

**LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: A STUDY  
OF THE NIGERIA 9<sup>TH</sup> SENATE, 2019 - 2023.**

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**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE  
FOR LEGISLATIVE AND DEMOCRATIC STUDIES  
(NILDS)/UNIVERSITY OF BENIN (UNIBEN) POST-GRADUATE  
PROGRAMMES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTERS DEGREE IN  
PARLIAMENTARY ADMINISTRATION (MPD)**

**MAY, 2024**

## **ABSTRACT**

Legislative oversight and good governance is very essential to promote accountability, transparency and rule of law in Nigeria. The study examined the role of Nigeria 9<sup>th</sup> Senate in using legislative oversight to promote good governance in Nigeria.

The research adopted the principal-Agent in discussing its theoretical framework, it further adopted descriptive method which uses primary source of data via questionnaire to elicit for information. Taro – Yamme formula was the technique sampling used for the research.

The study revealed that the 9<sup>th</sup> senate scored low in the performance of their legislative oversight functions while the senate demonstrated fair independence in carrying out their legislative oversight functions. It was revealed that the senate has the capacity to conduct comprehensive reviews of government programmes, policies and projects. However, the legislative oversight can only investigate and expose but lacks the legal power to prosecute. More so, legislative resolutions are not binding on the executive arm making its exercise in futility. Corruption and personal interest was discovered as the major challenge of legislative oversight and good governance in Nigeria.

The study recommends among others that public hearings and investigation should not be a witch hunting tool and the outcome should be made public and recommendations implemented. Serious efforts must be made to strengthen the

institutional capacity and capabilities of anti-corruption agencies. The senate must establish a strong institutional procedures for legislative actions that will be independent of executive interference in conducting its oversight functions, enactment of laws and passing of resolutions, investigation on allegations of poor administration and abuse of power and confirmation of appointee of the executive should be merit based. Finally, the senate should phase out the traditional method of voice vote and replaced with electronic voting system that enables the general public to know their respective stand on national issues.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background to the Study**

Legislative oversight refers to the process by which a legislative body, such as a parliamentary or a congress, monitors and evaluates the actions and decisions of the executives branch of the government. It is an essential function of the democratic governance as it ensure transparency, accountability and effective implementation of policies and laws. Through oversight, the legislative branch act as a check on the executive, preventing abuse of power and promoting good governance.

Good governance on the other hand, encompasses the principles and practices that contribute to the effective and accountable management of public affairs. It involves transparency, rule of law, participation, responsiveness, efficiency and inclusiveness. Good governance is crucial for promoting sustainable development, social justice and the well-being of citizens.

The significance of legislative oversight and good governance lies in their ability to promote transparency, accountability, and the protection of citizens' rights. Legislative oversight ensures that the government operates within the boundaries set by the law and that public resources are utilized effectively. Good governance, supported by robust oversight mechanisms, help to build public trust, enhance and foster socio-economic development.

In context of Nigeria, where the democratic governance is still evolving, legislative oversight and good governance play a vital role in addressing corruption, promoting development and ensuring public welfare. The Nigerian senate as the upper chamber of the National Assembly has a crucial responsibility to conduct effective oversight and contribute to good governance in the country. Studying the legislative oversight activities of the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria is significant as it provides an opportunity to evaluate the performance and impact of the senate in promoting good governance. It allows for an assessment of the strengths, weaknesses and challenges faced by the senate in fulfilling its oversight functions. Understanding these aspects can help identify areas of improvement and inform strategies to enhance legislative oversight practices and overall governance in Nigeria.

In an ideal democracy, there exist the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. These various arms of government perform complimentary roles, all working together to promote the rule of law and to ensure that the citizens of a nation enjoy good governance. The constitution empowers the legislative arm of government to make laws; it also gives it certain oversight functions over the activities of the executive arm. Against this background, Godwoli (2001) classifies these oversight functions as a model of intergovernmental relations, which can be described as a body of activities or interactions occurring between the executive arm of government and the legislative arm. It is a form of systematic

check and balance on the activities of government, which is constitutionally backed up. The complexity of the nature and patterns of oversight functions arises from the number of programmes and activities which different levels of government are engaged in within a specified period. These series of activities call for efficient and orderly management. Accordingly, the efficient, orderly coordination and management of activities and programmes brings to light the human dimension of legislative oversight functions, which is very critical. (Janda et al 2002). The dimension of legislative oversight function in the Nigeria 9th Senate brings a lot of question to mind especially with the amount of valuable resources, in terms of human material and financial that was committed to this venture whose outcome has never improved nor strengthened the country's political process and service rendered to the masses.

From the above therefore, the study aims to investigate the phenomenon of legislative oversight and its impact on good governance within the context of the Nigeria 9th Senate.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Legislative oversight plays a crucial role in ensuring good governance, transparency, and accountability in any democratic society. In Nigeria, the Nigeria 9th Senate, which began its tenure in 2019, holds significant responsibility in providing effective oversight of the executive branch and promoting good governance practices. However, several challenges and

concerns need to be addressed to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the legislative oversight process in achieving its objective:

i. Lack of independence: one of the primary concerns is the perceived lack of independence of the Nigeria 9th Senate when conducting oversight functions. The influence of external factors, such as political parties, special interest groups, and executive interference, has compromised the senate's ability to act as an unbiased check on the executive. This issue raises the questions about the senate's ability to hold the executive branch accountable and maintains good governance practices.

ii. Inadequate legislative capacity: executive oversight requires a strong understanding of policy issues and technical expertise. The Nigeria 9th Senate's capacity to conduct comprehensive review of government programmes, policies and projects may be limited due to lack of resources, training, and specialized staff. The absence of these critical components could hinder their ability to make informed decisions and recommendations for improved governance.

iii. Weak legal framework: the absence of a robust legal framework governing legislative oversight in Nigeria poses significant challenges. Clear guidelines and regulations that define the scope, powers and limitations of oversight activities are necessary to ensure transparency, consistency and

effectiveness. The lack of such framework has resulted in ambiguity, leading to inconsistencies in the exercise of oversight functions.

iv. Inefficiency and delayed response: timeliness is crucial for effective oversight. Delays in responding to reports, investigations or recommendations can undermine the purpose of oversight and weaken the impact of corrective actions. The Nigeria 9th Senate's ability to promptly address issues raised during oversight activities as well as the implementation of necessary reforms may be hindered by bureaucratic processes, lack of political will, or other systemic barriers.

v. Limited public participation: good governance requires active citizens' participation and engagement in oversight processes. However, there may be lack of mechanisms or platforms through which the public can contribute and monitor the senate's oversight activities. This limited public participation has resulted in reduce transparency, accountability, and public trust in the legislative process.

Addressing these challenges and concerns is crucial to strengthen legislative oversight and promote good governance in Nigeria. By ensuring the independence of the senate, enhancing legislative capacity, establishing a robust legal framework, improving efficiency and encouraging public participation, the senate can enhance its oversight role and contribute to the overall governance and development of the nation.



### **1.3 Research Questions**

The following questions will be addressed in the course of this study.

- i. To what extent does the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting oversight functions, and how does this independence influence its ability to promote good governance?
- ii. What is the capacity of the Nigeria 9th Senate to conduct comprehensive reviews of government programmes, policies, and projects, and how does this capacity impact the quality and effectiveness of its oversight activities?
- iii. How efficient and timely is the Nigeria 9th Senate in responding to reports, investigations, and recommendations during oversight activities, and how does this responsiveness contribute to effective corrective actions and reforms?
- iv. What are the main challenges and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance, and what recommendations can be proposed to address these challenges?

### **1.4 Research Objectives**

The broad objective of this study is to analyse the impact Legislative oversight on good governance, using the Nigeria 9th Senate as a case study.

The specific objectives of the study are to:

- i. Access the level of independence of the Nigeria 9th Senate in conducting

- oversight functions and its impact on promoting good governance;
- ii. Analyse the capacity of the Nigeria 9th Senate to conduct comprehensive reviews of government programmes, policies, and projects, and how does this capacity impact the quality and effectiveness of its oversight activities?
  - iii. Examine how efficient and timely was the Nigeria 9th Senate in responding to reports, investigations, and recommendations during oversight activities, and how does this responsiveness contribute to effective corrective actions and reforms?
  - iv. Identify the challenges and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance

### **1.5 Research Propositions**

Based on the problem statement regarding legislative oversight and good governance in the Nigeria 9th Senate of Nigeria, here are some research propositions that guided the study:

- i. The level of independence of the Nigeria 9th Senate in conducting oversight functions significantly impacts on the effectiveness of its role in promoting good governance.
- ii. National Assembly have the capacity to conduct comprehensive reviews of government programmes, policies, and projects through quality and effective oversight activities

iii. The 9th senate does not efficiently and timely respond to reports, investigations, and recommendations during oversight activities.

iv. There are challenges and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance

## **1.6 Significance of the Study**

The study holds significance body of knowledge on legislative oversight and good governance. The findings will provide insights into the role of the Nigeria 9th Senate in ensuring transparency, accountability, and effective governance. The research outcomes will be valuable for policy makers, legislators, civil society organizations, and scholars interested in promoting good governance through legislative oversight. It is expected that the study's recommendations will inform future reforms and strengthen the oversight functions of legislative bodies in fostering good governance.

## **1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study**

This study examines legislative oversight and good governance as a case study of the Nigeria 9th Senate of Nigerian National Assembly and covers a period of four years (2019-2023). Emphases were laid on effective performance, capacity, accountability and good governance of her statutory responsibility of legislatives oversight. Some initial difficulties were experienced in administering questionnaire on the legislatives staff, MDAs

and CSOs, this was because of oath of secrecy they signed, however, the research reassured them of the confidentiality of their information and it was to be used for academic purpose only, and coupled with financial constraints.

## **1.7 Definition of Key Terms**

**Legislative oversight:** Legislative oversight refers to the legislature's review and evaluation of selected activities of the executive branch of government.

**The Executive:** This is the arm of government that is responsible for executing the Law made by the legislative arm.

**National Assembly:** This refers to the second arm of government responsible for the enactment of Law made up of Upper Chamber (Senate) and Lower Chamber (House of Representatives).

**Legislator:** This word would be used to refer to the elected representative of the people in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

**Legislature:** This refers to the second arm of government responsible for enacting Laws

**Parliament:** It refers to an institution of Law-making body which members are also referred to as Parliamentarians and in Nigeria, members of National Assembly

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

#### **2.1 Conceptual Review**

##### **2.1.1 The Concept of legislative Oversight Function**

Heywood (2007) explained that the oversight function can also be referred to as scrutiny. According to Cosmeus (2016), the primary role of the legislature in public policy process is that they are responsible for holding governments accountable in their decisions and they scrutinize the government in their actions. In recent times, the legislators have become increasingly a scrutinizing body of the Executive so as to deliver responsible and accountable government.

Shafritz, Russell and Borick (2016), explained that the oversight functions take many forms and the most common is the annual (in a place like the US) congressional hearings of agency's budget requests where agencies have to defend or justify their activities to the satisfaction of the Congress. At some other times, subpoena power may be used to summon reluctant agencies or public officials. The constitution in most places gives a legal backing to the oversight function of the legislature in which it can monitor the activities of the Executive branch and its agencies to determine if public projects or programmes are being adequately executed.

According to Saiegh (2014), the oversight function or role of the legislature means ensuring the implementation of laws, ensuring that legislation and government policies are implemented effectively. Monitoring, reviewing and investigating programmes and activities of government to ensure that the actions taken are transparent, accountable and consistent according to the original intent as allowed by the constitution.

