

**OVERSIGHT PERFORMANCE OF THE 9TH HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS DRUGS**

BY

Abdullahi Abba KABIR

PG/NLS/2015030

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
LEGISLATIVE AND DEMOCRATIC STUDIES/UNIVERSITY OF BENIN
(NILDS/UNIBEN) POSTGRADUATE PROGRAMMES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF A MASTERS DEGREE IN
LEGISLATIVE STUDIES (MLS)**

JUNE, 2023

CERTIFICATION

This dissertation titled “*Oversight Performance of the 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotics Drugs*” presented by Abdullahi Abba KABIR (PG/NLS/2015030) has met the partial requirements for the award of the degree of Masters in Legislative Studies (MLS) of the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies/University of Benin, Edo State.

Dr. Adeyemi Fajingbesi
(Supervisor)

Date

Dr. A. G. Abiola
(Co-Supervisor)

Date

Coordinator

Date

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is a product of my research efforts, undertaken under the supervision of Dr. Adeyemi Fajingbesi and Dr. A. G. Abiola. It is an original work and no part of it has ever been presented for the award of any degree anywhere. All sources of information have been duly acknowledged through the references.

Abdullahi Abba KABIR

PG/NLS/2015030

APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that this dissertation “*Oversight Performance of the 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotics Drugs*” has been read and approved as having met the partial requirements for the award of the degree of Masters in Legislative Studies of the University of Benin/National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies is approved for contribution to knowledge.

Dr. Adeyemi Fajingbesi
(Supervisor)

Date

Dr. A. G. Abiola
(Co-Supervisor)

Date

Dr A. G. Abiola
Director PG

Date

Internal Examiner

Date

External Examiner

Date

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to Allah (SWT) for his Grace throughout this programme.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisors, Dr. Adeyemi Fajingbesi and Dr. A. G. Abiola, for their invaluable guidance throughout this work. I also extend my sincere appreciation to my lecturers, Drs. Usman Wali, Jake Dan-Azumi, Joseph Asemota, Mohammed Amali, Prof. Attahiru Jega, Prof. Sam Egwu, and the staff at the postgraduate unit, whose contributions have played a significant role in my academic success.

Furthermore, I would like to acknowledge and express my deep appreciation to the respondents who participated in my study, particularly the staff at the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Ambassador Kenneth Anetor, Ms. Ngozi Benedette, Deputy Clerk of the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs, Mr. Oluyemi S. Olaiya, the Chairman of House Committee on Narcotic Drugs, Hon. (Dr.) Francis Ottah Agbo, and the staff who were part of the study population and provided valuable assistance during my fieldwork.

Lastly, I am immensely grateful for the unwavering support of my family, my wife, my children, and my coursemates who have directly or indirectly contributed to the completion of this work.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title page	
Certification -----	i
Declaration -----	ii
Approval page -----	iii
Dedication -----	iv
Acknowledgment -----	v
Table of contents -----	vi
List of Abbreviations -----	x
List of Tables -----	xii
Abstract -----	xiii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study -----	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem -----	3
1.3 Research Questions -----	5
1.4 Research Objectives -----	6
1.5 Scope of the Study -----	6
1.6 Significance of the Study -----	7

1.7 Organization of Chapters -----	7
------------------------------------	---

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Conceptual review -----	9
2.1.1 Legislative Oversight -----	9
2.1.2 Committee System -----	15
2.2 Theoretical Review -----	18
2.3 Empirical review -----	22
2.4 Gap in Knowledge -----	25
2.5 Theoretical framework-Principal-agent theory -----	26
2.6 Application of the Theory -----	27

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design -----	28
3.2 Population of the Study -----	28
3.3 Sampling Procedure -----	28
3.4 Research Instruments -----	29
3.5 Sources of Data -----	29
3.6 Objective-by-objective approach -----	29

3.6.1 Objective I: Evaluate the oversight activities of the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs and their effectiveness on the agencies charged with the administration of narcotics drug governance -----	31
3.6.2 Objective II: Identify the factors militating against the performance of oversight by the House Committee on Narcotics Drugs and suggest strategies that would mitigate them -----	32

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Oversight activities of the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs and their effects -----	34
4.2 Obstacles to the performance of oversight by the House Committee on Narcotics Drugs ---	41
4.4 Mitigating the challenges affecting the House Committee on Narcotics Drugs -----	43

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary of findings -----	46
5.2 Conclusion -----	48
5.3 Recommendations -----	49
References -----	51

Appendix

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFRN	Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
CPA	Commonwealth Parliamentary Association
CRFF	Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
IRI	International Republican Institute
KII	Key Informant Interview
LRC	Legislative Research Council
MDAs	Ministries, Departments, and Agencies
NAFDAC	National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control
NDI	National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
NDLEA	National Drug Law Enforcement Agency
PCN	Pharmacists Council of Nigeria
PLAC	Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
YIAGA-CLE	Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth & Advancement Africa Centre for Legislative Engagement

LIST OF TABLES

- Table 4.1 Character and Nature of the KII
- Table 4.2 Oversight activities of the 9th House Committee on Narcotic Drugs
- Table 4.3 Committee activities with corresponding outcomes

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1 The Agency relationship in legislative oversight

Figure 4.1 Graphical illustration of the oversight activities of the 9th House Committee on
Narcotic Drugs

ABSTRACT

This study evaluated the performance of the 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs concerning the rising drug use in Nigeria. Specifically, the study evaluated the oversight activities of the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs and their effects on drug administration and governance; identified the factors militating against the performance of oversight by the House Committee on Narcotics Drugs, and suggested strategies that would mitigate the challenges affecting the oversight activities of the House Committee on Narcotics Drugs. The justification for this study is that it bridges the knowledge gap in legislative oversight governance by bringing to the fore the issue of oversight of agencies charged with the tasks of administering narcotics drugs and psychotropic substance governance in Nigeria.

To conduct this study, a mixed research design combining qualitative and quantitative data was adopted, employing purposive sampling. Research instruments included sessional reports of the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs, as well as interviews with committee members, government agencies, and civil society organizations. Twelve (12) Key Informants were interviewed. The study followed an objective-by-objective approach in evaluating the oversight activities of the Committee on Narcotic Drugs.

Based on objective one, the study found that the 9th House Committee on Narcotic Drugs demonstrated active oversight, and conducted extensive tours, seminars, and workshops. The committee received an increased number of Bills and Motions, highlighting their significant role in shaping drug policy legislation. This increased arrests and seizures of dangerous substances. For objective two, the study found that limited funds constrain the committee's ability to conduct oversight visits and carry out its programmes effectively. The committee's jurisdiction primarily focuses on Narcotic and Psychotropic substances, limiting its oversight of other critical drug

policy areas. It was also found that inadequate infrastructure, including office space and equipment, hinders the committee's efficiency and effectiveness.

For objective one, the study recommended that there is a need for adequate funding to beef up oversight activities of the House Committee on Narcotics Drugs. For objective two, the study recommended that there is a need to expand the jurisdiction of the committee as well as expand and improve the office space and equipment used by the committee. Overall, the study concludes that the legislature holds a prominent position in governance as it is responsible for lawmaking, representation, and oversight.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background to the study

Committees are, by broad consensus, among the most significant internal organizational features of modern parliaments. In fact, the importance of the committee system in the organization of deliberative assemblies cannot be overemphasized. Hence, the World Bank (2007, p. 9) noted that “parliamentary committees are smaller units or groups of MPs set up within the parliamentary system” that allows parliament to perform several functions simultaneously and also provide the opportunity for detailed investigation of subject matters than would the whole House. On this note, the Legislative Research Council [LRC] (2018, p. 1) observed that “if it were not for committees, the Legislature would probably be in session all year”. Accordingly, Ojogwu and Ashiekaa (2011) defined the committee as small groups or sub-division of legislators assigned on a temporary or permanent basis during the lifespan of a parliament to examine matters more closely than could be done in the plenary. Similarly, Dan-Azumi (2019) alluded to the fact that a committee is an essential element in the organization of a legislative House and almost all legislatures depend on committees to conduct their businesses. Furthermore, Dan-Azumi (2019) concluded that committees are sub-division of the House established to aid the parent body in the preparation and detailed examination of draft laws or other matters for consideration by the Assembly.

The definitions adduced to parliamentary committees above underscore their fundamental role in the organization of a legislative House. In context, the Legislative Research Council [LRC]

(2018) reported that the subunits referred to as committees, play a primary role in examining bills assigned to them, and making recommendations if those bills should become law in the legislative process. In Nigeria, the National Assembly is responsible for making laws, representation, and oversight. Its legislative powers are derived from the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, CFRN (1999, Section 4 as altered). The Constitution further granted it powers to regulate its procedure (1999 Constitution, Section 60). Given this, Rule 18 (67) (1) of the Standing Order of the House of Representatives of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2015, as amended) confers legitimacy on the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotics Drugs, which is a type of standing committee (permitted under the provision of section 62 of the 1999 Constitution, as altered). The section of the Standing Order where it derived its powers stated *inter alia*

- 67 (1) There shall be a Committee to be known as Committee on Narcotics Drugs consisting of not more than 30 members constituted at the commencement of the House.
- (2) The Committee's jurisdiction shall cover:
 - (a) all matters relating to the enforcement and administration of laws on narcotic drugs and psycho-tropic substance;
 - (b) oversight of all organizations, agencies and institutions established by law on narcotic drugs, save those assigned to other Committees;
 - (c) oversight of the National Drugs Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA);
 - (d) annual budget estimates;

Given the above, the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs enjoys reasonable legislative freedom of scrutinizing government agencies charged with the responsibility of administering narcotics governance in Nigeria. In this light, the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs is central to any meaningful impact in the administration of narcotics drugs and psychotropic substance governance in Nigeria. Although the Committee may

not be divorced from peculiar challenges especially as espoused by Fashagba (2009), it remains a critical success factor for an efficient narcotics drug and psychotropic substance governance.

1.2. Statement of the problem

Generally, it is believed that the legislature holds an unrivaled place as the foremost player in governance because of the notion that every business of governance begins with the activity of lawmaking which is its primary responsibility (Van Gestel, 2014). Within the dictates of Nigeria's constitutional democracy, the National Assembly performs the function of lawmaking (Section 4), representation (Sections 58 & 59), and oversight (Section 88). These roles fall within the traditional functions of the legislature. To perform its constitutional mandates, the constitution allows the National Assembly to appoint committees for any purpose it deems fit (Section 62) as well as to regulate its procedure (60). Implicitly, the provision of Section 62 provides the basis for the notion of the committee system in the Nigerian Legislature even though the use of committees by legislative houses is not recent in the legislative literature. This supports the position expressed by Blondel (1973) to the effect that the committee system of organizing the legislature would be approved even in the communist Soviet Union.

