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**ARTICLE**

**1**

**COUNTER-TERRORISM  
AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN NIGERIA**

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## **Abstract**

*Protection against violence, abuse, and neglect are few of the cardinal rights of children. Many countries including Nigeria are signatories to the United Nations (UN) Children's Rights (UNCRC) declaration but these declarations are hardly legally institutionalized by the signatory states. The activities of Boko Haram and Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP) have had detrimental effects on Nigerian children's rights, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. Consequently, as at 2018, more than 3 million children had been declared as "out of school children." Media reports revealed that hundreds of thousands of children are malnourished; molested; abused; forced into marriages; denied proper formal education; displaced from their homes and radicalized into terrorism or even murdered. Data collected were content analyzed. Observing the fundamental human rights of every citizen has been proven to be a veritable index of development and good democratic governance. For Nigeria to achieve sustainable-peace and security, every child needs to enjoy the UN children's rights declaration to the fullest,, irrespective of their tribe, culture, language and religion.*

**Keywords:** UN, Rights, Children, Counter-terrorism, Terrorism



## **Introduction**

Numerous discourses have been done on the impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism operations on the rights of individuals particularly children living in areas affected by terrorism ((Njoku 2019, 2018, 2017). Other works have underscored how counter-terrorism measures affect the operations of civil society organizations, particularly community-based organizations and non-government organizations (Howell & Lind 2010, Sidel 2010). However, studies are yet to analyse and explain how terrorism and counter-terrorism operations affect the rights of children and its implications on their developmental and psychological well-being as well as its impact on sustainable peace and security of the country.

This article contextualizes a research direction that engages the diverse manifestations of terrorism and counter-terrorism measures on the rights and lives of children in Nigeria and argues that young girls and boys have been deprived of their rights and their childhood taken has been away from them. by Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP) and other forms of social and religious violence in Nigeria. While many of these boys are conscripted as foot soldiers to terrorists, some of the young girls are made to be suicide bombers and re-procreators to terrorists. Others are forced to marry terrorists to continue the reproduction of the children of terror. All these create psychological trauma that lasts for years, even after the children have been rescued by government's security forces.

Children that are often apprehended and incarcerated on mere allegations of collaborating with or fighting for terrorist groups or are suspected to be terrorists have equally been deprived of their legal rights and even their rights to life. Many of them end up in various illegal secret detention facilities in various parts of the country. If child survivors of Boko Haram terrorism, for instance, are not adequately de-radicalized and given proper psycho-social support, the country runs the risk of harbouring future security threats. Children that did not benefit from proper support system may not be effectively re-integrated into the society and those who suffered from torture, rape, or any form of child abuse from counter-terrorism security officials (including prison officials) can easily and might willingly allow themselves to be recruited by terrorist group leaders just to get back at the society "for

hurting" them. This is one major justification for a study of this nature. In view of the foregoing, it is essential to know the many facets of terrorism, counter-terrorism and its impact. This paper argues that the infringement of the rights of children in terrorism and counter-terrorism operations have significant implications in mitigating and indeed, curbing terrorist operations by the government. In short, this article analyses the process of recruiting children into terrorist groups; the psychological effects of terrorism; and its security implications for Nigeria's future. The paper examines extant literature on terrorism and human rights; examines the impact of Boko Haram and ISWAP on Nigeria; and analyses the impact of terrorism on the rights of individuals' and groups. The article then interrogates the effects of ISWAP's terrorist activities on the rights of Nigerian children. The last section demonstrates the implications of terrorism on sustainable security and development in this nation.

### **Literature Review on Human Rights**

There is a direct correlation between Human Rights and Security and it is premised on two philosophical notions:: competitiveness and mutual support. The competitive interpretation posits that there is some zero-sum relationship or trade-off between them and that one needs to choose between security and human rights (security versus human rights). This view is, to a large extent, stimulated by the intensive violations of Human Rights by the State in the fight against terrorism. Extant international and regional human rights law categorically emphasizes that States possess both the right and the duty to protect individuals under their jurisdiction from terrorist attacks. This arises from the *defacto* duty of States to protecting individuals under their jurisdiction against undue interference in the enjoyment of human rights. In order to fulfill the obligations of protecting the life and security of individuals, states have a right and a duty to taking effective counter-terrorism measures, to prevent and deter potential terrorist attacks and to prosecute those responsible for perpetrating such acts. As part of the States' responsibility to protecting individuals within their jurisdiction, all counter-terrorism measures must adhere to international law, especially the international law on human rights, refugee, and humanitarianism, on the one hand (No, F.S. 32 [No.48] Human Rights Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 2008). On the other hand, the relationship is understood in a more complementary manner, and

seen as a mutually supporting relationship.

### **Terrorism and Counter-terrorism**

The growing relationship between terrorism and human rights has continued to gain traction in extant literature. Specifically, two major strands of debates exist on the issue in the literature. According to Prezelj (2016), how do various acts of terrorism by non-state actors affect human rights, on the one hand? On the other hand, what are the effects of counter-terrorism acts by state actors on human rights? There is a consensus on the issue of how terrorism affects human rights: terrorism poses a threat to the social and political values directly or indirectly related to the full enjoyment of human rights and freedoms. It is generally accepted that regardless of the entity that perpetrates terrorism – whether state or non-state actors – all acts of terrorism seriously affect the enjoyment of human rights, including socio-economic rights, such as the rights to health, food, and housing (Lumina, 2008). According to Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHC, 2008), terrorism directly affects the maximum utilization of human rights, especially the rights to life, liberty, and physical integrity. Acts of terror have the potential to destabilize governments, and weaken civil society in addition to threatening peace and security. It often creates far-reaching social and economic underdevelopment just as it negatively affects individuals and groups. These have a direct impact on the enjoyment of the basic fundamental human rights. In other words, the devastating impact of terrorism on human rights and security has been recognized by the Security Council and the General Assembly at the highest level of the United Nations, on different occasions.

On the negative impacts of terrorism on individual and group rights, the state's response to such acts has tended to be with the corresponding brutality, which may negatively affect human rights. The United Nations has noted that responses to terrorists' acts and events must be made within the context of the basic standards of human rights and international law. This, perhaps, explains the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1456's (2003) insistence that counter-terrorism measures must comply with international law obligations, "in particular international human rights law, refugee and humanitarian law." However, Scholars have posited that

counter-terrorism acts and measures have negatively affected the human rights of citizens in various ways. Hoffman (2004) argues that the design and nature of the “war on terrorism” threatens and complicates the international human rights framework as established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He asserts that “the way this ‘war’ is being waged is itself a threat to human security.” According to him, the War on terror not only challenges the international human rights framework but also, to a small extent, undermines human security. Thus, understanding the nexus between fighting terrorism and the abuse of human rights is vital to curbing terrorism. Therefore, it is necessary to strike a balance between liberty and security vis-à-vis the existing human rights framework. Piazza (2008); Wade and Reiter (2007); Pape, (2003); as well as Eubank & Weinberg (1994) argue that it is highly unlikely that states would protect human rights when faced with the threats of terrorism. This is so because the more the states seek to protect their citizens’ primary rights (both political and civil), the more the states become exposed to terrorist attacks. Therefore, being careful not to tamper with the rights of the citizens while trying to protect them is a necessary component of effective and efficient counter-terrorism process. In a somewhat contrasting view, Piazza & Walsh (2010) flip the coin by arguing that states which violate the physical rights of their citizens are more likely to be targeted by terrorists than those who fully respect these rights. Furthermore, they argued that states that experience terrorist attacks are more susceptible to being involved in extrajudicial killings, but these do not include violations of other forms of rights such as political imprisonment and torture.

Piazza & Walsh (2010), further argued that acts of terrorism differently impact types of human rights, and this consequently fuels terrorism in the long run. Matfess & Bloom (2014) examine how Boko Haram terrorist groups, through their various activities of abductions and kidnaps, have continuously abused and infringed the rights of women. Njoku (2019), Okoli & Azom, (2019) assert that the activities of the terrorist groups have impacted adversely on the rights of women, especially the activities of the group that have sexually violated the rights of women. The above literature affirms that both terrorism and counter-terrorism affects the human rights of different sections of the society/population negatively.

However, despite the concern about the impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism on human rights of individuals and groups, few scholarly attempts have been made to examine how terrorism and counter-terrorism operations specifically affect the rights of children (especially boys and girls) within the Nigerian context and its implications on their developmental and psychological well-being. It is against this background that we examine how terrorism and counter-terrorism activities affect human security and their effects on human rights especially the rights of boys and girls and what this means to liberty and security in Nigeria.

### **Terrorism in Nigeria: Impact on Individuals and Groups' Rights**

Every human being has three inalienable basic rights: the right to life; right to liberty; and the right to freedom. Unfortunately, terrorism has varying encumbrances and constraints on these rights. Terrorism impacts human activities and, by extension, human rights and freedom. The spectre of its impacts on human rights cuts across different strata of the human endeavor. There is no doubt that terrorism, directly and indirectly, violates human rights. The activities of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West African Province, for instance, have had detrimental effects on the enjoyment of all forms of human rights and fundamental freedom (Ewelina Ochab & Kelsey Zorzi, 2016). Their terrorist activities have also played a negative role by impeding the full realization of the cultural, social, and economic rights of citizens, including the right to work, education, health, development, and religion. Different reports by various international non-governmental organizations such as the Amnesty International (2015) validated this argument just as they have documented Boko Haram's violations and the gross human rights abuses of both individuals and groups. Thus, terrorist activities have affected the enjoyment of human rights at the cultural, social, educational, and even religious levels..

The most significant impact of terrorism is that it affects the rights to life of individuals and groups. Rights to life is a highly held right by both international and regional protocols and treaties, and it is not surprising that it is the most affected by Boko Haram and ISWAP activities in Nigeria. Ewelina Ochab & Kelsey Zorzi (2016) further argued that the deaths of many people caused by Boko Haram is in multiples. Amnesty International (2015)

reported that Boko Haram killed about 1,600 Nigerian civilians between June 2015 and September 2015, thereby accounting for one of the highest number of non-natural deaths.

According to a 2015 OHCHR report, since the inception of Boko Haram in 2009, deaths resulting from their attacks have killed over 20,000 civilians, thereby hindering people from having a right to live their lives as they wish and cutting short their lives. Furtherance to this, is the impediment to the right to liberty and security of persons. The abuse of human rights also encompasses the displacement of persons (leading to an increase in the number of internally displaced persons), and resulting in refugee crises. Ochab and Zorzi (2016), argued that Boko Haram's *modus operandi* of forcefully adapting, detaining, and imprisoning their captives deprives people of their right to liberty and freedom.

It has impacted the educational sector negatively. There has, for instance, been an increase in the number of out-of-school children in the North East since the commencement of Boko Haram's insurgency. According to a 2016 report of UNICEF, 1,200 schools were destroyed and 319,000 child learners were denied access to safe learning spaces, and 952,029 school-aged children were displaced because of the Boko Haram insurgency. Isokpan & Durojaye (2016) highlighted ancillary areas such as effects on school attendance; destruction of educational facilities; and educational deprivations of IDPs. The effects of terrorism have also been felt in attacks against civilians and protected objects such as schools, mosques, churches, prisons, hospitals, markets (Onapajo, 2017). Other manifestations of hindrances to the enjoyment of human rights include abductions of children (boys and girls) for indoctrination and recruitment into its fighting force; and sexual exploitation and forced marriages, amongst other things (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Similarly, children's right has been impacted negatively by terrorist acts in ways such as violence against children and the use of children in hostilities, as well as torture and other cruel inhuman and degrading treatment.

This next section of this paper examines, in details, the degradation effects of Boko Haram and ISWAP terrorist acts on children's rights. In 2019, the United Nations reported that the Nigerian military detained over 3,600 children

between January 2013 and March 2019 over suspicion of involvement with Boko Haram terrorists.

Detaining vulnerable children also robs them of their family rights and other rights embodied in the tenets of the UN Children Rights Act. Given that the children are already having dysfunctional growth and missing the developmental stages of childhood, in itself constitutes rights denial. According to Sigmund Freud at ages 4, 7, 12 -19, there are basic things a child that is developing well is supposed to learn at every stage. Missing a stage will not only negatively affect the learning process but may truncate and obstruct learning in the next stage. This, perhaps, explains why children who did not in future pass through these stages have problems navigating the next stage of life and subsequently poses a threat to peace and development of the society. When children are incarcerated by either terrorists or by security personnel the mental, emotional and psychological faculties of such children are also incarcerated, punctured and truncated. This was why Human Rights Watch affirms that the rights to liberty and freedom of the children would be impeded through these illegal acts of detention. (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

## **Effects of Boko Haram and ISWAP Terrorist**

### **Acts on the Rights of Children**

According to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), a child is everyone under the age of 18. Given that a child is vulnerable to all sorts of exploitation and inhuman treatment, the United Nations, in her Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), established a legally-binding international agreement that spells out the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights of every child, regardless of their race, religion, or abilities. The 54 articulated rights documents include rights such as the right to life, survival, and development. Article 9 of the act categorically affirms that no child should be separated from his or her parents against their will, except it is in the child's best interests. Sadly, in the region of Boko Haram insurgency, it is almost a norm for children to be separated from the caring arms of parents. This puts to question, the potency of Article 9 of the child's right not to be separated from his/her parents.

Articles 28 stated emphatically that every child has the right to education. Primary education should be compulsory and free. Different forms of secondary education should be available to every child. School discipline should respect children's dignity and rights. While Article 29 declares that education should help develop every child's personality, talents, and mental and physical abilities to the fullest. Children, according to this act, have rights to minority and indigenous groups. A child from minority groups has the right to enjoy his or her own culture, practice his or her own religion, and use his or her own language even as every child has the right to play and cultural and artistic activities. Every child has the right to relax, play, and take part in cultural and artistic activities.

Children are not expected to partake in drug abuse and should be protected from drug abuse. Children should be protected from using, producing, or distributing illegal drugs. Every child has the right to be protected from all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse, including unlawful sexual activity, prostitution, and pornographic materials. A child should not be involved in abduction, sale, and trafficking. A child should not be subjected to cruel treatment and detention. No child should be given a death penalty or a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. They should not be subjected to armed conflict. Dunn (2018), in her publication entitled "Childhood Wasting" revealed that descriptive evidence suggests that the terrible state of child health outcomes in the conflict areas of Northeast Nigeria may be connected to the disruptions in social services and the increased food insecurity in an area that is already resource-ridden. According to her other unidentified factors may contribute to conflict (Dunn, 2018). She also revealed that conflict impacts children's health in numerous ways. These include community and household resources getting diminished due to the diversion of funds away from social services, incremental rise in the prices of food and other commodities, and fear of physical obstacles preventing caregivers from pursuing livelihood activities. It is also expedient to know that most conflict-related deaths - particularly for children - do not result from direct causes such as war-related trauma but attributable to the deplorable pre-existing conditions such as severe malnutrition, diarrheal, acute respiratory infections, etc. that were already present before the conflict. Moss & Storms (2006) stressed that malnutrition is a contributory condition to about 45% of



children's deaths worldwide, and it is sensitive to disruptions commonly found in war zones such as increased food insecurity.

Due to the activities of Boko Harman and ISWAP, many families have been disconnected and children detached from their parents, especially mothers. Many children are bereft; some have become radicalized, conscripted, and drafted into the Boko haram sect or ISWAP to engage in acts of terrorism. They are used as child suicide bombers and spies to the sects. Essentially, the growth process, such as education, nurturing, parental love and care of these children are denied. Consequently, the children become vulnerable to being radicalized by Boko Haran or ISWAP terrorists group currently terrorizing Nigeria. According to Troup (2015), many of them meet untimely death in the counter-terrorist attacks of the state security apparatus combating terrorism. Some are traumatized and psychologically affected. This makes it difficult for them to build a healthy childhood while some meet their death. UNHCR (2015) further stressed that out of 2.3 million people that had been displaced by the Boko Haram conflict since May 2013, at least, 250 have left Nigeria and fled, as refugees, into neighboring countries such as Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. In 2019, Vanguard Newspaper reported that Boko Haram had killed over 6,600. The insurgent group had also carried out numerous abductions. This include kidnapping of 276 School-Girls in Chibok and 105 Girls of Dapchi Secondary School from their hostels in 2018; the attack and burning of 59 boys sleeping in their hostel in a secondary school in Buni Yadi in northern Nigeria in April 2014 by gunmen from Islamist group, There had also been isolated cases of kidnappings, killing, and sexual exploitations and molestation of innocent children. The *Telegraph* (2015) reported that terrorists invaded and occupied swathes of territory in and around their home state of Borno, estimated at 50,000 square kilometers (20,000 sq mi) in January 2015 (*Telegraph* 2015).

Government has to make the protection of human rights a pivotal issue in order to stop child rights' violation and abuse in Nigeria. Again, Nigerians will continue to remember that all these depict that Nigeria's future is being compromised by terrorism, noted Olawuyi (2015). For sustainable peace, security and development in this country, the rights of children needs to be respected by all the stakeholders.

Nutrition, an essential right of children becomes a victim as malnutrition soars and kills children. The World Health Organization and some scholars have reported that in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), malnutrition was cited by respondents as an underlying or primary cause of death in 8.1% of recorded deaths. (Coghlan, Brennan, & Ngoy, 2006). Agadjanian & Prata (2003) revealed that in Angola, 10.9% of the deaths in conflict areas and in Nigeria is due to nutritional deficiency. With the Boko Haram insurgency, virtually all articles embedded in the 54 rights of the child have been violated. According to Article 40 of the United Nations Child Right Article, every child has the right to juvenile justice. Children need to be protected from being abducted, sold, or trafficked to another country and exploited and exposed to other forms of exploitation even as it is stated in Article 36 of the rights of the child. No child should be subjected to torture or treated in a cruel or inhuman way. Article 32 sets out to protect the child from any harmful labor of any kind because it advocated that children in conflict zones should be accorded special protection. A child has the right to recover, especially from trauma and benefit from reintegration. To this extent, the state and all stakeholders need to ensure that every child is protected and secured, especially from Boko Haram terrorists in northern Nigeria and elsewhere in the country. However, it is unfortunate that the counterterrorism operations of the government has also impacted negatively on the rights of children. The next section of this examines counter operations and its effects.

### **Counter-terrorism operations and Children's rights in Nigeria**

It has been alleged that Nigerian government's counter-terrorism efforts has been alienating and violating human rights, civil liberty groups, individuals, and children's rights (Njoku, 2017). However, in the literature, not much attention has been paid the extent to which counter terrorism has affected the rights of children. Nigerian government has responded through both hard and soft measures to acts of terrorism perpetrated by Boko Haram and ISWAP, while these measures have been commendable, they have significantly affected and impacted the rights and freedom of children. In the process of carrying out their duties, the security agencies have covertly or overtly infringed on the rights of children through different means because they run contrary to the international best practices for the protection of children's rights. *Human Rights Watch* (2019) documented various ways in

which counter-terrorism measures and operations have impacted negatively on the rights of children. Some of them include restriction of movements; arbitrary arrests; mass and illegal detention; punitive interrogative measures; confinement; starvation; denial of access to medical and health facilities including family members. Government's security agents often detain children suspected of Boko Haram's involvement. In this regard, children, especially boys, are arrested by security agents with little or no evidence. The detained children are subjected to inhumane conditions in extremely overcrowded cells and detention centers meant for adults for months and sometimes years (Human Rights Watch, 2019, Amnesty International, 2018). In 2019, Human Rights Watch stated explicitly that many children are held without charge for months or years in squalid and severely overcrowded military barracks, with no contact to the outside world." (Human rights Watch, 2019). According to a recent United Nations' report, the Nigerian military detained over 3,600 children between January 2013 and March 2019 as suspects involved with Boko Haram terrorists.

Children's rights to liberty and freedom have been compromised through the humiliation and denial of human rights by state agencies. Human Rights Watch (2019) stated that "the military provides no formal education or rehabilitation activities for children at detention. Children reported that their only activities were prayer, watching television, and informal lessons provided by some children for others. The overcrowded conditions made physical activity impossible, and some children said they developed sores from restricted movement. "In other instances, allegations of sexual violence have been leveled against the Nigerian Security forces, repeatedly (Okoli & Azom 2019). Both Amnesty International (2018) and Human Rights Watch (2016) point to issues of sexual violence against girls in the IDP camps. According to them, security agencies including the civilian self-defense groups are all culprits in perpetrating various forms of sexual exploitation and abuse against girls and consequently eroded the fundamental right of the children to their own their bodies. Amnesty International (2018) further stated that both the soldiers and members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) are involved transactional sex against girls. In some instances, some of the girls and women are compelled to become wives and girlfriends to the security agents.

A more deplorable impact is the denial to requisite medical, psychological, and mental support for the victims of abuse. The trauma of being denied access to basic rights coupled with the sexual abuse, often batter the psyche of the children. The attendant stigma usually leads the children to living secluded lives, if they do not become cathartic and face life-threatening challenges. According to Human Rights Watch (2016), seclusion has negatively affected the psychological wellbeing of many of the women and girls. Many of the victims said that they had difficulty sleeping, and deliberately isolated themselves to avoid insults and slurs. In most cases, when combating terrorism, the rights of women and children are abused by the state agencies that are supposed to protect them. Many also said they felt constantly angry with their abusers, wishing they could harm them in retaliation.

Children are always the most vulnerable to the effects of terrorist activities and armed struggles. Radicalized and violent, internal strife and communal conflict situations of militarized violence affect children negatively. Given the vulnerable nature of children, they should be protected by the state; well-meaning individuals; civil societies; and all stakeholders in Nigeria.

### **Conclusion**

Boko Haram and ISWAP infringed on the rights of individuals particularly the rights of vulnerable children in Nigeria. Infringements on rights has serious negative implications for the peace and security development of the country. Government security agencies often arrest children suspected of having affiliations with Boko Haram and subsequently detain them for months or years and subject them to inhumane conditions in extremely overcrowded cells and detention centers meant for adults (Human Rights Watch, 2019; Amnesty International, 2018). Human Rights Watch (2019) revealed that that many children are held without charges. Thus by the time these children are released, they would have been psychologically affected and if not given adequate psycho-social therapy they leave detention worse than they came in and therefore pose serious threat to the security of the country in future.

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Crude oil politics and electoral violence in Bayelsa State, 1999 - 2019

**ARTICLE**

**2**

**CRUDE OIL POLITICS AND  
ELECTORAL VIOLENCE  
IN BAYELSA STATE, 1999 – 2019**

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## **Abstract**

*Since the return to civilian government in Nigeria on May 29<sup>th</sup>, 1999, elections in Bayelsa state have been characterised by violence. This intensification of the struggle for power often results in election related violence before, during and after the proper conduct of an election. The violence takes place both intra-party and inter-party. It is evidenced in the form of shooting, intimidation, compulsion, hate speech, bomb explosion, kidnapping, assassination, abduction, hijacking of electoral materials, disruption of campaign and voting process, compelling electoral officers to enter and announce false results, etc. The study attributes this regrettable state of affair on crude oil politics. It notes that electoral violence in the state is a manifestation of the struggle among political actor over who will control, expropriate and allocate the crude oil wealth as well as other crude oil production-related benefits such as surveillance contract, pipeline clearing contract, job placement, training and scholarship fund and oil spillage compensation, etc. The study concluded electoral violence in the state is tied to quest to use state power to determine the control of oil wealth and other crude oil related benefits. It suggested that awarding of contracts and employment should be based on merit instead of political patronage.*

**Keywords:** Crude oil politics, elections, electoral violence, political patronage, resource curse.

## Introduction

Across the globe, the conduct of regular free, fair and credible election has been acclaimed as the most acceptable means of leadership recruitment and succession. This is because it offers the candidates the opportunity to test their popularity while it affords the people an avenue to decide who governs them, on what terms as well as the quality of leadership to expect. Most importantly, it confers on the people, the power to recall or vote out underperforming leaders. In line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, election empowers the people, to hire and fire political leaders, while holding them accountable for their actions while in office. It is these qualities in addition to its inbuilt conflict resolution capacities that compelled nations to subscribe to it. In Africa, except such few places like the pre-colonial Igbo society, it took the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> waves of democracy to entrench this democratic value in the continent. This notwithstanding, there exist at the moment cases of tenure elongation through constitutional amendments, sit tight syndrome, life presidency and illiberal democratic

Practices and cultures across the continent. These are evidenced in several cases of election induced political crises in countries like Gambia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Guinea, etc. Even Nigeria, once had a third term agenda for the President. This does not suggest that electoral malfeasance is found only in Africa. Far from that, the challenges of electoral violence are global phenomena and no nation is immune to it.

In Nigeria, the mere mentioning of election generates serious trepidation in minds of people. Election in the country, with the possible exception of the colonial administered, and military administered elections, can best be equated to warfare. Here, actors and political parties exploit every means at their disposal in order to ensure they come out of the contest victorious. A situation that resonates the Machiavellian principle of *the end justifies the means*. Little wonder, former President Olusegun Obasanjo described the 2007 general elections as a do-or-die affair for the People's Democratic Party (PDP). An assertion that is very similar to the threat issued by Mohammed Buhari in the build up to the 2015 Presidential elections when he noted that "the monkeys and the baboons shall be soaked in blood" should he fail to win the election. Similarly, the Oba of Lagos, threatened that the Igbo's residing

in Lagos would drown in the Lagoon should they vote against his anointed candidate of the All Progressive Congress; Akinwunmi Ambode in the 2015 Lagos state gubernatorial election. These sorts of assertions from highly placed and respected personalities encourage their followers to indulge in electoral violence. These unfortunate developments compelled the Council on Foreign Relations (2019) to observe:

Elections in Nigeria, as elsewhere, are high-stakes, winner-take-all contests. With so much on the line, they are often, if not always, accompanied by violence. Politicians are all too willing to exploit simmering ethnic, religious, and regional divisions to gain political advantage. They stoke community tension and even target their rivals and their rivals' supporters. Not only do average Nigerians bear the brunt of such violence, the knock-on effects to the credibility of Nigeria's political processes is hard to understate.

In Nigeria for instance, where the control of crude oil production related revenues and largesse much more than ownership of its production processes and knowledge defines the contours of the struggle for state power. As each of the competing groups strives to emerge victorious and as such have unhindered access to the crude oil revenue and other benefits its control offers. Given that crude oil is the country's single largest foreign exchange earner, and also accounts for over ninety percent of its revenue. It therefore, becomes obvious that the competition for power within the context of Nigeria's peripheral capitalist formation in which the state serves as the primary instrument for primitive accumulation of wealth will be vicious. This explains why the major political parties in the country in addition to seeking to be win the governorship of crude oil producing states; ensures that their members control all major crude oil production related Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). The system creates army of unemployed followers that are at the beck and call of these appointees, whom are mobilized during election seasons to perpetuate violence in favour of their masters. This way, while political parties in other climes contest and win election to

formulate public policies; in Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, where the state is heavily under crude oil dependence; political parties formulate policies to win elections. It is under this context that electoral related violence usually occur during post-independence elections in the country.

Worse still, elections in Bayelsa state often witness high level of violence. This is demonstrated in sporadic shooting, bombing, maiming, assassinations, snatching of electoral materials, etc. even the November 16, 2019 gubernatorial election that was adjudged to be one of the most peaceful elections in the electoral calendar of the state, witnessed pockets of these types of electoral violence. Although, scholars and political analysts have given reasons in attempt to explain factors that induce election-related violence in the state, which they have blamed in partisan politics, personalities of the contesting candidates, lack of party ideology, etc. Conversely, this study locates the roots of electoral violence in Bayelsa state on crude oil politics. It is therefore, against this background that the study interrogated the nexus between crude oil politics and incidence of electoral violence in Bayelsa state.

### **Theoretical framework**

The theoretical framework of analysis adopted in this study is predicated on certain propositions emanating from the resource curse theory. Due to its analytical adequacy in explaining the issue under discourse. The major proponents of the theory are Auty (1993) Ross (1999), Sach & Warner (1995, 1999a & 1999b), De Soyasa (2002), Collier & Hoeffler (2005) as well as Rosser (2006). Besides, Okoye (2011) used it to examine the probable link between oil and national development in the Ghana. Also, Okoye (2014), equally utilized it in interrogating how the struggle over oil resources instigate various kinds of conflict, especially boundary dispute among states in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Contrary to conventional thinking that the abundance of natural resources will spur societal development; the resource curse theory, argues that rather than being a blessing, the abundance of natural resources (or at least an abundance of a particular type of natural resources [in this case crude oil]) is more of a curse than blessing. This is because it increases the chances of countries suffering negative economic, political and social outcomes as well as poor economic performance, low level of democracy and civil war. Although, the literature that examined whether natural resources

are bad for development are broadly classified into three categories: 1) economic performance, 2) civil war, and 3) regime type. This study isolates and applies some basic propositions from civil war and regime type thesis on resource curse.

The civil war thesis suggests that natural resources abundance influences the onset, duration and intensity of civil war (conflict). Collier & Hoeffler (2000) specifically noted that natural resource wealth enhances the chance of civil war. Scholars such De Soyasa (2002), Fearon & Laitin (2003), and Fearon (2005) identified crude oil export and crude oil wealth as a determining factor in the onset of civil war (conflict). Also, Reynal-Querol (2002) implicates natural resources in the occurrence of various forms of political violence, which election violence is an integral part. In linking natural resources to conflict, Ross (2004) noted that it encourages combatants to fight for territory that would otherwise have little value to them. Similarly, Okoye (2014) observed that the history of oil exploration, exploitation and production in the Niger Delta region has been the history of conflict, which involves community-Multinational Oil Corporations (MNOCs), community-government, state government-state government, and community-community. On the other hand, the regime type thesis, associate natural resource abundance with low democracy. In this light, Ross (2001) stated that a state's reliance on oil or mineral export tends to make it less democratic. This suggests that natural resource abundance not only transforms a state into rentier state, it ultimately characterizes it politics with various forms of undemocratic practices.

In applying the theory to the study, it was observed that the quest over who will control the huge state treasury that largely comes from federal allocation, and most importantly, the 13% oil derivation fund. In addition to other oil production-related largess that accrues to the state such as rent, royalties, taxes, job placements, awarding of contracts, employments opportunities, selection of candidates for training, allocation of training funds, scholarships, disbursement of compensations from oil companies for environmental disaster such as oil spillage, political appointments, etc account for the intense brinkmanship and brigandage that witnessed during political struggle in the state. Under this context, politicians as well as political parties, recruits, imports and mobilise mercenaries, youths, cult

groups as well as militants that serve both for defense and offense. This way, opposition candidates are threatened, kidnapped, or assassinated (or attempt at), property are destroyed, political party offices are attacked, scuttles electoral rallies and campaigns, bill boards, sign posts and posters are destroyed, community members that are ardent supporter of opposition candidate are either banished from the community during election or forced to stay indoor throughout the election day; electoral material are high jacked, ballot boxes are snatched and stuffed with thumb printed ballots, electoral officers are kidnapped, mal-handled and molested, polling units are destroyed, voters are victimized, injured and killed in extreme cases; and elections prevented from holding. At times, when the announced election result does not favour a particular candidate and party, their supporters often indulge in another cycle of violence.

The first natural casualty of this state of affair is democracy. Apart from the fact that it risks enthroning mediocre and inefficient leadership in addition to lack of accountability and transparency. It encourages and entrenches a culture of violence that favours and sustains conflict entrepreneurs. Given this, the defeated party and candidate, instead of joining forces with the government to ensure sustainable development of the state in the spirit of sportsmanship; will immediately start plotting on the quantum of violence it unleash both on its opponents, their support base and even the process itself come next electioneering period. Worse still, it undermines the democratic culture of citizen's participation both in the process of leadership recruitment and decision making (policy making), etc. This therefore, suggests that crude oil politics defined in terms of the struggle over who collects, receives, controls, manages, distributes oil wealth as well as oil production-related largess that are due the state sits at the heart of the intense competition among political actors in the state. A struggle that often result in violence as evidenced in most election conducted in the state following the reintroduction of democratic governance in the country on May 29<sup>th</sup>, 1999. In this respect, the theory adequately captures and highlights the nuances of crude oil politics that breeds electoral-related violence in the Bayelsa state. This notwithstanding, the study equally understands that there other variables that triggers and sustains electoral violence in the state. It however, argues that there about the primacy of crude oil politics towards intensification of the violence.

## **Area of the Study**

The area of this study is Bayelsa state. Bayelsa state is one of the 36 states that constitute the Federal Republic of Nigeria and it is located in the Niger Delta region. It is bordered on the East by Rivers State, on the West and South by Atlantic Ocean and on the north by Delta State. Geographically, the state landscape comprises of about eighty per cent riverine communities and just 20 percent of wet lands including the state capital, Yenagoa (Nwosu, 2011). Hence, most communities are surrounded by water and are inaccessible by road. In terms of occupation, the local population is mainly farmers and fishermen both at subsistence and commercial levels. The political economy of Bayelsa state revolves around oil and gas production. Indeed, the state has one of the largest crude oil and natural gas deposits in the country. The first oil found in commercial quantity in Nigeria in 1956 was in Oloibiri in Ogbia local government area of the state. It produces between 30 and 40% of Nigeria's oil and gas. Commercial fishing and agriculture, including oil palm, raffia palm, rubber, and coconut also make up a significant portion of the state's economy (Fund for Peace, 2015c). The people of Bayelsa state speak four major languages namely (1) Izon (2) Nembe (3) Ogbia and (4) Epie-Atissa. Interestingly, majority of the people are rural dwellers. The peculiar terrain of the state in conjunction with lack of adequate social infrastructures like transportation, communication, health and education facilities in addition to unemployment the state witnesses high rate of poverty and underdevelopment.

## **Understanding electoral violence**

Electoral violence is a variant of political violence. It can be distinguished from the political violence family through its particular objective. Indeed, it is aimed at influencing the behavior of the voters, candidates or distorting the results of the elections. For this purpose, it attempts to delay, prevent the vote or compilation of votes, in order to obtain results, which do not reflect the verdict of the ballot box (UNOWAS, 2017). Birch & Muchlinski (2007) see it as coercive force, directed towards electoral actors and/or objects that occurs in the context of electoral competition. Electoral violence is often explained in terms of violence between actors competing in an election. Sisk (quoted in Birch & Muchlinski, 2007) provided an expansive definition of electoral-related violence as:

Acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arise in the context of electoral competition. When perpetrated to affect an electoral process, violence may be employed to influence the process of elections such as efforts to delay, disrupt, or derail a poll and to influence the outcomes: the determining of winners in competitive races for political office.

Corroborating the above view point, the Council on Foreign Relations (2019) states that election-related violence typically includes clashes between political party supporters, incidents that take place at campaign events, and attacks on existing or aspiring politicians. On the contrary, Mehler (2007) approached the issue from another perspective, specifically in terms of difference in motive. He noted that contrary to conventional knowledge of electoral violence as tool for influencing electoral outcomes; it is a tool aimed at preventing election from holding in the first place. In this wise, violence is used not only to influence the outcome of the election but to spoil the election process itself. This implicates the idea, that those promoting violence may not stand a chance of emerging victorious or may not be contesting the election at all (Taylor, 2018). In his part, Nwolise, (2007, p.159) while quoting Albert defined electoral violence as “all forms of organised acts of threats physical, psychological, and structural, aimed at intimidating, harming, blackmailing a political stakeholder before, during and after election with a view to determining, delaying, or otherwise influencing an electoral process”. Table 1 below illustrates his further breakdown and components of these three major categories.



**Table 1: Categorisation of violence related to elections**

<b>Dimensions of electoral violence</b>	<b>Components</b>
<b>Physical violence</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Physical assaults on individuals, during campaign, election or when election results are released</li> <li>• Assassination of political opponents or people perceived as a threat to one's political ambition</li> <li>• Burning down of public or opponents' property and cars among other</li> <li>• Shooting, shoot outs</li> <li>• Killing of individuals</li> <li>• Partisan harassment by security agent arrests, forceful dispersal of rallies, or shooting, wounding of killing of people</li> <li>• Kidnapping and hostage taking</li> <li>• Bombing of infrastructure</li> <li>• Forceful disruption by thugs of political campaign rallies</li> <li>• Destruction of ballot boxes and ballot papers from polling agents</li> <li>• Free for all fight</li> </ul>
<b>Psychological violence</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Threats against and harassment by security agents of opponents of the ruling regime or party, which create political apathy</li> <li>• Shoot on sight orders that breed fear in voters</li> <li>• Terror inflicted by political assassinations, which makes people scared to participate in politics or elections</li> <li>• Publication or broadcast of abusive, insulting, or intimidating material or advertorial</li> <li>• Threat to life through phone calls, text message, etc</li> </ul>

<p><b>Structural violence</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coercion of citizens by government to register or vote or be denied certain national facilities</li> <li>• Exclusionary act and policies</li> <li>• Unequal opportunities for political parties and candidates</li> <li>• Deliberate changes in dates, venue or times of events to the advantage of others</li> <li>• Partisan delimitation of electoral constituencies and location of polling stations/booths</li> <li>• Excessive fees for the collection of party nomination forms</li> <li>• Absence of free campaign</li> <li>• Reliance on money and brute force instead of moral integrity and competence</li> <li>• Restraints imposed on voters</li> <li>• Use of the incumbency factor to give undue advantage to some candidates</li> <li>• Announcement of false or fraudulent results</li> <li>• Lengthy delays in announcing election results</li> <li>• Absence of adequate voting materials and electoral result forms</li> <li>• Delay in voting</li> <li>• Absence of electoral officers from polling booth at an appropriate time</li> <li>• Partisan behaviour of police and other security agents</li> <li>• Discriminatory acts and policies</li> </ul>
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**Source:** Nwolise (2007).