Similarly, Frolick (2016), Legislators have the legal backing, authority and responsibility to hold governments to account in their activities. Ojo and Omotola (2014) also posited that, Legislators hold Ministries, Departments and Agencies of government accountable in their activities to the public. Not only do they hold the Executive accountable in their functions, they also have the power to approve or confirm appointments made by the Executive and Judiciary. Such appointments include that of ministers, chairmen, Ambassadors, Chief Justice of the Federation, Federal Commissions and Councils, Justices of the Supreme Courts and the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court. The Legislators through their oversight function, rise up to ensure that funds appropriated for government institutions are utilized for the purpose they were allocated for to ensure that citizens get value for their money.

In the same vein, Posner and Park (2007) the legislators' authority to appropriate public funds has been the foundation for public budgeting and accountability. The fundamental power of appropriation gave the legislature

formative influence in allocating funds among competing priorities. And the varying influence of legislators in budgeting is reflected in the different political systems. For example, the prime minister in UK can be crossed examined once a week and the legislators can subject other senior ministers to similar scrutiny once a week if there is mismanagement in the federation's account (Heywood, 2007).

Also, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2004) in the presidential systems, the legislative oversight function is normally a routine of checks and balances which is part of separation of powers. Conversely, in parliamentary system, it may be politically difficult for legislative committee to question ministers since they are also members of parliament. In such cases a regularly scheduled question and answer period will serve the purpose by allowing opposition members to question the Ministers, challenging the decisions of government on policies and programmes. Ewuim, Nnamani and Eberinwa (2014) stated that the oversight function of the Legislators is a major component of modern day legislature irrespective of the system of government. This according to Saliu and Muhammad (2010) as cited by Ewuim, Nnamani and Eberinwa means the legislative body takes active role in understanding and monitoring the performance of the Executive arm and its agencies regularly. The principle behind this function of the legislature is to ensure that public policy is administered in accordance with the legislative intent. The oversight functions

also involve watching and controlling the activities of government through general debates, questioning of ministers, agencies and other public officials. They can also conduct investigation of committees and where necessary impeach officers they find opposed to democratic performance in their activities.

### **2.1.2 Structure and Function of Legislative Institution**

The roles the legislature performs in a democracy and the extent to which the roles are performed vary with the system of government in place, as well as they differ from one country to another. Essentially, the legislative institution provides for the citizenry the platform for participatory political process. However, the participation afforded by the legislative institution is the indirect type, as it will be practically impossible for the electorate to gather in one place for policy decisions, implementation and governance. Fashagba (2011) noted:

*The presence of legislative institution in any modern polity suggests the indirect participation of the electorates in the making of decisions on issues that affect their daily lives. Not only is the presence of a legislature salient to the acceptability of democratic regime, but also the extent to which the legislature demonstrates capability to freely express itself and asserts its power determine how democratic the government is.*

Government in a democratic system implies the rule of the majority. Apparently, the legislature is one democratic institution that allows the various constituencies to which a state is delineated elect their representatives. When elected, the



representatives are expected to represent the views, concerns and interests of their constituents in the legislature. In fact, central to representative democracy is the notion that elected representatives of the people constitute the legislative arm of government (Kousoulos, 1982). Indeed, representation of citizens in parliament is at the core of liberal democracy.

The legislature, hence, is saddled with enormous roles in any democratic system. This is even especially so where the institution enjoy a huge measure of autonomy in determining their internal operations, where there is constitutional provisions for operational and institutional independence. According to Fish and Kroenig (2009), the study of modern government and politics involving contemporary nation-states is impossible without an appreciation of the role of the legislature. Fashagba (2009) also affirmed that in modern democracies the roles of representation, law-making and oversight of administration are often ascribed to the legislature. In his view, Alabi (2010) established the power to make laws as distinctively resided with modern parliaments. It is however important to point out that while legislatures are often vested with the law-making role, some legislatures contribute effectively in initiating bills and raising policy issues for the House to deliberate upon but others simply debate whatever proposals the executive present to it. Of course, the former in addition to initiating bills deliberate on policy proposals and bills emanating from the executive.

Oversight function is also a very important role of the modern legislature. Oversight function particularly appears to preoccupy modern legislatures. According to Verney (1969), the watchdog function is perhaps more important for a legislative assembly than that of law-making. The legislature provides the institutional mechanism for ensuring accountability and good governance. Stapenhurst also noted that 'In most countries, the legislature is constitutionally mandated as the institution through which governments are held accountable to the electorate'. The role of oversight of executive administration thus specifically entails: scrutinizing and authorizing revenues and expenditures of the government and ensuring that the national budget is properly implemented. The constitutional power to participate in budgetary appropriation gives the legislature needed political influence to shape governance, and possibly carry out reforms that are sustainable. In this regard, Saffell (1989) asserted that 'no function of the congress is more jealously guarded or more basic to administrative control than the power of the purse' (p. 69). In the same vein, Posner and Park (2007) affirmed 'Legislatures in some countries have gained a role in approving macro fiscal frameworks'. The Nigerian legislature belongs to the class of legislative assemblies vested with preponderance of power over fiscal matters, perhaps.

The modern legislature equally performs representational function. Principally, the people's representatives for the singular fact that they are elected by the

people, especially under a democratic regime, hold the mandate of their constituencies within the polity (Davies, 2004). Sodaro put it thus: ‘the essence of representative democracy lies in the delegation of governmental power and responsibility to a small number of people by the citizenry as a whole’ (2007, p. 179). Consequently, the elected members of the legislature are expected to pursue good public policies for national development; this is most characteristic of electorates in the developed democracies of the world. In the emerging democracies some variation may be seen, in terms of what the representational roles of the legislators specifically are. Beyond public policy goals, patronage opportunities for members of the constituencies are expected, by electorates in emerging democracies, from their elected representatives in the legislature. This other electorates are so predisposed as the result of their high level of impoverishment and their neglect especially under the prolonged military rule.

It is noteworthy that the modern legislature serves as an agent of reform in the state (Reed & Scheimer, 2003). In a state where some members of parliament are ideologically inclined the desire to implement their reform agenda will greatly influence their behaviors in the assembly. There is the instance of Japan in 2003 when some members of the ruling party switched parties to form a new party: the party defectors sought to push for their reform agenda which they could not achieve in their former party. Moreover, Nelson Polsby (cited in Ornstein, 1992) observed that the legislature may be broadly categorized into

arena and transformative legislatures (cited in Orstein, 1992). As arena legislature, the assembly serves as forum for discussion of ideas and policies and it provides a formal platform for deliberation among significant political forces in the life of a political system. Conversely, the transformative legislature actively translates ideas into laws. The transformative legislature enjoys a huge measure of institutional autonomy to act on bills or policy proposals emanating either within the assembly itself or from the executive arm of the government. They mold and transform bills and proposals into laws, irrespective of the source. Nevertheless, a legislature can be transformative in function, a reformer in character, but such behavior is cautiously exhibited. According to Saffell (1989, p. 66), a common strategy is for congressmen to be conservative, clinging to past positions, while cautiously reaching for new positions on a few issues. This suggests that a legislature may sometimes find it very difficult to openly and passionately champion the necessity for a drastic reform, unless the action will improve the political fortune of the members pushing for the reform. Discarding old ideas for new ones thus means that not only has the society bought into the reform proposals but also the expected benefits of electoral rewards for the proponents far outweigh the cost. When this is the case, very many legislators willingly pursue reform agenda in the legislature. However, where the political cost is seen to outweigh the benefit, personal interest of the legislators will dictate that they tread with caution, as far as reform agenda are concerned. This

perhaps explains why reform agenda have been difficult to push through in the Nigerian legislature in the current fourth republic. Notwithstanding, some legislators have attempted to push for one reform or the other (Lewis, 2009).

### **2.1.3 Power of the Legislature under the 1999 Constitution**

The extent to which the legislature of any state can shape governance and public policy as well as initiate reforms and push them to successful end is a function of the level of power given to it by the constitution on one hand and the extent to which the executive defer to it, on the other hand. Unlike the executive arm which most often wields a preponderant of discretionary power, in addition to its explicit constitutional power (Fashagba 2009), the legislature is strictly guided by the provisions of the constitution that established it. Indeed, for most part of the 1980s and 90s, precisely a period spanning fifteen years and five months between January 1984 and May 28, 1999, the Nigerian military was in power, ruling through decrees and by administrative fiat (Akintayo, 1999). The military however transferred power to a civilian government under a new constitution in May, 1999. The 1999 Nigerian constitution which was amended in 2010 is currently undergoing another amendment process. The constitution was based on the presidential system. This translates into the separation of governmental powers, institutions and personnel under three distinct arms. In other words, the executive, legislature and judiciary were created as separate institutions, with each institution manned by distinct personnel. Consequently,

each arm of the Nigerian government draws its power from the 1999 constitution (amended in 2010). In this study, the interest is particularly on the power vested in the legislature.

The Nigerian central legislature, known as the National Assembly, enjoys a broad range of power under the 1999 constitution. This is perhaps so not only to rid the state of its immediate authoritarian past, but also to enable it initiate, moulds and shapes policy on the democratic platform of the fourth republic. Section 4, sub-section 1 vests the power to make law for the nation in the National Assembly comprising the Senate and the House of Representatives. In sub-section 2 of section 4, the constitution provides that:

*The National Assembly shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good governance of the federation or any part thereof with respect to any matter included in the exclusive legislative list spelt out in part 1 of the second schedule to this constitution.*

In addition to having the exclusive power to make laws on items in the exclusive list, the National Assembly is equally vested with power to make laws with respect to any matters in the concurrent list. This is provided for in the sub-section 4a of section 4. This means that the central legislature shares the power to make laws with the states (constituent units of the federation) on matters captured in the concurrent list.

In a similar vein, the National Assembly is vested with a unique power that makes it the only institution of the democratic government that can openly and legally amend the constitution of Nigeria. This is captured in section 9 of the 1999 constitution. However, the amendment of any section of the constitution by the National Assembly must be supported by the resolutions of not less than two-thirds majority of all the members of the central legislature and approved by resolution of the houses of assembly of not less than two-thirds of all the states. There are thirty-six states in the Nigerian federation among which twenty are required to support any proposed amendment to any part of the constitution before such amendment can become valid.

Furthermore, in section 80 of the 1999 constitution, the legislature is vested with the power to authorize expenditure from consolidated revenue fund of the federation. The sub-section 3 of the section gives the power to authorize withdrawal from public funds of the federation to the National Assembly. Also, it is also part of the power of the legislature to prescribe the manner of withdrawal of money from the public funds of the federation. The section of the constitution gives the power to authorize spending and raising funds to the legislature. This power of the purse importantly allows the legislature immense influence in shaping government policies, certainly (Saffell, 1989; Verney, 1969). The power to debate, deliberate, mold and/or amend the annual budgetary appropriation proposal presented by the executive president is hence the

opportunity to shape the state policies and influence governance. In this manner, the central legislature ultimately collaborates with the executive to meet the aspirations of the governed. This legislature's role in budgetary appropriation proposal, therefore, in a state where lack of institutional accountability and participatory policy-making under successive military regimes bred mismanagement of national resources and dysfunctional public policy, is of an uttermost imperative. With the legislature-executive collaboration on budgetary appropriation under the democratic Nigeria's fourth republic the economic crisis and erosion of national cohesion under the juntas should be reversed. There is yet the power to impose tax or duty vested in the National Assembly, stipulated in section 163 of the 1999 constitution.