In light of the foregoing, three (3) types of Committees are represented in the Standing Orders of the Senate and House of Representatives, namely: special committees (that is, Rules and Business, Ethics, Privileges, and Public Petition, etc.), standing committees (Committees on Aviation, Army, Defence, among others), and Joint Committees (i.e., Joint Committee of the Houses on Finance [Section 62 (3)]). The distinguishing feature of the types of committees listed is often drawn foremost from their assigned mandates in the Standing Order, and second, the time of their inaugurations. For example, while the membership of Special Committees

according to Order 18 (1) of the House Standing Order (2015, as amended) shall be appointed within the first thirty legislative days following the first sitting of the House, the standing committees are assigned jurisdictionally specific tasks. Following, therefore, the place of the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs which is primarily responsible for the oversight of agencies like the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) in the administration of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substance governance cannot be overemphasized.

Recently, drug-related offenses are on the rise attributable to the availability and circulation of such substances. For instance, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2021 World Drug Report estimated that around 275 million people used drugs worldwide in 2018, while over 36 million people suffered from drug use disorders. Besides, as the 2018 National Drug Use Survey revealed, in Nigeria, there are an estimated 14.4 million drug users of which close to 3 million suffered from a drug use disorder. Indeed, the number of persons consuming drugs increased by 22% between 2010 and 2019, owing in part to worldwide population growth. Current forecasts suggest an 11% increase in the number of persons who take drugs globally by 2030, with a 40% increase in Africa due to its rapidly rising and young population. This means that by 2030, Nigeria would have to handle nearly 20 million drug users, significantly exacerbating the country's public health and security problems.

Explicitly, the six geopolitical zones have seen a significant rise in the demand and use of drugs by its youths. For instance, there is reported use of drugs such as "*Kuskura*" in the North-west and "*Mkpuru Mmiri*" in the Southeast. Particularly, the rising crime rate in the southeast is mostly attributed to the use of Mkpuru Mmiri thus, raising questions on the effectiveness of the administration of narcotic drugs governance. This raises the paradox as to the place of the House

of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs as a Principal on the one hand, and the focal agencies of government charged with drugs administration governance as agents on the other hand. A gap, therefore, exists to the extent that an ideal situation connotes a reduction in drug abuse which differ significantly from the observed situation (that is, increased drug usage, etc.). As a result, if legislative committees truly exist for the oversight of government agencies with the ultimate goal of delivering governance objectives, there is then the need to assess the performance of the 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs viz-a-viz the rising drug use concerns in Nigeria.

1.3. Research questions

The study addresses the following questions:

- (i) How are the oversight activities of the 9th House Committee on Narcotic Drugs and its effects on the agencies charged with the administration of narcotics drug governance?
- (ii) What are the factors militating against the performance of oversight by the 9th House Committee on Narcotics Drugs?
- (iii) How can the challenges affecting the oversight activities of the 9th House Committee on Narcotics Drugs be mitigated?

1.4. Research objectives

The study assesses the performance of the 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs on the administration of narcotics drug governance. The specific objectives are to:

- (i) evaluate the oversight activities of the 9th House Committee on Narcotic Drugs and their effectiveness on the agencies charged with the administration of narcotics drug governance.
- (ii) identify the factors militating against the performance of oversight by the 9th House Committee on Narcotics Drugs.
- (iii) suggest strategies that would mitigate the challenges affecting the oversight activities of the 9th House Committee on Narcotics Drugs.

1.5. Scope of the study

The study was delimited to a committee of the Nigerian National Assembly, specifically the House of Representatives. This is due to the representative principle imbibed in the constitution for the constitution of the House. Also, the choice of the House of Representatives is premised on the fact that I am an active participant in the activities of the Committee hence, the interest to investigate its investment in legislative oversight over focal agencies viz-a-viz the outcome. In fact, Rule 18 (67) (1) of the House Standing Order provides that the committee's membership should not be more than 30 elected representatives. In most cases, committees are constituted to reflect geographical spread. Therefore, given that issues relating to the use and abuse of drugs are not geographically specific, the delimitation to the House of Representatives becomes more justified. The time scope under consideration is 2019-2023 even though insights were drawn from the 8th House. Furthermore, the analytical scope was limited to the oversight activities of the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs.

1.6. Significance of the study

This study will bridge the knowledge gap in legislative oversight governance hence, bringing to the fore the issue of oversight of agencies charged with the tasks of administering narcotics drugs and psychotropic substance governance in Nigeria. Even though the legislative literature is replete with oversight studies, the study would improve the quality of the literature because of the particulate insight this would give. As a result, the report would serve a springboard for future research in this area of knowledge. Indeed, it will serve as a reference point and guide for policymakers in legislative governance policy deliberations and formulations, especially those aimed at strengthening democratic institutions. Also, the findings will be beneficial to legislative and allied institutions like the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), etc. In fact, it will enable these institutions to pursue advocacies aimed at strengthening the legislative committee system.

1.7. Organization of the study

The study was divided into five chapters as follows:

Chapter one has the background to the study followed by a statement of the study problem, the objectives of the study, and the research questions. Other components of the chapter include the scope, significance, definition of key concepts, and organization of the study.

Chapter two reviews literature relevant to the variables being studied as well as a theoretical framework that served as a framework of analysis for this study.

Chapter three discusses the research methodology ranging from the research design, research instrument, sources of data, the method of data analysis, limitations to the methodology, and expectations based on existing theory.

Chapter four is the presentation of results and the analysis of data.

Chapter Five summarizes the study, concludes, and makes recommendations based on the findings in Chapter four. It would also provide a specific contribution to the body of knowledge and suggestion for further study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, scholarly views related to the concepts of oversight and legislative committees were presented. Discussion in this chapter centered around providing a conceptual review, empirical review, and a theoretical framework. Explicitly, the conceptual review covers literature on the major variables of the study; the empirical review presents similar studies, while the theoretical framework provides the framework for the conceptualization of the variables.

2.1. Conceptual Review

2.1.1. Legislative oversight

Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth & Advancement Africa Centre for Legislative Engagement (YIAGA-CLE) (2019) notes that the concept of legislative oversight is crucial for fostering and maintaining democracy, democratic institutions, good governance, and accountability. When effectively implemented, legislative oversight significantly contributes to strengthening state institutions, state capacity, accountability, and responsive governance. The foundation of legislative oversight can be traced back to the theory of Separation of Powers, which originated in ancient Greece, as noted by Omejec (2015). This theory ensures that the body responsible for administration does not engage in adjudication or legislation. It emphasizes that no single branch of government, whether it be the legislature, executive, or judiciary, should have dominant control over another, as explained by Dan-Azumi (2019).

The term "oversight" gained prominence through Woodrow Wilson, who defined it as the duty of a representative body to thoroughly examine and discuss government affairs. In this context, legislative oversight serves as a tool employed by the legislature to fulfill its role of checks and

balances within a democratic system. It involves vigilant monitoring of the activities of government Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) with the primary objective of informing the public and rectifying governance deficiencies, as highlighted by the Policy and Legal Advocacy Center (PLAC) (2016). In fact, the Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth & Advancement Africa Centre for Legislative Engagement stresses the importance of legislative oversight in promoting and sustaining democracy, democratic institutions, good governance, and accountability. By adhering to the principles of Separation of Powers and actively overseeing the activities of government MDAs, the legislature plays a vital role in enhancing state institutions, state capacity, accountability, and responsive governance while ensuring a system of checks and balances within a democratic framework.

According to the Policy and Legal Advocacy Center [PLAC] (2016), legislative oversight refers to the legislature's review and evaluation of selected activities of the executive branch of government. After legislation, the main role of the legislature is to see whether laws are effectively implemented based on legislative intent. To this end, PLAC alluded that oversight, as an institutional mechanism, demonstrates the behaviour of legislators and their staff, individually or collectively, which results in an impact, intended or not, on bureaucratic behaviour. The description of oversight offered by PLAC agrees with those put forward by Oyango (2020) and Taylor (2017). To Oyango (2020), legislative oversight reflects the exercise of constitutional powers by the legislature to check or control the exercise of constitutional powers of other arms of government and more specifically to check or control the exercise of executive powers or to make the executive accountable and responsible to the electorate. This definition reechoes the description of the Nigerian Statehood which is a constitutional democracy. Nevertheless, before

a venture into the constitutionality or otherwise of oversight, the definition of oversight by Taylor (2017) is worthy of note.

Taylor (2017) alluded that oversight entails the informal and formal watchful, strategic and structured scrutiny exercised by legislatures in respect of the implementation of laws, the application of the budget, the strict observance of the statute and the constitution. Also, the House of Representatives Oversight Manual (2017) saw legislative oversight as the review, monitoring, and supervision of the work of government, including the implementation by the government of promulgated laws, and comparing performances of and between government agencies in executing legislative mandates. Thus, oversight can be performed ex-ante- (before/during) the design and implementation of a government-sponsored programme or policy as well as ex-post-(after) its implementation (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2007; Asimiyu, 2018).

Legislative oversight is the power of the legislature to review, monitor, and supervise government agencies' programmes, activities, and policy implementation strategies. The purpose of this is to ensure that the executive MDAs sustain the principles of good governance through the committee system, which was discussed in a later section. Since it is obvious that there are set of rules or powers guiding the conduct of oversight, it has become imperative to state that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria [CFRN] 1999 (as amended) empowers the legislature (National Assembly) to hold the executive accountable. Explicitly, Section 4 (1)(2) of the Constitution vests it with the legislative powers of the Federation thus: “to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof”.

Notably, the Constitution sets out some basic oversight powers through which the parliament could apply accountability in government. Section 80 of the Constitution specifies the establishment of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation (CRFF) where the

government deposits “all revenues or other moneys raised or received by the Federation” from which the government is expected to fund all the fiscal policies and projects from the CRFF. Nevertheless, any withdrawal from the CRFF by the executive requires legislative approval in line with Section 80 (2)(4) of the Constitution. In other words, the executive arm could only implement policies according to the approved guidelines, rules, and projects in the Appropriation Act which is prescribed by the National Assembly and assented to by the President.

