ASSESSMENT OF THE OVERSIGHT PERFORMANCE OF THE 8TH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY COMMITTEES ON ANTI-CORRUPTION

BY

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PG/NLS/2015064

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE AND DEMOCRATIC STUDIES /UNIVERSITY OF BENIN (NILDS/UNIBEN) POSTGRADUATE PROGRAMMES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTERS DEGREE IN PARLIAMENTARY ADMINISTRATION (MPD)

APRIL, 2023

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation titled, *XXXXXXXXX*, presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Masters in Parliamentary Administration is my original work and has never been presented in this or any other institution for the award of the same or any other degree. All consulted works are duly acknowledged.

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this dissertation titled, *XXXXXXX,* was carried out by XXXX **(PG/NLS/XXX)** **and** has been approved by the following undersigned as having met the requirement for the award of the degree of Masters in Parliamentary Administration (MPD) of the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies/University of Benin, Benin City.

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Dr A.G Abiola   **Date**

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Internal Examiner   **Date**

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External Examiner   **Date**

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to the Almighty God; for His divine love, grace and mercy; and to my family, for their prayers, understanding and perseverance

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I want to express my sincere gratitude to Almighty God for his infinite mercies and grace throughout this programme.

ABSTRACT

The study examined the performance of oversight by the 8th National Assembly anti-corruption committees. Other objectives included evaluated the effect of the institutional and legal frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly in tackling corruption; investigated the deficiencies in the legal and institutional frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly in tackling corruption, and identified the strategies would mitigate the deficiencies in the future.

To address the concerns of the study, a mixed research method was adopted. The sample size of for the survey was 372, while for the qualitative oral interview the sample size was 10 key informants purposively selected. Both primary (questionnaire and interview) and secondary (journal articles, magazines, the internet, and official publications of government agencies, among others) data were also utilized. Descriptive statistics was adopted for the analysis of the questionnaire while content analysis was used to analyze qualitative data. The presentation was done in themes, tables, and charts.

The result of the analysis of field data revealed that during the period under review, the 8th Senate Committee on Anti-corruption and Financial Crimes deployed its oversight tool in several occasions to combat corruption. Hence, it performed its oversight function well. In doing so, the 8th Senate passed several anticorruption legislations and resolutions. Hence, the findings showed that there are legal frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly to tackle corruption in Nigeria. These frameworks include the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) Act, etc. The study further found that while institutional frameworks are critical success factors in the fight against corruption, key Informants queried the effectiveness of the legal frameworks in the fight against corruption is following various institutional measurements of Nigeria's Corruption Perception.

The specific deficiencies of the legal and institutional frameworks include immunity of public officers, insecurity of the anti-graft chairman's office, lack of special court for the prosecution of corrupt officials, the influence of politically exposed officials, lack of financial autonomy of the anti-graft agencies, and lack of substantive whistleblower legislation, etc. Nevertheless, the study recommended that that improved and independent funding of anti-graft agencies, repeal of the immunity provision in the 1999 constitution, vigorous enlightenment campaign, etcetera, as strategies that will mitigate the challenges confronting the fight against corruption in Nigeria.

Contents

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

Corruption is a global problem that affects all countries. Indeed, it exists in any country, at any time, and under any form of government (Jorgensen, 2005). Corruption is a pandemic and a sociological phenomenon that has become a norm in Nigeria. According to Fishman and Golden (2017), corruption carries negative social consequences, destroys economic efficiency, and social inequities, and undermines the functioning of democracy. In fact, Hanchard (2014) alluded that corruption has impeded the ability to deal with poverty effectively and it thrives where the rewards are potentially great and the risks are potentially low.

Corruption has been identified as one of the foremost factors hindering the significant growth and development of the Nigerian economy (Ardzard, 2017). In response, several institutional frameworks have been put in place to combat corruption. As a testament, the creation of legally enabled institutions saddled with the tasks of fighting corruption such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) as well as the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences Commission (ICPC) becomes worthy of mention. These efforts are attributable to the National Assembly following its constitutionally ascribed powers to make laws. Without a doubt, preventing corruption assists to raise city revenues improving service delivery, and stimulating public confidence and participation in elections (Klitgaard et al., 2000).

The legislative assembly comprises a group of elected people that make and change the laws of a country. This group of elected people is given a mandate by the citizens to represent them and be the voice for articulating their concerns at the national level. On this note, Lafenwa (2009) defined the legislature as people chosen by election to represent the constituent units and control

the government. Similarly, Okoosi-Simbine (2010) asserted that the legislature is lawmaking, and policy-influencing body in the democratic political system. In particular, Section 4(3) Part II of the constitution provides for the legislative powers of the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as follows,

> The power of the National Assembly to make laws for the peace, order and good governance of the federation with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List shall, save as otherwise provided in this constitution, be to the exclusion of the Houses of Assembly of States (CRFN, 1999, Section 4(3)).

Therefore, relying on the smaller division of its members known as committees, the National Assembly pursues anti-corruption objectives within the ambit of its oversight mandate. Essentially, legislative oversight underscores all legislative activities aimed at certifying the implementation of laws. Mostly, this follow-on activity of lawmaking is designed to ensure the implementation of laws in line with legislative intent. Explicitly, while section 88 of the 1999 constitution mandates the National Assembly to conduct or cause investigations to be conducted on subjects it enjoys comparative legislative powers, section 89 permits it to seek pieces of evidence in the conduct of such investigations. Expectedly, the National Assembly depends on its committees for the conduct of its oversight function.

The legislative literature attributes several benefits to the use of the committee system in the organization of modern legislatures. To illustrate, Abiola (2018), as well as Dan-Azumi (2019) posit that with committees, legislatures are divided into smaller manageable numbers for the timely and simultaneous completion of tasks. In Nigeria, as it is elsewhere, legislative committees are assigned jurisdictional tasks hence, ensuring that elected members are nuanced on any given

subject matter. For example, Order Twenty, Rule 14 of the 2020 House of Representatives Standing Order and Order 98 (3) of the 2021 Senate Standing Order both provide separately for the establishment of Ani-Corruption committees in both chambers. This demonstrates a commitment to tackling corruption. More specifically, the business of governance begins with lawmaking thus, further justifying the appointment of anti-corruption committees in the National Assembly.

Despite the provision for the above committees in the National Assembly, corruption continues to persist. Transparency International's [TI's] Corruption Perception Index (CPI) points to this fact. Nigeria was ranked 146/180, 149/180, and 154/180 in 2019, 2020, and 2021 CPI by Transparency International (Transparency International [TI], 2020; 2021; 2022). Regardless, the legislature as the accredited representatives of the people has the duty of protecting public funds and other resources. As the controller of the purse, it has the additional duty of serving as the guardian of the public treasury. This, in fact, is what the scrutiny of administration by the assembly seeks to achieve in a democratic regime. Apart from this, the lawmaking and representational powers of the legislature further boost its drive to curb corruption. As a result, this study attempts to investigate legislative effectiveness in tackling corruption in Nigeria.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Despite the abundance of natural resources, huge earnings, and several other objects capable of fostering socio-economic growth and development, a majority of Nigeria's citizens still grapple with meeting basic needs. For instance, Nigeria was declared the poverty capital of the world in 2018 fueled mostly by acts of corruption by Brooking's Institute (ThisDay Nigeria, 2022, 10th March). Implicitly, various governmental actors act in ways suggestive of a deliberate

advancement of personal gratifications. To illustrate, recently, some elected and appointed officials have been the subject of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) as well as the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences Commission (ICPC) investigations (The Cable Nigeria, 2021, 28th July; Premium Times Nigeria, 2020, 9th February). This may have further plunged Nigeria's corruption perception following Transparency Internation (TI) successive perception indexes.

Nothwithstanding the above, the legislature stands out as an institution saddled with the "watchdog" responsibility (Section 88 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria [CFRN] 1999 as amended) since the business of governance begins with lawmaking (Van Gestel, 2013; Section 80 (1) of the CFRN). To buttress this responsibility vested in the National Assembly, Section 89 (2) (b) was explicit in its mandate to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence, and the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it. Preceding this constitutional provision is the stipulation that permits the Houses to appoint committees for any purpose it deems fit (Section 62 (1)).

In addition, the principle of separation of powers upon which Nigeria's democracy is built sets constitutional limits for inter-branch checks and balances. Explicitly, the National Assembly utilizing the instrumentality of the committee system will expectedly pursue anti-corruption goals for the good governance of the Federation. Thus reemphasizing the place of the committee system in the organization of modern legislatures as espoused by Dan-Azumi (2019). Nevertheless, there exists a paradox where the presence of the anti-corruption committees in the National Assembly has failed to completely eradicate or at least deter corrupt activities as established in paragraph one. Therefore, calling the performance of oversight by these legislative committees to question.

As a result, this study investigates the performance of oversight by the 8th National Assembly committees on anti-corruption.

1.3. Research questions

The following research questions were formulated to guide the study;

1. How did the 8th National Assembly Committees on Anti-corruption perform their oversight activities?

2. How have the institutional and legal frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly aided the anti-corruption agencies in tackling corruption?

3. In what areas are the legal and institutional frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly deficient?

4. How can the deficiencies be mitigated to ensure the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies in the future?

1.4. Research objectives

The broad objective of the study is to examine the efforts of the 8th National Assembly anti-corruption committees in tackling corruption. The study is set to achieve the following specific objectives:

1. To examine the performance of oversight by the 8th National Assembly anti-corruption committees.

2. To evaluate the effect of the institutional and legal frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly in tackling corruption.

3. To investigate the deficiencies in the legal and institutional frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly in tackling corruption.

4. To identify strategies that would mitigate the deficiencies in the future.

1.5. Significance of the study

This study offers both theoretical and empirical significance *per* contribution to knowledge. Specifically, the study will be of immense benefit to legislators as the findings and recommendations arising from it will broaden the scope and also address identified challenges with the view to tackling corruption in Nigeria. The study is also significant because its findings will help identify factors that inhibit the Laws and Institutions aimed at tackling Corruption in Nigeria hence, proffering measures to be undertaken to address the factors or challenges. The study is also significant because it will provide a springboard for further research in this area of knowledge. In addition, the findings of this study will be useful to legislative institutions such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), and ECOWAS Parliament among others, and anti-corruption agencies like the EFCC, ICPC, etc., to advance policies that will reposition their anti-corruption drives.