And the legislature is given power to intervene in the judicial administration. For instance, the power to indicate cases in which appeals may be right, cases arising from judgments in the court of appeal to be referred to the Supreme Court, is vested in the National Assembly by the provisions of section 233 and sub-section 21. The legislature is also given the power to override executive veto on any bill. Where the legislature decides to make a bill it has passed have the full force of law, it can decide to use its two-thirds majority power to pass the bill into law. Consequently, the bill so passed by the two-thirds members of the National Assembly will no longer require presidential assent to become a law.



Considering the enormous constitutional powers vested in the central legislature, in addition to the fact that it has absolute power to determine its internal operations (stipulated in section 101 of the 1999 Nigerian constitution), as well as constitute a distinct and independent body, the legislature of the fourth republic is maximally equipped, politically and constitutionally, to shape and influence government policies, and serve as springboard for new ideas and policy reforms. The extent to which the legislature is able to use these powers, the level at which it is able to come up with policy initiatives, and the degree to which it is responsive to public opinions, society's developmental challenges and aspirations will determine its impact level on re-engineering the nation, socially, economically and politically.

**The power to conduct investigation;** The essence of the legislature conducting investigation on those matters appropriated to it by law is to ensure or make its legislation apparently effective for good governance. The National Assembly has from time to time used this power to investigate the departments, ministries and agencies of government. In recent times, the investigation of subsidy disbursement, the utilization of the subsidy disbursement in 2012, the utilization of subsidy re-investment funds and SURE-P fund in 2018 and others are clear examples of the power of the central Assembly to investigate the practice for the Legislature to conduct investigation for the good governance of the country, but the question is, how

effective and transparent is the legislative houses is carrying out these investigation.

Osundo, 2012 in his work titled: legislative practice in Nigeria: the activities of the House of Representatives' (2011-2015) He utilized data from a field survey conducted on 120 respondents, in addition to copious evidence derived from previous studies in his field work, it was apparent that effective legislative oversight is a precursory measure to the attainment of good governance goals. According to him, a series of events placed the National Assembly in the spotlight of a rising conversation on oversight performance. Constitutional issues, budget delays and poor performance, inconclusiveness of high profile investigations into corrupt practices and breach of public trust and the unsavory role of some legislators in managing the crises are some of the serious issues he examined. He concluded that the performance of oversight functions can only translate to socioeconomic benefits for Nigerians if and when sections of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN, 1999) are revisited and amended, when legislators see the incentive in advancing the national interest over self-interest and political party affiliations.

#### **2.1.4 The Committee System in National Assembly.**

Each Branch of the National Assembly meets in plenary session or through one of its committees. It would be unimaginable to conceive a situation where all the legislative proposals, report form oversights etc. of the National Assembly are

considered in plenary session. The size of the Assembly of which a good proportion would want to participate in any discussion before the House would render this impracticable. As a result, the Assembly has been characterized by a stable system of committees with fixed functions and jurisdiction. Michael (1979) Each House may appoint a committee of its members for such special or general purpose as in its opinion would be better regulated and managed by means of such a committee, and may by resolution, regulation or otherwise, delegate any functions exercisable by it to any such committee. However, neither House is empowered to delegate to a committee, its power to decide whether a Bill shall be passed into law or its power to pass a resolution on any matter. (Section 62 of the 1999 Constitution) The National Assembly has several different kinds of committees, which can be grouped into four. These are the Committee of the whole House, the Standing Committees, the Special Committees and the select Committees. (By Virtue of the 1999 Constitution)

### **Committee of the whole House**

The Committee of the whole House as its name suggests, is the whole Senate or House of Representatives sitting as a committee. This usually happens after a Bill has been read the second time when it shall stand committed to the whole House unless the House decides to commit it to a standing or select Committee. In such a situation, the President or Deputy President of the Senate or the Speaker or

Deputy Speaker, as the case may be, vacates the chair. However, he continues as the Chairman of the Committee of the whole House.

### **Standing Committees**

These are sometimes called ‘General Purpose Committees’ and are appointed at the beginning of the life of each legislature. Under the 1979 Constitution, there were twenty-seven of these in the House of Representatives and twenty-two in the Senate. Each Standing Committee in the House of Representatives and the Senate at that time had twenty-five and eleven members respectively.

### **Special Committees**

These are sometimes called “Special Purposes Committees” and are appointed at the beginning of each legislative session, though any other special committee may be appointed by either House and assigned such duties as the need may arise. The most important of the Special Committees is the Committee of Selection, appointed at the beginning of every session. Under the 1979 Constitution, in the Senate, it consisted of the President, the Deputy President and four other senators while in the House of Representatives, it was made up of the Speaker, Deputy Speaker and nominees of political parties in accordance with their numerical strength in the House. Its functions include nominating members to serve on ad hoc special committees and on parliamentary delegations.

## **Select Committees and Examples of Committees**

The Senate or the House of Representative may appoint a Select Committee of ten or fifteen members respectively to consider any matter that may be referred to it. The nomination in each case is by the Committee of Selection after a notice has been given on a motion made and a question put.

### **2.1.5 The Concept of Good governance**

Good governance recognizes accountability in terms of improving the delivery of public services, measuring performance and providing incentives to achieve targets and sanctions in case of non-performance. Accountability is not to be viewed only in terms of democratic control and integrity of operations but also in terms of performance. The term good governance, just like accountability cannot be easily defined but can at best be described as it has varied and broad connotation (Dogara, 2016). According to him, the only closest description to good governance is the fundamental objectives and directives principles of the state policy which is contained in chapter 2 of the 1999 Nigerian constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). It is his opinion that whenever the state aspires and attains these principles, it can be said to have attained good governance. This means therefore that it was the intent of the framers of our Constitution that government should provide good governance. Unfortunately, these fundamental and directive principles

are mere principles, as failure to implement them is not justifiable before any law court.

Governance is the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are made and implemented (or not implemented). On the other hand, Good governance is defined as the process of allocating resources through the instrumentalities of the State for the attainment of public good. Thus, good governance include institutional and structural arrangements, decision making processes, policy formulation and implementation capacity, development of personnel, information flows and the nature and style of leadership within any political system. Hence, good governance is about problem identification and solving it. (Ogundiya, 2010).In order to achieve good governance, the three arms of government must function efficiently and perform their tasks with integrity and commitment (Sharma et al, 2012). In their view, the objective of good governance is to facilitate the development of people and the society at large. It is also aimed at transforming the social, political and economic life of the people. In this regard, any government that meets or satisfies the yearnings or needs of the people with respect to development is good governance. Good governance is evident when there is increase in the living standard of the people and massive developments are seen all over.

On what constitutes good governance, Johnston (2016) and Sharma et al (2012) identified participation, accountability, transparency, rule of law,

consensus-oriented, effectiveness/efficiency, responsive, inclusiveness/equity as elements of good governance. For instance, where the Legislature hold the Executive to account, is known as horizontal accountability while vertical accountability is a means through which citizens, the media and civil societies seek to enforce standards of good performance on government officials. Newer forms of accountability comprise social and diagonal accountability. Democracy thrives where electoral accountability abounds. Government is electorally accountable to citizens who elected them into office. It has the responsibility to tell the people what it does, how and justifies same. This type of accountability can only be rewarded or punished at elections. Voters are provided with information on whether to vote officials out or retain them, depending on their performance in office. This means that the voters can shape incentive for effectiveness of the legislature through their demands, since they are the ultimate source of power. In contrast, corporate or institutional accountability is a situation where an organization is accountable for its performance or behavior while government/public accountability denotes the examination of the conduct of individuals in institutions of authority.

### **2.1.6 Legislative Oversight as an Instrument for Accountability and good Governance**

Legislatures in democracies share a lot of characteristics in their function, size, organization and modus operandi yet they vary in quite a number of ways. Among the functions of the legislature, the Legislative oversight is crucial to holding the Executive to account. Vemey (1969) corroborates this when he stated that the function of watch dog is, perhaps, more important to an assembly than law-making. Mezy (1983) sees legislative oversight as the power of the representative body to have control over the executive and its agencies; while Hudson and Wren (2007) define oversight as “keeping an eye on the activities of the executive and on behalf of citizens holding the executive to account”. In a related way Woodrow Wilson defines oversight as the “duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eye, the voice, and to embody the will and wisdom of its constituents.

Legislative oversight is also the review, monitoring and supervision of government and public agencies including the implementation of policy and legislation”. As representatives of the people, they are expected to keep an eye on the executive on behalf of Nigerians. The legislative oversight power of the National Assembly is rooted in sections 88(1a) and 89 of the 1999 constitution (as amended) which states as follows: Subject to the provisions of this constitution, each House of the National Assembly shall have power by resolution published in its journal or in the Official Gazette of the



Government of the Federation to direct or cause to be directed an investigation into; Any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to make laws; and the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government department charged, or intended to be charged, with the duty of or responsibility for executing or administering laws enacted by the National Assembly, and disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be appropriated by the National Assembly.

Through the provision of the above section and the subsections, the legislature is vested with power to oversee the exercise of power by the executive. This power enables the legislature to hold the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) of government accountable for their actions and inactions. The legislature can hold government accountable through its legislative oversight in several ways. First, the appropriation Act i.e. the budget of the state, that is expected to improve the socio-economic conditions of the citizens and bring about development is authorized by the Legislature through the budget process. Furthermore the legislature oversees the government expenditure as observes by Obasa (2016) that since the legislature allocates funds, it ensures that the public gets value for the money appropriated and ensure that the institutions are run in accordance with the law. The Legislature has the responsibility of ensuring that the Appropriation Act as passed by it is adhered strictly to, or implemented by the executive as intended. Through its legislative oversight, the National Assembly through its

standing committees embark on legislative oversight visits to projects sites of MDAs to ensure that value are obtained from resources committed to such projects. This will ensure that dividends of democracy are delivered to the people. Furthermore, as part of the budget process, the Legislature always invites the MDAs for budget appraisal and defense. During the budget appraisal, The Legislature normally invites the MDAs to explain to it how money appropriated to them for the current year was expended, justifying its actions and challenges encountered in the course of the implementation of the budget.

The Legislature is expected to have gone on oversight visit to ascertain physically what was on ground, the extent of implementation, resources already committed and the one expected to complete the projects. The essence of such visit is to establish the existence of such projects, verify claims of resources expended and whether the work conforms to standards or not. This gives the Legislature a fair idea of what is achieved and what is not achieved, and what are responsible. The budget defense is also another opportunity for the MDAs to defend before the legislature their proposed budgets. They explain to the legislators why such items, projects, services, personnel etc. are needed and at such costs, or why such items are not needed and the proposed amounts should be moved to other items that are much needed and more

productive. This has the capacity to engender accountability and culminate in good governance.

The Legislature too can ensure accountability and good governance through public hearing of its committees. Through public hearing, the legislature can hold government officials accountable as rightly observes by Pellizo (2013) that hearings are also most common oversight tools utilized by committees while they also have powers to summon government ministers and invite senior officials as well as witness if deem necessary to gather information on government activities and policy implementation and keep government accountable. Questions are asked in order to review executive actions to see whether they were in conformity with the laws or not and come up with corrective measures for improvement in the system as a whole. In some instances, new laws are enacted, old ones repealed or amended. This window too can afford non-governmental organizations, stakeholders, and the general public the opportunity to hold government accountable, participate in demanding for good governance and contribute to proposed legislation. Proceedings of most hearings are transmitted on the televisions and carried by the print media. It can generate information and provide access to information which is capable of promoting accountability and transparency. Closely related to public hearing is the public investigative hearing. Sec. 88 and 89 of the 1999 constitution (as amended) empowers the National

Assembly to minimize waste in the system, promote accountability and expose corruption. Investigative hearings by the Legislature always call the executive to account for their actions before the legislature (horizontal accountability or institutional accountability).

