

**Article**

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**Legislative Effectiveness in  
Nigeria's National Assembly: An  
Institutional Assessment Approach**

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## Abstract

Over the years, legislative scholars have designed different approaches, indicators, benchmarks and assessment toolkits for evaluating the legislature. These range from self-assessment guide to minimum criteria for legislative performance. However, the applications of these assessment toolkits seem difficult in evaluating the Nigerian legislature. It is against this backdrop that this paper employed a modification and domestication of Volden and Wiseman's LES model to come up with a measuring toolkit: ILES Model suitable for comparative evaluation of the Nigerian legislature using institutional approach. The ILES model was used to evaluate the National Assembly over three Assemblies and the findings show that the Nigerian legislature was ineffective during the 4th Assembly and fairly effective during the 5th and 6th Assemblies. Based on the volume of Bills processed, the paper concluded that the National Assembly has a high prospect to perform better. Thus, the paper recommended, among others, a robust capacity building for lawmakers especially on how to push Bills through the legislative cycle to become laws that will impact positively on the people.

Key-Words: Legislative effectiveness, Institutionalism, Assessment benchmark, Lawmaking, National Assembly.

## Introduction

The legislature symbolizes the existence of democracy. Fish (2006) argued that the effectiveness status of the legislature determines the status of democracy. If the legislature of a country is strong, the democracy of that country is bound to be strong. The fundamental question is: how can we measure the effectiveness of a legislature in order to know how strong or weak such a legislature is? Scholars, analysts, development partners and

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legislative practitioners have come to realise the need to constantly and continuously evaluate the legislature in attempts to deepen democratic process (Barkan, 2010; Okoosi-Simbine, 2010; Fish & Kroenig, 2009; Cox & William, 2008; Zwingina, 2006). The motivating factor for this belief stems out of the centrality of the legislature to democratic experiences. In fact, it is arguable that democracy is inconceivable without the legislature, as the tenets of democracy are construed around the legislature. Perhaps, it is in light of this that Bello-Imam (2004) asserted that any attack against the legislature is a blow against democracy.

The essence of evaluating the legislature is to establish the level at which the institution fosters democratic sustenance or its extent at exposing democratic rule to the threat of truncation, especially in the developing countries. In all democracies, citizens are always interested in the performance level of their legislators in advancing the interests of the constituencies on the floor of the House and the numbers of developmental benefits the legislators are able to attract to their constituencies. Premised on this, the legislators began to give priority to serving the interests of their constituents in order to win their sympathy for re-election. This coherent trajectory stimulated scholarship interests in evaluating the legislature thus leading to the emergence of the concept of “legislative effectiveness.”

Since the 1970s when the concept of “legislative effectiveness” gained traction, different approaches, indicators, benchmarks and assessment toolkits for evaluating the legislature have been put forward by scholars. These range from self-assessment guide to minimum criteria for legislative performance. Legislatures across the globe, especially in the developed democracies, have institutionalised these assessment toolkits and periodic evaluations have become more of tradition. However, the reverse is the case in developing democracies as most legislatures especially in Africa detest evaluation and the legislators are most willing to frustrate any attempt at evaluating them. More worrisome is the fact that most of the developed assessment toolkits are not applicable in these developing democracies given the differences existing across the legislatures and the specificity of the political environment where the legislatures operate.

In view of these disheartening experiences in Africa, efforts have been put into the development of workable assessment toolkits to evaluate legislatures in Africa. While these efforts are yielding fruitful outcomes, there are enormous gaps in the process. The developers of most of the African-specified assessment toolkits in picking their case studies, for instance, usually snub Nigeria despite having the biggest legislature on the continent. The underlying assumptions and variables of the assessment toolkits are usually not applicable given the country's socio-political specificity. It is expected that Nigeria should have been the adorable bride to the developers as any toolkit developed on the specification of the country is likely to work in most (if not all) developing democracies. It is against this backdrop that this paper examined a number of these assessment toolkits with the objective of developing an applicable toolkit suitable for evaluating the legislature in Nigeria especially in the aspect of the performance of its lawmaking function.

