

***THE EFFECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE SENATE
ON GOOD GOVERNANCE: A STUDY OF THE 8TH SENATE, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY,
ABUJA (2015-2019).***

Submitted

By

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TO

**A DESSERTAION SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF BENIN/NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE AND DEMOCRATIC STUDIES (UNIBEN/NILDS) POS
GRADUATE PROGRAMMES IN PARIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE AWARD OF MASTERS DEGREE IN PARLIAMENTARY ADMINISTRATION
(MPD)**

OCTOBER, 2020

APPROVAL PAGE

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DEDICATION

This research project is dedicated to the Almighty God, my Saviour who made it possible for me to successfully complete this stage of educational learning.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I give God the glory, praise and adoration for being my pillar strength and for seeing me through the programme. I am extremely grateful also to my **Supervisor, Prof. Victor Ekhaton** who has spent his time through this project to make it a successful one. My sincere thanks go to my **beloved Wife, Mrs. Comfort Emmanuel Sunday Abah** and my **Sisters, Mrs. Mary Igbe Ibochi and Mrs. Onyechi James Adole** who have supported me morally prayerfully programme. May the good Lord bless you.

Also not forgetting my beloved Children **Mrs. Juliet Omeyi Ojonye Emafiana, Mrs. Esther Omaedo Ojonye Ogidi, Mr. Ojonye Victor Ojonye (Jnr), Miss Doreen Agnes Ojonye, Miss Grace Ehi Ojonye and Miss Comfort Adole** who has been with me in prayers.

Finally, I can't but show my earnest appreciation to my indefatigable Boss, **Mr. Mustapha A. Oluwuyi, Clerk, Senate Committee on Media and Public Affairs**, also to my wonderful friends, Mr. James Onaji, Miss Ann Onoja, Miss Halimat Aliyu , Mr. Zaka Isa Fom, Mr. Emmanuel Bodunde, Mrs. Pinda Dauda , Mrs. Osham Sydney Gladys, Mrs. Joy Juwel and to all my course mates in MPD. I say a very big thank you, may the joy of the Lord remain with you now and forever through **JESUS CHRIST OUR LORD (AMEN)**.

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ABSTRACT

Over the years, the relationship between the legislature and the executive arms of government has attracted wide range of debates, especially its impact on governance. Both arms are two very important political institutions in presidential democratic regimes and they have a very critical task to play in promoting good governance. The achievement of this task however, is dependent on whether the relationship that exists between these institutions is cordial or conflictual. In Nigeria's Fourth Republic for example the relationship between the executive and legislature has been characterised more by conflicts, although some scholars have documented a cordial pattern and its impact. This, according to many, has varying degree of effects on the policy making and implementation process, untimely inhibiting good governance. More worrisome is the fact that even after twenty years of democratization in Nigeria, the political players have refused to wean themselves off from the culture of impunity and flagrant disregard to the rule of law, based on the political affiliation and interests protections. These factors and others have remained triggers of political conflicts in Nigeria especially between the executive and legislative arms of government. The study therefore seeks to reveal the effects of an identified relationship (cooperation or conflict) between the legislature and executive using the 8th National Assembly (especially, the Senate) as a case study. Specifically, the research covers the period between 2015 and 2019. The reason for selecting this time is that the period covered tremendous activities that reflect the relationship between the executive and legislative arms of the government. It adopted a primary (survey) method to examine the effect of relationship between the executive and legislative arms in the 8th Senate on good governance. The study reveals that the legislature has not lived to the expectation of Nigerians in terms of making laws that will guarantee good governance. Meanwhile, unhealthy relationship of the executive and its interference on the legislative processes was also identified as one of the hindrances to governance. It recommends that the executive and legislature ought to value and firmly adhere to the tenets of the principles of separation of powers, law-makers should be more accountable and open to their responsibilities and the two institutions of government should base their relationship in trust, mutual respect and understanding which will yield to good governance among others.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The widespread level of under development among the Third World countries appears undiminished. The state of their national development is still beneath expectancy years after political independence. Interestingly, it is noteworthy to know that national development remains a life-sustaining future of a nation, as such; its recognition is reliant on well-organized application of good governance and development administration. This will perfect into the improved economy and better standard of living among the citizens. Government, as an arm of the state, is constitutionally bound to formulate and implement policies that will promote stability in the state.

However, governance is regarded in terms of process and structure. Thus, Gill (2002) views it as the processes, structures and organizational traditions that determine how power is exercised, how stakeholders have their say, how decisions are taken and how decision-makers are held to account. Ogundiya (2010) sees governance as consisting of two essential elements of the state, namely, the structure of the state and the procedures of the legislative, judicial, executive and administrative bodies at all tiers of government.

The link amid the government has continuously been a constitutional means of running the activities of any state. Each of these arms has a role that is so inter-dependent on the obligations and duties they show to preserve their existence and endorse

development in the state. Though, it appears to be a perpetual, unavoidable struggle between the executive and legislature that could result in common understanding or clashes in the execution of their constitutional duties. But the system of checks and balances has a significant role on how these two arms unite to promote democratic standard in the Nigerian context.

Relationship has always been a task in participatory democracy in Nigeria. The Executive and Legislature are always tangled in cat and mouse relations in most democracies; the Nigerian situation has never indeed been different, even when the ruling party upholds an irresistible control of the chambers.

