the people administering the department in the three Territories together; in a sense, the successful precedent under the present regime has been the Federal Loan Council. The Federal Loan Council, was composed of the Finance Minister of the Federation and the three Territorial Ministers and their deputies; they had to come together in that committee, and I understand they never had any difficulty in arriving at a common viewpoint. It did not go by majority vote but they came to a consensus of opinion which was acceptable between them. We feel the same type of organisation at the top, which prevents the individual ministries in territories from operating entirely on their own and without meeting and exchanging ideas and views and trying to arrive at their common policies, is most desirable. This perhaps would be the way in which you could ensure that. If they do meet and discuss what each is doing, probably they will arrive at a common point of view, and then you will get reasonably uniform policies and standards.

Q. So that what you had in mind with regard to agriculture was not so much a common inspectorate as a team of inspectors?—A. A joint advisory council, which would consist of the Ministers of Agriculture of the three Territories.

Q. The purpose being to achieve unanimity of policy?—A. Yes.

Q. And you link this up somewhat with what you say later on about the civil service; if there was a common inspectorate in education, and if there was uniformity achieved at a Federal level in agriculture, that would facilitate the promotion of officers within the service in any of the three Territories and would improve their prospects. Had you in mind that there would be a common education service, for which officers would be seconded to the three Territories for such times as they would be working in those Territories, or would there be a single Public Service Commission which would lay down, after consultation with the Territorial Governments, common terms of service and ensure opportunity of transfer to the other Territories?—A. I think there has to be a transition period. At the moment, quite inevitably, you have local recruitment in Southern Rhodesia, because it is that much older and has a bigger population to draw from, and in the two protectorate Territories you have all your recruitment from outside, or practically all, under the Colonial Service; but that is closing down. Within a matter of a few years there is not going to be a worth-while Colonial Service. We have the greatest fear that they will be no longer able to attract the calibre of people they were able to attract in the past, when it was a very wide service with plenty of room for promotion; and as these countries do mature fully, they will more and more recruit from the people coming out of their own university or secondary schools, whether they are African or European, who will come into these things. You cannot straight away say "They will come under a unified service", but if you are trying to look to the future some distance ahead, that is the goal to which it is bound to go, and it is desirable.

Q. Later on you have suggested that certain top jobs may form a pool, a Federal service, recruited by a central Public Service Commission. Is that how you would imagine you would start, with a few top-grade officers from a central pool? (MR. EMRYS-EVANS): It is a bit early to say at this stage how that would necessarily work, but I think it is important to get a feeling that you are getting a Federal service. After all, you have two services in this country: you have your local government service and your civil service, and they work together eventually. That is what we have in mind, but that is something which must be built up.

Q. So you would build up to what I would call a Federation based service? Though there might be recruitment outside the Federation to such a service, there would no longer be officers of the Colonial Service from outside serving in Northern Rhodesia?—A. Eventually.

Q. One thing I would like to ask if you would stand upon is what you have said in paragraph 32 with regard to law and order—"The greatest weakness of the Federation at the present time is the failure of the Colonial Office to support and strengthen the administration in Nyasaland, and, to a lesser degree, in Northern Rhodesia, in its efforts to keep order." Would you explain just what you meant and in what way the Colonial Office had failed to support the administration in

Nyasaland?—A. In the first place, I should think the fact that they had the Southworth Commission at all was a sign of great weakness on the part of the Colonial Office. They bowed immediately to agitation and did not support their own police authorities out there. It had been proved beyond all measure that there is nothing in this. That has certainly weakened the administration and affected its morale, in our view. It has not been so much the case in Northern Rhodesia, but certainly we feel that very strongly about Nyasaland, it has been disastrous.

Q. You think it was giving way to clamour for a commission to be held regarding the incidents outside Ryall's Hotel? You do not think perhaps that the police force itself was anxious to have a commission there to make it clear that they were doing the right thing?—A. We do not know. They did not say so in the course of their evidence that they demanded a commission. It seemed to us that it was in reply to clamour in the House of Commons. There was complete misunderstanding here about the position there, and all that we hear since supports our view that it has had a disastrous effect on administration in Nyasaland.

Q. But by and large it did justify the action which the police took.—A. Entirely: that only strengthens our case.

Q. Without such a commission, that might never have been justified and the morale of the police might have been still further lowered?—A. Yes.

Q. Are there any other instances in which the Colonial Office failed to support and strengthen the administration?—A. We go back a little further. We do not think the Nyasaland administration was supported as strongly by the Government as it should have been over the Devlin Commission. That is more controversial and, as I say, a more distant question.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: On the Southworth Commission, I do not know whether you are aware that in fact an inquiry was ordered before there was any clamour in the House of Commons at all. An announcement was made by Mr. MacLeod before the matter was discussed. It was followed by a vote of censure put down by the Liberal Party after the announcement of the Commission; so I think there is a slight amendment required there, as regards historical fact.—A. I would not say that really alters my view in any way. I should have thought Mr. MacLeod merely anticipated what he knew was going to happen in the House. He is a very skilled member of that body.

Q. Do you not think that in fact the effect of the Southworth Commission Report has been extremely salutary in enabling people to give the newspaper reports slightly less weight?—A. I entirely agree with that.

Q. And if the thing had been left alone they would have gone on saying what they had said before, but supported by the Opposition in the House of Commons?—A. That may have been so.

CHAIRMAN: You say that no police force can be expected to maintain its morale if it becomes the object of hostile criticism. Hostile criticism from whom? It looks as if you meant the Colonial Office, following on your first sentence, because you say it had failed to support the administration.—A. I think it had failed to do that, but the hostile criticism came from elsewhere.

Q. You mean mainly press criticism?—A. Yes.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: I would like to ask one other thing about the question of wages raised in paragraphs 15 and 16. For our assistance and information, what would be the way in which you would suggest that this could be done? Would it be by way of legislation? It would be rather difficult to do, would it not? (MR. GRENFELL): There have at times been minimum rates of wages imposed in the territory: it has to be by government regulation. I would like to make it quite clear that is not necessarily saying that all wages, no matter what they are, should be increased by 10 per cent a year. If a man is going to work in the urban areas there must be a floor to his standard of living, if he is to be able to live there and support his wife and family.

Q. Would it not be necessary to get a really large measure of co-operation from employers in order to carry this out, rather than try and do it by Legislation?—A. I think you would probably get that; but the co-operation from the employers would be not so much on the rates of pay, which are different from the minimum rates of pay. In a sense what you are legislating for are the backsliders, who are not the good employers.

Q. And the other aspect of it would be the European trade unions? They would have to be persuaded, would they not?—A. It depends whether a government feels it necessary or feels able to do it.

Q. Because in fact they would be likely to oppose it on

their present policy, would they not?—A. Not necessarily, I think. Mr. Todd, when he was Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, imposed a very large increase in minimum African wage rates in Southern Rhodesia, without any consultation with the trade unions.

Q. And where is he now?—A. Exactly: but it may be a thing which just has to be done. I think you will find there are a lot of things which you can do there if you do not ask people, which perhaps you cannot do if you do ask people.

Q. Yes, and would you agree that something is required in the way of a gesture, backed up by reality, in order to get a better atmosphere?—A. Yes.

Q. And this kind of thing would obviously help?—A. Yes.

CHAIRMAN: One more question. In paragraph 26 you refer to political stability and you say that "the problem appears to be how to give Africans a larger share in the responsibility of governing the two Northern Protectorates, when there is no body of Africans with business or administrative experience to be the receivers. A period of transition is required. During that period of transition could not representatives of traditional tribal rulers and Native Authorities be brought in to take over certain responsibilities at the centre, not merely in their tribal areas." Could you say what you had in mind as regards what sort of jobs they could come in on—would it be a legislative body or executive body, and what sorts of responsibilities at the centre would they take on?—A. They would come into the legislative body, I think. Because we have taken as the ultimate goal something which is like the Westminster model, we have said that the first step must be a Westminster model, and it just does not work at this stage because the people you bring in are not people with standing or authority really in the eyes of their own community. They are very largely the chaps with a gift of the gab and a bit of a gift for organisation. Rightly or wrongly, we would probably regard them as being agitators, but they are not the people to whom traditionally the African population feels it owes respect; and I feel they should show respect if they knew that a number of those people were not merely carrying out the immense responsibilities of local governments—they have always done that—but were being consulted in their own system, the only form of democracy they have cognisance of: you might describe it as a tribal democracy. It is widespread consultation amongst their own people as to what they think, with various elements being allowed to express their opinions. Opinions are heard and the heads of the tribe arrive, after consultation at a conclusion and state what the policy or decision is. Traditionally, once that has been decided, the opposition falls away and that is accepted. That is an historical involvement, because if they had not operated with that sort of cohesion they would never have survived at all. That is their approach to problems, so they do want to be consulted, and many more of them want to be brought in on this consultation. They do not necessarily mind whether the decision after that consultation is the way they have been arguing or not; but they will say, "All right; this was all brought out and discussed with great patience and expenditure of time. We were all there, and the decision has been taken." In a sense you might say the executive is in a position, according to their traditions and customs, to take a decision which may well not be that advocated by the numerical majority; but they will not necessarily object to that if they are people to whom they are accustomed to looking up and respecting and who therefore have got authority. I think it would have been more imaginative if, when we were beginning to bring Africans into our political system, we had said, "You have to have a transition stage and you have to bring into your central legislatures representatives who are there by right of being respected leaders, shall I say, of the only form of government to which you have been accustomed". It is really a form of tribal democracy. If you had done that, of if you could still do it, with much larger numbers than the very few who have been brought into the legislature, it would have been more satisfactory and it would also have given you a very much wider range from which to choose those Africans you wish to train into administrative experience by bringing them into the Executive Council. As you know, in Northern Rhodesia there are two Africans now since the last election, who are there with Cabinet responsibility for big departments, but they are not necessarily people who naturally command a position in the eyes of Africans. You have only a handful to choose from, and you may say "I will choose this one or that, because they seem to me to be balanced or sensible people"—something like that: but otherwise it might not be too late for this transition without trying to give the image that really you are trying to get away from a system such as we Europeans have been accustomed to operate. You might have to grow towards it.

Q. You say this might have been more satisfactory, and it might not be too late. Did you have in mind that this legislative

body would be in replacement of the present legislatures of the territories?—A. It would be an enlargement.

Q. And it would include these native authorities in the existing legislatures?—A. Yes, by all means have some elected Africans as you have got, and try to get it that they are elected by a cross-section of opinion, but in addition to that I think it is necessary for the African to have very much wider representation and a very considerably larger number in the legislatures. Eight Africans in a country the size of Northern Rhodesia is too thin. They cannot be in contact.

Q. So you would let the legislatures remain as they are but give the Africans much wider representation, thereby bringing in selected tribal authorities—is that it?—A. As well as a certain number which you are going to bring in to start this process, chosen under an electoral system.

Q. How would the authorities select? Would you ask them to meet together and select themselves?—A. I would rather not go into that.

SIR CHARLES ARDEN-CLARKE: As a supplementary to that, in Ghana at a certain period—we passed through a lot of periods of transition there—there was a council of traditional authority of chiefs, in fact more than one; and those were made electoral colleges to elect a certain specific number of representatives to the central legislature. Would that sort of thing be what you had in mind?—A. Yes, I think that could well be.

Mr. ELLMAN-BROWN: I would like to ask these questions. I very much agree with what you said about law and order, and I would like Mr. Grenfell to give his opinion as to law and order and security in the two Northern Territories. As you know it is really divided between the Boma messenger, who has certain powers, and the police proper. Do you consider that system of dividing responsibility is a sound one? In Southern Rhodesia the police are looked upon as the protectors of the people. In Northern Rhodesia the police are only brought into areas when there is serious trouble, and therefore are looked upon as the enemies of the people. Do you think there might be some grounds for revising that system?—A. Yes, I do; and here again if you could have some central advisory council where the police forces in the three Territories discuss their common policies, it would be good. It is a difference in policy, as Mr. Ellman Brown says. Southern Rhodesia have always had the police force spread throughout the country and living in their areas. I think it is reasonably true to say in the Colonial territories that we have always tried to maintain law and order "on the cheap", and so long as it worked without trouble you did not bother to have the police force in the rural areas at all: you merely left it entirely to the local chiefs and to your district administration. Because you get away with it on the cheap your revenues are always exiguous, so you are inclined to go on and on until trouble comes, and then it is generally too late to change. But I think the patrolling system, established throughout the whole area, is more like your police force in this country; and their role and function is a much sounder one; but it is expensive.

Q. As regards my second question: You have dealt with the vital necessity of raising the standard of living in the two Northern Territories and you have discussed the value of nitrogenous fertiliser to increase the fertility of the land. Do you think it is necessary to launch a land husbandry scheme in the two Northern Territories, with considerable finance from outside to build up productivity? Would you say really that the only way to put it across is to encourage the Africans themselves to administer these schemes—naturally with all the supervision that is necessary in the early stages—and would that help to enhance the power and prestige of the chiefs and their native councils if they themselves helped to administer such a scheme? Would you say that was urgently necessary and that special funds ought to be made available, particularly in the northern province and Nyasaland?—A. I think one would say that a revolution in the system of land tenure is going to have to take place throughout Africa, and it is starting to take place. It is immensely difficult, and unless you do it very carefully you will get all the traditional authorities against you at once, and particularly in Nyasaland, where you have a very large number of tribes on the matriarchal system, it is even more difficult than in most other places. I am not going to suggest how to get over that, but it is going to happen and it is going to have to happen. I do not quite say that I feel the local people have to administer this system. You certainly cannot impose a change of land tenure: you can only do it with the consent of the people, if you are capable of persuading them, but it is going to be necessary if you want production. We have suggested that the only people who, in the present system, could effect a rapid improvement in production would be the traditional authorities, and

I think they could, without changing systems of land tenure, particularly in Nyasaland. It is densely populated: there could be very much more production, but for all sorts of reasons they have not got the incentive because they have not the security of it, but I think that is a very slow one to change. If they wished to get the crop production, particularly the cash crop production, doubled, and exerted themselves to do it, I believe they could do it.

Q. And my final question. In the last sentence of your memorandum you say you dismiss entirely any policy which may lead to the weakening or dissolution of the Federation. We have had quite a lot of evidence given to us that in the long run, to encourage the Africans to co-operate with us, that when they have self-government there should be an option of secession. As one of the biggest investors in Central Africa, I would like you to give the Commission your views as to how you think that would affect what I call the economic development and the possibility of investment in the long run.—A. (MR. EMRYS-EVANS): If I could go outside the Federation for the moment and take federations generally, I think they have always had to go through a difficult period. Sometimes you had to fight a war to keep a federation together, as in the case of the United States. But by and large I do not think you can start on a career of this kind of federation with an option to break it up at any moment. You will not have the confidence of the outside world if you say that at any moment various things will be happening. As regards various loans like the Kariba Dam, and great Federal projects which are taking place at the present time, it would certainly have a disastrous effect, on finances in Central Africa. That is what we feel. You would have a Balkanisation of that part of the world and you would now be going against the trend of the world today, which is to bring larger units into being. Indeed, the whole world is getting much closer together. People just have to learn how to live together. We feel if you begin to have doubts in peoples minds as to the future of a federation it would certainly retard its progress. If you make up your mind that you are really going forward with it, it will go forward at an even greater pace than during the last ten years. I think we must see the picture not only from the point of view of Federation but from the point of view of Central Africa and Africa as a whole, and indeed the world as a whole.

MR. KATILUNGU: In paragraph 7 of your memorandum you say the fact that progress has not been accompanied by equal advances in the political sphere does not detract from it, and you go on to say "by all means have change and political advancement, but without destroying the generator of future wealth". Do you imply in this paragraph that there is in fact a means insofar as African political demand for political advancement is concerned—and in this I mean for the time being—for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland? Would you say that goes even up to self-government?—A. (MR. GRENFELL): We would say that their destiny will be that those Northern Territories must eventually arrive at a point at which they are self-governing in the Territorial sphere. We would expect that when that time is reached it does imply that the majority of the legislatures and of the executives would be African, yes.

Q. I think you would make no objection to this goal if it was achieved within the Federation—that is what you mean by not destroying the generator?—A. Yes, you must have the larger unit for your markets and for creating confidence in order to be able to attract from outside the vast sums of money which are going to be required to make industrialisation and the implementation of the expanding population at a higher standard of living possible.

Q. With your experience of the present industrial situation prevailing, particularly on the Copperbelt, you say "An expanding consumer market might be assured by an increase of 10 per cent a year for ten years in African minimum wages in all public services, commerce and industry", paragraph 15. and you go as far as indicating that the European wage during that period should remain steady.—A. Basic rates, yes; just like the equivalent of a minimum wage.

Q. This does not interfere with any negotiations that might be pursued by the organisations concerned?—A. They would, of course, be naturally entitled to ask for improved rates. I do not say they would not get them, but I say they have a standard of living which is tenable, and the lowest-paid Africans have not yet risen to a standard of living in which they can, in an urban society, maintain themselves on a married basis.

Q. Dealing with the question of agriculture and education, you suggest there should be the possibility of integration of the teachers' training institution as well as the agriculture training institution. What is your opinion about the integration of secondary education as well as technical education?—

A. I am sure you have got to work from the top downwards. We are started, I think quite rightly, with the University. That is a fully-integrated multi-racial organisation. Any extension of that principle must be, again, from the top downwards, and certainly the next step should be the technical colleges and teacher training colleges. But you cannot do that unless the qualifications for the candidates attending those colleges are the same; and today, as far as my limited knowledge of it goes, they are not the same. So I cannot go much further than to indicate that those, in our opinion, would be the next organisations in the educational sphere which you could integrate fairly soon by having a common standard for the entrants. When you come down to secondary education, you cannot do it so easily in steps. I do not think you can say, "We will start off with integration at VIth form level"—it is either the whole secondary school range or nothing. That does present a very great difficulty, because for some time still to come it will be quite different age groups which will be starting your secondary education. I do not think you could mix age groups very well, even if they were of the same race. I do not think you can start a lot of 13 year old children working with 17 and 18 year old children, even if they were European: it would not really be practical. But in time no doubt those differences will fall away, because the African will get through his primary education at a very much younger age.

Q. One of the difficulties with that, which you do appreciate, and one of the African's complaints which you recognise, is about these discriminatory practices, particularly in educational institutions. That is why I ask you the question if the time had not yet arrived when the secondary school education integration could take place. They form opposition to Federation as far as Africans are concerned, and education is very important. Now turning to section E, (paragraph 24) on political stability, you say, "once people have become politically conscious political stability must ultimately rest on consent." I take this particular sentence to infer that no government is stable without the consent of people who are governed, and in this case would you say you are trying to direct the Commission that any form of government, before it is established, should obtain the consent of those to be governed? If so, leaving aside Southern Rhodesia, in the Northern Territories very few Africans have qualified on the voters' roll, and it is generally recognised in Central Africa, when translating the Preamble of the Constitution, that the "inhabitants" are interpreted as meaning those who are qualified as voters. On the other hand some interpret it as meaning "inhabitants" as being those human beings who are found within the territories concerned. If consent was to be obtained with regard to any form of government whatsoever, including Federal government, would you say the consent should be obtained only from those who are qualified as voters or from all the inhabitants, whether they are on the voters' roll or not, bearing in mind the present situation?—A. Ultimately, it must be wider than merely those on the qualified voters' roll. But your problem I think is again—and this is why we feel you have to have this period of transition—for some time the executive must not be subordinate to a legislature, or must not necessarily be subordinate to a legislature. In fact that is what you have got in the Northern Territories, and what you have under the Colonial Office government. The Colonial Office says, "We are responsible: we appoint the executive. We created these legislative assemblies and we gradually increase representation." But it is substantially a Colonial Office executive which is irremovable. It is not subject to an adverse vote in the legislative assembly. In that sense it means that it has still a duty and obligation to govern without necessarily winning overt consent from the mass below it. Ultimately that will have to change and it will be that the mass of the people, whatever the machinery is, will have to choose their representatives, and those representatives will in fact represent their views, and they will have the power to decide what it is that is going to be done.

Q. In the same paragraph (paragraph 24) you have referred to fears from both Europeans and Africans. The Africans fear they will be blocked, and the Europeans fear that they may be under the rule of immature politicians under a premature transfer of power. Do you regard these fears, expressed by both groups, to be justified according to their convictions?—A. According to their convictions, I say they exist, those fears.

CHAIRMAN: You mean they are genuinely entertained?—A. Yes, they do exist. As to whether they ought to exist is another question, but there is no doubt that they are operative in the minds of both sections of the community.

MR. KATILONGU: Therefore this fear should not be overlooked without special consideration being given to the reasons for it?—A. You have to try and find some way to reassure the people that they need not have those fears and that the

disasters which they feel will happen will not in fact happen.

SIR LIONEL HEALD: I would like to ask a supplementary question. In the next sentence, in paragraph 25, you say, "It is for the Monckton Commission . . . to provide guarantees designed to dissolve these natural fears of both parties." Would you agree that is really one of the fundamental problems that somebody has to solve somehow or other?—A. The fundamental problem.

Q. I am grateful to you for that paragraph, because some people come here who are not willing to give us advice. Could it be put this way: that you do recognise that one of the root troubles is this fear of domination—African fear of European domination and European fear of African domination—and somehow or other we have to try and find some way of meeting it?—A. Yes, and I would add to that: the reason why we added after "the Monckton Commission" "and the constitutional conference of the five governments" was that we thought something which was agreed by all five governments would be likely to carry conviction. I do not myself think that proposals in the two Northern Territories, backed by H.M. Government alone, would carry the necessary conviction. The fears will still remain. They will say, "Yes, but that is only one of the parties and the other parties may interfere with that." Therefore any programme or policy which is only underwritten, say, by the British Government will not eradicate these fears and, if you wish to have a chance of successfully dissolving these fears, I think it requires a programme and policy which has been underwritten by all five governments. If it was underwritten by all five governments there is a very good chance that the enormous majority, both African and European, will accept that and it will be adhered to.

MR. McCLELAND: You have not touched in your memorandum upon a point which is considered to be quite important in the Rhodesias. It has been suggested that one of the causes why the Federation is not as successful as it might be is because of the influence over the two Northern Territories by H.M. Government. Would you suggest this influence should be diminished in any way, or maintained to its fullest extent in the interim period you are talking about? (MR. EMRYS-EVANS): Surely H.M. Government is bound by the Lyttleton pledge, so there can be no diminution.

Q. Therefore you suggest it should remain exactly as it is?—A. Nothing can be done, I understand, under the terms of the Lyttleton pledge, going beyond that, without the consent of the two Northern Territories.

Q. But assuming that something could be done, would you agree it would be a good thing?—A. Assuming something could be done, and it is considered to be good, I think it would be.

Q. The other question is the siting of the capital. It has been suggested that because the capital has been badly sited this has caused considerable heart-burning. Would there be considerable economic upset if the capital was in fact changed to some other site?—A. (MR. GRENFELL): I think if some fairly godfather said, "We will give you free and gratis a very large number of millions of pounds which might make a change possible", people would look at it—or they would have looked at it: But I personally doubt whether they would as things are. I know there is this sort of pathological fear, if you like, of it being in Salisbury, but I cannot really bring myself to believe that merely changing the place where people get together is going to dissolve fears. They will still exist.

Q. What would be the economic implication if it were moved?—A. Less efficiency, I should say. I am afraid I have not got knowledge of these artificial capitals, but from what little I have heard of them in various parts of the world I am not attracted by them. I think it is very much better than legislators should have to live hugger-mugger with the likes of me.

MR. TAYLOR: In paragraph 19 you say that it would be of the greatest benefit to the Territories if a nitrogenous fertilizer factory were to be established in the Federation in the immediate future.—A. Yes.

Q. Why do you say that?—A. (MR. EMRYS-EVANS): There are two reasons. For one thing, it would be good to establish a new industry; we are always glad to see new industries established throughout the Federation; and in the second place, we think it would be of the greatest advantage to the agricultural community throughout the Federation.

Q. Is it your desire that there should be a plentiful supply of cheap fertilizer?—A. Yes.

Q. And do you think that a local factory could produce cheap fertilizer, as opposed to just fertiliser at any price?—A. I would not like to answer that question off-hand, but it would be the object of those who have this in mind at the present

time—and it is already being examined as you are now aware—to produce a cheap fertilizer.

Q. It would certainly be necessary for the factory to be able to command the entire Federal market, and even the entire Federal market may be a little small for the establishment of such a factory.—A. Exactly.

Q. So if there was any Federal market at all, do you consider that even the concept of a factory of this kind would be a feasible thing?—A. The object of establishing it would be to bring a new industry to the Federation and also to develop the local market.

Q. But unless there were the Federal area associated in some way as it is at present you would not even be thinking of it?—A. If we were contemplating the Federation being broken up, that would be a very different thing, of course. It would be very difficult to see our way to establishing more new industries if there were going to be three Territories rather than Federation. The fact that there is Federation and a big market—a big potential market, not necessarily a big market yet—is naturally encouraging industries which can see ten, fifteen, twenty years ahead. We are thinking of this nitrogenous fertilizer factory in Federal terms and not in provincial terms.

MR. HABANYAMA: I would like to follow up the third question asked by Mr. Ellman Brown; the last sentence of your memorandum. Is it the opinion of the Company to keep Federation as it is at present, in using particularly those two last words?—A. I would always say that every state grows, so you cannot say it would be in exactly the same state as it is today. In fact I hope it will not. I hope it will come much more closely together as time goes on, and as people work together they will come to the conclusion that Federation is a good thing for everyone within the Federation. It is almost bound to develop in certain directions. I know of no federal state which has not done so. If you look in other parts of the world: the United States has developed immensely as a Federal country, and you have had a rather interesting example within the last twenty years of Newfoundland going into the Confederation of Canada after staying out ever since Confederation. It was a very poor territory, it went bankrupt, and it had to be taken over by Commissioners and eventually it has gone into the Confederation and prosperity has gone forward by leaps and bounds. So I cannot say it will remain in exactly the same position as it is today. But I am looking at Federation as something which on common practice will grow and become stronger as time goes on.

Q. We have had some evidence that perhaps to keep the Federation in its present form it would mean continuous application of force. In your view, you would not like Federation to be reduced—you would rather see its powers increased, I suppose?—A. I should like to see the whole Federation increase; by consent, of course. This as I understand it was the pledge of the Governments. But we hope that all the Territories will gradually come together as they see the advantages of living together.

Q. Even if it meant maintaining it by force of arms?—A. I do not know what you mean exactly by maintaining it by force.

Q. The position is that most of the Africans are opposed to Federation, and there is a section of the European community which is also opposed to Federation. It has been submitted to us by some people that you cannot go on under these conditions without applying a lot of force to maintain the thing.—A. I should regard that as a pessimistic view, personally.

Q. Thank you. In paragraph 36 you have used the one word on which I have been trying to get information. You say: "In the first place it should be civilized and secondly it should be efficient." The word "civilized". What do you mean exactly there? Do you say that the Russian Government is civilized or Hitler's Government was civilized?—A. Not in a sense, I would not. They certainly did many uncivilized things, shall I put it that way, but I think what I mean by civilized government is what we understand in the West as civilized government.

Q. Do you think that is necessarily desirable in the set up of an African Government?—A. I think it is essential it should be civilized. I do not see how you can go forward unless it is—I mean in the modern world of today. You are competing with highly civilized and highly industrialised nations.

Q. But surely there are some Governments which are different from the Western model in the world today?—A. Yes. There are many models in the West, there is not only one model. There is a different model in various Western countries. I do not say that the Western model necessarily need apply. The Westminster model—as we are all talking about it—has not necessarily been a success everywhere. We

thought it was 100 years ago. We thought it was the one thing in the world which could really succeed in governing people justly. But it has not worked everywhere, and it does not work everywhere in the West today. That is a question which will no doubt be examined by you and the Commission as to what deviations from the Western model may be necessary, certainly as a temporary measure, to meet the conditions at the time.

MR. JUSTICE BEADLE: I want to follow up that question which was asked by Mr. Ellman Brown. Mr. Ellman Brown suggested to you that, in order to remove the fears of one set that it might ultimately be dominated by another, it might be a wise thing to write into the Constitution provision that, subject to conditions, any of the Territories might have the right at a future date to secede. I understood your reply to be that you thought it would be most unwise to write any condition of that sort into the Constitution because of the effect it might have on investment. Does that summarise your answer?—A. Not only for that reason, but I think for any reason. If you are setting out on a course I think it is a very bad thing to say at the beginning that you are probably going to turn off it almost immediately. I think you must make up your mind that you are going forward with Federation, and that it is a permanent thing. If you are going to write into the Constitution some option for seceding, I think it is almost from every point of view, not only from the point of view of the outside world, that everyone will be looking over their shoulders and not really putting their shoulders to the wheel and making Federation work.

Q. That is looking at it from the point of view of the outside world. Look at it from the point of view of the people in the Federation who are afraid, the one of being dominated by the other. Do you not think that if there was such a provision in the Constitution it would do a great deal to placate those fears?—A. I think myself it would produce a feeling of doubt everywhere. I should not have thought that it would have done anything to placate local fears.