### **The Concept of Legislative Effectiveness**

Scholarly works on "legislative effectiveness" has its origin in the United States and can be traced to the 1970s. In his classic work, Mayhew (1974) attempted to identify the factors that can guarantee an incumbent parliamentarian his or her seat in the next election. He examined the electoral connection in Congress and discovered that incumbents Congressmen were extremely sensitive to the potential electoral implications of their votes, and as a result, behave strategically when announcing a position on a roll-call vote. In essence, the electorate will only return a legislator if s/he is seen to be effective in the parliament; thus legislative performance is largely motivated by re-election.

What is central to the conceptualization of the term by these scholars is the fact that legislative effectiveness depends crucially on the ability of elected representatives to take the issues that are important to their constituents and to translate them into public policy. Volden and Wiseman (2013) argued that it is the varying abilities of legislators to advance their legislative agendas,

based on their personal aptitude and on their institutional positions that determined their position in the legislative effectiveness ranking. From this analysis, it can be deduced that the systematic differences across members in advancing agenda items can help us to understand the internal workings of the legislature and subsequently venture into the inquiry on why some legislators are more “effective” than others.

### **Problems of Measuring Legislative Effectiveness and the Methods Adopted**

Having popularised the term in the global political analysis (by the above mentioned scholarly efforts), the consequence was contesting whether legislative effectiveness can be determined through assessment of the individual legislators or the parliament as a whole. This, as earlier noted, led to the proliferation of indicators and benchmark such as the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association’s (CPA) Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures; the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs’ (NDI) Minimum Standards Assessment Survey; the Inter-parliamentary Union’s (IPU) Self-Assessment Toolkit for Parliaments; the Parliamentary Centre’s Parliamentary Report Cards; the International IDEA’s State of Democracy Assessment Methodology, among others, for measuring parliaments’ effective.

The tools/instruments for measuring individual legislator’s effectiveness include: PRS Legislative Research Service developed in India; Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) developed in Pakistan; Africa Leadership Institute- AFLI Parliamentary Scorecard developed in Uganda; Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) developed in the United States by Craig Volden and Allan Wiseman, among others. Despite the efforts of the World Bank Institute and the Griffith University by organizing a workshop on September 21-24, 2008 in Brisbane, Australia with the theme: “Workshop on Legislative Benchmark and Indicators;” where participants shared approaches, methodologies and results, and discussed whether a new holistic framework to measure

the legislature's capacity or performance could (or should) be established, no consensus was achieved on a unified benchmark and indicator owing to the fact that there was no unified resemblance of the status, function, institutional framework, membership composition of the legislature and, most importantly, the system of government in all democracies. Consequently, difficulties emerged in developing appropriate indicators that could fit into all case studies.

There are fundamental methodological problems facing scholars, practitioners, donors and politicians in measuring legislative effectiveness globally. These methodological problems emerged from varying epistemological standpoints. Scholars attempted to measure legislative effectiveness from different standpoints depending on their perception of what to measure, how to measure, what method and tool to adopt in measuring an intangible variable such as legislative effectiveness. Some scholars of comparative legislature (Volden and Wiseman, 2013; Cox and William, 2008; Adcock and Collier, 2001) argued that measuring legislative effectiveness is best done by measuring individual legislative effectiveness while others (Fish, 2006; Fish and Kroenig, 2006) argued for measuring the effectiveness of the legislature as an institution.

However, in Nigeria, scholarly efforts on studies of the effectiveness of the Nigerian legislature are highly appreciable. Before the emergence of the Fourth Republic in 1999, it was difficult to do any meaningful analysis of the lawmaking institution owing to the fact that the history of Nigeria's legislature had been riddled with disruptions, reinstatements and reforms, all of which left it without any strong, deeply engrained legislative tradition, institutional memory, norms, practices and procedures. The experience that the four times (First to the Fourth Republic) has sprung back into life, is that the process of setting down roots must begin afresh. However, for the first time in independent Nigeria, the National Assembly has witnessed about two decades of uninterrupted legislative activities from 1999 to 2003 (4thAssembly), 2003 to 2007 (5thAssembly), 2007 to 2011 (6thAssembly), 2011 to 2015 (7thAssembly), 2015 to 2019 (8thAssembly) and the current 9thAssembly (2019 and ongoing). This has prepared the ground on which

to base performance assessment. It is against this backdrop that scholars began to measure the progression of the legislative branch of Nigeria's evolving democratic government.