Nwolise’s conception of election violence points to the fact that violence associated with electioneering process need necessary manifest in the form of harm, injury, application of coercive force. Rather it can equally manifest indirectly by implanting fears in the mind of the people as well as the manner in which the electoral processes are organised, administered, and managed. It is for this reason that UNOWAS (2017) stated that electoral violence includes: verbal and symbolic electoral violence, psychological electoral violence, and physical electoral violence, structural or institutional violence. The voters can be prevented from participating in the poll, forced to choose

a candidate against their will. As a result, the elections are either disrupted or cancelled straightaway. The amorphous nature of electoral violence is such that those that respond to acts of violence hardly agree that they are perpetrating violence. Instead, they argue that they are simply countering the use of violence by the opponent. This confusion stems largely from Frantz Fanon's thesis of violence begetting violence. It is for this reason that Kehailia (2014) distinguishes eight of election violence, based on who the perpetrators are, and why the violence occurs, namely: 1) Party-on-Party Electoral Violence; 2) Party-on-Voter Electoral Violence; 3) Party-on-State Electoral Violence; 4) Voter-on-Voter Electoral Violence; 5) Voter-on-State Electoral Violence; 6) State-on-Voter Electoral Violence; 7) State-on-Party Electoral Violence; and 8) State-on-State Electoral Violence.

This notwithstanding, electoral violence is defined by four criteria namely 1) the motive of the violence, 2) the timing of the violence, 3) the actors perpetrating the violence, and 4) the targets of the violence (Höglund, 2009). In terms of motive, violence is usually intended to influence the outcome of an election. The style and type of violence employed can take a variety of forms, but it is temporally close to Election Day. The perpetrators of violence are generally state and non-state actors who have vested interest in the outcome of an election, such as members of the state security apparatus (police, military, etc.), militias that are loyal to particular candidate, parties, and rank-and-file party supporters (Taylor, 2018). Similarly, (Taylor, 2018) outlined the following four key dimensions to include 1) the timing of violence, 2) the perpetrators of violence, 3) the victims of violence, and 4) the severity of violence.

As observed, electoral violence can take place in any stage of the electoral process such as before, during and after the election. At times, it occurs at the instance of announcement of election result. This means that it can happen before or on the polling day, as was the case in the Guinean elections in 2010. It can also break out just after the elections as in the 2005 presidential election in Togo and in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 (UNOWAS, 2017). Birch & Muchlinski (2007) noted that it can take place before, during or after elections and it can target different entities, including candidates, activists, poll workers, election observers, journalists and voters. Election related violence also

occur at the instance of announcement of elections result (Seeberg, Wahman & Skaaning, 2018; So`derberg Kovacs, 2018), as was the case in Nigeria, in 2011, Gambia in 2016-2017, and Zimbabwe in 2018, etc. The violence is often targeted at human and non-human materials associated with the electoral processes. The severity of violence meted out differs among actors and situations. It also depends largely on the capacity, and nature of violence deployed. Therefore, electoral violence may involve the use of bare hands, words of mouth (hate speech), gerrymandering, unnecessary delays, supply of insufficient electoral material, late opening of polling booth, absence of security personnel, election securitization, security saturation, stick, stones, abduction, kidnapping, assassination, maiming, compulsion, matchete, club, gun, explosives, etc, in determining the outcome of election, influencing the choice of voters or direction of vote, deciding who emerges as a party's flag bearer at general election, or in preventing the conduct of an election.

In the view of this, electoral violence is a means to an end, and not an end in itself. The sponsors and perpetrators of electoral violence are primarily driven by what they stand to gain through the violence much more than in the violence itself. Hence, the higher the pay-off, the more intense the violence and the more sophisticated the instruments of violence deployed in the process. In accordance, Birch, Daxecker & Hوجلud (2020), observe:

Electoral violence is typically selected from among available tools to achieve electoral ends, even if the use of force may simultaneously deliver on other goals, as when land is forcibly taken from a political opponent to reward a political ally. The goals of violence generally include political exclusion, be it exclusion from candidacy (via attacks on candidates); from campaigning (via attacks on or obstruction of campaign events); from the provision of electoral information (via attacks on media outlets, election observers, and NGOs involved in voter education); from electoral participation and free electoral choice (via the intimidation, coercion, and/or the displacement of voters); from electoral victory (via

attacks on polling stations and poll workers or the destruction of polling materials); or from power (via post-electoral protests contesting the outcome of the election (p.5).

The causes of electoral violence include lack of confidence in the electoral process, culture of impunity, gerrymandering, systemic disenfranchisement of a section of the society, inordinate ambitions, winner takes all mentality, as well as lack of compelling message, among others. For UNOWAS (2017) observed that it takes place more often in a context of real or alleged rigging of elections; major challenges involving ethnic groups, clans, economic powers, and political actors; a minor difference between the candidates' results; unclear or disputed legal framework; non-impartial management bodies; lack of transparency, including electoral data management, proven or alleged fraud in the electoral process; first-past-the-post system; exclusion of specific communities during the electoral process.

### **Crude oil politics and incidences of electoral violence in Bayelsa State**

The political economy of Bayelsa State greatly revolves around crude oil production, its distribution and the revenue that it generates. The state is basically a civil servant state with no single industry. The absence of industries or industrial complex in the state has two implications. First, it means that the state has little or no viable source of internally generated revenue (IGR), second, it not only denies the state the benefit of organised private sector (OPS) but, also means that the state is the major employer of labour. Everyone in the state therefore, relies on government, and politics for survival. Although, the state boost of a number of contractors especially in the oil and gas sector, however, these contrapreneurs (or contraprenuerial class) depend largely on the state for contracts, jobs and patronage. Thus, fueling and supporting a vicious system of spoil politics. This suggests that most of the big names in the state are in one way or the other linked to the state or crude oil businesses.

As a result, elections in the state use to be hotly contested among different factions of the elites in the state. With all major political actors and stakeholders

in the state drawing their cheque from oil revenue that accrues to the state, and with oil being the only business in town, it therefore, becomes inevitable that high premium will be placed on the capture of the state's power by political gladiators in the state. The soul of the state is perceived by these actors as an object that must be captured at all cost and with every means necessary. This then, transforms (election that) what ought to be democratic process of conflict resolution among contesting parties into a zero sum affair in their struggle for state power.

A struggle that its outcome determines who receives, controls, disburses and appropriates the states oil wealth in addition to other benefits that are directly or indirectly linked to oil prospecting and production in the state. It is the lure of this largess that impels politicians to approach election in the state with a do-or-die mentality. Accordingly, they recruit and mobilise unemployed youths, cult groups, and militants to unleash mayhem on the electoral process, opposition candidates, opposition parties, royalties and supporters of opposition parties/candidates, electoral officers, voters, communities, electoral materials, public and private properties, etc. This results in bodily and psychological injury, population displacement, loss of property, loss of source of livelihood, destruction of property, cancellation of elections in affected polling units, wards and constituency (ies), and death in extreme cases. Decrying this ugly situation, Watts, (2008) noted that:

The militia for example got their start by being supported (financially and with arms) by politicians in the oil-producing states, the decentralization of corruption, the rise of powerful gubernatorial machine politicians, and the democratisation of violence that mark post-1999 Nigeria (p.40).

Evidently, politicians mobilise and perpetuate violence in areas they are in comparative disadvantage to their opponent. This is in line with the observations of Collier & Vicente (2014) when they observed that violence can be used to deter voters from exercising their rights. They also argued the use of violence may not always be to reduce turnouts in the beneficiary's – incumbent or challenger – strongholds, but in the areas the beneficiaries

may not be too sure of winning, especially in the swing areas. In the two gubernatorial elections, it is our view that both leading parties are equally capable to deploy violence for electoral purposes (Adigun, 2019). This prompted Obi (2010) to observe that violent conflicts in oil producing states are often the outcome of the struggles over oil. This, he noted is because of the strategic location of crude oil in global capitalism particularly the social relations of powers that are spawned around oil extraction and commoditization. Corroborating this, Egnweree (2014) opined that crude oil and politics are inextricably linked as politicians see its control as the major control of state power. This often led to intense competition for the capture of state power. On the basis of which not just oil resources, but the entire resources of the state are controlled, distributed and appropriated. Commenting on this, Omoweh (2005) argued that the oil wealth changed the character of politics in the country specifically the intensification of the struggle for the capture of state by members of the political class at all cost. Highlighting, this intricate relationship between benefits that are derived from crude oil politics through spoil politics and patronage system that triggers electoral violence in Bayelsa state, PIND (2015) observes:

In many ways, the results of the gubernatorial elections will be more directly significant for local constituents and ethno-political interests than the presidential contest, especially given the prominent role that political patronage plays in the state with political leaders rewarding their supporters with privileged positions in government establishments and lucrative government contracts (p.1).

Elections in Bayelsa state is symptomatic of the enduring character of electoral violence in most Niger Delta states where complex interplay of political and other socio-cultural forces complement each other in the struggle for the control of crude oil revenue. Having a history of electoral violence, political analysts now link the state's electoral calendar with oil violence as it often target both politicians and oil production (Thurston, 2012). Indeed, all the elements of Fund for Peace (2015a, p.2) description of election induced violence in the Niger Delta at the various phases of the process have occurred

in Bayelsa state. For them:

Elections at the national, state and local levels in the Niger Delta are often accompanied by complex conflict dynamics. Elections are seen as opportunities to influence the distribution of public wealth and to access large clienteles of political patronage, creating incentives for intra- and inter-party violence. Early in the process (before or after party primaries), those with a stake in the results may attempt to intimidate, abduct, or kill aspirants in order to influence which candidates ultimately run for office. Once candidates have been selected, violence may be used to intimidate voters and election officials during campaigns, registration, and polling. In some cases, violence can break out upon the announcement of the results if partisan polarization is very high and one group feels aggrieved by the outcome.

Since the reintroduction of democratic governance in the country in 1999, elections in Bayelsa state especially at the state, local government, and community levels have been marked by violence. For instance in 1999, while the Presidential election went on smoothly, the outbreak of oil wealth distribution induced violence delayed the conduct of state level of elections in the state. By the time of the 2003 general elections, the style and nature of the violence had increased. Most polling units and collation centres could not open due to high level intimidation. The election witnessed widespread violence across the state. In Nembe, it was reported that the clash between supporters of United Nigeria People's Party (UNPP) and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) on April 10<sup>th</sup>, 2003 at Bassambiri led to death of many (Human Rights Watch, 2003). In Southern Ijaw, the clash between the supporters of the All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) and the PDP on April 19, 2003 at Oporoma, the Local Government headquarters resulted in the death of seven persons. In Sagbama Local government, similar clash resulted in razing of the house of a local transition committee chairman as well as the office of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) with dozen of cars.



The 2007 gubernatorial election in the state even though appeared relatively peaceful witnessed twin attacks on the headquarters of the state chapter of the PDP.

During the 2012 elections, Bayelsa State was polarized by the intra-party violence within the PDP, which created a volatile atmosphere in the build up to the election. In 2012, there were two bombings suspected to be linked to political tensions around the gubernatorial elections (Fund for Peace, 2015b). November of 2013 was characterized by violence reportedly stemming from continued political tensions surrounding the Ijaw National Congress Elections in October 2012. These ugly incidents included the reported targeting and kidnapping of youth group members and political allies supportive of each candidate (Fund for Peace, 2015b). It was on this note that PIND (2015) stated:

Transition of gubernatorial power has historically been fraught with violence in Bayelsa. In 2012, for instance, political tensions were high, with reported explosions at party secretariats, cultist violence targeting political aspirants, a reported assassination attempt, kidnappings, and general political thuggery (p. 1).

Moreover, the 2015 gubernatorial elections, was contested between the All Progressive Congress (APC) coming from the back of its Presidential victory where it became the first party in the political history of Nigeria to unseat an incumbent President and party from power. It has former Governor, Timipre Sylva as its candidate, and the PDP, which presented incumbent the Governor, Henry Seriake Dickson as its candidate witnessed murderous violence. The election presents a shadow rematch of the APC and PDP in the state from the Presidential elections where the APC candidate Mohammedu Buhari won over the PDP candidate, a bona fide son of the Ijaw nation. In fact, the heat of that election was yet to settle, especially among the Ijaw's by the time the state went to poll on December 5, 2015 to choose its governor. The intense atmosphere under which the election was conducted can be gleaned from assertions of Asari Dokubo in an interview with PM News on September 8,

2015 stated:

...the Ijaw nation will not allow Governor Henry Seriake Dickson and former President Goodluck Jonathan to be disgraced by losing the December 5 gubernatorial election to the main opposition party in the state, All Progressives Congress, APC (PIND, 2015 p.2).

He went further to reinforce the significance of the December 5, 2015 elections within the context of the Ijaw nation and pride. Thus:

We Ijaws don't run away from our enemies. Jonathan did a lot for all those who have turned against us. Nobody, wherever he is, can move the Ijaw nation. We've never been conquered, the British knows this fact. This fight is beyond Henry Seriake Dickson, it is beyond you and me, it is for all. He will never be disgraced on December 5. They have boasted that they have control of the Army, INEC, Police, Navy and SSS. But we will meet in the battlefield on Election Day (PIND, 2015 p.2).

The 2015 gubernatorial election in the state can be described as the most deadly in terms of the volume of violence that was recorded in the process. Whereas the divisive nature of the pre-election campaign necessitated the deployment of large number of security personnel to the state, the election was characterized by voter intimidation, ballot box snatching, hijacking of electoral materials in addition to tumultuous violence in most parts of the state namely Brass, Ekeremor, Nembe, Sagbama, Southern Ijaw, and Yenagoa local governments. These were evident in the pre-elections sporadic shootings in Nembe local government precisely in Ogbolomabiri where two persons were shoot, Brass local government. In Ekeremor, gunmen on the early morning of the Election Day attacked the house of Minister of State for Agriculture, Heineken Lokpobiri who was the Director-General of the campaign team of the APC candidate (Ebiri, 2015). Southern Ijaw witnessed on the Election

Day heavy gun play and dynamites at Oporomo, headquarters of the local government where it was alleged that five persons lost their lives. According to the Amnesty International, the violence in addition to lives lost, led to the displacement of 600 persons in Southern Ijaw (Oguntola, 2016). The violence also resulted to the initial postponement of election in Southern Ijaw from Saturday to the next day (Sunday) before INEC declared the entire process inconclusive and consequently ordered a re-run in Southern Ijaw and few wards in Ekeremor and other places across the state where election did not hold were where cancelled due to one challenge or the other on January 10, 2016. According to the Fund for Peace (2015b):

There were over two dozen instances of insecurity in the second half of 2014. Of those, three incidents were believed to be mainly related to the upcoming elections. One such event occurred in November when unidentified gunmen shot and killed the Secretary of Bayelsa State Independent Electoral Commission (BYSIEC). Later in December, suspected political thugs raided the Bayelsa State Secretariat of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) (p.15).

Again, in its report on the Niger Delta election violence update, the Fund for Peace (2015c) observed that in the build up to the 2015 general elections there were several reports of destruction of campaign materials by youths and thugs in Brass, Kolokuma/Opokuma, and Nembe Local Government Areas (LGAs). During the same period, tensions between parties and candidates escalated to violence on several occasions, particularly in Sagbama, Nembe, Ekeremor, and Southern Ijaw LGAs, often involving suspected paid thugs.

The November 16, 2019 gubernatorial election even though was adjudged to be peaceful; was not entirely violence free. This was demonstrated by the death of some persons as a result of bullet wound, and various degrees of injuries incurred by others in election related violence in Nembe Local Government during a botched PDP campaign few days to the election. It was alleged that over five thousand thugs were imported from neighbouring Delta state and Rivers states to cause violence in the state during the election

(Ebiri, 2015). In other pre-election violence, one person was killed and many were injured when an All Progressives Congress (APC) rally in Sagbama, Bayelsa state turned violent on 3 February (Amnesty International, 13 February 2019). Commenting on the violence that happened in Nembe few days to the November 16, 2019 elections Governor, Henry Seriake Dickson stated that “what took place in Nembe, should be referred to as, ‘Nembe massacre.’ It’s unfortunate that in this day and age this continues to happen from time to time in our country and in this state particularly” (Oyadongha, 2020). The report of the panel of inquiry set up by the Governor, Seriake Dickson to study the pre-election violence in Nembe Local Government Area revealed that an estimated 21 persons were killed, 195 persons suffered various degrees of injuries, 19 persons were reported missing while another 350 persons reported that their properties were vandalized in the violence witnessed during the 2019 governorship election in the state (Osahon, 2020, Oyadongha, 2020). Besides, election was cancelled in Ologi (ward 03) in Ogbia Local Government Area following the abduction of an election official and the burning of voting materials (*Punch* 2019; Adebayo, 2019).

Conversely, the 16 Brigade of Nigerian Army in Yenagoa on February 24th, 2019, arrested 15 armed men suspected to be political thugs implanted to cause violence during the Presidential and National Assembly elections in Ikebiri, Southern Ijaw Local Government Area of Bayelsa. According to the Brigade Spokesman, Danjuma, items recovered from the suspects include one General Purpose Machine Gun, two 200 horse powered speedboats, large quantity of ammunition, 16 mobile phones and seven Motorola radio. Also recovered were five Motorola battery charger, three wrist watches, five torch light, four identify cards, and the sum of sixteen thousand naira (*Vanguard*, 2019). Responding to the violence witnessed during the 2019 general elections in some parts of the state, Governor Dickson in line with Section 2 (1) of the Commission of Inquiry Laws of Bayelsa State, inaugurated a six man commission of inquiry to study the violence witnessed during the conduct of Presidential and National Assembly elections in the state. The Commission was charged with the mandate of identifying the sponsors and perpetrators of the violence as well as identities of those that were killed or injured in the violence; in addition to properties destroyed (*Punch*, 2019).

## **Implications of electoral violence on the socio-economic and political development of the state**

Electoral violence just like all violent conflict results generates negative outcomes for the society where it occurs. Generally, violence in all its forms lead to injuries, population displacement, destruction of property, social dislocation, instability, etc. in addition to all these, electoral violence, specifically impacts democratic values and societal development in many ways.

First, electoral violence leads to the election of mediocre and incompetent leaders. Experience had shown that people that emerge ascend leadership position through violence rather than competitive electoral processes are often visionless, directionless, and planless. Violence are usually the instrument of those that believe they stand no chance of winning under free, fair and credible atmosphere. Democracy we all know works better in an enlightened society. Hence, the ascension of leadership position by persons not knowledgeable on the workings of human society and democratic order never augur well for societal transformation and advancement. It was on this note that the Chairman, BoT, G24 Embasara Foundation and former Executive Secretary/Chief Executive Officer of the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board, Arch Amagbe Denzil Kentebe observes:

Violence comes in when someone doesn't have something to offer. ...we believe that if there is no violence during election in Bayelsa State, we will have the best of leadership. And the best of leadership will always ensure great development (Salaudeen, 2019).

Second, violence during electioneering period use to give birth to leaders and government that suffer crisis of legitimacy. When the people assume that a leader imposes himself, or was imposed on them through *logic of the bullet rather than logic of the ballot*. They distance themselves from such a government, withdraw their support and hardly trust it and its policies. This lack of trust makes the people not to identify with the policies and programmes of the government. Alihodzic (2012) states:

Electoral violence reproduces repressive and non-democratic power structures including patriarchal repression in the institutional space. It doesn't only diminish trust in democratic processes, it undermines the quality of democracy both directly (repressing/killing voters, candidates, etc) and indirectly (limited inclusive participation) as well as through public perceptions of legitimacy. In some contexts, elections have already become synonymous with trouble and danger. Such associations have devastating effects on trust in democratic processes and institutions (p.57).

Third, another are that election-related violence is usually felt is voter-turnout. The popularity of a party's or candidate's programme in an election is measured by the percentage of the entire population of voting age (registered voters) that support his candidacy as expressed by the total vote cast in his favour. Interestingly, experience had shown that the rate of voter turnout and incidence of electoral violence are inversely related. Electoral violence scars people away from voting coming out to cast their vote. Decrying the situation, Akinola (2019) noted that during the November 16, 2019 gubernatorial elections, data from INEC shows that there are 923,182 registered voters in Bayelsa, however, only an abysmal 35.87% of them turned out to vote in the last election. Although, the November 16, 2019 gubernatorial election had been adjudged one of the freest and fairest elections conducted in the state in the recent times, the vestiges and memories of the one before and most especially the pre-election violence at Nembe and such other places across the state may have forced people to stay back. In so doing, it disenfranchises most of the eligible voters, violates their social and political rights and ultimately facilitates the election of an unpopular candidate. Fourth, is in the area of its effect on popular participation. Election-related violence undermines citizen's political participation in two ways: one of the ways it does this is by limiting voters turn-out on Election Day, as already mentioned. On the other hand, it discourages the involvement or citizens or their representatives in process of governance. As leaders having emerged relied on primitive accumulation of vote as well as efficiency norm as against legitimacy norm in winning the electoral contest, no longer see

the need for consulting or engaging the people in the process of policy making. This runs contrary to the Lincolnian understanding of democracy as government of the people, by the people and for the people.

Fifth, election-related violence seriously impact of economic activities. During violence, companies, manufacturing plants, business places, traders, farmers, transporters, teachers and fishers, etc, all shutdown. This way income lost and jobs are lost. Man hour are also wasted while crops in the farm ready for harvest spoil. Thereby triggering rise in the prices of goods and services. In the process, qualified labours, foreign companies and investments relocates their operational bases to areas they consider conducive for business. Alihodzic (2012) highlighted this fact when he observes:

Elections are the largest administrative undertakings in democratic societies, and consequently the costs associated with elections may represent a major financial burden. In some cases, governments are unable to finance elections and depend on international electoral assistance. In addition, electoral competition and election monitoring involve significant expenditures for political parties, and domestic and international monitoring groups. Election-related violence will not only squander those resources but will further cause destruction of local communities and infrastructure with numerous negative economic and developmental consequences, both direct and indirect (p.57).

Sixth, by destroying properties (both private and public) electoral violence indirectly enhances and worsens the underdeveloped situation of the environment. Given that the area suffers acute shortage of social infrastructures necessary for proper human functioning, the few available ones happen to be destroyed through the violence. For instance, when under the influence of election-related violence library facilities, building, markets, parks, water reticulation networks, etc are destroyed. It will not only set the state back, rather the government will be compelled to reallocate

its scarce resource. Suggesting that money that was previously budgeted for the provision of pressing needs to the people will be withdrawn in order to amend, reconstruct and replace what had been destroyed.

Seventh, electoral violence undermines the democratic character of electioneering processes. By not allowing the vote to count, electoral violence vitiates the democratic principles of electoral credibility and integrity from whatever elections that was conducted and opens the vortex for blame and counter-blames as well as claims and counter-claims that ends in electoral adjudications. Consequently, monies that ought to have been used in governing the state will be dedicated towards winning the court case while the society suffers. Throughout the period of litigation no meaningful governance takes place; thus reifying the idea of democracy without governance.

Eight after recruiting and mobilizing youths for to perpetrate electoral violence, politicians hardly retrieve these deadly weapons from them. This accounts for high rate of small arm and light weapons proliferations that often trail the elections in the state. it is these arms that use to fuel cult wars as well as increase in the rate of armed banditry, militant activities, and criminality in the state. This is evidenced in the daily reportage of cult related crimes in addition to armed robbery cases both inside commercial tricycles (popularly known in Nigeria as Keke), shop, business centres, markets, roadside kiosks and residential houses, etc.

### **Concluding remarks**

The Bayelsa political space is high tensioned and volatile. This volatility is evidenced in the brinkmanship that characterized elections in the state. Although, factors that trigger electoral violence are naturally curvilinear such as party politics, ethnicity based politics, etc. The findings of this study suggest that the roots of election-related violence in the state should be located in crude oil politics. Given that the state depends largely on oil revenue and other benefits that accrue therein for survival. As a result, the violence is but manifestations of intra and inter group struggles among political actors in the state over who or which faction of the elite class is to dominate the state. And as such, control, appropriate, and allocate the states crude oil wealth.



On this note, the study makes the following suggestions:

It is imperative that the economy of Bayelsa state be reformed and diversifies away from its crude oil dependence that is at the moment the major source of revenue to the state. As it is the lure of this easy wealth that requires no direct effort or input of politicians that compels individuals and groups to place high premium on the capture of state power that grants its occupant unrestricted access to the crude oil wealth. In addition to distribution and allocation of contracts and rewards, etc in the crude oil production value chain reserved for locals.

There should be severe punishment for sponsors and perpetrators of electoral violence. In Bayelsa just as elsewhere in Nigeria, nearly all forms of electoral exercise be it Presidential election, National Assembly elections, Gubernatorial elections, State assembly election, local council election, party primaries in addition to Ijaw National Council (INC) and Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) elections, etc use to marred by violence. Unfortunately, despite setting up of various committees and panels of inquiries; no one had been arrested or prosecuted in relation to these violence that claim lives in their numbers. The non-punishment of these conflict entrepreneurs and their foot soldiers even when arrested by security personnel serve to reinforce their commitment and predisposition to election violence. In addition to the prescribed punishment in the electoral, which to this study is too pedestral, such persons should be banned for live from participating in any political activities in the country. This will serve as deterrent to others. Politics should be on a part-time basis. In Nigeria and Bayelsa in particular, politicians take to politics as full time occupation. Hence, they have no other source of livelihood aside politics (the state). it is this situation that engenders the do-or-die approach towards the struggle for power. As the loss of power or inability to capture it, is not interpreted just as loss of position. Rather, it is, loss of means of livelihood and power. This explains why those in power do everything within their reach to remain in power, even when it is obvious to them they are not doing well. And those outside of power are equally too desperate to take over.

The state should be autonomous (independent) from the struggle of classes. This suggests that awarding of crude oil production related contract be it

surveillance or pipeline clearance, appointments, nomination/selection into committees, job placement, scholarship, etc, should be on the basis of merit as against mediocrity and partisanship. For as long as the state remain privatized in the interest of the dominant class or a section of it. And is by this token, seen as instrument of class rule, it becomes difficult, as argued by Okoye (2019):

For competing groups to see the state as an impartial public force that is out to protect the interest of all. Rather they view it as a partial entity that habitually intervenes on behalf of the group that controls state apparatus at any given time. Second, they all hold the opinion that their interests can only be served and protected if, and only when one of their own controls the mechanism for determination of who gets what, when and how? (p.41)

It is within the above context that electoral violence and its collateral damages to the society festers.

The government, its agencies, Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), academic institutions, etc should provide value reorientation intervention. The study assumes that the sponsors and perpetrators of acts of electoral violence are ignorant of the consequences of their actions in terms of human and material cost as well as its implication for democratisation. In the view of this, there need for relevant agencies such as the National Orientation Agency (NOA) and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to carry out a thorough value re-orientation campaign targeted at both politicians and youths. For the politicians, they need to understand that leadership is a call to service and not to be served or means of primitive wealth accumulation. And that it entails sacrifice and self-abnegation. On the part of the youths, they have to understand that violence is not a way of live. If it is to be, our politicians would have preserved and recruited their children for the jobs. Rather, than wasting their future maiming and destroying their available infrastructure, they should demand good governance as against guns, from politicians.

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ARTICLE

3

**MODERN AND REFRESHED APPROACHES FOR  
OPERATIONALIZING COMMUNITY POLICING  
MODEL IN NIGERIA**

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**Abstract**

*Community policing is a model of policing or strategy adopted by Nigeria to curb crime from the grassroots, starting from the local level. The strategy is based on the idea that local police have local responsibility to minimise the effects of stranger to stranger policing. The model promotes police working in partnership with the community in solving local problems. The idea is, however, fraught with many problems. A set of universally applicable principles and elements are identified, but exactly how they are implemented should vary from place to place, because jurisdictions and police agencies have different needs and circumstances. Throughout the development of community policing various definitions, meanings and practices have made the concept difficult to define. There is considerable uncertainty and disagreement about the conceptual framework of community policing and gross misunderstanding of the principles and elements of the model by those entrusted to implement the model. The study adopted qualitative methodology. An interview technique was used to collect data. A total of sixty-five participants were purposively selected for interview, due to their vast knowledge on the topic under study. The study reveals that officials entrusted with the implementation of the model are not specifically trained and most of them lack experience, cannot effectively operationalize the model. The recommendation includes training and retraining of community policing implementers to acquire the general knowledge of the concepts, elements and strategies of the model, need to identify other smarter policing tenets that can be operationalized in consonance with community policing, the adoption of modern, effective techniques and approach that best fits the diverse nature of Nigeria.*

**Keywords:** Smarter Policing, Refreshed Approach, Community Policing, and Nigeria

## **Introduction**

Recently, Nigerians have witnessed different types of crime such as extremism/insurgence, transnational crime, drug trafficking and related offences, organised crime, terrorism, and international proliferation of arms, smuggling and child trafficking, human trafficking, banditry, violence crimes, kidnapping and abduction, cybercrime, domestic violence and gender-based crimes. Police alone cannot effectively solve these aforementioned crimes. The question is, do we have enough specifically trained officers and partners who can be trusted with the operationalisation of community policing in Nigeria. The problem is that there is a misunderstanding surrounding the concept of community policing and some officials entrusted with the implementation of the model do not understand the conceptual framework of the model. Many thought that community policing is the same as regional security outfit or network. Many scholars have offered different definitions of community policing, there is considerable uncertainty and disagreement about how community policing and problem solving policing can be adopted together and the perception of limited insight of sworn officers held regarding the concepts of community policing. The study seeks to evaluate the concept and principles of community policing, identify community policing approaches and strategies, identify the elements of community policing, identify the benefits and effectiveness of community policing, evaluate barriers to community policing and make comparisons between community policing and other policing strategies. The study adopted qualitative methodology. An interview technique was used for data collection. Sixty-five participants were purposively selected for the interview due to their vast knowledge on the topic under study. The participants included officers from police force, policing experts, criminologists and academicians from various higher institutions of learning. Literature relating to the topic under study was consulted and qualitative analysis was used for data interpretations.

## **Rationale for the study**

The study outlines new community policing strategies, which emphasised that crime and incident statistics should be used as a partial measure for police performance and suggests survey as another way of measuring performance. The strategy is consistent with the approach that encourages the police and community to work together in partnership; develop role

that is broader than the traditional crime-fighting role; decentralised police resources, define geographic areas, that have the same identity and characteristics; focuses on problem solving rather than reacting to incidents that are merely symptoms of a broader problem; and emphasise flexibility with accountability. The study supports the proposition that community policing be operationalized in consonance with community oriented policing strategies, which required in the organisational structure; the need to devolve financial and operational accountability and responsibility to lower and more appropriate levels within a structure that supports change, ensures that the staff dealing with the community have the capacity to make decisions relating to their area. In terms of consultation; the police and community should work together in partnership and in consultation with particular reference to the role police and the public should play in resolving issues and problems. In the perspective of problem solving the need for an interactive process between the community and police, which identifies and resolves community problems. Policing must be intelligence driven.

### **Concept of Police and Policing**

Nigerian police is a department of the government charged with the preservation of public order and tranquility, enforcement of laws, the promotion of public health, safety and morals, prevention, detection and prosecution of offenders. The primary role of the police is policing. Policing is securing compliance with existing laws and in conformity with precepts of social order. However, the police are not the only agency in policing in the broad sense of the term. Conversely, not all those shouldered with policing responsibility belong to the police (Ezeji, 2020).

Policing has been necessary in all societies for the preservation of order, safety and social relations. Current police policies are based on the assumptions that proactive policing strategies will not only deter crime, but will also improve police and community relationships (Schanzer et al. 2016). Furthermore, policing is the activities conducted by police officers to preserve law and order. The policing of public places, actions of a person or group in authority to ensure fairness and legality in an area of public life. Policing involves overseeing, regulating, supervising, enforcing, implementing, observing, watching and checking up on (Ezeji, 2020).

## **Functionalist Theory**

Functionalist or consensus approach (theory) is a model that posits that behaviour in society is structured. This means that relationships between members of society are organised in terms of rules, social relationships that are patterned and recurrent. Functionalists believe, there is value consensus in every social reality. They believe that, there is a general agreement by members of a society on what is desirable, worthwhile, and worthless. People share consensus on the values, norms, and beliefs of a society (Wroblewski & Hess, 2003). A high degree of consensus in a society whether it is democratic or communist, bind members together to form an integrated and cohesive unit. In the application of functionalist or consensus approach in this study, Ezeji (2020) affirms that community policing is an organisation-wide philosophy and management approach that promotes agreement, consensus and partnership between the community, government and the police. In this agreement and consensus, community problems are solved proactively, causes of crime and other community issues, jointly resolved by the community, police and other role players. Functionalists also assume that societies and phenomena are pervaded by stability. The theory assumes that certain degree of order and stability is necessary for the survival of social system. Functionalists downplay the conflict in society between classes and argued that once norms and values are maintained, the society would be conflict free (Harlambos & Holborn, 2005). Despite class disparities, the authorities should ensure that norms and values that promote the economic growth and social welfare of the community is prioritized through consensus reached between the community and the Nigerian police, which is an integral part of the social system, because, the inability of the police to perform their duties effectively has affected economy, polity, families and the overall security of the nation. The perception has made people feel unsafe to go about their regular businesses, hence the agitation of smarter policing model that can be effective in addressing community problems in partnership with the police and members of the community. Wroblewski and Hess (2003) noted that the essence of community policing is to return to the day when safety and security are participatory and everyone assumes responsibility for the general health of the community not a selected few, not just the local government administration, not just the safety forces, but absolutely everyone in the community. According to Fridell (2004), functionalist or consensus

approach supports the key principle of community policing that posit that police should not be separated from, but rather joined in partnership with the community. Community Policing focuses on police and community participation, setting priorities, establishing partnerships and enhancing community safety. At the heart of community reassurance is engagement, listening and acting and taking proactive measures to prevent crime.

### **History and advent of Community Policing in Nigeria**

Due to the negative public perception about the Nigeria Police and its inefficiency in addressing crime at the local level, the former Inspector General of Police Tafa Balogun in 2003, undertook different measures to improve the police and citizens' relationship. He established in all states commands the Police Complaints Bureau and the Human Rights desks, and with the help of the British government, he introduced a pilot community policing project in Enugu State and presented eight points agenda that will address the following: massive onslaught against robbers, gruesome murder, assassination and other crimes of violence against the backdrop of which operation fire for fire was adopted as a methodology. Fast decisive crime/conflict management was adopted, a serious anti-corruption crusade, both within and outside the Force was launched. The comprehensive training programme conducive for qualitative policing was initiated, an improved condition of service and enhanced welfare package for officers, inspectors and rank and file. There were an inter-service/agency cooperation at all levels down the line. Robust public relations necessary for the vision of people's Police (Ibeanu, 2007). When Mike Okiro took over as Inspector General of Police in 2007, he introduced nine (9) way tests. The high points, which include transparency and accountability, war on corruption and crime, crime prevention, upgrading intelligence and crime database, improved training, improving the public image and relations of the police, improving human rights record of the police and interagency cooperation, Since 2004, when the Community Policing pilot project was introduced in Enugu State, it has also been implemented in other states such as Ogun, Ondo, Kano, Jigawa, Anambra, Sokoto, Cross River and Edo States (Ibeanu, 2007). Moreover, community policing can be traced back to the introduction of community constables, known as 'bobbies' by Sir Robert Peel in the newly created Metropolitan London Police District during the early the 19th century

(Patterson, 2007). Sir Robert Peel rationalised, police are the public and the public are the police.

### **Understanding the Concept of Community Policing**

Community policing involves collaboration between police and community members characterised by problem-solving and partnerships to enhance crime prevention. Community policing has been adopted by law enforcement agencies to improve trust between community members and the police, and leveraging on police resources through voluntary assistance by community members in public safety measures. The major reason for adopting community policing is to build a police organisation that is transparent, fair, neutral, accountable and responsive to public perceptions and expectations. The community helps develop effective strategies beyond the traditional method for policing, which is exclusively based on law enforcement and which tends to be reactive (Wilson and Kelling, 2007). Community policing involves problem-solving and community engagement with an emphasis on police-community partnerships to solve the underlying problems of crime, the fear of crime, physical and social disorder, and neighbourhood decay (Palmiotto, 2000).

Moreover, Cordner (2007) argues that the concept of community policing is misunderstood as a concept and recognises that community policing is not the answer to all the problems facing modern policing. It is not anti-law enforcement or anti-crime fighting. It does not seek to turn police work into social work and there is no iron-clad, precise definition of community policing nor a set of specific activities that should be included. A set of universally applicable principles and elements can be identified, but exactly how they are implemented should vary from place to place because jurisdictions and police agencies have different needs and circumstances. Throughout the development of community policing various definitions, meanings and practices have made the concept difficult to define (Brookes, 2006).