1.6. Scope of the study

This study focuses on the oversight activities of the 8th Senate Anti-corruption committee. The choice of the Senate is a result of its preeminent place as the upper chamber of Nigeria's National Assembly. In addition, the study is delimited to the period from 2015 to 2019 being the tenure of the 8th National Assembly due to the refusal of the Senate to confirm Ibrahim Magu as the Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) several times following corruption allegations (Premium Times Nigeria, 2017, May 15th). Analytically, it covers legislative

oversight activities by the committees of the 8th Senate within its tenure aimed at tackling corruption in Nigeria.

1.7. Definition of terms

Corruption: Behaviour that deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or `appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence.

Legislature: a political institution whose members are formally elected from delineated constituencies and are equal. In fact, the legislative authority derives from a claim that the members are representatives of the political community, and whose decisions are collectively made according to complex procedures.

Institution: a collection of customs and roles brought together into a common and collective value system that satisfies the desires of the persons involved.

Law: Law refers to set of rules ordinarily made by the government of a Country or State used in guiding and controlling the manner in which persons in should behave.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, different kinds of literature on the variables of the study are reviewed. The major concepts identified for review in this paper are the Legislative oversight, oversight performace, Committee Systems. The Thematic Approach is adopted in discussing relevant literature. Afterward, the study is situated within the frameworks of the Principles of Separation of Powers and structural functionalism.

2.1 Conceptualization

2.1.1 The Legislature

Legislature is referred as parliament in Britain, National Assembly in Nigeria, congress in United States (Abonyi, 2006). The legislature occupies a key position in the democratic process of government, with the purpose of articulating the collective will of the people through representative government (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). Awotokun (as cited in Abegunde, 2014) states that legislature is an arm of government made up of elected representatives or constituted assembly people whose duty is to make laws, control the activities of the executive and safeguard people's interest. Anyaegbunam (2000) define legislature as the role of making, revising, amending and repealing laws for the well being of its citizenry it represents.

Lafenwa (2009) defines legislature as people chosen by election to represent the constituent units and control government. Okoosi-Simbine (2010) asserts that legislature is law-making, and policy influencing body in the democratic political system. The legislature is the branch of government that has the responsibility to oversee the actions and omissions of the government (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). The lawmakers can be described in the light of sovereignty, the expression on the will of the people. This is derived from the people and should be exercise

according to the will of the people they represent. The legislature is derived from a claim that its members are representative of the political community, and decisions are collectively made according to complex procedures. The state of the legislature has been identified as the strongest predictors on the survival of every democratic development (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010).

The centrality of the legislature is captured by Abegunde (2014) when he asserted that legislature is the pivot of modern democratic systems. Instructively, the legislatures vary in design, structure, organisation, operational procedures, and selection process as well as sizes, tenure of office and nature of meetings. In a bicameral type of arrangement two legislative chambers exist in a country; one chamber seems to dominate the other. Nwabueze and Mueller (1985) noted that when they viewed that there exist some forms of dominance of one chamber to the other in some legislation, term of office, size of the constituencies represented. However, they intricate rules adopted usually harmonize the legislative function of the two chambers (upper and lower chamber).

Ewuim, Nnamani, and Eberinwa (2014) assert that bicameral legislative is common in federal states that stem from the imperative of one house to protect the interests of minority groups in such states. Nigeria operates in a federally bicameral arrangement on the dictates of 1954 Lyttleton Constitution. The House of Senate (Upper House) and House of Representatives (Lower House) jointly called National Assembly of Nigeria. The two chambers act as a check on other arms of government; such checks are minimal because the major policy demand debate is on party affiliations rather than national interest. This arrangement enhance passage of law and gives opportunity for division of labour between the two houses (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). In addition, bicameral legislature provides an opportunity for wider representation of various interests groups in a country from one democracy to the other.

The legislature performs various functions that are not identified in the literature (Ewuim, Nnamani, & Eberinwa, 2014). Ewuim, Nnamani, and Eberinwa note that some of these include putting governments in power through various means, such as an electoral college (like United Kingdom and United States of America); using apportionment formulae to represent various ethnic, religious, language, and geographic differences in their states (India and Ethiopia); serve as a recruiting pool for other positions in government. etc. Other discrete functions include; informing the electorate about the various roles and responsibilities of a member of parliament. While the functions of the legislature may vary depending on the country and region, legislatures are known for three distinct functions lawmaking, representation, and oversight (Abegunde, 2016). In what follows, the legislative functions of law making, representation and financial functions are discussed. However, since this research is focused on assessing oversight performance of the National Assembly, the legislative function of oversight will be discussed as a separate subsection (section 2.1.2).

Legislation

The duties of the legislature are stated as being the basic and most important roles of the legislative branch (Abonyi, 2006). The legislature is the body that writes the rules of society. It is also responsible for making laws that are in the state's interest. These laws may originate from the private members' bills or the executive branch (Benjamin, 2010). According to Umeagbalasi (2013), laws must be made in the interest of the general public and should be of good quality. Abonyi (2006) also noted that bills should be thoroughly examined before they are passed. Indeed, the legislative powers are often reduced to a mere deliberative assembly when the executive oversteps its authority and makes concessions to certain groups or individuals. However, Heywood

(2007) noted that the twentieth century witnessed a decline in the legislative power of many countries. Heywood suggested that this situation had reduced many legislative bodies to mere talking shops that do little more than rubber-stamp decisions that have effectively been made elsewhere.

Representation:

The role of the legislature is central to the administration of the state. This, according to Abiola (2018), is largely due to the complexity of modern government. The legislative institution serves as a vehicle through which the various interests of the population are represented. The representative function of a legislature is argued to give citizens a say in the management of their country (Ewuim, Nnamani, & Eberinwa, 2014). Members of the legislature are elected to represent the interests of various groups in a society. This allows them to articulate and advance their concerns and ideas (Simmons, 2002).

According to Edigheji (2002), the idea of representative assembly can be traced back to the ancient city of Rome. Legislators have dual roles. First, they represent the people they represent, and second, they represent the government in their constituency (Roberts, 2002). The legislature is the place where the people of the country can have their political representation. This is a central component of democracy (Davies, 2004; Saliu & Muhammad, 2010). The legislative function is a key component of a democracy. It carries out its duties through the formation and implementation of policies and procedures. The legislative process is expected to involve the participation of various political parties and individuals. The function of the legislature is to promote the legitimacy of public policy and reduce the estrangement between the governed and the government (Ewuim, Nnamani, & Eberinwa, 2014).

Citizens expect the legislator to meet certain demands emanating from their constituencies in the context of representation, having perceived the legislator to be obligated to electorates. These needs could be for information, services, or public goods. Riggs (1975) classified representatives' representational activities into expressive and intermediary functions. According to Riggs, the expressive intermediary representational functions entail expressing the public's thoughts on issues of public concern and lobbying government bureaucrats on behalf of the constituency. The latter is especially true because citizens believe legislators have access to government departments and members who are unquestionably superior to them. The provisions of Sections 48 and 49 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria [CFRN] (as altered) lend credence to this argument. These stipulations were expressly worded to carefully portray the National Assembly's representative nature based on agreed-upon criteria. Without a doubt, the United Nations Development Programmes [UNDP] and the Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU] (2012) noted about a legislator's representative activity that constituency service encompasses support to individuals, grievance-chasing, policy responsiveness, and project work. Indeed, the UNDP and IPU's (2012) classification of a legislator's representative functions/services corresponds, in part or whole, to Riggs' classification of representational activity (1975).

Financial Function

The legislature's financial function is also its responsibility. It is supposed to approve the expenditures of the government. All government spending, except those specified in the Constitution, must be approved by the legislature (Sanyal, 2009). Additional expenditure may be sanctioned through a supplementary demand for grants which Lafenwa and Gberevbie (2007) noted function as a catalyst for sustainable democratic governance. The individuals who make up

the legislature argue that the institution's responsibilities include control over public funds and taxation for the provision of a good life for the entire citizenry. In most cases, the financial function of the legislature is subsumed into its lawmaking mandate. For instance, Section 80 grants the National Asembly the power of the purse which in diferent times, is expressed through stipulated legislative procedure.

2.1.2 Legislative Oversight

The oversight function is a fundamental part of the legislative process and is carried out in a wide variety of ways and means. It is often referred to as a major component of the legislative activities of modern democracy (Fashagba, 2009). National Democratic Institute for International Affairs [NDI] (2000) stated that oversight is the most important function of a legislature. It stems from the endless wielding of executive powers.

Saliu and Muhammad (2010) defined legislative oversight as a process that involves the legislative body's active participation in monitoring and analyzing the performance of the executive branch. Ewuim, Nnamani, and Eberinwa (2014) described the role of legislative oversight as keeping a watchful eye on the activities of the executive. The legislative oversight of executive activity is aimed at ensuring that public policy is being administered under the intended legislative intent (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association [CPA], 2002). According to the literature on legislative oversight, oversight is intended to ensure accountability; transparency; ensuring executive compliance with legislative intent; eliminating corruption; eliminate inefficacy and waste in government, including, fraud and misuse of public funds as well as identification of functions which are duplicative, overlapping (Madue, 2012). The legislative function does not end once a bill is enacted. It continues afterwards following activities linked to the passage of bills

(NDI, 2000). After participating in the making of laws, it is the legislature's responsibility to ensure that they are being implemented effectively. Referring to the oversight functions of the legislature, Woodrow Wilson averred that:

> A representative body must diligently look into every aspect of government. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. Unless Congress has the proper tools to acquaint the public with the various acts and the various administrative agencies of the government, the country will not be able to learn how they are being served.… The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function (WIlson, 1985).

The oversight function is a mechanism that enables the Parliament to hold the government accountable for its actions and omissions. This function can also prevent the government from undermining its policies and procedures. Based on this, Abegunde (2014) stated that the concept of oversight is a vital part of the law-making process and is often invoked to justify the legislative process. The legislative branch carries out various oversight functions over the executive some of which include the appointment of officials and the financial behavior of the government, etc.

In Nigeria, the National Assembly (NASS) is charged with the oversight of executive agencies following the provisions of Sections 88 and 89 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. However, while the legislative powers of the Federation have been vested on the National Assembly following the stipulations of Section 4 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as altered) to create laws that meet the needs of the country's citizens, it is also a legislature's role to evaluate whether the laws it has passed achieve their intended outcome(s). Therefore, the legislature in Nigeria oversees the executive arm of the government using several tools at its disposal (Abiola, 2018), such as committee hearings, hearing in plenary

sessions of the parliament, the creation of commissions of inquiry, questions, question time, interpellations.