Ekor, Katz and Iweala (2014) attempted to fill this gap by domesticating the model of Volden and Wiseman (2009 and 2013) to study individual legislative effectiveness of Senators in the 6th Assembly. Ekor, Katz and Iweala (2014) came up with a framework for legislative effectiveness and also modified the LES model retaining most of the LES components and weighting system. As novel as this effort was, two gaps were observed. First, the analysis was limited to the Senate leaving out the House of Representatives. Perhaps, they followed the style of Volden and Wiseman who also used the LES model to study the United States' House of Representatives leaving out the Senate. Second, Ekor, Katz and Iweala (2014) only studied 43 Senators between 2007 and 2008 which, in our view, may not be enough to generalise the effectiveness level of the Senate in particular and the National Assembly in general. We believe it may have been better if the entire 109 Senators of the 6th Assembly are studied over the four-year period. This paper attempts to fill these gaps in the course of the analysis.

### **Evaluating the Legislature in Nigeria: The Institutional Legislative Effectiveness Score (ILES)**

This paper concurs with the fact that there are numerous legislative assessment toolkits but found solace in Volden and Wiseman's (2009 and 2013) Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) model to evaluate the legislature in Nigeria. Volden and Wiseman (2013) used the model to assess individual legislative effectiveness in the United States House of Representatives over eighteen Congresses. The proponents acknowledged three limitations to the model regarding its usage and this makes it directly inapplicable in the context of Nigeria. First, the LES model is used to assess individual legislative effectiveness and second, it is limited to one chamber (House of Representatives). Third, there are variables and information used in the

model that is not readily available and applicable in Nigeria. An example is classification of Bills by significance.

Minding these limitations, we modified the model to come up with a new version entitled “Institutional Legislative Effectiveness Score (ILES)” which is capable of assessing institutional effectiveness of both chambers in Nigeria’s National Assembly. The ILES aggregates the variables/information of all individual legislators to stand for the chamber as a unit (i.e. the study calculates the ILES for each chamber). In doing this, four indicators of effectiveness were combined to form the single measuring toolkit (i.e. ILES Model). The first indicator considers how many Bills were read the first time regardless of whether they were executive or members’ Bills. This is premised on three factors. One, the paper adopts institutionalism approach and not individualism approach. Two, Bill sponsorship is overlooked because it may come either as a member, executive or concurrent Bill. Three, there are some sponsored Bills submitted to the Committees on Rules and Business which the sponsor(s) had no intention of passing other than for record purposes that they sponsored such Bills. Such Bills were never followed up and the Committees on Rules and Business never slated them for first reading. The second indicator considers Bills that were read the second time, debated and successfully committed to the appropriate Committee(s). The third indicator considers Bills that received action in both Standing Committee and the Committee of the Whole House. Finally, the fourth indicator considers Bills that successfully went through the Committee of the Whole and were passed at the third reading.

In future studies of single chamber or unicameral legislature, the ILES will have five indicators. The model is specifically drawn to assess institutional legislative effectiveness as against that of Volden and Wiseman that assesses individual legislative effectiveness. This is shown in equations 1 and 2:



**ILES Model**

$$ILES_{it} = \frac{\delta}{N} \dots \dots \dots \text{equation 1}$$

where:

$$\delta = \left( \frac{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^N 1st R_{ej} + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N 2nd R_{ej} + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^N 3rd R_{ej} + \lambda \sum_{j=1}^N PAS S_{ej}}{\dots} \right) \left( \frac{x}{N} \right)$$

.....equation2

and where:

δ: the value of numerator of the ILES

α: is the weight assigned to Bills read the first time, i.e. 1

β: is the weight assigned to Bills read the second time, i.e. 2

γ: is the weight assigned to Bills read the third time, i.e. 4

λ: is the weight assigned to Bills read the third time, i.e. 8

i: each chamber (i.e. House of Representatives or Senate)

t: each Assembly (i.e. 4th, 5th or 6th Assembly)

e: all chambers under review

j: all Assemblies

ej: all chambers in all Assemblies

it: each chamber in each Assembly

N: number of indicators

x: number of Assemblies

$\sum_{j=1}^N$  : the sum of Bills taking all variables into consideration.