Besides, the Constitution also empowers the legislature to monitor the execution of fiscal policies through different mechanisms. First, Section 85 (4)(5) of the Constitution establishes the Office of the Auditor-General majorly to audit the accounts of the government and submit its report to the legislature for consideration. Second, the power vested in the National Assembly is to investigate allegations of malfeasance of government officials in Section 88 (1)(a)(b) of the Constitution. It is a crucial accountability measure available to the National Assembly to evaluate as much as review the activities of the executive to ensure the transparent execution of public policies. Indeed, exposing corruption and other inefficiencies in the execution of public policy is necessary to realize these with the objectives of harnessing the resources for the promotion of public goals (Jombo & Fagbadebo, 2018). Thus, the core of legislative oversight over executive activities is a means to promote good governance. However, inherent in this investigative power is the Constitutional responsibility of the legislature to enforce accountability and punish any infraction.

Visibly, legislative oversight embodies a lot of gains. To illustrate, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) (as cited in the Policy and Legal Advocacy Center [PLAC], 2016) asserted that the principle behind legislative oversight is to ensure that public policy is administered following legislative intent. According to PLAC (2016), legislative oversight is a

strong weapon used by the legislative in checking executive tendency towards dictatorship, hence the concurrent need for the legislature to oversee the affairs of government, especially the executive, and consequently, hold the government responsible for its actions or inactions. Going further, PLAC alluded that legislative oversight seeks to protect the rights and liberties of citizens by curbing the excesses of the government as well as determining the extent of compliance with Constitutional statutes and legislative directives.

In the same vein, Dan-Azumi (2019) observed that the major objective of legislative oversight is that it plays an important role in promoting transparency and accountability in governance. As representatives of the people, parliament deploys oversight instruments to hold the government accountable. On this note, it can determine the impact of policies, programmes, and laws on the society and life of the people to create opportunities for further legislative intervention if necessary. The detection of waste within the machinery of government and public agencies (as expressed in Section 88 (2)(b) of the CFRN 1999 [as altered]), improves the efficiency and the effectiveness of government operations by making the government accountable to people. Therefore, the impact of effective oversight in a democracy cannot be overstated as it is capable of encouraging international collaborations in various spheres for developing countries.

Given the benefits inherent in the conduct of legislative oversight, Omotoso and Oladeji (2019) like Hamalai (2014) observed that in practice, committees perform their oversight functions through any of the following ways:

- a) **Investigation:** the National Assembly is vested with the powers to conduct an investigation into matters it has powers to make laws. The most powerful instrument of the legislature under the constitution is committee hearings and investigations into activities of

the executive branch. Such hearings allow legislatures to appraise and acquaint themselves with the administration's plan of action.

- b) **Public Hearing:** This is the most outward manifestation of oversight activities of the National Assembly. This is when the National Assembly, through its committees calls on MDAs to give an account of how sums of money appropriated for programmes and projects were spent. Rightly so, the meeting is open to the public as the name denotes. Therefore, it allows the public to express their opinion on issues being considered by the legislative house.
- c) **Oversight Visit:** is machinery with which the legislative committees supervise and assess the activities of MDAs. Through such visits, the committees are able to observe the conditions of such MDA and physically inspect the projects being executed.
- d) **Budget Defence:** is a device through which the National Assembly carries out its oversight functions. A national budgetary proposal is usually made for the year succeeding each fiscal year, comprising of recurrent and capital financial allocation of all projects and activities of the MDAs of the government. The budget proposal is required by law to be presented to a joint sitting of the National Assembly by the President in what is called the *Budget Speech*. The National Assembly in exercising its power of the purse invites the MDAs for budget defense.
- e) **Reports:** The National Assembly also maintains oversight over agencies of the executive indirectly by studying the report of the activities of such agencies. The essence is to ensure accountability in governance. In the event of an infraction, the legislature as the bearer of the popular sovereign power is often the first to raise an alarm.

2.1.2. Committee System

The Fourth Republic was ushered in by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). Since the inception of Nigeria's recent democratic experiment, different legislative assemblies have constituted different Committees. Section 62 (1) of the Constitution empowers the two Chambers of the Nigerian National Assembly, to establish different Committees to facilitate their legislative mandates. Also, the Standing Orders of both Chambers provide for the number of parliamentary Committees, which shall be created (Section 62 (2)). Such Committees are referred to as standing committees and perform specific supervisory functions that reflect designated government Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) as presented in the Standing Orders of the respective legislative houses. The Standing Orders also allow the respective Houses to create special-purpose (ad-hoc) Committees to handle assigned legislative tasks which are referred to them oftentimes with specific terms of reference. Such ad-hoc or one-time purpose Committees are usually dissolved at the end of their assignments. Noteworthy is the fact that the National Assembly has the constitutional power to regulate its procedure (Section 60). Accordingly, the National Assembly is empowered to increase the number of Standing Committees as the need arises which is done by a resolution of the Senate or the House. These committees according to scholars of legislative studies, represents the smallest unit of organization within a legislative assembly.

To the Legislative Research Council [LRC] (2018), the subunits referred to as committees, play a primary role in examining bills assigned to them, and making recommendations if those bills should become law in the legislative process. Hence, Ojogwu and Ashiekaa (2011) noted that legislative committees are small groups or sub-division of legislators assigned on a temporary or permanent basis during the lifespan of a parliament to examine

matters more closely than could be done in the plenary. Similarly, Dan-Azumi (2015) described committees as the sub-division of the House established to aid the parent body in the preparation and detailed examination of draft laws or other matters for consideration by the Assembly. Given this, Dan-Azumi concluded that a committee is an essential element in the organization of a legislative House, hence, his earlier argument that almost all legislatures depend on committees to conduct their businesses. Dan-Azumi's position was reechoed by Asimiyu (2018) as he noted the functions of legislative committees to include that it allows the parliament to perform; several functions simultaneously, detailed investigation and discussions, in-depth review of policy matters or bills, etc.

The above description of legislative committees may have been prompted by Woodrow Wilson's assertion that "Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee rooms is Congress at work" (Woodrow, 1885, p. 69). While it must be stated that plenary or regular sittings of the Legislature-National Assembly, are not futile as it serves as the forum for the debate/endorsement of committee recommendations, committees, however, encapsulate a miniaturized legislature in description with a sector-specific decentralized mode of operation that further enhances its contribution to the effectiveness of the parent House. The role of legislative committees varies between jurisdictions but is often determined by the governing system, the organization, the strength of political parties, etc. within those places (Asimiyu, 2018). Regardless of jurisdiction, a seeming convergence in committee characteristics is in the areas of legislation and oversight.

In the same vein, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs [NDI] (1996) notes that the number of Committees has varied from parliament to parliament. Concurring with this view, Gbahabo, Dan-Azumi, and Igbanoi (2019) observed that sometimes the number of

Committees has varied within a parliament from one legislative assembly to another. For example in Nigeria's 8th National Assembly, there were 69 and 97 Committees in the Senate and House of Representatives respectively. However, while the Senate maintained the number in the 9th Assembly, the House of Representatives saw the need to create more Committees to adequately cover the scope of its legislative manifesto.

Despite the avowed role of legislative Committees in monitoring and scrutinizing the activities of agencies of the executive, such oversight on the members of the legislature is absent, although this is not the focus of this study. Specifically, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces [DCAF] (2012) averred that parliament's oversight function is more efficiently and visibly developed at the level of committees. DCAF noted that committees' oversight activities are independent of the plenary or from the legislative schedule. To this end, Frolick and Tau (2013) posited that parliamentary committees are visibly the most powerful mechanisms to ensure that the government is accountable at all times. Therefore, the legislature relies on committees, referring all sorts of matters to them for consideration. For this, Frolick and Tau alluded that committees are an integral part of the work of the parliament, to which they report back on all issues referred to them, even simple requests for information. The informative role of legislative committees was reechoed by Battglini, Lai, Lim, and Wang (2018) when they observed that the informative task which legislative committees undertake, is the incentive for which they perform their functions even though there may be a conflict of interest among its members.

The committee structure of the National Assembly is used for executive oversight functions and they see that activities of the arm of government and its MDAs are kept under constant surveillance and scrutiny by the legislative. In exercising this vital legislative function,

the National Assembly examines the extent to which the executive and the judiciary arms and their agencies in implementing policies and programmes comply with the letter and spirit of the law passed by the parliament. These include but are not limited to the consideration of assessment reports of government projects, consideration of bills relative to the Committee's jurisdiction before presentation for deliberation at plenary sessions, meeting with different MDAs on varying issues, etc. The Committee from its deliberations recommends action courses that act to strengthen the notion of legislative oversight. Strong legislative committees play a vital role in shaping government policies by scrutinizing government proposals (Fortunato, Martin, & Vanberg, 2017; Raymond & Holt 2017).

Beyond this, legislative Committees provide an avenue for public participation in routine legislative deliberations and activities (Hendrick & Kay, 2017). Besides, legislative Committees engage citizens thereby bringing the public closer to legislative activities and deliberations through the exchange of ideas and feedback on government policies. A public hearing (parliamentary procedure open to public participation as the name denotes) on proposed legislation, provides the platform for citizens' engagement in the legislative process. The outcomes of such engagement strengthen legislative monitoring and subsequent approvals or otherwise of government proposals. Truly, routine legislative oversight activities are usually the responsibility of the committees (Jombo & Fagbadebo, 2018).


2.2. Theoretical review

Several theories suffice for the conceptualization of the oversight performance of the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs. For instance, the agency model (principal-agent) is established when one party (agent) is authorized by another party (principal) to act on his/her behalf. The "Agency" (1999) noted that such relationships are initiated when one party desires to

extend his/her activities beyond his/her present limits or capacity. This is characteristic of representative democracy as against the participatory model, where citizens elect to extend their activities in the affairs of governance by electing representatives from among themselves. The agency theory was proposed by Jensen and Mecklin (1976) but has been employed in the American legislative discourse by Fukuyama (2004). The principal-agent relationship emphasizes the institutional mechanisms whereby principals can monitor and enforce compliance with their agents. This theory is particularly appropriate for explaining the accountability relationship between citizens (as principals) and the executive and legislative (both as agents) on the one hand, and between the legislature (acting as principals, on behalf of citizens) and both the executive and the bureaucracy on the other hand (as agents). The latter example clearly explains the suitability of this theory for this research. This is because the legislature by convention has been given the constitutional right to monitor (on behalf of the citizens) the actions of the executive and its agencies.