Q. Do you think it would be possible without the undesirable use of force to maintain a Government over a vast number of people who did not wish to be governed?—A. We are referring to the question of force. There has always got to be something behind the Government, some kind of authority, which is in the last resort backed up by force. That is inherent in all Governments everywhere, otherwise they fall to pieces. There must be the ultimate force if it is going to be a Government at all. In this period which lies ahead of us I should not put too much emphasis on force, but nor should I put in any question of an option. It has happened so frequently in the past; if I may go back historically to the fact that the union of countries has very often never been at all popular in its early stages, certainly in these islands it has been the case; there has been an element of force behind the maintenance of the union here, but I would not place too much emphasis on it.

Q. Let me put it to you another way. Supposing the overwhelming majority of a people in a Territory wished to secede from the Federation, do you think you could retain them in the Federation against their will?—A. In the long run I should say that is probably impossible to do when they become politically conscious, and if they were able to express themselves as a majority it would probably be an impossible thing to hold down the people indefinitely. Though it has been done and is being done over a large part of the world today, but that is not what we would contemplate.

Q. Writing into the Constitution a right to secede if the people clearly showed they wished to secede, would that be doing anything more than to give practical expression to what would inevitably happen if the bulk of the people wished to secede?—A. I think it would put ideas in people's heads; I think it would be much better that their minds were concentrated on trying to make what is there work, rather than always to be thinking, "We will break up what we have got".

Q. You do not consider it might have the effect of placating their fears and that if they had the right to get out any time they wished they might not want to get out at all?—A. I should doubt that myself. I know of no Federal Constitution which has ever had that written into it, so far as I can tell from the past.

MR. MOLSON: Is the reason why the Commonwealth of Nations stayed together so well recently because all the self-governing members of it know they can secede at any time they wish to?—A. They are in rather a different position. They are self-governing dominions. They are not part of the Federation. We have had all that out long ago as to whether the British Commonwealth should become a Federation. It never has.

Q. Perhaps it has some elements of contentment and

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stability about it which is lacking in many Federations?—A. I should not say so necessarily. I should have thought the Federation of the United States, which had a great struggle 100 years ago, is pretty stable.

MR. JUSTICE BEADLE: Supposing you were faced with only two alternatives—I do not want you to think of any other answer now—I want you to think of these two alternatives only. Supposing the one suggestion was that the present political concept of Federation should be broken up and that in its place you should attempt to retain some looser form of economic association, something on the line of the European Common Market. That would be one solution. The other solution would be to trim up the present political structure of the Federation to make it as acceptable as possible to all the people of the Federation—that subject to conditions, the people of any Territory could secede if they wished to do so. Which of those two alternatives would you prefer?—A. I am not very much in favour of either.

Q. I appreciate that. That was why I prefaced my question by saying that if you were offered only one of those alternatives which would you prefer.—A. (MR. GRENFELL): They are not the only alternatives.

Q. That is not the point. I realise that there might be ten other alternatives. I want to know if you were posed the question, which of these two would you prefer as a possible alternative?—A. (MR. EMRYS-EVANS): As I dislike both I do not think I can say I have any preference.

Q. You regard them both as equally undesirable?—A. I should regard them both as undesirable.

CHAIRMAN: Allow me to put one question. Following on what Mr. Justice Beadle is saying to you, you say a great deal about other federations. We are studying a good deal about other federations. Do you know of any other federations in which one of the federating units was opposed to the federation when it came and it was imposed upon it?—A. So far as the United States was concerned when it was being negotiated at the start: there was a tremendous struggle after the War of Independence.

Q. You realise that the authorities on federation have laid it down as one of the prerequisites that there should be a desire to get together among the units which are coming together. Do you find that prerequisite was satisfied in Nyasaland, for instance, to take the most obvious case, at the time when the Federation came?—A. I cannot remember any particular opposition at the time when Federation came into being. I may be wrong about that.

Q. The point that I am on is this: I think what Mr. Justice Beadle was dealing with was that if you are dealing with a situation which begins like that—imposition upon at least one unwilling member of the Federation, as now it is, and the position in which we have evidence that a very great majority of the inhabitants of that particular Territory are violently opposed to it, then you do get driven up against these alternatives, do you not, unless you are prepared to say, "We believe so firmly in this Federation that we are prepared to impose it; by force, if necessary?"—A. Yes. If you are actually in that position, I presume we are.

Q. Then you might have to consider the thing Mr. Justice Beadle is putting to you?—A. I am not satisfied myself, of course, that the whole of the inhabitants of the Northern Territories—I am talking of the mass of the Africans—are as opposed as is sometimes made out. You have a great deal more knowledge, having recently been there. What I am very anxious to do is to gain time. I think time is the important thing. If we can get another few years of Federation, I think those people who have doubts about it in the Northern Territories and are opposed to it might very well come round to it. But once you have got a Federation, if you surrender it almost immediately—after ten years—I think you are giving up the struggle far too soon. No Federation that I know of would have survived an examination after ten years, and the sort of thing written into the Constitution which Mr. Justice Beadle wants written in.

MR. CHIRWA: Do you not think that there is a big difference between the Federations of, say, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and so on, and the Central African Federation, in that in those Territories you have not got one race that does dominate another. In Central Africa there is the factor that you have a majority of people who are being ruled by a small minority of people, and when you brought Federation this majority of people did not want it. If you are going to keep the Federation going, how are you going to keep these people from objecting to Federation and taking measures which are not constitutional?—A. (MR. GRENFELL): I do not think we would agree, particularly if there are some alterations in functions, that the Federation is governing these

two Northern Territories in the respects which principally matter to them. The difficulty is that the two Northern Territories do not yet govern themselves, and because they are not governing themselves and the Africans are dissatisfied they attribute that all to the fault of being associated together in a Federation. But they have not experienced what the position would be if, in fact, those two Northern Territories were self-governing. If the Africans had an effective word in the two Northern Territories, they would find that an enormous mass of things now being attributed to the Federation has nothing to do with the Federal Government whatever; it has no grounds for intervening in most of the departments of Government which they are particularly interested in; particularly since agriculture and education were administratively under the Territorial Governments, there are very few functions other than professional services which the Federal Government is performing.

Q. I think you have not grasped the objection of the Africans to Federation, or at least you have under-estimated the tempo of African nationalism, which I think in your memorandum you have not considered. Do you believe yourselves that the Africans in those Territories would be satisfied to have powers given to them which are less than those which their friends enjoy? Take Nyasaland, for instance; you have knowledge of those Territories. You know that part of the tribes of Nyasaland are in Tanganyika. Do you think that those people who see their own relations in Tanganyika governing themselves, at least having a very large say in Government, and as you know from experience that once the Africans get greater share in Government the tempo of African advancement is faster, do you think that those Africans in Nyasaland can be satisfied to have less powers in their own Government than their own brothers in Tanganyika? Alternatively, do you think Africans in Northern Rhodesia at present seeing their brothers in the Congo having more power will be satisfied to remain under Federation and have the control of the Europeans at the centre?—A. I think we would say until he does experience the authority and the power which he would have if those two Northern Territories had self-government and if the Africans had reached a stage at which they in fact, had a majority, he might well find that the services which the Federal Government provide were extremely useful to him. I do not think he can judge it until he has actually experienced the power which self-government in these two Northern Territories will assure him. As far as I know he is bound to be affected by what goes on in other countries. The outcome of independence in the Congo on 1st July may not be very satisfactory.

Q. That may be the case, but it does not alter the fact that it does affect the situation in Central Africa.—A. I quite agree it does, whatever happens up and down Africa.

Q. You are saying in this memorandum in paragraph 26 that you do not think Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have business or administrative experience. That may be true, but would you say that in Tanganyika you have Africans who have those experiences? I do not know whether you know Tanganyika well, but I do. Would you say that those Africans in Tanganyika at present have more administrative experience than, say, the people have got in Nyasaland?—A. I would say that the African in Tanganyika is now going to find out by having to work out what the difficulties are and how well he gets on. We shall not know for another ten years whether it prospers or whether it does not prosper.

Q. Do you not think then we should give the Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland the opportunity to acquire those experiences?—A. I think they will.

Q. When?—A. That is not for me. That is for the five Governments deciding in the light of your Commission's recommendations.

Q. You are suggesting here that native authorities and traditional tribal rulers should be brought into the Government?—A. Yes.

Q. You want to keep the Nationalists out. You want to keep educated people out and bring in the traditional rulers to give them experience to acquire the knowledge of Government and want to keep out the people who have got the training. That is your suggestion.—A. The suggestion is that you cannot go straight from what you have been having, which has been a Colonial Office Government and hand over all those powers to a lot of very inexperienced, very young people who happen to be the leaders of the African nationalist organisations which exist in these countries. Somehow or other you have got to provide this transition period of the changeover. You really need a body of, you might say, professional Africans; people who have already had the education, have practised in whatever their walk of life is and have proved themselves capable in

their particular professions. Then you have got a body of people to whom it would be reasonable to say "Well, you have had to compete amongst each other in your profession; those of you who have succeeded do form an elite with experience of the world and it is possible for you to be the receivers of whatever power is being transferred". But that is not the method of selection of the leaders of these political movements in the two Northern Territories.

Q. Mr. Chairman, I am sure that the witnesses know that that is the ideal we would like to see, but history has never in African Territories shown that that would be the case. If you take the Gold Coast, for instance, when Dr. Nkrumah's Government came into being people said it would be just rabble. He took up boys from the streets with no experience at all, but still he is governing. The same thing can be said about Singapore. The papers complained bitterly that Singapore had brought in youngsters who could not run a government. I was reading *The Times* of 2nd June. The point I want to bring out is that you can never train politicians to run a country. You can train civil servants, or they can be dismissed at will; but the people in the legislature are elected by the people, and people choose anybody they want irrespective of their experience in administration. So this idea that you should train politicians never happens in natural life. When self-governments come you will find people who have experience, who have been in particular legislatures for a long time, may be wiped out, and you get an entirely new group of people who have never been in politics before. Politicians can never be trained. They are not subject to employment: they are subject to an electorate. The electorate is not a trained body: it chooses whoever it wants. You cannot say in Central Africa you have got to wait until you get trained politicians because that will never come. You can train civil servants but you cannot train politicians.—A. No, but you can produce a number of educated people who have had to prove as to whether they are capable in various walks of life and that is, we feel, the difference between the West African Territories and these two Northern Territories in Central Africa. That they were so much further ahead; they have had African judges and barristers and doctors and all sorts of professions, and people in commerce and business on a big scale for some considerable time. They have got a body of, so to speak, mature people with experience of the world, but just to have one or two failed B.A.'s who happen to be very good at haranguing rather excitable mobs and nobody else to choose from, that is what is lacking. I would agree with you, you cannot train or hand-pick who are going to be the future leaders. Therefore you must first produce a body of people from whom those leaders can emerge. They do not exist today in Central Africa.

MR. CHIRWA: My last question, Mr. Chairman. What I want to bring home to you is that the Africans feel that because of the existence of the Europeans who have settled in Central Africa their political advancement has been hampered. That is what is causing friction between these people; the Europeans want to dominate them and the Africans want to get away from that domination. If you were an African you would see. But no matter how educated they may be they can rise to the position with the greatest difficulty. The point I want to raise is this: if you are saying that in Nyasaland you do not have many educated people to run a Government, how is it that in Tanganyika, where you have less educated people, the people there are being given opportunity to run a Government? What is the difference—because most of the people are involved in politics in Nyasaland? At least you can find a group of eight people taking part in Cabinet; all perhaps may lack experience, but they can be found. In Tanganyika, if you took Julius Nyerere from the union there is nobody else. The Africans feel that what is keeping them down in Nyasaland is the existence of European domination in Southern Rhodesia. Because Nyasaland will be linked up with Federation, therefore they cannot go faster in acquiring more powers in Government. In countries like Tanganyika, which is separate from any other Federation, the people can move faster than in Nyasaland. As long as you say you must train people in these Territories the less educated people in Nyasaland are being denied. You cannot convince them.

CHAIRMAN: What do you say about that?—A. (MR. EMRYS-EVANS): There is an air of finality about that. I think we must agree to disagree.—(MR. GRENFELL): It is really a great tribute you have been paying to Julius Nyerere; that he has been thrown up and he has managed, and all credit to him, to win the confidence of other races in Tanganyika. We have not seen that in Central Africa.

MR. ROBINSON: I would like to change the subject if I may and ask a question in which I am very much interested. In paragraph 14 where you talk about an imaginative two-

pronged overall plan for economic development, would you suggest that both this Commission and the five Governments that you mentioned as being parties to any future recommendations for the peoples of the Federation should concern themselves as much with the provision of an economic development plan as the provision of a plan of political settlement? Obviously not in the sense of producing the funds and so on, or producing the details, but would you suggest that there should be a full inquiry by the Governments so that when the political programme for the future is announced it should be accompanied by some joint declaration of an economic programme?—A. I think we would welcome it very much. I do not think you can go too far in throwing on to Governments the responsibility of, so to speak, blue-printing economic development, because the bulk of the economic development, certainly as far as the extension of industrialisation is concerned, will not lie in their hands. It has got to be that you have created a favourable climate for investment. It is private enterprise from outside which is going to be attracted in. The Governments, on the other hand, could plan together the further extension of the public services which will still be necessary in order to create the base and the favourable circumstances within which this external private industry can come in, develop and operate.

Q. Would you not say in the public sector in recent times there has been a very severe pruning of plans?—A. Yes.

Q. And if that is the case, presumably it is due to the difficulties that the Federation would experience in raising adequate capital resources to pursue even their normal objectives?—A. Yes.

Q. If you agree to that, would it not be desirable for the Governments when meeting any review of the whole position possibly to agree upon some extraordinary assistance to promote that public sector?—A. Yes, I think it would; but as I said, do not ask me what the particular projects are for them to concentrate on. There are a large number of projects in the public sector which have had to go back into the drawer, and if they had the confidence of future public stability they could then set about approaching international organisations and agencies, if necessary, for the provision of loan funds with which they could execute those programmes. There is still, you know better than we do, a vast backlog of African housing which has got to be done. Essentially that is not for risk capital. It would be absolutely wrong for risk capital, which is a limited commodity, to have to go into the provisions of things like African housing in these urban areas and yet it has got to be done. It runs into vast sums of money.

Q. That is really what I am trying to enquire about. Perhaps I have in mind some wider field even than that, but it does seem, would you not agree, that if people are to anticipate benefits from the continuation of Federation then the application of the resources might have to be done in rather a different way to what has occurred in the past. I am not blaming the Government necessarily; but, in terms of their functions and their powers, is there any truth in the statement one hears, for example, that the impact on the African community as a whole is very small? It might be necessary, do you not think, to find very necessary capital schemes? There is in the process agricultural aid, the Shire scheme and one thing and another which are quite beyond the normal resources of the Federation.—A. Yes.

Q. I do not want to go on pressing the point unduly but does it not seem essential for the Governments to agree upon some programme of aid, if you like, to achieve rapidly rising standards of living for all the people?—A. Yes. I think we would whole-heartedly support that. That is why I think we do feel it most desirable that, however much these functions may be the responsibility of Territorial Governments and Territorial Ministers, they should be co-ordinated together in some way in each one by a Joint Federal Council—a Joint Advisory Council. I did quote the Federal Loan Council as an example. A lot of these functions in the public sector are and will be Territorial, but if they are going to be only Territorial they are not going to get very far. I think those have got to be dovetailed into an overall plan which you can only do, I believe, if you bring about that the Ministers responsible for particular services, who are not thinking merely in terms of their own Territory, come together and try and plan on an overall basis for the three Territories.

MR. ROBINSON: Thank you.

MR. KATILUNGU: My last question, Mr. Chairman. I would like perhaps to obtain some agreement from the witnesses on this very difficult point. One of the general beliefs, I think, is that no country could either attract investment or be able to develop the economic fields and other economic projects which will bring prosperity to the country unless, and

only unless, that country has first achieved political stability; and that this political stability is missing in so far as Central Africa is concerned. As a result, this Commission is sitting to consider the solution, or some suggestions. Would you agree, after examining all the circumstances, and always finding ourselves in difficulties, that in so far as Central Africa is concerned there should be no desire for political unity, but some form of association to develop economic projects and so on should be found without necessarily relating the political situation since the two Northern Territories will not agree?—A. (MR. EMRYS-EVANS): That was, I think, the same question as from Mr. Justice Beadle on which I think I said I did not agree. I think that you have to have something much more stable than mere economic arrangements in order to get the full results of economic development.

MR. WOODROW CROSS: May I ask Mr. Evans a question. Would he agree, as a representative of the B.S.A. Company, which not only has very large interests in the Rhodesias and the Federation but also are investors and possible future investors of large sums of money, whether (a) paragraphs 15-20 depends on (b) paragraphs 21-23; (a) being the steady increase

in wages, depends on (b) industrialisation and financing of the Territories, which would again depend upon a third factor which would be the political stability of the Federation—each one depends upon the other, and in fact they would fall away without the last requisite?—A. That is what we feel. It is fundamental.

Q. Your third factor would include more than a simple economic association of the Federation?—A. Yes.

Q. It would mean a fair political tie up as well?—A. Yes.

Q. In other words, those other parts would not come about without the final equation?—A. We do not think they would. It would not follow. This is a sequence we believe to be founded on political stability which as we see it is the making of it.

Q. On a loose economic association the other benefits would largely fall away, they would not take effect?—A. Presumably that would be the case.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much not only for your memorandum but for coming and supporting it.

PART III
UNITED KINGDOM
EVIDENCE OF WITNESSES
WHO SUBMITTED
WRITTEN DOCUMENTS ONLY

THE AFRICA BUREAU

I. Introduction

1. As a British organisation the Africa Bureau has directed its memorandum to aspects of the situation in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland which are primarily the responsibility of the British Government. It describes, in the first instance, the way in which throughout the history of the Federation, and indeed even in the preceding years when it was still being shaped, there has been a gradual whittling away of Britain's powers of protection over the two northern territories, and the transfer of increasing powers to the Federal government, which is firmly under the control of the local European communities. This process has had the inevitable result of undermining the confidence and affection felt by the majority of the population in the Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, towards the Crown and the British Parliament. The following section of the Memorandum consists of an abbreviated selection of African protests and complaints against the Federation. Even though the selection has been kept within strict limits, it is widely representative of public opinion deeply held. Starting before the Federal constitution was adopted, opposition has continued unabated, and even with increased fervour, up to the present time. Finally, attention is drawn to the apparent incompatibility between the agreements so far reached by the British Government and the Federal authorities on the one hand, and on the other the repeated assurances that Britain will honour the long-standing treaties of Protection between the British Government and the African peoples of the two Protectorates.

II. The Erosion of Protection

2. The first serious move towards Federation in Central Africa was taken when the 1951 Conference of Officials reported, (Cmd. 8233). The economic arguments it advanced in favour of Federation are familiar—the advantages of economic planning over a large area, the co-ordination of the public services, the greater attractions of overseas investment. Political arguments were also adduced—the superior capacity of a federation of territories to resist outside pressures and protect “British traditional principles” from “influences from outside the borders of British Central Africa”. The Report appreciated, however, that the crucial problem in Central Africa was the relationship between races; it was on this problem that all previous moves towards a closer unity between the Rhodesias and Nyasaland has foundered. So the principle of “economic and political partnership” between Europeans and Africans was laid down. This, the Report said was “the only policy which can succeed in the conditions of Central Africa”.

3. With this in mind, the political structure that was proposed was a curious compromise. In effect it transferred important powers to the European community, recognising the predominance of the Southern Rhodesian Europeans; at the same time, it suggested a number of safeguards for the Africans, the chief of which was the retention of certain key powers, as far as Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were concerned, in the hands of the British Government. But, ever since the first appearance of the Officials' Report in 1951, increasing powers have been claimed by, and conceded to, the local European community and the safeguards for the Africans have been correspondingly weakened. Britain has allowed her own position as regards the two Northern Protectorates to be progressively undermined, until it has begun to appear inevitable that she will give way entirely. This—and the failure to implement a policy which could remotely be described as an honest “partnership”—is the central reason for the growing dislike and distrust of Federation among the Africans. They had, from the start, feared that Federation would mean their deliverance to the policies of Southern Rhodesia; everything that has happened since 1951 has justified that fear.

4. According to the 1951 officials' scheme, the Europeans were to have 26 representatives out of 35 (of the 35, Southern Rhodesia to have 17—a high proportion not justified by any objective criterion); they would also be in control of a responsible Cabinet. But presumably because the Federal Assembly was so heavily weighted in the European interest—a clear division of functions was laid down between the Federal and the separate Territorial Governments under the Colonial Office; the more intimate domestic concerns of the Protectorates would remain under their own control. What was more, the two crucial questions of territorial political development and the control of the land in the two Protectorates would remain Britain's particular responsibility.

5. At the same time, various constitutional “safeguards” for the Africans were introduced. One was the inclusion of a special “Minister for African Interests” in the Federal Government, independently appointed by the Governor-General, and

with power to “reserve” any proposed executive action of the Government for prior approval by the Secretary of State in Britain. The second was the African Affairs Board. This was to be a committee of the Legislature, headed by this Minister, consisting of three officials (the Secretaries for Native Affairs from each of the territories), three Europeans elected members and three Africans. The function of this Board was to examine all proposed Federal legislation and report to the Federal Government if it considered a bill to be detrimental to African interests. Any such bill had then to be reserved for Her Majesty's assent before it could become law, which meant that it had to be referred by the Governor-General to the Secretary of State in London, and the final decision rested with the British Parliament. The Report pointed out the real strength of this constitutional device was that the Board would have a Chairman who would also be the Minister for African Interests and would thus be a member of the Cabinet. He would be strengthened by his appointment by the Governor-General, and his right of direct access to him.

6. The Officials' Report at once provoked African opposition. That the proposals would give important new powers to the Europeans, and particularly to Southern Rhodesians, was obvious. There were doubts about how the constitutional safeguards would work. A Conference was held in 1951 at Victoria Falls and attended by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. Southern Rhodesia sent no African delegates in her delegation, and only the greatest persuasion on the part of the British Ministers induced any Africans from the Protectorates to attend. The Conference broke up in disagreement. Its communique stated that “it is becoming evident that further discussion with each Territory and exchanges of views between the four Governments will be necessary . . . it is hoped that the position can be sufficiently clarified to enable the Conference to reassemble in London about the middle of next year”. There had, however, been agreement that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland must retain their existing political status, and that economic and political partnership between Europeans and Africans was the only policy under which Federation could be brought about. The Northern Rhodesian Africans expressed their willingness to consider Federation on these terms “after the policy of partnership in Northern Rhodesia had been defined, and as so defined put into progressive operation”.

7. Hardly had the Ministers returned to London when a General Election was held in Britain and a new government returned to office. The discussions which the Africans had asked for about the meaning of partnership did not take place; the date of the next conference was pushed forward to April 1952. This time no Africans at all from the Northern Territories attended; the Conference went forward without them. During 1952 and 1953 the original Officials' proposals (Cmd. 8233) were translated into a Draft Federal Scheme (Cmd. 8573), the Draft Federal Scheme into a Federal Scheme (Cmd. 8754), the Federal Scheme into an Order in Council (No. 1199 of 1953), the Order in Council into law, and the Central African Federation into fact.

8. In the rapid course of these developments, the original proposals which the Officials' Conference had drafted were transformed—and always to the detriment of the Africans. These changes may be summarised under four headings.

9. First: Britain's special responsibilities for the Northern Protectorates “for so long as their respective people so desired” were relegated to a Preamble in the Constitution, and doubts were soon expressed as to the validity of this Preamble.* In the Preamble itself, a new sentence had appeared which had not been there in earlier drafts and was nowhere in the Officials' Scheme:

“the association of the three Territories . . . in particular would foster partnership and co-operation between their inhabitants and enable the Federation, when the inhabitants of the Territories so desire, to go forward with confidence towards the attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth.”

The Federation was made to appear as a stepping-stone towards independence.

The saving clause “when the inhabitants of the Territories so desire” was itself the subject of argument. “Inhabitants means inhabitants” said Mr. James Griffiths in Parliament,

* In the House of Commons the Minister said: “The Constitution itself will be brought into force by an Order in Council, but the Preamble as such is not legally binding. It is part of the Constitution, but it is not legally binding in the Constitution itself . . . The Preamble . . . sets forth and deploys the arguments and, of course, as such, forming part of an Order in Council passed by Her Majesty the Queen, it would have a very strong and effective force.” (*Hansard*, 24.3.59, Cols. 788-9).

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"without any qualification of colour, race or creed". Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, then Secretary of State for the Colonies elaborated on this:

"By the 'majority of the people' I agree with the Rt. Hon. Gentleman that we mean the inhabitants which he said are the inhabitants. . . . Nothing short of that will enable any Government to approve of a scheme of amalgamation or of a status which will end in Dominion status without the agreement of the majority of the inhabitants. I give a categorical assurance about that." (*Hansard* 24.iv.53. Col. 1969).

Sir Roy Welensky, however, had other views. Talking in the Central African Assembly a few years later he said:

"The pledge that independence could not be granted before a majority of the inhabitants wanted it, did not mean that the Natives had the right to veto anything which would be in the best interests of the Federation." (Reported in the *Johannesburg Star*, 14.viii.57).

Another European member of the Federal Assembly was reported to have said, on the same occasion, that what was meant by the "majority of the inhabitants" was merely the "majority of voters". We need not elaborate here on whom the majority of the voters are. On the Preamble itself, Sir Godfrey Huggins said: "Let us, for the sake of federation, which was for economic advancement, not for the Preamble, which was forced upon us (our italics) have patience" (*Rhodesia Herald* 31.vii.54).

10. Second: The composition of the Federal Assembly was altered to the disadvantage of the Africans. The Minister for African Interests was dropped. In the Officials' original scheme the Europeans would have controlled 26 seats in the Assembly; in the final scheme they controlled 29—over three-quarters of the total.

11. Third: The African Affairs Board, besides losing an independent powerful chairman in the form of the Minister for African Interests was reduced to a standing committee of the Federal Assembly. Its membership was reduced from nine to six (the three Secretaries for Native Affairs were dropped); one of these six was to be appointed chairman by the Governor-General. The functions and powers of the Board were diminished. Yet, during the passage of the Bill through Parliament, great weight had been attached by the Government to this Board. Mr. Henry Hopkinson, then Minister of State for the Colonies, said in Parliament on 24.iii.53:

"It is unlikely that Africans will be elected to the first Parliament. It is precisely for that reason that the safeguard of the African Affairs Board—the most powerful instrument which has ever been inserted into a constitution as a safeguard for any one group—has been included."

The local Europeans held other views. Mr. G. A. Davenport, Southern Rhodesian Minister of Education said:

"The African Affairs Board would probably be necessary, if only to reassure the Natives. If the people in the African Affairs Board made a farce of it they could be replaced, and if the same thing happened a second time, the Board would have to go." (Reported *Rhodesia Herald* 25.vi.52).

Sir Godfrey Huggins said:

"I believe that the thing that is going to wreck this scheme is the so-called African Affairs Board." (Reported *Rhodesia Herald* 1.vii.52).

12. Fourth: The division of powers between the Federal and territorial governments was further weighted in favour of the Federal Government. The division proposed in the Officials' Scheme already favoured the Federal Government, in spite of their explanation that "those services which have a specially close relation to the day-to-day life and work of the African peoples should continue to be provided by the territorial governments", the Federal Government was given control of foreign affairs, of the armed forces, of the economy, of communications, of some key development services and the major sources of revenue. In the final scheme the following additional items were removed from the list of territorial functions proposed by the Officials' conference—some were transferred to the Federal Government, others went into a "concurrent list" in which both governments had power, but with the federal law prevailing:—

Income tax;

European agriculture in S. Rhodesia (permissive in Protectorates but in fact soon transferred in N. Rhodesia);

Veterinary services in S. Rhodesia (permissive in Protectorates);

Co-operatives (except where the majority of members were African);

Marketing;

Health;

Town planning;

European police forces;

Prisons;

Roads.

At the end of this process relatively few powers were left to the territorial governments—apart from "provincial and native administration".

13. The Federal Parliament was given the vital powers (a) to fix the first federal franchise and (b) bills affecting the electoral law, and all constitutional amendments, would require a two-thirds majority of the federal assembly i.e. they would be in the control of the European representatives.

14. There was no doubt in anyone's mind as to the implications of the Federal constitution, even in its earlier stages. At a meeting of Civil Servants in Salisbury (23.x.52) the Southern Rhodesian Minister of Justice explained:

"To the extent that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have given up powers to the Federal government, to that extent they have escaped from the domination of the Colonial Office; and I think myself the principal gain politically in the federal scheme is that a tremendous measure of control in that part of Africa will be taken away from the Colonial Office and put under the control of a number of our own elected members of Parliament and others like them, elected in Northern Rhodesia."

On 16.vii.51 Sir Godfrey Huggins told his party:

"once the Imperial government have granted this constitution they have lost all control—don't forget that."

15. A problem which weighed heavily with the Opposition as the Federal proposals went through Parliament was how the Federal Constitution, now so heavily weighted in favour of the Europeans, was ever to be amended in the Africans' favour. It was stressed repeatedly that the provision made for a two-thirds majority in the Federal Assembly in order to carry any constitutional amendment, was bound to mean that the Africans could never secure any improvement of their position without European consent; even together with the three Europeans nominated to represent their interests, they were still only nine in a House of thirty-five. To meet this objection, it was agreed that the working of the constitution should be reviewed within seven to nine years from the coming into force of the Federation, at a conference consisting of delegations from the Federation, from each of the three territories and from the United Kingdom, chosen by their Governments. But the purpose of this review soon became twisted to entirely different ends—at the 1960 conference the leaders of the Federation, so they announced their intentions, would claim independence from Britain. Innumerable statements by Sir Roy Welensky and others bear witness to this intention. The intention to claim independence grew stronger with the passage of each year; it was coupled with threats of a new "Boston Tea Party" should independence not be granted.