1stR: Bills read the first time

2ndR: Bills read the second time

3rdR: Bills read the third time

PASS: Bills passed by the parliament for presidential assent.

The ILES for each chamber is calculated by dividing the cumulative value of  $\delta$  with the number of indicators. The reason for this is to make the model flexible and amenable to change where the indicators are more than four (as used in this study). In addition, the overall weighting of  $\delta/N$  will normalise the value of ILES to be greater than 0 but less than or equal to 1 as thus:

$$0 \leq ILES \leq 1$$

The assumption is that no matter the situation or prevailing circumstance in any democracy (where the legislature is under review), each indicator is a value greater or equal to 0 as thus:

$$n \geq 0$$

where  $n$  is one indicator and  $N$  is the total number of indicators

The essence of this is to bring the model to situate under the basic rule of correlation coefficient that the value of  $r$  is equal to or less than 1. This will make it possible for us to adopt “Measures of Agreement” to formulate standard and global benchmark to be used to ascertain the effectiveness level and interpretation of ILES result. On the other hand,  $\delta$  is calculated by the four large fractioned terms, each representing one indicator. The value of  $\delta$  represents the fraction of each chamber’s (it) Bills read the first time (1); the second time (2); third time (3); and passed (4) relative to  $x$  (all Assemblies) under review. The four terms (indicators) were weighted by  $\alpha=1, \beta=2, \gamma=4$  and  $\lambda = 8$ . These weights were chosen to reflect the view

that advancing a Bill through the four stages becomes more difficult in progress from the early stage to subsequent stages (as also done by Volden and Wiseman). The rule of weighting is premised on subsequent stage attracting twice the value of the previous stage. Thus, a chamber or Assembly that introduces a large number of Bills but failed to push them through the legislative process will receive a relatively low ILES while the one that is able to advance its Bills to the last stage will receive high ILES.

There are a number of features in the model that should be noted. First, the model is comparatively inclined with the inverse relationship among the variables under comparison. The ILES of one Assembly is greatly determined by the output of other Assemblies in the fraction i.e. the higher the ILES of one Assembly the lower the ILES of others. The model rewards hard-work especially at the later stage of the lawmaking process due to the weighting system. Second, the value of  $\delta$  can be greater than 1 but the ILES value cannot be greater than 1 as a result of the normalizing factor. This makes the Measures of Agreement (benchmark) to be inevitable. Third, the model displays variation ranging from poorly ineffective to perfectly effective. The scores for the Assemblies under review can be situated within the measuring scale. Fourth, the ILES value can be subjected to a further large fraction especially when it is used to assess a bicameral legislature. In this case, in order to be able to do a horizontal comparison i.e. comparing Assemblies by merging the two chambers of an Assembly as a single entity, equation 3 (which is a complementary model) is adopted:

**Assembly Average ILES**

$$x_i = \frac{"HoR"ILES + "Sen"ILES}{2} \dots\dots\dots \text{equation 3}$$

where  $x_i$  is both chambers of an Assembly.

The ILES of the House of Representatives (depicted as “HoR” ILES) is summed up with the ILES of the Senate (depicted as “Sen” ILES) and the value is divided by 2 to find the average effectiveness score of the Assembly. The scores of all Assemblies are compared to know which is more effective than others. The average score is also used to plot a line graph to see the effectiveness direction. Finally, whether the comparison is made horizontally or vertically, the variation in the scores can further be subjected to a “value of significance” using a t-test to examine the degree of significance. This will enable a technical and in-depth understanding of the variation beyond the face values thereby assisting in easy identification of all variables that contribute to the effectiveness or otherwise of the legislature.