The story of the 8th National Assembly has however been peculiar. Its journey in 2015 took off on an acrimonious note, as the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) was pitted against members of the National Assembly who were bent on choosing their own leaders.

The relationship between the executive and the legislature in the legislative and oversight processes is intricate, yet dynamic and vigorous, with interdependent responsibilities and power sharing among these two arms of government.

The Constitution bestows on the Executive the responsibility to draft policy in the context of a legal framework, which in essence gives effect to a “draft bill” which is then referred to Parliament for consideration and deliberation. Likewise, the Constitution bestows on the Legislature the responsibility to pass legislation which the executive must implement. (Kolawole2017).

Co-existence of the relationship between executive, legislative and judiciary as organs of government can lead to political development which is imperative for every country. The political development indicates the level of social, political and economic progress (Pye & Verba, (2015). The pattern of political development of a country has three major dimensions; this includes the political, cultural and social aspects Ogai, (2003). Political development is the institutional capacity to meet the demands and challenges of people in modern society in carrying out public policies which are a necessary condition for realizing higher standard; this involves the systemic political capacity to manage public affairs and controversy as well as cope with popular demands Pye & Verba, (2015).

Ideally, political development is considered development from a state that seems to be undesirable to a state that is more attractive and desirable; that is tradition versus modernity Kingbury, (2007).

The relationships between the legislature and the executive are one of the key defining characteristics of the functioning of any political system Kopecky, (2004). It is central to the constitutional and political system of any territory and has been at the forefront of parliamentary debate in recent times Winetrobe, (2000). These relationships are complex, depending on a range of formal and informal practices. The constitutional prerogatives vested in legislatures and the executive are, of course, most important because they structure the interactions between the two powers (National Democratic Institute) NDI, (2000).

However, copious informal rules and conventions, such as the customs concerning nomination of members of the cabinet following an election, practically precedent, habit and the influence of political parties are very important as well Bernick & Bernick, (2008). Productive relationships between the executive and the legislative arms of government are indispensable to the effective maintenance of the constitution and the rule of law Holme, (2007). In recent years, however, the character of these relationships has reformed significantly, both because of changes in governance and because of wider societal changes.

Good scrutiny of these relations will bring to the limelight the nature of legislature-executive relations, the factors engendering such relations with a view to bringing to the fore valid modalities for improving it and ensuring good governance. This research examines the dynamics, nature, causes and consequences of the relationship between the two arms and on good governance in Nigeria's 8th Senate 2015-2019.

National Assembly

The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, assumes a National Assembly for the federation which consist of a Senate and a House Representatives. The National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is a bicameral legislature consisting of a Senate with 109 members and 360 House of Representative members. The body, modeled after the federal Congress of the United States, is supposed to guarantee equal representation with 3 Senators to each 36 states irrespective of size in the Senate plus 1 senator representing the Federal Capital Territory, Nigeria and single-member district, plurality voting in the House of Representatives. The Senate is chaired by the President of the Nigerian Senate. The House is chaired by the Speaker of the House

of Representatives. At any joint session of the Assembly, the President of the Senate presides and in his absence the Speaker of the House presides.

The Senate

The Senate is the upper chamber of Nigeria's bicameral legislature, the National Assembly of Nigeria. It consists of 109 senators: the 36 states are each divided in 3 senatorial districts each electing one senator; the Federal Capital Territory elects only one senator. The senate is saddled with the responsibility of making laws.

The President of the Senate is the presiding officer of the Senate, whose chief function is to guide and regulate the proceedings in the Senate. The Senate President is third in the Nigerian presidential line of succession. He is assisted by the Deputy President of the Senate. The current Senate President is Sen. Ahmed Ibrahim Lawan and the current Deputy Senate President is Ovie Omo-Agege both members of the APC. The Senate President and his Deputy are also assisted by principal officers including the Majority Leader, Deputy Majority Leader, Minority Leader, Deputy Minority Leader, Chief Whip, Deputy Chief Whip, Minority Whip, and Deputy Minority Whip. In addition, there are 63 Standing Committees in the Senate chaired by Committee Chairmen.

The House of Representatives

The House of Representatives is the lower chamber of Nigeria's bicameral National Assembly. The Senate is the upper chamber. The House of Representatives has 360 members who are elected in single-member constituencies using the plurality (or first-past-the-post) system. Members serve four-year terms. The Speaker of the Nigerian House of Representatives is the presiding officer of the house. The

current speaker of the House is Olufemi Hakeem Gbajabiamila. The House of Representatives is also saddled with the responsibility of making laws.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Over the years, the relationship between the 8th Senate and the Executive arm of government has attracted wide varieties of viewpoints both about conflict and cooperation, but what becomes notable is the effect such relationship had on governance. The recounting drama and conflict between the presidency and the senate in particular is the consequences of the leadership crisis of which the seed was planted by the rebellious legislators and how the party answered to the crisis. Not long after the dust had been settle on the leadership of National Assembly, the presidency commenced the prosecutions of senate president and his deputy, for allegedly forged the senate standing rules in their favour. Senator Bukola Saraki is been prosecuted separately at the Code of Conduct Tribunal for alleged falsification of declaration of asset form when he was about to leave office as the Governor of Kwara State. At the time the senate president is under trial, the panama paper unravels Saraki properties in tax heaven; the presidency later dropped the forgery trial. The trial at the CCT disrupted seating the senators relocated to the CCT in solidarity with the senate president, as if it was the senate that is under prosecution.