Oversight Tools

Legislative oversight tools are oversight mandates or instruments that parliaments employ to facilitate and perform their oversight roles (Hamalai, 2014; Yamamoto, 2007). While some of these tools are stipulated in national constitutions, others are part of the rules that govern parliamentary procedures (or the standing orders) (Hamalai, 2014). Table 4 presents and explains the oversight tools available to Nigeria's National Assembly.

Table 2.1 Legislative Tools and Mechanisms of the National Assembly

Oversight Tools/Mechanisms	Explanations
Questions (Written, Oral and Urgent)	Questions and interpellations refer to direct queries of Ministers and Heads of MDAs. They are the oral and written questions that legislators pose to the executive to scrutinize their programmes. They are formulated questions on the conduct of the government or its MDAs that often determine accountability by means of votes on motions.
Hearings (Including Committee and Plenary)	Legislatures use this is a procedure to get oral or written information. Hearings serve the following purposes: Hearings are organized to gather information either before a law is passed; during legislative oversight activities; when investigating reported cases of wrongdoing. Public hearing is a tool which constitutes an important aspect of oversight activities, as it also stimulates discussion of issues among the general public.

	After second readings, bills are referred to committee for deeper scrutiny and analysis at the Committee level. Motions are also referred to committees either for investigations or other purposes.
Specialized Committees	Committees are a small group of legislators that are constituted by the House to examine matters more closely (Hamalai, 2014).
Committee of Inquiry/ Investigative Hearing	This is a procedure used by legislative obtain information.
Impeachment	The process by which a legislative body or other legally constituted tribunal initiates charges against a public official for misconduct.
Censorship Of President /Executive	Often a condemnation or denouncement or a formal statement of disapproval.
Executive Appointees	Confirmation hearings to approve executive appointments. In Nigeria, it is only the Senate that has the constitutional power to exercise this power.
Public Petition	A petition is a formal request to an authority for redress of a grievance. It has also been defined as a formal written request presented to a court or other official body. It can take the form of either a request for assistance with a specific issue or for the redress of a grievance.
Budget Oversight/ Engagement With Appropriation Bill	This is the scrutiny and review of the appropriation bill. The legislative power of the purse allows Committees on Appropriation to play prominent roles in oversight.
Oversight Visit To MDAs/ Project Inspections	According to Hamalai (2014, p. 41), oversight visits "take the form of physical visits to government ministries, departments and agencies on which the legislature exercises oversight. In the course of such visits, projects and programmes for which funds

	were appropriated are inspected with a view to ascertaining the progress of implementation and possible challenges."
Ombudsman (Public Complaints Committee)	A person, independent from the government and sometimes also independent of parliament, who heads a constitutional or statutory public institution
	that handles complaints from the public regarding the decisions, actions or omissions of the public administration. The office is called the ombudsman, mediator, legislative commissioner, people's defender, inspector-general or a similar title.
Supreme Audit Institution (Auditor General of the Federation)	The Auditor General is in charge of the supreme audit office of the country. He (or she) is appointed by the president on the recommendation of the Federal Civil Service Commission subject to confirmation by the Senate, again possibly weakening his/her independence.
Anti-Corruption Agencies (ICPC and EFCC)	Nigeria has two anti-corruption agencies. The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) criminalize corruption in Nigeria by investigating allegations of corruption and prosecuting ministers and public office holders.

Source: Hamalai (2014); Draman (2015)

2.1.3 The Committee System in the Legislature

Legislative committees are "mini legislatures" where bills are screened and amended, according to Bob O'Donnel (as cited in Omenka, 2008). Committees are usually appointed by the legislature to carry out tasks and responsibilities. Legislative committees, according to the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] (2005), are organizational units within a legislative

chamber that allow groups of representatives to review policy matters or proposed bills more closely than the entire chamber. Also, committees are small groups of legislators who are assigned, either temporarily or permanently, to investigate issues more thoroughly than the full chamber could (Abiola, 2018, personal communication). Fashagba (2010) states that these bodies should have a clearly defined mission and direction. Committee functions are central to the legislative process and play a crucial role in the legislature. They review the financial demands of the government and the various ministries and agencies. According to Abonyi (2006), legislative committees function in a manner that depicts carrying out the investigative power of the legislature. There are standing committees that are composed of members of the legislature. These committees can be utilized for various purposes, such as emergencies.

Implicitly, committees help the legislature to establish issues and address problem areas to make the necessary improvements or changes to create an effective process. This assertion about legislative committees may have prompted Ojagbohunmi (2006)'s position to the effect that where the assembly would otherwise not have had enough time to carry out certain responsibilities, committees are delegated to perform such tasks for the parent body more closely and in a detailed manner. Consequently, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, CFRN (1999, as amended, Section 62 (1)) stated inter alia that

> The Senate or the House of Representatives may appoint a committee of its members for such special or general purpose as in its opinion would be better regulated and managed by means of such a committee, and may by resolution, regulation or otherwise, as it thinks fit, delegate any functions exercisable by it to any such committee.

The Constitutional provision above buttresses the stipulation of Section 60 of the CFRN 1999 (as amended) which allows the Houses to regulate their respective procedures. In the National Assembly, Committees are sub-division of members into sub-working groups to enhance the performance of the legislature. In broad terms, the committee system is designed to; promote legislative efficiency and effectiveness, make a detailed examination of Bills and other legislative assignments, provide for legislative oversight of the Executive Branch of Government and other matters related therein, summon any person to appear before them to give evidence under oath or affirmation, or to produce documents, compel the compliance by any person or institution to comply with a summons or a request for a report, receive petitions, representations or submissions from any interested persons or institutions, sits notwithstanding any adjournment of the House, and, promote public participation in the legislative process through a public hearing, interactive sessions, and investigations among others. Legislatures are found to divide their workload among smaller subunits called committees or commissions. To this end, Martorano (2008) alluded that empirical studies have demonstrated that the committee system impacts the legislative process itself and the public policies formed via this process significantly.

On this ground, legislative committees are set up to get the basic work of the legislature done. In perspective, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria [CFRN] 1999 (as altered), thus, provides that "the number of members of a committee appointed under this section, their terms of office and quorum shall be fixed by the House appropriating it" (Section 60 (2)). Such committees operate within the framework of the legislature's traditional roles of lawmaking, representation, and oversight (Abegunde, 2016).

2.1.4 8th Senate Committees on Anticorruption

The Senate Committee on Anti-Corruption and Financial Crimes is among the Standing Committee of the 8th Senate that was constituted on Wednesday 4th November 2015, according to section 62 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). The jurisdiction of the committee of Anti-Corruption and Financial Crimes includes: (a) The committee has the jurisdiction over Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU); (b) all matters relating to corruption and cognate issues; (C) all Anti-corruption Institutions and Services established by law; (d) Oversight of the agencies under the aegis of the committee; (e) Annual Budget estimate of the Agencies i.e. (EFCC, ICPC and NFIU).

As Table 2.1 shows, the membership of the committee is made up of 9 members.

Table 2.1: Membership of the Senate Committee on Anticorruption and Financial Crimes

1.	Sen. Chukwuka G. Utazi	Chairman
2.	Sen. Mustapha M. Sani	Deputy Chairman
3.	Sen. Mohammed Sabo	Member
4.	Sen. Babajide C. Omoworare	Member
5.	Sen. Monsurat J. A. Sunmonu	Member
6.	Sen. Isa Hamma Misau	Member
7.	Sen. Dino Melaye	Member
8.	Sen. Johnson Olaka Nwogu	Member
9.	Sen. Mathew A. Urhoghide	Member

Source: Sessional Report of 8th Senate Committee on Anticorruption, 2015-2019

In what follows, this research will discuss the concept of corruption in subsection 2.1.5 because fighting corruption is one of the major mandates of the Committees on Anti-corruption.

2.1.5 Corruption

To attempt a universally acceptable definition of the word corruption is a difficult task. The reason for this is that varying circumstances depending on the peculiarity and circumstances of an environment may result into determining whether a particular act was done with a corrupt intent or not. The concept has been defined in varying forms by some authors, statutory provisions. In some other statutory provisions instances of acts which may constitute corrupt practices are proffered. For instance the Criminal Code and its counterpart the Penal Code does not define corruption (Osipitan, 1999) rather the Criminal Code only provides that "an offence of corruption is committed where any public officer corruptly asks, receives or obtains any property or benefit" (LFN,2004). However, the Corrupt Practices Decree in its section 1 gave a restricted definition of corruption by restricting it to bribery. To Gardiner (2017, p. 26), "the act of doing something with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others ; a fiduciary's or official's use of a station or office to procure some benefit either personally or for someone else, contrary to the rights of others". While to Carl Fredrick, '' …corruption is a deviant behaviour associated with a particular motivation, namely that of a private gain at public expense.

Corruption has also been defined as "efforts to secure wealth or power through illegal means, private gain at public expense or a misuse of public power for private benefit"(Lipset, 2006, p. 112) while to Huntington (2017, p. 256), "corruption is a behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role, because of private [gains]-regarding (personal, close family, private clique, pecuniary or status gains. It is a behaviour which violates rules against the exercise of certain types

of [duties] for private [gains]- regarding influence".It must be stressed at this juncture that corruption is not limited to the political class. Aluko (2006), listed five types of corruption namely:

1) Political Corruption perpetrated by political office-holders and their collaborators

2) Economic/commercial corruption perpetrated by businessmen and contractors i.e. the private sector.

3) Administrative/Professional corruption refers to deliberate acts by top administrative and professional personnel either in public or private enterprises.

4) Organised corruption is perpetrated by groups of elite for the enrichment of those participating at the expense of society. Examples are hoarding, price-fixing, racketeering, smuggling, burglary, armed robbery and advance fee fraud.

5) Working class corruption. This is similar to those of the administrative /professional type except for the status of the perpetrators e.g. artisans, messengers, market women, etc.

To Thiankolu (2006), the variants of corruption include Grand Corruption, Political Corruption, Corporate Corruption, Administrative Corruption and Petty Corruption. From the foregoing, it is safe to infer that corruption is using power or position entrusted on a person whether public or private for selfish or personal gain to achieve a purpose not envisaged by such power. Broadly defined, corruption is the abuse of not only the public office but also private or commercial office for private gain. It invariably involves giving something to someone in a position power either in government or in a corporation, so that he will "(ab)use his power and act in a manner favouring the giver. It involves the offering, giving, soliciting or acceptance of an inducement or reward, which may influence the action of any person." Corrupt practices manifest itself in varying forms like bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, fraud, extortion, favouritism, electoral fraud, rigging, rent seeking, sexual harassment, examination malpractice amongst others.