### **Legislative Effectiveness Benchmark (ILES’s Measures of Agreement)**

The significance of the ILES model will not be fully appreciated without a benchmark. The benchmark will enable us to interpret both the ILES and its average to identify their places in the variation range. In light of this, an acceptable benchmark is inevitable. This paper drew its benchmark using “Measure of Agreement.” Historically, the first measure of agreement was proposed by Cohen (1960) known as “kappa measure of agreement” which measures the proportion of agreement between two raters and serves as an adjustment for agreement by chance, as defined under independence. Also, Jolayemi (1990) developed a measure of agreement by  $\tau$  where  $-1 \leq \tau \leq 1$  (i.e.  $\tau$  is greater than  $-1$  but less than  $1$ ) using  $\lambda$  as an R2-type statistic and  $X^2$  which is the value of Pearson’s goodness-of-fit test statistic under the model of independence. His classification of agreement range from “poor” to “almost perfect” as follows:

$$|\tau| = \begin{cases} 0.00 - 0.20 & \text{Poor} \\ 0.21 - 0.40 & \text{Slight} \\ 0.41 - 0.60 & \text{Moderate} \\ 0.61 - 0.81 & \text{Substantial} \\ > 0.81 & \text{Almost perfect} \end{cases}$$

Relying on Jolayemi (1990)'s  $R^2$ -type statistic and  $X^2$  value of Pearson's goodness-of-fit test statistic under the model of independence, we modified the above classification to serve as our Legislative Effectiveness Benchmark as thus:

$$|\tau| = \begin{cases} 0.00 - 0.10 & \text{Poorly ineffective} \\ 0.11 - 0.20 & \text{Ineffective} \\ 0.21 - 0.40 & \text{Fairly effective} \\ 0.41 - 0.60 & \text{Effective} \\ 0.61 - 0.80 & \text{Substantially effective} \\ > 0.80 & \text{Perfectly effective} \end{cases}$$

The above benchmark is a result of several analyses. The ILES model was pilot-tested with numerous possible hypothetical data. The results were subjected to Jolayemi's model and the modification was done in line with the assumption of the ILES model and observed trajectory. The reason for adopting Jolayemi's version among several others stems from the fact that it suits the specificity of this research's design. The overall weighting of the value of ILES, for instance, is greater than 0 but less than or equal to 1 (i.e.  $0 \leq \text{ILES} \leq 1$ ) likewise that of Jolayemi where  $-1 \leq \tau \leq 1$  (i.e.  $\tau$  is greater than -1 but less than 1).

### **Adopting ILES to Evaluate the Legislative Effectiveness of the Nigerian National Assembly**

In applying the ILES as an evaluating tool, information on all Bills between 1999 and 2011 spanning three legislative Assemblies was collected and all the Bills were tracked through the Bill progression report of the Committees on Rules and Business of the three Assemblies as well as the reports of the Clerks. A number of key issues were identified. First, a comparative analysis of the performances of the 4th, 5th and 6th Assemblies in terms of Bills processing and passage was done. Second, using the ILES model, a directional graph (line chart) was plotted with the score to show the level and pattern of the effectiveness of the three Assemblies. Finally, comparing both percentages on average over time (1999-2011) enabled the researcher

to identify the chamber that had more capacity in Bill pushing through the four stages (indicators). However, the researcher recognised that the indicator is not all-encompassing as it set aside other functions of the legislature that could have made up the assessment process. This will be tried in further studies.

## **Data Analysis**

### **A. Evaluating the Lawmaking Effectiveness of the National Assembly: the ILES Model Approach**

The ILES model is used to assess the lawmaking effectiveness of the 4th, 5th and 6th National Assembly. It is pertinent to note that the model is not interested in the number of Bills received by each chamber rather, the number of Bills that passed through the legislative cycle. Hence, importance is attached to those Bills that go beyond mere receipt but were slated for legislative actions from the first reading stage to the final Bill passage stage.

#### **i. Senate**

Out of the 250 Bills received by the 4th Senate, 227 Bills were read the first time. This shows that 23 Bills were never processed beyond receipt stage. In other words, the 23 Bills never made it to the floor of the Senate. However, out of the 227 Bills that passed through the first reading, 138 Bills scaled through and were read the second time. By implication, 89 Bills were killed after the first reading and never made it beyond the first stage of the legislative cycle. During debates, Committee stage, public hearing (for controversial or of sufficient importance) and the Committee of the Whole, 14 Bills were killed leaving 124 Bills to move to the third reading stage. However, only 64 Bills made it to the final stage and were passed by the 4th Senate. It was discovered that 3 Bills were voluntarily withdrawn by the sponsors out of all the 163 Bills killed. The assessment of the lawmaking effectiveness of the 5th Senate shows that 377 Bills were read the first time,

out of the 446 Bills received. This shows that 69 Bills were never slated by the Senate Committee on Rules and Business for legislative actions. 270 Bills were read the second time and 222 Bills were read the third time signifying that 107 Bills and 48 Bills were killed during the second and third readings, respectively. Out of these, 11 Bills were withdrawn. However, only 129 Bills were passed out of the 222 Bills that made it to the final stage. This shows that 93 Bills were killed after the third reading.