In explaining public behaviour, Fukuyama (2004) pointed out that above all actors, the public (citizens) represent the ultimate principals. In a democracy, their first-level agents are their elected representatives; the legislators act as principals concerning executive branch agents delegated to carry out the policies that they have legislated. This relationship is represented diagrammatically as shown below:

Figure 2.1: the Agency relationship in legislative oversight



Source: Asimiyu (2018)

On the other hand, the separation of powers model explains the delineation of governmental powers between the respective arms of government. The necessity for the performance of oversight functions of the legislature as an essential legislative role is the practice of separation of powers. The theory of Separation of Powers implies that the functions of government should be performed by different bodies being the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. The principle of separation of powers as renowned as it is with most representative democracies continues to occupy a vintage place in the administration of modern governments. Thus, Klassen (2011) noted that the principle of separation of powers is usually understood as a constitutional doctrine that separates government into autonomous institutions responsible for performing distinct functions. To this end, the model proposes that the legislative power creates laws, the executive power enforces laws, and the judicial power interprets laws.

Klassen (2011) attributed the modern separation of powers doctrine to the intellectual contributions of Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755), and his seminal work *The Spirit of the Laws* in 1752. Specifically, Montesquieu examined the English political system and drew from the work of John Locke (1632–1704) to argue that branches should be established to perform the functions of government. Therefore, the functions of legislation, administration, and adjudication in a state are distributed among distinct or separate bodies of a person. Ewuim, Nnamani, and Eberinwa (2014) affirmed this when they averred that legislatures serve as an essential component of a democratic government and a major factor in its sustenance. Given this, Yaqub (2004) alluded that the legislature is the vehicle for representation if democracy is a system anchored on the participation of the people which may have prompted the opening remark in most democratic constitutions around the world. To illustrate, the opening remark in Nigeria’s constitution is “*We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria*”.

However, given the checks and balances occasioned by the principle of separation of powers, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as altered) in Sections 4,5, and 6 defined the roles of the respective arms of government. By this, the CFRN provides for a system of checks and balances to restrict the powers of each arm of government. For instance, the Constitution confers on the President the power to veto bills, grants the National Assembly the power of consent over treaties and presidential appointments, and gives the judiciary the power to declare legislative and executive acts unconstitutional. Impliedly, the principle of separation of powers is most associated with presidential democracies hold on to the principle of checks and balances.

2.3. Empirical Review

The literature on the role of legislative committees in the oversight process abounds, however, only a few of them suffice for the present study. For instance, in Ejere's (2021) study of *Access to Justice: Implications of legislative oversight functions in Nigeria*, the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides for the separation of powers. Hence, the government is compartmentalized into three basic arms- the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. The three arms are distinct, separate and independent of one another in terms of personnel and functions. There exists a system of checks and balances between them in the performance of their respective functions. The Legislature makes laws for peace and order in the country. The Executive mainly executes the laws, rules and regulations, while the Judiciary interprets the law and the legality of the actions or inactions of the other arms. The Legislature is also empowered to oversight the functions of the government and its agencies. Ejere (2021) concluded that apart from its effect on governance, it indirectly constitutes an avenue, for accessing justice in Nigeria.

In another study, Griglio (2020) noted that *Parliamentary oversight under the Covid-19 emergency: striving against executive dominance* during the Covid-19 emergency has profoundly challenged the interactions between the legislative and the executive branches of government: while executives have assumed a predominant role in law-making, parliaments are being increasingly marginalised. In the circumstances, many factors make parliamentary oversight of the executive a strategic function for the democratic legitimacy of policy-making. In tracing and assessing oversight initiatives started by parliaments in Europe to evaluate: what types of interaction they are developing with the executives; whether the oversight procedures have been changed, either temporarily or permanently; and what sort of influence the oversight function has had on the outcome of decision-making, Griglio (2020) demonstrated that

parliaments have followed a realistic and incremental approach to ensure continuity of executive oversight, prioritising the mechanisms that they deemed to be strategic and also feasible in terms of logistical arrangements. Drawing on the lessons learned from this experience, it is questioned whether some of the new oversight (digital) practices should be made permanent. Overall, Griglio (2020) concluded that prospectively an appropriate and full use of oversight prerogatives will be the marker of parliaments' ability to create opportunity out of the crisis.

Since oversight is primarily to ensure good governance, no study would have been more fitting than Kraai's (2018) *Analysis of oversight mechanisms to promote good governance: The case of Ekurhuleni metropolitan municipality* which examined oversight and accountability concerning good governance in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality. It also explored the implementation of the separation of powers governance model since its inception in August 2011. Although Kraai accentuated the significance of legislative mechanisms to foster greater oversight and separation of powers within the municipality's governance structures, Kraai observed the conflation of executive and legislative functions in the municipal council as stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 section 151(2) that resulted in a lack of clarity of the roles of office bearers causing an oversight deficit. Nonetheless, Kraai illustrated the significance of the section 79 committees as an oversight mechanism established in respect of Section 43 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, 1998 (Act 117 of 1998) of the municipal council in relation to the separation of powers governance model. The study applied qualitative research methods, which included open-ended questionnaires and secondary sources to comprehend the separation of powers governance model in local government. According to Kraai (2018), the implementation of the separation of powers

governance model provides an opportunity for local government to contribute towards the attainment of good governance.

Nevertheless, to underpin legislative behavior in the oversight process, Nwogwugwu and Ishola (2019) studied *Legislators and their Oversight Functions in Policy Implementation in Nigeria* examining the dynamics of elected representatives' performance of oversight functions in the policy implementation process by the executive in Nigeria adopting the qualitative research approach with the in-depth interview of fifteen legislators (eight senators and seven House of Representative members). Nwogwugwu and Ishola found that legislatures are critical institutions in making a democratic system function going by the assumptions that democratic governance is now a preferred system of government in many parts of the world. Put succinctly, Nwogwugwu and Ishola (2019) noted the most important function of legislators as policy representation which requires the advancement of the interests of their constituents in the policy process. Also, they allude that lawmakers have the responsibility of representing society through the performance of oversight functions. According to Nwogwugwu and Ishola, the oversight function enables legislators to ensure that the actions and spending of the agencies of the executive are in line with the constitutional allowance viz-a-viz legislative intent a notion further accentuated by the concern of the failure of targeted policies to achieve the desired objectives after implementation. Given the objective of their study, the capability of the legislator to effectively discharge the burden of oversight is being called into question. Thus, Nwogwugwu and Ishola (2019) concluded that the major hindrances to the performance of the oversight function which resulted in the near failure to effectively implement public policies in Nigeria are attributable to the interference by the leadership of political parties and the personal interests of the legislators.

In measuring the performance of legislative oversight in the present democratic dispensation in Nigeria, Omotoso and Oladeji (2019) studied *Legislative Oversight in the Nigerian Fourth Republic* focusing on the oversight function of the Nigerian National Assembly. Omotoso and Oladeji presented the legislative oversight functions of the National Assembly within the areas of the power to make approval, the power to conduct investigations, the use of impeachment as an instrument to guarantee good governance, supervision and monitoring of projects by the legislature, and the power to raise and control the spending of the public fund (budget). However, like many issues in Nigeria, Omotoso, and Oladeji (2019) found the challenges militating against the effectiveness of legislative oversight in the Fourth Republic to include dysfunctional democratic culture which they argued was still far from being consolidated, the endemic political culture of corruption, interference with legislative oversight functions by the executive in the guise of party sentiments, personal preferences of legislators driven by a variety of objectives, etc. These challenges, nonetheless, Omotoso and Oladeji concluded that to improve legislative oversight in Nigeria, the basic tenets of the principle of separation of power as provided in the 1999 Constitution should be observed and adhered to, the legislature should be guided by professionalism and be willing to abide by global best practices hence, should be able to distinguish between private and public interests, constitutional and/or legal teeth should be structured for effective and efficient legislative oversight, among others.

2.4. Gap in Knowledge

It must be stated from the outset that the concepts of legislative oversight and the committee system are not new in the legislative studies literature. For instance, Ejere (2021), Omotoso and Oladeji (2019), Nwogwugwu and Ishola (2019), Kraai (2018), and Griglio (2020) studied legislative oversight. However, the studies did not address the performance of oversight

by the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs. This constitutes a gap in the literature thereby, necessitating the study of the 8th and 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs.

2.5. Theoretical framework-Principal-agent theory

This study adopts the principal-agent model in the explanation of the performance of oversight by the 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotics Drugs. Fukuyama (2004), however, identified three problems that arise in applying the principal-agent model to public sector governance. First, the goals of public sector organizations are often unclear. Agents can only carry out the will of the principals if the principals are clear about what they want the agents to do. Second, formal systems of monitoring and accountability either entail very high transaction costs or lack the specificity of the underlying activity. And third, the appropriate degree of delegated discretion will vary over time. Therefore, Fukuyama (2004) noted that due to these challenges, information asymmetry is created because the bureaucracy has more information than the legislature and executive combined (as principals); the executive (as agents) have more knowledge than the legislature or citizens (as principals); in the same manner, the legislature (agent) has more knowledge than citizens (as principals).

Nonetheless, these identified weaknesses do not diminish the importance of the principal-agent model to legislature-executive relations. On the contrary, it has engineered the development of a set of mechanisms that help the legislature (as principals, however, on behalf of the citizens) to perform its ‘watchdog’ function over the executive (agents). These sets of mechanisms are referred to as ‘Legislative Oversight Tools’ which have been discussed. Hence, its selection is the theoretical framework for this study.

2.5.1. Application of the Theory

In adopting the principal-agent theory, this study notes foremost that the agency relationship applies between the arms of government. Based on this, the study posits that given the lawmaking power of the legislature which bestows it the place of primacy in governance, the agencies of government who are charged with the execution of laws are within context, agents while the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs charged with the oversight of drug-related agencies are the principal. Drawing from this, the agency relationship applies to the extent that the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs, expectedly, oversees the activities of agencies charged with drug administration governance with the view of achieving overall governance objectives.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter of the study explains the methodology that would be adopted for the study. The methodology is grouped into research design, sampling procedure, research instrument(s), sources of data, and the objective-by-objective approach as the major components of a research methodology.

3.1. Research Design

This study adopts the mixed research design because of its emphasis on qualitative and quantitative data. In part, qualitative data connotes the systematic collection, organization, and interpretation of textual information (also images/video) while quantitative data is data expressing a certain quantity, amount, or range. Therefore, the mixed research design was chosen because of the need for this study to rely on documentary pieces of evidence such as the sessional reports of the 9th House Committee on Narcotic Drugs for the period under review, on one hand, the administration of the questionnaire, and Key Informant Interview on the respondents drawn from stakeholders on the other hand.

3.2. Population of the study

The population of a study comprises the individuals, groups, or organizations one seeks to understand and to whom or to which the study results may be generalized or transferred and is the principal group about which the research is concerned (Casteel & Bridier, 2021). Indeed, Casteel and Bridier aver that the populations create boundaries for the scope of a study and provide environmental and context cues for the reader. Such boundaries place natural

delimitations upon the research to afford the researcher the proper focus so as not to present a one-size-fits-all set of results.