In view of many, Senate President is been politically victimized by his party, and therefore, he must seeks help and support of PDP senators whose member he had helped to the post of deputy senate president. From the onset there was lack of coordination in the presidency on the one hand, and between the presidency and national assembly on the other hand. There are contradictories policies, programmes and reports from ministries,

department and agencies of government under the power and supervision of the presidency.

One of the issues that lead to the face-off between the executive and legislature is the discrepancies of what the executive presented as the 2016 appropriation bill and what the heads of some agencies defended at the appropriation committee. First, the lawmakers claimed that the executive had inflated the budget with unclear items injected; however, most of the MDAs claimed the budget the lawmakers were making reference to is difference from what they prepared for presentation by the president.

The discrepancies generated allegations and counter allegations, and the possibility that the presidency actually presented two versions of the budget. Again, that the budget was padded by cabals at presidency and in cooperation with the lawmakers may not be ruled-out. The House of Representatives investigated the allegation and subsequently suspended the chairman of the appropriation committee, Hon. Abdulmumin Jibrin, for 181 legislative days. Hon. Abdulmumin Jibrin had claimed that the speaker and other principal officers of the house inserted constituency projects into the budget. In the presidency, the head of budget office was sacked and replaced. There was also allegation of budget disappearing from the senate immediately it was presented by the president. The confusion that trails the 2016 budget is a reflection of lack of coherency, coordination and cooperation between and among the presidency, National Assembly and APC. Even though the president constantly met with the senate president and speaker, it has not made their relation less confrontational and distractive.

The funding and execution of constituency projects have remained unresolved since 1999. The legislators had earlier fumed at the exclusion of the constituency projects in 2016 budget and threaten a showdown with the executive. After negotiating with the executive, the projects were inserted into the budget.

The constituency projects is view by the legislators has their own effort to get the national cake to their constituents, and inability of any feasible project would negatively affect their ratings and re-election bid. The legislators were also not happy about their exclusion from the social welfare programmes of the present government. The senators wanted the programmes to be like a constituency projects that would get them directly involved. But, to the presidency, the legislators were only trying to hijack the programmes for their cronies and supporters and not for general goods as envisaged by the executive.

Similarly, another area of conflict between the executive and national assembly, particularly the senate is the rejection of summons by some government officials. First it was the Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF), Mr. Babachir David Lawal that refused to appear before the senate. The summoning was sequence to the allegation of fraud at the Presidential Initiative of North East (PINE), the award of contract for grass clearing in refugee camps in the north east.

The senate investigation unravels the fraud to the sum of N500m for grass clearing. Again the same award was contracted to the company in which the SGF have a substantial share which was against the rule of public procurement. In a move to give his refusal to appear a legal backing, he went to court but later rescinded and agreed to appear before the senate. The Senate

forwarded its report to the president and order the SGF sacked. In his response, the president sent a letter exonerating Mr. Babachir David Lawal to the Senate.

However, six (6) months after, the president ordered his suspension and constituted presidential panel headed by the Vice-President Prof Yemi Osinbajo to investigate corruption charges against the SGF along with the Director-General of National Intelligence Agency, Ayo Oke. Immediately after the swearing-in of president Buhari, change of leadership at EFCC was one of his priorities. Mr. Ibrahim Mustapha Magu though in acting capacity replaced, Ibrahim Lamorde, which many believe headed the EFCC of toothless bulldog. The EFCC act empowers the president to nominate the chairman of EFCC but subject to the approval of the senate. On the assumption of office, Mr Ibrahim Magu embarks on anti-graft crusade, which could only be comparing to Nuhu Ribadu era in EFCC. Money was voluntarily returned, while EFCC operators engage in recovery of funds hidden in banks, apartments and stores.

Politicians, ex-cabinets members, paramilitary chiefs, military officers, serving and retired were investigated and in some cases properties and billions of naira were recovered. Nigerians especially those in support of the anti-corruption war of the present administration hailed the success recorded, even when the prosecution and conviction of the accused is a rare occurrence.

Still there's some sense of approval among the masses but the power interplay among forces in the presidency and the senate are hard bend not to see Magu to cross the hurdle of a constitutional screening by the senate. The delay in forwarding the name of Ibrahim Magu was as a result of competing interest at the presidency. It took the bravery of Prof Yemi Osinbajo, the vice president then acting as president to forward the name of Ibrahim Magu as substantive

EFCC chairman for senate confirmation. Unexpectedly, the senate rejected his confirmation due largely to a damning report by Department of State Security Service (DSS) of him lacking integrity to continue as EFCC chairman.

President Buhari responded to the report by the senate of the rejection of Ibrahim Magu by ordering a separate underground background check on Ibrahim Magu and no concrete evidence to implicate him of the allegation was found, therefore he was re-nominated and his name forwarded back to the senate. In another twist of events, D.S.S once again sent an implicating report to the senate, therefore, the senate hinged on the report to reject the nomination of Magu. The senate had capitalized on the power game and supremacy battle within the presidency. As one senator reiterated. We told the leadership of our party that political appointees of President Muhammadu Buhari were using the media against us, especially Magu.