The Legislature can also promote accountability and good governance through its committee on Ethics and Public Petition. This Committee has the mandate to review complaints received on various subjects from citizens on government officials to ensure that they are not unjustly treated. Rule of law ensures that those in authority lead by the rules. Unfortunately, sometimes some leaders, who are vested with authority, rule at their whims and caprices. Hence the Legislature through its Ethic and Public Petition Committee ensures that rule of law as well as rights of citizens are protected or not unjustly infringed upon. Section 86(1) and (2) of the 1999 constitution also empowers the legislature to screen and confirm nominees by the president for certain appointments like the ministers, ambassadors, chairmen of boards and parastatals, CBN governor, commissioners etc. Similarly, the legislature through its Public Account Committee (PAC) can hold government accountable as posits by Pellizo (2013), it is most specialized oversight committee that reviews government expenditure and ensures government accountability. The Auditor General, who is an independent government appointee, has the mandate of carrying out comprehensive audit of the

accounts of all the MDAs and submits reports on them to the Legislature. When these audit reports are received, the Public Account Committee, normally chaired by a legislator in the opposition party, studies the reports, and where there are queries or lapses, invite the MDA or MDAs concerned for further interrogation. Once the committee is done, it can forward its recommendation to the plenary to pass it in form of resolutions that will direct the executive to implement as a remedy to such anomalies.

### **2.1.7 Relevance of Effective Legislative Oversight and Good Governance**

Legislative oversight in every government is key and a significant tool in holding government accountable. Scholars have captured the fundamentality of Legislative oversight in governance differently but much related. According to Madue,(2012) legislative oversights are conducted for reasons which include:

**Ensure transparency and openness of executive activities.** Legislatures shed light on operations of government by providing a public arena in which the policies and actions of government are debated, scrutinized, and subjected to public opinion.

**Hold the executive branch accountable:** Legislative oversight scrutinizes whether the government's policies have been implemented and whether they are having the desired impact.

**Provide financial accountability:** Legislatures approve and scrutinize government spending by highlighting wasteful expenditure within publicly-funded services. Their aim is to improve the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of government expenditure.

**Uphold the rule of law:** The Legislatures protects the rights of citizens by monitoring policies and examining potential abuses of power, arbitrary behaviour, and illegal or unconstitutional conduct of government.

### **2.1.8 Challenges of The Legislature and Good Governance**

It is not contestable that the legislature has a crucial role in promoting and good governance in Nigeria. However, such important and significant role is hampered by a lot of challenges. Such challenges according to Johnson (2005) include:

**Transparency and Moral Rectitude of legislative oversight process:** This is a great challenge to the role of the legislature in the promotion of good governance. The acceptability of the outcome of an oversight function will to a large extent depend on how transparent the process is and the moral rectitude exhibited by the legislature. NILS (2014) point out that the effectiveness of legislative oversight activities depends on the integrity and transparency of the process, noting that the ability of the legislators to resist corruption and inducement are vital in oversight. The Legislature will do well, if it can be

more open in the conduct of its business. Most of the oversight activities of the legislators are usually impaired by corrupt practices and inducement by those who's their assignments are to be scrutinize. Oversight functions become mere government activities that would not produce results when the moral rectitude of the legislators is questionable. It therefore implies that result-oriented oversight would be carried out by legislators with high and unquestionable integrity.

**Availability of Information and Data from the Executives:** Knowledge, they say is power and for the legislature to be able to oversight the executive as it should, records or information on the activities of the executive is necessary to enable it make informed decisions and hold government accountable. NILS and NSNL (2014) put it that it is impossible to have a meaningful oversight where information and data is lacking. It is expected that with the Freedom of Information Act in place, citizens, non-governmental organizations and even the legislature will have more access to information aside that in section 88 and 89 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which grant the legislature the power to invite any chief executive of ministry, department and agency in respect to activities of his organization. Freedom of Information legislation comprises laws that guarantee access to data held by the state.

They established a “right to know” legal process by which requests may be made for government-held information, to be received freely or at minimal

cost barring standard exceptions. Also referred as open records governments are also typically bound by a duty to publish and promote openness. In many countries there are constitutional guarantees for the right to access to information but usually these are unused if specific support legislation does not exist. A basic principle behind most freedom of information legislation is that the “Burden of proof” falls on the body asked for it. Freedom of Information means walking into any government ministry or and government establishment requesting to view certain Information like contracts awarded and tenders etc. Freedom of Information guarantees the right of an unhindered access to public Information Including Information held by all Federal government branches and agencies, as well as private institutions in which any Federal, State or Local government has controlling interest and those private institutions performing public functions.

### **2.1.9 Legislative oversight in the Nigeria 9th Senate, An Overview of the oversight activities undertaken by the Nigeria 9th Senate.**

The Nigeria 9th Senate popularly called the Red Chamber was inaugurated in June 2019 and Ahmad Lawan emerged as Senate president through a process devoid of the intrigues and rumpus that shaped the 8th senate leadership of National assembly. The Nigeria 9th Senate maintained a relationship with the executive that was rancour-free. The Nigeria 9th Senate legislative agenda with a target of passing legislation on the following key areas: security, economy, criminal legislation reform, public finance management, youth unemployment



and substance abuse, standard of education, health care services, social safety net and constitutional amendment. In the last four years, over 1,129 bills were presented on the floor of the Senate, and over 500 were successfully passed while 131 got presidential assent. Records also shows that 371 oversight visits were conducted to ministries, departments, agencies. The Nigeria 9th Senate confirmed 241 presidential appointments; 361 motions were moved and 488 resolutions were passed, which called the government's attention to specific issues and sought their intervention. The Nigeria 9th Senate leadership attributes its success to the cordial working relationship with the executive, which had earned it the Senate nickname of a "rubber stamp" parliament by Nigerians. To its credit, the Nigeria 9th Senate recorded a significant feat with the restoration of the country's budget cycle to the January – December timeline, the passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill (now PIA) and Electoral Bill 2022 with many technological innovations. Prominent legislations that also passed under the Nigeria 9th Senate were the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contract (Amendment) Act, 2019, the Petroleum Industry Act, 2021 and the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2020.

However, it is on record that the Senate also passed several bills seeking the establishment of tertiary institutions, hospitals, commissions and agencies without consideration of its financial implications. The constitution review exercise, which often gulps N1billion of taxpayers' money every parliamentary

session, was carried out by the Nigeria 9th Senate with high hopes that it would address critical issues facing the country. After the exercise, out of the 68 bills that were passed by both the Senate and House of Representatives, only about 20 were signed into law. Prominent among them are legislations raising the retirement age of judicial officers to 70 years, independence for state judiciaries and parliaments, and the approval of states' participation in railways and power. State police, resource control, fiscal federalism and local government autonomy, among others, suffered setbacks. As representatives of the people, the Nigeria 9th Senate, on several occasions, raised concerns about the country's acute insecurity, and at some points called for a state of emergency on security and the sack of former service chiefs. At the height of the wanton killings and kidnapping by armed men, the opposition lawmakers threatened to impeach then President Muhammadu Buhari if the situation did not improve in six weeks. The threat, like others, fizzled out but insecurity continued to ravage the length and breadth of Nigeria. The Nigeria 9th Senate came under heavy criticism over the speed with which it approved former President Buhari's loan requests, amid concerns about the country's rising debt profile. None of the loan requests sent to the parliament for approval by the former president was declined.

At an interactive session with the Senate Committee on Finance, in preparation for the 2023 budget, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) chairman, Professor Bolaji Owasanoye,

said the 2021 and 2022 budgets were padded with duplicated projects worth N400 billion by ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs), while N49.9bn was earmarked as salaries for ghost workers in the first half of 2022. Owasanoye said ICPC's thorough scrutiny of approved budgets for various MDAs saved the federal government from wasting billions of naira on fictitious projects. This revelation showed that the 9th National Assembly, like others, failed in its oversight duty to thoroughly scrutinise federal government's annual budgets before approving them. Members of the parliament were also not left out in the heist. The ICPC indicted several lawmakers in its constituency projects report. It documented cases of conversion of public property to personal use in executing constituency projects, shoddy completion, non-completion, or outright non-existence of these projects in their locale. The ICPC said it tracked 2,444 constituency projects between 2019 and 2022 and recovered N2.8bn in assets diverted or embezzled. Auwal Musa Rafsanjani, the executive director, Civil Society Legislatively Advocacy Centre (CISLAC), said the Nigeria 9th Senate had done fairly well in terms of lawmaking, with the passage and signing of some critical bills to improve the electoral process and promote anti-graft with the anti-money laundering legislation. He, however, said members of the parliament compromised their oversight of the executive to expose corruption and block leakages of public funds. Rafsanjani, who is also the board chairman of Amnesty International in Nigeria, said the federal parliamentarians betrayed their

representatives' trust in approving borrowing requests for the federal government even when they violated the Fiscal Responsibility Act.

#### **2.1.10 Senate's collaboration with other oversight agencies and civil society organisations.**

The Nigeria 9th Senate collaborated with ministries, agencies of government and civil society in the following areas;

**Campaigning and advocacy:** Parliament is required to disseminate key information related to its deliberations on bills. This requires advocacy to encourage maximum public participation. Government agencies and CSOs have been effective in raising issues, concerns and needs, as well as highlighting a point of view or general public interest that is not yet covered in legislation or other policy documents. CSOs are also a source of data or they can be engaged to generate an accurate data. This is helpful for advocacy or plans that combine narratives with data, something in which they are highly effective.

**Provision of information and awareness-raising:** Parliament is tasked with developing high-quality law. It, therefore, seeks maximum public participation to inform and create awareness. Awareness-raising within communities is a slow process that CSOs can assist with. CSOs are channels for reaching out to citizens and effecting social change early on. At the same time, the research conducted by CSOs helps to supplement policy and planning documents. Their wide reach at the grassroots can help to create widespread awareness and sensitise communities

on a wide range of issues, such as policies, rules and regulations, laws, strategies and technology.

**Expertise and guidance:** Parliament follows an exhaustive process of deliberating on bills, which involves intensive review of documents, and extensive discussions in committees and with stakeholders to ensure that the laws passed are beneficial and long-lasting. CSOs are well positioned because of their wide range of activities and engagement to provide invaluable insights, experience and understanding. This can contribute richly to law-making processes.

**Monitoring and evaluation:** Parliament has the important responsibility for oversight and scrutiny to ensure effective and efficient delivery and use of government services and resources. Since CSOs are present in almost every sector and sub-sector, they are a valuable source of verification as they follow up and document policy implementation, and provide insights into quality standards and best practices for future deliberations

### **2.3 Empirical Review**

Scholars in the social sciences have continued to conduct series of research on the different aspects of the operations of legislative oversight with the objectives of attaining good governance in Nigeria. Adebayi (2011) conducted a research “the constitutional provisions of the National Assembly, The study was aimed at making bare the provisional responsibilities of the

legislature which also included oversight functions and to use oversight function and also discussed cases of lack of transparency, accountability and effectiveness in the discharge of legislative-oversight in Nigeria. The study equally identified challenges of the National Assembly in carrying out oversight function in the study area. These were with the view to providing information on the impact of legislative oversight on good governance in the country. The study showed that relevant provisions of the 1999 constitution empowered the National Assembly to undertake effective oversight in Nigeria. The study equally found that oversight function of the legislature has not been transparent and effective because it has been abused overtime. The study equally found that the National Assembly oversight function is hampered by a number of challenges such as corruption, party politics, self-serving behaviour, absence of trust, and flexing of muscle for supremacy with the executive organ of government. He concluded his study that the National Assembly has not strengthened good governance by use of its oversight function and recommended among others that accountability should be strengthen in the discharge of his National Assembly duties.