"You cannot make people do things unless they wish to, except by force, and one of the curious things about our Constitution is this: We have complete control of our Defence Force. I can only hope we shall not have to use it as the North American colonies had to use theirs, because we are dealing with a stupid Government in the United Kingdom. . . . Our job is to consolidate our position economically, to advance our people as we do, and when we are strong enough we do not care, because nobody can stop us doing what we like." (Lord Malvern reported in *East Africa & Rhodesia* 30.viii.56).

"I don't want to talk about Boston tea parties and utter threats of what we will try to do in 1960. We will go to the conference firmly believing that the achievements of the Federation fully justify the granting of independence to us. Should we fail to convince Her Majesty's government of that, then will be the time to take stock and decide what other action is necessary." (Sir Roy Welensky reported in *Uganda Argus* 10.v.58).

16. The Federation proposals were fought step by step in

the British Parliament in the years before they came into law in 1953. The Opposition had begun by considering the Officials' Scheme "a constructive proposal". But, as they watched the treatment which African views were accorded in Central Africa, and observed the watering down of the scheme to the African disadvantage, they drifted into irreconcilable hostility. They withdrew all support for the proposals, and on not less than fifteen occasions divided the House. In defence, the Government continually reasserted its belief in the excellence of the proposals.

"Let me record, with the deepest sincerity" said the Secretary of State for the Colonies, "that I believe it is a thoroughly comprehensive and liberal document and that, as far as human foresight can see, it provides a means by which a partnership between the races can be established." (*Hansard* 24.iii.53. Col. 671).

17. The Federal Scheme was approved by the House of Commons on 24.iii.53 by 44 voters with the whips on and the Labour and Liberal Parties voting against it. It was then referred to a referendum in S. Rhodesia, held on 10.iv.53. Out of a total population of two million Africans and 150,000 Europeans, there were 46,355 voters. Only 380 were Africans. Just over 40,000 votes were cast; 25,570 in favour. In the legislatures of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland the African members were joined in opposition by the Europeans nominated to represent African interests, and in Nyasaland by the one Indian member of the council. The officials were instructed to vote with the Europeans.

18. In 1957 two major developments occurred, with grave implications for the future of the Federation. The first was the introduction in the Federal Assembly of two crucial Bills—the Federal Electoral Bill (Cmd. 362) and the Constitution Amendment Bill (Cmd. 298); the second was an agreement arrived at privately in London (and published as a Joint Announcement (C.R.O. 27.iv.57)) between U.K. Ministers on the one hand and Sir Roy Welensky and his cabinet colleague, Mr. J. M. Greenfield on the other. This agreement transferred further powers to the Federation, but also accepted in principle the proposals later contained in the two Bills just mentioned. One paragraph of this document reads as follows:

"... United Kingdom Ministers accepted in principle proposals for the enlargement of the Federal Assembly. The Federal Prime Minister stated that he would not be able to inform Her Majesty's Government of the Federal Government's definite proposals for the franchise, or to present a Bill on this subject to the Federal Legislature, until further discussions had been held in Salisbury. Meanwhile, however, he could assure United Kingdom Ministers that a Franchise Bill would be introduced, and would ensure that British protected persons otherwise qualified would not be required to change their status in order to be eligible for the Federal franchise, and that the qualifications for that franchise would permit of a reasonable number of such persons acquiring the franchise. United Kingdom Ministers took note with satisfaction of these assurances."

19. Briefly, the Electoral Bill proposed to divide voters into two rolls, a general roll and a special roll. To qualify for the general roll, an income of £720 a year and literacy in English would be required, or an income of £480 and primary education, or else an income of £300 and Cambridge School Certificate. Qualifications for the special roll were much lower—£200 a year and literacy in English. In neither roll would there be discrimination on grounds of race; but it was obvious, with qualifications such as these, that only a handful of Africans would qualify for the general roll whereas most Europeans would.

20. According to the accompanying Constitution Amendment Bill, the Federal Assembly was to be enlarged from 35 to 59 members. Previously the Assembly had been composed of 26 ordinary elected members (as they were called) six specially elected Africans and three Europeans representing African interests—making 35 in all. Now there were to be 44 ordinary elected members, 12 specially elected Africans, and the same total of three Europeans representing African interests. The crucial point was that the 44 ordinary elected M.P.s who would obviously dominate the Assembly of 59, were all to be elected by the general roll of voters only—who were nearly all Europeans. Of the 12 African members only four would be chosen by an all-African electorate, under the old method of indirect elections through the African Councils. The remaining eight would be elected by the general and special rolls combined—all the European voters who had already had their say in choosing the 44 European M.P.s, would now have another say in choosing eight African representatives out of twelve. There

was an extraordinary provision in this bill, laying down that if an African were to be elected to any of the 44 seats which were in the preserve of the general roll voters, a deduction would be made accordingly from the number of seats reserved specially for African representation.

21. The Constitution Amendment Bill was brought before the three separate territorial legislatures. The Southern Rhodesian Parliament—an all-European body—approved without incident. The African members of the Nyasaland legislature all walked out. In Northern Rhodesia all the African members voted against. The bill was then brought to the Federal Assembly. The African members from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, together with the two Europeans representing African interests there, voted against. But the required two-thirds majority was secured.

22. For the first time the African Affairs Board now decided to exercise its powers of objection. It declared (the argument on both sides is given in full in Cmd. 298) that the bill differentiated against the Africans and asked that it be reserved and referred to Her Majesty. No sooner had this request for reservation of the bill arrived in London, than Lord Home, on behalf of the British Government, announced that the view of the Board would be set aside and that the Queen would be advised to give her assent. A debate took place in Parliament on 25.11.57: it was pursued to a division. The Government triumphed by 301 to 245 votes. On the first occasion that the African Affairs Board had proclaimed its conviction that the Africans were being discriminated against, its arguments were overridden.

23. A similar fate befell the Federal Electoral Bill which was linked with the Constitution Amendment Bill. Sir John Moffat, the Chairman of the African Affairs Board, speaking in the Federal Assembly, said:

"How the United Kingdom Government can say that the Bill represents a general advance puzzles me... Can any hon. member contend that the people at the Federation conference, who considered that the millions of Africans who have no vote... should have more than the four to twenty-nine proportion in this House, then proposed, would have agreed even to that proportion had they known that in the very first election held under Federal auspices this would be reduced to four to forty-nine? I declare categorically that, had the Government disclosed during these discussions that the compromise reached with such effort and concession would be altered by them unilaterally without conferring, they would never have got the agreement. *They might never have got the Federation.*

"The African peoples were told in meeting after meeting of the safeguards which the Constitution contained for them. They were told they would have their own spokesmen in the Federal House and—mark this well—that they would elect their own spokesmen. We pledged our word... Must I tell them now that the assurances which I gave in good faith that they would elect their own representatives are false, and that the Federal Government... will see that European voters will flood them out?" (*East Africa and Rhodesia* 2.i.58).

The Bill passed through the Federal Assembly. The African Affairs Board declared it—like its predecessor, a differentiating measure. (The detailed argument on both sides is set out in Cmd. 362). Like its predecessor it was carried by the usual Government majority.

24. After these failures, the African Affairs Board lost heart and strength. In 1958 Rev. Andrew Doig, Nyasaland's European member representing African interests in the Federal Assembly, and a member of the Board, resigned. In his letter of resignation to the Speaker of the Assembly, he wrote:—

"My conviction that I can no longer usefully represent African interests in the Federal Assembly rests upon two facts:

(1) The setting aside of the reservation of the African Affairs Board in regard to the Constitution Amendment and Franchise Bills has so weakened the position of the Board as to render it completely ineffective as a safeguard for African interests. It is true that the Board has no power of veto, but it is equally true that the members of the Board consider all the aspects of a Bill and decide if on a balance it is disadvantageous. That this was the considered opinion of two-thirds of the Board and of all the members representing African interests from the two Northern Territories, both European and African, should have given the Federal Government, and even more the

British Government, furiously to think before pressing on regardless of the consequences for the Board. In my opinion further service on the Board is useless.

(2) The action of the Governments in insisting upon a fundamental change to the Federal Constitution (a) while African support had still not been won for Federation at all; (b) despite the implicit assurance in the wording of the Constitution that territorial practice would prevail (cf. introduction to sections 10-13 a variety never yet explained); (c) despite the increased suspicion and uneasiness of the Africans and the declared opposition through statutory councils and non-official bodies; and (d) without offering any explanation or proof of the urgency for such fundamental change, is a course of action I could not possibly defend and I feel compelled in the interests both of Africans and of the peace of these territories to protest further by my resignation."

25. Shortly after, Sir Roy Welensky said that the African Affairs Board had done a great deal of harm by the attitude displayed under the leadership of Sir John Moffat (Sir John had been Northern Rhodesia's European Member representing African interests in the Federal Assembly, as well as chairman of the Board). Sir Roy continued:

"I have never been critical of Sir John, but I want to say this—I have never said it in public before—I would never have proceeded with the introduction of a measure such as the federal franchise if I had not had considerable agreement with the U.K. Government (our italics). That is basic when the U.K. Government has the power of veto which it has at the moment. The African Affairs Board must have realised that this measure was to a large extent agreed to and yet it tried to kill it, with the result that the Board is now very much discredited." (*South Africa* 20.9.58).

To this, Rev. Andrew Doig replied:—

"Here we have it suggested that in any measure that has been a matter of discussion and agreement between the Imperial and Federal Governments, the Board, whatever it may think of the measure, should remain silent. This makes complete nonsense of the constitutional position of the Board. How can a Board discredit itself by carrying out the precise duty laid upon it by the Constitution to reserve any measure which in the opinion of its members is disadvantageous to Africans? Any discrediting must surely depend on the way in which the Board's constitutional act is dealt with. In this case it is the Imperial and Federal Governments between them who have left the African Affairs Board revealed as completely ineffective as a safeguard of African interests—a serious situation to have created at this stage." (*East Africa and Rhodesia* 25.9.58).

26. Sir John Moffat also soon resigned from the Federal Assembly in order to organise a political party—the Central Africa Party—in opposition to the Government. He was succeeded by his brother, Mr. R. L. Moffat, who said, in the Federal Assembly, "that the Board can no longer be considered an impartial or independent body. The members of the Board—the Federal Party members—must have their Party's loyalties to consider in any measure that comes before them". (*Rhodesia Herald*, 16.iv.59).

27. The result of the General Election in 1958 was that all the African representatives and the European Members for African Interests (elected under the new Electoral Law) were members of the United Federal Party which formed the Government. Therefore in the electoral college which chose the members of the African Affairs Board Government supporters predominated thus ensuring Government control of the Board itself.

28. The agreement entered into in April 1957 between the British Government and Sir Roy Welensky, can only be described as an agreement to transfer more power to the Federal Government. The Joint Announcement (CRO, 27.iv.57) the British and Federal Governments stated:

(1) The Federal Prime Minister had represented that the time had come for the Federation to assume more responsibility for external affairs. The United Kingdom agreed to entrust this responsibility to the Federation to the fullest extent possible.

(2) In future, the Prime Minister of the Federation would have direct access to the Sovereign in certain special matters.

(3) The United Kingdom Government would not

initiate any legislation to amend or repeal any Federal Act, except at the request of the Federal Government.

(4) It was agreed that all civil services in the Federation would eventually be locally based.

(5) It was agreed that the conference to review the constitution would be convened in 1960. Its purpose would also be to agree on further constitutional advances. "The conference will consider a programme for the attainment of such a status as would enable the Federation to become eligible for full membership of the Commonwealth."

29. It was after this that the demand for independence became increasingly forthright. "Independence cannot be withheld from us much longer" said Sir Roy Welensky in June 1957, (*East Africa and Rhodesia* 13.iv.57) and again:

"The issue of our full membership of the Commonwealth will soon be decided . . . I think I should make it clear that we will honour in full the terms of the Constitution, but we in the Federation look upon the year 1960 as the year when we will obtain our majority and that we expect to take our full place in the British Commonwealth of Nations".

III. The Nature and Extent of African Opposition to Federation.

" . . . it was generally acknowledged that Opposition to Federation was there, that it was deeply rooted and almost universally held. (*Devlin Report* para 43, published July, 1959).

30. The unanimity of African Opposition to a Federal State in Central Africa was frequently denied in Parliament, by visiting Ministers of government and by European spokesman from Central Africa who asserted that opposition was confined to a few ambitious political leaders, that the great majority of the people had no understanding of the issues, and that the African National Congresses in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were not representative of the people.

We submit here evidence in the form of quotations from petitions, memoranda and public statements to show the constancy of African opposition and the efforts made to express it by constitutional means.

31. Opposition to Closer Association

Opposition to any form of closer association with Southern Rhodesia was reported by the Bledisloe Commission in 1938 in the following words:

"The average native is ill-equipped to form a proper appreciation of the effects of amalgamation, either on his own position or on the prospects of the Territories, and in his present stage of development even longer time for consideration would probably have made but little difference to his attitude. Nevertheless, the striking unanimity, in the Northern Territories, of native opposition to amalgamation, based mainly on dislike of some features of the native policy of Southern Rhodesia and the anxiety of the natives in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland lest there should be any change in the system under which they regard themselves as enjoying the direct protection of Your Majesty, are factors which cannot in our judgment be ignored."

Opposition to the Federal Proposals 1951-1953

Nyasaland African National Congress

32. The memoranda and submission of 1951 to 1953 prepared by the Protectorate Councils, National Congresses and other bodies in the Northern Territories, deal directly with the proposals for a particular form of federation contained in the Government White Papers Cmd. 8233 and Cmd. 8754

33. Nyasaland African National Congress Memorandum on Closer Association in Central Africa addressed to the Secretary of State, the Rt. Hon. James Griffiths said *inter alia*:

"Things which mean one thing in Britain mean the other in Africa here; so it is with Federal partnership. To make a statement is one thing but to carry it out is quite another. The acceptance of partnership by Nyasaland Africans means that we should recognise Europeans and other aliens as being co-owners of the land. In practice, it would mean that the European will gradually 'enter' our flesh like a jigger until we are pushed right out to the end of the worst land. This is the story of town and country planning today where Africans are being driven from certain areas to make room for

industry, trade and European township of Blantyre/Limbe which Congress and Chiefs have protested and are protesting. The glory and honour that used to be the Chief's is no more. When in 1891 a British Protectorate was proclaimed and the administration of the territory was taken over by Her Majesty, Queen Victoria, it was with 'the consent and desire of the chiefs and people'. Partnership, in the sense in which British constitutional lawyers are putting it to us today, was never implied or understood as such in that Proclamation. The Africans in Nyasaland call this their land and they are determined to respect the sanctity and inviolability of the Protectorate. Events in India, Gold Coast, and Nigeria have within the past few years strengthened our continuity of confidence in the British Government as regards their tenacity of purpose. We are also anxious to follow the road India has gone. Nyasaland Africans take great exception to forming a political partnership in any form whatsoever with Southern Rhodesia and her Huggins Government. The redemption of Nyasaland, helpless as it may appear now to outsiders, will come ultimately, not from outside, but from Africans inside."

After examining the Report of the 1951 Conference at Victoria Falls the memorandum stated: "We can go on showing that Federation for the African is a dangerous thing to plunge into—Chiefs, peasants, artisans, teachers, in fact all sorts and conditions of Africans are unanimous on this total rejection of federation."

34. January 26 & 27, 1952—An Emergency General Conference of the Nyasaland African National Congress passed resolutions re-affirming their opposition to Nyasaland announcing their decision to send a delegation of Chiefs and Congress members to Britain.

35. April 6, 1953—The Nyasaland African National Congress issued a statement on Non-Violent Movement against Federation. It was resolved "that a Supreme Council of Action consisting of representative chiefs, members of the Legislative Council, Congress and people from various organisations be set up immediately which Council shall consider and direct the resistance movement."

The Nyasaland Chiefs

36. Chief Mwase of Kasungu, Nyasaland who attended the 1951 Conference made his views known in a letter to the *African Weekly* (January 16, 1952). He wrote:

"I deny that there was a delegate from Nyasaland, European or African who agreed to federation. If any delegate who was there says so, he does not say the truth.

All delegates from Nyasaland entirely refused federation. Moreover the Council did not compel any of us to agree. If we had agreed they would not have arranged for another conference to take place in London to discuss federation again . . .

The fact is that the people of Nyasaland do not want federation. Nyasaland has her reasons for refusing. These reasons are plain and I may state them here:

(i) Every nation wants to keep her respect and the place of inheritance for their children in which to exercise power. God has never said people must be denied their inheritance. It is for that reason that Nyasaland does not want federation with S. Rhodesia, but wishes to remain under the Colonial Office.

(ii) Nyasaland knows that if she agrees to federation, then she has deprived herself of self-determination as she will be governed by White men only. I am sure that our fertile land would be taken by them and we Africans would be placed in unsuitable place where food cannot grow well.

(iii) S. Rhodesia is a Colony and is governed by Europeans only. The African has no voice and laws are being made by Europeans. Whether the Africans want them or not, they must accept them.

(iv) Nyasaland cannot be enticed with the policy of partnership. Why was not this done in the past? Why should partnership be offered because of federation?

I have no doubt if we accept federation our children will blame us . . .

We have hope of attaining self-government in Nyasaland under the guidance of the Colonial Office. But if we federate with Southern Rhodesia then our freedom would be gone. We shall have no power over our

country and our people. We are being told that the protectorate status of N. Rhodesia and Nyasaland will be preserved. We do not believe this for the Europeans who shall live in the future are not the ones we have now. Who knows about tomorrow?

We do not like to be forced into federation. We do not want to lose our liberty which Queen Victoria gave us. Let us stand for our children's liberty."

37. A resolution passed by the Nyasaland Chiefs Conference (November 15 & 16, 1952) rejected federation, and condemned: "The propaganda being carried on by the so-called round table talks, presided over by responsible Government Officers directed at persuading Africans to accept federation be discontinued forthwith." The conference demanded that African members of the District, Provincial, and Protectorate Councils should be chosen by Africans themselves and the Chairman should be an African. They also asked that there should be 18 African seats in the Legislative Council to be filled by members chosen by Africans.

38. A delegation from Nyasaland consisting of Paramount Chief M'belwa, Chiefs Zomba, Maganga, and Kuntaja, and Acting Paramount Chief Gomani, Mr. I. C. K. Muwumba and Mr. B. W. M. Phiri arrived in London (January 1953). The delegation met the Secretary of State on February 4. They expressed their great disappointment at being refused access to H.M. the Queen to whom they wished to hand their petition against Federation.*

On the Chiefs return a special Management Committee of Nyasaland Chiefs organisations met at Blantyre for the purpose of receiving reports from the delegation. It was resolved to advise all Nyasaland African people at home and abroad to have nothing to do with the White Paper issued by the Government after the recent Federation Conference held in London, as it did not contain "anything beneficial to the African people of Nyasaland."

39. Chiefs from all parts of Nyasaland signed a petition to the United Nations protesting against the imposition of Federation.†

40. Chief Philip Gomani, while seriously ill, was informed that Federation had been decided upon. In fact a notice was put out by the District Commissioner of Blantyre to this effect on May 10, 1953, several months before the Enabling Act was passed, as was subsequently acknowledged by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons. In accordance with a decision reached by Chiefs and Congress to resist Federation by peaceful means, the Chief advised his people on how they should conduct themselves non-violently and terminated certain regulations issued on his authority. When he refused to withdraw his advice he was suspended and ordered to leave his district in 24 hours.‡

A letter (May 8, 1953) to the Governor from Chief Mwase and Mr. J. R. N. Chinyama expressed the view that by planning to delegate some of their powers in Nyasaland to the Federal Government H.M.G. was acting *ultra vires* the Treaties entered into by the Crown with the Chiefs in 1891-93. The letter asked for two assurances:

(a) None of the powers hitherto exercised by them over us and our people are being or will at any time in future be, handed over or delegated to any other state or authority without our and our people's consent, and

(b) the proposed scheme for a Federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland will not be imposed on us without our consent.

41. The Enabling Act to the Federal Constitution having been passed the Nyasaland Chiefs Union passed resolutions reiterating their opposition to Federation though advising withdrawal of the orders of non-cooperation with the Government with a view to restoring confidence between Chiefs and Government. The Chiefs called for the restoration of all Native Authorities including Chief Gomani who had resigned or been deposed as a result of their opposition to Federation (September 11, 1953). Chief Gomani was not re-instated and he died, exiled from his home, in May 1954.

* Text similar to Northern Rhodesian Petition: see Appendix I.

† See A Petition to H.M. Queen Elizabeth Against Federation made by Chiefs and Citizens of Nyasaland, published by the Africa Bureau (copy attached).

‡ The full story of this is told in *African Episode* by Michael Scott, published, Africa Bureau.

Nyasaland Legislative Council

42. One of the two nominated African members of the Legislative Council the Hon. E. A. Muwamba, addressing the Governor said (December, 1952): "Your Excellency, you complained that the Federal scheme had not had a fair hearing. This I regret to say I cannot understand. Your own speech to the Protectorate Council was printed and distributed throughout the territory. It was translated in both Chinyanja and Chitumbuka and published in *Msimbi*. Articles in *Msimbi* have explained it. *The African Weekly* and the *Bantu Mirror* which circulate in Nyasaland, as well as Northern and Southern Rhodesia have explained it. . . . The whole Administration, the Secretary for African Affairs, Provincial Commissioner, District Commissioners—all have been speaking to the Africans about it. . . . Chiefs held meetings in their respective areas with their people and have spoken about it. What more can be done? Surely it is not expected that African leaders should try to persuade their own people to accept something that they, the African leaders themselves do not believe in. . . . And when we refused to accept federation it does not mean that we wish Europeans and Asians to leave this territory. What sane man would wish that?"

Northern Rhodesia

43. A delegation from Northern Rhodesia consisting of D. L. Yamba, P. Sokoła, G. M. Musumbulwa and A. K. Walubita visited London in May 1952. A press statement issued on May 8, 1952, described their meeting with the Secretary of State for the Colonies as follows:

During the interview the Secretary of State informed the deputation of some of the conclusions of the Conference as referred to in the press. We were alarmed at the apparent intention of the Government to proceed with the proposed Federation in spite of the unanimous opposition expressed by the African people through their official and unofficial organisations. Nothing which the Secretary of State said has in any way diminished our unanimous opposition to the plan. On the contrary, our fears have been increased by our failure to secure any assurance from the Secretary of State that Federation will not be imposed against the wishes of the African people.

44. A delegation consisting of Paramount Chief Mzpeni and George Kaluwa, a Congress official, also visited Britain towards the end of 1952 in order to inform Britain of their peoples' opposition to the Federal Scheme.

45. In Northern Rhodesia African Members of the Legislative Council and officials of the African National Congress addressed a similar petition to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. They also petitioned the Speaker of the House of Commons and the Lord Chancellor:

We appeal to Her Majesty's House of Commons/House of Lords to grant us a hearing at the bar of the House, or by a Select Committee thereof, or by a joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament, and we respectfully request you Sir/Your Lordship, to allow this to be done before any legislation is brought before Parliament to enable federation to be imposed upon us against our will. We believe that the grounds of our appeal are those of right and justice, and the principles cherished and taught by Britain of government by consent of the governed.

Federation—A Reality

Nyasaland Chiefs

46. Chiefs Otiikowi, Mwase and Katumbi, Messrs. K. E. Mposa, E. A. Muwamba and H. K. Gondwe (Members of the Nyasaland Legislative Council) and C. R. Kumbikano and W. M. Chirwa (Members of the Federal Parliament) in a memorandum to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (May 3, 1954) said: The continued opposition of "the Chiefs and African people of Nyasaland" to the imposed Federation is recorded. Paramount Chief Mbelwa delivered an address to Sir Roy Welensky, when he visited Nyasaland (September, 1957) which was supported by Chief Mzukuzuka, and Inkosi Chanda II: "Nyasaland—before federation talks all was quiet and (Africans) maintained only law and order. But during federation very strong misunderstandings between the Government and governed arose because the rights of the latter were not considered. . . . Federation is still opposed" said the Chief, for fear of "Southern Rhodesia's African policies copied from South Africa". When at the Northern Province African Provincial Council (October 18, 1958) the Provincial Commissioner, Mr. Rowland, announced the presence of Mr. Hodgson, of the Federal Office of Race Relations, saying it was his intention to suspend business of the meeting in order to allow Mr. Hodgson to address the meeting, all but two members

of the Council walked out of the Chamber shouting slogans against Federation. . . . The Council consisted of 26 members, including all the senior chiefs in the Northern Province.

Nyasaland demands for "extraction" and "secession"

47. Congress re-affirmed its opposition to Federation at meetings on July 16 and in November, 1954. At the latter meeting commenting on the van Eeden plan to alter the boundaries of the Federation and abolish the federal system of Government, Congress said they did not wholly support the plan but added: "the Nyasaland African Congress desires to state publicly that the extraction of the Nyasaland Protectorate from the Federal Scheme of Rhodesias and Nyasaland would meet their persistent demand". The Eleventh Annual Conference (April 8-12, 1955) of Congress re-affirmed "its determined opposition to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and desire that the Nyasaland Protectorate be extracted from the Federal scheme."

Appendix I

48. Mr. W. M. Chirwa, African Federal M.P. from Nyasaland at a press conference in London (January 4, 1956) said: "Today the Africans of Nyasaland are even more firmly opposed and in fact desire to contract out of the Federation." The Secretary of State for the Colonies told the House of Commons that he had received some suggestion from Mr. W. M. Chirwa relating to the secession of Nyasaland from the Federation, and added "any such suggestion is wholly unacceptable to Her Majesty's Government, who adhere to the maintenance of the Federal Constitution."

49. Following talks (August 1956) between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and Lord Malvern at which the latter was reported to have asked for Dominion Status for the Federation, Mr. W. M. Chirwa sent a telegram to Mr. Lennox-Boyd saying that Nyasaland Africans opposed Dominion Status for the Rhodesian Federation and that they desired secession.

50. A conference of the Nyasaland African National Congress held in the Northern Province (April 30, 1957) issued a statement reaffirming their opposition to federation and demanding self-government by Africans in Nyasaland. The conference also called on the two Nyasaland African Members of the Federal Parliament to resign and said that if they did not do this they should be expelled from Congress. The conference felt that the presence of African representatives in the Federal Parliament was stopping the world from taking Nyasaland's opposition to federation seriously. The M.P.s ignored Congress's call and were subsequently expelled. Cyril Dunn writing in the *Observer Foreign News Service* (May 31, 1957) said: "The demand for Nyasaland's secession is in fact becoming more passionate and more extreme the more stubbornly it is repressed by European politicians, both here and in the United Kingdom, who insist that Federation has come to stay."

Nyasaland Legislative Council

51. Under the 1956 Constitution 5 Africans were elected to the Legislative Council. All were members of Congress. In the course of debates on the Nyasaland territorial budget they protested against Federation.

52. Mr. W. M. K. Chiume, M.L.C. said that recent events and utterances had made the opposition to Federation of the Nyasaland African Congress more intense. Mr. Kwenje, M.L.C. said that one reason for the Congress's opposition for Federation was that under the treaty by which Nyasaland had been proclaimed a protectorate, Africans were to be trained till such time as they could rule themselves.

53. During a visit to London Mr. H. B. Chipembere, M.L.C. submitted a memorandum to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. He said: "There is a general feeling in Nyasaland that Her Majesty's Government's colonial policy in Nyasaland is being influenced by a determination never to offend the Federal Government. The political future of the African people is being sacrificed to the interests of the settler-dominated Federal Government in Salisbury, and the recent Nyasaland constitutional changes are an illustration of this new practice." Referring to the Secretary of State's statement in the House of Commons (February 15) that the idea of secession for Nyasaland from the Federation was "wholly unacceptable", Mr. Chipembere said: "I can only say that all that the law permits will be done to achieve the liberation of Nyasaland from her unwanted political association with Rhodesia. The ever-growing popularity of the Nyasaland African Congress, so clearly demonstrated in its resounding victory in the last election, must have left your office without any doubts as to the trend of feelings on this matter among the Africans in Nyasaland".

54. In Nyasaland, Mr. W. M. K. Chiume, M.L.C. called for a referendum to decide whether or not Nyasaland should remain in the Federation. Mr. D. W. Chijozi, M.L.C. issued a press statement saying Africans wanted self-government within the British Commonwealth and opposed Federation.

55. Mr. N. D. Kwenje, M.L.C. moved in the Legislative Council (February 8, 1957) that Nyasaland be extricated from the Federation.

56. The African M.L.C.s addressed a letter to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting in London in June 1957. They said that Sir Roy Welensky, who was attending the conference, "carries no mandate of Africans, at least of Nyasaland". Their letter attacked the Federation.

57. When Lord Home, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, made a three week tour of the Federation, Mr. N. D. Kwenje, M.L.C. told him that to force federation on the Nyasaland Africans against their will was not democratic. "We told him we intended to get out," he said, "and that we will never accept federation."

Northern Rhodesia, Chiefs and Congress

58. Northern Rhodesian Congress circular (November 15, 1955) said: "We know that self-government, Federation, Dominion Status and the like may give to the white man some form of security and leave the African a subject of all sorts of humiliation. But all this can do no more than delay the progress of the African a little".