Causes of Corruption

Eugen and Guglielmo (2017) listed the possible causes of corruption are as follows:

First, corruption is caused by low wages paid to civil servants. The higher the wages paid to civil servants the less corruption. Second, corruption is encouraged by Weak Institutions. Corruption thrives when there are weak political and legal institutions in the society (Alexeev & Song, 2013). Weak institutions can create an environment that reduces motivation and productivity when employees face challenges such as promotion unconnected to performance, low salaries, it is easy to be disheartened. the fight against corruption could only be effective when national institutions were strengthened to act independently. Third, lack of Strict Punishment for corruption. The punishment meted out to corrupt officials is mild. People will tend to engage in corruption when the penalties mild and the rewards are great. Fourth, lack of accountability is a factor that motivates corruption. Fifth, lack of State Funding for Elections contributes to corruption. The culture of individuals or political parties funding elections encourages corruption because immediately they win the elections, they will tend to recover the moneys they had spent on the elections from public funds, if the state or the federal government funds the elections corruption will be less. Sixth, Constitutional Lapse also causes corruption. S.308 of the 1999 constitution provides immunity against both civil and criminal prosecution for a sitting president and his vice. This also encourages corruption. Our past leaders with history of grand corruption have never been prosecuted because of the immunity clause even when they are out of office.

Challenges To The Fight Against Corruption Immunity against prosecution by anti-corruption agencies

First, immunity from civil and criminal prosecution is granted to executive office holders during their tenure in office under Nigerian law. Top government officials enjoy blanket immunity from prosecution while in office (Adeleke, 2013). From the Nigerian standpoint, it includes immunity from civil or criminal prosecution against the holder in his personal capacity while in office. Second, ineffective systems of ensuring public access to information: In Nigeria, ineffective systems for the public to request government information, and serious problems with enforcing conflicts of interest safeguards across much of the government remain. Third, the problem of abuse of Office and Lack of Political Will to Tackle Corruption. Nigeria has enough laws to tackle corruption effectively. However, implementing the laws is a problem. Fourth, abuse of office militates against the war on corruption because it erodes the gains made by anti-corruption agencies and signals to all citizens and the international community that the anti-corruption agencies cannot bite hard enough. Fifth, Conflicts of interest among Anti-Corruption Laws and Institutions in Nigeria:There are common cases of conflicts of interest among the various agencies and institutions involved in anti-corruption crusade. Major conflicts of interest can be observed in the relations between or among various courts in the judiciary and law enforcement and security agencies; of particular importance are the conflicts that exist between. Sixth, the Attorney General of the Federation, EFCC and ICPC: there are uncertainties and conflicts about the dividing line between the roles, functions and powers of EFCC, ICPC, etc. on investigation, handling and documentation of fraud or corruption. Seventh, the challenges of Weak and overburdened Judiciary as well as Jurisdictional Conflicts between Federal and State Courts.

2.2 Empirical Review of Relevant Literature

Several studies have been conducted on oversight performance of legislative committees (Maccido, 2019; Abah, Andrew, and Obiajulu, 2017; Kabari, 2021; Umaru, 2021; Jooji, 2019). For example, Maccido (2019) assessed the effectiveness of the Senate Committees in performing oversight of the education sector. The study adopted a qualitative research, employed purposive sampling technique to select respondents for oral interviews. Data were collected with the use of in-depth interview. The principal findings of the study were: first, that members of the two Senate Committees overseeing the education sector in the 8th Assembly were competent to perform their oversight functions of the MDAs in the education sector. Second, the mandate of the Senate Committee on Education (Basic and Secondary) in the 8th Senate were to interact with stakeholders in identifying challenges and constraints facing educational institutions in Nigeria and proffer solutions to achieve the desired results and initiate legislations in line with government policies that would bring about positive changes in the sector. The Committee through oversight functions was to ensure that ministries departments and agencies are delivering on their mandates as articulated. Also, Abah, Andrew, and Obiajulu (2017) investigate the role of parliamentary oversight in the Nigerian government's attempts to combat corruption in the exercise of state authority. The study is based on structural functionalism theory. Data for the study were gathered from documentary sources and examined using descriptive content analysis. According to the report, this crucial component of the legislature's capacity has been badly eroded and is often abused. It also suggests that legislative oversight may be restored if citizens are given a greater value through a revised electoral process that gives the vote more power and, eventually, enhances voters' capacity to oversee public officials through the prospect of rejection at the polls.

Like previous studies, Kabari (2021) investigated the role of the National Assembly in the anti-corruption crusade to establish the efficacy of the NASS in the anti-corruption crusade and if

the NASS had made a major contribution to the anti-corruption crusade. Content analysis of documented material, such as textbooks, journal articles, magazines, the Internet, and newspapers, was used in the study. Despite the fact that the National Assembly made some efforts in the anti-corruption battle by introducing anti-corruption measures such as the Whistle-blower Bill and the Witness Protection Bill, Anti-money Laundering Bill, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matter and the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) Bill. The study discovered that the members of the National Assembly were only concerned with their own interests and not the interests of the public who voted them into the various positions in the National Assembly. According to the report, the National Assembly's inability to pass strong legislation was due to corruption. As a result, it was suggested that the National Assembly fight corruption by first providing a positive example for others. In the same vein, Umaru (2017) studied the impact of corruption on the legislature, using content analysis of documents and publications and books and periodicals. The research revealed that members of the National Assembly were mainly concerned with their own personal interests rather than the interests of the people who elected them. . In conclusion, the study identifies corruption as the reason why the National Assembly was not able to do proper legislation. It was therefore recommended that the legislature should be operated on a part-time basis and the number of sittings and the membership at both the lower and upper chambers should be drastically reduced.

Jooji's (2019) examined the extent to which NASS oversight duties benefited the sustainability of democracy, relied on secondary literature to generate data using text analysis. Using Principal Agency as a theoretical framework, the reveals that Nigeria's NASS has extensive constitutional powers. For example, NASS investigations into executive acts revealed that multiple MDAs maintained illegal bank accounts totaling more than $200 billion and screened a large

number of public officials. (e.g. auditor-general, heads of MDAs, and some key judiciary offices). However, while the legislature's oversight activities have grown greatly, they have not been effective in curbing corruption or boosting MDA budget performance.

Okeke (2014) interrogated legislative probe and corruption in Nigeria within the context of National Assembly oversight functions from 1999 to 2011. The study used a historical research method relying mainly on secondary sources of data from internet sources, official documents and country websites as the method of data collection. The study employed qualitative-descriptive analysis as the method of data analysis, that is, documentary studies of official document and other materials in analyzing the secondary data. The principal findings of the study are: one; the National Assembly oversight functions do not enhance fiscal accountability in Nigeria between 1999 and 2011. Two, that legislative probes impede the fight against corruption in Nigeria between 1999 and 2011. On the basis of this, Okeke (2012) recommends: the National Assembly should not exceed or over-step its constitutional roles or functions in carry out its oversight functions. Second, the NASS should focus on its primary role of law making rather than encumbering and compromising itself with probing or investigation.

Fashagba (2009) examined the effectiveness of the committee system in enhancing legislative efficiency in Nigeria using the Kwara State House of Assembly as a case study. The study employed Qualitative method and data was derived from interview with stakeholders, personal observation, reports of various committees, and the legislative hansard, and newspaper articles. Hansard of the fisth Kwara State House of Assembly. the Hansard of the Fifth Kwara State House of Assembly (June 2003-June 2007) were analysed. The study concluded that the legislative committees of the Kwara State House of Assembly enhances the performance of an assembly, despite the enormous constraints it faced.

2.2.1 Knowledge Gap

The literature on oversight has paid attention on oversight performance of legislative committees (Maccido, 2019; Abah, Andrew, and Obiajulu, 2017; Kabari, 2021; Umaru, 2021; Jooji, 2019). More so, several studies have assessed whether oversight has been effective or not (Jooji, 2019; Anah, Andrew and Obiajulu, 2017; Maccido, 2019). The literature has mixed findings with regards to the assessment of oversight performance of legislative committees' oversight function, with Fashagba (2009) believing that Committees oversight has been effective and Jooji (2019); Kabari (2021) believeing that committees oversight performance has not been effective. This research will confirm the findings of previous on the oversight performance of committees, particularly the committee on Anti-corruption and Financial Crime in the 8th Senate.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

This study adopted the principle of Separation of Powers and Structural Functionalism theory as the framework for its conceptualization. These theories are just a few of the theories which could put in plain words as well as properly situated the place of legislative committees in tackling corruption.

2.3.1 The Doctrine of Separation of Powers

The doctrine of Separation of Powers is the most ancient and enduring element of constitutionalism. It is based on the rationale that political liberty in a state is possible only when restraints are imposed on the exercise of the powers of government (Dasgupta, 2013). The functions of the government should be differentiated and assigned to separate organs to limit each section to its sphere of action. This is to enable these organs to interact independently between

themselves such that each arm exercises a check and balance system on the other. The proponent of the concept of separation of powers was Aristotle who did not discuss the doctrine in detail. Pointedly, Aristole analyzed the functions of the three branches of government as "the deliberative, executive and the judiciary without suggesting their separation." The doctrine went through some refinements up till the 18th Century when Jean Bodin one of the earliest thinkers of the modern period saw the importance of separating the executive and judicial powers only, to achieve political liberty.

However, the doctrine received its greatest boost with the postulations of John Locke in the 18th Century when he argued that the executive and legislative powers should be separate for the sake of liberty. Liberty suffers when the same human being makes the law and executes them. Many scholars agree, however, that Baron de Montesquieu is the first philosopher who gave the doctrine its paramount political importance (Oshio, 2013). The doctrine was espoused in the treatise called *De L'Esprit des Loix (The Spirit of Laws)* published in 1748 wherein Montesquieu gave the classic exposition of the idea of separation of powers. Montesquieu's experience during the days of the Bouborne monarchy in France which had established despotism whereby the people enjoyed no freedom fuelled his exposition. Thus, Montesquieu developed the theory of separation of powers as a weapon to uphold the liberty of the people.

The doctrine of separation of powers as stated above is therefore geared not only towards the good governance of the state but also the welfare of the citizenry. Without separation of powers, the citizen cannot enjoy political and civil liberties (Halsall, 2013). The doctrine of Separation of Powers thus postulates that three branches constitute a government in modern democratic societies or systems. These are the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary.

In essence, in every modern democracy, the functions of the government are lawmaking law, enforcement or law execution, and administration of justice. Within context, the legislature is responsible for making the law, the executive ensures enforcement and the judiciary interprets the law. In Nigeria, the system of government is also based on the doctrine of separation of powers with the 1999 constitution prescribing specific governmental functions. The 1999 Constitution is modeled after the presidential system of government. It recognizes the three arms of government as the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary. The powers of each arm of government are stipulated under the constitution.