Kumbut (2020), in her research legislative oversight and good governance examined the fundamental questions on legislative oversight with the objective to assess the tools used by the National Assembly for legislative oversight and ascertained the extent to which the National Assembly has ensured accountability

and good governance. The researcher employed the survey method, and the study revealed that oversight and public hearing were the most used tools in oversighting. It concluded that the tools used exposed the inadequate capacity of the National Assembly to conduct effective oversight because of inadequate trained staff. The study recommended that adequate funding and capacity building for committee staff and members of the National Assembly be improved. The study was interested in the tools rather than functions of institutions and how the dynamism of a leader can shape and promote good governance in Nigerian National Assembly but failed to examine the actions of actors in the discharge of their legislative responsibilities.

Olusesan and Adeniyi (2019), the legislative oversight and crisis of governance in democratizing Nigeria: a prebendalist perspective aimed at examining the legislature's oversight roles of the legislature in democratizing Nigeria against the backdrop of the seeing crisis of governance. It observed that the legislatures and their functionaries in Nigeria fourth Republic. The researcher concluded that as long as the Nigerian post-colonial rentier state and existing democratic institutions, the legislatures remain trapped in the prebendal orbit, the journey for accountability will continue to be a tortuous one. The legislative promote programs that are people-oriented. The research did justice to the subject matter, explained why are legislators performed abysmally in discharging their oversight roles, resulting in a crisis of governance The researcher failed to

examine how the actions of the executive arm contributed to the crisis of governance.

Usman (2016) in legislative oversight, good governance and the future Nigeria's democracy. The objective was to examine legislative studies in developed and developing democracies because legislature is essential to democratic governance. The researcher relied on secondary sources and the finding showed that legislature in developing democracies are weak and thus cannot effectively perform their functions of representation, law making and oversight. The study concluded that good governance and consolidating Nigeria's democratization process can be achieved through vibrant and selfless legislative process. The strengthening of legislative institutions was recommended. The researcher did a great work in explaining the reasons Nigeria's legislative arm has been meeting. He concluded weak institution is the main reason but failed to understand that lack of human capacity, training and opportunity or electing individuals who are not qualified to lead will also weaken strong institutions.

Aliyu, Ikedimma and Bello (2018) analysis of the challenges of legislative oversight on good governance in Nigeria. The objective was to examine the constitutional provisions of the National Assembly to use oversight function and also discuss cases of lack of transparency, accountability and effectiveness in the discharge of legislative oversight in Nigeria. Data was collected using secondary sources. The study revealed that provision of the 1999 constitution empowered



the National Assembly to undertake effective oversight in Nigeria. It also found out that oversight function of the legislative has not been transparent and effective because it has been abused overtime. The study concluded that the National Assembly has not strengthened good governance by the use of its oversight function. The study recommended that the nation's interest should be put over political party interest and self-serving behavior of National Assembly member. It is essential to state that the absence of trust, flexing of muscle for supremacy with the executive organ of government hampers the National Assembly oversight function.

Saliu, Hassan and Adebola (2020): an analysis of the role of the National Assembly in Nigeria's fourth republic and its possible reform. The study argued that the legislature is one of the key institutions in the democratic process, to the extent that any attack on its composition or functioning is seen as a blow against democracy. The study examined the utility of the National Assembly in the democratic process in Nigeria using descriptive method. The study found that though there are numerous issues that need to be resolved, the National Assembly is too weighty to be discarded. It concluded that the National Assembly should avoid unnecessary confrontation with the executive of the arm and improve on legislative-constituency relations to make the institution more effective. It recommends the building of strong institutions that will systematically provide the platform for healthy interaction among the legislatures and the executive arm of

government. The study outlined the importance of National Assembly to democratic journey of Nigeria but failed to address the issues that are discrediting the institution and bring about lack of good governance in the country.

Nwagwu (2014) in legislative oversight in Nigeria: a watchdog or a hunting dog?: The objective of the study is to investigate the activities of the legislature on its legislative oversight functions and the effectiveness of this organ in ensuring and sustaining good governance in Nigerian polity. The study revealed that legislative oversight, a critical aspect of the functions to mere alarm mechanism being used to blackmail or witch-hunt political opponent, extortion of money from the agencies and ministries under its supervision for selfish reason. It recommended constitutional/legal teeth be structured for effective and efficient legislative oversight as a watchdog on the executive arm. The research addressed the contemporary issue of the legislature in Nigeria. However, being a watchdog to the executive only will be likened to the European Union election observer report where they did not observe election but a crime watch which they lacked the legal power to interfere. The legislative must be seen as a watchdog that has the ability to bite the culprit who violated the constitution as a deterrents

Corelia (2019) Parliamentary resolutions and good governance in Nigeria: the objective was to undertake an examination of how good governance has remained elusive in Nigeria's political terrains despite several parliamentary resolutions on the matters or (urgent) public importance by the legislative. The

research methodology for this study was qualitative. The study found that resolution was viable instruments of legislation with the benefit that could deliver good governance although they have no legal force, it also discovered that many of the good resolutions made by the National Assembly have not been implemented by the executive. In conclusion, National Assembly resolutions are non – binding and should not be mistaken to be a law by the public. The study recommends that resolution should have the force of law, compliance and implementation in order to enhance good governance. Most of the resolution of the national assembly are sentiment base, in most of the resolutions there are constitutional provisions that can be followed to resolved the challenges if any.

### **2.3 Gap in Literature**

Haven systematically x-rayed examined literature on legislative oversight and good governance in Ngeria, the study observed that , Adebayi (2011) was concerned in identifying challenges of the National Assembly in carrying out legislative oversight functionn. Akomolafe and Bosede (2012), was interested to understand how independent are the legislature in the discharge of there legislative oversight functions. Nwagwu (2014) was not concerned in undersstanding if Nigeria legislatures are discharging their duties of promoting good governance, ensuring and sustaining good governance in Nigerian polity as a watchdog or a hunting dog? Corelia (2019) in her publication on Parliamentary resolutions and good governance in Nigeria was interested to

know how good governance has remained elusive in Nigeria's political terrains despite several parliamentary resolutions on matters of public importance by the legislature to promote good governance and Aliyu, Ikedimma and Bello (2018) was concerned on analysis of the challenges of legislative oversight on good governance in Nigeria but failed to provide a workable solution to the challenges identified.

From the literature reviewed, none of the scholars has attempted to examine how the Nigeria 9th Senate was using legislative oversight to promote good governance in Nigeria.

## **2.4 Theoretical Framework**

**The principal-Agent Theory** was initially propounded by Economist Michael Jensen and William H. Meckling in their seminar paper titled "Theory of the firm; managerial behavior, Agency costs, and ownership structure". The paper was published in 1976 in the Journal of financial Economics. Jensen and Mecklings work laid foundation for the principal-Agent Theory, which has since been widely applied in various fields, including economics, management, Political Science and Public Administration to analyse relationships of delegation, monitoring and control between principals and agents in different organizational settings.

The principal-Agent Theory: the principal-Agent Theory can be applied to understand the relationship between the legislative(principal) and the executive (Agent) in the context of legislative oversight. The theory focuses on the principal's need to monitor and control the agent's actions to ensure alignment with the principal's objectives. In this case, the legislature, represented by the Nigeria 9th Senate, acts as the principal responsible for overseeing the actions of the executive branch. The theory helps to analyse the challenges and dynamics of this relationship including issues of agencies problems, information and the potential for executive interference. It provides insights into the factors that influence the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the Nigeria 9th Senate in conducting oversight functions.

### **Institutional Theory:**

The institutional theory is a framework that has been developed and expanded by multiple scholars overtime. However, on the key contributors to the institutional theory is a sociologist and organizational theorist John W. Meyer. Meyer along with his collaborator Brian Rowan, introduced the foundational ideas of the theory in their influential paper titled “institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremony”. The paper was published in 1977 in American Journal of Sociology. While Meyer and Rowan played a significant role in formulating the initial concepts of the institutional theory, it is important to note that the theory has evolved

through the contributions of several scholars in subsequent years. These scholars have expanded and refined the theory applying it to various contexts, including political science, public administrations and management studies.

The institutional theory emphasizes the role of formal and informal rules, norms, and structures in shaping organizational behaviour and governance practices. Applying this theory, the study examined the institutional arrangements that govern legislative oversight in Nigeria, including legal frameworks, internal rules of the Nigeria 9th Senate, and broader political and social norms. The theory helps to understand how these institutional factors influence the capacity, efficiency, and legitimacy of the legislative oversight practices. It also sheds light on the potential barriers, such as bureaucratic processes and political pressures that have affected the Nigeria 9th Senate's ability to exercise effective oversight. Additionally, the theory highlights the importance of public participation and the role of external stakeholders in shaping institutional norms and practices.

By employing these theoretical frameworks, the study has been able to analyse the complexities and dynamics of legislative oversight and good governance in the Nigeria 9th Senate of Nigeria. These frameworks provide lenses through which we have explored the relationships, processes, and institutional factors that influence the effectiveness, independence, capacity and accountability of the Nigeria 9th Senate in promoting good governance

through oversight functions. The study adopted the Principal-Agent Theory because it was the most suitable for the research topic

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **METHODOLOGY**

The methodology for research on legislative oversight and good governance in Nigeria is designed to gather relevant data, analyze it rigorously and draw meaningful conclusions. The methodology can be discussed under the following main heads

#### **3.1 Research Design**

The research design that is adopted by this study is a descriptive, using quantitative method in analyses. The study involved a comprehensive review of relevant literature including academic articles, reports and existing studies on legislative oversight and good governance. Primary data was collected through questionnaire from key stakeholders, government officials, civil society representatives and experts in the field.

Additionally, an analysis of official documents, legislative records and public statements was concluded to assess the performance of the Nigeria 9th Senate in exercising oversight.

#### **3.2 Study Area**

The research was conducted in Abuja-FCT which is the seat of legislative arm of government in Nigeria. The National Assembly comprises of the Senate, the House of Representatives and Management. It is located in the Three Arms



Zone of the central business district of Abuja, Nigeria. However, the research work is focused on the Nigeria 9th Senate of the National Assembly making it pivotal study areas suited for better understanding of the legislative oversight and good governance.

### 3.3 Population of the study

The term population refers to the total number or the aggregate of concerns, which by virtue of the common characteristics, may lead to the gathering of relevant information. The research population in this study therefore, refers to the 109 Senators, Aids and staff of the Senate of the Nigeria 9th Senate of Nigeria National Assembly. Questionnaires will be administered to the above mentioned respondents as represented in the belowed table.

Respondents	No of staff
Senators	109
Aids	345
Staff of the Senate	650
Selected civil society organization	170
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1274</b>

### 3.4 Sampling Techniques and Sample Size

The sampling techniques that is used for this study is Taro-Yammne’s formular, with aid of the staff nominal roll sampling frame. The reason for this

sampling technique is that only staff affected by the promotion policy is sampled. The study seeks to engage this sampling method also because firstly, it is the appropriate method due to limited number of primary sources of date; secondly, the affected employees know and can better explain their view on the promotion policy. Taro Yamane's formula is used to draw the sample size from the study population of 1226. Taro Yamane's formula:

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)^2}$$

Where n = sample size required

N = number of people in the population

e = level of significance/error estimate at 5%

1 = constant

$$n = \frac{1226}{1+ 1226 (0.05)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{1226}{1+1226 (0.0025)}$$

$$n = \frac{1226}{1+2.5}$$

$$n = \frac{1226}{3.5}$$

$$n = 350.$$

Therefore, the sample size that will be used is three hundred and fifty (350) purposively selected for the study to ensure that diverse perspectives and expertise are represented.