The 6th Senate received 477 Bills and 463 Bills were read the first time. This shows that 14 Bills were not processed beyond the receipt stage. Almost half of the Bills read the first time never made it to the second stage as 228 Bills were killed after the first reading leaving the number of Bills read the second time at 235 Bills. The same trend continued during the third reading as 140 Bills were read the third time. During these stages, 12 Bills were withdrawn by the sponsors and others were killed. The final stage was not exempted from the trend as only 72 Bills out of the 140 Bills were passed. This brings the total number of Bills killed to 379 Bills. Adding this to the 12 Bills withdrawn shows that 391 did not scale through the lawmaking cycle. The foregoing data is subjected to ILES analysis as shown in figure 1:

**Figure 1: ILES Analysis of the Lawmaking Effectiveness of the 4th, 5th and 6th Senate**

Senate			
Assembly	4th	5th	6th
1st Reading	227	377	463
2nd Reading	138	270	235
3rd Reading	124	222	140
Passed	64	129	72
<b>Assembly</b>	<b>ILES (Effectiveness Score):</b>		<b>Interpretation:</b>
<b>4th</b>	0.17325348		<i>Ineffective</i>
<b>5th</b>	0.32190305		<i>Fairly Effective</i>
<b>6th</b>	0.2548435		<i>Fairly Effective</i>

Source: Author’s computation with data from NILS, 2013; using ILES Model Application

Subjecting these data to the ILES model as shown in Figure 1, the 4th Senate scored 0.17 against the 0.32 effectiveness score of the 5th Senate, while the 6th Senate scored 0.26. The interpretation of the scores based on the modified Jolayemi (1990)'s R<sup>2</sup>-type statistic and X<sup>2</sup> value of Pearson's goodness-of-fit test (Measure of Agreement), shows that the 4th Senate was ineffective while both 5th and 6th Senate were fairly effective.

## ii. House of Representatives

The 4th House of Representatives received 325 Bills, out of which 321 Bills were read the first time. This shows that only 4 Bills were never processed beyond receipt stage. However, out of the 321 Bills that passed through the first reading, 225 Bills scaled through and were read the second time, leaving the number of Bills killed at 96 Bills after the first reading. 214 Bills were read the third time showing that only 8 Bills were killed during debates, Committee stage, public hearing and the Committee of the Whole. However, more than half of the Bills read the third time were never passed as only 103 Bills made it to the final stage and were passed by the 4th House of Representatives. In all, 208 Bills were killed during the four stages and 10 Bills withdrawn by the sponsors totaling 218 Bills that never made it through the legislative cycle. The 5th House brought about a change in the lawmaking trajectory as all the 343 Bills received were read the first time. However, not all the Bills made it to the second stage as 256 Bills were read the second time making 87 Bills that were killed during the second reading. 248 Bills were read the third time showing that only 8 Bills were killed in the process. Out of the 248 Bills, only 168 Bills were passed signifying that 80 Bills were killed during the final stage. From the 343 Bills received, 168 Bills were passed, 15 Bills withdrawn and 160 Bills killed. Therefore, 175 Bills were not passed during the 5th House of Representatives.