59. In January 1957, the Secretary of State for the Colonies visited Northern Rhodesia and addressed the African Provincial Council for the Western Province. He expressed Her Majesty's Government's belief in Federation. Mr. P. Sokota, M.L.C. in reply said that the Provincial Council again registered whole-hearted opposition to the inclusion of Northern Rhodesia in the Federation. He listed four disadvantages: (1) the European settlers were using the Federation to embarrass the British Government in their Colonial policy; (2) race relations had worsened; (3) African fears that the European population would seek more power at the expense of the African were being justified; and (4) unskilled European immigrant labour was being encouraged to fill posts which could well be filled by Africans".

During his visit Mr. Lennox-Boyd met Mr. H. Nkumbula, President of the African National Congress, and other Congress officials who informed him of their opposition to federation and demanded secession for Northern Rhodesia. The *Rhodesia Herald* (January 22) reported Mr. Nkumbula as saying: "Does the British Government know that the Africans of Northern Rhodesia are now even more opposed to the Federal set-up than they have ever been before and that they are asking the British Government to allow N. Rhodesia to secede at the time of review?"

60. Paramount Chief Chitimukulu of the Bemba said of Federation: "We have regarded the move (of federation) and will continue to regard it as a grave betrayal of our existence as a free people of the Great Queen."

61. In the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council (August 20, 1958) Mr. Robinson Nabulyato urged that "Northern Rhodesia be permitted to secede from the Federation". He pointed out that this motion had been passed by the Provincial Councils and the African Representative Council.

62. The Zambia African National Congress formed in December 1958 voiced its "uncompromising opposition to federation in its entirety".

In the Federal Assembly

63. The African Federal M.P.s repeatedly drew the Federal Government's attention to the extent of African opposition. In July 1954 Mr. D. Yamba (African M.P. for N. Rhodesia) moved that equal terms be accorded immediately to all races in all public places within the Federation. He was seconded by Mr. W. M. Chirwa (African Member for Nyasaland). The defeat of this motion was frequently cited by Africans as an example of how not even lip-service was being paid to the principle of partnership by the Federal Government. In the course of the debate Sir Godfrey Huggins said that in regard to segregation in the post offices, the S. Rhodesian system was the best and added: "It is certainly impossible to alter it until the honourable leaders of the African people have cleaned up their brothers a bit." His statement clearly shows, said a meeting of African leaders in Blantyre, that "the policy of the Federal Government rejects partnership upon which

the Federal constitution is based. He affirms the domination of Europeans over the Africans and believes in the perpetual servitude of the African people. In view of this we reiterate our opposition to federation".

64. In July, 1958, Mr. Dauti Yamba proposed a motion that the Northern Territories be allowed to secede from the Federation. He said that the bitterness of the African's feeling against federation had grown and grown. The Africans were not anti-European, but they disliked the attitude of the Europeans, who wanted to keep their superior position for ever. This was one of the reasons they did not like federation.

The Presbyterian Church

65. The Blantyre Synod of the Presbyterian Church of Central Africa meeting in July, 1958, felt it to be urgently necessary to say that it is unanimously opposed to Federation as it has been seen in practice over these years. "We see no hope of a peaceful and righteous future for all the people of this land (whatever their race) under the present form of Federal Government. It is not for us to say what the alternative should be, whether independence with its possible financial disabilities, or some new form of Federation, or a complete revision of the present form or some other course."

66. The events which followed in 1959 leading to a state of emergency in Nyasaland and to the banning of the Zambia A.N.C. in N. Rhodesia are well known. They came as a result of the continual failure of those in authority to take seriously African opposition to the Federal Government.

IV. Conclusions

"Whatever the outcome of the Monckton Commission and whatever the outcome of the 1960 conference, the British Government will not withdraw their protection from the people of Nyasaland or Northern Rhodesia until their people so desire". (Harold Macmillan at Salisbury, 16.i.60).

67. Repeated assurances, the most recent that by the Prime Minister, quoted above, have been given to the effect that Britain will not withdraw her constitutional protection from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland until the people of these territories have requested her to do so. In this Memorandum we have described the process whereby, since the original Federal proposals were drafted by the Officials' conference in 1951, Britain's power to protect has been progressively eroded. It has been eroded (a) by the weakening of the safeguards for the Africans written into the constitution, which gave Britain the final veto over legislation detrimental to African interests; (b) by the division of functions between the Federal Government and the territorial governments in such a way as to give the lion's share of the power to the Federal Government and (c) by agreements entered into with the Federal Government which transferred increasing powers direct from Britain to Salisbury. We have also described how the opposition of Africans to the Federation which was evident from the time it was first mooted, has hardened; events have fully justified their fears. Confidence in Britain has been dangerously shaken. The dilemma with which Britain is now faced is whether she can indeed continue to exercise effective protection, and restore African confidence, with the truncated powers left her, as long as Federation continues in its present form.

68. Even if continued protection were possible, grave questions must arise for the future. How can the successful transformation of colonial administrations into independent states, carried out elsewhere in Africa, be applied to territories linked in a federation, whose government is based on entirely different traditions and objectives? The first seven years of Federation have showed no closing of the gap between British policies for colonial advance and the policies of the Federal government. Whatever constitutional advances are now offered to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, how can they have any meaning as long as policies regarding such vital matters as immigration, trade and economic affairs, development plans, relations with other independent African states, etc., remain outside their control?

69. We cannot but conclude that there is a fundamental incompatibility between, on the one hand, Britain's obligations to the Protectorates and indeed the whole trend of British policy elsewhere in Africa and, on the other hand, the powers now possessed by the Federal Government.

London

February 1st 1960

Copy of a Petition to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations

From :

D. L. Yamba, R. Sokota,
H. M. Nkumbula, S. H. Chileshe,
G. Kaluma

We, the undersigned representatives of the African people of the Central African Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, having appealed to the Government of the United Kingdom against the imposition of a Federation of Central Africa by every constitutional means open to us, wish to appeal to the United Nations to consider the matter referred to in the accompanying documents in relation to the Charter of the United Nations, especially Article 73.

We declare that our lands and people were entrusted by agreement with our forebears to the Protection of her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. Among the signatories included in the attached copy of a petition to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II are direct descendants and, according to our law and custom, legal successors of those chiefs who were the original signatories of those treaties with Britain whereby our territories were entrusted to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. (Copies of some of these treaties are attached hereto.)

Our lands, according to the proposal of the Government of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, would be brought under the government of a Central African federation against our expressed wishes, after we or other representatives of the African people had been consulted by the Secretary of State of the British Government on several occasions over a number of years, and after several deputations of chiefs and people had been sent to Britain to protest against the imposition of federation.

In making this appeal to the United Nations, we would call attention to the fact that in the recent Referendum conducted in Southern Rhodesia which declared in favour of Federation, the white population numbering 128,000 had approximately 49,000 voters on the electoral roll, while the African population of 1,726,000 (of whom less than 4,000 are eligible to vote) had 429 voters on the roll. In the Legislative Councils of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, to whom the question was next referred, there are only two Africans on each council in a total membership of 23 and 18 respectively. In Northern Rhodesia these two (who are amongst the undersigned), together with the two European representatives for African interests voted and spoke strongly against the Federal Scheme. In Nyasaland, the two African members, and the Missionary member, voted against the scheme. (The populations are 35,000 Europeans, 3,200 Asians and Coloured peoples and 1,640,000 Africans in Northern Rhodesia, and 4,000 Europeans, 5,000 Asians and Coloureds and 2,430,000 Africans in Nyasaland.) In the Southern Rhodesian Parliament there is no direct representation of Africans. Thus the decision on the question of Federation has been made by legislatures in which Africans have no effectual representation though they number nearly six million of the inhabitants, and in which the overwhelming predominance is held by the white population numbering less than 200,000.

While we acknowledge the jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as the lawful protector of our lands and people through the local administration of Northern Rhodesia, we declare that we cannot consent to the transfer of any of the powers of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to a federal government such as that proposed in the Federal Scheme. We declare that Her Majesty's Government, by relinquishing any of the powers freely entrusted to it and assumed by it, would violate justice and equity and the treaties and agreements entered into with our chiefs as representatives of their people.

We believe also that the imposition of this Federal Scheme would be contrary to the United Nations Charter, especially Article 73, which contains the following undertaking:—

"Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognise the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and to this end:

- (a) to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

- (b) to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the people, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement."

From our understanding of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter we believe it would be contrary to the trust accepted through the treaties with our chiefs, and ratified by the Charter, for the United Kingdom Government to transfer its sovereignty and responsibilities in whole or in part to any other body or persons, or to give any part of its responsibilities towards the inhabitants of the Protectorate: this would apply especially to the responsibilities of the Government of the United Kingdom in connection with the political, social and educational development and aspirations of the people, their just treatment and protection from abuses, and their development towards self-government.

It is our belief that the progress of the African people in these directions would be retarded and obstructed by the proposed federation and the reinforcement of colour barriers which already exist in the political, economic and social spheres, especially in Southern Rhodesia. We have petitioned Her Majesty's Parliament in Britain to hold Her Majesty's Government to its assumed responsibility under Article 73 of the Charter and the agreements with our chiefs and people, and to the undertakings which were given regarding our protection.

We believe that if the proposed Federal Scheme for Central Africa were imposed on us the powers and responsibilities of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom towards us and our economic, social and political interests and aspirations would be vitally and adversely affected, as indeed would be the mutual good faith that has existed between Britain and the African people of Northern Rhodesia. It would also be prejudicial to good relations between ourselves and those in Central Africa who seek to bring about this federation despite our declared wishes, and, whilst claiming us as their "partners" in it, relegate us to a position of subordination to themselves.

We petitioned the United Nations, and asked her Majesty's Government to support us in this, in order that the proposed Central African federation be examined either by reference to the International Court of Justice for its advisory opinion, or by some other appropriate organ or Commission to determine whether the proposed Federation would not be contrary to equity and justice and contrary to the United Nations Charter. We ask whether it would be compatible with international law for people who have voluntarily placed themselves under the protection of the Government of the United Kingdom to be handed over, regardless of their views and expressed wishes, to the jurisdiction of another government; and for territories which are Protectorates and sacred trusts to be handed over by the Protecting and Administering Government to another government's jurisdiction, whether in whole or in part.

We believe that the grounds of our appeal are those of right and justice and the principle cherished and taught by Britain of government by consent of the governed. We appeal to the United Nations to ensure that our protection be continued under the provisions of the Charter.

If both the British Government and the United Nations fail us in our appeal that the proposed Central African federation scheme be abandoned, we shall feel constrained to ask for the partition of Northern Rhodesia in such a way as to ensure that the policy described in Article 73 of the Charter be put into practise.

Lusaka
Northern Rhodesia
20th April 1953

[The Africa Bureau also submitted as Appendix II *A petition to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II* against Federation made by Chiefs and citizens of Nyasaland, dated 1953. This published document has not been reproduced. Copies are obtainable from The Africa Bureau, 69 Great Peter Street, London, S.W.1.]

G. DICKSON

Recently the Industrial Christian Fellowship issued a tract* entitled *The Church and the Challenge of Marxism*, dealing with the nature of industrial group life in the modern world. This tract challenges more than Marxism. Perhaps it offers also new illumination to the appalling problems with which mankind in Africa is confronted today.

It quotes the central theme of Marxist doctrine regarding the power of industrial group life, but goes on to indicate that

* Not reproduced.

there is a pattern for all human group life in which the Christian motive force of helping one another can be enlisted to the full only by first of all agreeing a common objective in clear terms.

Noting how emerging nations in Africa, and elsewhere, hurry as soon as they are free to do so into membership of the International Labour Organisation, noting further that at the annual conference of the I.L.O. in Geneva whereas in pre-war days it was easy to spot a black face it is now just as easy to spot a white one, we also note the nobility of the agreed common objective of the I.L.O. which is composed of very ordinary representatives of Employers, Trades Unionists and Governments, including those from Marxist nations. They have agreed:

"all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity;

the attainment of the conditions in which this shall be possible must constitute the central aim of national and international policy;

all national and international policies and measures, in particular those of an economic and financial character, should be judged in this light and accepted only insofar as they may be held to promote and not to hinder this fundamental objective."

In pursuit of this fundamental objective it is also agreed every nation must first of all commit itself to organise and manage its industrial group life to secure satisfactory full employment and a rising standard of living. This is the key.

The tract explains how Industrial Group Life occurs when the equally important interests of Consumers, Investors (state or private), and the People on the Payroll are mutually involved, and explains how the general purpose of all industrial group life is simply Trade and Employment. It also points out in good modern management practice trade targets must be set and achieved to secure the fullest possible use of the available employment resources of man-power and investment. It seems obvious, therefore, the objective towards which trade and employment targets are directed should be agreed by all concerned if a peaceful life is to be realised as the by-product of synthesised economic conflict.

At this present juncture in Africa, where (1) unity in Religious or Ideological Group Life is remote, (2) unity and harmony in Political Group Life is almost non-existent, I suggest there might be (3) practical and immediate progress towards unity through a better understanding of the nature and the essential good management requirements of Industrial Group Life as it is now presented by the techniques of mass-production, mass-investment and mass-distribution which are the inevitable development from the invention of the power unit that started the industrial revolution.

It is possible some employers in Africa, particularly in the Copperbelt, who are in close touch with I.L.O. struggles could soon share this view if they understood the reason and pattern behind it as indicated in the Industrial Christian Fellowship tract. Mr. Jack Thompson of the Rhodesian Selection Trust Group, with whom I have discussed this, is the type of man who might be encouraged to give useful industrial group leadership at this stage, since he has just sold his house in London and returned to take up permanent residence again in Lusaka in the future of which he believes devoutly.

Recommendation

The leadership required must be able to get set up in each of the three "federated" countries a National Trade and Employment Council composed of acceptable representation of Employers, Trades Unionists and Government on I.L.O. lines. When that is done, and perhaps as a lever to see it is done, there should be the prospect of councils in varying stages until, maybe before long, there could be hope of one all-Africa Trade and Employment Council representing employers, trade unionists and governments of all kinds from the Mediterranean to the Cape. Undoubtedly this will be difficult, but with a clear cut purpose held to the level of Industrial Group Life and agreement only, it should be a much more likely achievement than seems usefully possible by other means, if past history is anything to go by.

The purpose of these national, and international, Trade and Employment Councils would be to supervise and generally approve the setting and achieving of Trade and Employment Targets:

- (a) Geographically
- (b) Functionally.

On page 11 of the Industrial Christian Fellowship tract there is rightly trying to do with the British National Production is reference to what the T.U.C. in Britain in its fumbling way Advisory Council for Industry. It perhaps doesn't matter how we fumble in Britain; our six hundred years of democratic political group life conditioning will probably save us in time. But, in nations where there has been no such political group life conditioning, the urgency of this Trade and Employment Council management approach to the setting and achieving of *agreed* Trade and Employment Targets is desperate.

Perhaps, as two refined samples of what might be done in Africa to-day, the Commission could be referred to basic spadework tested successfully in the Medway Towns (as indicated in the little booklet enclosed—and which was born out of Clydeside experience in the twenties when our political conditioning alone saved the situation from violent civil war) and in the unique Wool Textile Industry Working Party report in which page 54 gives the clue.*

Incidentally, John Pears, senior partner of the famous Chartered Accountants, Cooper Bros., who, I understand, supervise some estimating and accountancy techniques for the World Bank (viz.: Volta, Kariba, Indus Waters, etc.) might give valuable evidence and advice on this matter. He was a key figure in the Wool Working Party, and his knowledge is invaluable concerning the nature of modern industrial group life.

Further copies of the *Church and the Challenge of Marxism* tract can be obtained from the Reverend Stephan Hopkinson, General Director, Industrial Christian Fellowship, 195, New Kent Road, London, S.E.2.

Dartford

Kent

20th April 1960

DUBLIN STREET BAPTIST CHURCH YOUTH FELLOWSHIP

1. The two Northern Territories are Protectorates of the United Kingdom, and as such should in all fairness be given the opportunity of accepting or rejecting Federation, as laid down in section (d) of the Preamble in the Federal Act. We hope that the African Representative Council for Northern Rhodesia and the three Provincial Councils for Nyasaland will be regarded as representatives of the African opinion in these two territories.

2. There should be no development allowed in the direction of Dominion status for the Federation without the full support of the majority of the adult or tax-paying inhabitants. This is in direct accordance with the Democratic Rights of the Citizens of this country.

3. It is essential that African opinion should be fully represented at the Review Conference this year. Truly representative Africans should form more than 50% of the delegations from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

4. We are appalled at the lack of Justice shown to the Africans in Nyasaland arrested and imprisoned during the State of Emergency who are still detained without any trial. This is an obvious indication of the danger to the Basic Human Rights of the African inhabitants shown by the Federation as it is at present constituted.

We recommend that the Conference should demand the immediate public trial, or release, of these detainees.

Edinburgh

24th January 1960

EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY LABOUR CLUB

R. W. Thompson—Secretary

I am writing to you on behalf of the Edinburgh University Labour Club to forward to you a resolution taken at our opening meeting of the Lent term, on the future of the Central African Federation. The meeting was addressed by the Reverend Kenneth MacKenzie, Secretary of the Church of Scotland's Council on African Affairs. We would therefore, respectfully forward this resolution to you:—

Recalling our obligations as British Citizens responsible for good government administration, and peace in the territories of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, we recommend to the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland that a plebiscite be held to obtain the views of all adult inhabi-

* These documents are not reproduced.

tants, irrespective of race, as to whether a federal form of government be retained or abandoned.

26th January 1960

FABIAN COMMONWEALTH BUREAU

The Committee of the Fabian Commonwealth Bureau wishes to present the enclosed pamphlet *Central Africa: The Economics of Inequality*,* as evidence to the Monckton Commission. The author, Mrs. Shirley Williams, is an economist and the General Secretary of the Fabian Society. We believe that the facts set out in this pamphlet may be of value to the Commission in their consideration of the economic benefits of Federation.

London

26th May 1960

A RESIDENT OF GLASGOW†

At the end of February in Edinburgh, the Christian Youth Assembly expressed its concern for the black Africans, especially in the territories of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as the majority of these people are opposed to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and have not been given the right to secede. As the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Federation in Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Youth Assembly, as a body, may have made recommendations to you. However, I would like to make known the views that, in the event of some sort of Federal Association between the three territories being retained:—

- (1) No more power be given away from the territories to the Federal Government until there is a representative African majority in the Legislative Councils of the two Northern Territories.
- (2) There should be no move at the 1960 Conference in the direction of Dominion status or independence for the Federation.
- (3) There should be a date set for a complete review of the decisions of the Conference.
- (4) Britain should keep and employ her right of veto in terms of the Southern Rhodesia Letters Patent (1923).
- (5) Some safeguard similar to, but stronger and more independent than, the African Affairs Board should be retained.
- (6) The United Kingdom should keep her powers in terms of the Colonial Laws Validity Act in respect of the Federation.
- (7) The Federal capital should be moved from Salisbury, as the Federal Parliament and Southern Rhodesian Parliament are within fifty yards of each other (cf. Washington in Columbia and Canberra).

I expect the work of the Commission has been strenuous, but I hope not too exhausting, and the members of it have been in the thoughts of many young people at this time.

4th April 1960

C. H. HAMILTON

1. If by referendum the majority of the adult population of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia show that they oppose Federation, Federation should not be retained. The right to secede from Federation should be recognised and appear on the agenda for the Review Conference to be held in November 1960, at which half the delegates should be Africans and chosen by the Governors thus:

In Nyasaland, from nominations sent by the Malawi Congress;

in Northern Rhodesia from nominations sent by the African National Congress and the United National Independence Party.

2. Should Federation be retained:

No step towards the independence of the Federation should be made.

* This publication has not been reproduced. Copies are obtainable from the Fabian Commonwealth Bureau, 11 Dartmouth Street, London, S.W.1.

† Name withheld at the request of the witness.

A stronger African Affairs Board should be instituted. Britain must retain her rights under the Colonial Laws Validity Act whereby she can veto the passing of Legislation in the Federation.

3. Britain should retain her right to veto certain aspects of native affairs in Southern Rhodesia.

Edinburgh

25th January 1960

P. G. H. HOPKINS

Note on Mr. Dunduzu K. Chisiza

Mr. D. K. Chisiza has now been in Gwelo prison, Southern Rhodesia, since March, as a result of the emergency regulations in Nyasaland. He now has a young baby son whom he has not yet seen because of his imprisonment.

I realise that the evidence of one man who knew Mr. Chisiza whilst he was in England cannot seem of very great importance; but I think it only fair to write about him, since the probability is that evidence of other people who knew him much less will be taken into account and also since the Devlin Report makes one or two slightly distorted statements about him. For example, in paragraph 48 we read: "Mr. Chisiza was brought back from England, where he had gone to begin a university course, in order to fill the office of Secretary General. Dr. Banda accepts the comment . . . that 'In choosing his colleagues he ignored the older, more experienced and more moderate leaders and took on the younger, more volatile and extreme people' . . . he found it necessary from time to time to curb the excesses of youth."

There is given here a clear impression of hot-headed, extreme young men, unwilling to use constitutional means where they are available. When such statements are combined with later comments regarding the alleged "murder-plot" and the addiction to violence of Dr. Banda's lieutenants, an atmosphere may be created in which we in England feel ready to believe that the suspension of Habeas Corpus and the normal rights of the British subject is justified.

I would therefore like to place on record the following facts:

1. That Dunduzu K. Chisiza came to Fircroft College in September 1957 for a one-year course of social studies with excellent references from Mr. Ernest Bader and Mr. Guy Clifton-Brock.

2. That I was his Warden and personal tutor from September 1957 to July 1958.

3. That I soon formed a very high opinion of his intellectual capacities and that by November I was convinced that he was capable of going on to a British university for an Honours Degree in Economics.

4. That when we discussed this possibility together he was strongly inclined to try for this so that he would be better qualified to serve Nyasaland later, but that after further discussion, we agreed that he would probably feel guilty to be pursuing abstract academic studies during the crucial period for his country. He decided to return to Nyasaland at the end of the year.

5. That he therefore returned to Nyasaland in the normal way at the end of his one-year course and took up duties as General Secretary of the Nyasaland African National Congress. Thus "brought back" seems to be a misleading phrase.

I would also like to place on record the following carefully considered opinions:—

(a) That, from our frequent discussions about the future of Nyasaland, I am convinced that his aim on return was to work peacefully and constitutionally for the ending of Federation and the restoration of full Protectorate status for Nyasaland, in the hope of independence being granted after a few more years.

(b) That he had a dedicated but constructive approach to Nyasaland's problems and was opposed to violence both temperamentally and on the commonsense grounds that violence cannot succeed (see paragraph 173 of the Devlin Report).

(c) That in his year here, living in a small, close community, he was one of the most thoughtful, level-headed and fair-minded students and was always popular with and respected by his fellows and the staff.

(d) That Dunduzu Chisiza is the sort of man who eventually will make a humane, moderate and constructive leader for his country if only he is given the chance.

Since his imprisonment he has continued his studies and he has asked for and received from us *Economic Development* by Meier and Baldwin ; *Colonial Social Accounting* by Deane ; *Home and Foreign Investment 1870-1913* by Cairncross ; and *The Industrialisation of Backward Areas* by Mandelbaum. He will digest these and he will understand them—hardly the expected prison-reading for a “young and volatile extremist”.

- (e) That his continued imprisonment without trial is
- (i) a lamentable waste of his qualities of intelligent and principled leadership—qualities which are bound to be scarce in any colonial territory ;
 - (ii) a violation of all the rules of political common sense and of human justice. (It is perhaps ironical that Mr. Chisiza was very fond of reading to his fellow students the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. This fact came back to me very forcibly when I read the last sentences of paragraph 255 of the Devlin Report.)

Fircroft College
Birmingham

THE HOUSE GUILD OF ST. COLM'S COLLEGE

Miss J. M. Watson

The House Guild of this College, which has so many historic links with Central Africa, wishes to record its unanimous support of the undermentioned recommendations, recently adopted by the 1960 Christian Youth Assembly, concerning Central Africa.

- (i) That no more power be given away from the Territories to the Federal Government until there is a representative African majority in the Legislative Councils of the two Northern Territories.
- (ii) That there should be no move at the 1960 Conference in the direction of Dominion Status or Independence for the Federation.
- (iii) That there should be a date set for a complete review of the decisions of the Conference.
- (iv) That the territories of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be given the opportunity to secede from the Federation through the instrument of plebiscite of all tax-paying citizens.
- (v) That all African opinions should be represented at the 1960 Conference.
- (vi) That (Dr. Banda and other) political detainees should either be released or brought to trial on specific charges.

Furthermore, as a College, we respectfully recommend that if in the end it is agreed that some form of Federal association should go forward, that the following arrangements be secured at the 1960 Conference :

- (i) That there should be no move in the direction of independence for the Federation.
- (ii) That Great Britain should keep and employ her right of veto on the terms of the 1923 Southern Rhodesian Letters Patent.
- (iii) That some safeguard similar to, but stronger and more independent than, the African Affairs Board, should be retained.
- (iv) That the United Kingdom should keep her powers in terms of the Colonial Laws Validity Act in respect of the Federation.
- (v) That no more powers should be transferred from the Territories to the Federal Government until there is a representative African majority in the Legislative Councils of the two Northern Territories.
- (vi) That no more powers should be transferred from the United Kingdom to Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia until there are truly representative African majorities in their respective Legislatures, which are recognised as such by the majority of the people.
- (vii) That there should be provision for a review or revision of any new constitution agreed upon.

In addition, we would urge that the Federal Capital should be moved from Salisbury, for example to Lusaka, because of its association in the minds of the African coloured people with the Government of Southern Rhodesia.

We recognise that Her Majesty's Government initially acted

in what they believed to be the best interests of the territories of Central Africa, but we believe that the system initiated in 1953 has failed to completely fulfil expectations. Recalling our duties in connection with the preservation of peace and good government within the Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, we therefore make the above recommendations based on the Christian principles which form the basis of British government. We pray God's Blessing on you in the difficult task of applying such principles in the present situation in Central Africa.

Edinburgh
April 1960

MRS. G. HOWARD

1. The lack of equal opportunity for the African. This is caused chiefly by the determination of the British artisan not to allow the Native to learn the most simple of crafts. This was confirmed when I engaged a Native to paint some poles in the garden. Within an hour a Foreman from the building site on the opposite side of the road came across and said that unless I stopped the Native from doing this work, all the white men on his site would come out on strike. He added “We are here to do the painting and the Nigger to hold the can”.

2. The underpayment of the Native for his labour. The Native Chef employed at the flats where I worked was as good as any I had in London at a weekly wage of £20. The wage of the Native Chef was £8 per month and he had a wife and four children to keep.

On the other hand the English artisan is grossly overpaid. For a 48 hour week Painters get £48 and Plasterers £52.

3. The houses that have been built at the Native Settlement outside Salisbury which the Natives are encouraged to buy are of outrageously shoddy quality. The weekly or monthly payment on the houses keeps the Native in a constant state of poverty, and by the time he will have paid for it, the house will be a ruin.

4. I was shocked beyond words at the way the English settlers of all classes think nothing of striking their Native employees at the slightest provocation. I have seen boys knocked to the floor or kicked across a room just because they were not walking fast enough with a tray of drinks. Our Night Porter at the flats was knocked down by my employer and had his face badly cut because he had turned the key in the Front Door after 1 a.m. on my instructions. His chair was beside the door so no Resident was kept waiting who wished to enter. I had been forced to make this rule to keep the English people, who had wine and dined too well in Salisbury from forcing their way in and demanding rooms for the night because they did not want to drive back to their own homes. As much as I deplore the striking of the Native, it is the fact that they have no redress against these people without losing their jobs that is so disgraceful. And unemployment to the Native means hunger.

5. I found the British Pioneer type, who chiefly live in the country, good employers. This in most cases is because he is a Farmer and fully aware that he is absolutely dependent for his living on Native labour. In the towns, however, it is not the case, and the advantages of low taxation, cheap Gin, cigarettes and servants has attracted the most undesirable type of white settler.

6. I found the average Native keen and quick to learn any new type of work. This reaction only occurs if one leads them. The Native as you know is a nervous creature, and the usual method of driving them only creates a sort of mental paralysis.

All the white settler does at the moment is to till the ground for the Agitator to sow his seeds of hatred and fear.

The above points I have set out seem to endorse the fact that the whole attitude of the White people towards the Native is wrong. The majority of White people have no desire or intention of improving the lot of the Native, as it is not in their interests to do so.

It is quite apparent from contact with the Native that they fear the handing over of their future destiny by Westminster to the Federation. This fear is quite natural because they know that they then will be at the mercy of the local White man whose general outlook towards them is reflected by the incidents described above.

May I send my best wishes to all Members of the African Commission.

25th January 1960

THE JOINT EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN BOARD

1. By its constitution and membership The Joint East and Central African Board is primarily concerned with the agricultural, commercial and industrial development of the territories, and therefore with security and good government, rather than with constitutional details.

In published statements of policy* our Board has, however, stated that it must have regard to the effects which politics may have upon the progress of East and Central Africa as a whole and that it firmly believes that the future pattern of development lies along the path of regional grouping. Thus it is for both economic and political reasons that it has supported the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland and the evolution of the East Africa High Commission.