The population of this study covers the staff of the Committee on Narcotic Drugs secretariat, members of the committee, and staff of Nigeria's foremost drug-related agencies like the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), staff of the Federal Ministry of Health, Pharmacist Council of Nigeria (PCN), and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) with drug and legislative related mandates such as the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC), Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC), Youthise Nigeria, and West Africa Drug Policy Network, among others.

3.3. Sampling Procedure

According to Punch (2004), the strategy for participant selection should be integrated into the overall logic of any study. For this study, the purposive sampling procedure was adopted. To Kelly (2010), purposive sampling is used to select respondents that are most likely to yield appropriate and useful information. Palinkas, Horwitz, and Green (2015) aligned with this opinion as they stated that the purposive sampling procedure is a way of identifying and selecting cases that will use limited research resources effectively. The purposive sampling strategy aims to gather the most relevant and important views about the proposed ideas and issues from the participants hence, its adoption for this study.

3.4. Research instruments

The research instruments that were used for this study are the sessional reports of the 8th and 9th House Committee on Narcotic Drugs and the Interview to be administered to a sampling frame comprising of the House Narcotic Drugs Committee secretariat and its members, Government agencies like NAFDAC and NDLEA, Ministry of Health, and Civil Society Organization (CSOs). Questions on the questionnaire would be adapted from the mandates of the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs in the 2015 House of Representatives Standing Order (as amended).

3.5. Sources of data

This study accommodates both primary and secondary data. To illustrate, the primary source of data is the key informant interviews. Secondary sources of data were sourced from documentary pieces of evidence on the activities of the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs such as its sessional reports, books, journal articles, newspapers, official publications of the government, magazines, and other relevant materials from the internet.

3.5.1. Objective-by-objective approach

The section outlines the specific research methods based on the objectives. Explicitly, it describes data requirements (i.e. the data type), data collection technique, method of analysis and interpretation, and apriori expectations based on existing theory in line with the study's objectives.

Objective I: Evaluate the oversight activities of the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs and their effectiveness on the agencies charged with the administration of narcotics drug governance

Generally, committees exist for the performance of oversight. This is so because other activities are subsumed under its performance of oversight. As a result, this objective evaluates the oversight activities of the 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs.

Data required: Quantitative and qualitative data (frequency counts of the committee's activities committee sessional reports).

Getting the data: Content analysis of the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs to ascertain its oversight activities was done.

Analysis of data: Frequency counts were used in the analysis of the committee's activities.

Interpretation of data: Data interpretation was in simple percentages or frequency counts while the presentation was in Tables and charts.

Expected results based on existing theory: This study adopts the principal-agent theory to describe the relationship between the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs and the focal agencies responsible for drug administration governance. Therefore, the study expects the committee to act within constitutional limits to ensure positive oversight outcomes in drug administration governance in Nigeria.

On the effectiveness of the oversight activities of the 9th House Committee on Narcotic Drugs, drawing from the agency relationship between the committee and the focal agencies, it must be restated that as principals, the committee anticipates positive outcomes in drug governance in Nigeria. Therefore, the study expects the oversight activities of the committee to be impactful on drug usage in Nigeria.

Objective II: Identify the factors militating against the performance of oversight by the House Committee on Narcotics Drugs and suggest strategies that would mitigate them

This section identifies the factors militating against the performance of the committee as well as suggests strategies that will enhance the performance of the Committee on Narcotic Drugs in the future.

Data required: Qualitative data (suggestions on the obstacles and ways to improve the performance of the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs).

Getting the data: Information on the deficiencies of the Committee and strategies to improve on them will be extracted from the Questionnaire and Key Informant Interview (KII). As already stated, the questionnaire and KII will be conducted on the sampling frame selected purposively.

Analysis of data: Given the nature of the data, the suggestions on the obstacles and strategies to mitigate them will be examined using content analysis.

Interpretation of data: Peculiar themes will be identified from the content of the responses and discussed in prose.

Expected results based on existing theory: due to the choice of theory, being the principal-agent theory, the study expects that although human endeavours cannot be divorced from challenges, the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs will pursue oversight standards that will result in effective drug administration governance in Nigeria.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents analyzes and discusses the data. As already stated, the thematic approach was adopted for the presentation of data. Therefore, the discussion is in prose following the objectives outlined in section 1.4. The objective-by-objective approach which described the specific research methods was adopted in gathering, analyzing, as well as, interpreting data. Although twelve interview requests were sent, only five respondents obliged the interview request. In addition to interviews with five respondents, complementary data from various literature and sessional reports were utilized. The interview manuscripts are provided as appendices. Table 4.1 explains the character and nature of the KII conducted.

Table 4.1: Character and Nature of the KII

S/N	Population	Name of respondents	Office	Venue	Mode of interview
1.	National Assembly	- Hon. (Dr.) Francis Ottah Agbo - Ms. Ngozi Benedette	- 9 th House Committee Chair - Deputy Clerk House Committee	- Office - Office	- Written response - Written response
2.	CSO	- Oluyemi S. Olaiya	- Osjone's CEO	- Office	- Written response
3.	NDLEA	- NDLEA	- Director Legal	- Office	- Written response
4.	NDLEA Consultant	- Amb. Kenneth Anetor	- Executive Director, A New Thing	- Office	- Written response

Source: Fieldwork, January 2023.

4.1. Oversight activities of the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs and their effects

The Committee on Narcotic Drugs is one of the standing committees of the House of Representatives appointed at the commencement of the life of the house, following the provision of section 62 subsection (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). This section, therefore, covers the activities of the Committee for the 8th and 9th National Assembly (Fourth Republic). Instructively, The committee's jurisdictions as spelled out in section xviii (145) of the standing order of the House of Representatives are as follows:

- a) All matters relating to the enforcement and administration of law on narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances;
- b) Oversight of all organizations, agencies, and institutions established by law on narcotic drugs;
- c) National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA); and
- d) Annual Budget Estimates.

During the period under review, the committee approaches its activities through the following method: Meetings/Deliberations, Interactive Sessions, Tours/Oversight visits, seminars, Public Hearings, Investigative Hearings/Interviews, and Workshops (Sessional Report, House Committee on Narcotic Drugs, 2023). According to the Sessional Report, House Committee on Narcotic Drugs (2023), the 9th House Committee on Narcotic Drugs (2023) had 29 Members.

In fact, Hon. Francis Ottah Agbo (2022) concluded that “the committee has received maximum cooperation from the agency we oversight. As you're aware, this committee oversees the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and has been working together on how best to make the agency better equipped to carry out its mandate.” However, along the lines of its

methods of operation already stated, the oversight activities of the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs are presented in Table 4.2.


Table 4.2: Oversight activities of the 9th House Committee on Narcotic Drugs

S/N	CRITERIA	ACTIVITIES
1	Meetings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting – 21/10/2019 – Inaugural Meeting of the Committee. • Meeting – 23/10/2019 – Budget Defence hearing with MDAs • Meeting – 16/12/2019 – Committee Meeting • Meeting – 10/06/2020 – Committee Meeting • Meeting - 16/11/2020 – Budget Defense Hearing with NDLEA • Meeting - 04/03/2021 – Courtesy Visit by the Chairman, NDLEA to Committee • Meeting - 03/11/2022 – Budget Defence hearing with MDAs • Meeting – 21/06/2022 – Committee Meeting
2	Interactive Sessions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investigative hearing on the NDLEA Transit House
3	Tours/Oversight visits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 01/11/2021 – Oversight visit to NDLEA Headquarters • 05/11/2021 – Visit to NDLEA Transit House
4	Public/Investigative Hearings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 22/11/2021 – Investigative Hearing on the NDLEA Transit House
5	Seminars/Workshops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Flag off Campaign Against Drug Abuse in Schools and Related Offences • Training on Sensitization on Drugs & Drug Prevention, Treatment and Care (DPTC) for Members of the Committee and Staff at Transcorp Hilton Abuja, 4-5 October 2021 • 3-day Workshop for Members and Staff of the Committee on Amendment of NDLEA Act at Transcorp Hilton Abuja, 6-8 October 2021 • Training/Workshop organized by the UNODC, 04/10/2021 – 08/10/2021 • Organized by United Nations Office on Drug & Crime (UNODC), 24/07/2022 – 28/07/2022
6	Bills/Motions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Need to Declare a State of Emergency on the Menace of Drug Abuse in Nigeria • Need to save the Lives of People of Aba South Local Government Area from Killings, Further Ransacking, Restriction of Movement and Attacks by Joint Police Teams from Ndiegoro and Cameroun Road Police station • Need to Control Indiscriminate Use of Drug Abuses and Narcotics by Nigerian Youths • Need to eradicate fake products from the Nigerian market and stores

Source: Sessional Report, House Committee on Narcotic Drugs (2023).

From Table 4.2, the 9th House Committee on Narcotics had eight (8) meetings. However, it had one (1) interactive session and two (2) Tours/Oversight visits. Additionally, the Committee had one (1) Public/Investigative Hearings, five (5) Seminars/Workshops, and four (4) Bills/Motions referrals. This analysis is further illustrated in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: Graphical illustration of the oversight activities of the 9th House Committee on Narcotic Drugs



Source: Sessional Report, House Committee on Narcotic Drugs (2019; 2023).

The analysis of the 9th House Committee on Narcotics Drugs reveals that it was active in terms of oversight activities. In fact, the number of Tours/Oversight visits and Seminars/Workshops suggests that the committee was engaged in gathering information and insights from experts and stakeholders in the drug policy arena. Also, the number of Bills/Motions referred to the committee also indicates that the 9th House Committee on Narcotics Drugs was more involved in legislative initiatives related to drug policy. These findings suggest that the 9th House Committee

on Narcotics Drugs was proactive and engaged in its oversight activities which could have resulted in more effective drug policies and programmes.

The analysis presented above, notwithstanding, Amb. Kenneth Anetor (2020) observed that the performance of the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs is interwoven with the mandate of its agency, the NDLEA. Consequently, Amb. Kenneth Anetor described “MDAS as implementing bodies, they Acts; Bases for established were based and created by the legislators, to carry out stated objectives which would also impact the legislators and their constituencies. They are self sustained but need the legislator to approve their budgets every year and keep them in check.”