We stated to them that Magu (case) was brought in dead; that what we did was to only conduct his funeral Baiyewu, (2017). EFCC had been investigating some senators of corruption especially ex-governors, there are some 17 ex-governors civilian/military governor/administrators in the 8th senate Emmanuel, (2015).

Immediately after his first rejection, EFCC had accused the senate president of fraud in the Paris Club refund to states government. It was alleged that Senator Bukola Saraki been a former chairman of the Nigerian Governors Forum (NGF) received the sum of \$3.5billion, the allegation the senate president denied. Despite Magu rejection by the senate twice, he still keeps his job as the acting chairman of EFCC which some senior lawyers have argued can remain in the job in an acting capacity. Some have suggested that the presidency could forward Magu for re-nomination until the senate confirms his appointment.

Other prominent aspect of frosty executive-legislative relationship was the confrontation between the senate and the Comptroller-General of custom Col. Hammed Ali (RTD). President Buhari had appointed the retired colonel as the head of the custom, raising eyebrow over the appropriateness of the post. While it is lawful for the head of custom to come outside the organization, the job title could have been an administrator of custom. Soon, the issue of uniform suffices, as retired military man; Col. Ali had said he wouldn't wear the custom uniform; because it would rub off his military prowess.

Custom had announced that it would embark on vehicle verification imported through land border and impound those without full duties. The senate summoned the CG and orders him to appear in appropriate uniform. The CG initially refused to turn-up and adamant not to appear.

He however appears before the senate in mufti and was turned back by the senators to appear in custom uniform. Later, the custom accused the senate of frustrating the new policy because it seized a SUV allegedly belonging to the senate president, the allegation the senate investigated and exonerate the senate president of any wrong doing.

In a move to inform the executive of the frustration of the senate, it had threatened not to take any further action on 2017 appropriation bill and the 27 Resident Electoral Commissioner nominees sent to it. In a swift reaction, the APC had caution the appointees to shed their sword and respect the senate. Subsequently, the senate proposed an amendment to the EFCC act that would transfer the power to appoint the chairman from the executive to the national assembly. Again, in bid to usurp the power of the executive, there is another proposal to bring the code of conduct tribunal directly under the control and influence of the National Assembly. The CCT has been placed at the presidency.

Even though there had been agitation in the past for the CCT to be taken to either the control of the judiciary or the legislature, however the present propose amendments are in bad faith. The power politics in the National Assembly took a new turn by the suspension of another member .Hon Abdulmumin Jibrin had been removed and suspended as the chairman of the appropriation committee of the House of Representatives after the budget padding scandal of 2016. The second suspension was handed to Sen. Ali Ndume, by this time, had been removed as the senate leader in what looked like a palace coup. It was reported that Se Ali Ndume excused himself to observe the noon Islamic prayer and before he came back, power had changed hands. Sen. Bukola Saraki sacrifice Ndume for Sen. Lawan Ahmad, his challenger for the senate presidency and the party's backed candidate. Sen. Lawan had been recommended to Senator Bukola Saraki as the Senate leader, but instead announced Senator Ndume as the senate majority leader.

The reason(s) why Senator Bukola Saraki removed Senator Ali Ndume is clouded in obscurity. But it may not be unconnected to Ndume's constant support for President Buhari. In reacting to Ibrahim Magu rejection by the senate for the second time, Sen Ali Ndume had challenged the Sen. Bukola Saraki for lacking moral right to base Ibrahim Magu rejection on D.S.S investigation. In the floor of the senate, Sen. Ali Ndume called for the investigation of Sen Dino Melaye certificate scandal and the allegation by the custom of fake document to clear SUV allegedly belong to the senate president. Both allegations were investigated by the senate committee on ethics; the report exonerated both Sen. Bukola Saraki and Sen. Dino Melaye. The committee recommended suspension of Sen Ali Ndume for 190 legislative days. There are similarities between the suspensions of Hon. Abdulmumuni Jibrin by house of representative and that of Sen Ali Ndume of the senate. First both men are members of APC the majority party in

both chambers of National Assembly; second, they were allies of both senate president and speaker who defied their party.

According to Chris and Gabriel (2019) they presents that despite the protracted acrimony between the 8th National Assembly and the Executive arm, the report indicated that it did well in passing 515 bills into law which includes the North East Development Commission, Not Too Young To Run, and others. Presentation of the report findings was made by former Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC, Prof Attahiru Jega, while the European Union supported YIAGA AFRICA on its findings. The report reads in part,

“The 8th Senate commenced its work amidst political tension, which arose from the manner in which its leadership emerged, contrary to the expectations (and directives) of the All Progressives Congress, APC, hierarchy, and by extension, the presidency. U.S. trade deficit widens in August Full speech: Buhari’s remarks at Town Hall meeting with Nigerians in S/Africa “Consequently, the discharge of its constitutionally mandated responsibilities was circumscribed, and relatively marred, by a poor, if not an antagonistic working relationship between the legislature and the executive arms of government.