2. We consider that the continuance and strengthening of the Federal association would be in the interests of the majority of the inhabitants of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, subject to such readjustments as may be made in the light of the report of the Monckton Commission, and we believe that in this way alone can be achieved that development of economic resources which is essential for the uplifting of the social and educational standards of the people and the true fulfilment of African aspirations. We would indeed go further and say that Nyasaland could not possibly survive as a separate unit, and that Southern Rhodesia, if it did survive, could only do so on the basis of a reduced standard of living. In the case of Nyasaland the question would be as to who in future would finance her ever-increasing demands on others to raise and even to maintain her existing standard of life.

3. On the question of viability the Commission will already have received evidence of the extent to which the creation of this new regional grouping in 1953 established a new field for foreign investment, which has been proved credit-worthy for World Bank loans. Progress has been spectacular in the last six years. The first major Federal project—the Kariba Dam and Hydro-Electric Scheme—has been successfully inaugurated, and we are expecting a new era of industrial expansion to begin, providing political stability is assured.

4. In the constitutional sphere we believe that if surrender to the present popular clamour for "one man, one vote" is ruled out, and if intimidation is controlled by the forces of law and order, many Africans in the three territories will cooperate in the gradual evolution of a non-racial form of government and administration. Much can be learnt from a close study of the African indigenous systems. One of the fundamental issues to be considered is whether stable government in these countries is possible if an elected Legislature has control over the Executive (responsibility of Cabinet to Parliament on the Westminster model). This has not proved suitable in many countries and only its modification has restored stability in France, Pakistan, Sudan and Ghana. Undoubtedly the desire of the Africans in the Federation is the immediate opportunity of expressing their views and a wider share in the election of their representatives. Given wider representation they might then be content to leave more decisions with the Executive.

5. This leads on to the fundamental questions of security and sound administration, on which the Board lays the greatest emphasis. Over a very large area of the continent south of the Sahara power is being surrendered by European Governments to popularly elected African governments. In the case of independent states there will be no external guarantees of the existing frontiers, or even of the safety of tribes in their present areas. Defence and the maintenance of internal law and order must in the future loom large in each self-governing zone. This aspect cannot be ignored when considering the future of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. The present Federation is viable, capable of undertaking its own defence and of manning an efficient civil service.

6. It seems to the Board that independence in the Federal sphere is not necessarily incompatible with the continuation of the Protectorate status of the Northern Territories.

7. The Board recognises the unpopularity of Southern Rhodesia in the eyes of the Africans of the Northern Territories, and we appreciate that this is the main cause of the present hostility to any form of association. It seems to us, however, that the powers reserved to the Territorial Govern-

* A publication by the Board entitled *Race Relations in Industry and Commerce* which was also submitted as an annexure to this memorandum has not been reproduced. Copies are obtainable from Joint East and Central African Board, 25 Victoria Street London, S.W.1.

ments already afford considerable scope for responsible self-government, and that, if it is considered necessary, these powers could be extended in certain fields, notably the administration of the Health Service. Experience in the use of these powers by Africans in office should convince them that in matters reserved to the Territories they cannot be interfered with by a Federal Government. It is a fact also that the Southern Rhodesian Government has been and is pursuing an enlightened policy of steady African advancement of which the fruits are already in evidence. For example, facilities for African education and gainful employment are already better than in the Northern Territories.

In spite, however, of what has already been done in this respect, the Board feels strongly that the main danger to the continuance of the Federation remains the fear of Southern Rhodesia. We would in fact assert that its future depends to an overwhelming extent on the capacity and willingness of Southern Rhodesia to go ahead fast enough in the removal of all that remains of racial discrimination. The Board has consistently striven to influence public opinion to support liberal policies, as is indicated by its pamphlet on *Race Relations in Industry and Commerce* (copy attached).

In this respect we are certain that the business community can make as great a contribution as the Government. For instance, it is vitally important that Africans at all levels, including especially graduates from Salisbury University, should be able to obtain employment in accordance with their qualifications. We should welcome a reference to this important matter in the Commission's report.

8. The Board would ask the Commission to take into consideration the hostile propaganda directed against the Federation during its early critical years. Some of this propaganda has been directed against the continuance of British influence in Africa. There is already strong evidence from such territories as the Congo and Guinea that the premature withdrawal of Western control leaves a vacuum that may be very quickly filled by other non-African powers.

9. In conclusion the Board submits that there is no quick or easy road to solve the complex human problems raised in acute form in a multi-racial society. It would be a great error to assume that because political power in the West Indies and West Africa has been transferred to African hands without ill effects, therefore the same would be true in Central Africa at this moment. Conditions are quite different. West Indians and West Africans have been in contact with Western influences for centuries and have attended Universities in large numbers for several generations. Those countries contain a body of men steeped in the traditions and disciplines of the Law and other professions. In all Central Africa the overall total number of African University graduates is less than 200 (probably less than 100) and those all date since about 1948.

If serious racialism is to be avoided in the two Northern Protectorates the protecting power must retain control long enough to build up an educated body of Africans serving in a wide variety of professions and capable of competing on merit with Europeans in at least the lower and medium grade posts in the public service. At the same time the reorganisation of Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service in such a way as to encourage the senior civil servants in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to remain after the transfer of power, and to guarantee a worthwhile career to those now entering the Service, is a matter of vital importance. Any transfer of executive power to an African majority before that stage is reached will only result in a breakdown in administration, a major setback in economic development and enforced curtailment of education without which there can be no true progress.

At all costs law and order must be maintained, and those responsible for governing must be assured of the full support of the Home Government.

10. To sum up, the Board recommends:—

- I. That on counts of general viability (i.e. defence, economics and administration) the Federation of the three territories must continue.
- II. In order that African assent may be assured
 - (a) The Governments of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be developed as rapidly as possible towards responsible self-government on non-racial lines with a maximum of African participation, and
 - (b) The Southern Rhodesian Government and business community must convince the Africans that they intend to make a reality of partnership.

III. In order that European assent may be assured it must be made clear that increased African participation in Government will not endanger the continuance of sound administration, and the maintenance of present standards of integrity and skill in all fields.

IV. The Board lays the greatest emphasis on the maintenance of law and order in the Northern Territories during the period of transition. So long as Her Majesty's Government remains responsible for the Protectorates the Governors must govern firmly, and must be seen to have the full support of the Home Government.

London.

[With reference to the above memorandum by the Joint East and Central African Board a letter was subsequently received from Mr. Austen Albu, M.P., a member of the Board, to say that he had not seen the memorandum before its submission to the Commission and that he believed that it was never discussed by the Council of the Board.

Mr. Albu, for his part, disagreed with the recommendation contained in paragraph 10 (I) of the memorandum. He did not believe that Federation was the only means by which the economic resources of the territories could be developed in the interests of their populations].

J. H. LASCELLES

This Submission is made solely in my private capacity and is an expression of my personal views alone.

Autobiographical note

I am presently Resident Director (London) of the Indonesian Selection Trust Group of Companies. From July 1953 to March of this year I was Executive Vice-President and a Director of the Group first in Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia, and from May 1955, in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia. I have investments in the Group and in other concerns operating in Rhodesia and from October 1954 until March of this year I was a property owner in Salisbury. During my time in Rhodesia I was also a Director of the Rhodesian Iron & Steel Company Ltd. and of Chilanga Cement Ltd., and an Alternative Director of Wankie Colliery Company Ltd. I was in addition a member of the Diocesan Standing Committee of the Anglican Church in Mashonaland.

Before joining the Group in January, 1951, I served from April 1956 (apart from the war years) with the British Iron & Steel Federation, London, latterly in the capacity of Assistant Secretary. During the war I held appointments in the rank of Colonel as (*inter alia*) Secretary of the Middle East Defence Committee in Cairo and as Head of the Inter-Service and Political Secretariat on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean. From May, 1945 to June, 1946, I served in the Economic Division of the Control Commission for Germany as a Deputy Controller-General in the Metallurgy Branch.

Introduction

1. It is believed that the Commission would wish any submission purporting to help it in its work to attempt to answer the following questions, on the basis of a correct interpretation of the Commission's terms of reference:—

- (1) What are the basic needs of the three federated territories?
- (2) What are the main current factors affecting the provision of those needs?
- (3) To what extent can constitutional changes remove or alleviate adverse factors and advance favourable factors?

The Terms of Reference

2. It is noted that the Commission is required to prepare advice "on the constitutional programme and framework best suited to the achievement of the objects contained in the Constitution of 1953, including the Preamble". In amplifying this, the Prime Minister claimed in the House of Commons on November 24th, 1959, that the Commission's terms of reference would enable it "to consider the whole field of the redistribution of powers in either direction between the Federation and the territories and to advise on the timing of any programme and the character of any changes in the framework that it may suggest". He also said that he regarded the Commission "as free, in practice, to hear all points of view from whatever quarter and on whatever subject"—but he added: "It will, of course, be for the Commission to decide what use to make of the material which reaches them".

3. It is clearly to be inferred from the Preamble to the

Federal Constitution that a principal object of that Constitution is to foster "partnership and co-operation" between the inhabitants of the federating territories, and that it is this object in particular which their association in a Federation is designed to achieve. The Preamble also declares (*inter alia*) that the three federating territories "are the rightful home of all lawful inhabitants thereof, whatever their origin".

4. It may therefore be assumed that the Commission's advice—

- (1) will aim at improving the prospect of "partnership and co-operation" between Africans and Europeans in the territories,
- (2) will endeavour to enhance the status of the territories as a "home" for their inhabitants, of whatever race,
- (3) will be confined to constitutional measures designed to achieve these objects.

5. However, because the operation of the federal constitution must be materially affected by whatever constitutional arrangements operate in the territories, the Commission will no doubt find it necessary to refer in their report to some aspects of the territorial constitutions. Territorial franchise conditions, and the composition of the territorial legislatures and executives, may in particular be expected to have important repercussions in the federal sphere.

The Basic Needs

6. Apart from the freedoms usually associated with British political philosophy, the main needs of the territories today may be stated as:—

- (1) Security of persons and property.
- (2) Security from foreign encroachment.
- (3) Economic development.
- (4) The narrowing of the political, economic, cultural and social gaps between black and white.
- (5) Maintenance (and enhancement) of the spiritual, moral and material standards of value appropriate to "western civilisation".

7. Internal and external security requires good, firm and consistent government both locally and, so far as applicable, from the United Kingdom. Economic development requires in particular the creation of a climate favourable to investment from beyond the federal borders. The narrowing of the gap between black and white requires in particular the more extensive and intensive education of the African, and the creation for him of employment opportunities appropriate to his education. Maintenance of standards will require that white leadership and influence should continue to predominate for some years to come.

8. Conflict between these needs will occasionally arise. Freedom of speech and movement will not always be consistent with the maintenance of security. The too rapid political advance of the African may prematurely eclipse European leadership. One of the chief problems of government will be to maintain at all times an intelligent and flexible balance between the various requirements. It is important that constitutional arrangements should be such as to facilitate the solution of this problem.

Current factors to be taken into account

9. In determining how constitutional modifications can best contribute to the pursuit of the basic needs a number of current factors must be taken into account. Some of these represent important obstacles in the path of progress: others give some indication of the lines along which limited progress may be possible. The following are among the chief factors concerned:—

- (1) It is not generally appreciated that the Federal Constitution is unique in human history. Never before has an attempt been made to federate units of disparate constitutional status whose constitutional relationship after Federation, both with each other and with the Federal Government, has differed and some of which have retained close ties with an outside Government having only a relatively tenuous connection with the Federal Government. The wonder is, not that this imaginative exercise in institutional ingenuity should be showing signs of strain, but that it should have succeeded to the extent it has.

- (2) There are strong economic and financial reasons for concluding that each federated territory would be weaker on its own than it would be if it continued in association with the other two.
- (3) Internal and external security in the area as a whole would be considerably more difficult to maintain if each territory had to deal with the problem completely on its own.
- (4) In so far as African opinion is vocal in the two northern territories, it is expressed overwhelmingly against the continuance of Federation.
- (5) Much of the support claimed in the federated territories by Africans who purport to express African opinion is obtained by methods summed up in the word "intimidation".
- (6) There is little appreciation among Africans of how Federation works, what it means, or the benefits it brings. On the contrary, there is much widely canvassed misconception. It is frequently said that Federation means domination of the northern Africans by Southern Rhodesian "white settlers". This appears to be widely believed, but is palpably untrue.
- (7) Similarly, while the words "Freedom" and "Independence" are frequently spoken on African platforms, there is little understanding among Africans of their meaning or implications and no recognition of the considerable degree of freedom—from famine, from disease, from war and slavery—already achieved.
- (8) The views expressed by certain African leaders in the northern territories on the economic and financial implications of independence are completely out of touch with reality.
- (9) Political advance in Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Tanganyika, the Belgian Congo and the former French African territories has led to a conviction in the minds of some African Rhodesians and Nyasalanders that political advance for the African in the federated territories is much too slow and that Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are already capable of governing these territories.
- (10) There are as yet no Africans holding important administrative posts in any of the four governments concerned.
- (11) Those who purport to express African opinion in the federated territories are strongly in favour of a political franchise based on adult suffrage. Yet enrolled African voters are presently a fraction of those entitled to enrol.
- (12) On the European side, the number of those who favour accelerated African advancement in the political field is small in relation to the total electorate.
- (13) There is widespread European opposition to the advance of the African in the industrial and economic field.
- (14) There is marked European reluctance to meet Africans or to understand their hopes, fears, and problems.
- (15) There is little European understanding of the tide of events in Africa.
- (16) There is a conviction among many Europeans in positions of authority and influence that the African can be denied real political power, if not indefinitely, at any rate for the next ten years at least.
- (17) European support for the continuance of Federation is by no means unanimous. In particular, a section of the Southern Rhodesian electorate which at present may well constitute a majority appears to be in favour of secession, and there is considerable resentment among Northern Rhodesian Europeans of the failure of Federation to bring them either political security or increased industrial development.
- (18) There exists a widespread feeling in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland that the administration of the Federal Government has been over-centralised, that there has been too little devolution of authority, and that territorial representations are given too little weight and are too often unreasonably over-ruled or ignored.
- (19) There is widespread and deep resentment among most Europeans in the federated territories at the opinions on federal affairs expressed in certain quarters in the United Kingdom. It is felt that an increasing number of people in the United Kingdom are coming to believe

that the African is always right and the European always wrong.

- (20) There is also a widespread European feeling that the Government of the day in the United Kingdom is too much influenced by British "left wing" opinion and that it is unlikely to give proper weight to the interests of Europeans in the federated territories. Rightly or wrongly, they regard the new constitutional arrangements in Kenya as an indication of this.

10. It is doubtful whether anyone with current knowledge of Rhodesia and Nyasaland would seriously question the validity of any of these statements. In combination, they reveal how wide and deep is the present gulf between African and European attitudes. It should be said, however, that in so far as they relate to European opinion, many of the statements have a quantitative rather than a qualitative significance. There is an important minority of Europeans whose views are not so limited. Nevertheless, it is in current conditions the quantitative aspects that counts politically: while liberalism is slowly broadening its base and strengthening its hold, it would be some years before Governments depending on European votes could afford to take a liberal lead at a pace fast enough to appear adequate even to the less vociferous moderate Africans.

11. On the African side, there is good ground for believing that the opinions expressed by those who purport to represent African views are in fact not widely held, but that much of the apparent support for them is based on intimidation. Many responsible Africans value the presence of the white man and appreciate the importance of not driving him away. The gap between these "moderates" and European liberal opinion can probably be bridged without too great difficulty, at any rate in theory. It is important to realise, however, that the recent disturbances in the Copperbelt, and in particular the death of a European woman following a brutal incendiary attack on her and her two young daughters, have not only exacerbated European extremists but have also temporarily halted the spread of liberal thought and probably in many cases reversed the liberal trend. Unfortunately, the fate of Mrs. Burton is likely to be long remembered, and there are many who will feel it their business to keep the incident alive.

Possible Constitutional Changes

12. The general conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is that the differences between Africans and Europeans are of such a kind that they appear unlikely to be composed to any important extent by constitutional changes. Majority European opinion will not willingly concede political dominance to the African: but the African extremist will not be content with less. Even if constitutional changes acceptable to European liberals and African moderates were effected, there would remain a lack of mutual confidence and a general absence of necessary goodwill between the races. What is required above all on both sides is a period of strong, wise and imaginative leadership of a kind which has not yet appeared in the Federation.

13. Nevertheless, although with goodwill and the capacity to give and take on either side, the present Constitution might be regarded as fully adequate to permit the growth of the "partnership and co-operation" between races for which it was established, circumstances are now such that it would be politically most unwise to leave matters as they are. The advantages of continued close association between the three territories, both from the security angle and, even more important, in the economic and financial fields, are too great to discard. On the other hand, it appears very desirable to bring the sources of administrative decisions closer to the individual and to place at a greater distance the federal concept to which African opinion in the north appears to object so strongly. It is also important that the African should soon be given a considerably greater political say than he has at present.

14. The first of these requirements calls for administrative decentralisation and the loosening of federal bonds. The following five steps are advocated:—

- (1) delegation to the territories of all taxing powers,
- (2) the creation of an Inter-Territorial Development Fund to be under the direction and control of the central government,
- (3) removal of the federal power to legislate in the "concurrent" field, and the renaming of the "Concurrent" as the "Territorial" List,
- (4) transfer to the Territorial List of all subjects other than those required for the direction of economic and financial policy and those whose administration cannot reasonably be conducted on other than a collective basis,

(5) change of the present name "Federation of Rhodesia & Nyasaland" to (for example) "The Associated States of Rhodesia & Nyasaland".

15. So far as steps (1) and (2) are concerned, for any real transfer of power to the territories it is important that the territorial governments should themselves be the sole taxing authorities. It should be possible to provide for quinquennial assessments of amounts to be contributed on an equitable basis by each territory to finance the central government—there has already been an agreed review of the proportions to be drawn by each territory from the Federal Exchequer. Because the "taxability" of the three territories is notably disparate, it is necessary to provide a central fund into which the more affluent would pay and from which all, but especially the less affluent, would draw—Northern Rhodesia already indirectly subsidises Nyasaland and, in most years, Southern Rhodesia. This fund would most suitably be devoted to the development work in the three territories and might be operated in conjunction with the Loan Council. Through it the central government would continue to control and direct the economic development of the area—an important requirement for the attraction of overseas investment.

16. As regards steps (3) and (4), the transfer of subjects from the Federal List is not likely in practice to be so easy as it may appear at first sight. Only those with intimate knowledge of the practical working of the Federal administration are likely to be able to make valid suggestions. However, there would appear to be a "prima facie" case for the reversion of, for example, Health and Prisons to territorial control. Also, it would appear that all Agriculture (other than research) and all primary, secondary and technical Education (but not "higher" education) might be handled territorially—there seems little logic, in associated multi-racial states, in placing African Education and Agriculture under territorial governments and European Education and Agriculture under the central government. Each subject should surely be regarded as indivisible. Control of posts and telegraphs, broadcasting, trunk roads, railways and civil aviation would clearly need to remain with the central government. Apart from economic and financial policy (which must remain centralised if overseas investment is to be attracted and most effectively used), defence and foreign affairs, the essential role of the central government should, it is suggested, be to handle only those subjects which provide common services to two or more of the territories.

17. On this basis, the future relationship between the centre and the territories would be such as to justify a change of name, a step which appears important as helping to reconcile Africans in Northern Rhodesia & Nyasaland to continued association with Southern Rhodesia. These five steps in conjunction should go far to meet the reasonable wishes of the northern Africans, and they would probably be generally acceptable to European opinion.

18. The most important requirement, however, is to introduce a real measure of political advancement for the African, while at the same time maintaining European leadership and allaying European fears. It seems inevitable that Africans will continue to press for the adoption of the principle "one man, one vote". They will be content with less in the short run only if they can see its full adoption as a certainty in the long run. Where political immaturity is likely to continue to be widespread for many years, and where advanced industrial, commercial and financial techniques are making their revolutionary impact on communities, large sections of which are bound to remain primitive for the foreseeable future, the adoption of this principle is unreasonable if the vote is used for *direct* election to the legislatures. It must be remembered that adult suffrage for this purpose is of comparatively recent origin even in countries with a strong Western European tradition and a long history of relative political maturity. It can be argued that it is not without grave faults, particularly when exercised under the influence of modern propaganda techniques and in the complexities of the atomic age. On the other hand, restricted suffrage creates political demands which are a source of constant friction. Property qualifications are unsatisfactory in an age when currency values are unstable, and particularly in Rhodesian racial conditions. Literacy qualifications depend on devising a reasonable measure—and definition—of literacy, and are not immune from unfair administration.

19. A possible solution in the circumstances of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which enjoys an unusual piece of constitutional mechanism and is composed of unusual communities, might be to adopt a system of *indirect* voting. Under such a system election to the legislatures would be by electoral

"colleges", but election to the colleges themselves could well be by adult suffrage. The general principles governing the composition of the colleges and the numbers returned to the legislatures by each might be laid down in the constitutions, but to ensure the necessary flexibility in detail there would need to be a permanent Electoral Commission or Court to vary the rules in accordance with the changing requirements of the community. This Court would preferably handle representational questions in respect both of the central and territorial legislatures, since it is important that the territorial and central representational systems should be mutually consistent. If this idea were acceptable, an opportunity might be taken to establish a new representational principle. It is an accident of history that a man's political vote normally depends on where he happens to live. A man's value in a community depends, not on where he lives, but on what he does. It is on this, surely, that his contribution to the government of the community ought to be based. It is possible to visualise a legislature composed of members drawn from colleges representing respectively, for example, organised labour, public utilities, agriculture, industry, mining, commerce, finance, the professions, the churches, women's organisations and so on. The number of members permissible from each college could be determined by the Electoral Court and, in the case of productive industry and services, might be based (as a very rough guide) on the contribution of each college to the gross national product.

20. While it is not possible at this stage to suggest details with any confidence, two important principles are here involved, the adoption of which appears suitable in the peculiar circumstances in which Rhodesia & Nyasaland finds itself. The first is that of indirect election to the legislature involving immediate acceptance of the concept of "one man, one vote": the second is that of departure from the residential basis of suffrage. It may well be considered that too much progress has already been made along orthodox paths for an electoral change as radical as this to be attempted. On the other hand, political conditions in the territories have become so critical that, if constitutional changes are to make any effective contribution to improving future prospects, it does appear that they must be radical in character.

21. Finally, whatever changes in the Federal structure may be proposed, and whatever constitutional programme suggested, it is much to be hoped that the extent of the changes and the pace of the programme will not be such that Rhodesians and Nyasalanders of European stock will no longer feel able to regard these territories as their home. Constitutional development designed to meet the reasonable needs and the legitimate aspirations of the African populations will be accepted, though possibly not with enthusiasm, by Europeans of goodwill: headlong changes conceded to the "demands" and intimidation of African extremists will drive from the territories the very European skills and resources on which the Africans themselves must depend for many years to come if they are not to exchange their growing freedom for a reversion to tyranny and barbarism.

London

30th May, 1960

G. McLEAN, J. BEATTLE and R. CAMPBELL*

Having studied individually the situation existing in the Central African Federation as conveyed to us for example in newspaper reports, *The Devlin Report*, and in conversations with one prominent African from Nyasaland and with Church of Scotland Missionaries recently returned from Africa, we wish to submit for your consideration the following memoranda and recommendations.

We note that by the Federal Act control over immigration, Defence, Medical Services, External Affairs, Currency, Exports and Imports and Companies has been transferred from the Territorial to the Federal authorities.

We note that the Federal Constitution Amendment Bill in 1957 and the Federal Electoral Bill in 1958 were referred to the U.K. Government by the African Affairs Board as being discriminatory in substance and that in both cases the U.K. Government supported the Federal Authorities.

We are of the considered opinion that Federation is not acceptable to the majority of Africans in Central Africa and that most of them are dismayed at the recession of British Protection.

* The Misses L., B., and E. McGilvray and also Messrs. F. Paterson, T. McAlpine and J. Richards have associated themselves with this memorandum.

We feel that the continued detention of leaders of African opinion is detrimental to chances of an early return to a secure situation in the Federation and that continued detention without trial is more likely to worsen the situation and to increase African opposition to Federation.

Accordingly we recommend:

- (1) That at the 1960 Review Conference the right of any of the three territories to secede from the Federation should be considered.
- (2) That at the 1960 Review Conference there should be a large African representation from the two northern territories. This representation should be selected by the Governors from nominations put forward by the Malawi and African National Congresses and by the United National Independence Party.
- (3) That at present no more powers should be transferred from the U.K. or Territorial Governments to the Federal Authorities.
- (4) That Dominion status or anything akin to it should not be granted to the Federation within the next 5 years.
- (5) That the African Affairs Board should be retained and indeed strengthened.
- (6) That the 1960 Review Conference should be held in London, not in Africa and that as many of its sessions as possible should be open to press and other observers.
- (7) That in order to prevent any repetition of the disturbing and undesirable incidents of the Stonehouse and Colvin cases, control of Immigration should be returned to the territories.
- (8) That "The Monckton Commission" should affirm immediately and publicly that no evidence lead by any person or persons to the Commission shall be used in any way in any legal proceedings that may be taken against such person or persons or against others.

Kirkmuirhill,
Lanarkshire.
28th January, 1960.

THE HON. P. L. O'BRIEN

"The smaller nations present a deplorably frivolous spectacle. Since Europe is said to be in a decline and is therefore ceasing to exert its authority, every nation and nationlet prances, waves its arms, turns somersaults or struts about pretending to be a grown-up with the right to control its own destiny. Hence the almost bacteriological horde of nationalisms that swarm on all sides."—Ortega y Gasset.

These somewhat cynical reflections of an eminent philosopher present the problem, Mr. Harold Macmillan himself supplies the basis for the solution.

"Our aim is a society in which individual merit and individual merit alone is the criterion for a man's advancement, whether political or economic";

"... the wind of change blowing through Africa. That's not the same as a howling tempest that would blow away the whole of the new developing civilisation. We must at all costs avoid that."

In the framing of any constitution for a country one of the first aims should be the formation of a system of government under which the greatest number of the inhabitants would derive the maximum benefit. Applied to the Federal Territories this means a constitution which would ensure the maximum benefit, both social and economic, to the greatest number of the indigenous and immigrant races. In practice there are two main schools of thought on this subject.

- (1) That advocated by the most vocal of the African leaders and supported generally by the British Labour Party, which envisages the break-up of the Federation, immediate universal suffrage in the two Northern Territories producing an African majority in the Legislature, followed by complete independence within the shortest possible period; and
- (2) The maintenance of the Federation with a staple form of multi-racial government at the head, but with a gradual yet accelerated voice in the government of the territories for the indigenous races, based on individual merit.

Let us consider briefly the first alternative, although this solution is not within the terms of reference of the Commission. A great deal is heard about the Rising Tide of African Nationalism, what does this really signify? In the Federation as a whole there has been no general surge of African Nationalism; it is true that, chiefly since Ghana's independence, certain African leaders and their Parties have done their best to encourage an often militant form of Nationalism, with comparatively little success in the Rhodesias, but more so in Nyasaland. The latter country sends annually to South Africa a fairly large labour force to work in the mines and in industry, thus first-hand experience of the policy of apartheid is obtained and this is often mistakenly considered to be the ultimate goal of a Rhodesian Federation with Dominion status. It should be appreciated, therefore, that by far the greater majority of the 7½ million Africans of the Federation, excluding the detribalised town dwellers, are not crying out for or even interested in universal suffrage or complete independence; but at the same time it must be conceded that a certain African "Consciousness" has begun to make itself felt; this is all to the good if directed into the right channels.

The type of Parliamentary Democracy, which has been evolved over the centuries in England, would be completely unworkable in an independent Nyasaland or Northern Rhodesia. The reason is simple. Whereas England has a population of some 50 million living in a fairly high state of civilisation and can, at any given time, call on many thousands of above average intelligence, education and sense of responsibility to run the country; the Federal Territories, on the other hand, contain millions who are still living in a relatively low state of civilisation, and there are not more than a score or so Africans of sufficient calibre, education, intelligence and sense of responsibility to fill the hundred and one vital posts in the present day administration of a Territory. The result at best would be a very marked lowering of the efficiency of the administration with almost certain exploitation of the population at the lower levels, or more likely, a reversion to Dictator rule as has virtually occurred in Ghana.

One often hears it said by African leaders that they would prefer a considerably less efficient government, provided they were free to govern themselves. No doubt the ruling bureaucracy would prefer this; they would have far more power and be better off, but it is the universal experience in other countries that the millions of peasants would be considerably worse off without any ameliorating compensations.

It was, I think, the Bishop of Nyasaland who maintained that it is better to give too much too soon than too little too late, on the assumption that a country freed from political agitation, even if less well governed, is preferable to the reverse. This is a fallacy because it assumes that a benign Colonial office administration would be replaced by a fully democratic African Government, whereas every territory so far that has been given independence under the Westminster pattern has within a very few years reverted to a form of dictatorship, because no African Territories are yet ready for a democratic form of parliamentary government, and the Federal Territories far less so than countries such as Ghana and Nigeria. If the basic fact can be understood, namely that the mental development of the African has not been able to keep pace with the great economic development of the East and Central African Territories over the past 50 years, then the whole concept becomes much simpler.

The economic aspect has been stressed so often that it hardly needs enlarging on. Suffice it to say that Nyasaland, being a poor country generally, depends very largely on financial aid from the Federation; also, unless it has a stable government and is underwritten by the resources of the Federation as a whole, it will never attract any risk capital for developments such as the Shire River Scheme or the Manje bauxite. Northern Rhodesia on the other hand possesses some of the richest copper mines in the world, and much potential wealth in other minerals, but also requires a strong stable government enjoying the confidence of the Capital Markets to develop its wealth. Under a weak unstable African Government all the potential wealth in the country would be of no avail.