Similarly, community policing is defined as a philosophy of policing that promotes community-based problem-solving strategies to address the underlying causes of crime and disorder and fear of crime and provides reassurance. The primary objective of community policing is that it creates

positive police community relationships, which are achieved through community engagement, and by emphasising collaboration and prevention (Cordner and Biebel Perkins, 2005). Bucqueroux (2007) uses a medical analogy to describe community policing patrol officers are 'society's casualty physician responds rapidly to an occurrence, whereas community police the 'family physicians who have the time and opportunity not only to treat an illness but to prevent disease and promote good health. Fielding (2005) suggests that community policing is not a single concept but a contrast to rapid response and enforcement-oriented policing, so constables are closer to the community. Community policing model complements the work of Neighbourhood support groups. Neighbourhood support encourages crime prevention techniques such as public surveillance; property marking; and home security. These techniques are an important component of the work of community constables.

### **The origins of community policing: urban or rural**

Pelfrey (2007) highlights ranges of school of thought regarding the origins of community policing. The first school of thought argues that community policing developed its origins from a rural style of policing. Rural officers participate in a broader range of policing techniques due to the isolated nature and limited services available, where police are the only 24/7 service. Rural police assume a community-based model of policing, where the officers are integrated as a member of the community and establish compatible community relationships. In addition, rural officers have closer relationships with their community than officers in most urban settings. Critics of the second school of thought question whether a successful rural model of community policing can be adapted to urban areas because the urban population is more mobile; crimes differ, and communities are more heterogeneous and divided by ethnicity, culture, class, age or lifestyle or otherwise poorly defined or fragmented (Young and Tinsley, 1998). Furthermore, Scott et al. (2007) believed that rural communities are structured differently and perceive what is considered 'socially threatening' and crimes differently to urban communities. The theorist from the third school of thought argues that the changing nature of communities is the catalyst for community policing (Segrave and Ratcliffe, 2004), irrespective of whether it is a rural or urban setting. Scott et al. (2007) argue that rural

communities are currently experiencing 'chaotic social change' with the breakdown in traditional social roles and networks, which is characteristic of the fragmented and interpersonal relations in urban areas. Segrave and Ratcliffe (2004) state that an increasing urban sprawl and subsequent 'dormitory suburbs', which are empty during the day, has resulted in the need for community policing. Finally, the fourth school of thought argues that rural and urban policing are similar in the sense that they are reactive and primarily endorse a police professionalism ideology (Scott et al., 2007).

### **Origin of Community Policing of selected countries**

Community policing as a concept was first introduced in the United States in the 1960s to increase police community contact and reduce the fear of crime (Innes, 2003). It became a dominant policing strategy in the United States during the 1990s with the introduction of 100,000 new community police officers (Cordner, 2007). The deployment presented a change of focus to encourage problem solving and community engagement as opposed to reactive policing. Weisheit et al., (1994) believe that community policing emerged because of many social trends and movements namely victims' rights and civil rights, which resulted in demands on police to be more accountable to the public by being more responsive and connected to the community. Bucqueroux (2006) argues that community policing emerged in response to two unintended consequences of a modernising policing profession. First, technology, such as the police radio and patrol vehicles changed the relationships between the police and community. Previously, officers developed personal relationships with the community and needed the community was willing to share information. Secondly, police applied scientific management to policing, which created the perception that police were responsible for keeping the community safe. Previously, the community understood that ultimately community was responsible for reaffirming the social norms that promoted public safety (Patterson, 2007). Fridell (2004) agrees with Sir Robert Peel who rationalised, the police are the public and the public are the police. Furthermore, Fridell (2004) believes that the above statement is the key principle of community policing and that police should not be separated from, but rather joined in partnership with, the community. Community oriented policing began in New Zealand in the late 1980s with the introduction of the New Zealand Police New Model of Policing Strategy.



The strategy was based on the idea that local police have local responsibility to minimise the effects of stranger to stranger policing (New Zealand Police, 1989). The document promoted the idea of police working in partnership with the community to solve local problems. As a result, community constables were introduced throughout the country in the late 1980s. It was quickly discovered that the community policing model complemented the work of Neighbourhood Support Groups. Neighbourhood Support encouraged crime prevention techniques such as public surveillance; property marking; and home security (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988).

Community policing was adopted in South Africa in accordance with the policy framework and guidelines for community policing which was released by Department of Safety and Security in 1997. In this respect, the policy framework stipulated a clear relationship between local government and Community Police Forum (CPF) to ensure effective crime prevention at local level and requires the CPF to cooperate with local government by involving in the following collaborative initiatives: jointly setting crime prevention priority and agreeing upon strategy to ensure their implementation, assist with the development of targeted social crime prevention program, identifying flashpoints, crime pattern, community anti-crime priorities and communicating these to local government and the SAPS and participating in problem solving, mobilising and organising community-based campaigns and activities and the resources required to sustain them and facilitate regular attendance by local elected representatives at CPF(DSS,1997). Community Policing Forum was established in all police stations across the country to ensure that station commanders or commissioners are more accountable to those they serve, was done primarily to build trust and legitimacy in the communities where there is mistrust and conflict. Community policing uses intelligence to enhance crime prevention and reduction by encouraging the public to report crime, and exchange information about crime and criminality within their locations (NCPS, 1996).

## **Findings and Discussions**

### **Principles and Elements of community policing**

The study identified ten principles of community policing, which recognise elements of successful community policing. These include communities as

the focus of the Nigeria Police Force policing approach; by reducing crime and road trauma, community policing improves safety and reassures the community; police are visible, accessible and familiar to their community; police listens to their community, jointly prioritise concerns and keep them informed; police provide opportunities for community participation; problems are identified and responded to on a local level with the support of area, district and national, when required; police engage other government, non-government and community groups in problem solving partnerships; flexibility with accountability for achieving local community outcomes is emphasised; community policing requires an integrated intelligence-led approach; and community policing is the responsibility of all police staff irrespective of role or rank (Cordner, 2007).

The study reveals that, philosophical dimension is one of the elements of community policing. In this perspective. The philosophical dimension is central to the ideas and beliefs that underlie community policing, such as citizen input, broad function, and personal service. The rationale for citizen input is that law-abiding people deserve to contribute to police processes, but in return they participate and support the idea of community policing. Community policing is not only about community engagement but involves police responsiveness to community concerns in the best way possible. The community define their problems, which police then take seriously, even if the problems they define differ from police priorities (Skogan, 2006). To accurately determine community needs and priorities community participation to identify problems, assist police to drive the solutions, and maintain community ownership of the issues. Extensive input from the community will not only assist in identifying problems but also in prioritising and finding solutions. Cordner (1999) suggests that there are many mechanisms for achieving community engagement, which include systematic and periodic community surveys, fora, community meetings, and meeting with advisory groups and businesses.

The study found that the type of neighbourhood determines whether the community is good at dealing with their own problems or not. In this regard, Reno et al. (1998) specified, if the community has more social capacity, will be able to deal with their own problems and attend arranged meetings

than those without such investment. The respondent (15) opines that it is necessary to adopt a range of engagement techniques to ensure broad community involvement. Broad function requires the community policing role to go beyond calls for service and arrests to meet the demands of continuous sustained contact with the community. In other words, Flynn (2004) maintains that community policing involves broadening the police mandate beyond narrow goals of law enforcement as an end in itself. It recognises the importance of police in developing and maintaining the idea of 'community.

The respondent (23) believes that community police officers have a comprehensive role as planners, problem solvers and community organisers. As planners they are required to identify principal crime and disorder problems faced by the community and prioritise, as well as analyse and develop strategies to deal with the issues. As the problem solvers, they implement the actions and strategies to address the crime concerns. As community organisers, they increase the consciousness of the community and organisations to deal with problems.

The respondent (20) states that community policing is about the police working with the community to enhance safety. The role of the police and community in this partnership involves; conflict resolution, assisting victims and reducing the fear of crime. The above respondent opines that, expanding the roles and duties of police officers in community policing will enable them to think critically, proactively engage in service delivery, follow up on activities and provide personalised service delivery.

The respondent (1) agrees with Cordner (2007) who stated that community policing works best when officers know the residents, can deliver personalised service, as opposed to stranger policing. In addition, police need to be accessible, knowing and appreciating what the community wants and needs (Mastrofski, 2006). The respondent (19) highlights, that police identify the intervention needs and crime problems of the community, maintain an intimate relationship with the people and the environment, develop localised, community-specific responses, which generates a sense of accountability and responsibility. Due to the growing requirement for customer satisfaction

within policing, Ferreira (1996) emphasises the importance of implementing community policing as a philosophy rather than just a programme or project.

According to finding, the second element of community policing is the strategic dimension. In this dimension, key strategic operational concepts translate philosophies into actions, linking with the broad ideas and beliefs that underlie community policing. The strategic dimension of community policing includes re-oriented operations, emphasis on prevention, and geographical focus. Community policing enables police address the underlying conditions that lead to crime, but enforcement is still a core function. The respondent (19) opines that in the operational practice, police should look beyond traditional policing strategies, such as motorised patrol and rapid response, and replace them with more effective interactive practises e.g. handling emergency calls more efficiently to enable more time and resources to participate in community policing activities. Moreover, Segrave and Ratcliffe (2004) maintained that community policing is about mutual support and agreement, therefore, re-orienting practises should ensure slower response times for non-emergency calls to enable officers to develop long-term solutions for community concerns. The above authors believed that by re-orienting police activities the focus will shift from patrol-based orientation to problem solving, crime prevention education, and building positive relationships.

*In the view of respondent (6), the police should not take sole responsibility for crime prevention, but should play a crucial role in developing strategies in partnership with local communities. Also, measuring the impact of crime prevention should move away from relying on crime statistics and clearance rates and complement the qualitative practise of community policing.*

The geographical focus is a priority in the strategic dimension. It involves organising and deploying geographically based officers to maximise identification between specific officers and their specific community these would result in stronger police-community relationships, which in turn will increase mutual recognition, responsibility and accountability. Cordner (1999) asserts that geographically based officers should develop knowledge about the community, which enables early intervention, problem

identification, avoid conflict and misunderstanding. Respondent (3) opines that permanency of officers in a location or an area is a crucial component as it builds familiarity, which in turn helps develop trust, confidence and cooperation from both police and the community. Respondent (7) supports the above respondent and points out that, if a specific officer has permanent responsibility for a fixed area, the police officer becomes more responsible for identifying, dealing with crime problems and encourage communication between the police and community.

*The study identifies challenges that confront geographically based officers, which includes; the mobility of the urban population, where both victims and offenders presents a major challenge, assumption that crime-related problems do not develop in identifiable communities but in pockets of several communities, communities are fractured and difficult to engage with. To address these challenges, models of community policing need to be flexible enough to accommodate the particular character of the area.*

The study reveals, the third element of community policing, which is the tactical dimension. This dimension involves translating ideas, philosophy and strategies into concrete programmes. Tactics and behaviours include; positive interaction, partnerships, and problem solving. During the police and community interaction, the police enforcement role tends to attract a degree of negative interaction, so it is vital that police take necessary steps to engage in positive interaction with all parts of the community. They engage in positive interactions, where possible, have several other benefits such as building familiarity and trust; hence, the officers will be more knowledgeable about the people and conditions of the community, obtain and provide specific information to enhance crime investigations and problem solving (Cordner, 1999). Segrave and Ratcliffe (2004) maintained that positive community perceptions of police can be linked to low levels of crime, which is achieved through positive police-community experiences.

The respondent (11) states that techniques such as media campaigns, shop-front based officers and accessible mini-stations are believed to encourage positive interactions. The above respondent further points out that getting to know the community, by talking with all members, encouraging requests

for non-emergency assistance, and becoming more visible, will encourage information sharing and increase appreciation of concerns. Moreover, Sherman and Eck (2002) argued that random motorised patrol and rapid response lead to more uneasiness between the community and police. In addition, these traditional methods are not effective way to deal with the community problems

The study reveals, tactical dimension adopts partnership strategies. In this dimension, the police engage with the community in partnerships to deal with crime and related problems, which includes working collaboratively with other public and private agencies. In this regard, the respondent (19) points out that the police and community should work in partnership not only to solve problems, but to reduce the fear of crime, physical and social disorder, and neighbourhood decay. These relationships need to be based on trust by challenging people to accept their share of the responsibility, which in turn will enable parties to identify priorities and develop responses to solve their own problems.

In support of community policing partnership strategy, Mastrofski (2006) suggests that community policing seeks to link the police more closely to the community in 'partnership' arrangements: joint activities to co-produce services and desired outcomes, giving the community a greater say in what the police do, or simply engaging with each other to produce a greater sense of police-community compatibility. Solutions developed in partnership are appropriately targeted and therefore more effective. Flynn (2004) argues that these partnerships need to be based on trust. Community policing partnerships develop information exchange: the community provides the police with information about problem conditions and locations, crime concerns, active criminals, and stolen property, and in return police provide the community with information about community fears, problems, tactical information and advice about preventing and reducing crime. Skogan (2006) points out that the police are only one of the agencies responsible for addressing community problems, and other agencies take responsibility and respond to crime prevention and problem solving in partnership with police at all levels. Working in partnerships with both public and private agencies, such as schools, health, and housing, enables a broader range of issues to be

addressed than if each was working in isolation.

Another approach adopted by community policing is problem solving strategy. In this respect, problem solving is an interactive process, involving police and communities, identifying crime problems and developing appropriate solutions. The problem solving is essential to community policing and as such, problems should not be limited to crimes, and solutions should not have to involve arrests. Police and the community should be empowered to adopt problem solving techniques and take every opportunity to address the conditions that cause crime incidents. The problem solving aspect of community policing relies more on preventing crime than traditional methods, through deterring offenders, protecting victims and making crime locations less conducive to identify (Weisheit et al., 1994). Bucqueroux (2007) suggests that problem solving needs to be measured by asking if the problem is solved. Rather than focussing on traditional methods, such as, the number of arrests.

Cordner (1999) points out that problem solving within community policing model has several important features. This operates as a standard method of policing, not an occasional special project; practiced by all staff throughout the ranks; decisions should be made on the basis of information that is gathered systematically; involves whenever possible, collaboration between police and other agencies and institutions; and incorporates, whenever possible, community input and participation, so that the community's problems are addressed not only police departments but community shares in the responsibility. Furthermore, Cordner (1999) identifies four steps for problem solving in which community input can be incorporated. These steps include the identification of the problem; analysis of the problem; a search for alternative solutions to the problem; and implementation and assessment of a response to the problem.

The study found that organisational dimension is another element of community policing. In this dimension, it is crucial that the organisation support changes promote community policing. The key elements of the organisational dimension include; structure, management and information. Police should re-examine their structures to ensure that they support and

facilitate the implementation of the philosophical, strategic and tactical dimensions of community policing. Organisational structures and training should be in place to support the concept of community policing (Skogan, 2006). In addition, the mission statement should set out the broad goals of community policing, the police should be encouraged to develop practices that will enable them to achieve set goals. Furthermore, community policing initiatives that have the greatest success in overcoming challenges are those that have been implemented for the long-term and changing to a community policing/problem solving model needs careful planning with a long-term focus, as well as considering the considerable variations across Police districts (Mastrofski et al. 2007).

The role of the management is crucial in the implementation of community policing. Leadership has been identified as key to the implementation of community policing. 70% respondents agreed that the role of management is not to direct the activities of the field personnel so much as to guide them and ensure that they have the resources they require to do their jobs. The police executives should set the tone for the organisation and provide appropriate leadership to ensure that each member is actively involved in community policing activities. It includes re-examining the way people are supervised and managed. Reno, et al. (1998) argue that the implementation of community policing would be more successful if implementers have a better understanding of the conceptual framework of community policing and support and commit to it.

According to the respondent (25), information is vital in operationalisation of community policing. Police information systems are crucial in providing information to assist the community and respond to their problems. The above respondent affirms that the utilisation of problem solving techniques has highlighted the requirement for information systems to aid the identification and analysis of problems faced by the community, including the use of geographical information systems (GIS). Cordner (1999) suggests that information can be collected from community police officers, performance appraisals that reflect community activities, evaluating programmes for effectiveness as well as efficiency and assessing the police's overall performance on a wider range of key indicators. Cordner emphasises the



need for qualitative information to measure success rather than traditional 'bean counting' techniques; e.g. collecting information on wider functions than enforcement and calls for service.

### **The benefits of community police**

80% of respondents agreed that improving police community relationships and perceptions of police enable police to develop improved police-community relationships. They believed that improving police community relationships provides the police with the opportunity to meet the community's needs while increasing public accountability over police through participation. 55% respondents pointed out that increasing community capacity to deal with issues, building a community capacity, can mobilise and empower the community to identify and respond to crime and insecurity concerns. The benefit of an empowered community is a stronger community who wants to participate in addressing issues. Community policing offers the public a larger window into police activity and provides opportunities for 'grass roots' support for police.

Patterson (2007) asserts community policing has positive effects on police through increased job satisfaction and improved interaction with, and confidence in the community. In the view of respondent (4), community policing allows police to gain more understanding about the problem of the community, help them design appropriate intervention and promote the positive image of the police. The respondent (5) states that community policing increases the perceptions of safety and decreases the fear of crime. There is evidence that increasing community police interactions are associated with lower levels in fear of crime (Skogan, 2006).

According to the respondent (11), community policing is a policing approach adopted to address a range of different crimes, such as disorder and anti-social behaviour. 58% opined that community policing approaches can be used to address property crime, gang violence and organised crime, can be adopted to deal with anti-terrorist activities. Community policing can be used to reduce crime and victimisation.

### **Measuring the effectiveness of community policing**

55% respondents opined that the effectiveness of community policing practise depends on the jurisdiction and approaches adopted by the implementers. It can have a positive effect on community attitudes such as fear of crime and neighbourhood satisfaction. Due to the complex nature of community policing evaluations provide limited evidence of either success or failure.

Furthermore, Patterson, (2007) argues that evidence of effectiveness has been largely anecdotal. Measurement has tended to focus more on traditional indicators such as crime statistics even though the objectives are more specific than to reduce crime (Segrave and Ratcliffe, 2004). Many of the community policing evaluations completed in some jurisdictions have been criticised for failing to determine whether practises were effective. One of the difficulties obstructing the implementation of community policing is the vague definition of success has also hindered identifying the effectiveness of community policing. In addition, the lack of concrete definition of community policing leaves it open to his- interpretation. Cordner (1999) argues that because community policing is not one consistent thing, it is difficult to say whether it works or not Likewise, Harvey (2005) suggested that there is limited evidence of effectiveness because community policing is diverse in both the intention and practise. Furthermore, the effectiveness of community policing are affected by other factors, for example organisation, operational and personality factors (Fielding and Innes, 2006).

### **Implementation barriers to community police**

Patterson (2007) asserts that the implementation of community policing is challenged by the incremental nature in which community policing is introduced, resulting in increased resources allocated within short timeframes with little time for planning. Mastrofski et al. (2007) pointed that the traditional barriers of organisational change, scarce resources and a resistant police culture still exist and continues to the jeopardise the successful implementation of community policing initiative.

The study summarises the barriers to successful implementation of community policing. The barriers to successful implementation include: lack of organisational commitment and culture change; community

engagement seen as a one off series of events and not 'mainstreamed, lack of community ownership of the process; inequitable power relationships; lack of control, flexibility and tailoring at neighbourhood level; lack of status/incentives for beat officers; lack of understanding of police and community role; performance measurement frameworks that do not reward community engagement; individual officer appraisals that do not reward community engagement roles; lack of training for officers on community engagement philosophy and methods; police 'beats' that do not correspond to community perceptions of neighbourhoods; not recognising the historical lack of trust between police and certain communities; lack of capacity and collective efficacy in some communities; lack of a clear definition and training for the community role in engagement; lack of good quality information about crime provided to communities; lack of adequate feedback to communities on action from engagement; not valuing the contribution of communities and volunteers; lack of coordinated multi-agency approach to community engagement; and lack of initial extra investment or re-profiling of resources to community work.

The respondent (1) spotlighted gross misunderstanding of the concept of community policing, as a barrier to implementation of community policing also, officials entrusted with the implementation of the model are not specifically trained and lack experience on how the paradigm can be implemented. Most of the implementers of the model lack basic knowledge of community policing tenet, are not well exposed to the principles and elements of the community policing paradigm, thus affects the adoption and implementation of community policing

According to the respondent (30), most of the police officers and role players tasked with the implementation of the model are not adequately trained in the formation of partnerships; nor do they have experience in organising community involvement or community empowerment programmes. Respondent (29) opines that, implementers have limited training, training is short-changed because community policing is labour intensive. The respondent (11) pointed out that recruitment and training in Nigeria police have not been substantially revised to promote community policing techniques.

Skogan and Hartnett (1998) specified one of the key barriers to community policing is sustaining organisational commitment. In support of the above assertion, the respondent (26) maintains that in a system where there is sustained commitment and community ownership decline in levels of crime, social disorder and physical decay. Consequently, Polzin (2007) suggests that Police adopt effective management strategies for community successfully implementation of community policing.

Respondent (21) points out that community policing initiatives cannot survive in a police agency managed in traditional ways. If changes are not made, the agency sets itself up for failure. Moreover, Greene (2000) asserts that police culture is resistant to change towards community policing for several reasons, including the potential loss of autonomy; diversion of resources from traditional core functions; imposing unrealistic programmes. Police culture can undermine police-community relationships because police officers dominate as 'crime and disorder experts', which disadvantages the community when offering solutions.

The effectiveness of community policing becomes obstructed when community policing is operated as specialised units. Specialised units can create an environment of isolation or cause friction between staff. More successful community policing initiatives have incorporated a 'whole of organisation' approach. However, the implementation of a 'whole of organisation' approach is problematic. The respondent (11) asserts that, if problem-solving and crime prevention responsibilities are assigned to specialised units without fundamental changes in policing will affect the performance of the police in the implementation of the model. The respondent (15) points out that in some cases, specialised community policing units have caused major friction between the beat officer and the community police officer and this friction is due to the differences in practices.

The study reveals that the ability to sustain commitment from the community and external agencies has been identified as a barrier to community policing. Community policing is highly dependent upon community involvement but maintaining their sustainability has been an issue. Residents, unlike the agencies, are not paid, and to participate take time away from work,

family, friends, daily chores, and personal interests. Community policing implies that individuals have common interests, values, integrity, demands and expectations but in practise communities are ambiguous. Community involvement is not easily achieved, some areas are not easily accessible, that part of the community becomes excluded. Community policing serves the interests of the vocal minority and the presence of strong personalities and influential groups can dominate discussions and control the direction of an initiative. The ethos of individualism undercut attempts to work in partnership with the police. In addition, the lack of capital investment is seen as a lack of social investment. The conflicting values are also a problem for agencies working together. The lack of sustained interagency cooperation ensues because agencies have traditionally viewed that community policing to belong to police rather than a community-wide responsibility. They believed that working in partnership can result in conflicting values and different social values, hence affecting cooperation.

### **Community policing and other policing strategies**

The study reveals that many ideas of community policing and problem oriented policing are inter-related, particularly the problem solving aspect. The two models involve police embracing social policing style that comprises complex programmes and organisational support. The difference between the two strategies of policing is that problem-solving policing focuses police attention on the problems that lie behind incidents, rather than on the incidents only. Community policing emphasises the establishment of working partnerships between police and communities to reduce crime and enhance security. Problem oriented policing is commonly associated with crime science triangle, with the assumption that, in order for a crime to occur, there is an offender, a victim and a location. The basic elements of problem oriented policing identified by Bullock and Tilley (2003) include; grouping incidents as problems; focusing on substantive problems as the heart of policing; effectiveness as the goal; systematic inquiry; disaggregating and accurately labelling problems; analysing multiple interests in the problems, capturing and critiquing current responses; adopting a proactive stance; strengthening decision making processes and increasing accountability; and evaluating results of newly implemented responses. However, Ezeji (2020) states that, the police should prioritise and collaborate with the community

in solving community's problems, hence community policing relies on the community to define its problems or crime issues.

Reassurance policing is a neighbourhood policing that underpins the 'refreshed' approach to community policing. Reassurance policing has been described as equivalent to community policing, which requires the community to address local crime concerns and signal crimes (Smartt, 2006). Aspects of reassurance policing that overlap with community policing, includes t police and community involvement in identifying community issues, addressing public fear of crime and increasing police visibility to encourage increased trust in police (Virta, 2006). Reassurance policing has similarity with community policing, the overarching aim of reassurance policing is to improve community perceptions of crime and safety. Reassurance policing is a contemporary variation of community policing, developed from the community policing philosophy. Fleming (2005) believes that reassurance policing requires community involvement in both individual and organisational level, outside the law enforcement and beyond the public sector. The study found that, recently, United Kingdom policing has undergone a transformation, responding to the changing nature of crime and terrorism and to the rising public expectations of police, rolling reassurance policing into an 'effective and responsive local neighbourhood-policing' approach.

## **Conclusions**

In conclusion, the community should own the practise of community policing for it to be effective. Community ownership requires long-term commitment. To sustain this commitment from the community, a range of techniques need to be adopted. These include community meetings and working in partnership with local groups, involving other agencies in partnership to conduct crime prevention activities, sharing and solving the problem, and delegating responsibility for crime prevention from district commanders to individual officers. In order for community policing to be successful all barriers need to be identified during the design phase of community policing initiatives and addressed.

## **Recommendations**

The study recommends specialised training for community policing implementers to enable them acquire general knowledge of community policing concept, elements and strategies. Effective smarter, tenets such as problem oriented policing, sector policing, reassurance policing and intelligence led policing can be operationalized in consonance with community policing. Should adopt modern and effective way of operationalising community-policing model in Nigeria.

Need for Police to re-examine their structures to ensure that they support and facilitate the implementation of the philosophical, strategic and tactical dimensions of community policing. Organisational structures and training should be in place to support the concept of community policing. The mission statement should set out the broad goals of community policing and encourage police to develop practises that will enable set goals to be achieved. Changing to a community policing/problem solving model needs careful planning with a long-term focus and considering the considerable variations across police districts and stations.

For effective implementation of community policing, the principles of community policing that recognise elements of successful community policing should be considered and adopted. The principles that recognise communities as the focus of the Nigeria Police Force; that focus on reducing crime and road trauma, improves safety and reassures the community; ensures police are visible, ensures police are accessible and familiar to their community; ensures police listens to their community, jointly prioritise concerns and keep them informed; police provide opportunities for community participation; problems are identified and responded to on a local level with the support of area, district and national, when required police engage other government, non-government and community groups in problem solving partnerships; where flexibility with accountability for achieving local community outcomes is emphasised; principle that requires an integrated intelligence-led approach and recognises that community policing is the responsibility of all police staff irrespective of role or rank.

To effectively operationalise community policing in Nigeria, the principles

and elements of the community policing model should be adhered to. The element involves philosophical dimension that deals with the ideas and beliefs that underlie community policing citizen input; community determines, prioritise and find solutions to problems; police respond to community concerns; police use many methods to engage the community. Strategic dimension translates philosophies into action; re-orient policing operations; tools are developed to address the underlying conditions that led to crime; operational practises are interactive; enforcement remains a core function of the police; focus on long-term solutions. Tactical dimension entails the translation of philosophy and strategies into concrete programmes.

Partnership strategy should be adopted, which means working in partnership with the community and agencies to achieve desired outcomes; developing collaborative and targeted responses to community issues; ensuring that a broad range of issues is addressed; exchanging information is mutually beneficial to police and the community. Must adopt problem-solving techniques that address the underlying causes of community problems or issues; ensures that communities play an important role in identifying and addressing their issues; involves an interactive process that is essential for community policing; a system that is less reliance on traditional criminal justice system responses to problems.

Need for an organisational dimension supports changing to promote community policing. Adopt a structure that supports a broad organisational goals that encourages a culture that supports community policing; employ long-term strategies that support community policing; encourage structures and training that promote community policing. The management should develop and take ownership of problem solving and solutions; police executives should adopt leadership style that supports community policing practices Need for adopting information systems that is crucial in the identification and analysis of crime problems.



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**ARTICLE**

**4**

**LOOK BEFORE LEAPING,  
A CAUTIOUS NOTE ON NIGERIA'S E-VOTING**

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## **Abstract**

*Both institutional and procedural uncertainties have marred electoral practices and resulted into gross misconduct in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. In 2015, the Smart Card Reader (SCR) was introduced to Nigeria's elections to verify and match the voter's Permanent Voter's Card (PVC) with the holder's identity. The introduction was described as historic and avant garde by any electoral umpire in Nigeria's electoral history. The SCR foiled different previous election rigging techniques that had earlier eluded manual checks. The SCR was not perfect but its introduction had begun to instill confidence into the electorate and given integrity to the democratic process. The outcome of SCR motivated the electorate and driven them to clamour for e-voting. This paper interrogates the trend by using a two-prong approach: First, by attempting to address e-voting through the trajectory of the general elections from 1999 till 2019. Second, by doing comparative analyses of e-voting system across some developed democracies. The methods revealed that fundamental clogs to e-voting in these developed democracies cannot be downplayed. The paper then argued that as much as Nigeria is eager to embark on electoral maturity, it must exercise restraint before adopting a comprehensive electronic voting system.*

**Keywords:** e-voting, election, SCRs, democracy

## **Introduction**

The need to consolidate a nascent democracy is the responsibility of every stakeholder in the state. In this regard, there must be a congruence of legitimate interest and objectives to reasonably accommodate humane, civil, different viewpoints and perspectives by both individuals and institutions. To attain this political “utopia” requires a free, fair and stable Election Management Body (EMB) because Nigeria’s elections have been perennially fraught with irregularities. If the EMB injects a high level of credibility and transparency into the election process, the electorate will have confidence in the election process, a development that would eventually impact constructively on voter- turnout because once the electorate sees that its votes count, it will respond positively to civic and election responsibilities. So, the EMB holds a very high potential in procedural reliability and viability.

The democratization of politics has not been able to fully check electoral frauds often perpetuated by different political parties, politicians, and sometimes, in connivance with the EMB. Scholars have established that the collapse of Nigeria’s First Republic (1960-1966) partially led to non sustainability of electoral process. They cite the short-lived Second Republic (1979-1983); the Diarchy Experiment of 1993, election irregularity and absence of institutional records for building up democratic culture. Democracy is attacked when leaders are not produced through credible elections.

According to Nnoli (2003), “elections are so clearly tied to the growth and development of representative democratic government that they are now generally held to be the single most important indicator of the presence or absence of such government.” When a state has a culture of periodic election that is free, fair and credible, we begin to analyse such state from the lens of consolidated democracy. Diamond (2008) captures the meaningfulness of elections as:

when they are administered by a neutral authority;  
when the electoral administration is sufficiently competent and resourceful to take specific precautions against fraud; when the police, military and courts treat competing candidates and parties impartially; when

contenders all have access to the public media; when electoral districts and rules do not grossly handicap the opposition; . . . when the secret of the ballot is protected; when virtually all adults can vote; when procedures for organizing and counting the votes are widely known; and when there are transparent and impartial procedures for resolving election complaints and disputes.

It may not be possible for an electoral history to produce the entire democratic character stated above but the responsible factors could be the differing political terrain, popular culture toward election, state sovereignty and other intervening variables. A way of interrogating this issue is to address the question: to what extent does Nigeria's democratic set up concur with these identified traits? The first decade of the Fourth Republic was characterized by ineffective administration attributable to the weak institutionalization of the primary agencies of electoral administration, particularly INEC and Nigerian political parties. INEC lacked institutional, administrative and financial autonomy; professionalism and suffered interference. In addition, the desperation of many Nigerian politicians encapsulated by Obasanjo's pronouncement of "do or die" (to win at all cost) political gladiators compromised election administration in the country. The procedures for organizing and counting the votes were opaque and generally not transparent (Nwangwu, 2015). The integrity of elections was so compromised that election results were known before being officially declared. This eroded citizens' confidence in the election process..

To ameliorate the problem, there were series of electoral reforms. A major reform was The Electoral Act 2010 which encouraged the accommodation of new thinking. The EMB headed by Professor .Attahiru Jega (the only Independent National Election Commission [INEC] Chairman to oversee two Nigerian General Elections (2011 and 2015). The 2011 General Elections, especially the presidential election, was a good startup point. It showed that the introduction of technology to voting was apt because it emasculated sharp- electoral-practices of different kinds. Nigeria is not an isolated case. The prevalence of electoral irregularities in many transitional democracies,



especially in Africa, has accentuated the clamour for and use of voting technologies for uncovering and reducing election frauds (Nwangwu, 2015).

### **A New Beginning**

According to Golden, Kramon & Oforu (2014), “these technological solutions, such as electronic voting machines, polling station webcams and biometric identification equipment, offer the promise of rapid, accurate, and ostensibly tamper-proof innovations that are expected to reduce fraud in the processes of registration, voting or vote count aggregation”. Biometric identification machines authenticate the identity of voters using biometric markers (such as fingerprints) that are almost impossible to counterfeit. The technologies are particularly useful in settings where governments had not previously established reliable or complete paper-based identification systems for their populations (Gelb & Decker, 2012).

Most of the factors that necessitated the introduction of voting technology include the challenges and problems of identifying a voter from an impersonator; as well as halting the attempt of multiple voting, amidst other challenges. The biometric identification machine, as observed by Gelb & Clark (2013), were already in use for voter registration and as of early 2013, 32 of the world’s low and middle-income countries had adopted biometric technology as part of their voter identification system. African states like Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, Cameroon, and Mauritania had adopted this system with varying degrees of success and it has improved their recent elections.

Following the various degrees of success recorded in the usage of SCR in both Anglophone and Francophone countries, it became incumbent on Nigeria’s EMB as well as the voting public to devise anti-rigging biometric devices for authenticating voters’ identity to match with their corresponding polling units for the 2015 general elections. The Smart Card Readers (SCR) was introduced as a precursor to technological voting. As expected in the introduction of new innovations, glitches occurred here and there and the card SCR was criticized from different angles but Idris & Yusof (2015) saw the viability of election administration as an implication for poverty alleviation. They revealed that the right-conduct of elections would ultimately usher in credible candidates

and good governance which is the hallmark of democracy. The only way to achieving this was to further introduce technology in election administration, and if possible, adopt e-based approach for the conduct of the 2019 elections. Enwere & Ladan-Baki (2015) noted that electronic accreditation and voting will reduce the menace of voters' inducement, though it was not really demonstrated. All these galvanized the passage of the 2010 Electoral Act Amendment Bill 2017 into law which empowered INEC to conducting electronic elections as it deemed fit. No sooner had the law been enacted than INEC established a committee to ensure full implementation of this law in delivering a technology driven 2019 election. The question that this paper seeks to unravel is "Nigeria really ready for a full electronic voting in 2019?" because isolated cases of machine malfunction in some units compelled INEC to use manual accreditation for some voters in 2015.

It would also be recalled that Section 52 (2) of the Act cautioned that "the Commission shall adopt electronic voting in all elections or any other method of voting as may be determined by the commission from time to time." It continued, "The amendment mandates e-voting without ambiguity but also gives the Commission discretion to use other methods if it is impracticable to use e-voting in any election." If Nigeria is yet to get the electronic voters' verification right, how possible would full e-voting be conducted within just four years when some advanced democracies have had to retreat from e-voting due to issues bordering on transparency, In this regard, there is some level of doubt in the mind of the electorate on the continuous usage of technology and going the entire way of e-voting .

This paper attempts a cursory review of electoral practices in Nigeria with particular attention to the SCR intervention to 2015 and 2019 general elections .It assesses the challenges and shortfalls, explains the workability of man-to-computer communication with the use of control model; runs a detailed comparative analysis of e-voting system around the world, especially developed democracies, and lastly, justifies Nigeria's needs to tread cautiously in its voyage of technological involvement to voting system.

### **Cybernetics: A Theoretical Statement**

Control model is an aspect of the generic system theory and it is

interdisciplinary. Otherwise known as Cybernetics, control science is the study of the interaction of human/machine and guided by the principle that different types of systems can be studied according to the principles of feedback, control, and communications. It underscores the implicit relationship between man and machine (in this case computer system) that prompts information creation, processing, storage and output, of which result goes to affect human environment and behavior. Mindell (2010) remarked that cybernetics has a quantitative component, inherited from feedback control and information theory but it is primarily a qualitative, analytical tool - one might even say it is a philosophy of technology. Confignal, Neuman, McCullouch, Ashbys work etc,(years) further grew the discourse but the model was fully developed by Norbert Wiener (1948), who articulated the fusion of communication and control for a generation of engineers, systems theorists, and technical enthusiasts of varied types. Cybernetics may not really exist as a concrete field of scientific discipline but its influence is felt in a wide range of academic endeavor, and therefore it is regarded as an interdisciplinary science. Novikov (2015) remarks that cybernetics has expressive relevance in a wed of fields; control theory, information theory, mathematical communication theory, data analysis and decision making, operations research, optimization, artificial intelligence, and general system theory. Wiener made a case for “systems approach” and called it a classic. In contemporary social analyses, a system consists of the process where supports and demands that are generated through the interactions between civil - civil, civil - authoritative and authoritative - authoritative societies, which are sponsored into the public decision making channel, processed and produced as a public decision in form of laws, policies, general understandings, or even inactions. Where cybernetics fits in here is the scientific philosophy of precise decision making and prediction under control black box (Mindel, 2010). One of the earliest studies on voting decisions where the cybernetics model was applied was *The American Voter* where Angus Campbell led other researchers to give sophisticated accounts of how computer technology influences electoral processes. What cybernetics tries to explain is how inputs are made into computer brain box to elucidate understanding of the desirability of achieving credible electoral democracy within the electronic womb of computer technology (Mindel, 2010).