“This notwithstanding, the 8th Senate has received a favourable rating in the discharge of its responsibilities relative to the previous Assemblies, with regards to law-making and oversight functions. “For example, it has introduced and passed much more bills than the previous national legislatures, notwithstanding that a significant number of the bills have not been signed into law by the President (perhaps a result of the executive-legislative) frictions. Similarly, a number of the 8th National Assembly’s key Senate and House Committees have actively and vigorously conducted oversight functions, with positive and impactful results on governance and good order

of the country” “Interestingly, 95.8 per cent of bills introduced during the 8th Senate were private members’ bills. The dynamism in Bills sponsorship by legislators can be predicated on years of unbroken democratic governance and accumulation of institutional memory, which tremendously enhanced the law-making capacity of legislators in terms of expertise.

“During the four years of the 8th National Assembly, on average 541 bills were introduced and 129 bills were passed per year. This undoubtedly reflects high performance. Although a bill should, averagely, take less than six months to pass, our data reveals that out of the 515 bills passed in the 8th National Assembly, only 47 (9.1%) were passed within 50 days, while a whopping 271 (52.6%) took over 351 days to pass.” The report also highlighted some bills passed into law by the 8th National Assembly which include the Minimum Wage Bill; Not Too Young Run Bill; People With Disability Bill; Child Protection Bill; Local Government Autonomy Bill; Electoral Act Reform Bill; Grazing Bill; Public Procurement Bill, Basic Health Care Bill; Bill on Prompt Treatment of Accident Victims; Judicial System Protection Act; Whistle Blower Protection Bill; Petroleum Industry Bill; Nigerian Financial Intelligence Bill; Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act; Abolition of Dichotomy Between HND and Degrees Bill; Agriculture Loan Bill; Nigerian Railway Authority Bill Public Treasury Bill; Police Act Amendment; Digital Rights Bill; Bill Against Sexual Harassment of Students in Tertiary Institutions; Bill on the removal of Age Limit in Employment; Federal Audit Commission Bill; Local Industry Bill; Peace Corps Bill; Bill on Test for HIV Status Before Marriage; and Girl-Child Marriage Bill. On oversight functions, the report scored the 8th Assembly ‘good’ on performance, “In all, therefore, the performance by the National Assembly Committees in the area of oversight was good. Overall, many of the committees met international benchmarks on requires the number of meetings and oversight activities (visits, hearings, referrals,

investigations, etc). However, the report pointed out that there were challenges of funding, lack of committees' expertise on technical issues, poor access to information during oversight functions, and others. Some of the recommendations made in the report include electronic voting on passing bills, adequate funding on oversight functions, advertising constituency projects, and others. The relationship between these arms has become an overwhelmed exercise for policy influence. The Executive Arm interfering in the activities of the legislature, wherever it occurs, the image of the nation is belittled.

These findings are also consistent with the observation of Nwosu (1998) and Ajayi (2007), with regards to the Nigerian case, they argue that the previous republics collapsed largely not because the constitutions were bad. Rather, the demise of these republics resulted from the inability of the governing elites to comply with the basic rules of the game. This study therefore intends to assess the extent to which the conflict between the executive and the legislature has in good governance.

1.3 Research Questions

This study gears towards examining the effects of relationship between the executive and legislative arm in the 8th Senate on good governance. It is therefore imperative to examine the nature of the legislative-executive relations in fostering good governance. Based on the above, it is important to ask the following:

- (i) What are the factors influencing the executive and legislative conflict in Nigeria?
- (ii) How does the executive interference in the legislative process affect development in Nigerian?

(iii) What are the effects of the executive and legislative conflict in the development of the country?

1.4 Research Objectives

The broad objective of the study is to examine the effects of relationship between the executive and the Senate on good governance in 8th National Assembly,

The specific objectives are:

- (i) To identify factors influencing the executive and legislative conflicts in Nigeria,
- (ii) To ascertain effect of executive interference in the legislative process in the Nigerian.
- (iii) To examine the extent of effects of executive and legislative conflict in the development of the country and proffer solutions.

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study will have an enormous influence and benefits on the administrators of the Nigerian states ministries on whose shoulder much is expected, and help in transformation and guaranteeing a firm political framework that will be accessible to the citizens in the democratic setting. Furthermore, the research work serves as a beneficial piece of learning that will add to the existing literary works obtainable for use; a resource material for the government officials and the society as a whole and subsequently support further research.

Also, this study will support and aid imminent aspiring political leaders, as well as the current political actors to grasp the working relationship of the executive and legislative in the

presidential setting. The Executive being accountable to the Legislative Assembly, this will be of a great help in various stages of development for the people in Nigeria.

Finally it will be of immense benefits to stakeholders in the political landscape of Nigeria and also members of both the executive and the legislature in Nigeria.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The scope and limitations of this study is to study the executive and legislative relationship with its effect on good governance in Nigeria. The research covers the period between 2015 and 2019 of the 8th National Assembly in the history of Nigeria's democracy. The reason for selecting this time is that the period covered tremendous activities that reflect the relationship between the executive and legislative arms of government.

The data for the study will also be limited to information gathered through interview with some government parastatal official in Nigeria and relevant extract from online articles, journals, textbooks, newspapers among others to avoid unnecessary information and to have genuine references for the study. Finally, conducting a study based on existing documents and supported by the opinions of informants usually encounters distinct challenges such as factual level of the documents, attitude of some informants and objectivity of respondents.

1.7 Operational Definition of Terms

Effects: a change which is an outcome or consequence of an action or other cause

Relationship: This refers to an existing mode or kind of connection or interactions, a significant association between the executive and the legislature.