It is often assumed by African leaders that the British Government would step in and finance with many millions a country such as Nyasaland if, through independence, it fortified its right to financial aid from the Federation, is it fair to expect the British taxpayers to do this? The leaders then argue that if the British Government will not help, no doubt they can get financial aid from some less desirable source; surely this is little better than blackmail? Why should the British Government give in to a vocal group, claiming without any justification to be working for the well being of the majority, and then

lay itself open to blackmail to avoid possible Communist influence? (The Commission is strongly recommended to study carefully the recent consolidation of Russian interests in Ethiopia and the price extracted from the Emperor for the 400 million dollars-worth of aid. Attention is also drawn to Haile Selassie's confidential talk in January last to the Ethiopian National Union of students which was attended by representatives from all over Africa).

I have tended rather to stress certain aspects and possibilities resulting from complete independence, or independence within the Federation, of the two Northern Territories for the simple reason that, whether we like it or not, this solution will be uppermost in the minds of some members of the Commission; and, judging from statements in the past, it is probable that any other solution will be strongly criticised by the Labour Party at home. I fully appreciate, however, that the Commission has not been appointed to consider this way out, but to arrive at a working formula which will make the multi-racial Federation a success and an example to other countries in Africa.

At this point it is perhaps relevant to express a strong view on the refusal of Her Majesty's Official Opposition to sit on the Commission. Their action unfortunately highlights one of the weaknesses of the British Party system of Parliamentary Democracy which we are in danger of trying prematurely to foist on some of our Colonies. Rather than assist the Commission by expressing their views, however strongly, in the working sessions, and trying to convince their opponents of the validity of their arguments, the Labour Party prefer to reserve their criticism until after the findings of the Commission, and turn into a Party squabble a matter which requires statesman-like handling and should be kept well out of the realms of Party Politics. It is as well also to remember that unfortunately the Africans often have as their advisors clever but unscrupulous lawyers, and even Q.C.s, whose advice may please the African leaders but is frequently shortsighted, unstatesman-like and often has a curious warped antagonism against their own kith and kin.

Returning now to the second alternative—Maintenance of the Federation on a multi-racial basis—there is no doubt whatsoever that this is the right and only course, even though it is fraught with difficulties. What are these difficulties? The Federation, as such, is rich above the average for a group of African Territories, it is prosperous and with cheap hydro-electric power has enormous potentialities for future development, what then can hold it back and deprive the indigenous population of their full share of this potential wealth and prosperity? Surely the main cause could be an eventual break-up of the Federation, and a loss of confidence internationally in its creditworthiness. The Government must therefore remain for many years to come in the hands of a strong multi-racial group whose sole objective is to maintain and increase the prosperity of the Federation and the well being of all its inhabitants, and all racial and as far as possible party considerations should be swept aside. On this basis universal suffrage must obviously be ruled out at present, for exactly the same reason that within living memory universal suffrage in England was considered impracticable. Suffrage must be based on education and income but the standard must, (unlike the proposals for Kenya), be kept reasonably high otherwise it will defeat its own end. The African must learn, like all other civilised countries have had to learn before him, to walk before he can run, and again the greatest benefit to the majority, that is the millions of African peasants must be the first consideration. It follows, therefore, that for some years to come, until more Africans reach a higher standard of education, it will just not be possible, however much we may wish it, to select many Africans of sufficient calibre to match up to Ministerial rank, but the standard must not be lowered and appointments must be made on merit.

We have heard a great deal lately about the independence of our neighbours the East African Territories; Tanganyika has virtually been given it already—why? Largely through the foresight and statesmanlike qualities of one African leader, Julius Nyerere, who has succeeded in commanding the support of all races; is there an African leader in the Federation of anything like his stature? Even if one did arise, how long could he pursue a moderate statesmanlike policy in the face of the strong shortsighted nationalism of so many African leaders? This is the danger that Tanganyika will have to face. Uganda on the other hand while claiming with some justification, at least so far as the Buganda Province is concerned, to be the most politically advanced of the three East African Territories, has shown little sense of responsibility, has Nyasaland shown signs of any greater responsibility?

Regarding Kenya, following upon concession after concession to the African leaders at the Lancaster House Conference, of which the Koinage incident was probably the most reprehensible, Messrs. Ngala and Mboya's uncompromising public statements on their return home and subsequent actions, hardly augurs well for a policy of appeasement to African nationalism.

It must also be fully appreciated that any action taken now which could have the effect of permitting the two Northern Territories to secede from the Federation at a later date, would almost certainly force Southern Rhodesia to look to South Africa in the future; this is an extremely important point.

It is clear, therefore, that the well being and prosperity of the inhabitants of two Northern territories must not be sacrificed to a minority of extreme African Nationalists demanding immediate independence, *even within the Federation*.

A counter argument may well be put forward in terms such as these: "Yes, we are well aware that the best course for the majority of the inhabitants is a very much slower progress to independence along sound economic lines, but your views are unrealistic, we cannot stem the tide, therefore we must grant concessions against our better judgment." The answer to this is clear; it is basicly wrong to adopt a course we know to be wrong for the sake of expediency; strength in taking the right course is a quality admired by all people, not least the African, weakness in taking the easy way out is universally despised and invariably leads to further difficulties; the Lancaster House Conference on Kenya may prove an example of this.

It must also be remembered that such prosperity as now exists in the Territories was brought there almost entirely by the Europeans, therefore in equity it is only right and proper that their side of the question should receive an equally fair consideration. Further, to quote Mr. Jan C. Smuts, the liberal minded moderate South Africa, "The Majority of the Whites of Southern Africa are opposed to the 'breakneck almost irresponsible speed with which independence has been implemented, and fear that the very dangers which Britain has tried to avert have been aggravated, and the encroachment of communism will now be hastened'".

How then should the problem be solved and the constitution framed? The following suggestions are made as a basis on which to work:—

- (1) No universal suffrage for many years to come, until the bulk of the indigenous population is sufficiently advanced fully to appreciate the significance of the policy for which it is voting.
- (2) Ensure that everything possible is done both by higher university education and otherwise, to bring a much larger number of Africans up to that stage of education and sense of responsibility which would enable them to take over high ministerial posts and command the full respect and confidence of their staff.
- (3) Consideration might be given to an extension of, or perhaps a more liberal form of education or income qualification for the voter, provided this is not overdone as in Kenya.
- (4) A strong central multi-racial form of Federal Government which will command the confidence of such institutions as the World Bank, and of international credit, and will be able to attract risk capital for the development of its vast potentialities.
- (5) The Commission must not be stampeded into giving way to so called "African Nationalism" in the Northern Territories, but must ensure that the government of these territories remains in competent responsible hands irrespective of race or colour, encouraging any African who can make the grade to take his place in the highest ranks of Government service.
- (6) It is obvious, and became abundantly clear at the Kenya Constitutional talks, that guarantees to minorities written into a Bill of Rights can never be enforced in an Independent Sovereign African State, except by the will of the People. This fact must be very clearly understood and appreciated by the Commission when considering the position of minorities.
- (7) In short to institute a fully multi-racial form of government with appointments based entirely on Mr. Macmillan's dictum that individual merit alone must be the criterion for a man's advancement, whether political or economic.

No doubt, the African leaders of all territories would resent this relatively slow progress to self-government, but we must

not be stampeded by what is happening further North, and I would like to end my memorandum on the theme on which it started and is primarily based, namely that the chief aim of the Constitution must be to arrive at a form of Government in which the greatest number of the inhabitants will derive the maximum benefit.

I have submitted this Memorandum because I feel that, having lived and worked for 37 years in virtually all the East and Central African Territories from Somaliland to South Africa at one time or another, I have had some experience of the territories concerned, and can look back with pleasure in a happy and friendly association with a great and varied number of the local inhabitants of all tribes and races.

Tailpiece: "The wind of change is a desert wind, harsh, cheerless, parching, destructive of all but the prickly cacti of dogmatism and prejudice."—Peregrine Worshtorne.

Ludlow
Shropshire
March 1960

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SOCIETY

Southern Rhodesia

The Franchise and the Electoral System

1. The terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry require it to consider matters relevant to the attainment of two objects: just representation of the people of the Colony in its Legislative Assembly, and government by civilised and responsible people. Among the factors to be considered, the terms of reference mention specifically two: qualifications to vote, and qualifications to become a candidate. Among other factors that will promote or hinder the attainment of the objects laid down is the method by which votes are recorded and counted; this can have a very great influence on a country's development.

2. We suggest that, in the present instance, the electoral system chosen should fulfil the following requirements:—

- (a) The method of casting a vote, and the purpose served by that vote, should be within the comprehension of all those qualified as electors.
- (b) Those who vote should be able to see that their participation in the election has influenced the result in the way they desired.
- (c) As among those citizens who are placed on an equality by the franchise, the voting and counting system should not disturb that equality; it should not allow the votes of some groups of electors to be much more effective than the votes of other groups.
- (d) If it is thought advisable to introduce deliberately certain inequalities (for instance to give an extra vote to an elector of superior education, or to guarantee representation to specified groups), the system must be flexible enough to admit of these variations, and to allow such provisions to be modified or abolished if changing circumstances should require this.
- (e) The system should offer fair representation to whatever divisions of the electorate are felt to be important now (e.g. races, tribes, religious groups, etc.) but should allow full freedom for the development of other groups (e.g. political parties) alongside these; it should not tend to "freeze" the groups in the pattern existing at any given time.
- (f) The system should not emphasise divisions between one part of the electorate and another, but should promote a feeling of national unity.
- (g) Ultimate responsibility for good government should rest squarely on the voters, whose decisions should involve their own consequences and should not be liable to be nullified by chance or by other extraneous circumstances. The system should offer as little opportunity as possible for the abuse of power (e.g. by gerrymandering).

3. The system commonly used in the United Kingdom (the first-past-the-post system, in which each voter marks with an X as many candidates as there are seats to be filled, and the returning officer declares elected the candidate(s) with the most votes) meets none of the above requirements except the first (simplicity); and perhaps the fourth. A large proportion of those voting (a little under half in a typical English general election) vote for losing candidates and do not affect the result, and even those whose candidates are successful have a minimum of responsibility for the result: for example, if they wish

to support a particular party, they are limited to voting for a candidate chosen for them by that party and cannot exercise their own judgment concerning the personal merits of candidates. Similarly the voter cannot support a party and at the same time discriminate among the candidates in favour of his own tribe; the system forces him to choose between voting exclusively for his party and voting exclusively for his tribe, and makes it difficult for parties to develop gradually across the existing divisions. Minorities are often excluded from representation altogether, or nearly so, while, of two nearly equal groups, one (sometimes even the smaller) often obtains far more seats than the other. How many seats are won by any particular group of voters depends not only on how numerous they are, but also on other factors, such as whether they are evenly spread over the whole country or concentrated in particular districts; therefore also on the way in which constituency boundaries are drawn. Therefore, it is possible for those in power to adjust the boundaries to their own advantage, and, even though that may not actually be done, suspicion of it may give rise to much bad feeling. Also, the system usually causes any change of opinion from one election to the next to be reflected in a very much larger change in the composition of the elected body (see for example the recent elections in Ceylon*); this may be the cause of dangerous instability, especially in a country where the bulk of the voters are not yet firmly attached to any party.

U.N.P.	Percentage of votes	Percentage of seats
1952	44	56
1956	28	8
1960	29	33

4. Nearly all the drawbacks mentioned above are inseparable from any system of election in single-member constituencies; the fundamental objection is that, even if only two candidates contest each seat, anything up to half the votes are "wasted": any group of voters which falls even one vote short of the majority can have no influence on the result. Only if several representatives are elected together does it become possible to ensure that most of the votes cast do affect the result, to secure representation for several different groups of electors, and to ensure that a large group gets more representation than the smaller one.

5. But the mere enlargement of constituencies to return several members each will not achieve those objects if the method of voting usual in the United Kingdom is retained. In the first place, where voting is mainly on group lines (whether the groups be political parties, races, or other sections), it is well known that the almost invariable result is to give all the seats to some one group; there is still the same high wastage of votes and the same lack of minority representation. It is less generally realised that the results may be equally unsatisfactory even where there is no group voting—where all votes are cast according to the personal merits of the candidates. That is because, if there are for instance five seats to be filled, each voter casts one vote for the candidate he most wants and four votes for other candidates *against* him; thus it is possible for a candidate preferred to all others by a substantial majority to be defeated by the second, etc., votes of his own supporters. Further, as soon as the candidates realise that this is happening, they will be driven to organise on "party" lines against each other, even if there be not otherwise any wish for such organisation. (The candidate whose supporters are drilled into voting only for him, or for him *plus* certain other selected candidates, will beat a man with equal or greater backing whose supporters are left to use their own discretion about how they use their second and later votes.) Therefore, the tendency of the system is for any voting group that exists at a given time (whether a tribe, a personal faction or some other group) to become fixed as a permanent party, exclusive of and antagonistic to other groups.

6. Certain other voting systems which are designed to secure fair representation for both majority and minorities still suffer from this drawback that they tend to "freeze" the existing political structure; these are the party list systems of proportional representation which are generally used on the Continent of Europe but not anywhere in the English-speaking world. These are based on the general principle that votes are cast for a party (or tribe or other group) and each party is allocated seats in proportion to the votes cast for it. It will be seen that such a system necessitates the official recognition of parties (or other groups), tending to draw attention to the divisions between them and to hamper their merg-

*Ceylon. The United National Party in 1952 obtained a majority of seats (54 out of 96) for 44% of the votes; in 1956 it dropped to only 8 seats although still polling 28% of the votes, and in 1960 it again became the largest party in parliament (50 seats out of 151) although increasing its poll only to 29.4%.

ing in a larger unit or their replacement by new groupings. For that reason (irrespective of any other arguments) we consider party list P.R. unsuitable for the conditions of Southern Rhodesia.

7. "P.R." as used in English-speaking countries has, however, quite a different basis and would be very suitable. It removes the fundamental cause of the troubles referred to in paragraph 5 by, in the first place, giving each elector only *one* vote, no matter how many places may have to be filled. This makes it impossible for a candidate to be defeated by the votes of his own supporters (because if they have used one vote for him they cannot then also vote against him). It also makes it extremely unlikely that any one group will capture all the seats in a constituency, excluding minorities from representation—because that characteristic result of the United Kingdom voting system arises from the fact that each supporter of a given group can give a vote to *each* of that group's candidates, up to the number of seats to be filled. If, on the contrary, each elector can give a vote for only *one* candidate, then if (in a 5-member constituency) two candidates of a group numbering 200 voters each have 100 votes, then a group numbering 300 voters (and therefore having a total of 300 votes) cannot have more than three candidates who equal that poll. A large minority can therefore secure representation in proportion to its voting strength.

8. It will, however, be seen that the fair representation of 200 and the 300 voters (two seats and three seats respectively) depends on their having their votes distributed evenly among the appropriate number of candidates; running too many candidates, or have one far more popular than another, could lead to unfair representation of those groups. To avoid that, the vote is made transferable, so that if it is given in the first instance to a candidate who already has more than enough for election, or to one who has no chance of election, that vote can be transferred, according to the voter's instructions, to another candidate, and further if necessary, until it reaches a candidate it can help to elect.

9. The difficulties associated with giving those instructions will be discussed below (paragraph 17); for the present, this memorandum is concerned with the process in a literate electorate. There, the instructions to the returning officer are given by numbering as many of the candidates as the voter chooses: he marks the candidate he most wants to see elected "1", the candidate he considers the next best "2", and so on. If he numbers first all the candidates of his own group (party, tribe, etc.), then the effect will be to ensure that the group secures representation in proportion to the number of voters supporting it. For instance, if in the foregoing example the 200 voters have scattered their votes over three candidates, giving them respectively 150, 40 and 10 votes, then the surplus votes of the candidates with 150 and all the votes of the candidate with 10 will be transferred, securing the election of that group's two most popular candidates.

10. Group representation is thus secured by the action of the voters themselves, without there being necessarily any recognised parties. It could happen that the voters ignored the groups they were expected to follow, and allowed their votes to be determined by quite different considerations (e.g., party political instead of tribal). Thus, the system does not tend to "freeze" any existing grouping, but offers freedom for new ones to develop.

11. Moreover, at any given time, different kinds of groupings will operate together. The system does not demand of a voter that, for instance, in order to support a political party he must in any way abate his loyalty to his tribe: he can vote for the party but at the same time pick out from among its candidates those who belong to his tribe. After which, he can proceed to give later preferences, if he wishes, either to that party's candidates belonging to other tribes or to candidates of his own tribe but supporting other parties. Because the great majority of votes, in practice, become effective for their first or a very early preference, the effect is to give proportional representation both to the parties and to the tribes (and to any other groups concerned) at the same time.

12. In general, a minority group, of whatever nature, will obtain fair representation by the votes of its own supporters. It sometimes happens, however, that it is desired to ensure representation for some group that is too small to be sure of electing of its members in that way. If so, a simple modification of the rules may lay down that "one" or "at least one" or "not more than x" of the elected members must belong to some specified group. No resort to communal electorates or any similar device is called for.

13. It is equally simple to adapt the system to circumstances in which it is decided that certain electors shall have more voting-powers than certain other electors. All that is necessary is that an elector having (say) two votes shall be provided with a ballot paper on which the value 2 is indicated by means of a printed figure or by the use of differently coloured paper. In some trade union elections, votes are cast on behalf of branches, and a ballot paper has a value corresponding to the membership of the branch using it; this does not give rise to any difficulty in the count.

14. It will be seen that an elector cannot vote for any one group without making a selection among several candidates of that group: his attention is drawn to the fact that, even though he gives general support to all those candidates, they differ in personal merits, and he is encouraged to give proper consideration to those personal merits. This contributes to his education as a responsible citizen. Moreover, the elector is invited to consider also the merits of candidates outside his own group; he may number all the candidates, and cannot harm his group if he does so. This helps him to perceive that, for example, the rival tribe is not composed solely of people antagonistic to everything he believes in, but contains some candidates who have similar political ideas; national unity is thus promoted.

15. The system offers the minimum scope for the abuse of power. No group can win a dominant position in the elected body without the support of a correspondingly large body of the voters. An excessive growth of party discipline is checked, because any elected member depends for his seat not on the favour of his party organisation but on that of the voters. Gerrymandering to any significant extent is impossible, because the precise way in which the boundaries of (say) a five-member constituency are drawn can affect, at most, only one of the five seats. There is no advantage to a party in attempting to regiment its voters; it is not possible to win more seats by inducing the voters all to place the candidates in a particular order, and any attempt at such dictation can safely be ignored by the voters. There is also no temptation offered for the elector to support any candidate or party other than his real choice: it does not matter whether the candidate he most wants has much support or little, a vote cast for that candidate cannot thereby be wasted, provided further preferences are recorded. Also, since such further preferences can in no circumstances count against the first, there is no need for the voter in giving them to consider anything other than his own opinion of the candidates' relative merits.

16. The system has been used successfully, and with effects of the nature predicted above, in many elections of very various kinds, including:

all parliamentary and local government elections in Eire since 1920;

the election of both houses of the Church Assembly, since 1921;

the election of the Maltese Legislative Assembly, since 1921;

the election of the Tasmanian Lower House, since 1907;

the election of the Gibraltar Legislative Council, since 1950;

various elections in British trade unions, co-operative societies, students' unions, etc.

It is included in the proposed new constitution for Mauritius.*

17. It has not, however, been applied so far in an electorate where the majority are illiterate. The nearest approach to this is in Malta, where illiteracy approaches half the electorate. In that country, difficulties associated with a low standard of education certainly do arise, but there is no evidence that they are worse than they would be under any other system of election; the problem of how the illiterate is to mark his ballot paper is successfully solved. In Malta, it is done by allowing the voter to tell the presiding officer (of course in conditions of secrecy) how he wishes to vote; this is quite satisfactory provided that sufficient presiding officers are available and that the electorate has confidence in their integrity. It may, however, be possible to allow illiterates to mark their own papers. If the candidates are represented by easily-recognised symbols (a common practice in elections involving a mainly illiterate population) it should be quite easy for a voter to indicate the *one* candidate for whom he most wishes to vote, and (since more votes become effective

* Dropped owing to opposition of Mauritius Labour Party.

for their first preference than for any other) the result will as a rule be reasonably satisfactory (certainly fairer than under any majority system) even if a large proportion of the voters can do no more than that. Those who are capable of indicating further preferences by the figures 2, 3, etc., or by some method such as the marks //, /// and so on devised to meet the needs of that population, could be encouraged to do so, and their votes would be more certain of being effective. That the better educated voters would thus in practice tend to have a rather greater influence on the result of the election might be considered a good thing.

July 1956

THE REV. GRIFFITH QUICK

I have the honour to submit the following evidence to the Commission of Enquiry relative to the proposed revision of the constitution of the Federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

My qualifications for submitting this evidence is based on a wide and extensive experience and knowledge of territories concerned, having been a resident educational missionary in Northern Rhodesia for fifteen years, serving as a chaplain with Rhodesian and Nyasaland troops during the late war 1939-45, and subsequently maintaining close contact with these territories and lecturing in Bemba and Nyanja, the official languages of the territories.

1. I would first sympathise with the Commission that has been appointed to enquire into the intricacies of this well-nigh insuperable problem. The ramifications of racial, political, social, economic and cultural forces are so varied and powerful that one almost despairs of complete harmony and agreement on any issue, and one views the absolute integration of the three territories as a physical impossibility.

2. I am concerned chiefly about the welfare of the African peoples of the two Northern territories,—Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Both of these territories have been cradled and nurtured in the benign cultural milieu of Protectorate governments. They have not been conquered and annexed. The early treaties with paramount chiefs provided for protection, which the British South Africa Company and later the British Government fully provided. In this connection we must not forget the paramount importance of early missionaries and pioneer missionary societies, who provided spiritual, educational and medical ministries to the frightened and destitute remnant of the Arab slave trade. These factors cannot be overlooked in making an assessment of past conditions, present day progress and prosperity, and future aspirations. Many elderly Africans now living can bear witness to the amazing beneficent influence of missionaries, administrators, and others engaged in various pursuits in the territories. The influence they wielded may be described as paternal; but it was paternalism of the right sort, in the right place, and at the right time. That is the only kind of rule, authority, and benevolence that Africans of that period knew, and they seemed to have been reasonably contented and progressed fairly well under it. Racial, political, social, economic, cultural, educational, religious and every other aspect of community life appeared to flourish and to progress evenly and harmoniously—even if slowly. And this is true of the progress of all communities. Civilisation itself is a plant of slow growth.

3. The fact of Federation has abruptly changed all this. The advanced political concepts implied in the Federal constitution and the high qualifications required of African electors are such as to far outstrip all other vital aspects of culture and community life, disturb all social and economic equilibrium, and render unstable the emotional state of the communities involved therein. It is as if one limb—a hand or a foot—grew abnormally large and long, and out of all proportion to the rest of the human body. The same applies to the body politic.

A glance at the qualifications for an African in Nyasaland to be placed on the General Federal Electoral Roll will illustrate this, and indicate how unrelated it is to the general economic and educational level of the mass of approximately 2½ million Africans in the territory, whose average wage is only a few shillings a month.

“Qualifications for admission to the General Electoral Roll

Every elector must be 21 years of age or over, and be able to speak English . . .

It is also necessary that (1) he is in receipt of not less than £720 per annum, or hold property valued at not less than £1,500.

or (2) that he is in receipt of not less than £480 per annum, or hold property valued at not less than £1,000 provided he has passed Standard 6 in the Primary School (almost equivalent to our Schools Entrance Examination)

or (3) that he is in receipt of not less than £300 per annum, or hold property valued at not less than £500, provided he has passed Form 4 of Secondary School Standard (which is almost equivalent to our G.C.E. Ordinary level.)”

The above extract is from the Electoral Pamphlet *Nditani Kuti Ndiipate Vote* (“What I must do to get a Vote”) published by the Government Printer, Zomba, Nyasaland. The translation is mine.

Now I wonder how many people over 21 years of age in Britain—let alone Nyasaland—would qualify for the Electoral Roll by this standard? There were very few Africans (fewer than 30 I think) who qualified at the last Election. And how long will it be before the number of Africans who qualify will be equal to the number of Europeans—who qualify more or less automatically—about 3,000 in all? It will be a very long time indeed. And even then there will be only 3,000 African electors out of a total of over 2½ million. The cry against Federation in its present form is “Tsankho!” (“Favouritism!”). Is it any wonder that they are indignant and enraged. Such disproportionate representation at such cost.

I do not belittle the advantages of Federation that accrue to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland from the point of view of defence, finance, communications, posts and telegraphs, and so forth, but disproportionate electoral representation based on differential standards of living, education, and income does violence to all human standards of equity. No amount of grants-in-aid whether from Federal or any other source will please where human regard is lacking and the future is at stake. Better independence and freedom now at any price than a black future with no prospects of even a fair share in the government of the country. That is the general feeling among Africans.

As one of the means of ensuring African regard for the “monster” Federation, which few of them understand and fewer still respect, I would propose the amendment of the qualifications for African voters on the General Federal Electoral Roll.

4. The concept of independence, and relationship with Britain and the Commonwealth. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland cannot be compared with Ghana and Nigeria, which have recently attained independence. These West African States have a great historical past and have experienced a much longer period of British tutelage and administration, which has resulted in their present-day educational and cultural standard. I firmly believe, that given the right opportunity, both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland will in time reach the same high standard. But for some time to come I feel convinced that the best interests of the African peoples of these territories will be best served if the direct link with Whitehall in the home country is maintained. Neither African chiefs nor an autonomous Federal Parliament can adequately provide the measure of protection, security, and confidence that African people need today for harmonious development into the full stature of manhood and full citizenship in a multi-racial society. There is every reason why there should be both European and African representatives from these territories at all Commonwealth conferences. This is only fair and reasonable. There will be nothing to fear or to lose from this, but rather everything to be gained.

5. Dominion Status. Fear of Dominion status is the root cause of most of the unrest in Nyasaland and in Rhodesia. Dominion status is synonymous with “apartheid”. There is a silent fear which is becoming more articulate and more vocally and actively expressed against any form of government based on the South African pattern with racial discrimination. The paramount influence in South African affairs has nearly always been Dutch nationalism with a strong Calvinist bias and a prejudicial attitude towards the Bantu people of the Union. One is sometimes tempted to think that Calvinism is a convenient cloak for sheer dominance of spirit. However that may be, South Africa has had three hundred years of Dutch rule and Calvinist or pseudo-Calvinist ideology, and neither the South Africa Nationalist Party nor its government is likely to change its outlook suddenly in favour of closer co-operation with the new Dominion of Central Africa—if it materializes.

Dominion status for the Federation of Central Africa is unthinkable. It will open the door to new and strange influences, and under pressure from South Africa racial dominance and the superiority of the white man will become the ruling principle. We cannot commit the 2½ million Africans in Northern Rhodesia and the 2½ million in Nyasaland, who are at present under our care, to this fate. It will be suicidal.

My conclusion and the proposals that I humbly submit to the Commission are these:

- A. That no change in the present Constitution of the Federation of Central Africa be contemplated, but that proposals for the reform of Electoral Rolls be made so as to ensure at least equality or correspondingly similar electoral qualifications (educational and economic) among the three races, African, Indian and European, and that an assurance of such impending reforms be communicated to the African people, of Nyasaland especially, without much delay.
- B. The maintenance—and perhaps even the strengthening—of ties with Britain through the Colonial Office.
- C. Outright rejection of Dominion status.

We have a glorious opportunity of demonstrating to the world our regard for human rights and the common weal of all the people committed to our charge, whatever their race. By our attitude towards the native people of the three territories in the Federation of Central Africa we can, under God, prove that we are worthy guardians of the less privileged people of the modern world.

With every good wish for the success of the Commission.

Wrexham

N. Wales

16th January 1960

H. ROLF GARDINER

Chairman: the Nchima Tea and Tung Estates Ltd., Cholo, Nyasaland. (Registered office: 53 Eastcheap, London, E.C.3.)

Chairman: the Michiru Company Ltd., Blantyre. (Registered office P.O. Box 327, Blantyre.)

Member: the London Committee, Nyasaland Tea Association Ltd.

I beg to submit the following points for consideration by your commission of Enquiry. While giving my credentials for knowledge of Nyasaland during the past thirteen years above, *I am writing entirely as an individual*, and not on behalf of the Board of either Company or of the Nyasaland Tea Association. As the Commission will be burdened by a great mass of evidence, I am not repeating historical or statistical detail already common knowledge of the Commission or accessible to it, but confining myself to a brief statement of some problems underlying the Constitutional issues on which the Commission has been appointed to advise, and to a consideration of how these problems might be solved.

The Necessity of a Wider Homeland

(because of population-pressure, desiccation and the need for capital investment in Nyasaland)

1. Three outstanding problems face the future of Nyasaland and its peoples:

- (1) the increasing pressure of population
- (2) the threat of desiccation
- (3) the need of money to finance civilising projects sustaining increasing African self-government.