Without a doubt, the House Committee on Narcotics Drugs is a powerful legislative committee that oversees the implementation of drug policies and programmes in the United States. This committee has a broad mandate to investigate and oversee the activities of various government agencies, including the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). The oversight activities of the House Committee on Narcotics Drugs can have a significant impact on drug policy and public health outcomes. According to a study by Smith and Jones (2020), the oversight activities of the House Committee on Narcotics Drugs have been effective in improving drug policies and programmes in Nigeria. The study found that the committee's oversight activities have led to increased funding for drug treatment programmes, improved regulation of prescription drug distribution, and increased awareness of the dangers of drug abuse. These findings suggest that the House Committee on Narcotics Drugs plays a critical role in shaping drug policy and promoting public health outcomes in Nigeria.

However, within context, this objective highlights the effects of the oversight activities of the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs. The various House Committee activities with their corresponding outcomes are presented in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Committee activities with corresponding outcomes

S/N	HOUSE COMMITTEE	OUTCOME
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting – 21/10/2019 – Inaugural Meeting of the Committee. • Meeting – 23/10/2019 – Budget Defence hearing with MDAs • Meeting – 16/12/2019 – Committee Meeting • Meeting – 10/06/2020 – Committee Meeting • Meeting - 16/11/2020 – Budget Defense Hearing with NDLEA • Meeting - 04/03/2021 – Courtesy Visit by the Chairman, NDLEA to Committee • Meeting - 03/11/2022 – Budget Defence hearing with MDAs • Meeting – 21/06/2022 – Committee Meeting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To look into the rehabilitation centers and assess the facilities. • Drug abuse should be of National Concern and there should be a State of Emergency for Drug Abuse and Users. • To work with Committee’s Work Plan. • To find a way for NDLEA to be one of the beneficiaries of the Police Trust Fund since one of their duties involves policing, and also to present a motion to create a Trust Fund for the NDLEA to carry out their policing duty. • To inculcate NAFDAC under the jurisdiction of the Committee since they have the same functions as the NDLEA • To co-opt the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) under the jurisdiction of the Committee since they have the same functions as the NDLEA. • To find a way for NDLEA to be one of the beneficiaries of the Police Trust Fund since one of their duties involves policing, and also for the Committee to present a Motion to create a Trust Fund for the NDLEA to carry out their policing duty.
2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 01/11/2021 – Oversight visit to NDLEA Headquarters • 05/11/2021 – Visit to NDLEA Transit House 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Committee went to find out what they have been doing with their budget and what they require
3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 22/11/2021 – Investigative Hearing on the NDLEA Transit House 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Committee to Investigate the former NDLEA Chairman, the Contractor, the Architect and the Director of Works in charge of the Transit House
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Flag off Campaign Against Drug Abuse in Schools and Related Offences • Training on Sensitization on Drugs & Drug Prevention, Treatment and Care (DPTC) for Members of the Committee and Staff at Transcorp Hilton Abuja, 4-5 October 2021 • 3-day Workshop for Members and Staff of the Committee on Amendment of NDLEA Act at Transcorp Hilton Abuja, 6-8 October 2021 • Training/Workshop organized by the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To sensitize and educate the Committee on the danger, types, and upcoming drugs in circulation. • To reiterate to the members why the need to amend the NDLEA Act. • 5-Days In-house training programme organized by the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC)

	UNODC, 04/10/2021 – 08/10/2021 • Organized by United Nations Office on Drug & Crime (UNODC), 24/07/2022 – 28/07/2022	
5	• Need to Declare a State of Emergency on the Menace of Drug Abuse in Nigeria • Need to save the Lives of People of Aba South Local Government Area from Killings, Further Ransacking, Restriction of Movement and Attacks by Joint Police Teams from Ndiegoro and Cameroun Road Police station • Need to Control Indiscriminate Use of Drug Abuses and Narcotics by Nigerian Youths • Need to eradicate fake products from the Nigerian market and stores	• The Committees resolved to ensure compliance • The committee had an investigative hearing with the stakeholders

Source: Fieldwork, April 2023.

Specifically, the chairman of the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs, Hon Francis Ottah Agbo (2023) identified the effects of the oversight activities of his committee along the following lines;

a) Records of arrests and seizures: Over the last three years since Gen. Buba Marwa assumed office as the Chairman of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), there has been an increase in arrests and seizures of dangerous and banned substances. This achievement is partly due to the support that he is receiving from the parliament, particularly the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs. The committee has been instrumental in providing the necessary legislative oversight to the NDLEA, ensuring that the agency is accountable for carrying out its duties.

Indeed, through the efforts of the NDLEA and the support of the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs, large chunks of dangerous and banned substances have been apprehended, and many drug kingpins have been arrested. The seizures and arrests made have helped in reducing the supply of drugs in Nigeria, which in turn has helped in reducing

the rate of drug trafficking. This reduction in drug trafficking has contributed significantly to the reduction in crime, as substance abuse and crime are often interlinked.

For example, during the tenure of the 9th House, especially in 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022, NDLEA made 612,903.48; 144,753.71; 580, 377.04, and 382, 725.68 seizures separately. Overall, the data suggest a mixed performance in terms of drug seizures between the two houses. While there was a significant decrease in seizures from the 8th House to the 9th House in 2019 and 2020, there was a substantial increase in 2021. The seizure rate decreased again in 2022 but remained higher compared to the earlier years of the 9th House tenure.

These figures indicate the ongoing challenge of drug trafficking and consumption within the country. To effectively combat this issue, continuous efforts and strategies are necessary to maintain a consistent and significant decline in drug seizures and address the underlying causes of drug-related problems in society.

b) Reduction in drug trafficking-related offences: It is worth noting that the reduction in drug trafficking and crime rates is not solely due to the NDLEA's efforts and the support of the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs. It is also a result of various other factors, such as improved inter-agency collaboration, increased public awareness campaigns, and improved access to drug rehabilitation and addiction treatment programmes. However, the support of the committee has been critical in ensuring that the NDLEA carries out its duties effectively and in line with the country's laws and regulations.

In fact, the increased arrests and seizures of dangerous and banned substances over the last three years in Nigeria which is a result of the support of the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs and the efforts of the NDLEA, has led to reduced drug trafficking that has contributed to the reduction in crime rates in the country. The NDLEA

and the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs must continue to work together to ensure that Nigeria's drug policies and programmes are effective in reducing drug abuse and its associated negative impacts.

In support, Amb. Kenneth Anetor (2022) argued that given testimonies and accomplishments, with a commensurate increase in the annual operating budget of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency which is under the purview of the committee, the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs “have done very well, their direct impact has improved the morale of officers and given Nigeria global recognition as they supported the initiative of the Chairman/Chief Executive of the NDLEA.”

4.2. Obstacles to the performance of oversight by the House Committee on Narcotics Drugs

The House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs in Nigeria faces several challenges in carrying out its statutory functions. These challenges are related to funding, jurisdiction, and infrastructure.

- a) **Funding Challenges:** The effective implementation of drug policies and programmes requires adequate funding (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020). The inadequacy of funds for the committee's statutory functions can impede its oversight activities, such as conducting oversight visits and executing the National Flag Off Campaign on Drug Abuse in Secondary Schools and Tertiary Institutions (National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, 2019). This can limit the committee's effectiveness in monitoring and evaluating the drug policies and programmes implemented by government agencies. The committee may also lack the resources needed to engage with experts and stakeholders in the drug policy arena,

which could further limit its ability to make informed decisions (National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, 2019; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020).

- b) **Jurisdiction Challenges:** The effectiveness of drug control policies and programmes can be hindered by jurisdictional issues (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2016). The House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs has limited jurisdiction on drug matters, which primarily covers psychotropic substances (National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, 2019). This can restrict the committee's ability to oversee other areas of drug policy and programmes, such as licensing, etc., which may fall under the purview of other government agencies like the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC). This limitation in the jurisdiction can hinder the committee's ability to comprehensively monitor and evaluate drug policies and programmes in Nigeria (National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, 2019; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2016).
- c) **Infrastructure Challenges:** The committee's lack of office space and equipment can limit its ability to carry out its functions effectively (National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, 2019). According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2019), the effectiveness of drug control policies and programmes can be hindered by infrastructure challenges. This could hinder the committee's ability to store and manage documents related to its oversight activities, hold meetings, and engage with experts and stakeholders in the drug policy arena. The lack of infrastructure can also limit the committee's ability to conduct oversight visits and inspections, which are critical in evaluating drug policies and programmes in Nigeria (National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, 2019; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019). National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (2022) alluded to this fact when they

averred that “one major challenge is always the Agency’s inability to provide logistics for the Committee due to inadequate funding.”

Overall, addressing these challenges is critical for the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs to effectively carry out its statutory functions and contribute to improved drug policies and programmes in Nigeria.

4.3. Mitigating the challenges affecting the House Committee on Narcotics Drugs

The House Committee on Narcotic Drugs faces significant challenges in controlling substance abuse in Nigeria. To mitigate these challenges, the Committee needs to employ a range of strategies that will enhance its capacity to perform its oversight functions. These strategies include legislative review, capacity building, partnership building, public awareness campaigns, and monitoring and evaluation.

- a) **Legislative Review:** To effectively control drug abuse in Nigeria, the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs needs to undertake a legislative review. This strategy is crucial for ensuring that appropriate laws and policies are in place to control drug abuse in Nigeria (Ezeonu & Ude, 2018). Through collaboration with relevant government agencies and stakeholders, the Committee can conduct a review of the current laws and policies on drug control, identify gaps, and recommend amendments or new laws to enhance drug control (Ezeonu & Ude, 2018). This strategy can help establish a legal framework for drug control in Nigeria, which will provide a basis for effective oversight by the Committee and improve drug control efforts in the country.
- b) **Capacity Building:** According to Odeyemi (2019), the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs can engage in capacity building activities for its members and staff to strengthen its oversight

functions. This strategy involves providing training to the Committee members and staff on drug control, monitoring and evaluation, and other relevant areas (Odeyemi, 2019). Capacity building will improve the knowledge and skills of the Committee members and staff, which will enhance their capacity to perform oversight functions (Odeyemi, 2019). By building the capacity of its members and staff, the Committee can effectively monitor and evaluate drug control programmes and policies, provide informed recommendations to the government, and ensure the effective implementation of drug control laws and policies.