### **3.5 Research instrument**

The instruments used in obtaining data for the study were questionnaires. The purpose of the questionnaires was to elicit written responses from the respondents through a series of questions put together.

Questionnaire method of collecting data was used because it has proven to be more reliable source of data collection and have gained acceptance by major scholars. The administered questionnaires has two sections; A and B. section A requires the respondents to indicate their bio-data while section B contains questions on legislative oversight functions and good governance of the Nigeria 9th Senate of Nigeria National Assembly.

### **3.6 Validity and reliability of the instrument**

The essence of this was to point out the researcher's statements that were poorly and wrongly worded and to ensure that the questionnaire item provided information that would help to answer the research questions. The instrument was presented to my boss in the office whom edited before presenting it to my supervisor who read through to ensure content validity, correction on use of English language etc. His opinion was considered before the draft was produced.

### **3.7 Method of Data Collection**

### **3.7.1 Primary source:**

#### **(a) Quantitative Data**

- A survey was conducted to gather quantitative data on perceptions, attitudes, and experiences related to legislative oversight and good governance.
- The survey was administered to various stakeholders, including members of the Nigeria 9th Senate, staff, government officials, and civil society organizations.
- Standardized scales or Likert-type questions were utilized to measure variables such as independence capacity, efficiency and public participation.

### **3.8 Methods of Data Analysis**

For quantitative data, statistical analysis technique such as descriptive statistics was employed to examine the variables. For this study, data was presented in tables and percentages. The responses of the respondents were collected, compared, aggregated and presented using Statistical Package for Social Student (SPSS). Based on the frequencies of occurrence and percentages were established and used for analysis. The results were presented in pie chart, bar chart histogram to ensure easy understanding of the analysis.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**


### **DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION**

This chapter presents and analyzes the data obtained from the respondents during the field survey. It is displayed in tabular form and chart, accompanied by brief explanation or interpretations of the pattern of the responses to each question.

#### 4.1 Background Information of Respondents.

**Table 4.1.1 Distribution of Questionnaires**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	328	93.7	100.0	100.0
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		



Source: Field survey, 2023


Table 4.1.1 revealed the number of questionnaires distributed, the table shows that three hundred and fifty (350) questionnaires were administered on the population of the study and out of which three hundred and twenty-eight (328) representing 94% were correctly filled and returned. This showed that

majority of the questionnaires was filled.

**Table 4.1.2 Gender of the Respondents**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	178	54.3	54.3	54.3
	Female	150	45.7	45.7	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

Source: Field survey, 2023



Source: Field survey, 2023


Table 4.1.2 above represents the gender of the respondents. It was revealed that 54% of the respondents were male while 46% of the respondents were female.

This showed that majority of the respondents were male, this may likely be due to lack of interest of women to participate in Nigeria politics.

**Table 4.1.3 Age range of the Respondents**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	18-25	17	5.2	5.2	5.2
	26-35	88	26.8	26.8	32.0
	36-50	164	50.0	50.0	82.0
	51 - Above	59	18.0	18.0	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

Source: Field survey, 2023




Source: Field survey, 2023

Table 4.1.3 revealed the age range of the respondents, 17 of the respondents representing (5.2%) are between 18 -25, 88 of the respondents representing (26.8%) are between 26-35, 164 of the respondents representing (50%) are between 36 -50 years old while 59 of the respondents representing (18%) are between 50 –above of year. The study showed that majority of respondents are not youths.

#### Table 4.1.4 Educational Status of Respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
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Valid	SSCE/NCE	13	4.0	4.0	4.0
	HND/Degree	82	25.0	25.0	29.0
	MSC/MBA	175	53.4	53.4	82.4
	PhD	58	17.6	17.6	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		



Source: Field survey, 2023

Table 4.1.4 revealed the educational status of the respondents, 13 of the respondents representing (4%) are holders of SSCE/NCE, 82 of the respondents representing (25%) are HND/Degree holder, 175 of the respondents representing (53.4%) are MSC/MBA holder while 58 of the respondents representing (17.6%) are PhD holders


The study showed that majority of respondents are MSC/MBA holder, this revealed that the respondents are highly educated and are knowledgeable of the questions in the questionnaires.

#### **Table 4.1.5 Category of Respondents**



		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Legislators	33	10.1	10.1	10.1
	Legislative Aids	66	20.1	20.1	30.2
	Senate staff	161	49.1	49.1	79.3
	Selected Civil society	68	20.7	20.7	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

Source: Field survey, 2023



Source: Field survey, 2023

Table 4.1.5 revealed the category of the respondents, 33 of the respondents representing (10.1%) are legislators, 66 of the respondents representing (20.1%) are legislative aids, 161 of the respondents representing (49.1%) are senate staff of national assembly while 68 of the respondents representing (20.7%) are Selected Civil Societies.

The study showed that majority of respondents are Senate staff members of the national assembly who most are directly in contact with the oversight activities of the legislators, this revealed that the respondents are highly

knowledgeable of the oversight activities of the legislators.

**Table 4.1.6 Are you a member of Nigeria 9th Senate**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	33	9.42	10.1	10.1
	No	295	84.2	89.9	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
	Missing System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

Source: Field survey, 2023

Table 4.1.6 revealed 45 of the respondents representing (13.7%) are members of Nigeria 9th Senate, 283 of the respondents representing (86.3%) are not members of the 9 Senate. The study revealed that non Nigeria 9th Senate members are majority of the respondents who questionnaires was admitted. The non members are the civil society, staff members of the senate, legislative aides etc.

**Table 4.1.7 Have legislative oversight functions been carried out proficiently to meet set goals?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agreed	245	74.7	74.7	74.7
	Disagreed	74	22.6	22.6	22.6
	Undecided	9	2.7	2.7	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing System		22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

Source: Field survey, 2023

Table 4.1.7 revealed that 245 of the respondents representing (74.7%) agreed that legislative oversight functions been carried out proficiently to meet set goals, 74 of the respondents representing (22.6%) disagreed while 9 of the respondents representing (2.7%) were undecided if legislative oversight

functions been carried out has proficiently meet set goals of oversight function. The study revealed that majority of the respondents agreed that legislative oversight functions been carried out proficiently to meet set goals.

**Table 4.1.8 How will you rate the performance of legislators in performing oversight functions**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High	201	61.3	61.3	61.3
	Low	88	26.8	26.8	88.1
	Intermediate	39	11.9	11.9	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

Source: Field survey, 2023

Table 4.1.8 revealed that 201 of the respondents representing (61.3%) rate the performance of Legislators in performing oversight functions high, 88 of the respondents representing (26.8%) rate the low performance of Legislators in performing oversight functions while 41 of the respondents representing (11.9%) were intermediate on the performance of legislative functions.

The study revealed that majority of the respondents scored the legislators high in the performance of Legislative oversight functions.

**Table 4.1.9 The Performance of legislative oversight functions has very significant impact on the activities of the National Assembly during the Nigeria 9th Senate**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agreed	200	61.0	61.0	61.0
	Disagreed	124	37.8	37.8	98.8
	Undecided	4	1.2	1.2	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		

Total	350	100.0		
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Source: Field survey, 2023

Table 4.1.9 revealed that 200 of the respondents representing (61.0%) agreed that performance of legislative oversight functions had very significant impact on the activities of the National Asembly during the Nigeria 9th Senate, 124 of the respondents representing (37.8%) disagreed while 4 of the respondents representing (1.2%) were undecided if performance of legislative oversight functions had very significant impact on the activities of the National Asembly during the Nigeria 9th Senate.

The study revealed that majority of the respondents agreed performance of legislative oversight functions has very significant impact on the activities of the National Asembly during the Nigeria 9th Senate.

## 4.2 Section B : Research Question

**Table 4.2.1 Research Question One:** To what extent does the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting oversight functions, and how does this independence influence its ability to promote good governance?

**Table 4.2.1 Supervision over the executives actions to ensure and promote good governances.**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	77	23.5	23.5	23.5
	Agreed	112	34.1	34.1	57.6
	Disagreed	85	25.9	25.9	83.5
	Strongly Disagreed	54	16.5	16.5	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	

Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

**Source: Field survey, 2023**

Table 4.2.1 revealed that 189 of the respondents representing (57.6%) agreed that Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting oversight functions through supervision over the executives actions to ensure and promote good governances, 139 of the respondents representing (42.4%) disagreed that Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting oversight functions through supervision over the executives actions to ensure and promote good governances.

The study revealed that majority of the respondents agreed that the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting oversight functions through supervision over the executives actions to ensure and promote good governances in Nigeria.

**Table 4.2.2 Enactment of laws and passing of resolutions that promote accountability and good governance**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	94	28.7	28.7	28.7
	Agreed	146	44.5	44.5	73.2
	Disagreed	40	12.2	12.2	85.4
	Strongly Disagreed	48	14.6	14.6	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

**Source: Field survey, 2023**

Table 4.2.2 revealed that 240 of the respondents representing (73.2%) agreed that Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting

oversight functions through enactment of laws and passing of resolutions that promote accountability and good governance, 88 of the respondents representing (26.8%) disagreed that Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting oversight functions through enactment of laws and passing of resolutions that promote accountability and good governance.

The study revealed that majority of the respondents agreed that the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting oversight functions through enactment of laws and passing of resolutions that promote accountability and good governance in Nigeria.

**Table 4.2.3 To represent the interest of the citizens in their Constituencies**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	120	36.6	36.6	36.6
	Agreed	122	37.2	37.2	73.8
	Disagreed	48	14.6	14.6	88.4
	Strongly Disagreed	38	11.6	11.6	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

**Source: Field survey, 2023**

Table 4.2.3 revealed that 242 of the respondents representing (73.8%) agreed that Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting oversight functions through representation for the interest of the citizens in their constituencies, 86 of the respondents representing (26.2%) disagreed that Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting

oversight functions through representation for the interest of the citizens in their constituencies that promote accountability and good governance.

The study revealed that majority of the respondents agreed that the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting oversight functions through representation of citizens interest in their constituencies that promote accountability and good governance in Nigeria.

**Table 4.2.4 Investigate issues of alleged poor administration, arbitrary and capricious behaviors abuse, waste and fraud.**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	69	21.0	21.0	21.0
	Agreed	94	28.7	28.7	49.7
	Disagreed	90	27.4	27.4	77.1
	Strongly Disagreed	75	22.9	22.9	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

Source: Field survey, 2023

Table 4.2.4 revealed that 163 of the respondents representing (49.7%) agreed that Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting oversight functions through investigation on issues of alleged poor administration, arbitrary and capricious behaviors abuse, waste and fraud, 165 of the respondents representing (50.3%) disagreed that Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting oversight functions through investigation on issues of alleged poor administration, arbitrary and capricious behaviors abuse, waste and fraud that did not promote

accountability and good governance in Nigeria.

The study revealed that majority of the respondents disagreed that the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting oversight functions through investigation on issues of alleged poor administration, arbitrary and capricious behaviors abuse, waste and fraud. Majority of the respondents disagreed that the actions of the legislators failed to promote accountability and good governance in Nigeria.

**Table 4.2.5 Confirmation of appointment made by the executives and ensuring that appointed public officials are accountable to the people**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	119	36.3	36.3	35.7
	Agreed	130	39.6	39.6	75.9
	Disagreed	38	11.6	11.6	87.5
	Strongly Disagreed	41	12.5	12.5	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

Source: Field survey, 2023

Table 4.2.5 showed that 249 (75.9%) of the respondents agreed that Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting oversight functions through confirmation of appointment made by the executives and ensuring that appointed public officials are accountable to the people while 79 (24.1%) of the respondents disagreed that the confirmation of appointment made by the executives demonstrated that independence in conducting oversight functions.