The African nationalist clamour for independence, however much impelled by "the wind of change" blowing down the continent, as by dislike of Rhodesian supremacy, and by the need for political excitement (to replace the lost communal enjoyments of tribal life), disregards these stark necessities, considering them secondary to "freedom", "one man one vote", and "African self-government now". The problem of constitutional re-organisation and advance is bedevilled by the psychological factors and the need for time to canalise emotions into constructive projects of self-help, as by the need for lowering the temperature of men's minds—in order to avoid violence.

2. It is in the Southern Province of Nyasaland that these problems are most acute. It is here that European capital

investment provides revenue for the country's administration and economy, and employment for a dense population. But this valuable region is that most threatened by over-population, unemployment and desiccation; moreover, in spite of the annual migrations of young men to the South, there is continuous infiltration of Anguru from Portuguese East Africa. These incursions, first noted by Sir Philip Mitchell when serving as a junior officer in the Mlanje district in 1914, have gone on unabated, till the escarpment of the Shire highlands and the great Palombe Plain, but a short while ago covered with timber and running with game, have been skinned of forest-cover and become densely settled. The ravaging of the landscape by these forest-destroyers and maize-hoers has created the greatest difficulties for the Agricultural Department, which has achieved wonders in the circumstances. But the situation is most precarious; and, if the population is not decreased by resettlement elsewhere, there will be a "dust-bowl" all around the two most productive and revenue-yielding districts of the Southern Province, Cholo and Mlanje. Until the second decade of the century the Southern Province, except along the shores of Lake Nyasa, was sparsely populated. The Angoni, crossing the Zambezi from the south about 1835, had clashed with the Yaos coming southwards to the Lake, leaving the peaceful indigenous Manganja on one side. But in the fertile Shire highlands it is the Anguru intrusions which have created overpopulation. *The vast majority of present day Nyasalanders are immigrants, black, white and brown, a fact which is conveniently forgotten by African nationalists.*

3. The African population of Nyasaland is doubling itself every twenty-five years. What will become of this small potentially fertile country, if there are no outlets in the adjoining territories? There is plenty of room in the two Rhodesias if such policies as the Land Apportionment Act are revised, if the primary problem of water-procurement is overcome, and if communications are improved. It is only in the *wider living space of Central Africa* (and this must some day include Mozambique) that an increasing population can survive.

4. The boundaries of the Nyasaland Protectorate are not defined by any abrupt changes of geographical feature. But communications across the Zambezi, except by air, are still rudimentary. And so there is a feeling of detachment between Southern Rhodesia and the Southern Province of Nyasaland as between two remote, disconnected countries. The wide corridor of Portuguese territory, straddling the Zambezi, makes a barrier, a sort of No Man's Land. Salisbury and the other Rhodesian cities have no historical associations with Blantyre and Zomba and breathe a different air.

5. Ideally Nyasaland, framed by its mountain-escarpment and clustered along its four hundred mile Lake, forms an idyllic unit and were it not overpopulated could well stand on its own. Moreover, the legend of *Dr. Livingstone* casts over it a spell different from that of *Rhodes the Founder* in Mashonaland and Matabeleland.

6. These factors are undoubtedly reflected in the emotional attitude of Nyasaland Africans towards Federation. Sojourns in the Rhodesian South are as transient, and perhaps as trance-like, as used to be those of Italian and Greek peasants in the United States. The wanderer with his hard-won gold returns to his homeland, which in his subconscious, he has never left. Such geographical and psychological factors accompany, for Nyasalanders, the fear of the Rhodesian way of life, and maybe the Nyasalander instinctively resents the possibility of that atmosphere percolating his tropical Arcadia. So might the Irish resent the idea of transforming the emerald isle into a replica of the Middle West of America. Against these geographical, historical and psychological impediments to acceptance of the Federal area as a wider homeland and living-space for a multi-racial society (underlying the political prejudices and ambitions of African leaders), stand the staring facts of population pressure already cited, and the threat of desiccation.

7. Nyasaland, ecologically, is a forest country (and potentially a producer of timber and wood-products). Human habitations and cultivation for crops, first for human consumption and then also for export, began as clearings in the forest. The forest mothered the soil, protecting the earth from the baking rays of the sun, the drying winds of the winter, and the torrential rains of the summer months. Shifting cultivation by a sparse population of hunters and fishermen achieved a rough rotation of forest and arable, the forest returning to close the gaps. But with increased population cane bush fires, to which both the undergrowth and the best and most shade-giving trees were sensitive. In the wake of repeated fires there only grew savannah of the brachystegia type, a poorish sort of open woodland surviving drought and fire and giving but little cover to soil and water. The cumulative results of this pro-

cess have been *desiccation*, a general lowering of the water-table, and the recession of the once plentiful streams, such perennial brooks often becoming *wadis*, dry for the greater part of the year.

8. It may be difficult for most members of the Meekton Commission visiting Nyasaland for the first time, during a season of growth and harvest, to realise the appalling dryness to which the country is subject from June till December. This year the rains have been well below average and complaints by farmers and planters will be loud enough. But the worst is to follow. Except for the "Ciperone" mist-drizzies, no big rains may come for months. By August the country will be hung with veils of smoke, drifting across the mountains, by September the fires will be raging up and down the country, licking the very outskirts of Blantyre and Limbe, and devouring plantations, hillside, woodlands and the sparse grazing lands. Water then will be a major problem. For year to year this grows worse, and with increasing population and civilisation it is accentuated. Fore and desiccation point only one way: to *famine in the desert*.

9. It may be considered that such cries of "Wolf" are exaggerated, even romantic. But nature works cumulatively, and in Africa, with inexorable speed: either as destroyer, or, with encouragement, as builder. Cumulatively Nyasaland is drying up. And this not only because of what may prove to be a new drought-cycle, but because of human folly and disregard. Against this disastrous trend only a concerted effort will help. Piping water from the Shire to the towns; creating a barrage to irrigate the lands below the escarpment; these are praiseworthy plans costing vast sums of money. But they will not solve the general problem, which is to restore the forest-cover and replenish the brooks, streams and rivers. The forest-cover cannot be restored unless drastic measures are taken to prohibit and prevent fires. The African leaders could do no greater service to their country, than by outlawing bushfires and punishing all offenders. The water resources of the territory are the basis of its prosperity. As Professor Debenham, the greatest authority on the subject, wrote: "Every little upland stream should have a series of weirs thrown across it . . . All possible slopes should be bunded or terraced, even where they are not to be used for crops, and no cutting of trees should be allowed anywhere near the headwaters of any stream". Barrages, dams and fishponds lower down would impound the water and allow it to soak the ground and be used for irrigation, and in some places for power. So the country now fast losing its substance (the soil) to the Indian Ocean, together with its life's blood (the water that carries it), would recover and become what it was destined to be: a forest-garden of productive health, wealth and beauty.

10. Such a restorative transformation, the creation of an African "Kulturlandschaft" will cost money. Vast injections of capital will be needed over a period of time. But even more than capital is the need for goodwill, and constructive desire. The only capital available to an independent Nyasaland is that which can be spared by a heavily committed and indebted Britain and which has never sufficed to make the Nyasaland Cinderella become the Princess of her promise. Private companies, many of whom have sunk and ploughed back hundreds of thousands of pounds into the Protectorate and given employment to the population, will be reluctant to raise new capital in London for investment in a territory that gives to the European small security. Yet the Federation, with the momentum of an expanding economy, with its organised exploitation of mineral resources, and its harnessing of the Zambezi at Kariba, is prepared to do so. These are commonplaces of the present situation.

11. What are lacking? Trust as between Africans and Europeans, Nyasalanders and Rhodesians, and the goodwill out of which enthusiasm for a common cause and a common patriotism can be fired. How can Africans be shown that "political freedom" is worthless in an encroaching desert, Europeans that, without the warmth of respect for the African's emerging personality, co-operation will be withheld? Patience is not as attractive to emotional people as excitement. We have made life for Africans, used to the drama and passion of tribal society, incredibly dull. Boredom and repression are the parents of political revolt. Political agitation is a natural answer to frustration and delay. It is a surrogate for religious devotion and the pursuit of high aims.

12. The conservation and husbandry of Natural Resources are the fundamental conditions governing the prospects of an expanding population and an expanding economy. Both opportunistic exploitation by Europeans and feckless misuse

by Africans are against the long term interest. So far, after many initial mistakes and some reckless irresponsibility, Europeans have, by example and ordinance, enforced systems of conservation without which the country would long since have been destroyed. Most Africans grumble about these measures which they consider tricks to steal "their land" for European exploitation. Meekness towards European authority has resulted in grudging acquiescence, and only a minority of Chiefs (e.g., Kuntaja in the Chileka district north of Blantyre) has shown understanding enthusiasm for the efficacy of agricultural reforms. If the handful of devoted and over-worked European officials were to be removed, it is extremely doubtful if any African authority would or could control the natural fecklessness of the people.

This is the fundamental situation underlying all political change. There are in this, as in other fields, perhaps three alternatives:

- (1) continued paternalism
- (2) surrender to African "freedom" and autonomy
- (3) multiracial fraternalism

1. It is probably inescapable that the days of *paternalism* should be numbered. However, sound as its benevolent best the forces arrayed against its continuance are too impatient. At the most one can hope that it will not be hustled out, but can be allowed time to adjust itself to social change. Yet it would be well to remind ourselves of the considered views of two scientific writers, G. V. Jacks and R. O. Whyte, writing in a world survey of soil erosion (*The Rape of the Earth*, 1939). At the end of their report of the situation in Tropical Africa, they came to the following unequivocal conclusion:

"At present, humanitarian considerations for the natives prevent Europeans from winning the attainable position of dominance over the soil. Humanity may perhaps be the higher ideal, but the soil demands a dominant, and if white men will not and black men cannot assume the position, the vegetation will do so, by the process of erosion finally squeezing out the whites. For the tropical environment is so delicately balanced that the soil must have a firm ruler, or chaos will supervene. . . . Either the white man or the wild vegetation is destined to become dominant on the soils which the former now administers but does not rule. . . . Soil erosion is precipitating a decision which might well have been deferred until all men in Africa had gained wider experience, and soil erosion will in the end negative any decision except the right one."

Is this the writing on the wall, to which History will add the word "Finis?"

2. The African nationalist desire of "Africa for the Africans", with the Europeans either a tolerated minority, or employed *pro. tem.* as technicians or investors of risk-capital, is condoned by the European socialist or liberal theorist. It is a point of view which I can best quote from a letter: "I find the Africans awfully Irish! It seems to me that it is only through their own muddles and mistakes, for which they can hold no one else responsible that people learn discipline and responsibility. That self-government in many African States will produce a hell of a mess I don't doubt, but I think it will be a better mess in its ultimate outcome than the present one. . . . What we should do is to help the change over and make co-operation possible instead of closing down on it through producing the kind of frustration and bitterness that make it impossible (as in the Union of South Africa)." This reasoning, however enlightened it may seem to the *modern* psychologist and educationalist, places inordinate faith in African judgment and ability to learn. It ignores fundamental differences of racial inheritance, the incredibly short background of emergence from primitive savagery, and the extremely rapid reversion to anarchy and, above all, the surrender to the encroaching desert, which might ensue if European authority relinquished its hold at all quickly.

3. Is there time, and have we the imagination and resourcefulness to develop *multi-racial fraternalism* against the threat of anarchy and the desert? The number of accessible African minds is very small, and they are far too obsessed by the political excitement encouraged both by the more advanced African States and by the sympathy of anti-settler opinion in Britain (while both Cairo and Moscow radiate subversive propaganda at an ever intenser rate). It would seem that the

only solution of the problem is to uphold benevolent paternalist authority in an unobtrusive manner as long as possible, while endeavouring to persuade men such as Dr. Banda and Orton Chirwa to recognise the hopelessness of a viable economy in a self-contained Nyasaland, faced with increasing population and shrinking natural resources. Meanwhile every effort must be made to get the young men of all races, particularly at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and in such non-racial organisations as the Scouts and Guides, to train their minds on the problems of natural resources' conservation, on the protection and improvement of the landscape, by afforestation, fire-control, head-water arrestment, irrigation and intensive systems of manuring and cropping. In the face of a common danger, a common impoverishment, addressed to fear of desiccation and famine, which will affect everybody regardless of class or colour, can a united front be built up which says: *this is our homeland*, for us to husband, plan and develop for our children and our children's children? Let us combine before it is too late. Let us work with Nature to increase the *substance* of common wealth in the wider homeland of Central Africa. Here is a cause into which we can put all our ardour, hope and love.

Shaftesbury

Dorset

12th March 1960

ST. LUKE'S AND QUEEN STREET CHURCH YOUTH FELLOWSHIP—BROUGHTY FERRY

B. Morgan—President, and R. G. F. Walker—Secretary

We understand that you are empowered to consider as evidence for your report, not only the facts about the Federation of Central Africa, but also statements of opinion. We, as a gathering of young people of the Church of Scotland, have given the matter some study and thought and therefore wish to lay before you the following opinions.

We believe that all men are equal in the sight of God, and therefore consider that it is essential that the British Government does *not*.

- (1) Accord dominion status to the Central African Federation without the consent of each constituent territory.
- (2) Permit, within any territory under its jurisdiction discrimination in any form by one race against another.
- (3) Acquiesce in the unduly lengthy detention without trial of any person.

And therefore we recommend that :

- (1) There should be no move at the 1960 Conference in the direction of dominion status or independence for the Federation.
- (2) There should be a date set for a complete review of the decisions of the 1960 Conference.
- (3) All African opinions should be represented at the 1960 Conference.
- (4) The territories of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be given the opportunity to secede from the Federation through the instrument of plebiscite of all tax-paying citizens.
- (5) Dr. Banda should either be immediately released or brought to trial on specific charges.

May God guide you in your deliberations to just and equitable recommendations.

Broughty Ferry

Angus

1st March 1960

THE MOST HON. THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I have debated much in my mind whether I should put in a paper to the Monckton Commission or no. I have no official

status. I represent no one but myself. Moreover, the Commission have, I know, already taken an immense amount of evidence inside the Federation itself from men and women of all shades of opinion, who live on the spot and have intimate personal knowledge of the subjects of which they speak. On the other hand, I understand that you will also be taking evidence from others who, like myself, do not live in the Federation. Moreover, I have one advantage over many of these, and even over many of those who today live in Central Africa. I was present at the Conferences in 1952 which brought the Federation into being, and I know therefore the motives which inspired those—and in particular the representatives of the Government of the United Kingdom—who took part in those Conferences. This seems to me to be some justification for my putting in a short note of general policy. I do not intend to trouble you with events of the far distant—or even fairly recent—past. You and the other members of the Commission know all about these. I therefore start with the simple question: Why did the representatives of the various Governments concerned come down, in 1952, in favour of a Central African Federation which should include Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland? As you will have been told again and again, the representatives of Southern Rhodesia did not themselves at first favour the inclusion of Nyasaland. They saw no advantages in it from their own point of view. Indeed, economically, it was likely to be a heavy liability. They were persuaded to agree by successive Governments of the United Kingdom, for reasons which seemed to them, and appear to me still, to be valid. The Rhodesias are rich; Northern Rhodesia, with its Copperbelt, very rich. Nyasaland, on the other hand, is both highly populated and poor. Nor is she likely to get richer. So far as I know, there are in Nyasaland no valuable mineral deposits waiting to be developed. She is likely to remain what she has always been in the past, a predominantly agricultural country; and her main export will probably continue to be the export of men—of her surplus population—to assist in the development of the mineral and industrial riches of her neighbours the Rhodesias and the Union. Up to 1953, she had only been kept going at all by assistance from the United Kingdom; and the amount of this was inevitably limited by the resources available to the Colonial Office: and the Colonial Office, it must be remembered, have many other territories in all parts of the world, very similar, in their impecuniosity, to look after. Here seemed a golden opportunity to improve the conditions of the Nyasa people. As a member of the Central African Federation, she would be able to draw on the greater wealth of her two sister members; and there was so far as we could see, no other way in which she could be helped so rapidly and so effectively. That was the economic argument in favour of including Nyasaland in the Federation. And it tied in, if I may use such a phrase in this connection, with wider considerations of general policy. To any one who has given any study to Central Africa and its future, so it seemed to us, perhaps the greatest and most basic fact must be the Zambezi. That mighty River could be either one of two things. It could be the frontier between Central and South Africa, the dividing line between two alien and mutually distrustful spheres—and useless to either. Or it could be a main artery, flowing through the centre of a new African nation—a blood stream bringing power and prosperity to the territories bordering its banks to the South and North. In the minds of those of us who took part in the consultations which led up to Federation, there was, I think, no doubt which of these two alternatives offered the better future for the Africans themselves and for the world in general: and we envisaged that new nation not as European or African, but at a blend of both, each race contributing what it best could, to the prosperity of the whole. We saw it too as a nation based on those broad principles of freedom and justice, which have for so long obtained in our own country. A multiracial nation, based on the British way of life: that is what we had in mind.

We recognised from the first that the early years of the infant Federation were not likely to be easy ones. There were bound to be centrifugal tendencies both among the black and the white Rhodesians. There were Europeans who would have felt safer with a closer attachment to the Union—though I doubt whether they would hold that view so strongly now: and there were sections of the African population who must be expected to fear the Federation, if for no other reason, merely because it was new. Primitive peoples are like children. They are intensely conservative with a small c. They like what is familiar to them. They are suspicious of the unknown. It was for those reasons that any provision for secession by members of the Federation was deliberately omitted from the Federal Constitution. It was for that reason too that practically all those functions of Government which directly affected the daily life of the African were left in the Territorial sphere,

to be administered by the Authorities who the Africans already know. It was done to calm their fears. Whether it was right or wrong I do not know. I only state it as a fact.

Such were the considerations which weighed with those who drew up the Federal Constitution in 1952, and it is, I submit, difficult to see in what respect subsequent events have falsified them. Of course, the Federation was always bound to have teething troubles; and teething troubles, as those who have to deal with young children know, are frequently accompanied by convulsions. But the children do not always die. On the contrary, with careful nursing, they usually get through their troubles and grow up into strong and healthy men and women. And it is just the same with States. In Southern Rhodesia, indeed, it may well be that the danger point is already past. The change that has come about since I first went there in 1908—and even within the last ten years—is very striking. In old days, there was a rigid colour bar, and especially an industrial colour bar. An African could not hope to rise above a certain height in industry. And it went further than that. To take one simple instance, he might not even, in the main cities of the country, walk on the pavement. Now, more and more, this colour bar is breaking down. In the University College in Salisbury, white and black sit side by side at their work and their meals; even, in some cases, so I was told by Mr. Adams, the Principal, dance together. One finds Africans in the shops along with white people. Intelligent and educated Africans are today occupying important and well paid posts. The pass laws are becoming a thing of the past. Of course, even in Southern Rhodesia, where the progress is greatest, there is still a long way to go before the goal is achieved of a multiracial state, in which all races are on a complete equality. Africans are still subject to many—as it must seem to many of us—unnecessary disabilities. And even when, in future, these are removed, and no differentiation is made between the citizens on grounds of race or colour, there is bound still to be this difference—which must be recognised by any impartial person—that, for some considerable time, the average African will not be mentally the equal, or nearly the equal, of the European. How should he be? A hundred years ago, he was a complete savage. It is indeed wonderful what progress he has made. But he remains, in the great majority of cases, a child, with the gaiety, the irresponsibility, and the cruelty of a child. In this twilight phase, the great need is for education and yet more education. The more emphasis the Commission feel they can throw on this, the better, I am sure, it will be. One of the difficulties indeed of ensuring an equal advance in education over the whole Federation is that the primary education of the African was, in the Constitution left in the Territorial sphere. The Federal Government pay for it, but they do not administer it. That makes for a lack of uniformity. Looking back, I regret this. It was left with the Territories, as I explained earlier, to give confidence to the African that those who had up till then watched over his daily life would still be in charge. But I believe that more money would be spent and more advance made if the whole administration of education, elementary as well as advanced, had to be shouldered by the Federal Government. For they have the money, and it is above all to their interest that the African should become an educated civilised man, not, as he is apt to be at present, immature, emotional, a prey to any demagogue who comes along. The proof of this is that the advance of the African has been greater in Southern Rhodesia, where education is administered by those whose home and whose children's home is in Rhodesia, than in the two Northern Territories, which are administered from London. If sufficient time can be given—and it need not necessarily be a long time—in Southern Rhodesia at any rate, the goal of multiracialism is, I believe, not so very far off. I don't pretend that there are not still serious problems, but I believe that they can and will be surmounted.

In the two Northern Territories, the situation is admittedly far more difficult. For, in these territories, with the exception of the Copper Belt itself, the European population is, and is likely to remain, very small in proportion to the African. Indeed, I imagine that, so far at any rate as Nyasaland is concerned, it will generally be agreed, even by the most convinced Federalist, that its future must be as a black State. The real point of difference between the varying schools of thought is as to whether that black state should be inside or outside the Federation. The main argument in favour of putting it outside seems to be that the majority of the inhabitants would at present prefer this. No one would deny that that is a powerful consideration. But is it conclusive? It will hardly be disputed that the average Central African today is, politically speaking, immature. The vast majority can neither read nor write. Not one per cent, I suppose, understands the true meaning either of the term "parliamentary democracy" or even the

word "Federation". They are at present utterly unfitted to come to considered decisions on concepts so remote from their experiences. There is no reason why they should not come to understand these things, just as the average European, with his far longer experience of political institutions, has come to understand them. But there must be a period of training and education. How is that to be provided? That is surely the main issue before us all. And is there any way in which Africans can be associated with the business of Government during the interim period? It is of the first importance that more Africans should be given, as soon as possible, practical experience of administration in a modern state. Who are likely to have the right qualities of experience and responsibility for this purpose? Not, I feel, the young ambitious nationalists, clever but immature, whose real motive is not to bring free institutions, which they hardly understand, to their country, but to get rid of the Europeans and assume power themselves. A far wiser and more experienced body of men are the chiefs, who by birth and position are the natural rulers of the country. It may well prove that the democratic approach has not been the right one for peoples so primitive as those of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, and that we ought, from the first, where possible, to have made more use of the chiefs in the political structure which we have sought to build up in Africa. But, even if that is not so, we could, I believe, now, over the interim period, instead of immediately expanding the franchise to include wide sections of the African population who we know, in our heart of hearts, are not yet ready to exercise it, begin by bringing in the natural leaders of the people. This is a line of thought which the Commission may well have already explored: but it is, I am sure, well worth exploring further. For, were the chiefs to become convinced of the economic and other value of the Federation to the territories themselves, their advice to their own people would tend to neutralise that of the political extremists, and that division of opinion on racial lines, which runs counter to the whole conception of the multiracial state, would give place to another, much healthier, based not on race but reason. And then, gradually, the African representation could be widened, as more and more Africans acquire the education and administrative experience to qualify them for higher posts. If I were asked for a timetable for this evolution, I should answer that it was impossible to give any exact one, just as it is impossible to give any exact timetable for the achievement of independence by the Federation. These things must work themselves out. But what is certain is that both will be brought sensibly nearer if Her Majesty's Government make it absolutely clear that, during the evolution, law and order must be maintained and will be maintained. That is the essence of all ordered progress, the very condition of individual liberty. I should personally like to see the maintenance of internal law and order throughout the territories of the Federation made a Federal subject, like Defence. The present position, under which the Territorial Government, (which means in effect the Secretary of State in London,) orders the arrest of Dr. Banda, who is then incarcerated in a Federal prison, and then orders the release of Dr. Banda, who is then let out of a Federal prison and allowed to return to territories within the Federation, without the Government of the Federation having any constitutional say in the matter at all, seems not only illogical, but intolerable. But if it is thought politically too dangerous to alter this state of affairs, it becomes the more important that Territorial Governments should carry out the essential duty of maintaining law and order themselves. Recent reports from Nyasaland seem to indicate that, in certain parts of that country, law and order is actually now within measurable distance of breaking down. A continuation of such a state of affairs might well strike a fatal blow at the whole future of Federation.

This brings me to the last point I want to make. Even if the Commission have come back to this country convinced that Federation ought to continue, the problem still exists of ensuring that it is able to do so. Any system of Government, to survive, must be a living entity. It must play a part, and be seen to play a useful part, in the life of the people. Otherwise, it will die of inanition. It will appear to fulfil no valuable function, and will come to be regarded merely as an expensive luxury which the country can no longer afford. And indeed if it was never going to do more than it is doing now, if its sphere of action was permanently to be limited to foreign affairs, Defence, Health—and I believe Health is threatened—and a few other comparatively limited responsibilities, there would be considerable substance in such a criticism. But that was certainly not the idea in the minds of those who framed the constitution in 1952. They looked forward to the time when many subjects would be transferred from the Territorial to the Federal sphere. It may well be that that time has not yet come, though I should personally like to see some subjects—to give one example, the Civil Service—transferred immediately. But,

short of the absolute transference of one or other subject from the Territorial to the Federal sphere, is there not at any rate something that could be done to bring into play the Federal machine and give it more to do? What I have in mind is something in the nature of a network of Joint Advisory Committees, composed of representatives of the Territories and sitting under a Federal Minister to discuss and, if possible, co-ordinate policy with regard to many spheres of public administration which do not at present come within the Federal orbit. The Territorial representatives would not be bound by the decisions of the Advisory Committees. There would be no decisions. They would not be executive bodies. But they would give an opportunity for regular and valuable contacts between the Federal and Territorial authorities on numbers of subjects with regard to which such regular contacts do not probably at present exist; they should lead to a greater co-ordination of administration within the Federation; and, if Africans were willing to serve on them as Territorial representatives, that should help to break down the present rigid African opposition to the whole idea of Federation. And other devices of the same kind might, I suggest, be used to weld the Federal and Territorial Administrations more closely together, on a consultative basis.

What, after all, is the alternative to Federation? The Nyasa African leaders would not be satisfied with purely Colonial Office government any more than with Federal government. They want something quite different. They want in effect to get rid of the white man. The first thing with which we should be faced, if the Federation broke up, would be a demand by Nyasaland and possibly Northern Rhodesia for independence, for which those countries are at present entirely unfitted. If that demand were granted, it would in effect be the end of all that Western civilisation has brought to Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, and their inclusion in the Afro-Asian, that is, in practice, the Russian sphere. It is not that the African Nationalist leaders are consciously inclined to Communism. I have heard no evidence of this. But they have by all accounts, through their leaders, been strongly influenced by the Accra Conference, and at the Accra Conference the Russians were very active. There can be little doubt that Africa is regarded by the Russian Government as an area of the first importance in the Cold War, as indeed it is. And for them, as for us, a key point is the Central African Federation. If the experiment of the multiracial state, which is being tried there, were to succeed, it might prove a model and a precedent for others. That would be disastrous for the anti-Western block, and a turning point for the nations of the free world. So great, I believe, are the issues involved. The gradual achievement of an equal partnership between black and white; that has been our policy in Africa for many decades now. It must take time to work out in an area where the backgrounds and the standards of life of the two communities differ so widely. But it is, I am sure, even in these times of change, worth working for. For all our sakes, the Federation must continue, and that means that not only the Territorial Governments but the Federal Government itself must be, and must be seen to be, not a shadow but a reality, playing its full part, as its creators intend it to do, in a balanced constitutional structure. That is perhaps as far as it is possible to go at the moment. Pending wider African approval for Federation, the Lytton pledge precludes any rapid move forwards towards independence and Commonwealth status. But the kind of approach that I suggest might, I hope, help to bring over, if not the leaders of the African National Congress, who want to get rid of us altogether, but at any rate the Chiefs, and so make a breach in the hard line between black and white.

On the wider issues of world politics involved in the Central African problem, we are all, I suppose, equally entitled to our views. But on the local situation, the Monckton Commission, by virtue not only of the personal weight and distinction of its membership, but also because it has, I suppose, had a more comprehensive opportunity than any previous body to study the situation on the spot, must speak with unrivalled authority. For that reason, I submit these comments with very considerable deference. But I am emboldened to do so not only by my past connection with the affairs of the Federation but also because of my deep affection for a country, delightful in itself, on whose success in solving its present problems the future of the whole of Africa south of the Sahara, and possibly much more beside, may, I profoundly believe, largely depend.

London.

SCOTTISH CHRISTIAN YOUTH ASSEMBLY, STEERING COMMITTEE

J. B. Marshall—Chairman

I am instructed to bring to your notice the enclosed Resolution passed by the 12th Scottish Christian Youth Assembly,

held in the Assembly Hall, Edinburgh, on the 13th and 14th February, 1960.

The Assembly was attended by some 450 delegates, representing youth groups of the following denominations and organisations:—

- The Church of Scotland,
- The Episcopal Church in Scotland,
- The Methodist Church,
- The Congregational Church,
- The Baptist Church,
- The United Free Church,
- The Young Men's Christian Association,
- The Young Women's Christian Association,
- The Student Christian Movement,
- The Christian Workers' League,
- and others.

The Christian's Task in the World—In Central Africa

We recognise that Her Majesty's Government initially acted in what they believed to be the best interests of the Territories of Central Africa but we believe that the system which was initiated in 1953 has failed to completely fulfil expectations and therefore

We resolve (*inter alia*)

As an Assembly to bring our views on the appended (Appendix A) facts to the notice of the Monckton Commission and the Secretaries of State for Colonies and for Commonwealth Relations respectively.

Appendix A

We believe:

- (i) That no more power be given away from the Territories to the Federal Government until there is a representative African majority to the legislative Councils of the two Northern Territories.
- (ii) (a) There should be no move at the 1960 Conference in the direction of Dominion Status or Independence for the Federation.
- (b) There should be a date set for a complete review of the decisions of the Conference.