Cyberspace now resonates everything man does. A reality which is x-rayed in citizens increased participation in public decision making process, where elections are domiciled. Public orientation in form of awareness creation, electoral education, public service announcement etc, are communicated through various social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Blackberry Messenger, Whatsapp, Skype, Instagram YouTube etc. Nwangwu (2015) is of the view that the youth are especially mobilized and sensitized through those mediums on the need for registering, collecting their PVCs and actual voting. It is in progressive enculturation of this that the SCR was introduced for pre-voting verification. However, whenever SCR malfunctions at a particular unit, it provokes tension and suspicion of foul play and confusion and rising tempers which could only be tamed with timely intervention. The fact that e-platforms were used to frustrate criminal attempts to disrupt elections in polling booths and collation centers cannot be discountenanced. Cases of irregularities and sharp-practices were brought to public notice through the use of technology. According to Momodu (2014), riggings are becoming obsolete because smart technologies are breaking down the wall of election *hocus-pocus* of the past years. The cybernetic input to the 2015 elections in Nigeria therefore, has restored confidence into the nation's elections and the electorate. Perhaps, the only concern that might evolve is the ingenuity that might be displayed by "Smart Alec" to bypass the computer brain box through money induced voting because money induced voting is becoming a noticeable but worrisome trend in Nigeria's democracy.

### **Conceptualizing E-Voting**

E-voting refers to the electronic means of verifying voters, casting votes and the electronic means of tabulating votes. Ansolabehere (2006) puts a thin distinction between electronic voting and internet voting.

He stated that electronic voting is rightly seen as a transitional technology between traditional modes of voting and Internet voting. In this broad sense, most voting methods currently in use in the United States employ electronics. In a country where voting exercise has been fully automated, e-voting may evolve. Essentially, therefore it indicates that e-voting varies from democracy to democracy.

## **Kiosk**

Kiosk e-voting consists of dedicated machines used in polling stations or elsewhere, such as shopping malls, to let electors cast their votes. Votes are cast using buttons or a touch screen and are stored in an electronic memory. If kiosk system is used in a polling place, it has the advantage of being supervised (ORG, 2007). Kiosk is common in many developed democracies around the world.

## **Remote Voting (Internet)**

This is the system where votes are cast via computers, mobile phones, tablets or any internet enabled devices from the convenience of the voters' locations. Unlike the kiosk, it is not usually supervised by any official, and could be subject to abuse because polling can be electronically monitored to know who has voted what and from which device. Therefore, privacy and anonymity is seriously compromised and it opens the door to vote buying. According to ORG (2007), "There are technical problems too. The system is vulnerable to attacks both on the central e-voting server and on each computer used to vote." So, countries need to think twice before embarking on this option. Renowned cryptographer and computer security expert Bruce Schneier (cited in ORG, 2007) argues that "a secure internet voting system is theoretically possible, but it would be the first secure networked application ever created in the history of computers."

## **OMR (Optical Mark Recognition)**

Optical Mark Recognition (OMR) is half-manual, half-electronic. The voter marks an OMR sheet that bears the names of the candidates with boxes to shade. Then an OMR reader will read the poll and the results will later be extracted and communicated to a central collation center through a modem but the deposited sheet will be available for audit in case of malpractices.

## **Short Code/Message System**

Votes are cast either through a touch-tone system (similar to that used for television votes) or through SMS text messages on mobile phones. Authentication is achieved through the use of PIN and access codes that are mailed to voters ahead of the ballot (OMG, 2007)

Punch Card is another form and it has enjoyed great history in the American voting system. All these methods have been experimented, continued in some states but rejected in others with established reasons. They are far from being infallible in practice, though with great precision appeal in idea state. The shortfalls to them will be revisited in a later section of this paper.

### **2015 General Elections and the Smart Card Reader (SCR)**

Nigeria's 2015 General Elections has been the most politically engaged election in the political history of the country. It was the closest to true multi-party democracy that Nigeria is expected to practice. In the words of Alebiosu (2016), "huge resources were used for the elections including 120 Billion Naira expended by INEC; deployment of 750,000 ad-hoc election staff and over 360,000 security personnel. The presidential election was contested by fourteen candidates from different political parties." This shows that large scale human and material resources went into the election. It was an elaborate election, it was unprecedented. Perhaps, it should be stated that 2011 had created the pathway for the 2015 elections. At the end of the voter registration exercise in 2011, INEC had claimed that a total of 73 million Nigerians had registered out of which the Automated Fingerprint Identification System had removed 800,000 persons for double registration (Aziken, 2015). It was on this basis that INEC resolved to produce a more credible election result in the 2015 election by introducing Permanent Voter Card (PVC) and Smart Card Reader (SCR) to verify and accredit voters at the polls. The SCR matches PVC with the holder identity to ascertain if he had previously registered as a voter in that particular unit. The 2011 voters' register-Nigeria's first electronically compiled register- was used in the production of the PVCs for the 2015 General Elections (Nwangwu, 2015). For the nation to prevent another "Orange Revolution" at all cost, INEC marshaled all available tactics to ground any attempt at rigging the election. It would be recalled that national security was at a precarious state (owing to insurgency in Bauchi, Adamawa and Yobe [BAY] states and a high level of insecurity in other parts) as the 2015 elections was approaching. It was against this backdrop that the SCR was introduced into the INEC Voters Authentication System (IVAS).

The INEC Voters Authentication System (IVAS) was specifically designed to

electronically authenticate voters on polling day and it adopted Dual Core Cortex - A7 CPU with ARM ultra-low power consumption. It has a single frequency of 1.2GHz and an Android 4.2.2 operating system (INEC, 2016). It has a Secure Access Module (SAM) card used to enhance security and cryptography performance on the device. It is used commonly in devices that need to perform secure transactions, such as paying terminals. Physically, a SAM can either be a SIM Card and plugged into a SAM slot in a reader or a fixed integrated circuit. The ability of the Smart Card Reader (SCR) to perform the above functions as well as keep a tally of the total number of voters accredited at the polling units and forward the information to a central database server over a Global System for Mobile (GSM) network makes the card reader suitable to the nation's electoral history (Engineering Network Team, 2015). Apart from the need for a credible, transparent, free and fair election, other reasons for the deployment of the SCR were to do a range of statistical analysis of the demographics of voting for the purposes of research and planning; to build public confidence and trust in the election; to reduce electoral conflicts; to ensure a free and fair election and to further deepen Nigeria's electoral and democratic process (Alebiosu, 2015).

On March 7, 2015 (21 days to election), INEC test-ran, for reliability, the biometric technology in 225 out of the entire 120,000 polling units and 358 out of the 155,000 voting centres used for the elections (Idowu, 2015). The test-run of the device took place in 12 states namely: Rivers and Delta (South-South); Kano and Kebbi (North-West); Anambra and Ebonyi (South East); Ekiti and Lagos (South West); Bauchi and Taraba (North East); as well as Niger and Nasarawa (North Central). The pilot revealed a number of inconsistencies but INEC remained confident that the device was good for general elections. Out of the total experimental voters that came out for the test-run, 59% had their PVCs accredited. For the remaining 41% , INEC resolved (with the political parties) to manually accredit any genuine voter whose PVC could not be accredited by the SCR. Instructively, a wide percentage of the Nigerian public remained skeptical of INEC for the introduction of the SCR. In fact, a section of the political class criticized INEC's boss for attempting to strategically rig the election by introducing the SCR. Others, however, felt it was a laudable idea; Mohammed averred:

Nigerians have sacrificed all they can to obtain their PVCs, which are now their most-prized possession. They have also hailed the plan by INEC to use the card reader to give Nigeria credible polls. Only dishonest politicians, those who plan to rig, those who have engaged in a massive purchase of PVCs and those who have something to hide are opposed to use of the machine (cited in Adeyemi, Abubakar & Jimoh, *The Guardian*, March 5, 2015).

In corroboration of the above, Professor Attahiru Jega (as cited in Oche, 2015) maintained that it was only those that hitherto nurtured plans to fraudulently manipulate the outcome of the elections that were crying foul over the introduction of the technology. Some other people also criticized INEC for postponing the elections (based on security reasons and to ensure equitable distribution of the PVCs). At the heart of this was the debate on the legality of SCR usage. Some contended that it was unconstitutional for INEC to introduce a machine to manage Nigeria's voting process since the Electoral Act 2010 directly outlaws electronic voting in Nigeria. A better comprehension of this discourse will require interrogating the statutory responsibility of INEC itself.

Under paragraph 15 of Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution (as amended), INEC is mandated to organize, undertake and supervise all elections in Nigeria; conduct the registration of persons qualified to vote and prepare, maintain and revise the registration of voters for the purpose of any election (Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre, 2015). It is also empowered to carry out the functions conferred upon it by virtue of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). It would be recalled that Section 118 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) subjects the registration of voters and the conduct of elections to INEC's discretion. (Discretion in the sense that from time to time INEC may need to change strategy to suite the demanding political environment in Nigeria). If it is true that the Electoral Act 2010 really confers on INEC the power to cause, to design, print control the insurance of voters cards to voters whose names are on the voters register, then it implies, as expressed by the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (2015), that INEC has express and



implied powers to design means, procedures and processes that enable it exercise the powers granted it under the Constitution including, for example, the use of permanent voter cards in the 2015 general elections.

Falana (2015), in his contribution, averred that the deployment of the card reader by INEC was not illegal. He submitted that INEC has the constitutional power to set the standards and guidelines for elections. In view of this, he argued that the card reader was part of accreditation and not voting. He maintained that what the law proscribed is electronic voting and not the card readers. Therefore, he said that the usage of the card reader in the 2015 general elections was legal and legitimate (cited in Oderemi, 2015). Banire (2015) concluded: “The basic canon of interpretation or construction of statutory provisions remains that what is not expressly prohibited by a statute is impliedly permitted.” Amidst all the debates, the elections were held and the SCRs were used.

### **Smart Card Readers: Matters Arising**

The operation of the Smart Card Reader (SCR) did not just go without hitches on election days. A discussion of some of the challenges of the SCRs which came from its usage in the prescribed environment will suffice. Thereafter, there would be a look at the operational problems of the machine.


*Poor public awareness:* Nigeria is a country with a high level of illiteracy and restricted accessibility to modern western civilization. A large number of Nigerians especially the electorate in rural communities was completely unaware of the device. Many of them had neither seen nor heard of the card reader until the election day. Before INEC initiated something new and unique, the Commission was expected to have undertaken massive public education especially in rural areas. The urban dwellers would not have needed much re-education on the SCR because they were already familiar with electronic transactions and internet of thing (IoT). So, due to be absence of public awareness, there was a lot misconception about the device. To some electorate, the card reader was a voting device. Inadequate information dissemination and poor sensitization of the electorate on the card reader led to some poor human relations and uncooperative attitudes between some of the illiterate electorate and election officials (Alebiosu, 2015)

*Inadequate Training for INEC Staff on SCR operation:* INEC's field staff especially the Presiding Officers and Assistant Presiding Officers were not properly trained on the use of Smart Card Reader (SCR). Many of the ad hoc staff did not have any knowledge or exposure or orientation on e-governance before the election time. At the point of practical training, the venues were always cramped with trainees and the machines were inadequate. Sometimes, a hundred or more participants had to share just one or two machines. In other words, the trainees were inversely proportional to the machines. These resulted to inadequate training and consequently, INEC staff had little or no technical knowledge to take charge at polls. Many times, they got flustered by minor problems that they ought to have been able to handle but often resorted to calling on the technical crew. One of the most simple but embarrassing problems was that the staff did not know that they ought to remove the protective film on some the card readers before putting them to use. This prevented some of the devices from detecting thumbprints. Inability to detect thumbprints infuriated some members of the electorate and they expressed anger and embarrassment. This snowballed into tensions because the presiding officers themselves had become confounded by the scenario.

Nwangwu (2015) summarized the problems encountered by voters as well as INEC staff in the course of operating the machine. Some of the challenges include inability to read fingerprints especially the fingerprints of elderly people; some card readers were not sensitive to thumbprints; rejection of Permanent Voter Card (PVC) especially cards brought from other polling units; there were cases of card readers not working at all; there were delays in using the card readers in some polling units; there was network failure; there were cases where voters' pictures did not appear on card readers; some of the card readers functioned slowly and did not pick up on time; some card readers initially rejected their passwords; there were a few cases of low battery strength and in some instances the batteries were completely drained; there was a case where the card reader did not correspond to the manual; some card readers stated card mismatch information; some of the card readers had incorrect setting; and during the Governorship and SASS Elections, some card readers still had data from the March 28 elections on them (Election Monitor, 2015, pp. 46-47).

Most of these problems reached a crescendo at the Presidential and National Assembly elections. However, there had been marked improvement in the Gubernatorial and State Assemblies elections that followed especially in the South East. Election Monitor (2015) presented the chart as thus:

**Figure I: Rate of Failure of Card Reader during the 2015 General Elections**



Source: Adapted from Election Monitor (2015). *2015 General Elections observation report*. A Publication of Election Monitor.

Overall, the SCR was not short of expectation at all in its performance. In the words of Jega (cited in Oche, 2015),

we have made rigging impossible for them (electoral fraudsters) as there is no how the total number of votes cast at the polling unit could exceed the number of accredited persons. Such discrepancy in figures will be immediately spotted. This technology made it impossible for any corrupt electoral officer to connive with any politician to pad-up results. The information stored in both the card readers and the result sheets taken to the ward levels would be retrieved once there is evidence of tampering....

This above did not rule out the fact that Nigeria needed to improve its election technology. It has not been fully demonstrated that the SCR is totally secured and cannot be hacked.

### **The 2019 General Elections and the Smart Card Readers**

There was no significant improvement between the conduct of the 2015 and the 2019 General Elections. After a laudable landmark in the 2015 election, the electorate expected a remarkable improvement in the conduct of the 2019 elections but the contrary was the case. There was no significant efficiency of delivery and this led to the waning of public confidence and accountability in the election process. Consequently, it led to all-time low voter turnout and poor logistics management. The last minute postponement of the Presidential and National Assembly elections, barely few hours to commencement was partially attributed to low voter-turnout owing to loss of interest and confidence in the process (NDI/IRI, 2019). The postponement in itself was partly attributed to delay in election budget-approval by the National Assembly. The elections were eventually held on the postponed dates.

In 2019, there was neither significant difference nor improvement in the application of the SCRs from the 2015 elections. Perhaps, the only noticeable improvement was on the introduction of electronic collation of results. While this was piloted in both Osun and Ekiti States gubernatorial elections that preceded the general elections, the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended in 2017) by the National Assembly that would have granted INEC the legal backing was not assented by the President on the ground of bad timing. Therefore, only the number of accredited voters was electronically communicated to the Resident Collation Centers. As recorded in 2015, challenges were recorded both by INEC officers and voters. As observed by Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room (2019), some of these included reports of card malfunction from Lagos, Ogun, Imo, Abia, Nassarawa, Kebbi, Kaduna states and F.C.T ; manual accreditations in Imo and Sokoto in some polling units because of system failure; Biometric failure in capturing finger prints of voters, notably YPP's presidential candidate (Prof Kingsley Moghalu in Anambra State) and then House of Representatives Speaker (Hon. Yakubu Dogara in Bauchi); disappointing performances of some INEC ad hoc members (NYSC corps members) who could not operate the Smart Card Readers properly but were purportedly adequately trained by INEC.

From the foregoing, it can be said that the blueprint of 2015 had not really been advanced. Measuring the advancement of a democracy is not directly tantamount to how sophisticated an election is electronically managed but preventing and managing preventable election problems.

### **Select cases of E-Voting Application in Advanced Democracies**

The earlier section demonstrated the problem with Nigeria's nascent democracy. It reviewed the introduction of SCRs to the 2015 general elections. It also highlighted the attendant problems and issues with the SCRs and showed its fragility in election conduct in Nigeria. An examination of the international application of e-governance will legitimize the construction of a valid opinion on SCRs application in Nigeria.

### **Americas**

The history of e-voting can be traced to the 19<sup>th</sup> century when the legislature roll call vote proposal was made. Extant Literature from the United States shows that it is perhaps, the very first country that experimented with e-voting in its elementary form. Generally, the punch card system debuted in the 1960s (McCarthy, 2008). The traditional e-voting technology, which is the Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) was first introduced in 1975 in Chicago, Illinois, and called 'Video Voter.' The 1994 presidential election and, by extension, the 2000 represented another bold era in machine voting in the US. The progress appeared tremendous because comparing 7.7% of American voters in 1996 who were already using one form of e-voting or the other, 28.9% in 2004 had complied with this system (McCarthy, 2008). The American experience has not always been an easier one. In 2007, Open Rights Group (ORG) reported that a group of experts, in 2004, issued a critical report on a planned internet voting system for US soldiers oversea, resulting to the project being cancelled. The vulnerability, the group says, cannot be fixed by changes or bug fixes to the system. They are software ubiquitous feature today, which cannot be eliminated in the foreseeable future without some unforeseen radical breakthrough (Serve Security Report, 2004). According to Voter Unite.org (2007), hundreds of election equipment malfunction have been reported by the media. In the 2004 General Election, more than 125 of such were reported. With all these lacunae confronting the most advanced democracy in the world, coupled with the infamous 18,000

questionable votes cast with an e-voting system that threw congressional seat into limbo in 2006/7, puts a double to the glorious failure of DRE application seat in US elections (ORG. 2007). Part of what contributed to the problems with e-voting in the United States was the decentralized nature of the American voting system. It is theoretically envisaged that since many European states practiced relatively centralized democracies, obviously with smaller geographical lay-out, e-voting system should bring better results in its experimentation, but this is rarely the case in even the most developed of these states.

Canada did not present anything too different. Venezuela had a radical turn. Though it started quite late, but up to 99.5% of polling places in the country used e-voting technologies in the 2007 election (The Carter Center, 2007). All machines would be disconnected till after polling are concluded, and then relay the votes at a go to curb transmission hacks. This was a breakthrough, but it had its own cost.

## **Europe**

A ground breaking pilot was conducted in United Kingdom in 2003, which covered 14% of the English electorate and was funded with £18.5 million by the central government, and with complementary budget by local governments. EC Press (2007) revealed that the electorates criticized the selection and management of the exercise on the cost of e-voting compared to pencil and paper. Stratford (2003) revealed that for ordinary election, their cost were less than £1 per vote, while it cost as much as 55 and 120 for internet and kiosk votes, respectively. Inability to maintain voters' anonymity can open the way to vote buying and ballot audit difficulties arising from non-materials natures of the votes, and most importantly, network security. Schneider (2007) argued that "a secure voting system is theoretically possible but it would be the first secure networked application ever created in the history of computer." Is it worth the cost?

After a number of trials at the birth of the millennium, the Italian Interior Minister Guiulano Amato announced Italy's decision to stop machine voting. He said that "it will be triumph of our ancestors..... Let's stick to voting and counting physically because it is less easy to falsify". It would appear that

the unverifiability nature of computer black box informed Italy's decision.

The Dutch Intelligence and Security Service confirmed that from a remote end, a vote cast from the machine's radio emission could be detected. Security expert analysed this as an unpardonable flaw of the e-voting machine and subsequently the technology was repurchased by the Irish government. In view of this, Netherland government reviewed its electoral law which led to eventual withdrawal from e-voting (Wikipedia, 2017)

The Republic of Ireland bought voting computers from a Dutch company Nedap at the sum of €50 million. It was test-run for a pilot election of some constituencies in the 2002 election but could not instill confidence into the Irish. Eldelman, an Irish Statistician (cited in ORG, 2007), asserted that "scientists and statisticians presented evidence of both possibility and actuality of fraud using such machine", the scale of public condemnation rose to such a level that the machine were immediately banned in the entire Republic and put into indefinite storage. Elections are still tallied manually in Ireland. After spending €110.4 million on e-voting between 2002 and 2004, Ireland moved on with manual voting (ORG.2007)

### **Look before leaping**

So far, the discussion has demonstrated that e-voting remains a practice and a wishful state of engagement around the world. It has revealed the nascent and incipient nature of Nigerian democracy. It has showed both fragility and the delicate nature of elections from different perspectives. The earlier section briefly addressed the exploits of e-voting in select democracies. The choice of some developed states in this is quite deliberate and purposeful. E-governance is predicated on cyber technology and it originated from the West. Therefore, the West is light years ahead of the Third World countries that often receive technology late.

The comparative account showed that e-voting has not really festered well in advanced democracies. The trajectory shows that developed democracies are growing distrustful of machine voting. Many are progressively withdrawing from its usage. Why should developing countries be eager to adopt machine voting when advanced democracies have been eager to drop it?

Brazil led the way in South America while Angola followed closely in Africa. Angola seemed to have recorded above average in her 2014 general elections. Nigeria seems success of the SCRs in the 2015 election has prompted many stakeholders into advocating the adoption of e-voting technology for the upcoming 2019 General Elections. The questions that have arisen include the following: Why are many developed democracies withdrawing from this method, falling back to pencil-paper old method, while Ireland, Netherland, Germany and some of Italy and Canada had actually totally jettisoned it? Why have all the states in the US not fully adopted this technology? The answers to these questions ought to make Nigeria weary of an uncalculated leap from a dazzling height.

Scholars have argued that e-voting could be an avenue to alleviate poverty in Nigeria. Idris & Yusof (2015) argued that popular legitimacy that a transparent process would bring though SCR can gear the incumbent leaders to think of development. While it is not too contentious that a well conducted, free, fair and credible election will likely produce the people's choice, it is not a sufficient premise to conclude that a credible election would bring good governance. This does not mean that credible election cannot engender good governance which has both the philosophical and material capacity to ensuring welfare to the greatest number. It is *argumentum ad ignorantiam* to infer that e-voting will eradicate poverty because only a terse premise can be generated from that. It is again fallacious to state that e-voting is transparent because, drawing from Nigeria's 2015 election, the SCR was not e-voting rather it was a mere means of verification and authentication of voters. It should be noted that the Electoral Act 2010 first abolished e-voting in Nigeria before the 2017 amendment cautiously "resurrected" it.

Another note of caution is the cost of running the e-voting process. The past two general elections (2011 and 2015) were executed on unprecedented heavy budgets. Each of these elections gulped more than N100 billion for its execution. The bulk of this money was used for procurement of registration and verification equipment and logistics. The Direct Data Capture Machine (DDCM) and Smart Card Readers (SCRs) for 2011 and 2015 took up a lion share of the budget. If, indeed, Nigeria will opt for e-voting in 2019, one can only imagine how much it would gulp from the national treasury. It



would be recalled that Ireland spent more than €110.4 (approximately N48 billion) on this technology between in 2002 and 2004, a figure that must have doubled by now. In the United Kingdom, it was reported that per vote, cost around £120 for internet voting and £22 for kiosk vote as against £1 for manual voting (ORG, 2007). Inferring from the precarious state of Nigeria's finance, can the country really afford the cost of e-voting?

Ireland, Netherland, Germany, Canada etc, have either fully exited or have partly implemented e-voting because of its heavy cost, but mostly due to transparency-deficit. Confidence building for any government should start right from the polls. This happens when the whole electoral process is credible. Credibility comes from the transparent nature of the election process. Here, the argument is not to suggest fraud in every computer black box processes but to demonstrate the burden of probity. In the case of malpractices, how can the ballot be subjected to audit, for instance? E-votes are nonmaterial votes so they cannot be subjected to physical audit in case of litigation. The only way this can be possible is if a printout is issued for every vote cast for future referencing and accountability.

Related to the above is the possibility of cyber security compromise. This is perhaps the biggest argument against e-voting apologists. Can it be possible to make a computer that cannot be compromised? Schneider (cited in ORG, 2007) revealed that "a secure voting system is theoretically possible, but it would be the first secure networked application ever created in the history of computers." Similarly, this criticism has been put against cybernetics as a model in the sense that if the interaction between man and machine is tampered with, it would produce an undesirable result such as leading to armed conflict. From a remote end, a programme can be written and transfused into the stream to alter the functions of the original programme and produce a different result. This was the case of the Dutch Government's experiment. The technical capacity of the Nigerian system is very fragile and incapable of such security sophistication. Where this poses a serious threat is that election results can be manipulated to an unimaginable extent and still remain untraceable. This can be done in several ways. Since there will be a central collation point where all the results are electronically sent after polling, the result can be distorted in such a way that a section of the

electoral constituency could have its result undermined while another could be inflated. This alteration would totally change the voting pattern from the expected outcome. This can bring violent response. It can also be a case where ballot is reading for a candidate while the other candidate is having negative count with a systematic sequence.

United States' 2004 elections had more than 125 cases of irregularities as the DRE machines demonstrated system failure. A perfect computer system can never be built. So when things go wrong, how do we retrieve the ballot? In the case of North Carolina and Florida, where software count to 32,767 and then counted backward, how was it handled? Obviously, a fresh election had to be conducted in such areas. In that case, where does the technology stand? Nigeria's political environmental space presents numerous reasons for computer systems to malfunction. Some of the factors include poorly educated electorates; ill-trained electoral officials who could possibly mishandle the equipment and cause system failure. Other factors include infrastructural deficit such as poor electricity, non-motorable roads for transporting sensitive and not so sensitive equipment and can cause system malfunction. The machine runs on Android 4.2.2 whereas most mobile phones run on Android 7.0. This casts doubts on Nigeria's preparedness.

"Choiceless democracy" is a serious problem. Voting without choosing has gradually crept into the Nigerian electoral culture where people's franchises are materially harassed. Enwere & Ladan-Baki (2015) argued that through media consciousness, propelled by cybernetics and through e-voting, electorates will be more informed of the associated legitimacy issues that come with inducement voting and as such resist gratifications either before, during and after polling. While it is not contestable that information liberates, it is fundamental that electorates giving in to inducement does not have a mono-causal attribution. There are several reasons for voters' inducement; chief among them is the socio-economic wellbeing and not even political awareness of the people, Where e-voting triggers inducement voting is when politicians are aware that crude rigging methods like ballot box snatching, voters' register manipulation etc are impossible because of SCRs, they will likely opt for other subtle means of influencing voters before or after polling. Money and other means have proven to be very effective. Inducement voting

is not new in Nigeria but it took a new approach after the introduction of the SCRs in 2015. The recent gubernatorial elections in Ondo, Anambra, Ekiti and Osun states clearly showed the new dimensions. A serious threat to democracy is that computers cannot read the human mind to know if it had been compromised; and it is not a menace that INEC can control or correct but a collective struggle that requires total attitudinal change on the perception of the political group. Before that correction is effected, Nigeria's democracy would be handling legitimacy crisis - voting without choosing.

### **Conclusion**

So far this discourse has revolved around the viability of progressive deployment of machines for election governance in Nigeria. Most importantly, INEC has promised using the technology in the 2019 General Election and it would be the first ever electronic election in Nigeria's electoral history. The committee set up for this has keyed-into adopting an indigenous technology sponsored by the Ministry of Science and Technology to effect this. It is the responsibility of all to ensure a hitch free democratic transition process. Three main stakeholders will play pivotal roles to achieving this objective: the government, INEC and the people as well as political parties. Legislations must recognize the peculiarity of voters before e-voting is finally and fully implemented. Most voters in the rural areas do not have sufficient electronic proficiency to adequately fit into this scheme. Such group must be identified and sufficient alternatives be made for them before a large chunk is disenfranchised on the ground of non compliance with electronic. Apata (2017) an experienced system analyst, warned that INEC must develop a website and voting process for Effectiveness, Efficiency, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Compliance, and Reliability otherwise political parties would lose confidence and trust in the whole process and those that lost out would resort to litigations for foul play. By now, one would have expected INEC to have begun pilot voting to test run the process and engender troubleshooting to combat bugs. If this is delayed till the last minute, there is the likelihood of crisis during the elections. These are some of the reservations for e-voting in Nigeria and therefore INEC is being urged to tread cautiously, indeed very slowly but steadily regarding the the introduction of electronic machines to election management.

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ARTICLE

5

**IN-FEMINISM AND WOMEN-WOMEN  
MARGINALISATION  
IN OGUN STATE, NIGERIA**

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## **Abstract**

*The importance of women in the society cannot be downplayed. Today, what has become a social problem is women-women marginalisation in politics and political process despite the fact that women constitute significant proportion of the Nigerian population. The mixed method design was used for the study, which combines both qualitative and quantitative research to describe events in greater depth. Primary data were obtained using well-structured questionnaire, randomly administered to educated women from the study area in the three Senatorial Districts of Ogun State, Nigeria. Peer-reviewed journals, books, and government publications constituted secondary data sources. The data were analysed using descriptive statistics such as percentages, mean, graphs, and charts. Findings showed that women-women marginalisation exists. The paper concluded that women-women marginalisation should be curtailed and recommended the need for more trust and collaboration among women, and new research such as In-Feminism, to promote women participation in politics and political process.*

**Keywords:** Feminism, In-Feminism, Politics, Women-Women Marginalisation.



## Introduction

The role of women in realising societal aspirations cannot be over-stated. Women are key to national development (Asaju & Adagba, 2013). It is a truism that women constitute an integral part of the society because of their rich and innate abilities to hold the family together and engage in productive activities. World governments, international non-governmental organisations and other key policy makers have always encouraged women to adequately participate in the building of families, economy, government, and in conflict resolution processes (Wader, Dahiru & Imam, 2015).

In the traditional African societies, women are respected, though not publicly, because of their unique engagements in endeavours that are relevant to the stability and continuous existence of their various communities with particular focus on the issues of leadership, peace and security (Diallo, 2015). Today, women continue to show appreciable levels of managerial and organisational skills in their multi-tasking roles as mothers, homemakers, character moulders and sustainers of humanity as well as in their occupational roles in the making of pottery, weaving, spinning and other vocations that they had been involved in for several years. Nigerian women that fall under this category include Ladi Kwali, Peju Alatishe,

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Njideka Akunyili Crosby and Ndidi Dike, among others. Their valuable contributions to nation building go beyond the traditional and customary conception of their role in family keeping, procreation and permeating all facets of the national life (Wader *et al*, 2015). Despite these unique attributes and the fact that women constitute a significant proportion of the Nigerian population, they are still being discriminated against and when compared to men (Fatile, Akhakpe, Igbokwe & Oteh, 2012).

In Nigeria, the invaluable contributions of women in a virile democracy involve fostering of unity and cohesion among the diverse ethnic groups

as can be seen in inter-ethnic and inter-tribal marriages (Sarumi, Faluyi & Okeke-Uzodike, 2019). With the crisis of leadership and endemic corruption that have bedeviled Nigeria since independence, when only men held sway in political offices, there is a growing consensus in the polity that women could fill the critical leadership gap in providing the much-desired good governance (Ngara & Ayabem, 2013). This reasoning further lends credence to why the place of women in politics and political process should be given prominence.

In the political terrain, Nigerian women have been largely limited as voters after which they are expected to attend to their families, as only insignificant number among them are eventually appointed or elected into public offices. This lopsidedness and the call for the involvement of women in decision-making responsibilities had elicited scholarly and public interest since the 1980s and 1990s, through participation in series of international conferences, notably, the fourth women conferences held in Beijing, China in 1995, which could be described as water-shed in the annals of feminism, which made a case that at least, 30% representation of women should be included in national governments (Wader *et al*, 2015).

In 2000, the United Nations Millennium Summit was held in New York, United States of America where the clamour for gender equity was also promoted. Similarly, the Justice Mohammed Uwais Report of 2008 in Nigeria proposed a proportional representation for women, although this recommendation had been ignored alongside the 2006 National Gender Policy, which raised the affirmative action at 35% for Nigerian women. The number of women in leadership positions has not been encouraging as the role of Nigeria women in the post-independence politics seems not appreciable enough (Innocent, Onyishi & Nwaoha, 2014). This is despite the massive women support given to the various political parties on the platforms of women organisations, market women movements and societies (Wader *et al*, 2015).

Recently, few women such as Mrs. Mobolaji Osomo, Dr. (Mrs.) Obiageli Ezekwesili, Dr. (Mrs.) Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Hajia Nenadi Usman, late Professor (Mrs.) Dora Akunyili and Mrs. Kemi Adeosun, were appointed as cabinet ministers in Nigeria. The marginalisation of women in politics can

be described as unfair, not only because they constitute larger percentage of eligible voters in Nigeria but also because Section 17 (1)(2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), disallows discrimination against persons, women inclusive. It is, therefore, illegal and uncharitable to continue to sideline women in the scheme of things with their enormous talents, abilities, capacities and capabilities, as change agents. Apart from the visible marginalisation in politics, women are not allowed to get married or pregnant in some banks in Nigeria on the premise that such marital engagements could reduce the organisations' productivity and profits. Many young women are made to use their bodies in the name of marketing to 'woo' customers for their organisations in what is popularly called, Corporate Prostitution. Until, a Federal High Court in Nigeria stopped the practice, married women were required to obtain letters of consent from their husbands before the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) could process international passports for them (Ogbeide, 2010). It was not until 1979 that women in Northern Nigeria, such as Hajia Gambo Sawaba, were allowed to vote and be voted for (Woman.ng, 2016).

In addition to the litany of biases and prejudices against women, a growing concern and occurrence that does not attract much attention and discourse within the society, government and academic discourse, is the marginalisation of women by women, which is known as women-women marginalisation. The resultant effect of this development is that our women continue to be discriminated against, not only by men because of the highly patriarchal society but also by the women themselves. Many factors are responsible for why women marginalise themselves. Ngara and Ayabem (2013) equally observe that the major challenge facing women in politics and decision-making is women themselves. They argue that most women tend to lack confidence in their own ability and capacity to lead. This assertion demands an investigation for a better understanding of the political process and the Nigerian society.

Women, because of undue pressure from men and now women themselves, feel that the game of politics is an exclusive preserve of men and they dare not go into it; and for those that manage to venture into it, they are usually content with occupying the back seat. This limits the participation of women

in politics and the political process due to factors such as envy, mistrust and jealousy, which are associated with interpersonal relationship among women, as most women would rather vote or support men to win elections than support their fellow women in spite of their numerical strength (Fatile *et al*, 2012).

The importance of women in politics and political process remains critical in a democracy (Agunbiade & Akiode, 2017). The nation cannot be said to have witnessed good governance despite the domination of women by men in politics and political process. Hence, the justification for why more women should be more active to bring about the desired change (Ngara & Ayabem, 2013). Despite the enormous work carried out by New Feminist scholars, the problem of women-to-women marginalisation, which tends to impede their political abilities and impact, remains a major missing gap in the literature. There are instances to support this position from the existing literature and primary data obtained for the study, covering women-to-women marginalisation in politics and political process known as In-Feminism. Therefore, the study seeks to examine In-Feminism and women-women marginalisation in Ogun State, Nigeria. The main objective of the study is to assess In-Feminism and women-women marginalisation with a view to finding out if women discriminate against themselves in politics and political process. Specific objectives include to determine the perception of the women about marginalisation in Nigerian politics, understand the nature of marginalisation among Nigerian women in politics, identify the causes of discrimination among Nigerian women in politics and examine the concept of In-Feminism.

### **Women in Political Communication, Politics, and Political Process**

Communication involves the exchange of information or message by a sender through specific means to a receiver, who discloses or decodes same and in turn, sends a feedback to the original sender, either through the same means or another and hence, it is regarded as a process (Eweka, 2017). The art or science of communication cuts across all areas, fields, sectors of life and politics (Agunbiade & Akiode, 2017).

Political communication is an important process in politics. Olayiwola (2013)

defines political communication as the subset of communicatory activity that is political in nature by virtue of the consequences; actual and potential that it has for the functioning of a political system (p.25). It addresses issues that are at the heart of democracies through the use of informational and persuasive messages that are transmitted from political institutions of society through the mass media to the citizenry (Olayiwola, 2016; 1991). There is no doubt that the traditional African society has assigned women a nurturing role that has put a lot of strain on them.

According to Wader *et al* (2015), these strains have succeeded in dwarfing their political aspirations or economic pursuits when compared to their male counterparts that are not retarded by domestic considerations. Lack of adequate political socialisation for leadership positions can be seen in women's exclusion from access to strategic political information and marginalisation in the mainstream political party hierarchy that is usually run based on male norms and values. It is for issues like these that Alvarez and Lazzari (2015) have stressed the importance of mentoring younger women by older women, for better human development, social relations and giving voice to women in the society. Political communication, a specialised form of communication, deals with the production, dissemination and processing of information through mass media of communication as well as interpersonal interactions that happen within a political context (Olayiwola, 2016; 1991).