From the above, it was agreed by majority of the respondents that the Nigeria



9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting oversight functions through confirmation of appointment made by the executives and ensuring that appointed public officials are accountable to the people.

**Research Question Two:** What is the capacity of the Nigeria 9th Senate to conduct comprehensive reviews of government programmes, policies, and projects, and how does this capacity impact the quality and effectiveness of its oversight activities. How does the Nigeria 9th Senate capacity impact the quality and effectiveness of its oversight activities?

**Table 4.2.6 The Nigeria 9th Senate have the legislative capacity for effective oversight functions?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	134	40.9	40.9	40.9
	Agreed	176	53.7	53.7	94.6
	Disagreed	15	4.6	4.6	99.2
	Strongly Disagreed	3	0.9	.9	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

Source: Field survey, 2023

Table 4.2.6 showed that 310 (94.6%) of the respondents agreed that Nigeria 9th Senate has the legislative capacity for effective and oversight functions to conduct comprehensive reviews of government programmes, policies, and projects while 18 (5.5%) of the respondents disagreed that the Nigeria 9th Senate has the legislative capacity for effective and oversight functions to conduct comprehensive reviews of government programmes, policies, and projects.

From the above, it was agreed by majority of the respondents that the Nigeria

9th Senate in Nigeria has the legislative capacity for effective and oversight functions to conduct comprehensive reviews of government programmes, policies, and projects.

**Table 4.2.7 Public hearing was effectively utilized to hear directly from the citizens for its legislative oversight**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	113	34.5	34.5	34.5
	Agreed	124	37.8	37.8	72.3
	Disagreed	46	14.0	14.0	86.3
	Strongly Disagreed	45	13.7	13.7	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

**Source: Field survey, 2023**

Table 4.2.7 showed that 237 (72.3%) of the respondents agreed that public hearing was effectively utilized to hear directly from the citizens, these showed that the Nigeria 9th Senate have the legislative capacity for effective and oversight functions to conduct comprehensive reviews of government programmes, policies, and projects while 91 (27.7%) of the respondents disagreed that in the Nigeria 9th Senate, public hearing was not effectively utilized to hear directly from the citizens

From the above, it was agreed by majority of the respondents that in the Nigeria 9th Senate public hearing was effectively utilized to hear directly from the citizens, these showed that the Nigeria 9th Senate have and utilizes its legislative capacity for effective and oversight functions to conduct

comprehensive reviews of government programmes, policies, and projects in Nigeria.

**Table 4.2.8 Investigation was one of the effective tools for its legislative oversight**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	96	29.3	29.3	29.3
	Agreed	80	24.4	24.4	53.7
	Disagreed	77	23.5	23.5	77.2
	Strongly Disagreed	75	22.9	22.9	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

Source: Field survey, 2023

Table 4.2.7 showed that 176 (53.7%) of the respondents agreed that investigation was one of the effective tools for its legislative oversight for the Nigeria 9th Senate to conduct comprehensive reviews of government programmes, policies, and projects while 152 (45.8%) of the respondents disagreed that in the Nigeria 9th Senate, that investigation was one of the effective tools for its legislative oversight for the Nigeria 9th Senate to conduct comprehensive reviews of government programmes, policies, and projects

From the above, it was agreed by majority of the respondents that in the Nigeria 9<sup>th</sup> Senate, investigation was one of the effective tools for legislative oversight.

**Table 4.2.9 The creation of commission of inquiry**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	74	22.6	22.6	22.6
	Agreed	82	25.0	25.0	47.6
	Disagreed	89	27.1	27.1	74.7

	Strongly Disagreed	83	25.3	25.3	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

Source: Field survey, 2023

Table 4.2.9 showed that 154 (47.6%) of the respondents agreed that creation of commission of inquiry was effectively utilized to show that the Nigeria 9th Senate have the legislative capacity for effective oversight functions to conduct comprehensive reviews of government programmes, policies, and projects while 172 (52.4%) of the respondents disagreed that that creation of commission of inquiry was effectively utilized to show that the Nigeria 9th Senate have the legislative capacity for effective oversight functions to conduct comprehensive reviews of government programmes, policies, and projects

From the above, it was obvious that the creation of commission of inquiry by the Nigeria 9th Senate did not have impact to effective legislative oversight functions in Nigeria.

**Research Question Three:** How efficient and timely is the Nigeria 9th Senate in responding to reports, investigations, and recommendations during oversight activities, and how does this responsiveness contribute to effective corrective actions and reforms?

**Table 4.2.10 The Nigeria 9th Senate are efficient and timely in responding to reports, investigations**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	45	13.7	13.7	13.7
	Agreed	77	23.5	23.5	37.2

	Disagreed	113	34.5	34.5	71.7
	Strongly Disagreed	93	28.4	28.4	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

**Source: Field survey, 2023**

Table 4.2.10 showed that 122 (37.2%) of the respondents agreed that Nigeria 9th Senate are efficient and timely in responding to reports, investigations and recommendations during oversight activities while 206 (62.9%) of the respondents disagreed that the Nigeria 9th Senate are efficient and timely in responding to reports, investigations and recommendations during oversight activities.

From the above, majority of the respondents disagreed that the Nigeria 9th Senate are efficient and timely in responding to reports, investigations and recommendations this affect the responsiveness contribution, effective corrective actions and reforms of government to promote good governance.

**Table 4.2.11 Finding during public hearing and oversight activities are used in policy formulation in National Assembly**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	48	14.6	14.6	14.6
	Agreed	61	18.6	18.6	33.2
	Disagreed	128	39.0	39.0	72.2
	Strongly Disagreed	91	27.7	27.7	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

**Source: Field survey, 2023**

Table 4.2.11 showed that 109 (33.2%) of the respondents agreed that findings during public hearing and oversight activities are used in policy formulation in National Assembly while 219 (66.7%) of the respondents disagreed that the

Nigeria 9th Senate Findings during public hearing and oversight activities are used in policy formulation in National Assembly

From the above, majority of the respondents disagreed that the Nigeria 9th Senate findings during public hearing and oversight activities are used in policy formulation in National Assembly, this showed that there was no effective corrective actions and reforms from the finding of oversight functions of the legislators.

**Table 4.2.12 The Nigeria 9th Senate oversight reports, investigations, and recommendations contribute to effective reform in promoting good governance**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	47	14.3	14.3	14.3
	Agreed	52	15.9	15.9	30.2
	Disagreed	113	34.5	34.5	64.7
	Strongly Disagreed	116	35.4	35.4	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

Source: Field survey, 2023

Table 4.2.12 showed that 99 (30.2%) of the respondents agreed that Nigeria 9th Senate oversight reports, investigations, and recommendations contribute to effective reform in promoting good governance while 229 (69.9%) of the respondents disagreed that Nigeria 9th Senate oversight reports, investigations, and recommendations contribute to effective reform in promoting good governance.

From the above, majority of the respondents disagreed that the oversight reports, investigations, and recommendations contribute to effective reforms in promoting good governance this showed that there was no effective corrective actions and reforms from the finding of oversight functions of the legislators.

**Research Question Four:** What are the main challenges and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance, and what recommendations can be proposed to address these challenges?

**Table 4.2.13 Poor funding of committees**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	107	32.6	32.6	32.6
	Agreed	132	40.2	40.2	72.8
	Disagreed	60	18.3	18.3	91.1
	Strongly Disagreed	29	8.8	8.8	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

**Source: Field survey, 2023**

Table 4.2.20 showed that 239 (72.8%) of the respondents agreed that the poor funding of committees was one of the main challenges and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance while 89 (27.1%) of the respondents disagreed that poor funding of committees was one of the main challenges and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance

From the above, majority of the respondents agreed that poor funding of committees was one of the main challenges and barriers faced by the Nigeria

9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance, more funding should be made available

**Table 4.2.14 Lack of cooperation from ministries, departments and agencies (MDA) of the executive.**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	83	25.3	25.3	25.3
	Agreed	90	27.4	27.4	52.7
	Disagreed	89	27.1	27.1	79.8
	Strongly Disagreed	66	20.1	20.1	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

**Source: Field survey, 2023**

Table 4.2.14 showed that 173 (52.7%) of the respondents agreed that lack of cooperation from ministries, departments and agencies (MDA) of the executive is one of the main challenges and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance while 155 (47.2%) of the respondents disagreed that lack of cooperation from ministries, departments and agencies (MDA) of the executive is one of the main challenges and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance

From the above, slight majority of the respondents agreed that lack of cooperation from ministries, departments and agencies (MDA) of the executive as a challenge and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance. They legislative arms must



discharge it dues in line with set rules and regulation and not try to compromise and complied the minister in their favour.

**Table 4.2.15 Capacity – deficiency among staff and lawmakers**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	76	23.2	23.2	23.2
	Agreed	81	24.7	24.7	47.9
	Disagreed	76	23.2	23.2	71.1
	Strongly Disagreed	95	29.0	29.0	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

**Source: Field survey, 2023**

Table 4.2.15 showed that 157 (47.9%) of the respondents agreed that capacity–deficiency among staff and lawmakers was one of the main challenges and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance while 171 (52.2%) of the respondents disagreed that capacity deficiency among staff and lawmakers was one of the main challenges and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance

From the above, majority of the respondents disagreed that capacity–deficiency among staff and lawmakers as a challenge and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance in Nigeria.

**Table 4.2.16 Poor planning and Lack of Legislative Agenda / work plan**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	126	38.4	38.4	38.4
	Agreed	135	41.2	41.2	79.6
	Disagreed	36	11.0	11.0	90.6

	Strongly Disagreed	31	9.5	9.5	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

Source: Field survey, 2023

Table 4.2.16 showed that 261 (79.6%) of the respondents agreed that poor planning and Lack of Legislative Agenda / work plan was one of the main challenges and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance while 67 (20.5%) of the respondents disagreed that Poor planning and lack of Legislative Agenda/Work Plan was one of the main challenges and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance

From the above, majority of the respondents disagreed that poor planning and Lack of Legislative Agenda / work plan as a challenge and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance in Nigeria. A research center should be established with educated scholars and researcher employed to help the legislators discharge their duties.

**Table 4.2.17 Corruption and pursuit of personal interest**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agreed	152	46.3	46.3	46.3
	Agreed	155	47.3	47.3	93.6
	Disagreed	13	4.0	4.0	97.6
	Strongly Disagreed	8	2.4	2.4	100.0
	Total	328	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	22	6.3		
Total		350	100.0		

Source: Field survey, 2023

Table 4.2.17 showed that 307 (93.6%) of the respondents agreed that corruption and pursuit of personal interest was one of the main challenges and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance while 21 (6.4%) of the respondents disagreed that corruption and pursuit of personal interest was one of the main challenges and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria

From the above, it is obvious that corruption remain a cancer that have eaten Nigeria deeply, it is a major reason for Nigeria's underdevelopment and serious efforts like strengthening the institutional capacity and capability of EFCC and ICPC to discharge their duties efficiently and effectively.

### **4.3 Discussion of Findings**

The study revealed that out of the 400 questionnaire admitted, 350 of them was correctly filled and returned, The study showed that majority of the respondents are male and most of the respondent are within the age of 36-50 years old, they are highly educated as majority of the respondents are MSC/MBA degree holders. The category of respondents that correctly filled and returned the questionnaire are the legislator, their aides staff of the 9<sup>th</sup> Senate and selected civil society organization and majority of the respondents agreed that legislative oversight functions been carried out was proficiently to meet the legislative set goals.