Executive: The term executive in the context of this study is the branch of government that has sole authority and responsibility for the daily administration of the state bureaucracy.

Legislature: The term legislature, as used in this study, means a branch of government, a deliberative assembly of persons, usually elective, with the power to pass, amend, and repeal laws for a state.

The Senate: an assembly or council of citizens having the highest deliberative functions in a government, especially a legislative assembly of a state or nation. It is the upper chamber of Nigeria's bicameral legislature, the National Assembly of Nigeria.

Good Governance: of a high quality or standard in the act of governing

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Numerous studies in the area of legislative-executive relations have been undertaken by diverse researchers. Rockman in Momodu & Matudi, (2013) identifies some causes of executive-legislative conflict namely: pride and personality clash, executive dominance, ignorance of the constitution, functional overlapping and legislative performance of oversight function. Generally, the causes of executive-legislative feud are highlighted as follows: Struggle for power and domination; Conflict of roles; Limited conceptualization and understanding of their constitutional responsibilities; Highhandedness of the executive over the legislature; Greed and hypocrisy of members of the two organs; Lack of patriotism; Corruption; Poor leadership skills; and Poor conflict management skills.

This chapter comprehensively reviews previous related studies, observations, opinions, comments, ideas and knowledge that shed light on the crucial concepts under discussion. The essence is to situate this study in proper context and to generate a bond between related previous studies and this research work and as well identify the recounting drama and conflict between the presidency and the Senate. Thematic method is adopted in reviewing literature on political institutions, forms, model and operations of government and other issues that are germane to the relationship between the executive and the legislature in a presidential political system. Attempt is also made to conceptualize this study within a theoretical framework relevant to the field of study.

2.1 Conceptual Review

2.1.1 The Executive

The executive, according to Heywood (2007), is the irreducible core of government. Similarly, Laski (1992) sees the executive as occupying a very crucial position in the administration of a state. According to him, the executive in all democratic systems exists to, first and foremost, decide on the final choice of policy to be submitted to the legislative assembly for approval; secondly, it is its business to see to it that the public services fully adhere to that policy as intended by the legislature; and thirdly, it ensures that it delimits and also coordinates the activities of the different departments of state. It is on this score that Puke (2007) sees the executive as responsible for providing good and responsible governance for the state.

Edosa and Azelama (1995) also see the executive as the implementation organ of government. They, noted that from ages, making and enforcing binding rules and allocations through the executive have been the primary functions of government. They however, argued that while political structures have existed for centuries without separate agencies for making laws, state structures without executive organ will be hard to come by. This position is also supported by Heywood (2007) when he averred that political systems can operate without constitutions, assemblies, judiciaries, and even political parties, but cannot survive without an executive arm to formulate government policy and ensure that they are implemented. Similarly, Ranney (1975), in looking at the executive, noted that it is the arm of government that is basically concerned with the application of

the authoritative rules and policies of any society. It is the executive which formulates and then implements various policies.

Garner (1928), however, observed both the broad and collective perspective of the executive as he sees the executive organ as embracing the aggregate or totality of all the functionaries and agencies which are concerned with the execution of the will of the state as that will has been formulated and expressed in terms of law. By this definition, therefore, the executive comprehends the entire governmental organization. Thus tax collectors, inspectors, commissioners, policemen and perhaps the officers of the army and navy are a part of the executive organization.

Similarly Appadorai (1975) lends his credence to the broad perspective of the executive. He defined the executive as the execution of the will of the state. Similarly, Heywood (2007) analyzed the executive in this broad perspective. He defines the executive as the branch of government that is responsible for the execution or implementation of laws and policies made by the legislature. He sees the executive to extend from the head of government to the members of the enforcement agencies and includes both the ministers and the civil servants. He categorizes the executive into political executive and bureaucratic executive. This, according to him, highlights the difference between politicians and the civil servants, and more broadly, politics and administration. In his final analysis, he posits that more commonly, the term executive is now used in a narrower sense to describe the smaller body of decision-makers who take overall responsibility for the direction and coordination of government policy.

Puke (2007) also sees the executive from the broad perspective as he defines the executive as the arm of government responsible for implementing laws made by the legislature. While Puke (2007) defines the executive from the broad perspectives, he however equates the functions of the executive with that of the chief executive – the President. This makes the functions of the executive rather ambiguous considering the fact that the term “President” may not have the same responsibility in all political system. The President of India, for example, may not perform the same responsibility as the President of United States of America.

Though the term executive is understood both in broad and narrow senses, in the realm of the study of politics, its narrow meaning is applied. It is the executive head and his principal colleagues who run the machinery of government formulate national policy and see that it is properly implemented Grant, 1967; Abonyi, (2006). The foregoing analysis reveals that the executive initiates policies and programmes, executes them after they are passed into law by the assembly, and equally coordinates government policies to ensure that policy execution is done within the framework of the original plan and the legislature’s approved policy. It is because of these enormous responsibilities that Fasagba (2010) sees the executive as strategically important to the attainment of democratic goods.