For human society to develop, there is the need for harmony, better cooperation, communication, trust and collaboration among people without discrimination. Political communication, besides being a sub-sector of communication is the connecting link between political actors (Agunbiade & Akiode, 2017). This is seemingly prevalent in the area of governance, particularly, the means and manner of communication in politics. Robust political process is inclusive and involves key players like men, women and youths in taking their pride of place in the scheme of things. The political communication process would be aided when more women are engaged in national life through policy design, formulation and implementation using their talents, glamour, beauty, humour, bliss, intellect and fashion (Fatile *et al*, 2012).

The powerful communicative effects of the choice of specific clothing items, colours and accessories, provided by specialists for female politicians and spouses of male political leaders, are not to be underestimated when it comes to intra and inter personal communication. Agunbiade and Akiode (2017) state that this model of visual political communication includes fabric of attire, style of head-tie, jewelry and footwear, which are key elements of political communication and hence, female politicians are to internalise such visual political communications as they embark on election campaigns (p.166). It is not unusual to see billboards of female politicians also looking glamorous and adorned with expensive accessories. However, these images, as important as they are, would not resonate with the everyday realities in the lives of the electorate and do nothing to convince the electorate that the female politician understands the community problems and can be trusted with leadership.

Agunbiade and Akiode (2017) further noted that the message may be genuine and full of viable solutions to the country's problems but her image and sense of fashion for the occasion could, at the same time, send a wrong message to voters (p.166). What this implies is that there is still the need for Nigerian women to blend fashion appropriately to produce desirable results to aid political communication in politics and political process. According to Fatile *et al* (2012), though the current crops of Nigerian women politicians are fashionable and elegant but would prefer to get contracts at the expense of their integrity than engaging in issues that could liberate other women and reposition them for greater or brighter political involvement. In 1979, the United National General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

The convention has been described as a sort of gender empowerment and women's International Bill of Rights. The convention reflects the depth of neglect of the fundamental rights of women arising from biological differences by calling for equal rights for women despite their social status in life, though critical questions have been asked bordering on the lack of implementation of the provisions of the convention in terms of according women appropriate status in elective, appointive offices and political process (Agbalajobi, 2010). The right to democratic government is a legal entitlement conferred on the

entire citizenry by virtue of Section 40 (12) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), it provides that every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, irrespective of the political party, trade union or any other association while Section 42 (1) of the 1999 Constitution also provides that citizens of Nigeria should not be discriminated against on the basis of ethnic group, place of origin, sex, religion, and political opinion, among others (Wader *et al*, 2015).

To bring the plight of women into limelight, the concept of feminism came to the fore-front of academic discourse. Feminism is associated with a particular historical movement when a coalition of women succeeded in bringing issues of gender equality, sexual oppression and discrimination into the public arena with all forms of discrimination (Fatile *et al*, 2012). For Abdulkadir (2003), feminism is an ideology, which seeks to assert the principle that women should have political, economic, and social rights equal to those of men. It is a movement that entrenches these rights through the emancipation of women, liberating them from class, gender exploitation, and oppression. A widely-celebrated scenario of women-to-women marginalisation was recorded when a former Nigerian Minister of Women Affairs, Mrs. Josephine Anenih endorsed a two-time woman presidential aspirant, Dr. Sarah Jibril for the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria.

Anenih said the endorsement was to achieve Nigeria's adoption of 35% Affirmative Action for women during the 2011 general elections to increase the number of women in appointive and elective positions in line with the Beijing Declaration of 1995 for Women (Omenka, 2017). Anenih further revealed that political empowerment of women was one of her Ministry's highest priorities. Many promises were made by many women and feminist groups across the country to provide logistical and material supports for the realisation of Jibril's political ambition. At the end, Jibril got only one vote in the primaries, meaning that no one voted for her, except perhaps, herself. In the Economic Confidential (2011) story titled, "Sarah Jibril: When women betray a woman", an embittered Jibril, asked a rhetorical question: What offence have I committed against the women of Nigeria? They should tell me so that I will know ... Nigerian women should tell me what I have done wrong and how I have misrepresented them that made them afraid to vote for me

(Economic Confidential, 2011). Despite the barrage of complaints, her 'voice' and that of her supporters as well as women pro-democracy advocates were not given the deserved attention suggesting that the political communication effort deployed to that important incident was not impactful.

In an article in *The Guardian* of United Kingdom titled; "Why does the women's rights movement marginalise women with disabilities?", Goyal (2016) equally decried that women with disabilities, who should ordinarily elicit compassion and sympathy often face serious issues central to women's rights agenda and are often kept on the fringes of the gender justice debates that are even championed by women (Goyal, 2016). In another study titled; "Feminism and political participation in Nigeria: An empirical analysis", Fatile *et al* (2012) show that women-to-women marginalization actually manifested in the 2011 general elections in Nigeria. Factors adduced by all the women respondents in the study include lack of awareness of female candidates for elections (37.2%); preference for men belonging to the same ethnic group and political party ahead of female contestants (17.0%); and women being 'directed' by their husbands to vote against fellow women (29.8%). The study revealed that female respondents believed that men were more qualified, capable and suitable for the task of the presidency, or the governance of their fellow women contestants (Fatile *et al*, 2012).

Cultural orientations constitute disincentives for women in politics and political process, just as religion is also used as instrument of stereotype against women, who dare to venture into politics in Nigeria. Both Christianity and Islam do not accord women much role in public affairs because of the belief that home and family matters are more important (Ngara & Ayabem, 2013). Despite the existence of women-to-women marginalisation in politics and political process, challenges in many African countries such as Rwanda still use the quota system to ensure women's political appointments and institutional integration as women had the highest number of women parliamentarians worldwide with 61.3% of seats in the lower house (IPU, 2019). In Uganda, affirmative action was introduced in favour of marginalised people, particularly women, as the new Ugandan constitution has entrenched the rights and dignity of women, guaranteed equality, social justice and development by increasing the presence of women in parliament



to 24.5% (Wader *et al*, 2015).

The experience of women in politics and political process in Nigeria does not seem to be very encouraging. They are not 'heard' due to discriminatory attitudes/practices, family and child care responsibilities, high cost of seeking/holding public office, socialisation and negative stereotypes and the reinforcing tendency for political decision-making process to remain in the domain of men (Nwankwo, 2009). Women appear to have little or no financial backing while aspiring for public offices while the feminisation of poverty makes women more financially-constrained to communicate properly in politics and political process.

### **In-Feminism**

Feminism is a phenomenon of the 20<sup>th</sup> century although its root could be traced to the 18<sup>th</sup> century Europe. Feminism ideology seeks to advocate that every society should recognise claims of women for rights by equaling those possessed by men (Ezeigbo, 1996; Lerner, 1993). Feminist movements are aimed at defining, establishing and defending equal political, economic, social rights and equal opportunities for women (Adadevoh, 2001) while Iwuchukwu (2006) sees feminism as the belief in the importance of gender equality, invalidating the idea of gender hierarchy as a socially-constructed concept. Feminism focuses on women's issues and clamours against the subjugation and oppression of women by advocating for equal rights for both men and women (Fatile *et al*, 2012).

Feminism has been misunderstood to mean the intention of some aggressive women, trying to be like men, who dress carelessly and abandon essential feminism attributes (Ezeigbo, 1996; Oloruntoba-Oju & Oloruntoba-Oju, 2013). In this sense, feminism is seen as an aggressive tool for politics, political process and communication. On the other hand, there is another perception that feminist ideology is about the agitation for women's economic, social, legal, political and educational rights that would eventually lead to their empowerment and development. Mohapatra (2009) argues that feminism is a combination of some major developed traditions such as Liberal Feminism, Socialist Feminism, Radical Feminism, New Feminism and Post-feminism. According to (Mohapatra, 2009), Liberal Feminism is based on the principle

of liberalism that advocates for equality of human individuals, regardless of their sex and other distinctions, which formed the basis for women's equal entitlement to all rights and privileges in the society, as enjoyed by men, on the basis that both were human beings.

Socialist Feminism emerged as a reaction to the stance taken by the liberal thinkers, which they put forward that political and legal rights are not enough to emancipate women from all of their disadvantages but that this reality could be attained through social revolution that would give them economic equality or economic freedom through men (Mohapatra, 2009). It advocates for equality of women not only in politics and economy but also in all aspects of personal, sexual existence and communication while the New Feminism points to the psychological, cultural and intra-sexual aspects of feminism. Post-Feminism thinkers seem to be making compromises with regard to their anti-men or patriarchy posture by calling for the restoration of family values by subscribing to traditional role given to women in the family for social stability and order (Mohapatra, 2009).

New Feminism advocates for the integral complementarity of men and women rather than clamouring for the superiority of men over women or women over men. It, however, believes that women should be valued in their unique roles in the family (Allen, 2006). It discourages any form of discrimination, segregation and marginalisation of persons. The term was first used in the Great Britain in the 1920s and its proponents include Eleanor Rathbone, Janet E. Smith, Katrina Zeno, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Colleen Carroll, among others. New Feminism supports the thinking that men and women have different abilities, strengths, perspectives, roles and duties in the society even though they are different in biological composition. Feminists and gender scholars have rationalised varied justifications theoretically for sexism. According to Ajayi (2007), these rationalisations are often situated within the boundaries of physiology, biology, tradition, culture, materials and modernity that show clearly that women are the weaker sex (p.139). Kramarae and Treichler (1988) further stress that the fundamental, physical and physiological differences between men and women in part account for the ascribed masculine supremacy, and patriarchy inevitability in societies (p.2261).

To this end, the discourse on women in political communication, politics and political process has not been exhaustive because of what looks like the dearth of adequate literature on women-to-women marginalisation in the scholarly space. Similarly, Omotoso (2017) has observed that there is a disturbing culture of silence on African political communication and ethics to the extent that African researchers do not get to study African and Afrocentric Africanist theories and ideologies as they sojourn through the study of political communication in higher institutions, noting that African political communication, using an application of African ethical indices, is highly under-theorised (p.57). One of the many reasons for explaining the silencing of women in politics and political process is curricular impoverishment, which takes its root from the obscuring of African politics and political communication. This lacuna has been captured in a previous study. Therefore, contents of feminist advocacy deserve re-examination and re-formulation (Ajayi, 2007).

It is instructive to note that Sarikakis, Rush, Grubb-Swetnam and Lane (2008) reveal that in nearly four decades of current feminists scholarship, it is learned that women's communication, along with minorities of both genders, have been 'othered' or 'silenced' in mainstream research as gender theories and feminist research in communication have created the considering points for some inevitable issues, which remain contending issue for future research to reveal the voices of those that have been silenced. Sarikakis and Rush (2009) attest that this would involve the 'greening' of communication process and integration of theory and research since Feminist enquiry is complex, comprehensive, and fluid. Therefore, the challenge for scholars is to address the gaps in knowledge deriving from gender imbalances (Sarikakis & Rush, 2009).

This would entail a better understanding of the ontology of communications in order to expand the intellectual horizon and elicit women's experiences as they always speak with many voices. While researching women's issues in communication since the early 1970s, there was little that had been preserved or shared about the role and status of women in society in terms of theories or methods to guide research. Women theories had been around for a long time but were either destroyed, silenced, distorted, or co-opted (Sarikakis

& Rush, 2009). As a way forward, gender theories and feminist research in communication should refuse to be 'silenced' by drawing out, making visible and revealing their powerful voices within social and historical contexts (Sarikakis & Rush, 2009). This is the gap that this study seeks to fill by interrogating women-women marginalisation in politics and political process, which is known as In-Feminism.

### **Methodology**

This study, which examined In-Feminism and women-to-women marginalisation in politics and political process, was conducted in Ogun State, Nigeria. The design that was used for this study is the mixed method design. It combines both qualitative and quantitative methods to describe events in greater depth as they relate to major variables in the study. It also provides for a more meaningful interpretation of the data and phenomenon being examined (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003). Useful information were elicited using well-structured questionnaire while data were obtained from a cross-section of educated women respondents across the state, who were selected using the multi-stage sampling procedure Yaya, Asunmo, Abolarinwa & Onyenekwe, 2015). This entailed random selection of a total of one hundred and fifty (150) educated females, who are actively involved in politics, with fifty (50) educated females selected from each of the Three (3) Senatorial Districts of Ogun State, Nigeria, namely: Ogun West, Ogun Central, and Ogun East. Quantitative data were collated and analysed using descriptive statistics such as simple percentages, mean, frequencies, graphs, and charts while the qualitative data were thematically analysed. The study had its focus on women-women marginalisation in politics and political process in Nigeria. However, in the course of data collection, it was observed that many female politicians, who were readily available were not learned or educated enough to understand the context of the work while the learned and educated ones were not readily available to participate in the survey; a development that made it difficult and strenuous to elicit adequate information within the available resources and time.

### **Discussion of Findings**

The demographic representation of the respondents presented in Table 1 below shows that majority (74.0%) of the respondents were married while

the remaining (26.0%) were single. Also, the age distribution shows that 63.3% of the respondents were between the age of 21 and 40, 30.7% were between the ages of 41 and 60, while 5.3% were below the age distribution of less than 20 years and the remaining 0.7% was above the age of 60 years. The respondents' religions showed that 69.3% were Christians, 28.7% were Muslims while 2.0% were traditionalists. The survey also revealed that of those sampled, majority (52.7%) had tertiary education qualifications, 36.0% studied up to the secondary school level, 18.7% studied up to the primary school level while those without formal education was 2.7% of the total respondents. This implies that most of those sampled had a form of education and which is of importance to their understanding of the focus of the study.

**Table 1: Demographic Representation of Respondents**

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Marital Status</b>		
Single	39	26.0
Married	111	74.0
Total	150	100.0
<b>Age of Respondent (Years)</b>		
Less than 20	8	5.3
21-40	95	63.3
41-60	46	30.7
Greater than 60	1	0.7
Total	150	100.0
<b>Religion</b>		
Christian	104	69.3

Islam	43	28.7
Traditional	3	2.0
Total	150	100.0
<b>Educational Background</b>		
No Formal Education	4	2.6
Primary	13	18.7
Secondary	54	36.0
Tertiary	79	52.7
Total	150	100.0

**Source:** Field Survey (2019)

Table 2a shows the perception of women about marginalisation and it can be observed that 74.0% of the women, who were sampled, believed that women discriminate against themselves in politics. This is in line with the views of Ngara and Ayabem (2013) that the major challenges facing women in politics and decision-making is women themselves. 26.0% however, did not agree with the opinion that women discriminate against themselves. Furthermore, 55.3% of the respondents surveyed for the study responded that they have been discriminated against at one point or the other in the course of their political career, just the way they are still being discriminated against in politics and political process (Fatile *et al*, 2012).

44.7% of the survey participants have never been discriminated against in any form in the course of their political career. Based on the opinion gathered from the survey of discrimination of women against themselves, marginalisation was believed to be a serious issue by 74.0% of the respondents sampled for the survey because they see the women as the 'second fiddle' (Olojede, 2009; Narayan, 1997). 26.0% of the respondents on the other hand, believe that marginalisation is not a serious issue.

**Table 2a: Perception about Marginalisation**

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Do you think women discriminate against themselves in politics?</b>		
Yes	111	74.0
No	39	26.0
Total	150	100.0
<b>Have you ever been discriminated against at any point in the course of your political career</b>		
Yes	83	55.3
No	67	44.7
Total	150	100.0
<b>Do you think discrimination of women against themselves is a serious issue in Nigerian politics?</b>		
Yes	111	74.0
No	39	26.0
Total	150	100.0

**Source:** Field Survey (2019)

To further understand the perception of respondents about marginalisation, questions on the preference of respondents on issues relating to marginalisation were asked and evaluated, using a five-point Likert scale (Strongly agreed, Agreed, Indifferent, Disagreed, Strongly Disagreed). The result showed that most of the respondents prefer to have a male boss to a female boss as the perceptual statement had a mean of 4.16 of the total sampled respondents, strongly agreeing with the statement while the perceptual statement on whether the respondents will support any female aspiring for elective positions also had a mean value of 4.16. Reasons for this tally with findings of the study that was conducted by Fatile *et al* (2012) in which the women themselves were found to believe more in men than their fellow women.

Furthermore, based on the opinion of the respondents, it was discovered that 34.7% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement that males were better able to handle sensitive matters than female with a mean of 3.63. The preference of the women being their bosses to having female bosses had a mean value of 3.45 agreeing with the statement. Also, the statement that was meant to evaluate if the women can get along with themselves in the work place or if they have to work together had a mean value of 2.67 of the sampled respondents disagreeing with that statement.

**Table 2b: Perception about Marginalisation (Cont'd)**

Items	SA	A	I	D	SD	Mean(SD)
	Freq (%)	Freq (%)	Freq (%)	Freq (%)	Freq (%)	
I prefer a male to a female boss	75 (50.0)	45 (30.0)	13 (8.7)	13 (8.7)	4 (2.7)	4.16 (1.08)
I will support any female aspiring for elective positions	62 (41.3)	62 (41.3)	17 (11.3)	6 (4.0)	3 (2.0)	4.16 (0.92)
I will rather be my boss than allow a female be my boss	36 (24.0)	44 (29.3)	30 (20.0)	31 (20.7)	9 (6.0)	3.45 (1.23)



I cannot get along with a fellow female working together	13 (8.7)	33 (22.0)	21 (14.0)	57 (38.0)	26 (17.3)	2.67 (1.24)
Males are better composed to handle sensitive matters than female	52 (34.7)	42 (28.0)	16 (10.7)	29 (19.3)	11 (7.3)	3.63 (1.32)

**Source:** Field Survey (2019)

Table 3 shows the causes of marginalisation among women. Lack of trust among women seems to be one of the major causes of marginalisation as it had the highest mean of 3.83 of those sampled. Cultural issues were also found to lead to marginalisation among women as those agreeing to this statement had a mean of 3.60. This is in agreement with the view of Ngara and Ayabem (2013) that cultural orientations constitute disincentives for women's participation in politics and political process, just as religion is also used as an instrument of stereotype against women, who dare to venture into politics. Intimidation by male folks with a mean value of 3.57 agreeing to it was found to be another cause of marginalisation while jealousy had a mean of 3.54 agreeing to the statement. Lack of awareness of female candidates had a mean of 3.49 agreeing to the statement. This could be because men are more dominant in the political scene and it takes women, being the voice for themselves, which can make their impact felt in the political space. Also, ignorance and fear of women failing in politics were also found to be reasons for discrimination by some of the respondents with the mean values of 3.45 and 3.40, respectively. Other causes of marginalisation, which were identified by the respondents include inferiority complex, lack of love, low educational background, arrogance, ego among women, level of achievements, poor interpersonal skills, pride, religion, and political gains. This suggests that feminist issues are complex, comprehensive, and fluid (Sarikakis & Rush, 2009).

**Table 3: Causes of Marginalisation among Women**

Items	SA	A	I	D	SD	Mean(SD)
	Freq (%)	Freq (%)	Freq (%)	Freq (%)	Freq (%)	
Intimidation by male folks	35 (23.3)	56 (37.3)	24 (16.0)	29 (19.3)	6 (4.0)	3.57 (1.16)
Lack of trust among women	44 (29.3)	67 (44.7)	14 (9.3)	19 (12.7)	6 (4.0)	3.83 (1.11)
Cultural issues	31 (20.7)	62 (41.3)	26 (17.3)	28 (18.7)	3 (2.0)	3.60 (1.07)
Fear of women failing in politics	19 (12.7)	66 (44.0)	28 (18.7)	30 (20.0)	7 (4.7)	3.40 (1.09)
Preference for men rather than women when the need arises	31 (20.7)	57 (38.0)	26 (17.3)	29 (19.3)	7 (4.7)	3.51 (1.16)
Jealousy	30 (20.0)	63 (42.0)	22 (14.7)	28 (18.7)	7 (4.7)	3.54 (1.15)
Ignorance	35 (23.3)	43 (28.7)	34 (22.7)	30 (20.0)	8 (5.3)	3.45 (1.20)
Lack of awareness of female Candidates	28 (18.7)	62 (41.3)	23 (15.3)	29 (19.3)	8 (5.3)	3.49 (1.16)

**Source:** Field Research (2019)

Table 4 shows the possible solutions to marginalisation among women based on the opinions of the respondents sampled. It was discovered from the result that sensitising women on the need to support each other and not discriminate in politics had a mean value of 4.43 strongly agreeing with that statement. Also, another possible solution, which was concurred to by majority of those sampled that had a high mean value of 4.43 was that women should stand up for each other. Making laws to prevent marginalisation and leaving some elective positions for women were also concurred with by majority of those surveyed with mean values of 4.11 and 3.98, respectively. This aligns with the suggestion that women should be given reserved slots

in the political space (Wader *et al*, 2015).

Non-governmental organisations should encourage more women to be in politics. This was found to be a possible way out as it had the lowest mean of 3.97 with respondents strongly agreeing with the statement. Respondents recommend that women should be more enlightened on the dangers of marginalising themselves through the media and other social platforms by the government, civil society organisations and feminist groups. They should be better educated and acquire requisite skills so as not to be sidelined when taking decisions affecting them and that government should partner non-governmental players in the advocacy, communication awareness and enlightenment drive (Olayiwola, 2016).

Respondents stated that men should desist from influencing women against other women to bring about unity and while women should avoid envy, jealousy and petty behaviour that divide them against one another. For the few women occupying in top political and administrative positions, they should play more modeling and mentoring roles to encourage upcoming women. They should use such positions to promote legislation, policies that would enhance access of other women into politics and political process and that women-to-women marginalisation should be seen as a common problem among women and should be discussed from time-to-time. Respondents were of the view that collaborative studies and research should be carried out on various dimensions of women-to-women marginalisation with a view to promoting their participation in politics and political process, which flows with the position of Agunbiade and Akiode (2017) on the imperative of collaboration.

**Table 4: Ways of Curbing Marginalisation among Women**

Items	SA	A	I	D	SD	Mean(SD)
	Freq (%)	Freq (%)	Freq (%)	Freq (%)	Freq (%)	
Sensitising women on the need to support each other and not discriminate	82 (54.7)	56 (37.3)	8 (5.3)	3 (2.0)	1 (0.7)	4.43 (0.75)
Making laws to ensure that discrimination in whatever form is not allowed	58 (38.7)	65 (43.3)	15 (10.0)	9 (6.0)	3 (2.0)	4.11 (0.95)
Women should stand up for each other	86 (57.3)	49 (32.7)	10 (6.7)	3 (2.0)	2 (1.3)	4.43 (0.81)
Some elective position in government should be left solely for women	55 (36.7)	61 (40.7)	16 (10.7)	12 (8.0)	6 (4.0)	3.98 (1.08)
Non-governmental organisations should encourage women in politics	52 (34.7)	71 (47.3)	8 (5.3)	8 (5.3)	11 (7.3)	3.97 (1.13)

**Source:** Field Research (2019)

### Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has examined In-Feminism and women-women marginalisation in politics and political process in Nigeria. Findings show that marginalisation truly exists among women and that women are not only being marginalised by men but also by their fellow women. It was also discovered that marginalisation among women is a serious issue that should be adequately studied and addressed. The major causes of women-women marginalisation are lack of trust among women, cultural issues, intimidation by male

folks, jealousy and preference for men rather than women when the need arises among other causes of marginalisation. For virile women political engagements, there is need to fight the enemy within, which is women-women marginalisation.

The study recommends that women should be more enlightened on the dangers of marginalising themselves by sensitising them through the media and other social platforms by the government, civil society organisations and Feminists groups. Furthermore, government should partner non-governmental players in advocacy, communication awareness and enlightenment drive.

Secondly, men should desist from influencing women against other women in politics to bring about unity and better communication as intimidation by male folks, which was found to be a major cause of women discrimination in politics. Women in top political and administrative positions should play more mentoring roles by creating awareness for upcoming women in politics and use such to promote legislation and policies that would enhance the participation of younger women into politics and political process. Lastly, there is need for further research and collaborative studies in In-Feminism on how to curb women-women marginalisation.

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**ARTICLE**

**6**

**CLIMATE GOVERNANCE AND  
LEGISLATION IN NIGERIA:  
MATTERS ARISING**

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## **Abstract**

*Climate governance in Nigeria is a new entrant to the domain of public interest and attempts at legislating on it through agenda setting in-roads and eventual attainment of the list of state responsibilities for public policy appears illusory. This paper attempts an interrogation of the political architecture – National Legislative Assembly (NASS) and Federal Executive arms of government in Nigeria’s capacity to articulate climate change policies and sustain its governance in the midst of competing exigencies. Relying on secondary documents, the “public choice theory” helps in understanding the legislative delays and its ramification for Nigeria climate policy. The core argument herein, hinges on the comatose nature of legislation on that area, the state of the Nigeria’s earlier vision 2020 framework in which climate change was encased and the eventual drifting into obscurity of the vision. This paper further posits the need for governance urgency connected to concretized deliverables within the context of the greater good and inclusiveness.*

**Key Concepts:** Climate Change, Climate governance, Legislation and Public Choice Theory

## **Introduction**

The interest on the climate and its ramifications has moved from passiveness to obvious concerns. Tilakasiri (2016) explains that climate change has today become everyone's buzz word after being sidelined for decades and being the subject of debates and policy agenda setting. For Nigeria and Africa amongst the developing societies, climate issue adds to the cart of subsisting living conditions that require urgent proactive public policy foresight. Indeed, previous attempts at mitigating the age-long traditional practices of natural gas flaring in the exploration of crude oil (Nigeria's major economic income source), has always been docile and wrapped in a web of political and socio-economic incapability.

This subsisting pattern forms the sub-culture of environmental decline in Nigeria, seen in deforestation, pollution of types, desert encroachment and other fallouts manifest in trickle-down violent conflicts among farmers and cattle herdsman. This in the mainstream Nigeria polarization 'mind-set' has taken ethnic and religious proportions with deaths and communal hostilities.

This paper interrogates the political antecedents of the Nigerian legislative (the National Assembly) and executive arms of government to muster the capacity to attain the required climate governance and policy as the need arises. The main thrust herein is to outline the climate threats and public policy (legislative/executive) responses within the context of Nigeria's political history.

## **Conceptual and Theoretical Issues:**

### **Climate Change, Legislative Process and Public Policy**

The correlation of conceptual and theoretical linkages within the subject of climate change and governance comes with the emphatic imperatives that theories provide the fundamentals upon which societies and organizations thrive and decline over time. Jinping (2014: 9) explains that socialism with Chinese characteristics consists of a path, theory and system, of which the theory offers a guide to action - effective principles and policies, and the system provides a fundamental guarantee. Nigeria and Africa as in most developing societies contrast the attempts to foster home-grown ideas-concepts-models outside the norms of "drop-down" policies to assuage

threats as climate variation.

Climate change can be described as the collapse of the atmospheric systems, processes and pattern which represent massive environmental challenges to maintaining a habitable earth. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007), cited in Issah, Abdullahi, and Olatungi, (2016:93), it is 'a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. Climate change and climate variability manifest themselves in global warming and extreme weather events such as floods, drought, heat waves and typhoons. As reported succinctly in the work of Leighton, Shen & Warner (2011),

Climate change due to greenhouse gas emissions is now, at some level, a fact. IPCC and other scientific bodies have modeled a number of future scenarios estimating changes in weather patterns, ocean currents, and (more recently) ecosystems. Average atmospheric temperatures are increasing and with this increase scientists expect (and in some cases may already be observing) more rapid melting of the earth's ice sheets, sea level rise, and greater seasonal variability in rainfall.

These phenomena affect land and marine product systems from which livelihoods are derived and also destroy infrastructure and other life support system (IPCC, 2001). This is attributed to natural factors and 'man-made' factors (i.e. anthropogenic) - GHG emission, carbon emission (cars, engines etc.) gas flaring, afforestation and deforestation and other human liveliness. Put differently, and from the "common Nigerians" perspective, climate change depicts; no drinkable water and fishes in rivers polluted by crude oil spills, insufficient rainfall for crops and animal grazing and closer desert and shrinking water bodies, coupled with more firewood cooking from trees and hunting wildlife for food (Nigeria: Climate Change Challenge, 2012).

The main cause of climate change has been attributed to anthropogenic (human) activities. For example, the increase industrialization in the developed Nations has led to the introduction of large quantities of Greenhouse gases (GHGs), including carbon (IV) oxide (CO<sub>2</sub>), Methane (CH<sub>4</sub>) and nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O) into the atmosphere (Odjugo, 2010:14). Climate change affects even the capacity of the individual members of the society to survive economically, socially and hence challenges the human security. It is in response to the above that the global efforts at checking the human excesses which according to Huber and Knutti (2014) is the major contributor to the degeneration of the eco-system was intensified through the formation of global coalitions towards checking the activities of individuals, groups, corporate organisations and countries. The state of Nigeria also factors itself into the programme through joining in these global efforts and in local policies at controlling the conducts of the people in the country.

Achieving this by any state is predicated on credible government efforts at evolving and implementing suitable legislations to control. According to Fagbohun (2010), law is that which must be obeyed and followed by citizens subject to sanctions or legal consequences. Law clearly will be central to restructuring and re-orientating conducts and activities that were hitherto accepted as safe, but now found to be contributing to climate change. He adds that, there are four broad modes through which the law can play a role in meeting the challenges of climate change:

- a. Self-governing mode with focus by government on itself and its activities (“leading by example” or “getting your own house in order”).
- b. Control and compliance mode through the use of traditional forms of authority such as regulation and planning.
- c. Governing by provision, in which emission reductions are achieved through the delivery of particular forms of service and resources (BRT/Green Houses).
- d. Mode of enabling, where governing takes place through facilitating, coordinating and encouraging

action through partnership with private and voluntary sector agencies, and in the form of various types of community engagement (Interfaith initiatives, Clinton Foundation cited in Fagbohun, 2010).

A process on the other hand, is a systematic series of actions directed to some ends. It depicts continuous actions, operations, or series of changes taking place in a definite manner. It also defines “what” needs to be done and which roles are involved. Closely related to it is a procedure which defines “how” to do the task and usually only applies to a single role. According to Bandor (2007) a process consists of a number of things:

- Roles and responsibilities of the people (roles) assigned to do the work
- Appropriate tools and equipment to support individuals in doing their jobs
- Procedures and methods defining “how” to do the tasks and relationships between the tasks.

These are the expected in a particular activity within a system, to, becoming regular enough in the conduct within the system to attain the position of a practice. There could be series of processes within a particular practice in a system depending on the number of duties that are performed within that system.

Understanding the duties of the legislature in line with Ikejiani-Clark and Nwanegbo (2010) which includes essentially law making (includes the participation in debate and actually making of the laws, rules, guidelines and regulation that enhances governance within the state) and oversight (regulatory and supervisory) functions, it means that two main lines of processes exist in the legislative practices. First, the “legislative processes” and the “oversight processes”.

The “legislative processes” refer to the activities performed by the legislature to accomplish some sort of tasks mapped out for the legislature (e.g.



generating bills, taking the different readings, committee stage, passing bills into law, and assenting to the bills by the executive, etc) (Booker, 2001). As could be seen in the above mentioned, these are all processes tending towards the making of the law.

The legislative process akin to Nigeria comes with abstraction of some sort as the 'public interest' it is meant to serve within public policy context is vague. There are 36 sub-national legislative Houses, along with the central government's National legislative assembly, yet the disconnection coming from the 'spirit and letter' of the law and citizens at equitable levels are conspicuous. Further evidence is posited in Nigeria's political history. In 1999, the advent of the new millennium saw the Nigerian military recognizing the new 'order' as democracy was gaining space globally.

The corollary of the public choice theory selected in this study amplifies the contest to govern, which has contrasted the Nigeria's 'public interest' through decades of governance. The Public Choice Theory seeks to understand and predict the behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats in nation-states (Izueke, 2014 cited in Ikeanyibe and Mbah, 2014). There is an assumption that politicians and bureaucrats are rational agents, as they maximize their interest first and produce goods for others as a by-product. The Public Choice originated as a distinctive field of specialization through the works of Buchanan and Tullock (1962) in which public choice is described as politics without passion.

This illustrates the Nigerian governance terrain as Izueke, 2014 (citing Sen, 2003) argues that public choice theorists recommend a minimal state so that the role and dominance of unethical political leaders and bureaucrats are diminished. Hence, the public choice theory suitably affirms the carriage of the totality of governance fundamentals as 'public interest' is not a priority in Nigeria. Significantly, the core argument of this paper is that plans, visions and missions proclamations of the Nigerian political architecture (Executive and Legislative) for 'national and public interest' has hardly stood the test of time presumably for the obvious reason of priming 'personal and primordial interests' to 'public interest'.

In 2012, the Federal Executive Council adopted a comprehensive strategic policy on climate change referred to as the ‘Nigeria Climate Change Policy Response and Strategy’ (New Climate Institute, 2015), which this paper refers to as ‘NCC-PRS 2012. This policy response and strategy was with an array of ambition and targets to achieve low-carbon, high-growth economic development and build a climate-resilient society (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2013; UNFCCC, 2015).

**Figure 1: National Policy on Climate Change Nigeria 2013**

<b>Name of policy</b>	Nigeria Climate Change Policy Response and Strategy
<b>Jurisdiction</b>	Country
<b>Supranational region</b>	–
<b>Country</b>	Nigeria
<b>Region</b>	–
<b>Sub-national region or state</b>	–
<b>City or local</b>	–
<b>Policy objective</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mitigation</li> </ul>
<b>Type of policy instrument</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Climate strategy</li> </ul>
<b>Sector name</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• General</li> </ul>
<b>Policy description</b>	<p>"In order to reflect the increasing importance of climate change issues in Nigeria, the Federal Executive Council adopted in 2012 the Nigeria Climate Change Policy Response and Strategy. To ensure an effective national response to the significant and multi-faceted impacts of climate change, Nigeria has adopted a comprehensive strategy, as well as a number of specific policies. The strategic goal of the Nigeria Climate Change Policy Response and Strategy is to foster low-carbon, high growth economic development and build a climate resilient society through the attainment of the following objectives:</p>

- "- Implement mitigation measures that will promote low carbon as well as sustainable and high economic growth;
- "- Enhance national capacity to adapt to climate change;
- "- Raise climate change related science, technology and R&D to a new level that will enable the country to better participate in international scientific and technological cooperation on climate change;
- "- Significantly increase public awareness and involve private sector participation in addressing the challenges of climate change;
- "- Strengthen national institutions and mechanisms (policy, legislative and economic) to establish a suitable and functional framework for climate change governance".

<b>Policy type</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Changing activity</li> <li>• Energy efficiency</li> <li>• Renewable</li> <li>• Nuclear or CCS or fuel switch</li> <li>• Non-energy<sup>5</sup></li> </ul>
<b>Policy stringency</b>	—
<b>Implementation state</b>	Implemented
<b>Date of decision</b>	2012
<b>Start date of implementation</b>	2012
<b>End date of implementation</b>	—
<b>High impact</b>	—
<b>Impact indicator</b>	
<b>Supports policies</b>	—
<b>Is supported by policies</b>	—
<b>Comments (background and assessment)</b>	—
<b>Status</b>	Final

Source: <http://www4.unfccc.int/submission> Accessed 2017, February 10

The outline of figure 1 depicts the articulate response to climate change in 2012 by the Federal Government of Nigeria. The contrast resonates from the

demand for measurable changes five years down in 2017 and the retrospective suggestion that, Nigeria has been actively engaged in international climate policy negotiations since it became a Party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) of 1994 and ratified its Kyoto Protocol in 2004. Nigeria submitted its First National Communication (FNC) in 2003 and a Second National Communication in February 2014 (APP, 2016).

The vision of the National Climate Change Policy Response and Strategy (NCCPRS) is a climate change-resilient Nigeria ready for rapid and sustainable socio-economic development. Its mission is to strengthen national initiatives to adapt to and mitigate climate change and involve all sectors of society, including the poor and other vulnerable groups (women, youth etc.) within the overall context of advancing sustainable socio-economic development. Its main objectives are to:

- i. Implement mitigation measures that will promote low carbon as well as sustainable and high economic growth;
- ii. Strengthen national capacity to adapt to climate change;
- iii. Raise climate change-related science, technology and R&D to a new level that will enable the country to better participate in international scientific and technological co-operation on climate change;
- iv. Significantly increase public awareness and involve the private sector in addressing the challenges of climate change;
- v. Strengthen national institutions and mechanisms (policy, legislative and economic) to establish a suitable and functional framework for climate change governance

NASPA-CCN, (2011) and APP, (2016) policy briefs note that the National Policy on Climate Change in Nigeria is a strategic policy response to climate change that aims to foster low-carbon, high growth economic development path and build a climate-resilient society through the attainment of set targets. The plan explicitly identifies climate change as one of the major threats to economic development goals and food security. Further to meet these challenges, the policy foster's plans that include concrete targets in the areas of climate change adaptation, afforestation, and energy supply. Within this dimension herein, are the vision and the tangible deliverables sought to be attained within the context of these periods connected to Nigeria's National legislative framework. This paper looks at the level of successes achieved in the efforts at managing the climate change challenges in Nigeria with particular emphasis on the quality of legislation, implementation of the legislative decisions and the spate of advancements made therein since the adoption of the National Climate Change Policy Response and Strategy (NCCPRS) in 2012.