However, majority of the respondents scored the Nigeria 9th Senate low in

performance of their legislative oversight functions laid significant impact on the activities of the National Assembly during Nigeria 9th Senate. Most of the respondents agreed that the 9<sup>th</sup> senate of Nigeria National Assembly has demonstrated independence in conducting oversight functions, this independently influenced the ability of the Nigeria 9th Senate to promote good governance through the supervision of the executive arm of government, enactment of laws and passing of resolutions that promote accountability and good governance that largely represent the interest of their citizens in their respective constituency through investigation on allegations of poor administration, wasteful spending, fraud and abuse of power, the legislative arm has promote good governance and ensuring that appointed and elected public officials are accountable to their people.

In line with the research finding, Pelizo (2013) agree that the legislature have the capacity to hold the executive arm to accountability, the Nigeria 9th Senate has the capacity to conduct comprehensive reviews of government programmes, policies, and projects. Majority of the respondents agreed that the Nigeria 9th Senate had the capacity for effective oversight functions, it revealed that public hearing, investigation, was effectively utilized to hear directly from the citizens for its legislative oversight, however, creation of commission of inquiry by the Nigeria 9th Senate did not have impact to effective legislative oversight functions in Nigeria. The Nigeria 9th Senate capacity impacted the

quality and effectiveness of its legislative oversight activities by bringing the executive arm of government closer to their various constituency and ensure that their voice is heard during public hearing thereby promoting good governance and accountability, this is in agreement with views of Madue, (2012)

The research revealed that the Nigeria 9th Senate were not efficient and timely in responding to reports, investigations and findings during public hearing and oversight activities are not used in policy formulation in National Assembly. Also, the Nigeria 9th Senate oversight reports, investigations, and recommendations did not contribute to effective reform in promoting good governance, this aligned with the views in NILS (2014) which blamed lack of data as the reason the 9<sup>th</sup> senate was not efficient in discharging their constitutional duties timely.

The research revealed that the main challenges and barriers faced by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance were poor funding of the legislative committees, lack of cooperation from ministries, departments and agencies (MDA) of the executive, Capacity deficiency among staff, Poor planning and Lack of Legislative Agenda / work plan while Corruption and pursuit of personal interest was the biggest challenges of legislative oversight and good governance. The research recommends serious efforts like strengthening the institutional capacity and capability of EFCC and ICPC to discharge their duties efficiently and effectively and establishment of

research center with educated scholars and researcher employed to help the legislators discharge their duties. Etc. The above revelation is in line with Aliyu, Ikedimma and Bello (2018) on the challenges of legislative oversight.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1 Summary**

Legislative oversight in Nigeria is the process by which a legislative body monitors and evaluates the actions and decisions of the executives branch of the government. It is an essential function of the democratic governance as it ensure transparency, accountability and effective implementation of policies and laws. Through oversight, the legislative branch act as a check on the executive, preventing abuse of power and promoting good governance. The significance of legislative oversight and good governance lies in their ability to promote transparency, accountability, and the protection of citizens' rights. The study investigate the phenomenon of legislative oversight and its impact on good governance within the context of the Nigeria 9th Senate. The study examined the challenges that needs to be addressed to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the legislative oversight process

The study was divided into five chapters, the background to the study, research problems, research question, limitations etc were outlined in the chapter one of the study, the chapter two deals with critical evaluation of differnt scholarly viewpoint on a given research problem as found in the previous relevant studies. The chapter two examined the conceptual review, empirical review which examined the viewpoint of different scholars on legislative oversight and good governance in the Nigeria 9<sup>th</sup> Senate of Nigeria National Assembly. The

theoretical framework was stated to guide the study. Chapter three deals with the research methodology, it explained the research techniques, population of the study, size and methods of data collection. The chapter four of the study deals with data presentations, analysis and interpretation of data collected using questionnaire and analyzed with SPSS. Finally, the chapter five deals with the summary of the study, conclusion and recommendation from the research finding.

## **5.2 Conclusion**

The growing trend in modern democracies is the use of the Committee system with an obvious advantage that it permits parliament to deploy its resources efficiently and effectively, both in terms of people and time, to examine complex and wide ranging issues more thoroughly than when they are discussed on the floor of the House. For one thing, the whole Senate does not have the luxury of time to consider matters in all particular details; hence, committee systems are inevitable in the legislative and oversight business of the legislature. For another, against the backdrop of the complexity and variety of the issues that face modern legislatures, the demand on the time of legislators calls for specialization and division of labour. This purpose is often very well served by Committees. The oversight role of the Senate in governance is very crucial. Hence the legislature has been discharging its constitutional responsibility of legislative oversight through various legislative oversight tools which promotes accountability, transparency, rule of law and good



governance etc. but the legislative oversight are hampered by inadequate resources at committees' disposal. Consequently, the committees should be provided with such needed resources that are fundamental to the performance of legislative oversights. The oversight function of the Nigeria 9th Senate was essential to promote transparency, good governance, public trust in governance and to hold the executive accountable always. Whether the Nigeria 9th Senate carried out its legislative oversight function diligently in line with constitutional provisions is an issue of national discourse among citizens; some Nigerians see the Nigeria 9th Senate as rubber stamp of the executive.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

In line with findings of this study, the following recommendations are very pertinent to enhance legislative oversight and good governance in Nigeria:

- i. The legislative arm must be transparent and accountable in discharging their legislative functions, Resolutions of the senate should not be by voice vote, An electronic voting system should be used as to tell the public the stand of their representative on National issues of urgent national importance, this will show if the interest of their citizens in their respective constituency are well represented in the senate.
- ii. The senate must establish a strong institutional procedures for legislative

actions that will be independent of executive interference in conducting its oversight functions, enactment of laws and passing of resolutions, investigation on allegations of poor administration and abuse of power. Confirmation of appointee of the executive should be merit base.

iii. Laws should be enacted to give legal backing for resolutions of the senate with punishment. Reports, investigations and finding during public hearing and oversight activities should be communicated to the executives for implementation in form of resolutions and should be considered in policy formulation in National Assembly.

v. The Senate should involve concerned stakeholders and general public with relevant experts in oversight processes and activities, this is to build public trust, transparency and accountability in the legislative system and overall governance

vii. The senate should enact laws that strengthening the institutional capacity and capability of EFCC and ICPC to discharge their duties efficiently and effectively, and establishment of research center with educated scholars and researcher employed to help the legislators discharge their duties and address deficiency among staff and poor planning in the Senate.

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## Appendix 1

### QUESTIONNAIRE ON:

### LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE, A STUDY OF THE NIGERIA Nigeria 9th Senate, (2019 – 2023), Abuja

National Institute for Legislative  
and Democratic Studies.  
Maitama - Abuja.

**Dear Respondent,**

I am Elibazeth Chinatu Amadi a Post-Graduate student at the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies (NILDS)/University of Benin (UNIBEN). I'm currently conducting a research study in partial fulfillment of the conditions for the award of Master in Legislative Studies. My research topic is **legislative oversight and good governance: a study of the Nigeria 9th Senate, Abuja**. I would appreciate your cooperation in answering the attached questionnaire to enable me obtain relevant and accurate information. I would be grateful if you could complete the questionnaire as soon as possible.

I assure you that all the information and materials provided shall be confidential and strictly used for academic purposes only.

Thank you in anticipation of your kind cooperation.

**Yours faithfully,**  
Elibazeth Chinatu Amadi

### SECTION A BIO DATA

**Please tick (✓) where appropriate**

1. Gender : (A) Male [ ] (B) Female [ ]
2. Age category 18-25 [ ] 25-35 [ ] 36-50 [ ] 51 – and above [ ]
3. What is your level of Education: SSCE/NCE [ ] HND/Degree [ ] MSC/MBA [ ] Ph.D [ ] Others [ ]
4. What category of stakeholder are you ? Legislators [ ] Legislative Aids [ ]  
Senate staff [ ] Other [ ]

**SECTION B**

**RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

1. Are you a member of the Nigeria 9th Senate?  
Yes [ ] No [ ]
2. Have Legislative oversight functions been carried out proficiently to meet set goals?  
Agree [ ] Disagree [ ] Undecided [ ]
3. How will you rate the performance of legislators in performing oversight functions?  
High [ ] Low [ ] Intermediate [ ]
4. The performance of legislative oversight functions has very significant impact on the activities of the National assembly during the period within 2011 to 2015.  
Agree [ ] Disagree [ ] Undecided [ ]

**SA = Strongly Agreed, A =Agreed, SD = Strongly Disagreed, D = Disagreed, U=Undecided**

5. To what extent does the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria demonstrate independence in conducting oversight functions, and how does this independence influence its ability to promote good governance?

Questions	SA	A	SD	D	U
Supervision over the executives actions to ensure and promote good governances.					
Enactment of laws and passing of resolutions that promote accountability and good governance					
To represent the interest of the citizens in constituencies					
Investigate issues of alleged poor administration, arbitrary and capricious behaviors abuse, waste and fraud					
Confirmation of appointment made by the executives and ensuring that appointed public officials are accountable to the people					

6. What is the capacity of the Nigeria 9th Senate to conduct comprehensive reviews of government programmes, policies, and projects, and how does this capacity impact the quality and effectiveness of its oversight activities. How does the Nigeria 9th Senate capacity impact the quality and effectiveness of its oversight activities?

Questions	SA	A	SD	D	U

The Nigeria 9th Senate have the legislative capacity for effective oversight functions?					
Public hearing was effectively utilized to hear directly from the citizens for its legislative oversight					
Investigation was one of the effective tools for its legislative oversight					
The creation of commission of inquiry					

7. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the existing legal framework governing legislative oversight in Nigeria, and how does this framework affect the transparency, consistency, and effectiveness of oversight practices in the Nigeria 9th Senate?

Questions	SA	A	SD	D	U
The legislative oversight can only investigate, inquire and expose but lacks the legal power to Prosecute.					
Legislative resolutions arising from finding from oversight is not binding on the executive					
The senate can refuse/reject budgetary allocation to any agencies and ministries of government without proper accountability until such is corrected					



8. How efficient and timely is the Nigeria 9th Senate in responding to reports, investigations, and recommendations during oversight activities, and how does this responsiveness contribute to effective corrective actions and reforms?

Response	SA	A	SD	D	U
The Nigeria 9th Senate are efficient and timely in responding to reports, investigations					
Findings during public hearing and oversight activities are used in policy formulation in National Assembly					
The Nigeria 9th Senate oversight reports, investigations, and recommendations contribute to effective reform in promoting good governance					

9. What is the level of public participation in the oversight processes of the Nigeria 9th Senate, and how does this participation influence transparency, accountability, and public trust in the legislative system and overall governance?

Responses	SA	A	SD	D	U
The Nigeria 9th Senate involved stakeholders in oversight processes and activities					
Public hearing ensure public participation and promote accountability and trust in the Nigeria 9th Senate					

Public participation influence transparency, accountability, and public trust in the legislative system and overall governance					
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10. What are the main challenges and barriers face by the Nigeria 9th Senate in Nigeria regarding legislative oversight and good governance, and what recommendations can be proposed to address these challenges?

Responses	SA	A	SD	D	U
Poor funding of committees					
Lack of cooperation from ministries, departments and agencies (MDA) of the executive.					
Capacity – deficiency among staff and lawmakers					
Poor planning and Lack of Legislative Agenda / work plan					
Corruption and pursuit of personal interest					