The 6th House followed the trend of the 5th House. All the 503 Bills received were slated for legislative action by the House Committee on Business and Rules and were read the first time. Out of these Bills, only 377 Bills were read the second time. Some Bills were killed at the third stage as 301 Bills were read the third time. However, only 152 Bills were passed



at the final stage. This shows that 351 Bills (comprising 7 withdrawn Bills and 344 killed Bills) were not passed during the lawmaking cycle of the 6th House. Figure 2 shows the ILES analysis of the lawmaking effectiveness of the House over the period under review:

**Figure 2: ILES Analysis of the Lawmaking Effectiveness of the 4th, 5th and 6th House of Representatives**

House of Representatives			
Assembly	4th	5th	6th
1st Reading	321	343	503
2nd Reading	225	256	377
3rd Reading	214	248	301
Passed	103	168	152
<b>Assembly</b>	<b>ILES (Effectiveness Score):</b>		<b>Interpretation:</b>
<b>4th</b>	0.19898862		<i>Ineffective</i>
<b>5th</b>	0.24646503		<i>Fairly Effective</i>
<b>6th</b>	0.30454633		<i>Fairly Effective</i>

**Source:** Source: Author's computation with data from NILS, 2013; using ILES Model Application

- A. From figure 2, the 4th House scored 0.2 inferring that the Assembly was ineffective in lawmaking. The 5th House scored 0.25 and the 6th House earned 0.31, indicating that both Assemblies were fairly effective.
- B. Average ILES Analysis of the Lawmaking Effectiveness of the 4th, 5th and 6th Assemblies


Having identified the effectiveness status of each chamber over the three Assemblies, we also need to find out the effectiveness status of each Assembly by combining the scores of the two chambers that made up each Assembly. The essence of this is to empirically state whether or not the National Assembly is effective in lawmaking at a particular point in time; compare the performance status over time; and give an explanation

of the causal factors of the identified trend. It should be noted that giving effectiveness status of each chamber may not suffice to pronounce the effectiveness level of the National Assembly. This is because both chambers are two sides of the same coin. Since Nigeria operates a bi-cameral legislature, the legislative output of one chamber (Bills) is subject to an identical passage in the other chamber. No matter the number of Bills passed by one chamber, such cannot be enrolled for executive assent until passed by the other chamber in identical form. This means that the performance status of one is attached to that of the other. In addition, the two chambers are seen administratively as one institution operating a single budget, staff control and identical procedural pattern. Thus, the combination of the scores using average analysis is inevitable.

#### 4th National Assembly

From the foregoing analysis, the 4th Senate scored 0.17, while the House of Representatives counterpart scored 0.2. Using the Average ILES model, the ILES value for the 4th National Assembly is 0.19. This is shown in figure 3:

**Figure 3: Average ILES of 4th National Assembly**



**Interpretation:** *Ineffective*


Source: Author's computation with data from NILES, 2013; using ILES Model Application

Subjecting the effectiveness score of the 4th National Assembly to our measure of agreement (benchmark) as can be seen from figure 3, we can empirically posit that the 4th National Assembly was ineffective in lawmaking.

### 5th National Assembly

The Average ILES value of the 5th National Assembly is 0.29. While the Senate scored 0.32, the House of Representatives scored 0.25. This is shown in figure 4:

**Figure 4: Average ILES of 5th National Assembly**



**Interpretation:** *Fairly Effective*


**Source:** Author's computation with data from NILS, 2013; using ILES Model Application

By interpretation based on our benchmark, we can empirically posit that the 5th National Assembly was fairly effective in lawmaking.

### 6th National Assembly

Going by the performances of the 6th Senate and House of Representatives, the 6th National Assembly earned 0.29 from the ILES of 0.26 and 0.31 of both chambers, respectively. This is shown in figure 5:

**Figure 5: Average ILES of 6th National Assembly**



**Interpretation:** *Fairly Effective*

**Source:** Author's computation with data from NILS, 2013; using ILES Model Application

In view of the foregoing, the 6th National Assembly is fairly effective in lawmaking.

### D. Aggregate Lawmaking Performance of the National Assembly (1999-2011)

In order to get the aggregate lawmaking performance of the National Assembly, the study finds the average score of the three Assemblies. This is shown below:

$$\frac{0.19 + 0.29 + 0.29}{3} = 0.27$$

On a general perspective, we find the average effectiveness score of the National Assembly to be 0.27 for the period spanning 1999 to 2011. Situating this on the legislative effectiveness benchmark, the paper empirically posits that the National Assembly was fairly effective in lawmaking under the periods of study.