### **Government Policies without Legislation and Climate Change Responses in Nigeria**

The responsibility of making and implementing policies towards governance in any society rests on the governmental agencies within the state. Understanding that there are three major governmental arms in every modern (especially democratic) states, it comes directly unto the shoulders of these three arms of government namely; legislature, executive and judiciary. Noteworthy is that while in some countries, independent agencies exists and can operate outside the direct supervision of any of these three arms of government, under the constitution of Nigeria, every governmental agency that involves in any way in the making and implementation of government policies does that under the direct supervision of one of the arms of government. That puts on them the responsibilities of the state and therefore becomes the units of analytical concentration of our study.

On the issue of climate change, two arms of the state ought to have initial direct responsibilities towards evolving and implementing credible policies for climate change in Nigeria; the legislature and the executive. While good legislation is expected from the legislature, ensuring implementation

is the responsibility of the executive and also the legislature because of its oversight role/powers, hence this should be the basis of looking at the functioning of the government's effort at climate change policies and policy implementation.

Yet, five years onward, National Climate Change Policy Response and Strategy (NCCPRS) and climate change policy is still preparing to take off. This, according to Ekpoh (2014), is evident in demands at seeking to establish a national climate change commission that would coordinate climate issues nationwide. Thus far, according to the London School of Economics and Political Science (2013), Nigeria is yet to have any climate change specific law enacted by the National legislature and assent to by the President as required. The country has extant laws bordering on numerous environmental and sectoral policies, strategies, and plans where climate change adaptation could apply; though at present their use in enabling and supporting climate change adaptation is limited (BNRCC, 2011).

Ekpoh further notes that the bill on setting up the commission however is yet to be approved. However, the AAP (2016) states that the Federal Government of Nigeria has also established the National Climate Change Trust Fund and the Environmental Sustainability Group to design and attract financing mechanisms for adaptation initiatives. Commendable as this legislative and public policy vigor and thrust may convey, the fundamentals enshrined within the governance paradigm are flawed.

According to Olowu and Sako (2002:38) cited in Cloete (2003), governance within the context of political leadership styles operates within a system of values, policies and institution by which a society manages its economic, political and social affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil society and private sector. They argue that it is on this basis of style of governance that political leaders are judged as good or bad. Though the broader realms of phenomenological inquiry hold contrary views as political systems are viewed as determinants of political leadership styles (Biu, 2017).

Furthermore, Hyden and Braton (1993:7), and Cloete (2003) suggest four fundamental elements of governance that are central herein to the NCC-PRS

2012 in Nigeria. They are:

- a. Degree of trust in government
- b. Degree of responsiveness in the relationship between government and civil society
- c. Government degree of accountability to its voters
- d. Nature of the authority that the government exercise over its society

The timelines evidently set for the NCC-PRS, 2012 in Nigeria and the accompanying legislative ‘recesses’ and absence of existing extant laws and public policy on climate change contrast the configured governance template. The ramifications of connecting the legislation on climate change in Nigeria has an ‘all-inclusive’ and yet trickle-down effect. However, the pull of diverse interest within fragile institutional and state capacities adds to the dynamics of NCC-PRS, 2012 outcomes.

Put differently, the executive arm of government (The Presidency and Civil/ Public Service at Federal and sub-national regional levels) in Nigeria have not evidently rolled out executive policy instruments and ‘orders’ for climate change management as seen in the NCC-PRS 2012 policy.

Though the National Assembly (NASS) legislative process is rigor-driven, as seen in figure 2 (see the appendix), with eleven stages of legislative process. The 2015 legislative year illustrates this in figure 3, which figure 3 illustrates the reality of the modus operandi using the 2015 legislative year. The National Assembly comprises two chambers: the Senate, which received 299 Bills that were intended to be passed and made into laws and members sat for only 96 times in the whole of year 2015. The second chamber, referred to as the House of Representatives, received 685 Bills with members sitting for 104 times during the same year. This saw the Senate passing only 11 Bills into law and the House of Representatives passing just 85 Bills out of the 299 and 685 proposals respectively (see figure 3 in the appendix).

However, the specific focuses of these legislative Bills are not outlined in terms of initiation and purpose, this paper puts the corollary within the context of climate governance legal framework. Rose-Ackerman (1999) cited in Miller (2007) has clearly explained that, “money cannot be entirely eliminated from politics. Elections must be financed and wealthy interests concerned with legislative outcomes and government policy may be willing to foot the bill”. This comes to terms that the subsisting political culture within the Nigerian Legislative Assembly may not concur as deemed appropriate, coming from antecedents that require paradigm shifts congruent with the demands to meet current and future climate threats in Nigeria and beyond.

### **Conclusion**

The Nigeria Federal Ministry of Environment policy document (2010) anchored the climate change NEEDS study on the comatose vision 20:2020 initiated in 2007 to launch Nigeria among the 20 largest economies in the world. This requires nothing other than history to insinuate the likely outcomes for Nigeria. The expectations connected to this broad-based vision for the year 2020 is two years away with the wider ramifications for our collective National interest at stake. As with the absence of continuum in government policies in Nigeria, the transition of two regimes down the line apart from the ‘reductionist’ fate, the vision 2020 has transmuted into other ‘newer’ policy frameworks.

This affirms the argument that policies devoid of legislation like the climate change policy framework, will not survive the ‘murky waters’ of Nigerian politics. Looking forward, the urgent task is to enlarge the local non-governmental groups and stakeholders to include international climate change advocacy groups. Furthermore, alternative sources of energy bordering on renewable energy within renewable law should be pursued by the National Legislature of Nigeria and the Executive arm of government.



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## Appendix


Figure 2: Nigeria Legislative Making Template



Please read the full article here: [www.lawpadi.com/11-steps-to-how-a-law-is-made-in-nigeria/](http://www.lawpadi.com/11-steps-to-how-a-law-is-made-in-nigeria/)

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**Figure 3.** National Legislative Assembly Bill Passage, 2015



Source: Pulse news; Premium Times news & www.oroata.com (2016) accessed February, 13 2017

**ARTICLE**

**7**

**E-GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION  
IN NIGERIA: BUILDING A NEW PARADIGM  
FOR PUBLIC TRUST**

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## Abstract

*This study investigated how the online delivery of public services (e-government) has impacted public trust in the Nigerian government. This was done using an electronic survey conducted with 13,743 users of online government services. The study found that that electronic public service delivery had ( $t = -4.73, p < 0.05$ ) significant effect on public trust in Nigeria. However, the practical significance as the  $t_{obtained} -4.73$  is greater than  $t_{critical\ value} -4.303$  under 2 degree of freedom at 5% significance level. This difference further implies that significant effect existed between service delivery and public confidence with practical difference from the null value. Stemming from this finding, the study concluded that the significant positive relationship is established between electronic public service delivery and trust in government and it could catalyse the promotion of trust in the Nigerian government.*

**Keywords:** E-Government; Trust; Public Trust; Public Service Delivery; Mistrust

## **Introduction**

Trust is the bedrock upon which the legitimacy of public institutions lies and it has remained a necessity for restoring and maintaining social cohesion. A number of social behaviour depends on the extent of trust the citizens repose in their governments. Trust in government agencies and their modus operandi are therefore means of establishing a number of patriotic values which are not limited to; encouraging compliance with state rules; facilitating active cooperation between the state and relevant stakeholders and even 'co-production' between the citizens and MDAs. In essence, it legitimizes public funds raising to finance governance and social service delivery. Similarly, government's competence is predicated on her responsiveness and reliability in effectively delivering public services.

Lincoln's dictum, "government of the people, for the people, by the people", has assumed a prominent role in defining democracy and by extension good governance. Yet, the mode of governance across the world is far from this perspective (Parent, Vandebeek & Gemino, 2005). Developing countries, in particular, have failed in their mandate of effective and efficient social service delivery and ensuring prudence in public spending. These failures have culminated into a sour relationship between the citizens and their government as trust keeps declining in their relationship. In Nigeria for instance, some of the limitations in the traditional approach to governance can be attributed to bureaucratic rigidity and complexity among government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), repeated paperwork, inefficiency in task performance that usually culminate into long waiting time both for the public service users and public officials (Al-Hakim, 2007). In furtherance to this, Babalola (2012) held that Nigerians distrust in their government has been a long fairy tale, accumulated over the years by the nonchalant manner with which public goods and services are being delivered. However, the trust deficit is not limited to Nigeria or the developing countries as a myriad of surveys indicated that even the developed world is also battling with a persistent decline in public trust (Moti, 2007 & 2013). Consequently, distrust can pose a serious challenge to working with governments (Iroghama, 2012).

In a bid to reverse the poor service delivery trend and inculcate prudence in governance while recouping the trust deficiency, a service-overhauling quest began. This quest formed the contemporary scramble for e-public



service delivery adoption in governance. ICT was thus incorporated into governance in what is known as e-government. Electronic government is not just a movement that is peculiar to a particular country or continent; rather it is a worldwide phenomenon that concerns developed and developing nations (Reddick, 2010). The incorporation of ICT in governance has remained the cornerstone in savaging the incessant menace of poor social service delivery across the globe. All governments aspiring to restore and retain the much-needed popular legitimacy now embrace digital revolution to enhance their performances. A well-institutionalized e-public service delivery can guarantee four important targets of accountability, openness, accessibility and growth. In return for timely, effective and efficient social services, the people pay taxes promptly; they abide by state laws and offer themselves as and when necessary to the service of the state. The interchange of these mutual responsibilities does not just facilitate a harmonious co-existence between the state and the citizens but is also helps in building citizen's trust in the government. In a more general way, it raises social capital by increasing overall levels of trust in the society.

However, reversing the decline in public trust in governments has become a necessary task for scholars and modern governments. With the recent e-government adoption in Nigeria, it therefore became necessary to investigate whether the e-public service project has actually succeeded in reversing the decline in citizens' trust in the Nigerian government. It is within this framework that the need for this study surfaced.

### **Hypothesis**

**H<sub>0</sub>:** e-government had no significant effect on citizens' trust in the Nigerian government.

### **Literature review**

The incorporation of ICT tools in governance has given birth to a number of new concepts in the social sciences. Prominent among these concepts were; e-government; e-governance; e-policing; e-filling; e-voting etc. Of these concepts, e-government and e-governance are often used interchangeably though there are significant differences in their meaning and audiences (Singh & Sharma, 2009). With new technology, the headaches of doing business with the government is eliminated as citizens can now do much of the work

themselves (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2009). E-Governance encompasses more concepts than e-government that only deals with enhancing social service delivery with digital tools in a bid to facilitate a change in the perception of the citizens towards their governments (Lim, Masrom & Din, 2013).

### **E-Government**

The concept of e-Government is now a cogent subject of discussion in public service delivery literature at least for about ten years now (Heeks, 2006; West, 2005; Garson, 2003 and Fountain, 2001). However, e-government is not constrained to the field of public administration alone, rather it is multidisciplinary in nature as it covers fields like Information System, Political Science, Information Technology and Computer Science. E-Government is still a new phenomenon where ideas are still pouring out from scholars and its practitioners. Thus, it is devoid of a standard and universal definition (Reddick, 2010).

However, the term can simply be described as summing up 'government-as-usual plus ICT'. E-Government is a clear move away from the statuesque as it is not about business as usual, instead, it redirect focus to the use of ICT to rebrand the structures and procedures of governance (Alshehri, & Drew, 2010). Adeyeye and Aladesanmi (2011) quoted the former President Obasanjo's (Rtd) when he described e-Government as "the use of information & communication technologies, to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of governance through implementing data warehousing and integrated decision support system to manage the modern economy for the benefit of the governed."

However, an elaborate digging into the definitions of e-Government shows that there are variations in the submissions of scholars as a number of them view e-government as an end in itself while many others see it as a means to an end. To the former, one of the cardinal duties of government is service delivery in an efficient and effective manner and e-government provides the platform to do just that. Thus, the successful implementation of e-public service delivery marks the realization of prominent objectives of the government. As such, e-government becomes a means to an end. Authors with this perspective are presented as follow;

The European Commission, (2003) posits that e-government is the use of ICT in public administration combined with structural and skills improvement in order to enhance public services, promote democratic dividends and strengthen support for public policies. Similar to the European Commission's view is the perception of Denhardt & Denhardt (2009) and Olowu (2004) who conceptualize e-government as a tool for service delivery. i.e. the adoption of "all the information and communication technology platforms and applications in the public sector or the use of the internet for delivering government information and services to citizens". To buttress this perspective, Adah (2015) described e-Government as a double-lane communication process that deals with the use of ICT to deliver public services while ensuring unfettered access of such services to citizens. Practically, e-government entails the adoption of new leadership orientation, mechanism of decisions making and investment, new ways of making social services available to citizens, a genuine way of listening and responding to needs of the public in addition to new ways of organizing and delivering public information and services. Dhamodharam & Saminathan (2011) termed e-government as the government's use of ICT tools specifically web-based internet applications to facilitate access to and delivery of public information and service to citizens, businesses and government departments. In the words of Jalali & Khorasani (2012), the idea of e-government depicts service delivery and information exchange both within the organizations (Intra-Governmental) and outside them (Inter-Governmental) that are observed using various technical tools and is seen as a mutual engagement between government and citizens, non-profit organizations, business persons, employees and the government itself is enhanced. Concisely, a common understanding in this service delivery group is that e-government refers to the application of ICTs, particularly Web-based platforms, to provide cheaper, effective, easier and faster access to government services.

E-Government to the latter is a means through which political values and mandates are being fulfilled. In this perspective, through e-public service delivery, popular participation can be engendered, transparency can be achieved and accountability enshrined. To back up the idea, Al-Hakim (2007) submitted that e-Government denotes the use of ICTs by government to improve the way public administration interacts with citizens and businesses

and to improve the efficiency of the administrative process. Similarly, Means and Schneider (2000) examined the concept from the perspective of the relationships between governments, their customers (businesses, other governments, and citizens) and suppliers by the use of the internet. More discretely, Lawson (1998) describes e-government as “transferring power to people, by operating in a one-stop, non-stop way, and doing more for less”. In the view of Heichlinger (2004), citizens are focal to the idea of e-government, so he defined “e-Government as a set of activities supported by information systems with the aim of improving the relationships between government institutions and citizens.” The constant mention of “government-citizen relationship” in the above definitions portrays an element of politics. To Davies (2015), e-Government refers to concerted efforts of public authorities to use information and communication technologies to better public services delivery and increase democratic participation. Conclusively, e-Government possesses the potentials to transform government to be more prudent, accountable and responsive to the citizens (Reddick, 2010).

Despite the scope disparity between the presented perspectives, there are still many common threads in their ideas and they are the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs): its ability to transform government and make it more responsive and accountable to citizens through participation and service delivery. However, this study shall adopt the perspective of the former that takes e-government as a means to an end where they defined e-government as the use of IT to deliver social services in an effective and efficient manner. Sequel to this, e-government, therefore, assumes the substitute for e-public service delivery.

### **Public Trust**

Despite the convenience with which people discuss the concept of trust on a daily basis, not a succinctly acceptable clarification of the construct has been arrived at by the scholars (Romano, 2003). However, trust connotes a three-part engagement concerning at least two individuals and one act: a person may trust specific people or specific establishments to do specific things at a given point in time (Guinnane, 2005). The term is conceptualized as a multifaceted term with varied features that are considered relevant in defining it. Trust appeared with the humanity and the development of social interaction. Almost every aspect of a person’s life is based on one or another

way in trust (Colesca, 2009). Several kinds of literature, types of research, conferences, workshops, and seminars have been conducted in defining the concept of trust (Colesca and Schoon & Cheng, 2011). Trust is a concept drawn from an array of disciplines that is influenced by both measurable and non-measurable factors. Jalali & Khorasani (2012) buttressed that trust appeared in the everyday life of the people. Therefore, trust is a very robust concept, covering a wide range of relationships.

Trust connotes the expectation that arises in a community of individuals with shared norms and honest intentions on the part of other members of that community that certain things will be taken care of or done (Iroghama, 2012). In a slightly different perspective, Lewicki & Bunker (1995) explained trust to be scenario involving confident positive expectation on the motives of others with respect to one's situations involving risk. Trust is subject to assessment of the influence of others in terms of the extent of to which one perceived that quality and significance impact will be ensured on one's outcomes in a given situation, such that one's inclination toward such influence provide a sense of assurance over the likely results of the situation. Nonetheless, trust is conditional, incremental and Symmetrical. Simply put, public trust is the confidence reposed in others (government) indicating that they will (always) do the right thing.

Trust is a key element in the relationship between voters and elected representatives and forms part of the representative legitimacy, part of the political system. If one desires a solid basis for making and enforcing rules for citizens and society, trust is essential (Eigeman, 2007). Trust is the first responsibility of the political administration. It must constantly strive to gain trust, to maintain a sustainable position of the government as a carrier of public authority. In the OECD (2000), perspective, [public] trust is the expectation of citizens from a public servant (s) to function in the interest of the public [citizens] with fairness and to manage and distribute public resources properly without prejudice. Thus, a fair, reliable and equitable public services provision inspire public trust and create a favourable environment for citizens and economy to prosper. The concept of trust in a political and public institution is quite a long tale with different notions, ideas, and concepts been generated over the years within the spheres of political science, public administration, and public policy. Various schools

of thought have emerged in laying theoretical background on the concept of trust. None of these schools possesses the monopoly of explaining what trust in government is as there is great overlap in their discussions over time.

### **E-Government implementation in Nigeria**

The innovation in ICT and the emergence of the Internet were strong pushers in the movement from an industrial to an information age (Wirtz & Daiser, 2015). The world has assumed a global village where all nations strive to attain a significant level of electronic governance that involves the use of ICTs to deliver government services (Adah, 2015). Nigeria is regarded as the giant of Africa in the international community; this attachment emanated from her enormous population, considerably large landmass and not necessarily because of its advancement in information and communication technology. However, the need to combat rising levels of corruption, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness in the public sector led to the decision to take governance to the next level by ensuring the presence of government online. This is established in a speech of former president Obasanjo when he stressed that his administration has been centred on reorientation and reorganization of the civil service and public officials by changing the business as usual (corrupt, bureaucratic, and inefficient) default system to a transparent, efficient and productive, and participatory one. Moreover, he continued that his administration has taken a bold step to re-engineer the backroom engine to institutionalize an “effective system through computer-assisted modern processes known as e-government” (Obasanjo, 2004). In a collaborating view, a top government official in the Ministry of Science and Technology buttressed the need for e-government as a change element in the Nigerian public service. He described e-government as:

...a hurricane that nobody, not even a President can stop. Can you see a President stopping a hurricane? He cannot. No dictator, for instance, can tell you that you cannot send an e-mail... One way to diminish [419] fraudsters are to have proper data and proper documentation which IT [introduces].

Aside the presented political vocal attention paid to the e-government project, history reveals that the application of computer in the conduct of public governance in Nigeria dated back to the year 1948 when the British colonialists installed it at the Nigerian Port Authority. Later in the 70s, the Nigerian government promulgated an indigenization decree that set apart business categories for Nigerians only and the computer business was one such area. This move allows indigenous citizens to set up businesses in the importation and sale of computers and in the long run, the number of computers in the country experienced a serious boost (UNU, 2004). In furtherance to this, by the late 1970s, the Nigerian government established the Central Computer Committee (CCC), that is charged with the responsibility of creating standards for users and vendors of computers in Nigeria and develop inputs for the national policy on computing. However, the Nigerian Communication Commission (NCC) that was formed in 1992 was reactivated in 2000 and since then the e-government implementation framework has rolled-out several “citizen-centric projects” (Agunloye, 2007).

The National Telecommunications Act was established to serve as the regulatory framework for all ICT related issues. To realize the objectives of the National Policy, the government established the National Technology Development Agency (NITDA), which is under the auspices of the Ministry of Science, and Technology to implement the policy frameworks (NITDA, 2001). The rapid emergence and growth of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in everyday life of citizens has thereby pushed the Nigerian government to transform itself into an electronic government (e-government) to better serve the citizens. In furtherance to the e-government journey, Prof. Akunyili (2010) while delivering a speech at the World Congress on Information Technology in Amsterdam opined that the common characteristic of e-government is the automation of the initial paper-centred processes to enhance access to public services. More importantly, it seeks strengthen government’s drive towards efficiency in governance and increased transparency in the management of resources, for national growth and development.

Sequel to the concerted effort of the government in the adoption of e-government between 2011 and 2013, mobile applications and channels

that can directly enhance poverty alleviation, gender mainstreaming, social inclusion and disaster management were designed and operationalized. More interestingly, the creation of National Service Portal in 2013 marked a significant epoch in the Nigeria e-public service delivery project. The portal offers a number of interconnection between government Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs). Comments from unofficial quarters show that the portal has been very helpful in citizens' access to Government services in the short run while it has the potential of facilitating transparency in governance and in the end, trust in the government.

Nigeria is currently experiencing a slow but steady growth in the ICT sector. In a recent ranking by the United Nations in 2020 on e-Government implementation around the world, Nigeria was positioned 141<sup>th</sup> of the 193 United Nation Member States with the following breakdown: 0.4406 on Global Development Index, 0.4507 on Human Capital Index, 0.5176 on Online Service Index and 0.3534 on Telecommunication Infrastructure Index (UNDESA, 2020).

### **Public Mistrust in Nigeria**

Nigerians distrust in their government has been a long fairy tale, accumulated over the years by the nonchalant manner with which public goods and services are being delivered by the past and present government administrations (Babalola, 2012). Successive administrations and regimes have always pledged their commitment to enhancing better life and infrastructural development for the Nigerian masses as a basis for introducing reforms, policies and programmes but mostly ended up achieving the opposite. A simple glance into the trends of events that culminated into mistrust in the Nigerian government can be traced back to the military administration of General Ibrahim Babangida (1985- 1993) when the Structural Adjustment Programmes was introduced despite the disapproval both from Nigerian at home and abroad. A program that was to rejuvenate the economy but ended up throwing the masses into abject poverty (Anyawu, 1992).

The return to civil rule in 1999 was a gentle balm for Nigerians as everyone looks forward to a better and prosperous Nigeria only to be disappointed afterwards through incessant increments in the price of petroleum products, endemic political corruption etc. The first civilian administration (1999-



2007) recorded increase in the price of petroleum products five times. Every occasion is supported by a promise to enhance the quality of lives and infrastructural development, but all ended up with empty results (Salami & Ayoola, 2010). Voters also evidenced the dearth of public trust in the Nigerian government in the 2007 general election where electoral fraud was glaring, the results were contested in many fora, and this led to protests. Many independent observers called for the cancellation of the result as well as a quick electoral reform (Iroghama, 2012). On January 1, 2012, the government subsidies on Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) was removed and this led to an increase in the petrol pump price by up to 91.65%. Nigerians took to the streets in protest of the development that grounded economic activities of the country for about weeks.

It is apparent that a productive society or nation is reliant on a high degree of public trust in the government and its institutions. Cynicism among Nigerians is rampant, as Nigerians do not trust the government in any respect. The Minister of Finance and the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Dr Ngozi Okonjo- Iweala was quoted in the Punch Newspaper of January 8<sup>th</sup> 2012, to have said that *"I really agree on this issue of mistrust; I think it is part of the problem(s) governments faced over the years. Nigerians have not seen their governments fulfilling promises..."* (Baiyewu, 2012:2). A lawyer and human right activist, Femi Falana also corroborated the minister's argument when he was quoted to have said;

We have lost trust because what we are hearing now what the government intends to do with the funds from subsidy removal is not new. We have been told the same thing in the past. What is the guarantee that we will not hear the same thing after the deregulation of the downstream sector? (Nnodium, 2012:5).

Mistrust in Nigerian government by Nigerians caused by lack of transparency and empty promises of the past government to improve the living standards of the people persists. These factors have deemed the government unapt of which the resultant effect might threaten the fragile country's nascent democracy and sovereignty. N/Nzeako painted a clearer picture thus:

The agonizing queues in our banks, the snail-speed delivery of mails by our postal system and the chaotic scenes at our airports have been accepted as normal ways of life. Needless to talk about the frustrating bottlenecks of the nation's bureaucracy – the missing or misplaced documents, stockpiles of files and the absence officer. Ghost workers dumped mails and financial embezzlement and mismanagement are common features of the society. These and many instances suggest how far our society stands behind the frontiers of modern civilization (Akoh, 2001:3).

What is even more disturbing is the fact that the average Nigerian citizen has long ceased to believe that he can get any useful service from any government institution unless he offers a bribe, which is now considered a normal deal in the conduct of public business.

Public trust is an important element in realizing good governance in Nigeria just like in every other nation. It is also a vital feature needed to create a conducive atmosphere for institutions to implement public policies, enshrine transparency and improve public participation. Moreover, the Nigerians placing trust in government serves as an all-important yardstick to measure the legitimacy upon which the political and administrative structure is based. Public trust is important for decision-making, public participation, and voting behaviour, adoption of professional standard and ethics as well as adherence to the laws and regulations of the state. The absence of trust has made Nigerians perceive the government as having misplaced its priorities, corrupt, inefficient, waste resources and incompetent in making and implementing policies to better the lives of Nigerians.

E-Government has therefore been proffered as a panacea to government's inefficiency, the absence of transparency and it will facilitate an increase in the level of interaction between the government and the citizens (Dhamodharam & Saminathan, 2011; West, 2005). In many countries, E-government is fast replacing the traditional and conventional bureaucratic mode of public service operation, though much faster in some than others are. In the Sub-Saharan African countries (where Nigeria belongs), the rate is quite slow

but steady as most of the public bureaucracies “are still hierarchical and lack accountability and transparency” (Ngulube, 2007). The emergence of information technology in Nigeria serves as a new paradigm shift in the manner, process and pattern of communication between, within and outside the public sector. E-government is gradually posing as a tool for enhancing the external and internal relationship between the government and the citizens through constituency participation and efficient service delivery through technology and the new media (Gartner Group, 2000).

### **Methodology**

Despite the intense effort and spending on e-government implementation in Nigeria, has the overall level of trust between the citizens and the government improved? In answering this, primary data was collected from eight (8) purposively selected Federal Agencies in Nigeria. The agencies were: the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS), Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) and the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC). In the list also is the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) and the National Youth Service Corp (NYSC). Their selection was based on the ground that they constitute the foremost online public service delivery agencies in Nigeria.

In the administration of online survey, the respondents were reached on the Facebook Audience-Access Service, sorted on the bases of Nationality (Nigerians), Educational Status (Higher Education) and Profession (Graduates, Self-employed, Elite and Artisans). This was premised on the assumption that a significant number of Facebook subscribers have interacted with government agencies electronically before, since all efforts to get details of visitors to the selected agency’s website yielded only a few results as only the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) and the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) had visitors’ counter on their websites. The survey was made available online to respondents for a period of four (4) weeks. Data collected was analysed with a one-sample statistics *t*-test..

## Data Presentation

### Socio-Demographic Features of the Respondents

As presented in the Table 1, over the four weeks timeframe allotted to the online survey, 13743 responses were received. Out of these, 5624 (40.9%) of the respondents were between 20 - 40 years, while 8117 (59.1%) of the respondents fall within the age range of 41-60 years. This indicates that the respondents were considerably matured and at their service age of 20-60 years and this feat of respondents engendered very detailed and reliable responses for this study. The table equally showed that 3179 (23.1%) of the respondents were female, while 10564 (76.9%) were male. This indicated that there was a difference in the representation of the male and female in the universe of this study. However, this was incapable of skewing the findings because the research is not gender-oriented. More remarkably, the total respondents have attained the tertiary level of education in their respective disciplines. This implies that the respondents have the relatively required academic acumen and exposure for providing basic and accurate answers for the survey questions.

In addition, 54.7% of the respondents were civil/public servant from diverse government ministries, departments and agencies of federal, state and local governments; 24.6% of the respondents were from private organisations with notable interface with government services; and just 7.5% of the respondents were self-employed; while 12.9% of the respondents constituted students in numerous higher institutions of learning across the country. Just a few of the respondents were unemployed. To this end, these selective respondents were considered capable of providing comprehensive information on the e-Government Implementation in Nigeria.

**Table 1: Socio-Demographic Details**

Age	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
21-40 years	5624	40.9	40.9
41-60 years	8117	59.1	100.0
Below 20 years	2	.0	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>13743</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
<b>Sex</b>			
Female	3179	23.1	23.1

Male	10564	76.9	100.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>13743</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
<b>Academic Qualification</b>			
Tertiary	13743		
<b>Profession</b>			
Civil/Public Servant	7524	54.7	54.7
Private Worker	3394	24.6	79.3
Self-Employed	1032	7.8	87.1
Students	1784	12.9	100.0
Unemployed	9	.0	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>13743</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

Source: Field Survey, 2020

### **Effect of e-Government implementation on Public Trust in Nigeria**

In establishing the link between e-government and public trust in Nigeria, a number of indicators were adopted and they were; reliability, confidence, recommendation, transparency, and feedback. As presented in Table 2, 7423 (54.0%) of the respondents established that reliability of information provided to them through e-governance is moderate. This is a revelation that e-governance has been obediently reliable in the provision of required information to the citizenry. In addition, they believed that government would always do the right thing through e-governance in service delivery. This is evidenced in the 7685 (55.9%) reacted with moderate rating to this assertion.

It was equally established on the table that there is a direct positive relationship between the government and the populace made possible by e-service delivery, consequent upon 9178 (66.8%) respondents that asserted that there is moderate improvement on their interaction with government on services delivery. However, inferences from people's responses showed that they have confidence in the quality of services rendered to them through e-public service delivery with 8290 (60.3%) of respondents established that the confidence is moderate as there has not being any report of suspicious act through the use of e-public service delivery system.

Furthermore, possibility for recommending e-public service to other citizens who have not used the system to transact with the government was used to measure the effect of e-Government on public trust in the Nigerian government. In their response, 7194 (52.3%) of the respondents admitted that there is high possibility for recommending e-public service to other people, owing to the conveniences enjoyed and its effectiveness in transaction online service. Also, to understand the effect of e-Government on public trust in the Nigerian government, assertion were made to investigate the extent of government online transparency, 6717 representing (48.9%) of the respondents acknowledged that the extent of government online transparency is moderate when compare with the traditional methods of services delivered by government.

It was also observed from the findings that people pay taxes/fees willingly without any pressure mounted on them by the government officials since the proportion of the taxes/fees will be charged with the original payment of services in the course of transaction, with moderate acknowledgement of the assertion by 7501 (54.6%) of the respondents. In addition, to ascertain the trust in the Nigerian government, respondents were asked if willingly they will give feedback to the government on her e-services delivery, 6708 (48.8%) of respondents declared their willingness to give feedback to the government. However, 8111 representing (59.0 %) of the respondents also disclosed their willingness to collaborate with government on e-public service delivery project.

**Table 2: Effect of e-Government on Public Trust in the Nigerian Government**

S/N	Trust in the Nigerian Government	High	Low	Moderate	No Response
		f	f	f	f
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
i.	Reliability of information provided to you	5844 (42.5)	410 (3.0)	7423 (54.0)	- (-)
ii.	Belief that the government will always do the right thing	1251 (9.1)	4741 (34.5)	7685 (55.9)	- (-)
iii.	Improvement on your interaction with government	2432 (17.7)	2067 (15.0)	9178 (66.8)	- (-)
iv.	Confidence in quality of services rendered to you	3533 (25.7)	1854 (13.5)	8290 (60.3)	- (-)
v.	Possibility that you will recommend e-public services to others	7194 (52.3)	1184 (8.6)	5299 (38.6)	- (-)
vi.	Extent of government online transparency	3839 (27.9)	3120 (22.7)	6717 (48.9)	1 (.0)
vii.	Your willingness to pay due taxes/fees to the government without any pressure on you	4893 (35.6)	1282 (9.3)	7501 (54.6)	1 (.0)
viii.	Your willingness to give feedback to the government on her e-services	4636 (33.7)	2332 (17.0)	6708 (48.8)	1 (.0)
ix.	Your willingness to partner with government on e-public service delivery project	8111 (59.0)	773 (5.6)	4792 (34.9)	1 (.0)

Source: Field Survey, 2020

**Data Analysis and Discussion**

The statistical tool used in the analysis of the data is one sample statistics *t*-test. The alpha level used in the analysis is 5% (i.e. 0.05). This hypothesis is tested on the effect of e-government on public trust in the study area. The *t*-test result was generated from variables 26 – 28 set out in the questionnaire for this purpose (See, Appendix I).

**Table 3: Test of Hypothesis**

$H_0$ : e-government services have no significant effect on public trust in Nigeria.

One-Sample Statistics

	N	Grand Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Effect	3	2.14	0.903	0.066

**Table 4: One-Sample *t*-test**

	Test Value = 60						
	<i>T</i>	<i>t<sub>crit</sub></i>	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						Lower	Upper
Effect	-4.73	-4.303	2	.000	-57.86	-58.05	-57.78

Using a test value of 60, a *t* obtained of -4.73 with 2 degree of freedom is significant at 95% confidence level. This is much far away from *t* critical value of -4.303. There is 0% chance of obtaining an insignificant positive effect on public trust by error. At any level of the three (3) areas of public trust assessed, significant positive effect were somewhat lower at an average of -57.86 than the set standard. Since probability value (0.000) is lesser than alpha level (0.05), this study rejected  $H_0$ ; and accepted  $H_1$ . This therefore implies an acceptance of the alternative hypothesis that e-government



implementations have ( $t = -4.73, p < 0.05$ ) significant effect on public trust in Nigeria. However, the practical significance is relatively clinical because the  $t_{obtained} -4.73$  is greater than  $t_{critical\ value} -4.303$  under 2 degree of freedom at 5% significance level. This difference further implies that significant effect existed between service delivery and public confidence with practical difference from the null value.

The study also looked into the effect of e-government on public trust in the Nigerian government by engaging variables like reliability of public information, improvement in the relationship of citizens with the state, confidence, service recommendation and transparency.

In the end, the study found that e-government implementations have ( $t = -4.73, p < 0.05$ ) significant effect on public trust in Nigeria. One of the cardinal essence of government is to deliver public goods while protecting lives and properties of her citizens. Service delivery has therefore remained a solid platform upon which government performance is rated. It is therefore not a mirage that a significant relationship exists between e-government implementation and public trust in Nigeria. In the submissions of Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006; Moti, 2007; Sang & Sunhyuk, 2012; and Parent, Vandabeek & Gemino, 2005, the trust level in the government has been on the decline as public service delivery has similarly continued to deteriorate over the years. These scholars linked service delivery to public trust and confidence by concluding that a symbiotic relationship exists between the duos. That is, when service delivery is efficient and effective, public trust and confidence is boosted.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Nigeria is a country with a long history of cynicism in which the citizenry exhibited serious doubt in most actions of the government. Many factors, not within the focus of this study, could have been responsible for the situation. However, it has been partly established in the literature that online delivery of public services is capable of engendering transparency and subsequently promoting trust in a nation's government. This study investigated how the online delivery of public services (e-government) has impacted public trust in the Nigerian government. This was done using an electronic survey

conducted with users of online government services. Stemming from the findings, the study concluded that the significant positive relationship is established between electronic public service delivery and trust in government could catalyse promotion of trust in the Nigerian government. Although a considerable improvement is now surfacing in the extent of trust Nigerians have in their government as a direct fallout of the e-government effort, yet the government needs to reinforce this positive scenario by ensuring that service quality is improved upon. This can be achieved by imitating the international best practices in this regard. Through periodic trainings and ICT tool update, a better trust level can be attained.

It, therefore, recommends that electronic delivery of services in the country should be improved upon and extended to other areas not currently covered to earn further trust from the citizens.

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**ARTICLE**

**8**

**NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, FEDERAL BUDGET  
AND APPROPRIATION IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH  
REPUBLIC: 1999-2019**

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**Abstract**

*The paper examines the role played by the legislature in the appropriation and budget process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic from 1999 to 2019. Using data generated from primary source such as interview and reports and corroborated with scholarly work. It was found that the legislature has been actively engaged with the yearly budget since the inception of this democratic dispensation in 1999. However, delay in submission from executive and lack of speedy passage from the legislature are affecting the performance of budget over the years in the Nigeria's democracy. Recently, there are changes in the budgetary process. Even though, budget implementation is still not more than 54% throughout the years. Critical among the issues responsible for the fiasco were; delay in preparation, submission and appropriation, cumbersome bureaucratic process of securing release of funds, poor implementation and above all corruption. Consequently, the paper suggested that constant monitoring, timely submission of the budget to the legislature, and discouragement of unnecessary lobbying of the National Assembly (NASS) by MDAs are way forward for increasing budgetary performance.*

**Keywords:** Appropriation, Budget, Implementation, Monitoring

## **Introduction**

In Nigeria, National Assembly (NASS) plays an essential role in the process of governance in the country's democratic project. This is not only in Nigeria but all other countries around the globe. One of the critical areas where the legislature plays a pivotal role is the budget process. The Federal Constitution of Nigeria empowers the NASS to ensure efficient and effective management of public funds in the discharge of statutory responsibilities of catering for the welfare of the citizens by the executive tier of government.

Budget contains a comprehensive monetary plan of the government that outlines in details both economic and non-economic actions which government desires to undertake over a precise period of time with special focus on its policies and programs that are validated with revenue and expenditure projections for the period in view as approved by the NASS (Sale, 2020). Accordingly, government can only make a conscious choice on development strategies through budget. Allocations of resources could be made by government towards the pursuit of its developmental goals and it seeks to achieve such plan with definite outcome.