The executives perform numerous of functions which are as follows:

According to Edosa and Azelama (1995), the executive organ performs quite extensive functions resulting from the growing complexity of the modern political system. These functions, they averred, are so broad to the extent that even the legislative

and judicial functions cannot be completely separated from the formulation and implementation of policies which the executive carries out. Abonyi (2006) also lends his credence to this view as he posits that there are many parts to executive powers. He noted that these powers appear to have increased in most political systems. According to him, The British Prime Minister is referred to as “Primus Inter pares” which means first among equals. In recent years, however, the Prime Minister of Great Britain has grown beyond the status of simply functioning as first among equals. Heywood (2007), in the same vein, affirms the enhanced and widening role of the executive as a result of the increasing responsibilities of the state in both the domestic and international realm. Abonyi (2006) further accounts for the factors responsible for the increasing powers of the executive. These include the growth of a disciplined party system especially in a parliamentary system, the considerable influence of the Chief Executive over the legislature, the executive’s control of his cabinet and his power to determine policy lines of the nation, national emergency and terrorism and the single nature of the executive position. Anifowose (2008), however, encapsulates the powers and functions of the executive into three; legislative, administrative and judicial functions.

(a). **Legislative Functions:** The executive performs legislative functions by recommending and initiating bills for the consideration of the legislature. In addition, through delegated power by the legislature, the executive can issue statutory orders and rules necessary to meet changing circumstances. Furthermore, in a parliamentary system, the executive performs the political function of summoning, proroguing and dissolving the legislatures Anifowose, (2008). The power of veto is also a legislative function of the executive most especially in the presidential system of government Abonyi, (2006).

(b). **Administrative Functions:** Under this function, the executive coordinates controls and administers the affairs of the state as well as directs, supervises and coordinates the implementation of law Abonyi, (2006). In addition, the executive appoints, controls, disciplines and removes the higher administrative officers. Such appointments, however, have to be confirmed by the legislative body. Another administrative function according to Anifowose (2008) is the control of military forces. By this function, the Chief executive is the supreme command of the army and has the power to declare war against external aggression and internal insurrection. He has the responsibility of declaring a state of emergency in the country. Another administrative function is the conduct of foreign affairs. Further to the administrative functions of the executive is the determination of foreign policies by the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive as well, represents the country in international assemblies and conferences and negotiates binding treaties with foreign countries. The treaties, however, may need the ratification of the legislature for their validity Abonyi, (2006).

(c). **Judicial Functions:** The judicial functions of the executive include issuing prerogative of mercy on offenders of the state. Such prerogative may include reducing a judicial sentence already passed on a person who had committed an offence, relieving a person from the legal consequences of crimes committed or delaying execution. The chief executive can also issue a proclamation of amnesty on specific class of persons thus freeing them from the legal consequences of their actions Abonyi, 2006; Anifowose, (2008).

2.1.2 The Legislature

The term “legislature” has been given different names across nations of the world. It is referred to as “Parliament” in Britain, “National Assembly” (the central legislature) in Nigeria, “Congress” in United States etc. Abonyi, (2006); Heywood, 2007; Lafenwa, (2009). As noted by Lafenwa (2009), however, there is no serious contention about its definition. The legislature is seen as occupying a key position in the machinery of government Heywood, (2007) and as the people’s branch with the singular purpose of articulating and expressing the collective will of the people Bernick&Bernick, 2008; Okoosi-Simbine, (2010). As an organ of government, it is the forum for the representation of the electorate Taiwo&Fajingbesi, (2004).

Awotokun (1998) conceptualizes the term legislature from a functional perspective. He defines the legislature as the branch of government made up of elected representatives or a constitutionally constituted assembly (body) of people whose duties among other things are to make laws, control executive activities and safeguard the interest of the people. Following this functional definition, Anyaegbunam (2000) conceptualizes the legislature as having the role of making, revising, amending and repealing laws for the advancement and well-being of the citizenry that it represents. Similarly, Lafenwa (2009) defines the legislature as an official body, usually chosen by election, with the power to make, change, and repeal laws; as well as powers to represent the constituent units and control government. Okoosi-Simbine (2010) also conceptualizes the legislature as the law-making, deliberative and policy influencing body working for the furtherance of democratic political system. He describes the legislature as the First Estate of the Realm, the realm of representation and the site of sovereignty, the only

expression of the will of the people. It follows from this analysis that the authority of the legislature is derived from the people and should be exercised according to the will of the people who they represent. This seems to be the position of Bogdanor (1991) when he affirms that the authority of the legislature as a political institution is derived from a claim that its members are representative of the political community, and decisions are collectively made according to complex procedures.

The strength and the state of the legislature have been identified as among the strongest predictors of a country's democratic development and survival (Okosi-Simbine, (2010); Poteete, 2010). As Lafenwa (1991) argues, the legislature is the central element of democracy. Democracy cannot exist in any country without a healthy and lively legislature (Blondel, (1973); Taiwo&Fajingbesi, 2004). As noted by Edosa and Azelama (1995) the nature of the legislature that is adopted determines whether a given political system is democratic or not. The centrality of the legislature to democracy is perhaps succinctly captured by Awotokun (1998) when he avers that the legislature is the pivot of modern democratic systems.

The Legislators perform various roles as a body and it is pertinent to mention such roles in this study. According to Heywood (2007), the role of the legislators varies from one country to another and from one system to another. But most importantly, the legislators irrespective of their names or place provide a link between government and the people. The role of the legislators in policy making is primarily to collate the views, interests, demands and problems of their constituents, harmonise and translate them to policy proposal for legislature. Such proposals are subject to the entire legislative processes after which it is presented to the president for ascent. Nigeria operates a bi-

cameral legislative system comprising the Senate and the House of Representative which is called the National Assembly.