2.3.2 Structural Functionalism

Structural functionalism is originally a sociological approach. It is a branch of the theory known as "Functionalism" which is of three types namely: eclectic functionalism, empirical functionalism and structural functionalism (Flanigan & Fogelman, 2016). Structural Functionalism has an anthropological basis in the works of theorists such as Marcel Mauss Vilfred Pareto, Max Weber, Herbert Spencer, Bronislaw Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and Emile Durkheim. It was also improved upon by classical theorists such as Marion Levi (1997), Talcott Parsons (1951) and then Parson's student; Robert K. Merton (1997). Structural functionalism posits that every political system has structures i.e. institutions that perform different functions.

The "functions" are the "roles" performed by the various institutions. The efficiency of the political system in the performance of such a function determines its rating on the scale of political development. For example, Ritzer (2008) contends that systems have the property of order and interdependence of parts as the nature of one part of the system has an impact on the form that the other part can take. Systems tend to self-maintenance and may be static or involved in an ordered process of change (2008). Gabriel Almond's Structural-functionalism theory would serve as the

apt theoretical framework and the analytical tool for this discourse. Gabriel Almond contends that all political systems bear similarities in the realm of: Having a structure, having the same structure performed by in all the political systems, all structures performing more than one function, and all systems are mixed since they consist of both primitive and modern elements.

Hence, borrowing from the system analysis design of input-output workings of the political system, Almond identified a seven variables list of functional categories. Gabriel Almond classified four as the input functions. These are political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political communication (Varma, 1975). Explaining, Gabriel Almond noted that the input functions are usually performed by non-governmental subsystems such as the home, the family, peers, the faith community, the social community, the political parties, pressure groups, etc. Accordingly, Gabriel Almond posited that the output functions are highly significant, therefore, he classified three other variables as output functions. They are:The rule-making functionary translating to the legislature, the rule application functionary translating to the executive, and the rule adjudication functionary translates to the judiciary.

No doubt these are the traditional three arms of government. Their roles are clearly defined or marked out in the famous doctrine of separation of powers as already explained. Almond's Structural Functionalist's approach stresses certain points. The first one being that in different systems, the same structure may perform different functions. Second is that while a particular institution e.g. the legislature performs the function of rule-making, it does not usually have a monopoly of such function. Thus, it is quite possible for the executive and the judiciary to perform similar functions in conjunction with the legislature as active participants and the same also applies to functions that are performed by the other institutions.

For instance, the legislature makes the law while the executive enforces and the judiciary adjudicates. However, judges also make rules through judicial decisions/pronouncements. Such rules become the law through the doctrine of *stare decisi* (judicial precedent) and must be followed by subsequent cases or decisions. In this perspective, the judiciary can be said to have exercised the function of the legislature. Third, the political system is an open system and is constantly influenced by the social, cultural, and economic environments. Within this context, a mention of legislative interventions aimed at tackling corruption becomes pertinent. Overall, while the doctrine of separation of powers underscored the centrality of the legislative institution in the political system, on one hand, the structural-functionalist approach connotes the essence of the specific legislative interventions toward curbing corruption in Nigeria. Based on this, the doctrine of separation of powers and the structural-functionalist approach was selected as the frameworks for this study.

2.3.3 Application of the theories

The choice of the principle of separation of powers and the structural-functionalist approach as the frameworks for conceptualizing this study stems from their general imports. To illustrate, whereas the separation of power divides governmental powers between the arms of government, the structural-functionalist approach underscores the contribution of each of the arms of government in achieving governmental goals. In fact, the doctrine of separation of powers underscored the centrality of the legislative institution in the political system, on one hand, while the structural-functionalist approach connotes the essence of the specific legislative interventions toward curbing corruption in Nigeria. Within this context, it can be argued further that although modern democratic states (especially presidential ones) are built on the principle of divided governmental powers, it is also necessary that within the limits of such designs, the arms of

government function for the overall effectiveness of the state. Based on this, the doctrine of separation of powers and the structural-functionalist approach was selected as the frameworks for this study

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the research methods necessary to achieve the objectives of the study. They were grouped into the following headings: study area, research design, population, sampling procedure, sample size, research instruments, sources of data, and method of data analysis and presentation.

3.1.   Study area

The study area emphasizes the geographical scope of the study. Given the study problem being an assessment of legislative effectiveness in tackling corruption with a focus on the 8th National Assembly, the study location is Nigeria's National Assembly. The National Assembly is a

bicameral legislature of four hundred and sixty-nine (469) member House, that is, a Senate of one hundred and nine (109) members and a House of Representatives of three hundred and sixty (360) members located in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. The choice of this location is because of the visible anticorruption stride of the Federal government in the establishment of foremost anti-corruption agencies like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other related Offences Commission (ICPC), among others. Implicitly, the National Assembly has jurisdiction over the agencies listed hence, its choice as location.

3.2.   Research design

The study adopted a mixed research design. A mixed research design utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methods. In perspective, the quantitative research design involves explaining phenomena by collecting numerical data that are analyzed using mathematically based methods while the qualitative method explores meanings and insights in a given situation. Indeed, whereas the quantitative which involves the scientific methods for data collection and analysis makes generalization possible (Daniel, 2016), the qualitative research design helps to gain insight; explore the depth, richness, and complexity inherent in a phenomenon (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Within context, the mixed design was chosen because of the need to provide complementary data on the subject of legislative effectiveness in tackling corruption. In fact, the study utilized relevant data from the committees of the National Assembly as quantitative data and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) as a major source for qualitative data.

3.3.   Population

For this study, the target populations were the focal Ministries, Departments, and Agencies charged with corruption-related matters as the: Office of the Auditor General for the Federation, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), anticorruption committees of the National Assembly, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) with anti-corruption as well as legislature-related mandates. The choice of the population was deliberate because of the quality of information desired which is in short supply as well as the jurisdiction of the highlighted sampling frames in the anticorruption drive of the government. Table 3.1. provides the sizes of the population.

Table 3.1: Population size

S/N	POPULATION-TARGET ORGANIZATION	SIZE
1	Office of the Auditor General for the Federation (OAuGF)	1850
2	Anti-Corruption Committees	• Senate 8 • House of Representatives 32
3	CSOs with anti-corruption and legislative mandates	• Anti-corruption 42 • Legislative mandate 11
4	Staff of ICPC	1385
5	Staff of EFCC	1950
6	Total	5278

Source: Fieldwork, October 2022.

3.4. Sampling technique and size

The purposive sampling procedure was used for the selection of documents as well as respondents for the administration of the Key Informant Interview (KII). The purposive sampling technique is a nonprobability sampling procedure that ensures the researcher selects his/her respondents based on a set of outlined qualities-in this case, suitability of the information (Bernard, 2002). As subjective as the purposive sampling procedure could be argued to be, it was chosen for this study because of the nature of information required which is in short supply and is limited to specific groups otherwise known as key informants. Besides, purposive sampling deals with the selection of respondents because they can provide the data required The sample size for the administration of the questionnaire was determined using Taro Yamane's formula as follows:

$$n = \frac{N}{(1 + Ne^2)}$$

Where: n = corrected sample size

N = 5278

e = Margin of Error (MoE) = 0.05

Therefore, n = $5278/1 + 5278 (0.05^2)$

= 5278/1 + (5278×0.0025)

= 5278/(1 + 13.195)

= 5278/14.195

= 371.82 ≈ 372

Also, the sample size for the conduct of interview study was ten (10) from the population highlighted in section 3.3. Sandelowski (1995) posited that the sample size for qualitative research is usually a subjective judgment since the target populations are persons considered knowledgeable about the phenomenon being investigated. Therefore, two (2) respondents each were drawn from

the target population to make a total of ten (10). Specifically, both respondents from the National

Assembly Anti-Corruption Committees were selected singly from each of the Chamber. Table 3.2.

presents the target sample size.

Table 3.2: Sample size for the conduct of the interview

S/N	POPULATION-TARGET ORGANIZATION	SAMPLE SIZE	RATIONALE
1	Office of the Auditor General for the Federation (OAuGF)	2	The choice of OAuGF is derived from its constitutional responsibility to present public accounts report to the National Assembly (Section 85 of the 1999 Constitution, as altered).
2	Chairmen of the Anti-Corruption Committees	2	The chairmen of the House and Senate Anti-Corruption committees were selected because they have in-depth knowledge of the working of the anti-corruption committees in the National Assembly.
3	CSOs with anti-corruption and legislative mandates	2	As critical stakeholders within certain subject matters, CSOs with anti-corruption and legislative mandates were interviewed to give balanced judgment of the subject of this study.

4	Staff of ICPC	2	The ICPC is an establishment of the law with the mandate to pursue anti-corruption-related goals. This justifies its inclusion in the study.
5	Staff of EFCC	2	By the extant provision, the EFCC just like the ICPC enjoys the powers to investigate and prosecute economic and financial crimes.
6	Total	10	

Source: Fieldwork, October 2022.

3.5. Sources of data

Data were taken from primary and secondary sources. The primary sources of data were the unstructured interview and questionnaire while the secondary sources were made up of official publications of the Federal Government of Nigeria, journal articles, magazines, and the internet, among others. These sources of data provided literary as well as empirical basis for the analysis and discussion of findings in chapter four.

3.6. Method of data analysis

Quantitative and qualitative methods were adopted for the analysis of data. Explicitly, descriptive statistics using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 23.0) was utilized for the analysis of quantitative data, and content analysis was adopted for the analysis of qualitative data. Content analysis is a method of analysis that deals with the systemic study of patterns in recorded communication. Therefore, emphasis was on the textual and numerical (processed data) presentation of the data that were obtained in the course of the study. Complementarily, this helped

to find out about the purposes, messages, and effects of communication content and in this instance, the 8th National Assembly committees' effectiveness in tackling corruption. Thereafter, the findings were presented in a thematic manner using graphs and tables driven by the objectives contained in section 1.4.