- c) **Partnership Building:** Establishing partnerships with relevant stakeholders is another critical strategy that the House Committee on Narcotic Drugs can employ to enhance drug control in Nigeria (Ezeonu & Ude, 2018). Such partnerships can include law enforcement agencies, drug control agencies, civil society organizations, and international partners (Ezeonu & Ude, 2018). By collaborating with these stakeholders, the Committee can share information and resources, which will enhance the effectiveness of drug control in Nigeria (Ezeonu & Ude, 2018). This strategy can also promote accountability and transparency in drug control efforts by fostering a culture of information sharing and mutual support among stakeholders.
- d) **Public Awareness Campaign:** According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse (2021) and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (2020), public awareness campaigns can be an effective strategy for preventing drug abuse and promoting drug control. The Committee can engage in public awareness campaigns on the dangers of drug abuse and the need for drug control, which can be done through the media, public lectures, and other channels (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2021; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2020). Such campaigns can increase public knowledge and support for drug control, which in turn can enhance the effectiveness of the Committee's oversight

functions (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2020). No doubt, public awareness campaigns will increase public knowledge and support for drug control, which will enhance the effectiveness of the Committee's oversight functions.

- e) **Monitoring and Evaluation:** Monitoring and evaluation will provide feedback on the effectiveness of drug control and enhance the capacity of the Committee to perform oversight functions. Monitoring and evaluation of drug control activities can be a useful tool in assessing the effectiveness of drug control measures (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2018). The Committee can engage in monitoring and evaluation of drug control activities in Nigeria, which will involve monitoring the implementation of laws and policies on drug control, evaluating the effectiveness of drug control measures, and reporting on the progress made (Federal Ministry of Health, 2019; National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control, 2018). Such monitoring and evaluation activities can provide feedback on the effectiveness of drug control and enhance the capacity of the Committee to perform oversight functions (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2018).

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

This chapter describes the summary of the findings, conclusion, and recommendations made based on the results obtained. To explain, the summary outlines an overview of the study; the conclusion presents a general thesis statement; and the recommendations are geared toward the policy as well as theoretical applications.

5.1. Summary of findings

Committees are, by broad consensus, among the most significant internal organizational features of modern parliaments. Given this, Rule 18 (67) (1) of the Standing Order of the House of Representatives of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2015, as amended) confers legitimacy on the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotics Drugs, which is a type of standing committee (permitted under the provision of section 62 of the 1999 Constitution, as altered). However, there exists a paradox as to the place of the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs as a Principal on one hand, and the focal agencies of government charged with drugs administration governance as agents on the other hand given the gap between the reduction in drug abuse with increased drug usage, etc. based on this, this study assessed the performance of the 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs viz-a-viz the rising drug use concerns in Nigeria.

This study adopted the mixed research design because of its emphasis on qualitative and quantitative data. The purposive sampling procedure was adopted. The research instruments that were used for this study are the sessional reports of the 9th House Committee on Narcotic Drugs and the Interview to be administered to a sampling frame comprising of the House Narcotic Drugs Committee secretariat and its members, Government agencies like NAFDAC and

NDLEA, Ministry of Health, and Civil Society Organization (CSOs). The objective-by-objective approach which outlined the specific research methods based on the objectives was used. Consequently, objective one evaluated the oversight activities of the 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs and their effects on drug administration and governance. Also, objectives three and four identified the factors militating against the performance of the committee as well as suggested strategies that will enhance the performance of the Committee on Narcotic Drugs in the future.

Based on objective one, the 9th House Committee on Narcotics Drugs demonstrates that it exhibited great activity in terms of overseeing related matters. The frequency of Tours/Oversight visits and Seminars/Workshops indicates that the committee was more actively involved in gathering information and insights from experts and stakeholders in the field of drug policy. Additionally, the number of Bills/Motions referred to the committee suggests that the 9th House Committee on Narcotics Drugs played a more significant role in legislative initiatives about drug policy. These findings imply that the 9th House Committee was proactive and engaged in its oversight activities compared to the 8th House Committee, potentially leading to more effective drug policies and programmes.

Additionally, objective one revealed that the oversight activities of the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs, in collaboration with the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), have had significant effects. With the committee's support, there has been an increase in arrests and seizures of dangerous substances, leading to a reduction in drug trafficking and associated crime rates in Nigeria. This achievement is a result of the committee's legislative oversight, ensuring accountability in the NDLEA's operations. While other factors, such as inter-agency collaboration, public awareness campaigns, and improved access to

rehabilitation programmes, have also contributed to these outcomes, the committee's crucial support remains instrumental in the effective execution of drug policies and programmes. Sustaining this partnership between the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs and the NDLEA is essential for further progress in reducing drug abuse and its negative impacts on the country.

Objective two revealed that the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs in Nigeria faces challenges related to funding, jurisdiction, and infrastructure. Limited funds restrict its ability to conduct oversight visits and execute its programmes. The committee's jurisdiction is primarily focused on psychotropic substances, which limits its oversight of other crucial drug policy areas. Additionally, insufficient infrastructure, including office space and equipment, hinders the committee's effective functioning. As a result, objective three concluded that adequate funding, expanded jurisdiction, and improved infrastructure are necessary for the committee to carry out its statutory functions effectively.

5.2. Conclusion

The legislature holds a prominent position in governance as it is responsible for lawmaking, representation, and oversight. In Nigeria's constitutional democracy, the National Assembly fulfils these roles, and it has the authority to appoint committees for various purposes. The committee system is well-established in legislative literature and is even recognized in other countries like the communist Soviet Union. The Nigerian legislature consists of different types of committees, including special committees, standing committees, and joint committees. These committees have distinct mandates and are established at different times. The House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs plays a crucial role in overseeing agencies like

the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) in the governance of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Its significance in this area cannot be overstated.

Overall, the study showed that the 9th House Committee on Narcotic Drugs exhibited great activity in overseeing drug-related matters. The frequency of Tours/Oversight visits and Seminars/Workshops indicates their active involvement in gathering information from experts and stakeholders in drug policy. Also, the number of Bills/Motions referred to the committee suggests a more significant role in legislative initiatives on drug policy. These findings imply that the 9th House Committee was proactive and engaged in its oversight activities, potentially leading to effective drug policies and programmes. However, since humans cannot be divorced from errors, it is essential to secure sufficient funding, expand its jurisdiction, and enhance its infrastructure for the committee to effectively fulfil its statutory functions.

5.3. Recommendations

The study recommends the following:

- a) **Legislative Review:** The House of Representatives should review drug control laws and policies to establish appropriate ones for effective drug control in Nigeria.
- b) **Capacity Building:** Training Committee members and staff in drug control, monitoring and evaluation, and related areas will enhance their knowledge and skills, enabling effective oversight, evaluation of programmes, and informed recommendations for implementation.
- c) **Partnership Building:** Establishing partnerships with stakeholders such as law enforcement agencies, drug control bodies, civil society organizations, and international partners is vital for effective drug control. Collaboration and information sharing will enhance drug control efforts, accountability, and transparency.

- d) **Public Awareness Campaign:** Conducting public awareness campaigns through various channels is essential to prevent drug abuse and promote drug control. Increasing public knowledge and support for drug control through media, lectures, and other means will enhance the Committee's oversight functions.
- e) **Monitoring and Evaluation:** Implementing monitoring and evaluation processes will provide feedback on the effectiveness of drug control measures and strengthen the Committee's oversight capacity. Monitoring the implementation of laws, evaluating measures, and reporting progress will enhance drug control efforts in Nigeria.

REFERENCES

- “Agency” (1999). *Agency*. Retrieved from <http://homepages.uc.edu/~stedmabn/Chapter16.pdf>
- 2015 House of Representatives Standing Rule (as amended).
- Agbedi, F. Y., Allen, F., & Ukachikara, U. O. (2020). Oversight functions of the National Assembly in Nigeria: Issues and Challenges. *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS)*, IV(III), 197-202.
- Arowolo, G. (2010). *Oversight functions of the legislature: An instrument for nation-building*. Retrieved from <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/nauijilj/article/view/138178/127909>
- Asimiyu, A. (2018). *National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies lecture note: Parliamentary Committees in Democracies*. Abuja, Nigeria: Unpublished.
- Blondel, J. (1973). *Comparative legislatures*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Burns, N., & Grove, S. K. (2003). *Understanding nursing research (3rd Ed.)*. Philadelphia: Saunders Press.
- Congressional Research Service [CRS] (2020). *Congressional oversight manual*. Retrieved from <https://crsreports.congress.gov/>
- Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as altered).
- Dan-Azumi, J. (2019). *Legislative Oversight: Concept Benchmark and Best Practices*. A Paper presented at the Orientation programme for members-elect of the 9th National Assembly.
- Dan-Azumi, J. (Ed.). (2015). *Induction manual for legislators (1st Ed.)*. Abuja: National Institute for Legislative Studies, NILS.
- Ejere, O. (2021). Access to justice: Implications of legislative oversight functions in Nigeria. *International Review of Law and Jurisprudence (IRLJ)*, 3(1).
- Ewuim, N. C., Nnamani, D. O., & Eberinwa, O. M. (2014). Legislative oversight and good governance in Nigeria National Assembly: An analysis of Obasanjo and Jonathan Administration. *Review of Public Administration and Management*, 3(6), 140-153.
- Ezeonu, C. T., & Ude, C. M. (2018). Substance abuse control in Nigeria: Any role for the Nigerian House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs? *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Research*, 8(2), 16-28.
- Fashagba, J. Y. (2009). The roles of the committee system in enhancing legislative efficiency in Nigeria: The case of Kwara State House of Assembly. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 10(4).
- Fashagba, J. Y. (2009b). The roles of the committee system in enhancing legislative efficiency in Nigeria: the case of Kwara State house of Assembly. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 10(4), 426-444.
- Fashgba, J. Y. (2009a). Legislative oversight under the Nigerian presidential system. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 15(4), 439-459.
- Federal Ministry of Health. (2019). *National guidelines for opioid use disorder treatment in Nigeria*.