The importance of government budget has been stated and stressed by several stakeholders in democratic era. For instance, the former Speaker of the House of Representative, Honorable Aminu Waziri Tambuwal (2012) has emphasized that no part of government function has much impact on the wellbeing of citizens and their chance of benefiting from government than the budget.

There is paucity of empirical studies on the roles played by the legislature on the budget and appropriation process in the Nigerian democracy. Most of the studies conducted on budgetary process and appropriation are conceptual and documentary. Examples are evaluation of legislative lawlessness in the Nigerian budget (Olaoye, 2014), budget implementation on public policy (Eghe & Paul, 2015) and budget process and tackling the challenges (Sam-Tsokwa & Ngara, 2016) budget process in Nigeria: the role of legislature (Sale, 2020). However, empirical studies on budget are sparse and need to be conducted to ascertain the role played by the legislature in the Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

The objective of this paper is to understand the role played by legislature on budget process and appropriation in the Fourth Republic from 1999 to 2019. The selection of the period under review was informed by six tenures of administration which is enough to ascertain how well or otherwise the legislature has performed. Fourth Republic is the lengthiest democratic regime in the history of Nigeria's democracy.

The findings of this paper will benefit reseachers, scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to identify potential factors for enhancing bugetary process in Nigeria, as well as having a better perception of the roles played by the legislature on the federal budget.

### **Research Methods**

In order to achieve the main and specific objectives of this study, qualitative research approach with case study research design were adopted in this paper. Empirical data was generated from semi-structured interview using purposive sampling technique. Consequently, the primary data generated was corroborated with secondary data to strengthen the study. The rationale for adopting these methods and techniques is the nature of the study which is to understand the role played by the legislature in appropriation and budgetary process in the Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Furthermore, the reason for using Purposive sampling strategy in selecting the informants is that they are the most relevant in providing the required data (Creswell, 2012; Braun & Clarke, 2013). Consequently, 15 informants were recruited for the interview in this study. The informants that were interviewed includes five NASS members, two researchers from National Institute of Legislative Studies (NILS), and two from Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). The CSOs members were drawn from Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC) and Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC). Other interviewees include two experts from academia, two civil servants from Ministries Department and Agencies (MDAs) and two persons from the Media. The members of NASS were drawn from diverse political parties and one of them was from upper chamber. In fact, maximum variation or heterogeneous sample was used in this study to strengthen the work by triangulation of data source. One of the advantages of triangulation of data source is that it adds to the credibility and transparency of the information.

**The codes and the category of Informants**

Code	Interpretation	Frequency
A	Members of NASS	5
B	Researchers from NILS	2
C	Staff from MDAs	2
D	Members of CSOs (CISLAC & PLAC)	2
E	Academics	2
F	Media	2
<b>Total</b>		<b>15</b>

**Literature Review**

**Appropriation in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic**

Appropriation is the legislative role that is provided for under Sections 59(2) and 80, 81 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Constitution authorizes the legislature to ensure effective management of public funds in the discharge of statutory responsibilities of catering for the welfare of the citizens by the executive branch. The NASS collects appropriation bills and supplementary appropriation bills and passes them into law within the government stipulated financial year.

Similarly, appropriation is a series of processes, ranging from submission of a budget proposal by the President to the combined session of the NASS. Both of the two chambers of legislature must go through the proposed budget, debate it thoroughly leading to first, second and third readings, and finally pass it with or without amendments. In addition, many studies have argued that the legislature has been very active in the appropriation process. For instance, there are 56 standing committees in the upper chamber, and 90 standing committee in the lower chamber. The budget process follows overall procedures, first reading, second reading and third reading. Consequently the appropriation committee will further debate and thoroughly scrutinize it (Wehner, 2002; Gboyega, Soreide, Le, & Shukla, 2011; Obadan, 2014; Ogujiuba & Ehigiamusoe, 2014).

It was also observed from the scholarly work that, in the Nigerian democracy

there is nowhere the lack of understanding of separation of powers is obvious than in the budget matters. Throughout military era, the various regimes were typified by the domination of the executive. It was after the emergence of civilian regime that the legislature begun to engage actively in budget activism. By so doing, they no longer content with the approval of the budget proposal without thorough scrutiny (Stapenhurst, Jacobs, & Olaore, 2016). Furthermore, according to Obadan (2014) there is evidence that the NASS committees have been actively engaged with the yearly budget process since the beginning of this democratic dispensation in 1999. Whether or not their performance has resulted in positive outcomes is another issue. Similarly, Gboyega et al., (2011) emphasize that in the last few years, the Nigeria legislature has become more active in budgetary process. However, there has always been delay in passing the budget constantly (Mba, 2014; Ewuim, Nnamani, & Eberinwa, 2014; Ogujiuba & Ehigiamusoe, 2014).

The reason for appreciation of separation of powers in the democracy is that no organ of government can dominate public affairs without checking. It is the responsibility of the executive to prepare and propose budget to the NASS, and upon scrutiny and approval by the legislature, the executive has power to implement it. The legislature is the representatives of people; they review and approve annual and supplementary budgets on behalf of the electorates.

There are two key documents that define the budget process in Nigeria. First, we have the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and the second document is the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) 2007. The NASS has three traditional functions as mentioned in the constitution, namely, lawmaking, representation, and oversight. The Constitution in section 80-84 provides that the control and powers over public purse at the Federal level is in the hand of the legislature. It is specifically indicated in section 80(4) that “No money shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation except in the manner prescribed by the National Assembly” (1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria). Furthermore, in Section 80(1) provided that:” The president shall cause to be prepared and laid before each House of the NASS at any time in each fiscal year estimates of the revenues and expenditure of the Federation for the following fiscal year”. Moreover,

the constitution explained that “upon passage of the appropriation bill, the legislature should send the bill to the President for his assent. The President is expected to give such an assent within 30 days; failure to do so, the NASS can veto the bill”.

The broad objective of the FRA, 2007 is to enhance probity in the management of financial resources with a view of ensuring long-term macroeconomic stability, among others (NILS, 2012; Okagu, 2012; Ogujiuba & Ehigiamusoe, 2014). The Act also provides the responsibilities and obligations of Ministers on their budget proposal for their Ministries. Participation in the appropriation process is one of the pivotal roles of the legislature. In fact, the legislative power from the Constitution to control purse recommended the committees of appropriation to play a role in oversight through visits and investigations.

### **Discussion of Findings**

This section is devoted to the analysis and discussion of the findings of the paper. The discussion is based on the interview conducted and reports generated. Findings from the opinions and views of the informants of this study suggested that, the legislature with regards to budget process is playing a significant role in two key areas, firstly, budget scrutiny and approval and secondly, monitoring of budget implementation. It has been deduced from the interview conducted that over the years the legislature has come to assert itself as the branch of government that can be relied upon in budgetary process. This is because the proposal made by the executive is thoroughly deliberated upon and necessary amendments are made for approval. The moment government voted money for something, the NASS is made into committee of supply, and in that they deliberate from one committee to another, depending on the money voted and came out with a vision that will add value to the society. For example, in this present era, the House of Representative constituted about 90 committees, and various MDAs are forcefully made to submit to the whims of the committees.

It has also been observed also from the interview conducted that recently the legislature is more active when it comes to budget than other constitutional responsibilities. It played a significant role from 1999 to 2019. It is rather

unlike during the military era where the budget always emerged from the top, even though currently, it requires reform.

### **Federal Budget Scrutiny and Approval**

Budget is an instrument for the allocation of financial resources to several sectors within a particular fiscal year. The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides that the appropriation bill must be scrutinized and approved by the NASS after presentation by the president in each financial year before money can be withdrawn, and from the appropriate funds for running of the administration of government. The scrutiny and passing into law of the appropriation bill is the important measure by which the legislature becomes the watchdog of the public purse. The practice allows the NASS to ascertain the revenues of government and how those revenues are allocated and expended. In fact, the constitutional treatment of matters relating to the appropriation bill proves the emphasis placed on the requirement for the input of the NASS in the control of government funds. It is such that the President and other members of the Executive Council of the Federation cannot spend any public fund, for any reason(s), until it has been submitted as an appropriation bill and passed by the legislature. Therefore, 'the power to spend or not to spend' public funds belong to the legislature (Ogujiuba, & Ehigiamusoe, 2014; Sam-Tsokwa, & Ngara, 2016).

The legislators are inspectors in the operation of government; they represent the interest of their principal and act as a separate institution of government for ensuring probity and rectitude in government spending. The informants interviewed from all categories agreed and admitted that despite the role plays by the legislature, there is always delay in the submission of federal budget proposal, approval and implementation in Nigeria. Although, some are of the view that recently the legislature has taken measures to correct the defects and anomalies in the Nigerian budget, still budget takes time. In fact, budget in Nigeria at times takes four to six months, and occasionally takes up to a year. Invariably, there are several issues surrounding the process of budget in Nigeria.

Accordingly, all categories of the informants consulted have lamented on the delay in the submission and passing the budget in the Nigeria's Fourth

Republic, and the inability of the NASS to provide a framework for doing that in proper time. Although, the informants claimed that the executive usually submits a budget to the legislature lately. However, some of the informants accused the legislature of corruption in the process of the budget passing. Furthermore, it was observed from the information gathered that legislature in Nigeria is actively involved in budget scrutiny and approval since from the inception of this republic. The only problem identified is the delay from the executive and unnecessary sluggishness from the legislature in scrutiny and approval. Furthermore, the allegation of corruption was widely reiterated. The most recent one is the budget padding in 2015, when 2016 budget was submitted to the legislature by President Muhammadu Buhari.

The above submission has also been supported by several informants, like, F 1, F 2 (MDAs) who have been working in various agencies for a long time. It was indicated that "the NASS is demanding a bribe from the Ministries and Agencies before they approve budget proposals submitted, this has also contributed to the delay" (Informant F1). This corroborated with rare previous researches conducted, for instance, it was reported that in year 2004, Professor Fabian Osoji a former Minister of Education, was allegedly dismissed for bribing the NASS with 55 Million naira to warrant the passage of huge amount of money in 2005 budget allocation to the ministry of education (Adesote & Abimbola, 2012; Mudasiru, 2015; Olatusanya, Lauwo & Adelaja, 2015). What is perhaps more surprising and disturbing was not the incident, but the claim made by the Osoji that what he committed is a common attitude and normal business at the federal level and other governmental levels in Nigeria. One of the implications of his statement was that since it has become the order of the day in the public services then he should not be apprehended. This had tempered with the quality of the political appointees and the legislature in the Nigerian democracy. Both the Minister and the Senate President and other members of Senate committee were indicted. The later was released from ministerial appointment for inducing the committee members of the NASS, and the former was indicted for accepting 55 Million naira as a bribe. Finally, the Senate President was impeached from Senate leadership by members of Senate by two-third majority, passing the vote of no confidence on him (Olatusanya, Lauwo & Adelaja, 2015).



In the course of the discussion with the informants in category A, they asserted that the issue of scrutiny and approval of budget usually takes longer time because of various factors, among other things, are late submission from the executive, scrutiny process in the NASS, and sometimes the desire of the legislature to represent their constituencies and their personal interest. NDI/ Nigeria (2005) has reported that there is a growing demand of participation in the budgetary process by the legislature which causes dispute between the cabinets and delay in the passage of the budget. In a personal interview with an informant A 2, he asserted that the NASS is always taking measures to speed the approval of the budgets in the Nigerian Fourth Republic. "In order to speed the process and approval of the budget in Nigeria, the NASS has increased the number of committees depending on the situation and the requirements of time, and that has actually assisted the democracy" (Informant A 2). There is a consensus among all categories of informant that there are incessant delay and late submission of the budget from the side of the executive. However, they stressed and supported that some of the actions of the legislature in passing and approving the budgets at the federal level are contrary to the ethics and provision of law. Many informants have reiterated that there is corruption in the budgetary process, for instance, the accusation of budget padding and corruption which has to do with insertion of projects which are not planned and proposed by the executive. It was constituency projects for the legislature that tainted this important legislative function.

The views of the informants were supplemented by the literature on the subject matter, some findings are attributing the problem to the executive while others to the legislature. Ewuim, Nnamani, & Eberinwa, (2014), and Ogujiuba and Ehigiamusoe, (2014) have asserted that the delays in budget preparations and approval are worrisome, and that it is no longer a story that there is unnecessary delay in the passage and implementation of the budget in Nigeria since 1999 and it slowed down the Nigerian democracy. Similarly, Ibrahim (2011) and Stapenhurst and Olaore (2016) posited that low level of budget performance and delays in its preparation are because of the inability of the executive to submit a budget proposal in time. Accordingly, in the study conducted by Sam-Tsokwa and Ngara (2016) findings established that the problem of delay in the budget can be attributed to the executive. Since

1999 the executive has on several occasions failed to meet the best practice of presenting budget in two or three months before the fiscal year (January). Accordingly, Fashagba (2009) has accredited the delay of the passage of 2008 budget to the inability and reluctance of the executive from MDAs to supply to the legislature the required information in time, probably because of poor information management system in Nigeria.

Similarly, in another study conducted by Yagboyaju (2011) he affirmed that the most disturbing thing in the Fourth Republic is the excessive delayed of the budget during the process of approval by the legislature. Right from Obasanjo administration to the President Umaru Musa, no budget was approved before the actual time. Oyewo (2007) expressed that the way the legislature handled 2000 and 2001 budget are below the expectations of Nigerians. Again, the delay in passing the budget at that time is because of conflict between the Senate President Chuba Okadigbo, the Speaker of the House Ghali Umar Na'Abba and the President Obasanjo in passing 2000 appropriation bill. Then later in 2001, the attitude of President to budget has also raised the question of the integrity of the NASS and the President himself, this is because instantly with the release of Six Billion Naira to the NASS, speedily the NASS has passed the budget after the presentation. Notwithstanding, despite accusations of corruption the scholar investigation confirmed that there is an improvement in the budget process in Nigeria (Stapenhurst and Olaore, 2016).

**Figure: 1** Dates of receipt of appropriation Bill by NASS & approval by the President

S/N	Bill Tittle	Date of Presenta- tion	Date passed by NASS	Date As- sented by President	Time Lag
1	Appropriation Bill 2000	24 November 1999	14 April 2000	5 May 2000	Four months 21 days
2	Appropriation Bill 2001	9 November 2000	21December 2000	Same month	One month 12 days
3	Appropriation Bill 2002	7 November 2001	28 March 2002	March 2002	Four months 21 days

4	Appropriation Bill 2003	20 November 2002	11 March 2003	10 April 2003	Three months 19 days
5	Appropriation Bill 2004	18 December 2003	20 April 2004	21 April 2004	Four months two days
6	Appropriation Bill 2005	12 October 2004	18 March 2005	12 April 2005	Five months six days
7	Appropriation Bill 2006	6 December 2005	21 February 2006	22 April 2006	Two months 15 days
8	Appropriation Bill 2007	6 October 2006	22 December 2006	December 2006	Two month 16 days
9	Appropriation Bill 2008	8 November 2007	27 March 2008	14 April 2008	Four months 19 days
10	Appropriation Bill 2009	2 December 2008	3 February 2009	10 March 2009	Two months & day
11	Appropriation Bill 2010	23 November 2009	25 March 2010	22 April 2010	Four month two days
12	Appropriation Bill 2011	15 December 2010	25 May 2011	27 May 2011	Five months 10 days
13	Appropriation Bill 2012	13 December 2011	15 March 2012	13 April 2012	Three months two days
14	Appropriation Bill 2013	10 October 2012	20 December 2012	26 February 2013	Two 10 days
15	Appropriation Bill 2014	19 December 2013	11 April 2014	24 May 2014	Tree month 22 days
16	Appropriation Bill 2015	17 December 2014	28 April 2015	19 May 2015	Four month 11 days
17	Appropriation Bill 2016	22 December 2015	23 March 2016	6 May 2016	Three months one day
18	Appropriation Bill 2017	14 December 2016	11 May 2017	22 June 2017	Four months 27 days
19	Appropriation Bill 2018	7 November 2016	16 May 2018	20 June 2018	Six month eight days
20	Appropriation Bill 2019	19 December 2018	30 April 2019	27 May 2019	Four months 11 days

Source: NASS and designed by Author

From table 1 one can discern that, for instance, in 2006, 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2014 the proposal were sent to the legislature days before the commencement of the fiscal year. Furthermore, the Table is signifying that probably the whole fiscal year seem to be short for the approval and implementation of the national budget. Take for instance 2005 when the extension was six months to a succeeding year, while in others, it used to be three to four months, this is contrary to international practice. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) proposes that budget proposal should be submitted far enough in advance to allow the parliament to appraise it appropriately.

The issue of budget padding comes to take the attention of analysts recently in Nigeria. According to Theophilus (2016) budget padding has to do with the insertion of estimate in the budget proposal without the knowledge of the executive (President) and in that the budget will be larger than its initial submission Theophilus (2016), asserted that in the 2015 the budget proposal submitted for 2016 fiscal year, some members of the legislature were reported to have implanted some estimate of constituency projects after the budget was passed by two chambers. This is unconstitutional because neither the constitution nor FRA has empowered the NASS to act that way. Budget padding is very rare in both developed and developing democracy like Nigeria. Falana (2016) posited about 20 legislators from both chambers have inserted the estimate of constituency projects more than 100 billion naira. Both in the upper and lower chamber allocated to themselves 60 and 40 billion naira respectively. This is because of the information asymmetry and conflict of interest between the agent (legislature) and principal (executive). The legislature has privilege information, instead of utilizing it constitutionally, they misused it at expense of the poor masses.

In a nutshell, the legislature is active and strong in the process of scrutiny and approval of a budget in the Fourth Republic; however, there are accusations of budget padding and corruption in the appropriation process. Researches have long-established that the executive over the years has failed to submit a budget proposal within the stipulated time of the fiscal year; this has contributed to the delay in approving the budget by the legislature. Similarly, the desire of the legislature to debates on a budget proposal to represent

their constituencies makes the scrutiny and the approval of budget proposal takes time. Therefore, the legislature has yet to live up to expectations in this regard.

### **Legislature and Monitoring of Budgetary Implementation in Nigeria**

After government budget is prepared, passed and assented by the relevant authorities, the implementation based on what the laws provided must begin by the executive immediately so that the aim of the budget can be realized. For the realization of the budget objectives, it should be properly designed, efficiently and effectively implemented, and monitored adequately, and finally its performance should be assessed (Faleti & Myrick 2012). It is pertinent to note that budget implementation is the responsibility of the executive branch of government (Ogujiuba & Ehigiamusoe, 2014). Capital expenditure which is faster in the public-sector investment program that is aimed at bridging the gap between physical infrastructures in various sectors is always given priority in the NASS debate. Similarly, the recurrent expenditure can be productive as capital expenditure in the country's economy (Heller, 1979). The reviewing and monitoring of the budget during or after implementation is the responsibility of the legislature, therefore, the role of the legislature is to determine the level of implementation through supervision.

In an interview conducted with informants in all categories, they all concurred that there is a problem with the implementation of capital expenditure in Nigeria and is one of the reasons why there is disagreement between the legislature and the executive. Moreover, the informants stated that since 1999 the implementation of capital expenditure had never exceeded 54%. These assertions from the interview have corroborated with the findings of Ogujiuba & Ehigiamusoe (2014), though, with the slightest difference, they declared that in 2012 there was only 50% implementation of capital expenditure of what was appropriated. Among the factors contributed include, the insufficiency of implementation plan, late release or non-release of budgeted funds, poor conceptualization of budget, lack of technical capacity of the MDAs and delay in the passage of the budget. Similarly, in their analysis, Oladipo et al., (2012) observed that, over decades, the implementation of

capital expenditure varied, for example in 2002 and 2003 it was 50%, in 2004 it was 52%, while it was 43.9% in 2008, and indeed it was 54% 2009. That is why the level of performance is insufficient to foster development. Furthermore, Fayomi (2013) observed that it has been reoccurring every fiscal year, in fact, in 2012 the legislature complaint that the implementation of the capital vote is only 32%, and the executive replied that it was 52%.

In a similar vein, Ingwe, Mboto and Ebong (2012), and Faleti, and Myrick (2012) deliberated on unspent funds from the budgets and attributed the failure of the implementation to the MDAs. The phenomenon of laxity and half implementation of capital expenditure in the democracy have the potentiality of spreading poverty across the country. Nigeria is struggling with the budget implementation since the commencement of the democratic project to date, unlike other countries around the world whose have effective management of their budgetary process. Countries like: China, Brazil, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and India probably are good examples of countries with the applicability of relationship between effective budgetary policy and economic growth (Yagboyaju, 2013). What is accounted for the 80 % of low implementation of the budget according to the interview conducted with (staff of MDAs) is delayed and low implementation of budget. It was also observed that sometime the problem is from the executive in term of final approval. Similarly, the legislature also took long time in passing it.

Furthermore, the legislature has played a significant role in ensuring the compliance and the implementation of the budget as intended originally. The informants response shows that the legislature is monitoring and supervising the MDAs for the implementation, and if there is any laxity or error during or after the implementation the legislature usually question the ministry or sometimes call the minister or chairman of a particular agency to clarify why there is a delay in the implementation. Various committees of NASS are getting in touch with several respective ministries and ensure that what has been enshrined in the budget is fully implemented. The above statement was supported by the staff working in the NASS, that the legislature is worried with the implementation of budgets and they plays a greater role always when it comes to the budget process and monitoring of its implementation.

This has proved the extent of checks and balances among the legislature and the executive, which is derived from the philosophy of the Principle of Separation of Powers, most especially in the presidential system of government which Nigeria operates. In addition, researchers like, Ochanma (2009) and Onike (2012) have presented that the NASS has tried to impeach President Yar Adua because of the poor implementation of the budget in 2009, and most specifically, the senate was at loggerhead with him over non-implementation of constituency projects in the same year. Later, the same event has occurred during President Good Luck when he failed to properly implement capital expenditure budget in 2010 and 2011 correspondingly. Researches have demonstrated that there is development in both budget approval and monitoring of the implementation by the legislature (Fashagba, 2009; Gboyega, Soreide, Le, & Shukla, 2011). In another vein, Fayomi (2013) posited that it was on the implementation that the legislature severally threatens to impeach the executives.

### **Conclusion**

Accordingly, the findings of this paper demonstrates that the NASS has been actively involved in budgetary process since 1999. In federal budget there was always a delay in submission from the executive, and sluggishness in passing the budget from the legislature. Moreover, there are allegations of corruption and padding in the budget process in Nigeria. However, recently from 2016 there are changes in the submission from the presidency. Even though, several ministries and agencies are delaying in submitting their proposals.

Furthermore, the study shows that, the legislature has made several efforts in ensuring implementation and compliance of budget through supervising the executive or questioning the ministries and agencies to provide reasons for their laxity or delay in implementation. However, despite efforts of the legislature in the monitoring, the implementation of the capital expenditure is not more than 54 % of the actual estimates in every fiscal year in the Fourth Republic.

Accordingly, the solution to the problems of the budget in Nigeria is timely submission of the budget to the legislature, discouragement of

unnecessary lobbying of the NASS by MDAs and constant monitoring of the implementation are some of the ways forward for increasing budgetary performance.



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**ARTICLE**

**9**

**REPOSITIONING THE NIGERIAN STATE  
THROUGH THE SYNTHESIS OF ARTS,  
RELIGION AND POLITICS**

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## **Abstract**

*Fifty years after independence, Nigeria still confronts several basic problems of insecurity, underdevelopment, electoral malpractices, corruption and poverty, poor standard of education, infrastructure deficit, religious violence, bad leadership and connivance in followership. The thrust of this paper is to closely examine the role of arts, religion and politics in the country and establish the extent to which they can be deployed in repositioning Nigeria for development. Arts, religion and politics in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods were examined and it was discovered that there is a nexus binding arts, religion and politics especially in both the traditional and contemporary lives of the citizens. The paper also established the integration of religion and politics into Nigeria's political space and demonstrated that both religion and politics have been used as instrumentations for positive and negative purposes. The paper concludes that good governance is the antidote to crises and it is the glue that binds arts, politics and religion. Therefore, the paper recommended the funding of arts by governments to promote nation building. With the recognition of religion as a great divisive factor in the Nigerian state, the paper also recommended jettisoning of religious considerations in the formulation and implementation of policies just as it urged religious leaders to maintain neutrality on the political space, among others.*

**Keywords:** Arts, Religion, Politics, Nigeria

## Introduction

Fifty nine years after independence, Nigeria still faces severe problems of insecurity, underdevelopment; corruption and poverty; poor standard of education; poor infrastructure; bad leadership; and connivance in followership. About four decades ago, the national discourse was fixated on replacing military dictatorship with civilian, democratic governance in the belief that democratization would put an end to the myriad of problems confronting the country. Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999 but the country is still besieged by serious challenges and they require immediate and urgent attention. Indeed, it is necessary to rebuild and reposition the country in order to take it to the desired level. For development to thrive in Nigeria, it is imperative, as this paper later recommended, to ensure, that the required prerequisites are instituted in arts, religion and politics and this is the focus of this paper. In view of this, the paper examines the key roles played by the core components of arts, religion and politics in repositioning Nigeria. Art empowers people in society with creative skills that broaden the grounds for participation; creates job opportunities; allows for communication through the transfer of ideas and serves the purpose of perpetuating stability. Therefore, as pointed out by Abakporo (2018: 223), “art cannot be divorced from any society no matter the level of innovation that had taken place within that society.” Religion is integral and plays a vital role in the society. Apart from its significance to the core of human existence it has strong implications for the political, economic, social and other aspects of life. Religious values such as equality, dignity and sanctity of human life are of great benefits to the conceptualization and development of democracy, as well as the democratization process (Tsele, 2001). Even when changes and innovations occur they breed new culture and forms of arts in society. Due to the heterogeneous nature of the Nigerian state (with diverse cultures, religions, languages, ethnic affiliations, customs and ideologies), no serious discourse downplays politics and its nuances. Therefore, scholars and social scientists often aver that politics is a means of survival and it invariably conceptualizes the culture of political socialization and behaviour in contemporary times in Nigeria (Oddih, 2009). A critical examination of the tripod of arts, religion and politics in Nigeria establishes their influence, harmony and synchronization to ensuring the much needed repositioning of this country particularly in the face of current challenges.

In subsequent sections, this paper examines the role of arts, religion and politics in pre-colonial, colonial as well as post-colonial periods in Nigeria. It later recommended measures for making the political landscape more accountable and harnessing inherent potentials in the arts as an instrument for social re-engineering while depicting religion as a key factor in correcting moral decadence.

## **Conceptual Clarifications**

### **Arts**

The word “art” has no universally accepted definition and has been variously viewed by scholars. In the opinion of Tatariewicz (1971:134), art is “the ability to make things consciously (not instinctively); and since conscious ability seemed to follow certain rules...art (is) the ability to make things according to rules.” As such, many human endeavours including religion and politics can be classified as arts because they are created and operated using certain rules. Brookes and O’ Neil (2017) describe art as “activities including painting, literature, cinema, and dance, which people can partake in for enjoyment, or to create works which express sublime meanings or ideas of beauty.” A closer examination of these definitions shows that art involves human endeavours for expressing ideas about individual experiences and the world around. Art is an expression of its creator’s imagination and it can be in visual, audio or performance. To Demirel and Altintas (2012), arts provide a window into the political landscape of a country. This is because they are instruments used by their makers to express either negative or positive judgments about the entire political landscape. As such, arts can either be employed to benefit members or used to distort order in the society.

### **Religion**

Many scholars have not been able to reach a consensus on the definition of religion because it is a social construct and has multiple interpretations (Greil, 2009; Van den Heever, 2001). Not only are there different definitions of religion but different methodological approaches shape its definition. Olson (2011) identifies these methodological approaches as economical, theological, sociological, historical, racial, postmodern and psychological, among others. Taylor (2007: 12) is of the view that “religion is an emergent; adaptive network of symbols; myths; and rituals; which on the one hand figure schemata of



feeling, thinking, and acting in ways that lend life, meaning and purpose and, on the other hand, disrupt, dislocate, and disfigure every stabilizing structure." In this regard, religion is double-edged because it provides meaning to lives but its destructive dimension cripples the lucidity of human existence. Perhaps, this explains why Marx (1970:17) describes religion as "the opium of the people." Marx, in his critique of Hegel's philosophy of right, sees religion as an instrument used by the "haves" to oppress the "have nots" and as what that the "have nots" embrace to console themselves.

To James and Mandaville (2010), religion is a relatively-bounded system of beliefs, symbols and practices that addresses the nature of existence, and in which communion with others and otherness is lived as if it both takes in and spiritually transcends socially-grounded ontology of time, space, embodiment and knowing. The world's religions include Buddhism, Hinduism; Islam; Judaism; Christianity; and indigenous religious systems as well as beliefs. It is imperative to state that religion possesses great functional values and believed to have been in existence since time immemorial. Religion constitutes the deepest root of human existence and integrates human life into a coherent whole (Schuurman, 2011). In fact, it stimulates man to controlling his environment by struggling for power, so as to achieve his objectives. In essence, religion empowers man to pursue political power and other forms of power that can make him gain firm control of his environment.

### **Politics**

The word "politics" originated from the Greek word "polis," which means city state. The definition of politics is as varied as its scholars and practitioners. David Easton (1965) viewed politics as the authoritative allocation of values. From this definition, politics can be viewed as the institutions and processes by which governments distribute the state resources in a manner that would not engender violence. To avoid crisis, government must be seen as fair and just in the distribution of these resources and must also be viewed as possessing adequate competence and legitimacy by the citizens. For Lasswell (1951), it is the process of who gets what, when and how. This definition looks beyond government because it views politics as broader than government. Politics has to do with exercise and struggle for power and authority among humans. It encompasses the manner for organizing humans for interactions

through institutionalization of social structures as well as the erection of legal and governmental systems, as posited by Nwoko (1988).

### **Arts in Nigeria**

Arts played significant roles in Nigeria's traditional societies. Before the advent of colonialism, art flourished through the works of artists and craftsmen who engaged in different crafts such as wood carving, terra cotta, pottery, leather works, mat making, calabash carving, stone carving, bronze carving, tusk and horn carving, weaving and dyeing of clothes, brass making, among others. Ndubuisi (2017) asserts that the evidence of artistic skills and crafts were revealed in the discovery of their works in Nok (500BC), Igbo-Ukwu (900 AD.); Benin (1400 AD); and Ile-Ife (1000-1500 AD). Music has also been linked to art and culture because different genre of music existed in the traditional Nigerian societies.

Reaserchers and scholars have given different accounts on arts in pre-colonial Nigeria. Available scholarly evidences have equally established that local institutions, religions, cultural beliefs as well as patterns of trade were disrupted during colonialism and this led to the introduction of new technologies by the Europeans. The new technologies were embraced by local artists in Nigeria and in Africa as they begun to enjoy patronage and change their forms of expression. As a result of these, Clarke (2006) posits that although as early as the sixteenth century African Arts had been taken to Europe as souvenirs and gifts, a relatively significant quantity found its way into the continent. Another account stated that during colonialism, the production of art works declined as it was believed that art making activities had some kind of spiritual connection to the worship of idols (Ogunduyile, Kayode and Ojo, 2008). Therefore, as missionaries embarked on evangelism, they discouraged the worship of idols and this impacted significantly on the production of art works. Interestingly, some scholars posit that during the colonial period, some Europeans looted, excavated, illicitly trafficked and stole some African artifacts. They cited the attacks and looting of artifacts of Benin kingdom and the exiling of the king to Calabar, as examples (Eluyemi, 2002; Onyima, 2016).

After independence, art schools were established in Nigeria and many artists

received different kinds of educational training. However, as a result of backward educational policies and the belief that the study of art was an occupation for individuals who were not intellectually sound, a downward trend pervaded the profession (Ogunduyile, Kayode and Ojo, 2008).

In contemporary times, several challenges have created impediment to the art development in Nigeria. These include inadequate funding; lack of effectiveness of art administrators; the poor state of art councils, public museums and galleries; a system of education that does not promote heritage studies; low visitor-ship and patronage to public museums and galleries; and the migration of great artists, designers and craftsmen for imagined greener pasture (Ogunduyile, Kayode and Ojo, 2008; Shyllon, 2013). There is a critical need to urgently and adequately address these challenges in order to preserve the rich cultural heritage of Nigeria.

### **Religion in the Nigeria**

The three major religions in Nigeria are African Traditional Religion (ATR), Islam and Christianity. In this country, religion has been a double-edged activity. It has contributed positively to different spheres and has also been used to negative ends. A closer look reveals that religion has contributed immensely to Nigeria's economic, political and social life. Through the teachings of the early missionaries, for instance, many lives were saved in various Nigerian communities because the early missionaries were instrumental to engendering social change. In essence, religion has influenced social life and put an end to barbaric acts of killing twins, and also rubbed off on the modes of dressing, architectural designs, and system of marriage in Nigeria (Onwubiko, 1973). In the pre-colonial era, African Traditional Religion was the dominant religion and it helped in instilling values that were instrumental to the economic and political development of society. In traditional societies, for instance, for one to be considered wealthy, one had to be in good standing with one's creator, ancestors and community (Narayan, 2001). Behaviours such as dishonesty, stealing, lies, laziness and indolence were considered shameful and those that exhibited such tendencies were stigmatized.

Religion has also impacted positively on the educational sector in Nigeria.

Through African Traditional Religion, traditional values and virtues have been transmitted to recipients with African identity and personality. Although this form of education was informal; it wielded great influence as the trainings were centered on virtues including honesty, dignity of labour, moderation, peaceful co-existence, hard work, self-reliance, love for neighbours, respect for people and their property and vocations including farming, fishing, hunting, building of houses, among others (Okoro, 2010). Islam and Christianity equally brought about the establishment of Quranic and Missionary schools and adherents subscribed to the tenets of both religions. In addition, English language, the present official language of education, trade and commerce was introduced and engendered by the Christian missionaries. Additionally, several schools at varying levels of education have been established and are managed, especially by Christians and Muslims. Many analysts have depicted religion as one of the major factors engendering nation building and stability in Nigeria. Leaders of the various faith groups enjoy the respect of their followers and often times, in the different places of worship; these leaders give messages of hope; the need to live at peace with one another and need to pray for the government, even when things are not going as expected. Through various messages, prayers, sermons and preaching, religious leaders douse tension and ensure stability (Omotosho, 2014). Religion has also impacted positively on Nigeria's economy because some religious institutions have investments employed workers and pay them salary as part of economic development. Adesina (2013), for instance, pointed out that many churches in Nigeria have enhanced economic development by investing in banking, publishing, schools, broadcasting, entertainment and hospitality industries. Islamic organizations provide funds for agriculture and improve food security by establishing financial institutions and making loans available at interest-free rates to people in order to address poverty and grow entrepreneurship (Abdullahi, 2016; Sapovida, 2015). Over time, religion has played a great role in the provision of health care services in Nigeria. Churches and mosques have established hospitals, orphanages and homes for the aged, handicapped and people with other special needs. The building of health care facilities was started by the early Christian missionaries through cottage hospitals, leprosaria, maternity homes and dispensaries (Williams, 1991). Following the introduction of health care facilities by early Christian missionaries,

governments in Nigeria have sustained the trend by building public health facilities and established the Ministry of Health to oversee the health of the people and the nation. Religious organizations also engage in charitable acts like provision of relief materials to people in times of conflict and natural disaster, provision of financial support for surgeries, free medical tests and treatments, among others. Religion has contributed positively in many ways but it has been argued that it also has negative effects. Several acts of violence have direct correlation to religious intolerance, religious fanaticism, offensive propagation of religious beliefs and doctrines, wrong religious doctrines (Sulaiman, 2016). Several violent communal conflicts with religious undertones have been recorded in different Nigerian states including Kaduna, Plateau, Benue, Taraba and Borno, among others. Mavalla (2014) avers that the frequency of religious crises have led to a breakdown in communication and deepened mutual suspicion between Muslims and Christians. These acts of violence, particularly the violence of Boko Haram insurgents, have led to unnecessary maiming, killings, abductions and destruction of property and lives, devastation, agony, instability and uncertainties in the North Eastern states of Borno Adamawa, and Yobe (BAY) and created ripple effects in other parts in the last fifteen years or so. Some scholars have also argued that the prayers, teachings and messages of some religious leaders have doused tension in the country but that of others promote unjust political and economic systems. Agbiji and Swart (2015) have explained that the call for prayers, as well as the various sermons for the embrasure of peace and being hopeful are exhibitions of nonchalance to socio-political and economic challenges facing the country and that these weaken actions geared towards fighting injustice. Besides this, religion has been used to play destructive roles in the country. Although Christianity, Islam and African Traditional Religion are instrumental to marshalling of economic and political power, Kalu (2010:37) has stated that they are often used by the elite as “instruments of political conflict.” When opportunities are made available to people on religious grounds; the struggle that ensues especially when the opportunities are limited provokes conflict in society. The effect that religion has on the Nigerian state has been aptly described by Afolabi (2015) as being positive on the one hand because of the value that the participation of ardent religious believers rub off on the polity and on the other hand, being negative, when viewed from the perspective of sectarian

tendencies in which religious bigots ensured that positions are occupied by their adherents at all cost.