3.7 The outcome based on the principle of separation of powers and structural functionalism theories

The outcome of this study was guided by the frameworks used in conceptualizing it, i.e., the principle of separation of powers and the structural functionalism theories. For emphasis, the principle of separation of powers connotes the delineation of governmental powers between the branches of government while the structural functionalism theory denotes the responsibility of the components of the political system in the overall functioning of the system. Within context, whereas the principle of separation of powers underscores the legislative powers vested in the National Assembly to tackle corruption, the structural functionalism theory predicates the essence of legislative interventions in tackling corruption. In essence, this study envisages a two-pronged outcome to literature (theory) and policy. On the aspect of literature, the study revealed that indeed, the principle of separation of powers and the structural functionalism theory are essential democratic theories especially in conceptualizing the activities of government. Therefore, the findings of this study shape future policy discussions as it proffered actionable policy alternatives that will enhance legislative efforts aimed at tackling corruption in Nigeria.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presented the results of the analysis based on the research objectives. As already established, the questionnaire, structured interview, and different kinds of literature were the sources of data. Specifically, the questionnaire was made up of two sections which comprised demographic information of the respondents and questions related to the specific objectives of the study. Overall, the study used descriptive statistics to achieve the first and second objectives while the third and fourth objectives were achieved using qualitative data.

4.1 Response Rate

To establish the rate of response from the respondents, the analysis of the response and non-response rates was shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Response Rate

Rates	Frequency	Percent
Response	329	88.4%
Non-Response	43	11.6%
Total	372	100

Source: Fieldwork, November 2022.

The result shows that the responses of the participants were not fully retrieved. This means that some of the questionnaires administered to the respondents were not completely returned and filled out by the respondents. The percentage of the response rate was 88.4% while that of the non-response rate was 11.6%. According to existing studies especially that by Cooper and Schindler (2009), the response rate is adequate and satisfactory since the return rate surpassed the 50% threshold. In the same vein, only three (3) interview requests were obliged. In fact, unnamed personnel of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (nondisclosure due to the sensitivity of his office), Programme Manager at the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre, Omolara Akinyeye, and Mr. Abdullahi Musa, staff of the Auditor-General for the Federation's Office were interviewed. For emphasis, both data types served a complementary purpose and were so used to complement emerging themes.

4.2 Demographic Information

The demographic information of the respondents was collected in the form of sex, age, and level of education.

4.2.1 Sex of the Respondents

This section provided the sex distribution of the respondents. Figure 4.1 show the number and percentage of male and female respondents in the study area.

Figure 4.1: Sex Distribution of the Respondents

Source: Fieldwork, November 2022.

The distribution of the respondents based on sex as shown in Figure 4.1 revealed that both males and females were represented in the sample, with male respondents constituting 69% (227) and females 31% (102) respectively. This indicates that the majority of the respondents in the study are male. The gender distribution of the study area can be attributed to the nature of the job of the respondents who are mostly referred to as security officials. In Nigeria, women are always underrepresented in security due to the lack of interest in enrolment.

4.2.2 Age of the Respondents

This segment offered the age bracket of the respondents. The number and percentage of the age bracket of the respondents were documented in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Age distribution of the respondents

Age	Frequency	Percentage
18 - 28	42	12.8
29 – 39	140	42.5
40 – 50	99	30.1
51 – 61	26	7.9
62 and Above	22	6.7
Total	**329**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, November 2022.

Table 4.2 shows the age distribution of the respondents. The result of the study revealed that out of the total respondents, 42 (12.8%) were between 18-28 years, 140 (42.5%) were between 29-39 years, and 99 (30.1%) were between 40-50 years of age. In addition, 26 (7.9%) of the respondents fall within the age bracket of 51 and 61 years while 22 (6.7%) of the respondents are 62 years and above. This result showed that all the respondents were qualified and had sound knowledge of the subject matter based on their age distribution and experience within the scope of the mandates of their respective populations.

4.2.3 Level of Education

The level of education of the respondents was also interrogated. The outcome of the educational level of the respondents is presented in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Educational Distribution of the Respondents

Educational Qualification	Frequency	Percentage
FLSC	23	7.1
SSCE	27	8.3
OND/NCE	69	20.9
HND/BSc	139	42.3
MSc/PhD	71	21.4
Total	**329**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, November 2022.

From Table 4.3, some of the respondents (7.1%) had a First School Leaving Certificate (FLSC) qualification, while the others had Secondary School Certificate Examination (SSCE), Ordinary National Diploma/NCE, Higher National Diploma/Bachelor degree, and Masters/Ph.D. Certification at 8.3%, 20.9%, 42.3%, and 2.14% respectively. The results of the survey indicated that all the respondents had different levels of education thus, connoting their suitability to be sampled for the study.

4.4 Oversight Performance of 8th Senate Committee on Anti-corruption

This study was limited to the 8th Senate Anti-corruption and Financial Crimes Committee for reasons explained in section 1.6. According to the Sessional Report, Senate Anti-corruption and Financial Crimes Committee (2019), the committee held a total of forty (40) meetings from June 2015 to June 2019. The meetings include budget defense meetings, joint committee meetings, interactive meetings with agencies and screening of the President's nominees for confirmation in different categories/positions. Others include but are not limited to – meeting with GTB and INNOSON motors, deliberation with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department of State (DAS) United States of America Interactive sessions with ICPC, and Code of Conduct Bureau

(CCB). Joint meetings with Judiciary, Human Rights and Judicial matters, Foreign Affairs, etc.

Table 4.4 is a compendium of the activities of the 8th Senate Committee on Anti-corruption and Financial Crimes.

Table 4.4: Activities of the 8th Senate on Anti-corruption and Financial Crimes Committee

S/N	Activity	Description	Outcome
1	Oversight visits	• Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Headquarters (EFCC) and its state offices in the South South and South East geo-political Zones. • Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission Headquarters (ICPC) and its Zonal and State offices in the North West and South West geo-political zones. • Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU). • ICPC TRAINING Centre in Keffi, Nasarawa State; EFCC Academy, Karu Abuja, and Federal Inland Revenue Service Headquarters Abuja.	•
2	Confirmation of Presidential nominees.The committee carried out four (4) screening exercises within the period.	• Confirmation of the Secretary nominee of EFCC, Olanipekun Esq. • Screening and confirmation of the Chairman and Members of ICPC. • Consideration and rejection of the nomination of EFCC Board Members due to lack of Federal Character. • Screening and the confirmation of the Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit Director.	• Confirmed • Confirmed • Rejected • Confirmed

3	Budget matters. The Committee considered the budgetary allocation of the agencies from 2015-2019. For instance, 2019 approved budgets for the EFCC, ICPC, and NFIU are presented in the column to the right.	• EFCC=N22,070,514,433 • ICPC= N5,985,219,312 • NFIU= N1,126,125,889	• Passed • Passed • Passed
4	Bill matters. The bills in the adjoining column were referred to the committee for further legislative action.	• Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Bill 2016 (HB 227) sponsored by Sen. Ali Ndume	• Not passed
		• Mutual Assistance in Criminal matters Bill 2016 (SB 224) sponsored by Sen. Ali Ndume	• Passed
		• Proceeds of crimes Bill 2017 (SB 376) sponsored by Sen. Mohammed Hassan	• Passed
		• Nigerian Assets Management Agency Establishment etc. Bill 2017 (SB 285) sponsored by Sen. Mustapha Bukar	• Not passed
		• A bill for an act to establish the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU)	• Passed
5	Public hearings. Within the period being examined, the	• Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Bills 2016	• Passed

		Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017.	• Not passed
	Committee held three (3) public hearings.	• Nigerian Assets Management Agency Establishment Bill 2017	• Passed
		• Public investigative hearing involving EFCC, GTB and Innoson Motors	Passed
6	Motion	• Urgent need to investigate the granting of concession of the western (Lagos – kano and Eastern, Port Harcourt – Maiduguri) rail lines to general electric United States Company. Sponsored by Sen. Albert A. Bassey	•

Source: Sessional Report, Senate Anti-corruption and Financial Crimes Committee (2019).

From Table 4.4, the 8th Senate Committee on Anti-corruption and Financial Crimes carried outs its activities within the ambit of the traditional role of the legislature, viz: lawmaking, representation, and oversight. Instructively, other functions of the legislature appear to be subsumed in its oversight activity hence, the emphasis on the latter. To illustrate, in the performance of its oversight mandate, it considered the budget of focal agencies under its jurisdiction, bills bothering subjects within its purview were referred to it, it also undertook quasi-judicial functions in the GTB and Innoson Motors saga.

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4.5 Legal and Institutional frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly in tackling corruption

This objective examined the legal and institutional frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly in the fight against corruption. Therefore, separate descriptive tables laying out the legal and institutional frameworks were presented. Pointedly, utilizing descriptive statistics implies ascertaining the degree of the respondents' agreement or disagreement with selected parameters designed to measure the legal framework in the fight against corruption in Nigeria. The result is presented in Table 4.5.

**Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics on Legal Framework**

Statement	N	Percentage					Mean	Std. Deviation
		5	4	3	2	1		
The ICPC and EFCC have laws that guide their fight against corruption	329	20	40	0	27.5	12.5	3.8659	.4863
The powers of the anti-graft agencies are backed by Acts of the National Assembly	329	25	25	17.5	20	12.5	3.5885	.4973
All the rules of engagement by the anti-graft agencies are provided in their act	329	15	42.5	22.5	15	5	3.5634	.5747
There are contractual terms entered into by the anti-graft agencies before corruption cases are filed	329	50	30	10	7.5	2.5	3.7565	.8653
All the rules found in the act adequately protect the anti-graft agencies from victimization	329	16.7	48.5	22.7	3.0	9.1	4.3939	1.0937
Average Score	329						3.8336	0.7035

Source: Fieldwork, November 2022.

In Table 4.5, the statement that the ICPC and EFCC have laws that guide their fight against corruption was agreed upon by the respondents. The value of 3.8659 mean and 0.4863 standard deviation confirms the claim. The powers of the anti-graft agencies are fully backed by legislations of the National Assembly aligned with the response of the respondents as noted by mean and standard deviation values of 3.5885 and 0.4973 respectively. Indeed, section 4 (1) confers the legislative powers of the Federation on the National Assembly. Besides, since the activities of governance begin with lawmaking, the place of primacy on anti-corruption matters is bestowed on the National Assembly. All the rules of engagement by the anti-graft agencies are provided in their act aligned with the views of the respondents following the mean and standard deviation values of 3.5634 and 0.5747. As to whether there are contractual terms entered into by the anti-graft agencies before corruption cases are filed, the respondents affirmed the position given the mean and standard deviation values of 3.7565 and 0.8653.

Given mean and standard deviation values of 4.3939 and 1.0937, all the rules found in the act adequately protect the anti-graft agencies from victimization by powerful governmental figures. Overall, there is a consensus on the effectiveness of the legal frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly in the fight against corruption in Nigeria as noted by the composite mean value of 3.8336. Omolara Akinyeye (2022, *personal interview*), however, disagreed with this finding as she noted that within the same period, "not much improvement has been seen as corruption continues to thrive in every aspect of life in Nigeria. The Corruption Perception Index [CPI] of 2020 points this out". To illustrate, a study by Afrobarometer showed that between 2016/2018, 24.9% of its respondents thought that corruption increased a lot while 10.2% stated that it decreased a lot within the same period (Note, opposite ends of the measure [see figure 4.2]).