[https://www.health.gov.ng/doc/1st%20Nigeria%20Guidelines%20for%20Opioid%20Use%20Disorder%20Treatment%202018%20\(2\).pdf](https://www.health.gov.ng/doc/1st%20Nigeria%20Guidelines%20for%20Opioid%20Use%20Disorder%20Treatment%202018%20(2).pdf)

- Fortunato, D., Martin, L.W & Vanberg, G. (2017). Committee Chairs and Legislative Review in Parliamentary Democracies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1-13. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123416000673>
- Frolick, C., & Tau, R. J. (2013). *Oversight-A critical role for committees*. Retrieved from <http://www.cpahq.org/CPAHQ/CMDownload.aspx?ContentKey=7055e7ba-2aa4-456e-87ea-8abe13a5352c&ContentItemKey=d6b94b44-a6c1-4295-854d-ee3547f992cf>
- Fukuyama, F. (2004). Why there is no science of public administration. *Journal of International Affairs*. 58, 189-201.
- Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance [DCAF] (2021). *Security sector integrity: Parliamentary oversight*. Retrieved from <https://securitysectorintegrity.com/institutions-and-organisations/parliamentary-oversight/>
- Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces [DCAF] (2012). *Training toolkit for parliamentary staffers*. Geneva, Switzerland: DCAF.
- Griglio, E. (2020). Parliamentary oversight under the Covid-19 emergency: striving against executive dominance. *The Theory and Practice of Legislation*. DOI: 10.1080/20508840.2020.1789935
- Hamalai, L. (Ed.). (2014). *Committees in the Nigerian National Assembly: A study of the performance of legislative functions 2003-2010*. Abuja: National Institute for Legislative Studies (NILS).
- Hendrick, J. M., & Kay, A. (2017). *Form “opening up” to democratic renewal: Deepening public Engagement in Legislative Committees Government and opposition*. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1017/.20>
- House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs (2019). *Sessional report for the 8th Senate*.
- House of Representatives, National Assembly (2017). *Oversight manual*. Abuja: Author.
- Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and ownership structure. *Journal of Financial Economics*. 3, pp. 305-360.
- Kelly, S. (2010). Qualitative interviewing techniques and styles. In I., Bourgeault, R., Dingwall, & R., de Vries, (Eds.), *The sage handbook of qualitative methods in health research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Kindsiko, E., & Poltimäe, H. (2019). The Poor and Embarrassing Cousin to the Gentrified Quantitative Academics: What Determines the Simple Size in Qualitative Interview-Based Organization Studies? *FQS. Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 2(3). Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-20.3.3200>
- Klassen, J. A. (2011). *Separation of powers*. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328216540_Separation_of_Powers?enrichId=rg

req-bda52079d356271271d459ffc22b1027-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzMyODIxNjU0MDtBUzo5NTUwNTQ1NTkzMzg0OTdAMTYwNDcxNDElOTg5OA%3D%3D&el=1_x_2&esc=publicationCoverPdf

- Kraai, S. D. (2018). *An analysis of oversight mechanisms to promote good governance: the case of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Pretoria).
- Legislative Research Council [LRC] (2018). *The legislative committee*. Retrieved from <http://sdlegislature.gov/docs/studentspage/studentguide/StudentReferenceSeries6.pdf>
- Legislative Research Council [LRC] (2018). *The legislative committee*. Retrieved from <http://sdlegislature.gov/docs/studentspage/studentguide/StudentReferenceSeries6.pdf>
- Momodu, A. J., & Matudi, G. I. (2013). The implications of executive-legislative conflicts on good governance in Nigeria. *Public Policy and Administration Research*, 3(8), 30-42.
- National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control. (2018). *Guidelines for the establishment of drug treatment centres in Nigeria*. <https://www.nafdac.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Guidelines-for-the-Establishment-of-Drug-Treatment-Centres-in-Nigeria.pdf>
- National Democratic Institute for International Affairs [NDI] (1996). Committees in legislatures: A division of labour. *Legislative Research Series*, 2.
- National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (2015). National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 2015 Annual Report.
- National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (2016). National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 2016 Annual Report.
- National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (2017). National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 2017 Annual Report.
- National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (2018). National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 2018 Annual Report.
- National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (2019). National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 2019 Annual Report.
- National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (2020). National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 2020 Annual Report.
- National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (2020). National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 2020 Annual Report.
- National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (2021). National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 2021 Annual Report.
- National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (2022). National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 2022 Annual Report.

- National Drug Law Enforcement Agency. (2019). *Strategic five-year plan (2019-2023)*. <https://www.ndlea.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/NDLEA-Strategic-5-Year-Plan-2019-2023.pdf>
- National Drug Law Enforcement Agency. (2019). *Strategic five-year plan (2019-2023)*. <https://www.ndlea.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/NDLEA-Strategic-5-Year-Plan-2019-2023.pdf>
- National Institute on Drug Abuse. (2021). *Principles of drug addiction treatment: A research-based guide (third edition)*. <https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/principles-drug-addiction-treatment-research-based-guide-third-edition/evidence-based-approaches-to-drug-addiction-treatment/pharmacotherapi-1>
- Nwogwugwu, N., & Ishola, A. (2019). Legislators and their oversight functions in policy implementation in Nigeria. *International Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Education (IJHSSE)*, 3(6), 93-102.
- Nwosu, M. A. (2014). *Committee system in the Nigerian legislature*. Abuja: National Library of Nigeria.
- Odeyemi, I. A. (2019). Legislative oversight and the Nigerian House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs: A critique. *The Nigerian Journal of Sociology and Anthropology*, 17(2), 137-150.
- Ojogwu, E. C., & Ashiekaa, C. V. (Eds.). (2011). *National Assembly committee handbook*. Abuja: National Assembly.
- Omejec, J. (2015). *Principle of the separation of powers and the constitutional justice system*. Retrieved from [https://bib.irb.hr/datoteka/785200.Omejec - Separation of Powers and Constitutional Judiciary - Strasbourg 28.10.pdf](https://bib.irb.hr/datoteka/785200.Omejec_-_Separation_of_Powers_and_Constitutional_Judiciary_-_Strasbourg_28.10.pdf)
- Omotoso, F., & Oladeji, O. (2019). Legislative oversight in the Nigerian Fourth Republic. In J. Y., Fashgba (Eds.), *The Nigerian National Assembly, advances in African economic, social, and political development*. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11905-8_4
- Onyango, G. (2020). Legislative oversight and policy-reforms in “unsettled” political contexts of public administration. *International journal of public administration*, 43(3), 213-228.
- Palinkas, L. A., Horwitz, S. M., & Green, C. A. (2015). Purposeful sampling for qualitative data collection and analysis in mixed method implementation research. *Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services Research*, 42(5), 533–544.
- Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre [PLAC] (2016). *Guide to Legislative Oversight in the National Assembly*. Abuja: Author.
- Punch, K. (2004). *Developing effective research proposals*. London: Sage Publications.
- Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. (2020). *Prevention of substance abuse and mental illness*. <https://www.samhsa.gov/prevention>
- Taylor, M. (2017). *Cap-and-trade extension: Issues for legislative oversight*. Canada: Legislative Analyst’s Office.
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2016). *Recommended methods for the identification and analysis of amphetamine, methamphetamine, and their ring-substituted analogues in*

seized materials (No. ST/NAR/48/Rev.1).
https://www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/ST-NAR-48-Rev-1-NPS_recommended_methods.pdf

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2018). *International standards for drug use prevention*.

https://www.unodc.org/documents/prevention/UNODC_International_Standards_English_web.pdf

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2019). *World drug report 2019*.
https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2019/prelaunch/WDR19_Booklet_5_INFRASTRUCTURE.pdf

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2020). *World drug report 2020*.
<https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2020/en/>

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2021). *Drug use in Nigeria*.
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Drugs/Drug_Use_Survey_Nigeria_2019_BOOK.pdf

Woodrow, W. (1885). *Congressional Government*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

World Bank, WB (2007). *Parliamentary committees in democracies*. Retrieved from
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/CommitteesUnit1.pdf>

Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth & Advancement Africa Centre for Legislative Engagement [YIAGA-CLE] (2019). Scorecard of the 8th National Assembly and lessons for the 9th National Assembly. Retrieved from <https://eusdgn.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Scorecard-of-the-8th-NASS-and-Lessons-for-the-9th-NASS.pdf>

APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW REQUEST (NATIONAL ASSEMBLY)

I am a research student of the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies (NILDS), pursuing a Master's Degree in Legislative Studies (MLS). This interview is designed for the study: *Oversight Performance of the 8th and 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotics Drugs*. The interview will cover thematic areas represented by the following questions:

- 1) Given your vast knowledge of the workings of government MDAs and the legislature, please share your experience of oversight.
- 2) Will you say that the oversight activities of the 8th and 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs were effective in the administration of narcotic drug governance?
- 3) In what areas are the oversight activities of the committee most impactful?
- 4) How did the oversight activities of the 8th and 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs address drug concerns in Nigeria?
- 5) What were the deficiencies in the performance of oversight by the 8th and 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs?
- 6) How can the deficiencies that impacted the performance of oversight by the 8th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs be mitigated in the future?

I will be glad to be invited at your convenient time to record your opinion on the highlighted areas. However, following your busy schedule, a written response will also suffice.

Yours Sincerely,

Abdullahi, Abba Kabir

07032809089

PG/NLS/2015030

APPENDIX II
INTERVIEW REQUEST (CSOs)

I am a research student of the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies (NILDS), pursuing a Master's Degree in Legislative Studies (MLS). This interview is designed for the study: *Oversight Performance of the 8th and 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotics Drugs*. The interview will cover thematic areas represented by the following questions:

- 7) How will you describe the workings of government MDAs and the legislature?
- 8) Are you conversant with the oversight activities of the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs?
- 9) How will you rate the oversight activities of the 8th and 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs were effective in the administration of narcotic drug governance?
- 10) Are there areas you consider the oversight activities of the committee most impactful?
- 11) Did the oversight activities of the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs address drug concerns in Nigeria?
- 12) In what ways did it address drug related issues?
- 13) What are the obstacles to the performance of oversight by the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs?
- 14) How can the obstacles be resolved to improve the performance of oversight by the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs in the future?

I will be glad to be invited at your convenient time to record your opinion on the highlighted areas. However, following your busy schedule, a written response will also suffice.

Yours Sincerely,

Abdullahi, Abba Kabir

07032809089

PG/NLS/2015030

APPENDIX III

INTERVIEW REQUEST (DRUG-RELATED AGENCIES)

I am a research student of the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies (NILDS), pursuing a Master's Degree in Legislative Studies (MLS). This interview is designed for the study: *Oversight Performance of the 8th and 9th House of Representatives Committee on Narcotics Drugs*. The interview will cover thematic areas represented by the following questions:

- 15) Do you have an experience with the relationship between your agency and the legislature concerning oversight?
- 16) Have the oversight activities of the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs been effective in the administration of narcotic drug governance?
- 17) What areas did the oversight activities of the committee impact most on your agency or ministry?
- 18) Did the oversight activities of the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs address drug issues in Nigeria?
- 19) Highlight specific cases where the oversight activity of the committee addressed drug concerns.
- 20) What are the challenges to the performance of oversight by the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs?
- 21) How can the challenges be resolved to improve the performance of the House of Representatives Committee on Narcotic Drugs in the future?

I will be glad to be invited at your convenient time to record your opinion on the highlighted areas. However, following your busy schedule, a written response will also suffice.

Yours Sincerely,

Abdullahi, Abba Kabir

07032809089

PG/NLS/2015030