### **Politics in Nigeria**

In pre-colonial period, the system of administration was based on the existence of kingdoms and empires as seen in Oyo Empire, Benin Kingdom, and the Habe Kingdom, amongst others. With the advent of colonial rule, the southern and northern protectorates in Nigeria were amalgamated into one entity in 1914. It has been pointed out that the British colonial government's failure to take into consideration, the heterogeneous peculiarities of the different societies, the people and that their incompatible political development laid the foundation of a faulty Nigerian state (Ayatse and Iorhen, 2013). The faulty foundation laid by the colonial administration paved the way for power struggles and fierce politics along different ethnic and religious divides in the country. In post-independence Nigeria, efforts geared towards true representative governments, the struggle for equitable sharing of power and state resources have generally been futile, in most cases. Politics is considered as a means of survival and as asserted by Oddih (2009), it conceptualizes the culture of political socialization. Few political elites gain the dividends of politics but majority of the populace don't. To perpetuate themselves in power and ensure continued access to the national cake, the political elites have always resorted to self-help; compromises and form alliances without considering its moral implications. A close examination of the electoral process shows that the political class has erected ways of securing party tickets for party primaries without necessarily seeking for votes. This is a pointer that there is absence of internal democracy among political parties in Nigeria and this is buttressed by Adejumobi (2010) who avers that majority of the political parties in Nigeria were merely set up for the purpose of attaining power and not necessarily worthy to be referred to as political parties because they are undeserving of such labels. This has been corroborated by Brown (2013:173) who asserts that political elites have used political parties as platforms for "actualizing the authoritative allocation of values, often times idiosyncratic values which are inconsistent with the parent political-style copied, thus making the attainment of good governance impossible".

Most of the elections in Nigeria have been characterized by electoral disputes, vote buying, court cases, threats against judicial independence, legitimacy crises, intimidation of voters, violence, hate speeches, destruction of lives and loss of properties. Additionally, Kurfi (2005) noted that a key feature of elections in Nigeria is rigging and this had been demonstrated in the general elections of 1964/1965; 1979; 1983; 1993; 1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; and 2019. The primary reason for rigging is the zero-sum nature of politics created by the exploitative character of political elites (Mbah, Nwangwu and Ugwu, 2019). Politics is a weapon used to protect and defend the interests of the political elites, hence the reason for making elections look like war and seen as a “do or die” affair. Political power, once gained, is used to pursue the interests of political elites, ensure that they are recycled and used to compensate their allies. Therefore, in Nigeria, politics is considered as a matter of “life and death because whoever wins in politics wins everything, and whoever loses, loses everything including lives and livelihoods” (Ibeanu and Mbah, 2014:47). Therefore, politics in the country has become a way of amassing wealth and for this reason; many are ready to do anything, including actions that undermine democracy and are inimical to national cohesion and integration.

### **The Synthesis of Arts, Religion and Politics in the Nigerian State**

Music has a link to arts and this has, over time, provided a window to the political terrain in Nigeria. In the late 1970s and 1980s, for instance, Fela Anikulapo Kuti’s songs were often viewed as radicalized and anti-government and so government made concerted efforts to muzzle him. During the military rule in the country, Fela Anikulapo Kuti criticized Nigerian leaders through songs such as *Zombie* and *Beasts of No Nation*, to mention a few. Similarly, Eedris Abdulkareem, a modern day contemporary musician, through the lyrics of his song *Jagajaga*, has condemned the leadership of the country for corruption and insecurity. On the contrary, *One Love* and *Unity Song*, the songs of Onyeka Onwenu were seen as promoting national cohesion and consequently given primetime on radio and television stations nationwide. There is a deliberate association between art and religion, especially in relation to the socio-religious lives of people. For many Nigerian artists, the Christian religion has offered a platform for expression of artworks. Various woodwork designs, stained-glass designs, mosaic-designs, stone carvings

and cuttings, wall decorations and inscribed sculptural designs have found expression in churches. In the traditional religion, art works have also found expression in shrines and as posited by Igbaro (2010), it has been a viable channel for the promotion and spread of religion in Nigeria. Arts has also been employed as an instrument for promoting national unity and foreign policy objectives and a good example include the various dance troupes in Nigeria. The Swange dance troupe which began as a folk dance among the Tiv people of Benue state has been “repositioned and popularized within the precept of cultural diplomacy” (Auwawuer, 2016:143). To encourage intercultural harmony, the Benue State Council for Arts and Culture (BSCAC) has been able to take Swange dance to many countries and in recognition of this, the federal and state governments have often sent the troupe to many parts of the world where it keeps performing for select audiences, bringing back honours to the state and the nation. (Auwawuer, 2016).

Nigeria is a secular state, yet almost all government meetings and ceremonies commence and end with prayers. When officials are to be sworn into public offices, they take oaths of office by using either the Bible or Quaran. Often, government sponsor pilgrimages to Jerusalem and Mecca and most times, the beneficiaries get the pilgrimages as political compensation for patronages. Politics in Nigeria has been so fashioned along religious divides that it has led to the loss of lives of political leaders. It has been averred that the military coup led by Major Chukuma Kaduna Nzeogwu(1937-1967) that led to the killing of Ahmadu Ibrahim Bello(1910-1966) , as well as the reprisal attack by the northern military which led to the killing of Major General Aguyi Ironsi in 1966, had religious and ethnic undertones (Ntamu, Abia, Edinyang and Eneji, 2014).

At different times, religion has provoked tension within the country. In 1973, the Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), the apex Islamic authority in Nigeria was established and this made it possible for Nigeria to become a registered member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1985. The membership allowed Nigeria to have access loans and other financial obligations from Muslim countries across the world (Imo, 2008). This membership stirred up anxiety and feelings of apprehension of Muslim domination among Christians in the country. It provoked religious



crises, riots and violent uprising especially in the Northern part of Nigeria. To strengthen the political voices of Christians in Nigeria and challenge the islamization of the country, Pentecostal and Orthodox Christians who previously had opposing doctrinal beliefs united and formed the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) (Kukah and Falola, 1996).

The role ascribed to religion is so important that Kukah (1993) asserted that one needs to; at least, pretend to be religious to occupy some political offices in Nigeria. In Nigeria, religion has often been used as bait by political elites to shop for votes during elections because political elites never shy away from using religion to achieving their objectives. In 1999, for instance, Alhaji Ahmad Sani Yerima won the gubernatorial elections in Zamfara because he promised to introduce Sharia laws in the state (Ayantayo, 2005). As a result of the introduction of Sharia, between 1999 and 2003, Islamic clerics organized Muslim faithful to vote for Yerima and his government gave the voters due recognition by involving them in cardinal segments of the Zamfara state public service. When Legislators were debating the issue of Sharia for the draft of the 1999 Constitution, the Christians in the National Assembly unanimously kicked against its adoption but Muslim legislators remained resolute in ensuring its endorsement. Eventually, the provision on the Sharia Court of Appeal was inserted into the proposed constitution and accepted and this provoked different religious reactions. While the Christians resisted it because they perceived it as a means of islamizing the country, the Muslims saw nothing wrong in its adoption. Subsequently, this created religious tensions and provoked unrest. After Obasanjo assumed office in 1999 twelve states adopted the Sharia and this appeared to have escalated animosity between Muslims and Christians and eventually led to insecurity, killings, destruction of religious building as well as properties (Afolabi, 2015). Afolabi further affirmed that the religious crises that took place in Kaduna led to reprisal attacks on Mosques and Muslims in Abia and Owerri in Eastern Nigeria.

In recent years, religion has been actively used as a major instrument of campaign. This was reflected in the 2011 elections when Muhammad Buhari, (a Muslim) took Pastor Tunde Bakare (a Christian) as his running mate on the platform of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). Buhari eventually

lost the 2011 presidential election to Jonathan Goodluck, a Christian whose electoral success was said to have been determined by religion and appeal to ethnicity, given that the votes that gave him electoral victory were from the Christian dominated areas of the South and Middle-Belt region (Onapajo, 2012). Not giving up on the strategy of adopting a Christian counterpart, Buhari took Prof. Yemi Osinbajo (a Senior Pastor in the Redeemed Christian Church of God [RCCG] as his running mate on the platform of the All Progressives Congress (APC) and this can be said to be one of the reasons for the landslide victories recorded in the 2015 and 2019 presidential elections in the country. Political elites recognize the role of religion and some of them resort to patronising religious leaders and religious houses for prayers, as a means of getting more votes during elections. In preparation for the 2011 elections, Jonathan Goodluck worshipped at the Redemption Camp of the RCCG along the Ibadan-Lagos Expressway and was said to have knelt before Pastor Enoch Adeboye for prayers to secure his electoral victory. Religious leaders are expected to be detached from partisan politics but several instances have shown prominent Muslim and Christian clerics endorsing and encouraging their followers to vote for particular candidates, often on the basis of similar religious affiliation. The leadership of *Jama'atu Izatul Bid'ah Wa Iqamatus Sunnah* (Society for Removal of Innovation and Reestablishment of Sunna) for instance, a top Muslim Cleric, Sheikh Kabiru Gombe publicly announced and encouraged their followers to vote for Muslim political candidates (Isah, 2019). Interestingly,, Bishops Matthew Kukah of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Sokoto and David Oyedepo of Living Faith Church Worldwide, respectively were in attendance when a media magazine, *Pulse* (18 December 2018) widely reported a reconciliatory meeting between Olusegun Obasanjo and Atiku Abubakar (a presidential candidate for the 2019 election in Nigeria). Their presence ignited controversies over the endorsement of Atiku but both clerics denied the claim.

To get into power at all cost, political elites regularly use financial inducements to garner support from religious leaders. Before the 2015 elections, there were allegations that Jonathan Goodluck donated about 30 million US dollars to CAN under the leadership of Ayo Oritsejafor and the speculations were that its purpose was to get the loyalty of CAN's leadership (Obadare, 2015). Apart from this, it was also reported that millions of Naira was spent on Marabouts

from North Africa and Saudi Arabia by the Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, the National Security Adviser to Jonathan Goodluck to conduct prayers for his re-election into office in 2015 (*International Center for Investigative Reporting*, 4 December, 2015). In the blind pursuit of power, some politicians visit traditionalists to get charms to intimidate political opponents. From time to time, religious leaders, organizations and associations express their views on political issues in the country and religious bodies including CAN; the Christian Council of Nigeria; the Council of Chief Imams and Alfas in various communities; the Ansar-Ud-Deen Association of Nigeria and the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria, to mention a few, have, at different times, expressed displeasure at kidnapping, electoral violence, banditry, failure to ensure youth participation in elective positions, terrorism and killing of Christians in Northern Nigeria (Adunola, 2019; *Pulse*, 28 May, 2018; *Punch*, 12 February, 2017; *Punch*, 27 July, 2019; *Vanguard*, 29 July, 2018). While some of these religious leaders express their views on political issues with sincerity and from a moral perspective because of the prophetic offices they occupy, some speak for pecuniary motives.

There have been arguments that it is improper to mix religion with politics, yet there is overwhelming evidence of integration of religion and politics in Nigeria. Integration has been provoking religious violence and promoting political instability in the country but if it is constructively deployed it could serve as a positive force that would bring about positive, economic, social, moral and political transformation in Nigeria.

### **Recommendations and Conclusion**

This paper has shown that if arts is properly employed it can be a veritable instrument of unity. Arts speak a universal language irrespective of ethnic or religious differences. One of the main problems confronting Nigeria is lack of unity. Since arts have the critical potential of uniting the nation, the government needs to deploy arts to ensuring unity in Nigeria. In view of this, this paper recommends the resuscitation of National Arts Fiestas often organized to bring Nigerians together. Arts should be funded by governments to promote nation building. Rather than seeing artists who criticize governments as enemies, such artists should be considered as the voices of the ordinary Nigerians and efforts should be made to correct any

ill portraiture in the works of such artists. In addition, artistes, especially musicians need to continuously use their songs to correct the ills perpetuated by political elites, government and the people in larger society.

Scholars have established that religion has a great divisive potential in Nigeria because it has direct correlation as the causal factor to many devastating crises in the country. In view of this, the paper recommends that true secularism should be adopted at all levels of governance. Governments should discontinue the sponsorship of pilgrims or the promotion of religious activities both in Nigeria and other parts of the world. In the same vein, religious considerations must be jettisoned in the formulation and implementation of policies. A government that considers religious beliefs in taking decisions stands to be accused of partiality by adherents of other religions. Most Nigerians tend to be very religious but this does not transcend into expected actions and attitudes of pious people. Research by scholars into different religions has shown that they all have sound moral codes to guide the day-to-day interactions between the leaders and followers. The Bible, for example, admonishes that one should love one's neighbor as oneself. Other religions also affirm this moral injunction. However, the contemporary occurrences in Nigeria's politicalscape depict greed and manifests as exploitation of public offices for aggrandizement, self-enrichment, religious intolerance, looting of public funds, electoral malpractices and various corrupt practices, among others. This reveals the vacuity of religiosity among many leaders. It is imperative for religious leaders not only to continue to teach moral codes but live by conducts worthy of emulation to promote morality.

There is a need to sensitize the electorate that elections and politics should no longer be framed with religious considerations; rather votes should be based on the consideration of party manifesto and on the credibility of the political candidates. Additionally, instead of meddling in politics for personal gains, religious leaders should play the role of correcting anomalies and encouraging good conduct among political elites. In addition, religious leaders should maintain neutrality on the political space, instead of making utterances that can spur violence or encourage religious divisions. When this is accomplished, more constructive ethos would be engendered in the political milieu.

Good governance is the antidote to crises and it is the glue that binds arts, politics and religion in Nigeria. National integration and democracy cannot be consolidated without institutions and leadership devoid of bad governance. When government is seen as being truly responsive and responsible, the arts and religions will cease to be lethal weapons of destruction and will become instruments for constructively enhancing the betterment of Nigeria.

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**ARTICLE**  
*10*

**LEADERSHIP, DEMOCRACY AND  
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA:  
FOCUS ON THE FOURTH REPUBLIC**

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## Abstract

*Leadership is critical to any country's development because it is a major pivot of democratic government. Democracy is not just trending, it is the most popular representative form of government. This paper discusses the challenges of leadership, democracy and national development in Nigeria's Fourth Republic and used synthesised information from secondary sources. It adopted empirical typology of analysis for both theoretical framework and analysis. The findings showed that leadership has not demonstrated sufficient vision and has inadvertently constituted the main clog to development in Nigeria. The paper concluded that as long as visionary leadership and functional democracy do not exist in Nigeria's socio-economic and political transformations, national development would remain an illusion and unattainable in the 21st century and beyond. Consequently, the paper emphasises the need for visionary, democratic leadership that places national interest above other considerations and reiterated that achieving this requires the deepening of democracy through inclusive broad-based participation of the citizens whose votes truly count during elections and thereafter.*

**Keywords:** Leadership, Democracy, National development, Socioeconomic, Political

## **Introduction**

Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960. As a symbol of Nigeria's new status, the British Union Jack was lowered and replaced by Nigeria's flag of Green-White-Green as a symbolic gesture to establish Nigeria's sovereignty. Unfortunately, the newly found excitement of self governance was short lived as the nation's public space was upstaged by a colony of "incompetent leaders" who have impacted negatively on democracy and national development in the country. Therefore, the original vision of the some of the prominent nationalists and the nation's leaders-Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Chief Anthony Enahoro and other departed statesmen, who laboured night and day to birth an Independent Nigeria, remains a mirage (Nzeako & Chuks, 2019).

After independence, Nigeria adopted Parliamentary System of Government, the model used in the United Kingdom. The first Prime Minister was Tafawa Balewa while Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was the Governor General as well as the President; Chief Obafemi Awolowo was the first Premier of Western Region. No sooner had Nigerians got onto the seat of power than the euphoria which greeted the nation's independence began to wane. This was because the leaders failed to offer envisioned leadership and focused direction to governance. All their infractions eventually forced the military to stage the first coup and made incursion into power and politics. The first military coup was led by Major Kaduna Nzegwu in 1966. Things further degenerated and ultimately culminated in the first civil war (1967-1970). Several other coups, counter coups and palace coups took place. Eventually, a Military Head of State, General Murtala Mohammed established a definite timetable for transiting from military to civilian administration. He set up the machinery for transition to civil rule in 1975 but could not see the process through because he was killed in an aborted Military coup on February on February 13, 1976 by Col. Bukar Sukar Dimka Gen., Murtala's Deputy, General Olusegun Obasanjo, supervised the election process and successfully handed power onto the politicians in 1978. After elections had been successfully held in 1978, the political party that produced the president was the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). NPN's Presidential Candidate, Alhaji Shehu Shagaria emerged as the democratically elected civilian leader

in 1979. Unfortunately, the civilian governmentt was plagued by corruption and “prebendal politics” (Richard, 1987) and succumbed to another military coup in 1983.

Suberu (2013) explained that Richard’s (1987) theory of prebendal politics provides and provokes stimulating analyses of Nigeria’s federalism (1987, 1998). The theory shows that the constituent ethnicities of Nigeria’s federal society are the bases for the organisation, mobilisation, and legitimisation of prebendalism’s ethno-clientelistic networks of patronage, corruption, and rent-seeking. Similarly, the innovative Nigerian principle of “federal character,” according to which the country’s ethno-regional diversity must be reflected in all governmental appointments and disbursements, has effectively transformed prebendalism (or the personal, factional, and communal appropriation of public offices) “from an informal norm of political competition into a directive principle of state policy” (Richard, 1987, p,56). Obviously, the fragmentation of Nigeria into a multiplicity of centrally-funded, sub-national states and local governments has vastly expanded and multiplied the access points and conduits for the individual and sectional appropriation of public power and resources. Indeed, the Nigerian federal system operates almost exclusively as a mechanism for the intergovernmental distribution and ethno-political appropriation of centrally collected oil revenues. The system abets, and is enmeshed and subsumed in, an overall context of prebendal and neopatrimonial politics (Suberu, 2013).

During the protracted military rule, Nigerians expressed the desire for democracy as the platform to engender positive political change (Nweke, 2015). Unfortunately, corrupt leadership inherited from military had permeated the democratic era such that, in addition to economic and financial corruption, political corruption ranks very high with the greatest feature of electoral malpractices (Nweke, 2015). After upstaging President Alhaji Shagari in 1983, military administration continued until 1999 when the country returned into democratic practice. It elected Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, (a former Military President) as an Executive President in 1999. Since 1999, all aspects of leadership have come under scrutiny because of the need for improvement in leadership, democracy and national development.

Nweke further asserted that the 1999 democratic military-to-civilian transition saw the emergence of democratic government headed by a retired army general, Olusegun Obasanjo, as the Fourth Republic Nigerian President. Obasanjo's administration was fraught with a subtle militarisation of a civilian government (Nweke, 2015). Akuta's (2009) corroborated Nweke's view:

Sincerely speaking, the only gain we have got in the past 10 years of democracy in Nigeria is simply that we have had a civilian regime. Besides, it has not been really civilian in the true sense of it. Eight years out of the last 10 years (Obasanjo's administration) was a quasi-military government because Obasanjo ruled Nigeria like a military head of state (p.7).

Adagbabiri and Okolie (2019) equally stated that the issue of democracy and national development in Nigeria's Fourth Republic will continue to dominate political discourse by both academics and non-academics because democracy is at the crossroads and national development has only materialised in the imagination of Nigeria's national development planners (Adagbabiri & Okolie, 2019). Since Nigeria attained independence in 1960, it has been in search of a workable democracy and envisioned leadership. Nigeria needs to find ways of adapting democracy to the country's numerous stakeholders. This may require the pursuit of consociation, an arrangement that will allow for power sharing among competing groups and political interests in the country (Adagbabiri & Okolie, 2019).

Nigeria's renowned first generation novelist Chinua Achebe (1984) noted that political leadership has been one of the main obstacles to democracy and development in Africa. He stated that post-independence political leadership has been everything but productive; it has been distributive rather than productive in orientation, wasteful, and corrupt in political and economic management. Achebe's argument still remains relevant till date. Given the character of the country's leadership, it is not surprising that there have been threats to human security. The threats seem to have direct correlation to the



schism in the ranks of the political elite who lack the hegemony and discipline to engender socio-economic and political stability (Igbodalo, 2012).

All over the world, leadership, democracy and development have been used as pivots for effectively dealing with inter and intra-group conflicts arising from democracy. Sadly, these concepts do not seem to transform into development in Nigeria because Nigeria's experience with leadership and democracy has not been as productive as it ought to be. Some of the reasons include inability to make the electorate's vote count in election processes; preponderance of ethno-religious violence in the polity; prostrate economy; widespread poverty as well as deficit of infra structure. The popular expectations that leadership and democracy will resolve all these challenges have largely been unattainable. It is against this backdrop that this paper has explored the effects of leadership and democracy on national development in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

### **Theoretical Issues**

Analytical typologies as an approach, refocus attention on the observable functions of leadership, the personal qualities of a leader or the sources of a leader's authority. Rather than assessing leadership from the sublime perspective of terminal values, the typologies seek to situate the problem within a context of individual and social psychology, group interactions and intergroup processes, as determined by historically concrete configurations of social structures and institutions. Max Weber's (1946, 1958) tripartite ideal-type analytical typology of traditional, rational-legal and charismatic leaders is representative in this regard. Weber employed a leadership-centred approach to political thinking and acting by viewing politics as "the leadership or the influencing of the leadership of a political association, or a state." In other words, it refers to a "human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Weber distinguishes between the cultural, social and psychological sources of leaders' powers. Leadership is exercised according to traditional, legal-rational or charismatic domination, authority and legitimation (see Table 1; Weber 1946). Weber's typology of the most common "motors" of leadership in pre-modern and modern societies emphasises leaders'

embeddedness in society, and helps solve the research tasks of a comparative nature.

Deutsch (1978) offers a typology of leaders based on the extent of leaders' powers. Devised as a continuum that ranges from strong, successful leaders to relatively weak and unsuccessful ones, Deutsch's typology correlates key features of the leader's personality, the type of support extended by the followers, and, crucially, the fit between the policies advocated by the leader and the prevailing 'spirit of times', or the requirements of the historical situation that the leader can ignore only at his or her own peril (see Table 2).

**Table 1: Weber's Typology of Legitimate Power/Authority**

Type of Legitimate Power/Authority	Source of Legitimate Power/ Authority
Traditional Custom	Perennial institutions
Rational-legal	Legal-bureaucratic procedures
Charismatic	Personal qualities (extraordinary 'gifts') of the leader

Source: Weber (1946, p.44).

**Table 2 Strong versus Weak Leaders**

Leaders	Personal Qualities	Type of Support from Followers	Fit between Leaders' Policies and Situations
Strong	Strong, decisive personality	A large group or coalition of groups strongly united with consistent bonds of attitude and interest	Fit
Weak	Weak, indecisive personality	Few supporters, or many supporters who are weakly united	Lack of fit

Source: Deutsch (1978, p.67).

The theory is apt for this study on Nigeria's leadership because rather than assessing leadership from the sublime perspective of terminal values, the theory situated the problem within a context of individual and social psychology, group interactions and intergroup processes, as determined by historically concrete configurations of social structures and institutions.

## **Conceptual Discourse**

### **Leadership**

Leadership is the manner by which an individual influences the thoughts, attitudes, and behaviour of others. Leaders set a direction for the team, thereby assisting followers to see what lies ahead, and visualise what they might achieve. Leaders also encourage and inspire their followers. Without leadership, a group of human beings quickly degenerates into rancour and conflict because they see things from different perspectives and lean toward different solutions. Leadership helps to point followers in the same direction and harness their efforts. Leadership is the ability to get other people to do something significant that they might not otherwise do. It is all about energising followers toward a goal (Mills, 2005). The Oxford English Dictionary (2018) explains leadership thus:

Leadership is the dignity, office, or position of a leader, especially of a Political party; ability to lead; the position of a group of people leading or influencing others within a given context; the group itself; the action or influence necessary for the direction or organization of effort in a group undertaking.

The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines a leader as "the person who leads or commands a group, organization, or country." To lead means to "cause (a person or animal) to go with one by drawing them along; show (someone) the way to a destination by preceding or accompanying them." In other words, both goal setting and motivation figure prominently as essential attributes of the notion of leadership. Other languages differ considerably with the meanings of equivalent translatable terms, but have also adopted the English "leader" and "leadership" in the last century (Blondel, 1987).

Leadership is almost exclusively a communication activity. Indeed, effective leaders communicate clearly, promptly, empathically, and keep team members well-versed. Real leaders “walk the talk” by delivering what they promise (Rosenbach, Sashkin & Harburg, 1996). The two expressive qualities of effective leaders are identified as active listening and sympathizing with what people have to say (Rynders, 1999). Leaders know how to listen and possess essential qualities that encourage positive work relations, inspire trust, and augment the result. Effective leaders know people have a necessity to be heard. Lucia (1997) noted that empathy, a leadership trait, is as appreciated as the willingness to listen. Leadership is an essential feature of all government and governance; weak leadership contributes to government failures, and strong leadership is indispensable if the government is to succeed. Wise leadership secures prosperity in the long run; foolhardy leadership may bring about a catastrophe. Lack of leadership routinizes governance. Its political and creative aspects fade away: it becomes no different from administration, focusing solely on pattern maintenance and repetition of the same.

Nigeria’s enormous resources (both human and natural) have been unmaximised by the leaders. Leadership-deficit cut across all levels of governance (federal, states or local governments). Leadership is not only germane to the growth of democracy, it should translate into development. It would appear that Nigerians have been experiencing the Machiavellian concept of politics which implies that the end justifies the means.

### **Democracy**

Democracy, a derivative, came from the Greek words, “demos” which means (the people), and “Kratia” (rule). Therefore, it is a combination which means rule by the people (Supo, 1986). In his famous “funeral oration,” Pericles, the Athenian Statesman declared: “our Constitution is named a democracy, because it is in the hands, of not few, but many” (Supo, 1986, p.40). Democracy, as practised in ancient Greece, or in more recent times in the New England town meetings, was called “direct or pure democracy.” It was a democracy characterised by decision making directly by the people. Representation was not necessary because each citizen was able to voice out his or her own opinion and directly makes binding political decisions for the society.

On village democracy in Africa, Supo (1986) noted that “elders sit under the big tree, and talk until they agree.” In any case, direct democracy is not practicable in modern societies because of their large sizes and populations. Though direct democracy could still be practicable at the village level, the modern states practice representative democracy (p.41).

This affords the citizens the maximum freedom and opportunity to choose their representatives in government at defined regular intervals. This method suggests the existence of different political parties, an election process and free and fair competition among competitors seeking to hold offices on behalf of the larger citizens of the state through the exercise of franchise by the citizens (Nyerere, 1965).

Democracy could be better expressed thus:

- i. Multiplicity of political parties seeking for political power through election.
- ii. Competition for power is open to all qualified citizens free from victimization.
- iii. Elections to political positions are held periodically and through the secret ballot system.
- iv. There is the utilization of the universal adult suffrage in the selection of political leaders.
- v. There is guarantee for the fundamental human rights of citizens.
- vi. There is separation of power among the three tiers of government.
- vii. The rule of law is enforced to the latter.
- viii. Popular decisions are taken through the decisions of the majority in the legislative assemblies as the house is the representative of the citizens (IPU.1994)

Abraham Lincoln, the sixteenth American President defined democracy as government of the people, by the people and for the people. This paper is of the opinion that Nigeria's Fourth Republic has not really been practicing democracy. What led to the demise of Nigeria's Second Republic democracy appears to have recurred in the Fourth Republic. Therefore, democracy in Nigeria, could be defined as government of the bourgeois by the bourgeois and for the bourgeois. It would appear that one needs to belong to the class of bourgeois to be able to win elections in Nigeria. Essentially, it does appear that those grounded in development issues rarely get the opportunity to participate in government.

### **Development**

Generally, development implies a high level of economic production and consumption, and well-organised, broad based specialised political institutions which permit political mobilisation and participation in policy-making processes. In extant literature, the concept of development is closely linked with change from traditional to modern ways of life. Social scientists using the development approach see development as a pattern of institutional change occurring in a particular society as a result of modernizing economic and social conditions.

In an attempt to develop general theory, the literature on development has greatly expanded. Most theorists studying development have focused on its economic dimensions. Used interchangeably with "Modernization", "Innovation" and "Change", development is seen by Monte (1973) as a process of achieving parity with the world's most economically developed states in the production of goods and services. In terms of its political, economic and social dimensions, Monte contends that development is progression away from societies organised along traditional, tribal and village lines toward the development of an ideal type modern society approximated but not fully achieved by the world's more industrialised states (Monte, 1973). The problem with this definition is that it fails to specify the nature of progression through which a traditional society passes in its movement toward an ideal type modern society.

Apter (1969) views development as part of modernization and therefore

defines development as the process of consciously directing and controlling the social consequences of increased role differentiation and organisational complexity in a society. According to Akin (1980, p.300), development process is the application of rational thought to the mobilisation and utilisation of two fundamental resources – productive land and the labour of its population – to improving the material conditions of the people as a whole.

Ndekwu (1996) would want the government to address some policy directions in order to confront development issues in Nigeria and other developing states in international relations. According Ndekwu, the policies should address the following:

- i. Policy formulation or design and how to minimize macro-economic policy instability which is reflected in departure from original design, reversals and abandonment;
- ii. Conflict of objectives especially between achieving an economic balance at the cost of social upheaval whose resolution requires the realignment of interests and perception of the leadership and policy makers;
- iii. Timing and sequencing of policies which requires strict sense of priorities; and
- iv. consistency which is of three forms, namely,
  - a) Design or formulation consistency between initial conditions and policy designs, objective function consistency between objective and instruments and strategies, and
  - b) Implementation consistency. If the distortions, contradictions and inconsistencies are recognized in the policy programming and appropriate strategies are put in place to redress them, then the probability of successful policies would be high (Ndekwu, 1996).

## **The nexus between Leadership, Democracy and National Development in Nigeria**

In every political clime, leadership is germane and it is *sine quo non* to democracy and national development because good leadership engenders and promotes development. All over the world, democracy is both projected and promoted because it enables people voice out their opinion on social, economic and political matters. When a leader fails, such a leader is shown the way out through elections. This shows that the citizens understand the power of elections and often reflected it. Nigeria's various crises have emanated from failure of leadership because, among other deficiencies. Nigeria's leadership tradition appears to opt for primordialism which promotes tribal and ethnic proclivities rather than accomplishment. When there is effective and efficient leadership, democracy will thrive and development will take place in all ramifications.

Adefarasin (2015) asserts that Nigeria is blessed with both human and natural resources; yet, it is quite evident today that the country's political independence has not matched economic independence. Nigeria has not been able to develop and join the comity of nations simply because of leadership-deficit. Majority of the leaders that have emerged in post independent Nigeria have exhibited poor leadership qualities, appear unconcerned about national development because of corruption, unethical democratic principles, mediocrity, infractions of law and order, lack of rule of law, injustice, among other violations.

Agbor (2012) states that the United States of America which today ranks as one of the world's most technologically developed nations did not attain greatness by accident rather, it had been nurtured into greatness by successive political leaders. Some of the often mentioned ones include George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, John Kennedy and many other contemporary presidents. Russia offers yet another example of the importance of political leadership in nation building. Before 1917, the Russians suffered under the autocratic misrule of the Czars but today, the Russians ranks with other powerful and developed nations of the world. Russia's development has been linked to the sterling leadership qualities of Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin. Without Lenin, the great Bolshevick



revolution of 1917 which transformed Russia into a superpower, would not have occurred, In 1959, Fidel Castro brought down the corrupt and inefficient regime of Fulgencio Batista and mounted a progressive political leadership in Cuba. Cuba's example demonstrates that good leadership lifts the citizens from poverty, ignorance and disease into affluence and contentment. Under the leadership of Fidel Castro, Cuba has been transformed politically, socially and economically and his government has vastly expanded educational opportunities and institutions. These are a few examples of the role of political leadership in nation-building. All the nations of the world that have succeeded did so primarily through good leadership (Chikendu, 1987).

### **Challenges to Leadership, Democracy and National Development in Nigeria's Fourth Republic**

Lack of envisioned leadership is one of the major problems in Nigeria. This country, for instance, has the capacity for tackling social, economic and political problems but lacks the willpower to confront these challenges because the willpower is largely locked in the hands of leaders at the political and economic levels. The challenges include failure of leadership; corruption; insecurity, insurgency; insincerity; lack of political will; lack of proper vision by the political leadership; lack of accountability in governance; amongst others. Essentially, leadership crisis, a major obstacle to development in this country, involves politicians, scholars, students, social critics, labour leaders and seasoned bureaucrats. All these have continually undermined the democratization process and national development in the country.

Since Nigeria's political independence in 1960, the country has not had the opportunity of being governed envisioned leaders but those often described as "accidental leaders." In other words, the mantle of leadership has continually fallen, by default, on the shoulders of those that lack the capacity, lack the required experience, and are neither prepared nor expectant of such responsibility. This has resulted into "visionless policies." This underscores the fact that most of Nigeria's developmental challenges are rooted in lack of envisioned, sound, and result-based leadership. As Chimee (2009) noted, the three major strands that account for leadership failure in Nigeria are lack of ideology; ethnicity; and corruption. These vices have compromised the

efforts Nigeria's political elites. For effective transformation and national development, the world is consciously moving away from infractions and promoting democratic values; public accountability; transparency; good conscience; fiscal discipline; due process but this progressive effort is being dogged by lack of credible leadership to enforce these democratic ethos. This is the tragedy of the Nigerian nation.

Another serious challenge to democracy and national development in Nigeria is that corruption appears to have been entrenched in all facets of national life. According to Joseph (2001) cited in Osimiri (2009), corruption has compromised governance in Nigeria. In view of the all pervasive effects of corruption, successive governments have embarked on anti-corruption campaigns. The administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo, for instance, established the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2003 to fight corruption. As Osimiri (2009) noted, the Commission gained such level of notoriety in the country that it is often said that "the fear of EFCC is the beginning of wisdom." EFCC's activities has painted the picture of transparency, openness and accountability but the resultant records have shown that there is much to be desired. The EFCC, especially, under the Obasanjo administration received much commendation from within and outside Nigeria but it has been alleged that it was selective in focus and justice-dispensation and allegedly used as an instrument for silencing political opponents.

Successive elections have shown that elections are gradually becoming part of the political culture in Nigeria. Unfortunately, elections are often manipulated and hijacked by "money bags" and incumbents, who deploy the entire state's apparatus for re-election. The widespread electoral malpractices which often characterises elections in Nigeria are inimical to the consolidation of democracy and good governance. In 2011, allegations of fraud in the general elections provoked violence and massive destruction of lives and property but the 2015 elections under the watch of former President Goodluck Jonathan was described as credible and widely acceptable by the electorate, political gladiators and election observers. The transition was also unique because it was the first time that a sitting president was defeated by an opponent without provoking rancour. The election ushered President

Mohammad Buhari. Unfortunately, this 2015 gain seem to have been lost in 2019 elections especially in Kogi and Bayelsa states.

Insecurity has become prevalent in Nigeria and has festered through non state actors. Perhaps, the most prominent is Boko Haram whose insurgent activities in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY) States have retarded socio-economic and political development of the northeast in particular and the country in general. Inability to contain the insecurity spawned by Boko Haram is a strong indicator of the failure of Nigerian state. Other regions of the country are also under siege: Northwest is plagued by banditry just as kidnapping (for ransom) in the Northcentral and southern region has made the country unsafe. Other indices of insecurity include farmers/herders clashes in the middle belt. All these pose serious challenges to democracy and national development because insecurity is progress. The only way to remedy the situation is to confront it . Therefore, the government ought to combine its current military approach with political will so as to effectively and efficiently address the challenges of insecurity, poverty and underdevelopment of the country.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Leadership is a *sine quo non* to, it also drives democracy and national development. Leadership, democracy and national development are interwoven and remain central to all facets of development. Nigeria's history of ethnic and tribal pluralism has greatly affected democracy and national development in the country. Sadly, the prebendal politics of the Second Republic is still playing out in the Fourth Republic; nothing seems to have changed rather, the situation is getting worse. Nigerians need visionary leaders; justice; equity; and fairness to promote national development and instill confidence into the electorate. These are attainable only through committed, visionary, leadership and inclusive functional governance because all these deepen democracy, socio-economic and political transformations as well as national development.

Therefore, this paper concludes that as long as visionary leadership and inclusive functional democracy are elusive, the socio-economic and political transformations and, ultimately, national development will remain an

illusion in the 21st Century and beyond. The paper reiterates visionary, democratic leadership that places national interest above any other parochial considerations. This can be achieved through inclusive broad-based participation of the citizens whose votes truly count during elections and thereafter.

Essentially, therefore, government policies should be put in place to strengthen democratic institutions like Political Parties, National Assembly, Judiciary, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Civil Society, anti-graft agencies such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), among others. These institutions must be allowed to operate independently and effectively to ensure the growth and sustenance of democracy and national development. There is need for positive change through rebranding of the country's value system to promote hard work, integrity, honesty, transparency and accountability at all levels of governance. Similarly, a relatively large percentage of the population needs proper civic education, enlightenment and empowerment to hold their leaders accountable.

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