The Episcopal Church formally recorded their withdrawal from part IIIb and IVb of those resolutions dealing with Central Africa.

"On behalf of the Episcopal Church in Scotland, concerned as we are about the problems before us, it is the known policy of our Church that we, as delegates representing the Youth fellowships of our Church, shall not commit the Church by our vote to any one particular political policy, since this is left to individual conscience and there are appropriate channels in our Church through which we can express our concern. We therefore formally record our withdrawal from part IIIb and part IV of this Resolution, and I ask that this be recorded in the Minutes."

Elderslie

Renfrewshire

8th March 1960

SCOTTISH COUNCIL FOR AFRICAN QUESTIONS—GLASGOW COMMITTEE

1. This Committee notes that the Government of the Central African Federation proposes to ask for Dominion status. We feel most strongly that any concession by H.M. Government in the direction of Dominion status for the Federation, whatever the alleged economic advantages, is morally indefensible.

2. The Africans of Nyasaland were never conquered; they agreed, after long and heart-searching talks between chiefs and missionaries of the churches of Scotland, to seek the protection of the Government of the United Kingdom. This protection was reluctantly given, and was agreed to by H.M. Government only after considerable pressure by those churches. When

protection was given in 1891 it was a provision of the protection treaty that the people would eventually move towards self-determination and that, when they reached appropriate educational standards and political maturity, that right would be granted them. This solemn pledge was broken in 1953, when federation was imposed on the people of Nyasaland. H.M. Government had no right then to hand over the powers that it conceded to the Federal Government. It has no right now to transfer further the responsibilities it undertook under the original treaties.

3. Even if H.M. Government had the legal power to hand over its powers to the Federal Government, such an action would still be morally wrong. It is easy, from the preliminary statements of Federal politicians, to see what Federal policy will be if Dominion status is granted. We need mention only two points :

- (1) The African Affairs Board, weak and unheeded as it is, and doing little to fulfil the purposes for which it was set up, i.e., representing African interests in a Federal Government heavily weighted in favour of the European community, will be abolished ;
- (2) The clause in the Constitution invalidating Federal legislation "repugnant to English Law" will be abolished or disregarded. We submit that it would be futile for H.M. Government to try to safeguard the interests of the Africans, of Nyasaland or elsewhere, by entrenched clauses in a new Constitution. The history of similar clauses in the Constitution granted in 1910 to the Union of South Africa is both a convenient precedent for the Federal Government and a warning to H.M. Government which it cannot in honesty ignore.

4. We have studied the arguments put forward for federation in 1951 and the following years, and for closer integration now. We note that they are almost wholly economic in character, but even as economic arguments they do not impress us, and we recommend that the Commission note carefully the difference between the vague but sweeping claims made by the mouthpieces of the Federal Government and the cautious qualified assessments of the Jack Report. We suggest particularly consideration of three points :

- (1) Much is made of the £3,000,000 grant from the Federation to the territory of Nyasaland ; the Commission might well assess how much of this is needed for police and administration expenditure not required before federation set people and Government against each other ;
- (2) The Commission might also seek information on the extent to which the general economic improvement claimed as a result of federation is due to other factors ; we also, we are told, have never had it so good ;
- (3) The Commission might also wish to include in the economic picture an assessment of the effect on Nyasaland peasant production of (1) the disturbances of last year, and (2) the present estrangement between the peasants and the territorial Agricultural Department, both of which are direct results of federation.

5. But whether or not the economic benefits are significant, we submit that the economic argument is of minor importance in the planning of the next moves. Those of us with personal experience of Africans have not found them less interested in material benefits and ready cash than anyone else ; if they spurn them, it must be because they find the price in other fields too high. In fact the problems they—and the Commission—face are essentially human ones. There is an economic background, but the basic fact is the conflict of attitudes and ambitions, a conflict which is growing steadily more bitter, and to study it in the light of theories of the "economic man" is to miss the real point.

6. In the first place, there is no real desire, on either side for further integration, or even for the continuance of Federation. For domination under the label of federation, yes, but the Commission will note that, as soon as Mr. Macmillan repeated the gist of point (d) of the Preamble the other day, secession came as readily to the minds and lips of the Southern Rhodesian Europeans as it had come previously to the Nyasaland Africans.

7. The conditions for a successful Federation based on partnership in any real sense of the term simply do not exist. The only attitudes common to both sides are fear, suspicion and hatred.

8. The African of the northern territories fears that Dominion status or any step towards it will mean permanent domination by the European settler. We submit that this fear is well grounded ; the history of race relations in Southern Rhodesia since 1923 and of Federal legislation since 1953 makes it impossible for any thinking African to feel otherwise.

9. The European community similarly fears the rising tide of African nationalism and sees any concession to it as a direct threat to white political power, social privilege, and standards of living. We hold that those fears also are well-grounded ; the territory cannot support the present European standard for the 7,000,000 Africans who will hope to attain to it when they win political power, and part of the improvement they will demand must be at the expense of the European standard of living.

10. The overall result is a serious widening of the gulf between the two peoples. The European group, having political power, is determined to use it to defend its position. Its temper was clearly shown in the 1958 Southern Rhodesian territorial elections, when the only party with any trace of liberalism in its programme, that of Mr. Garfield Todd, was signally defeated and practically disappeared as a political force, while the ultra-right Dominion Party polled more votes than the United Federal Party. Recent statements by the Federal Prime Minister before the British General Election and again on the occasion of Mr. Macmillan's visit, and the reaction—already referred to—of the Dominion Party to Mr. Macmillan's speech on January 19th, underline the determination of both European parties to hold what they have and go to any length to do so. Similarly, African unrest is kept under only by the creation of what the Devlin Report describes as a Police State.

11. The multi-racial society envisaged by H.M. Government and the moderate elements in Central Africa can be achieved only by establishing a partnership based on tolerance, mutual confidence, and willingness to work on common tasks and towards common aims. Prospects of success were weakened by the untimely imposition of federation in 1953 ; they have declined steadily and seriously since, largely, we suggest, by reason of the policy and actions of the Federal Government.

12. We submit therefore that the only hope of saving the situation is by a process of disengagement : We note the reference to "redistribution of powers in either direction" in Mr. Macmillan's announcement of the Commission's terms of reference. Nothing less than secession and the handing over of effective power to the African communities will restore the confidence of the African people and lower the temperature enough to allow real progress. We see no reason why secession should be regarded as a final breaking up of the Federation. The Commission's concern is with ways of reaching long-term objectives, and an apparent retreat for a few years may mean that the ultimate goal is reached the sooner.

13. If the Commission is unable to take its terms of reference as allowing it to recommend secession we strongly urge that it make recommendations on these lines :

- (1) *A writing into the Constitution of the gist of point (d) of the Preamble.* Many contradictory, vague and confusing statements have been made about this ; the matter can be clarified and false assumptions and misrepresentations avoided, by taking it out of the Preamble and giving it the force of law.
- (2) *The granting of a new liberal constitution to each of the northern territories.* The time is long past when Africans there or anywhere else were willing to be ruled either paternally from abroad or by a small local privileged group, and those constitutions must provide an extended franchise and give effective power to the African populations.
- (3) *Revocation of the 1957 agreement.* We deplore particularly points (3) and (4). By point (3) H.M. Government, on whom responsibility for native well-being is placed, gave up all control of Federal legislation over a wide range of matters affecting African interests. Point (4) we regard as highly dangerous ; much power in executive action lies in the hands of senior civil servants ; legislation can be nullified by lack of co-operation at executive levels, and much of the value of Colonial Office control may be lost if the territorial services are staffed by officers whose attitudes are those of the local Euro-

pean community and who may feel that their allegiance is primarily to that community.

- (4) *Resumption by the Colonial Office of Control over immigration.* The Federal Government has shown itself unworthy to be trusted with this power. It is intolerable that it should be able to expel—as it did last year—a British M.P. from territory still under the control of H.M. Government.

14. Finally we would submit one recommendation about the future programme of the Commission. Through its missions the people of Scotland have been for a long time much more closely involved than the rest of the United Kingdom in the Affairs of Nyasaland. There has been much concern among us since federation was first mooted. We ask that when the Commission returns from Central Africa, it sit in Edinburgh to take oral evidence. We ourselves are aware that many of the points raised in this memorandum are not adequately developed, and that they could be dealt with much more usefully in discussion.

DR. CATHERINE SNODGRASS

I write to plead with you in the name of honour, justice and human rights to recommend to H.M. Government the following:—

- (1) that the possibility of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia seceding from the Central African Federation should be put on the agenda of the 1960 Review Conference,
- (2) that the "emergency" in Nyasaland be ended forthwith and Dr. Banda and other congress leaders allowed home from the concentration camps in Southern Rhodesia,
- (3) that constitutional changes be introduced before the Review Conference so that Territorial Governments can be set up in these two protectorates which will be truly representative of the people of the countries and elected on really wide franchises and this would ensure that the opinion of the majority of the inhabitants would be truly represented at the 1960 Review Conference.
- (4) that pending the last arrangement being carried through important matters, such as immigration, should be returned from the Federal to the Territorial Governments.

It was clear at the time that the majority of the Africans in Nyasaland were against their homeland being federated with Southern Rhodesia in 1953, and that since many of their worst fears have since proved amply justified, they are even more strongly against the continuance of this new constitutional arrangement that was imposed on them in contravention and discourteous disregard of the treaty regarding Protectorate States into which their chiefs voluntarily entered in 1891 with the representatives of Queen Victoria, as well as of many promises of moving towards self-government made to them since. To treat them as the British Government did in 1953 was to treat them as pawns being moved about a chessboard: and it was a most dishonourable and ungentlemanly action of that Government to force the young Queen to go back on her great grandmother's pledge.

The Africans regard this treatment of a solemn treaty as a "scrap of paper" as immoral, and rightly so, and the British Government should realise that it is a matter of elementary honour and justice that they should reverse this stupid and cruel policy. They should be aware that honourable people can admit a mistake and injustice and try to make amends without delay, and that it is only small minded people who stubbornly persist in injustice and error because of false notions of grandeur and of face-saving.

It was a shocking thing to make changes that disrupted a society where Africans and Europeans had been working together in friendship for many decades and thus deliberately to attempt to destroy the very good work done by the missionaries of the Church of Scotland and others among people who are regarded as being very fine indeed by those who know them well.

With hopes that you will take a firm stand for justice, fair play, human rights and the honouring of treaties.

Edinburgh
28th January 1960

THE REV. R. D. SPEIRS

I have been asked to forward to you the attached memoranda from the three political societies, the Cosmopolitan Club and the Student Christian Movement of the St. Andrews Colleges of the University of St. Andrews. During the past year several speakers have put to us many aspects of the Central African problem and there has been a great deal of study and discussion about it.

As is evident from the memoranda there was disagreement between the Conservative and the other societies, but all were agreed on the following points which they have authorised me to submit to you:—

- (1) That the possibility of secession should be considered by the Commission.
- (2) That there is need for an objective assessment of the economic arguments for and against Federation.
- (3) That means of making the African Affairs Board a more effective instrument of protection should be considered.
- (4) That there should be consideration of the possibility of basing the franchise on educational qualifications alone. This would imply the need for a rapid extension in African education.

Fife
29th January 1960

Annexure I
St. Andrews University Cosmopolitan Club
Labour Club
Liberal Society and
S.C.M. Branch Study Group on Race Relations

We, the members of the above groups, believe it essential for a democratic solution to the problems of Central Africa, that:

- (a) an economic argument should never be used as an excuse for the with-holding of the means for self-determination;
- (b) progress toward universal adult suffrage should be clearly defined, the system for admission to the electoral roll, in the meantime, being based upon educational rather than property qualifications;
- (c) no further power should be granted to the Federal Government until a majority of the people so desire.

Annexure II
St. Andrews University Conservative Society

As there was a wide divergence of opinion on the subject, it was thought advisable to put down both sides of the argument.

Extension of the Franchise

One side reaffirmed their belief in the qualitative vote, with secondary education as a necessary qualification. The African at present, apart from a small educated elite, has no real understanding of how to use the vote, and could be easily led by anyone with a vested interest—the demagogue or the self-seeking politician.

The usual basic education is not sufficient and some attempt would have to be made to give the ordinary African some understanding of his own country's development and the part that the European has played in this process.

The other side maintained that a conservative approach could not be followed with success in the face of the rising tide of African nationalism. Rather than attempt to repress these forces we should put ourselves at the head of the new national movement, and try, if it is practical, to make positive concessions.

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The Group as a whole would like to suggest that the Monckton Commission look into the possibilities of having more African members elected onto the Legislative Assembly as a means to solving the unrest.

Secession

It is undeniable that Nyasaland benefits economically from her association with the Federation and if she finally secedes from the Rhodesias through fear of social domination by the European, she must be given generous aid to prevent her degenerating into a rural slum. Some regard the rumours of apartheid in Central Africa as exaggerated, and cannot justify her claims to secede on these grounds alone. Others regard Nyasaland as a separate unit, which must be given individual treatment on account of the extremely high proportion of Africans to Europeans.

M. R. and D. E. STEWART

On the assumption that the Commission for which you act will consider the submissions of all people lawfully interested in the Commission's work, on all matters touching the Commission's remit however directly or indirectly, my husband and I, as United Kingdom Parliamentary voters, submit these points for consideration.

1. A Commission whose membership excludes a representative cross-section of the main interests at stake in formulating recommendations for a Federal Constitution—the interests of the Africans in Central Africa—must work grievously handicapped. The present Commission is not responsible for its own composition (apart from the members' willingness to serve on it in the light of its known composition) and cannot be criticised for any exclusion in membership appointment. But the point ought to be brought out in the Commission's report.

2. Whatever the composition of the present Commission, its study and its findings ought to be based primarily and mainly on African evidence in the relevant territories. Any other weighting of emphasis will make the Commission's report nugatory.

3. The Commission's inquiries ought to be seen to be objective and impartial. This cannot be if some people offer, or are asked for, testimony while they are under restraint; or refuse to testify, because they are under restraint.

4. Dr. Hastings Banda and every other person now under restraint in the Rhodesias or Nyasaland for purportedly security reasons ought to be unconditionally released, or brought to open trial, now.

5. In the context of African conditions as a whole, the present Commission ought to refuse to give special consideration as to a separate problem—to the idea that economic factors can conflict with spiritual, moral or emotional factors in the formulation of a constitution in Central Africa. All these factors must obviously be already weighed by the people if the majority interest referred to under "1" above (and other witnesses) before they give evidence to the Commission. That is, the resolution of any such conflict of factors ought to be left to witnesses—their thoughts naturally being elucidated, if necessary in examination by the Commission—and the Commission's right part ought to be in the main to report the sense of the witnesses. The Commission's recommendations ought to stem from the consensus of the fully, proportionately, representative witnesses; not necessarily from special beliefs of Commission members.

6. Secondary to the wishes of the peoples of the Central African territories, but important, are the wishes of the people of the United Kingdom in this matter. By the "people" we do not necessarily mean "the Government", "the Cabinet" or any other Parliamentary body of the United Kingdom. The Commission ought to try to assess relevant public feeling in this country. We feel certain that a majority in Scotland will support the majority attitude of the Church of Scotland. We think that a majority elsewhere in the United Kingdom may do.

7. Consideration by the Commission of testimony derogatory to African responsibility in the business of Government or industry ought to be slight, if it exists at all. It will be pointless, as it was in the case of pre-independence India; or pre-Treaty Ireland; or the Federation of Malaya; or 11th Century England; or a host of others.

Edinburgh

29th January 1960

STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT, GLASGOW UNIVERSITY

T. D. Campbell, Secretary

The Committee of the above branch of the Student Christian Movement would like to bring to the attention of the Commission some of the points concerning the Federation, which have greatly concerned us:—

- (1) Since there is clear evidence that the Federation was imposed, in 1953, against the known opposition of the majority of the native inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland surely the right of these territories to opt out of the federal connection should be placed on the agenda of the Review Conference. To ignore the strong convictions which the peoples of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have in this matter, would be completely contrary to the ideas expressed in Mr. Macmillan's speech of the 2nd inst. in South Africa.
- (2) Britain ought to renounce the April 1957 Convention whereby she agreed not to introduce any legislation affecting federal laws without the permission of the Federal Government, since this is a violation of the promises made in the preamble to the 1953 constitution. The unsatisfactory situation at present is illustrated by the case of one of our former members, the Revd. Tom Colvin, who, whilst occupying a grant-aided post with the Church in Nyasaland, that is being subsidized by the Territorial Government, was refused re-entry to Nyasaland by the Federal Government.
- (3) There should be no move in the direction of independence for the Federation, until the inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have had an opportunity in a plebiscite, to say if they desire to remain within the Federation.

Glasgow,

3rd February, 1960.

P. F. TAIT

The review of the Constitution of the above Territories is a matter which vitally affects every voter in this country since we are responsible for the security and wellbeing of the inhabitants of two of the countries which go to make up the Federation. This and not any specialised knowledge of these Territories is the reason which I put forward to justify the sending of this memorandum.

The Commission has been set up to Review the Constitution, this is not enough, it must also have the power to discuss and recommend, if it comes to that decision, that the Federation be dismembered and that Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia be allowed to dissociate themselves from the racist policies of Southern Rhodesia.

The people of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, i.e. every person over the age of 21 years, regardless of literacy, must be given the opportunity to vote as to whether or not they wish to remain within the Federation. This vote of the people themselves must be the decisive factor in any and all future deliberations about the future of the two Colonies. Although precedent is not of great importance in matters such as these, nevertheless it must be pointed out that such referenda have been carried out in the past in countries where the proportion of illiteracy amongst the population was much higher, e.g. The Northern Cameroons Plebiscite.

If Federation is to be retained then it is imperative that the powers of the Federal Government be not increased indeed they should be reduced and the watch-dog of the African Affairs Board should be retained and greatly strengthened. That the powers of the Federal Government are much too great in at least one sphere, that of Immigration, is obvious. The situation is at one and the same time dangerous and laughable when a Member of the British Parliament is removed against his will from a Colony where many of the inhabitants are incongruously designated "British Protected Persons". The final degradation came when the Federal Government of Sir Roy Welensky refused to re-admit into Nyasaland a Minister of the Church of Scotland. As a member of this Church and having some personal knowledge of the Reverend T. Colvin as an honest and sincere Christian, I can only assume that there has been an attack on the principle of love with brotherhood which the Church has put into practice and to which the Federal Government has paid only simpering lip service.

The basic point to be made is that the Africans in the two Northern Territories must be given the power to govern their own affairs and this means quite shortly and simply that they

must be given political power. Until they have such political power it is criminal folly to give any more authority to the Government of the Whites for the Whites in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Musselburgh
Midlothian

D. R. THOMAS and others

We, the under-signed, recall our duties in connection with the preservation of peace and good government within the Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. We note that, despite the apparent benefits of Federal Development, the majority of the inhabitants of these Territories are still opposed to the Federal system. This has been brought home to us by recent press reports about our Prime Minister's tour which would appear to indicate that the opposition is widespread and in places potentially dangerous. Accordingly we respectfully recommend in the light of the approaching Conference Reviewing the Federal Constitution:

- I. That the right of a Territory to contract out of, or loosen its relation to, the Federation be recognised;
- II. That the Federation should not be retained if a majority of the inhabitants of all races make it clear in a referendum that they so desire:
- III. That if the Federation in some form be continued—which we would count desirable on grounds of general development for the whole region—no further powers be transferred from the Territories to the Federal Government and that no further powers be ceded to any Government in Central Africa until there are genuinely representative African majorities in the Legislatures of the Protectorates.

We pray God's blessing upon you in your difficult tasks.
Edinburgh
26th January 1960

UNITED STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION—EDINBURGH
UNIVERSITY BRANCH
J. Metcalf, President

The Edinburgh University Branch of the United Students' Association notes that the Federation of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland imposed on a Freedom loving people in 1953 met with much opposition. The people of Nyasaland, a State that has an overwhelming African Majority, think that it will do more harm than good if they are federated with the people of Northern Rhodesia which has among its settlers—the South African type of settler.

It is indeed surprising to observe that the Majority of African Tax Payers enjoy no democratic right of electing their government. The electoral qualifications and other requirements keep the African inhabitants of Nyasaland from choosing a government on the principles of democracy, and this, to the world at large, is a betrayal of the essence of democracy which many nations including Her Majesty's Citizens of the United Kingdom have for centuries advocated and preserved. The Authorities think that the majority of the tax-paying people of Nyasaland are illiterates and thus should not participate in electing their Government, but one may argue that if by such a condition, people are denied the privileges of democracy, they, by such condition are ineligible for paying taxes which support such Government. The experiences of Ghana, India and Uganda where illiteracy in the English language predominates have made the argument of the Authorities unjustified. The people of Nyasaland, in obedience and respect to the principles of democracy, should be accorded the privileges and rights to decide whether to belong to Federation with Rhodesia or stay as a separate state.

Any Conference to review the present political set-up in Nyasaland, to enjoy the confidence and support of Africans particularly the native inhabitants of Nyasaland, should be held outside the Central African Territories to prevent unrepresentative influence on the reports and findings of the Commission. A fact-finding delegation may be sent to Nyasaland to obtain original facts on which the Commission may base its reports otherwise the settlers are bound to exercise undue influence on the Commission.

To return to a normal existence as prevailed in the past the composition of the Monckton Commission must enjoy the support of the majority of Africans, such African support can be gained by admitting as members of the Commission such Political Parties which have the support of Africans. In this

respect, the African National Congress of Northern Rhodesia, United National Independence Party in Northern Rhodesia the Malawi Congress Party of Nyasaland and the Zambia African Congress should be admitted into the Commission.

In view of the present situation, Her Majesty's Government should not grant political independence or relax its political responsibilities to Nyasaland—otherwise the majority would be dominated by the minority and further pave the way to apartheid policy, a policy condemned and opposed by world opinion. Her Majesty's Government should re-consider Her undertaking in 1957 not to introduce any legislation affecting the Federal Laws without the concurrence of the Federal Government. An African Affairs' Board to guide the interest of Africans is a misleading idea since such a Board will inevitably be dominated by the minority—in other words—the few white settlers.

Her Majesty's Government should be conscious of the magnitude of Her responsibilities to the Majority inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and should for the sake of democracy allow the wishes of majority of Her Majesty's subjects in the two Territories to prevail.

25th January 1960

R. W. WALKER

I am writing as one who worked in Nyasaland as an Ordained Medical Missionary from 1943 to 1951—being there when the question of the Federation was first fully and publicly discussed throughout Nyasaland.

I can well recall the quick reaction by the African against the whole project, and to my mind there was no doubt whatever but that the basis of objection lay in the fear that his country would come under similar conditions to those that have applied in South Africa with its apartheid doctrines and to a lesser extent in Southern Rhodesia. I believe his fear was based on neither extremist propaganda nor on ignorance but that it was justified particularly in the light of later happenings.

Nyasaland up till 1951 was a very happy, even if not a rich, country and there was the finest feeling of friendliness and accord between black and white, with small though significant openings for the training of the African in the sphere of Government. Since the Federal issue however was raised the situation changed radically worsening when the Federal Constitution was imposed upon a people who were unanimously opposed to the proposals.

It has seemed to many of us quite out of keeping with the British way of life and its honour, on the one hand to take over the protection of a country at the close of the last century under such terms as "with the consent and desire of the Chiefs and their peoples", and then on the other hand, sixty years later when great advances have been made educationally and in many other ways to turn round to the African and say, in effect, that he was still a child, that he did not know what was good for his country, and that only later would he see and bless the advantages of Federation which for the time being must be thrust upon him.

I am convinced that but for the Federal Scheme we would not have had the present situation in Nyasaland, with its unrest and tension and suspicions and I feel strongly that if the subject of secession from the Federation is to be barred from consideration in your Commission's forthcoming enquiry and especially in the Review Conference later this year untold damage will be the result in Central Africa and it is more than likely that many Africans will turn for help to countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

I believe Britain has already surrendered too much of its authority to the Federal powers and that there is only one way to restore confidence to the African in British goodwill and justice. It is to give to the African, if he so wishes, the opportunity to retrace his steps to the position his country was in under the British Crown prior to 1953, and to allow him to move forward under the Colonial Office to eventual self-government within the Commonwealth, with Nyasaland linked perhaps to the Rhodesia and/or neighbouring territories in an agreed Association. But I firmly believe we must act quickly or the day will be lost.

In view of the above, and much else that could be said, I would humbly submit the following recommendations:—

- (1) That at the 1960 Review Conference the right of any of the three territories to secede from the Federation be considered.

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- (2) That at this Conference there be a large African representation from the two Northern territories—this representation being selected by the Governors from nominations put forward by the Malawi and African National Congresses and by the United National Independence Party.
- (3) That at present no more powers be transferred from the U.K. or Territorial governments to the Federal authorities.
- (4) That Dominion status or anything akin to it be not granted to the Federation within the next five years and only then under a majority consent of all the inhabitants of the territories concerned.
- (5) That the African Affairs Board be not only retained but strengthened.
- (6) That the 1960 Review Conference be held in London, not in Africa, and that as many as possible of its sessions be open to press and other observers.
- (7) That in order to prevent any repetition of the disturbing and undesirable incidents of the Stonehouse and Colvin cases, control of Immigration be returned to the Territories.
- (8) That your Commission affirm, if this has not already been done, that no evidence lead by any person to the Commission be used in any way in any legal proceedings that may be taken against him or against others.

Lesmahagow,
Lanark.
28th January, 1960.

G. WIGHTMAN REED

In the course of the past term, and again in the current one, the question of Central Africa and its future is one which has stood high on the list of subjects discussed, by individuals and by many and varied groups here in the University.

Many people have come to the conclusion that responsibility for the present unsatisfactory state of affairs lies, at least partly, with the electorate in Britain. I should like, therefore, on my own behalf and on that of many likeminded undergraduates, to suggest that it is essential that the present Commission should discuss the case for and against the possible independence of Nyasaland as regards the Federation.

The equivocal news reports of the past ten days stress the lack of clear thinking or clear statement on the question.

The future of any country is the concern primarily of the adult inhabitants of that country—and, therefore, the people of Nyasaland have a right to express their own opinion on the matter, and that opinion ought to be the last word. To measure the educational standing of the people of Nyasaland against the yardstick of the British electorate would be foolish—a truer parallel is to be found in the Indian States where popular representation exists despite a low level of literacy.

No matter what happens, power cannot justifiably be handed over from the Nyasaland protectorate to a—largely unsympathetic—Federation authority. Nor should the African Affairs Board be removed or weakened, under any circumstances.

These are but a few of the points which seem of outstanding importance, and it is to be hoped that this Commission will not fail in its duty to discuss them adequately.

Trinity College
Cambridge
29th January 1960

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, EDINBURGH BRANCH

Dr. Catherine Snodgrass, Chairman

The members of the Edinburgh Branch of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom have followed

closely recent events in Central Africa. It is natural that this should be so in view of the long association of the people of Scotland with the people of Nyasaland and of the concern of our League for human rights and for the value of every individual regardless of colour, race and creed.

All the available evidence indicates that the majority of the Africans in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were against being federated with Southern Rhodesia in 1953, a change which altered, without their consent, the protectorate status into which in the case of Nyasaland the chiefs had voluntarily entered with Queen Victoria in 1891. Now we understand they are even more wholeheartedly against the continuation of this new constitutional arrangement. We therefore believe that, if the majority of the adult inhabitants of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, irrespective of race, indicate in a plebiscite or referendum that they are against Federation, it should be discontinued—c.f. recent plebiscites in Togoland and Northern Cameroons.

We would also urge upon you the necessity and justice of including on the agenda for the 1960 Review Conference the right of the two northern territories to secede from the Federation and of ensuring that there are strong and truly representative African delegations from Nyasaland and N. Rhodesia at that Conference.

Meantime it is very important that the British Government should exercise to the full the protecting powers it retains and that it should take steps to return to the Governments of Nyasaland and N. Rhodesia and the Colonial Office authority within these two territories for immigration, defence, external affairs and other vital matters.

25th January 1960

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, GLASGOW AND WEST OF SCOTLAND BRANCH

Mrs. E. A. Campbell, Chairman

I have been asked to bring to your attention the following resolution which was approved at a meeting of the Glasgow Branch of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, held in Glasgow on January 21st:

"The members of the Glasgow Branch of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom have followed closely recent events in Central Africa. It is natural that this should be so in view of the long association of the people of Scotland with the people of Nyasaland and of the concern of our League for human rights and for the value of every individual regardless of colour, race and creed.

All the available evidence indicates that the majority of the Africans in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were against being federated with Southern Rhodesia in 1953. This change altered, without their consent, their protectorate status. Now we understand they are even more wholeheartedly against the continuation of this new constitutional arrangement. We therefore believe that, if the majority of the adult inhabitants of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, irrespective of race, indicate in a plebiscite or referendum that they are against Federation, it should be discontinued.

We would also urge upon you the necessity and justice of including on the agenda for the 1960 Review Conference the right of the two northern territories to secede from the Federation and of ensuring that there are strong and truly representative African delegations from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia at that conference.

Meantime it is very important that the British Government should exercise to the full the protecting powers it retains "and that it should take steps to have returned to the Territorial Governments and to the Colonial Office such functions of administration and government as have been assumed by the Federal Government."

We trust that this resolution will receive the careful and sympathetic consideration of your Commission.

In conclusion we send you our good wishes for great success in your investigations and deliberations.

Glasgow
28th January 1960