Figure 4.2: Level of Corruption in Nigeria 2016/2018

Source: Afrobarometer (2019)

To further buttress the position expressed by Omolara Akinyeye (2022, *personal interview*), Nigeria's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) within the tenure of the 8th National Assembly are provided in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6: Corruption Perception Index and Ibrahim Index of African Governance between 2014-2019

S/N	YEAR	CPI (RANK/SCORE)	IIAG (RANK/SCORE)
1	2014	136/27	38/26.5
2	2015	136/26	32/35.2
3	2016	136/28	33/32.7
4	2017	148/27	32/29.4
5	2018	144/27	34/30.5
6	2019	146/26	38/29.5

Source: Transparency International [TI] (2020); Ibrahim Index of African Governance [IIAG] (2021)[1]

The import of the above rankings is that out of 180 countries, Nigeria's corruption perception ranking from 2014 to 2019 was 136, 136, 136, 148, 144, and 146, respectively. In the same vein, of the 52 countries in Africa, Nigeria ranked 38, 32, 33, 32, 34, and 38 in governance in the years 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 separately. A graphical presentation of these rankings is shown in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3: Nigeria's CPI and IIAG Indexes from 2014-2019

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[1] See https://iiag.online/data.html?meas=ANTICORR&loc=NG&view=table

Source: Transparency International [TI], 2020; Ibrahim Index of African Governance [IIAG], 2021)

For the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), between 2014 and 2019 Nigeria's rank of anti-corruption staggered between 32 and 38. Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) soared to 148 in 2017 and then 146 in 2019. In 2018, Nigeria's corruption perception rank was 144. Impliedly, despite the legislative interventions by the 8th National Assembly in fighting corruption, not much improvement was seen as proven by the IIAG and corruption perception by the TI. This, therefore, confirms the position of Omolara Akinyeye (2022, *personal interview*) who doubted the responses of respondents about the effectiveness of the legal frameworks facilitated by the legislature.

On the other hand, the views of the respondents on the institutional frameworks utilized in the fight against corruption in Nigeria were evaluated using specific parameters. Along this line,

the descriptive analysis ascertained the extent of the respondents' concurrence or disagreement

with the parameters. The outcome of the analysis is presented in 4.7.

Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics on Institutional Framework

Statement	N	Percentage					Mean	Std. Deviation
		5	4	3	2	1		

The anti-graft agencies in Nigeria have been consistent in the fight against corruption	329	5	7.5	32.5	25	30	4.8327	.8257
All indicted personalities in corruption cases and the funds are made public by the anti-graft agencies	329	17.5	7.5	20	22.5	32.5	3.9286	.6556
The anti-graft agencies follow due process of the law in the arrest of publicly indicted figures	329	10	17.5	5	47.5	20	3.9281	.6814
The looted funds recovered are used for the provision of services that meet the fundamental needs of Nigerians	329	12.5	15	5	27.5	40	3.7281	.7850
In the fight against corruption, anti-corruption agencies preserve Nigeria's norms and values	329	24.2	69.7	3.0	1.5	1.5	3.8636	.6768
Average Score	**329**						**4.0562**	**0.7249**

Source: Fieldwork, November 2022.

The results of the survey revealed that the respondents strongly agreed that the anti-graft agencies in Nigeria have been consistent in the fight against corruption. The position aligned with the mean and standard deviation of the study as indicated by the separate values of 4.8327 and 0.8257. the statement that "All indicted personalities in corruption cases and the funds are made public by the anti-graft agencies" was agreed to by the respondents given the mean and standard deviation scores of 3.9286 and 0.6556 respectively. Equally, the statement regarding whether the anti-graft agencies

follow due process of the law in the arrest of publicly indicted figures was agreed upon by a majority of the respondents. This is indicated by the means and standard deviation values of 3.9281 and 0.6814.

About whether the looted funds recovered are used for the provision of services that meet the fundamental needs of Nigerians, the respondents agreed to the extent noted by the mean value of 3.7281 and standard deviation of 0.7850. However, Omolara Akinyeye (2022, *personal interview*) disagreed as she cited the ongoing investigation of Ladidi Mohammed, head of asset recovery and management unit, ministry of justice, by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) over allegations of fraud especially the sale of recovered loots. According to Omolara

> Ladidi Mohammed was initially detained for a number of days by the EFCC and grilled over allegations of fraudulent sale of recovered assets worth billions. She was granted administrative bail with strident bail conditions.

In addition, Abdullahi Musa (2022, *personal interview*) confirmed that the activities of the Office of the Attorney General of the Federation has failed to handle the anti-corruption fight properly with the shady handling of looted assets recovery contract. To Abdullahi Musa, this erodes the institutional capacity of the anti-corruption agencies and whatever efforts made by the National Assembly as the AGF's office is the chief prosecuting officer. In fact, Mr. Abdullahi Musa cited the withdrawal of cases against Senator Danjuma Goje.

The separate mean and standard deviation scores of 3.8636 and 0.6768 affirmed that the anti-graft agencies conduct their activities in a manner that preserves Nigeria's norms and values. The unnamed EFCC official (2022, *personal interview*) supports this position by stating that our traditional society frowns at corrupt acts by punishing yam theft in the olden days. As a result,

"apart from the necessity of the modern times, we have a rich history that must be protected. We must never forget who we are" (unnamed EFCC Official, 2022, *personal interview*).

Based on the outcomes from each statement, the composite values of the standard deviation and mean values of the respondents reported on the effectiveness of the institutional framework in the fight against corruption in Nigeria are observed as 4.0562 and 0.7249. In line with this, Olujobi (2017) observed that what is required on the part of the government in addition to legislative and institutional reform strategies is the strong political will to prosecute the alleged corrupt offenders and implementation of the letter and spirit of the law against corruption thus, the national anti-corruption laws are the most effective legal instruments that can address corruption in the sector.

Although Ejalonibu, Uzodinma, and Osolafia (2021) posited that the institutional frameworks on the anti-graft war had recorded fewer achievements and more failures despite the attention it receives, Jibrin (2020) averred that an increase in the level of autonomy of the anti-corruption institutions and an increase in the level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences would improve the level of effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions. Also, Onuigbo and Eme (2015) called for a reform of the anti-corruption agencies to increase accountability in government agencies as a way of curbing corruption. Obolo (2013) optimistically expressed the view that serious and sincere commitments to counter corruption would involve comprehensive institutional and administrative reforms, and not using it as a tool to acquire political support and exercises political power.

4.6 Deficiencies in the Legal and Institutional Frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly in tackling corruption

The fight against corruption in Nigeria has since encountered difficulties thereby making the fight difficult in Nigeria. According to Obolo (2013), corruption attacks the foundation of

democratic institutions by distorting electoral processes, perverting the rule of law, and creating bureaucratic quagmires whose only reason for existing is the soliciting of bribes. Despite the continuous fight against corruption by strengthening both legal and institutional frameworks, there still exists corruption on a large scale in the public and private sectors in the country. Based on this, the views of the respondents were collected (and recorded in Table 4.8) on the deficiencies of the legal and institutional frameworks.

Table 4.8: Deficiencies of the legal and institutional frameworks

Statement	N	Percentage					Mean	Std. Deviation
		5	4	3	2	1		
Immunity of public officers	329	25	40	1	10	5	3.7954	.9483
Appointment of the anti-graft chairman	329	15	30	20	12.5	12.5	4.3453	.7433
Lack of special court for the prosecution of corrupt officials	329	35	37.5	30	17.5	10	3.7432	.8547
Influence of politically exposed officials	329	30	27.5	7.5	27.5	7.5	3.9332	.6437
Lack of financial autonomy of the anti-graft agencies	329	42.5	25	10	20	2.5	3.8030	.7690
Lack of an extant whistleblower legislation	329	30	50	2.5	10	7.5	3.7727	.5202
Average Score	**329**						**3.8988**	**0.7465**

Source: Fieldwork, November 2022.

The responses indicated that the respondents agreed that the constitutional immunity conferred on public officers has been one of the major deficiencies of the frameworks in the fight against corruption in Nigeria. This position is validated by the mean and standard deviation values of 3.7954 and 0.9483. Citing the case of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Omolara Akinyeye (2022, *personal interview*) posited that "if the Prime Minister of Israel can be made to face legal action against his misconduct, I see no reason why we cannot adopt the same strategy

here to fight corruption". Going further, Omolara noted the sad situation where government officers hide under the cloak of *executive immunity* to perpetuate corrupt acts and then hope to negotiate their ways out of prosecution.

The survey showed that the uncertainty surrounding the appointment of the anti-graft chairman has also constituted a major deficiency in the legal and institutional frameworks used in the fight against corruption in Nigeria following the mean value of 4.3453 and a standard deviation of 0.7433. In support, Onuche (2018) affirmed that the provision of Section 171 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, gives the power to the President to appoint Heads of Anti-Corruption Agencies even in an acting capacity without the confirmation of the Senate. Abdullahi Musa (2022, *personal interview*) decried the consequence of this as he cited the case of the immediate past chairman of the EFCC, Ibrahim Magu who was rejected several times by the Senator (Dr.) Bukola Saraki-led National Assembly. In fact, the unnamed EFCC Official (2022, *personal interview*) posited that the "lack of a clear leadership ascension in the commission remains the bane of our activities. Most times, as was the case with the past chairmen, people are brought in from nowhere to head the commission without recourse to its traditions and values".

Furthermore, field data found that the lack of a special court for the prosecution of corrupt officials results in the delay of the prosecution of corrupt public officers as revealed by 3.7432 and 0.8547 mean and standard deviation respectively. According to Samson (2018), the prosecution of corruption cases has been marred by delays resulting from prosecutorial procedures, a large number of cases in the Court Docket, and other factors resulting in uncompleted cases by the anti-graft agencies. In addition to this deficiency, the influence of politically exposed officials was found to constitute a major challenge in the fight against corruption in Nigeria. Separate mean and standard deviation scores of 3.9332 and 0.6437 support this argument. Omolara Akinyeye (2022,

personal interview) points out that mostly, public officers immune to prosecution, consciously seek ways to influence the trajectory of their graft cases.