### **Discussion of Findings**

Subjecting the gathered data to ILES analysis, the paper discovered that not all received Bills were slated for legislative floor actions (which begin with first reading). The 4th Senate, for instance, received 250 Bills out of which 227 Bills were read the first time. Out of the 446 Bills received by the 5th Senate, 377 Bills made it to the first reading and 463 out of 477 Bills received by the 6th Senate received action on the floor of the Senate.

The ILES model not only gives consideration to the number of Bills read the first time from the Bills received, but considers the number of Bills that made it through the four stages (as used as indicators of the model). It would be recalled that we noted that ILES model reward hard-work with regard to the ability of the Assembly to push its Bills through the legislative cycle; thus, we found that the 4th Assemblies of both chambers were ineffective in lawmaking while the 5th and 6th Assemblies of both chambers were fairly effective. We also discovered that except in the 6th Senate, there was progressive increase in the ILES value from the 4th to 6th Assemblies of both chambers. The findings from the ILES model reveal that while there is a progression in the lawmaking effectiveness of the House, the Senate recorded a different case. The 5th Assembly of the House was more effective than the 4th Assembly and the 6th Assembly out-performed the 5th Assembly. However, in the Senate, the 5th Assembly was more effective than the 4th Assembly but a decline in effectiveness was recorded

by the 6th Assembly. Though the number of Bills received was at an all time high, there was a geometric decline in lawmaking output which lowered the ILES. Figure 6 epitomizes these trajectories:

**Figure 6: Graphical Presentation of the Lawmaking Effectiveness of the 4th, 5th and 6th Assemblies by Chambers**




Source: Author’s computation with data from ILES calculation

From figure 6, while there is a continuous ascension of lawmaking effectiveness of the House, the Senate increased from the 4th to 5th Assemblies before declining. This illustration shows that the House was more effective than the Senate in the 4th Assembly but the Senate was more effective in the 5th Assembly. The table was turned in the 6th Assembly as the House reclaimed its spot at the top. Simply put, this shows that the House is more effective than the Senate.

In addition, the second part of the ILES model which gives the average effectiveness status of the three National Assemblies shows that while the 4th National Assembly is ineffective in lawmaking, the 5th and 6th National Assemblies were fairly effective. This is graphically illustrated in figure 7:

**Figure 7: Graphical Illustration of the Lawmaking Effectiveness of the 4th, 5th and 6th National Assemblies**



**Source:** Author’s computation with data from Average ILES calculation

From figure 7, the findings reveal that there is continuous growth in effectiveness status of the Nigerian legislature from the inception of the current republic. The effectiveness status increased from 0.2 to 0.25 and 0.31 for the three Assemblies, respectively.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

The outcome of the assessment of the legislative effectiveness of the Nigerian National Assembly with reference to lawmaking function evidently shows that the performance output of the legislature is greatly influenced by the institutional framework and the political environment where the legislature is situated. In view of this, the study found that despite the myriad of challenges facing the legislature, it is fairly effective in lawmaking performance though with high prospects to perform better if certain steps are taken. There is a need for more capacity building of the legislators through continuous training and re-orientation toward effective

performance on Bill conceiving, legislative drafting and politics of Bill pushing. The necessity for this stems from the gap between the number of Bills sponsored and the number of Bills passed which shows that most legislators lacked the ability and capacity to push through their Bills.

In addition, to solve the problem of the automatic death of Bills that are not passed at the end of the outgoing Assembly, we proposed that a mechanism be put in place to ensure Bills continuity in the succeeding Assembly. If the sponsor of Bills does not return to the new Assembly, for instance, such Bills should be collated and taken over by a designated “personality” created for that purpose. A “personality,” for example, could be created to take charge perhaps, personified by the Majority Leader of the House/Senate who automatically becomes the sponsor of such Bills. However, such should not be counted for him/her as the sponsor during assessment in order to prevent him/her from having undue advantage over others especially in ranking as suggested above. It would be recalled that we earlier noted that the outcome of this research cannot be generalised for an overall assessment of the National Assembly. This is because the study only uses lawmaking function leaving out the other three cardinal functions (oversight, representation and budgeting) for future research. Therefore, the conclusion that the Nigerian National Assembly is fairly effective is with regard to lawmaking function.



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