Also, the anti-graft agencies lack financial autonomy which has made them puppets in the hands of highly placed government officials in Nigeria. This argument is supported by the mean and standard deviation values of 3.8030 and 0.7690. Lastly, the absence of substantive whistleblower legislation creates a gap in curbing corruption in Nigeria. Generally, the composite mean and standard deviation of 3.8988 and 0.7465 confirms that there are, indeed, deficiencies in the legal and institutional frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly hence, resulting in a relatively low impact in the fight against corruption. According to Onuche (2018), these challenges constitute impediments to the fight against corruption in Nigeria.

4.7 Mitigating the deficiencies to ensure the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies in the future

To mitigate the deficiencies in the legal and institutional frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly in tackling corruption in Nigeria, the suggestions of the respondent were presented in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9: Improved and independent funding of anti-graft agencies

Options	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	107	32.5
Agree	131	40
Undecided	16	5

Disagree	56	17.5
Strongly Disagree	16	5
Total	**329**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, November 2022.

The data in Table 4.9 indicates that the majority of the sample respondents (40% + 32.5% = 72.5%) suggested the improved and independent funding of anti-graft agencies to prevent dependence on the goodwill of supervisory ministries such as the Ministry of Justice to carry out its activities. Even though a few (17.5% + 5%) disagreed, 5% of the respondents were undecided. Concurring with the majority position, Omolara Akinyeye (2022, *personal interview*) and Abdullahi Musa (2022, *personal interview*) stated separately that the anti-graft agencies must be funded adequately for them to perform optimally. Therefore, they suggested an increase in their budgetary allocations.

Respondents also suggested repealing the immunity clause in the 1999 constitution as a strategy for resolving the deficiencies in the activities of the anti-graft agencies. Their responses are outlined in Table 4.10.

Table 4.10: Immunity Clause repeal from the 1999 constitution

Options	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	90	27.5
Agree	75	22.5
Undecided	57	17.5

Disagree	57	17.5
Strongly Disagree	50	15
Total	**329**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, November 2022.

From Table 4.10, 50.0% of respondents agreed that the anti-corruption agencies and other stakeholders should immediately work to repeal the Immunity clause in the 1999 Constitution; 32.5% objected to the suggestion while 17.5% were undecided. Analytically, the majority of the respondents believe that the Immunity Clause as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution should be repealed to enhance the effectiveness of the various frameworks designed to tackle corruption in Nigeria. Baring her mind, Omolara Akinyeye (2022, *personal interview*) that the immunity clause not only shields public officers from prosecution but also affords them an influence-peddling opportunity.

Finally, respondents suggested that public education and enlightenment programmes should be carried out to educate the citizens on the various issues of corruption. Table 4.11 presents the responses.

Table 4.11: Public education and enlightenment programs

Options	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	66	20
Agree	123	37.5
Undecided	90	27.5

Disagree	33	10
Strongly Disagree	17	5
Total	**329**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, November 2022.

Table 4.11 indicates that the majority (20% + 37.5% = 57.5%) of the respondents support the National Orientation Agency (NOA), Federal. and State Ministries of Information to engage in public education and enlightenment programmes to educate the citizens on the activities of anti-graft agencies while 15.0% others disagreed. 27.5% of the sample respondents were undecided. The importance of a well-coordinated enlightenment campaign cannot be overemphasized hence, the unnamed EFCC Official (2022, *personal interview*) posited that "citizens see us as their enemy. They barely know the things we do. Honestly, if their eyes are opened to corrupt activities going on, they will meet their elected leaders with jungle justice. Therefore, I totally support an enlightenment programme for citizens on the things we do. We have been doing this in the commission but the National Orientation Agency must step in to help".

4.8 Discussion of Findings

The result of the analysis of field data shows that the demography is made up of 69% males and 31% females and the majority of the respondents fall within the age group of 29 to 39 years. The study also observed that majority of the respondents had Higher National Diplomas and First Degree certificates hence, affirming their suitability for the study. Based on objective one, the

Sessional Report, Senate Anti-corruption and Financial Crimes Committee (2019) recorded that the committee held a total of forty (40) meetings from June 2015 to June 2019. The meetings include budget defense meetings, joint committee meetings, interactive meetings with agencies and screening of the President's nominees for confirmation in different categories/positions. Others include but are not limited to – meeting with GTB and INNOSON motors, deliberation with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department of State (DAS) United States of America Interactive sessions with ICPC, and Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), among others.

For objective two, the study found that there are legal frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly to tackle corruption in Nigeria. These frameworks include the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) Act, etc. However, Key Informants queried the effectiveness of the legal frameworks in the fight against corruption. Prof Okonkwo (as cited in Onuche, 2018) supports the Key Informants when he quipped thus: "in most cases, there are existing laws which deal with relevant crimes but still, there is a need for legislation to cover the full ramifications of the crime, plug loopholes, create stringent penalties, provide speedy, effective and more appropriate procedures…for dealing with crimes and importantly to manifest governments determination and preparedness to do battle with criminals." In addition, Olujobi (2017) stated that the challenge is not only with the existing anti-corruption legal regime but enforcement of the laws to achieve the desired objectives of combating corruption.

In addition, objective two revealed that institutional framework is critical in the fight against corruption. Therefore, Egbegi and Ajah (2020) noted that it is necessary to build trust with Nigerians through methods of strengthening institutional structures that help to enhance the perceived legitimacy efforts of fighting corruption. This logic is drawn from the adage that effective crime control relies upon support and cooperation from the general public and that if

members of the public do not regard authorities and laws as legitimate, they are less likely to defer to those authorities and laws (Cherney & Hartley, 2015).

As is with most human endeavours, deficiencies of the legal and institutional frameworks include immunity of public officers, insecurity of the anti-graft chairman's office, lack of special court for the prosecution of corrupt officials, the influence of politically exposed officials, lack of financial autonomy of the anti-graft agencies, and lack of substantive whistleblower legislation, etc. Nevertheless, the study found that improved and independent funding of anti-graft agencies, repeal of the immunity provision in the 1999 constitution, vigorous enlightenment campaign, etcetera, as strategies that will mitigate the challenges confronting the fight against corruption in Nigeria.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION

`   This chapter presents the summary, recommendations, and conclusion of the study. Its contents were therefore taken from previous chapters.

5.1 Summary

This study investigated the efforts of the 8th National Assembly committees in tackling corruption. While it broadly sought to examine the efforts of the 8th National Assembly anti-

corruption committees in tackling corruption, it specifically: examined the performance of oversight by the 8th National Assembly anti-corruption committees; evaluated the effect of the institutional and legal frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly in tackling corruption; investigated the deficiencies in the legal and institutional frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly in tackling corruption, and identified the strategies would mitigate the deficiencies in the future.

To achieve the objectives, the study adopted the mixed research method hence, relying on qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis. Although the designated sample size (using Taro Yamane's formula) was 372 respondents, only 329 survey instruments were retrieved. On the other hand, 10 key informants were subjectively selected for the conduct of interviews. In all, the purposive sampling technique was used in the selection of respondents. Primary (questionnaire and interview) and secondary (journal articles, magazines, the internet, and official publications of government agencies, among others) data were also utilized. Descriptive statistics was adopted for the analysis of the questionnaire while content analysis was used to analyze qualitative data. The presentation was done in themes, tables, and charts.

The result of the analysis of field data revealed that the 8th Senate Committee on Anti-corruption and Financial Crimes held a total of forty (40) meetings from June 2015 to June 2019. The meetings include budget defense meetings, joint committee meetings, interactive meetings with agencies and screening of the President's nominees for confirmation in different categories/positions. Based on objective two, findings showed that there are legal frameworks facilitated by the 8th National Assembly to tackle corruption in Nigeria. These frameworks include the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) Act, etc.

Although Key Informants queried the effectiveness of the legal frameworks in the fight against corruption thrive following various institutional measurements of Nigeria's Corruption Perception (see Figure 4.3), objective two further revealed that, indeed, institutional frameworks are critical success factors in the fight against corruption. Highlighting its centrality, Egbegi and Ajah (2020) opined that strengthening institutional structures enhances the legitimacy of the efforts aimed at fighting corruption.

However, given the inherent fallibility nature of humans, specific deficiencies of the legal and institutional frameworks include immunity of public officers, insecurity of the anti-graft chairman's office, lack of special court for the prosecution of corrupt officials, the influence of politically exposed officials, lack of financial autonomy of the anti-graft agencies, and lack of substantive whistleblower legislation, etc. Nevertheless, the study found that improved and independent funding of anti-graft agencies, repeal of the immunity provision in the 1999 constitution, vigorous enlightenment campaign, etcetera, as strategies that will mitigate the challenges confronting the fight against corruption in Nigeria.

5.2 Recommendations

The study recommends as follows:

1) Improved and independent funding of anti-graft agencies. The National Assembly must take the legislative initiative in providing an independent and adequately funded purse for anti-graft agencies. This has become necessary because of the financially demanding nature of their activities.

2) Repeal of the immunity provision in the 1999 constitution. To avoid the delay in the prosecution fueled by influence-peddling by corrupt officials, the National Assembly in exercising its legislative powers should undertake the review of the constitutional immunity for elected officials.

3) Vigorous enlightenment campaign. This recommendation is multi-agency targeted. Explicitly, relevant government agencies such as the EFCC, ICPC, and the National Orientation Agency (NOA), among others, should emphasize citizens and public enlightenment on the activities of the anti-graft agencies as well as issues of graft.

4) Special courts should be established to try corruption cases. Exercising its legislative powers, the National Assembly should with the support of the judiciary enact extant provisions for the establishment of special corruption courts. Without a doubt, this will give speed and quick judgment to corruption cases.

5.3 Conclusion

No doubt, for any meaningful effect of the anti-corruption war, the legislature is critical. From the data presented and analyzed in chapter four, the study concludes that although several institutional and legal frameworks to combat corruption exists, their effectiveness as shown by empirical data for the period under study was low. Indeed, the negative impact of Corruption in Nigeria has accounted for the socio-political and economic under-development of Nigeria and its image among the International community as shown by Transparency International (TI) and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIGA).

While several efforts to combat Corruption, the study found that the various efforts have yielded minimal success. This study attributes this to deficiencies in the institutional and legal frameworks such as the immunity of public officers, insecurity of the anti-graft chairman's office, lack of a special court for the prosecution of corrupt officials, etc. To mitigate the deficiencies, the study suggested the establishment of special courts to prosecute corruption cases, enlightenment campaigns, the repeal of the constitutional immunity clause, and so on. Overall, the study concludes that for any effective anti-graft fight, the listed recommendations must be implemented.

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