The national legislative authority in South Africa is vested in parliament, which consists of two houses: the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. As in many countries, the National Assembly under the Constitution is a body elected to represent the people and to ensure government of the people by the people Kola-Olusanya, Omotayo & Fagbohun, (2011). As posited by Agba, Chukwurah & Achimugu (2014) Nigeria operates a bi-cameral legislative system comprising the Senate of 109 members and the House of Representative with 360 members. It is called the National Assembly and it is the highest elective law-making body of the nation. The national legislative authority in South Africa is vested in parliament, which consists of two houses: the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. As in many countries, the National Assembly under the Constitution is a body elected to represent the people and to ensure government of the people by the people. The legislative mandate, they went further are those vital duties or constitutional stated roles of the legislators which are to enact, repeal, revise and review existing laws and regulations for the development and wellbeing of the citizens.

The question however is, do the legislators perform their roles in policy process. Ojo and Omotola (2014) stated that the legislatures or parliaments are at the heart of governance and the national integrity system that citizens entrust with the great task of making sure that states which practice democracy and are aided by the constitution fulfil their functions in the interests of the citizens. They further stated that though there can be

government without the legislature, but there cannot be democracy without the legislature.

In summary according to Popoola (2016), the role of the legislators in policy making is primarily to collate the views, interests, demands and problems of their constituents, harmonise and translate them to policy proposal for legislature. Such proposals are subject to the entire legislative processes after which it is presented to the president for ascent.

Legislatures can ensure greater accountability and transparency in issues of implementing national or public policies as this is in line with their three (3) main functions which are – legislative, oversight, representative and investigate. However, the focus of this study is on the performance of oversight functions by the legislators.

2.1.3 The Senate

The Senate is the upper chamber of the Nigeria's bicameral legislature, the National Assembly. The National Assembly (popularly referred to as NASS) is the nation's highest legislature whose power is to make laws, is summarized in chapter one, section four of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended). It consists of 109 Senators: the 36 states are each divided into 3 Senatorial districts each electing one Senator; the Federal Capital Territory elects only one Senator.

The President of the Nigerian Senate is the presiding officer of the Senate of Nigeria, elected by its membership. The Senate President is second in line for succession to the Nigerian presidency, after the Vice President of Nigeria. The current President of the Senate is Ahmed Ibrahim Lawan.

2.1.4 Relationship between the Executive and Legislature

Constructive relationships between the executive and the legislative arms of government are essential to the effective maintenance of the constitution and the rule of law Holme, (2007). In recent years, however, the character of these relationships has changed significantly, both because of changes in governance and because of wider societal changes. Scholars have been expressing a wide variety of viewpoints on legislature-executive relations, about conflict and cooperation, whether one or the other dominates, and whether benefits or liabilities result from either. While some see conflict between the executive and legislature as a necessary and beneficial precondition to limiting and controlling government Aiyede, (2005), others view it as contributing to gridlock over major public policy decisions, thus making government ineffective Mbah, (2007); Dulani & Donge, (2006).

Aiyede and Isumonah (2002) explicated the imperative of interaction between the executive and the legislature when they posited that democratic consolidation can only occur in a context in which political institutions, especially the executive and legislature, are functional and interact in a way that reinforces confidence in the government and the process through which the offices of these government institutions are filled. In a similar dimension, Kopecky (2004) sees the relationship between the legislature and the executive as one of the key defining characteristics of the functioning of any political system. He noted the vital place that structural and legal factors hold in shaping the relationships between these two political institutions. This position is emphasized by Lijphart (2004) when he argued that the constitutional prerogatives vested in legislatures and the executive are most important because they define the broad framework for

interactions between the two powers. Similarly, Posner and Young (2007) averred that institutionalized rules are increasingly becoming relevant in regulating the behaviours of political actors, especially in Africa. This new development, to Fashagba (2010), is heartwarming because it aligns with the postulation that democracy entails an institutionalized arrangement for arriving at political decisions.

While the institutional view of executive-legislature may hold strong as a factor that shapes the relationship between the executive and the legislature, numerous informal rules and conventions, such as the customs concerning nomination of members to the cabinet following an election, are very important as well. Perhaps this is exemplified by Bernick and Bernick (2008) when they affirmed that such relationships are largely shaped by the attitudes and beliefs of the participants. They contend that these relationships are complex, depending on a range of formal and informal practices. Of course while formal texts of constitutional charters and law are very instrumental to the relationships that exist between the executive and the legislature, however, such relationship hinges on the informal conditions and practices that permit these norms to be implemented in practice.

2.1.5 Governance

Governance is a concept that is germane and relevant to corporate organisation; regional organisation; international organisations and institutions; among other groups and organisations across the globe. Etymologically speaking, the term “governance” is believed to have originated from the ancient Greek. Semantically, it is being used as a verb *kybernein* (infinitive) or *kybernao* (first person) which literally means ‘steering’, ‘guiding’, or ‘maneuvering a ship or a land-based vehicle’. Plato was reputed also to have

used the word ‘governance’ for the first time ever. Plato had used the word metaphorically to depict ‘the governing of men’ or ‘the governing of people’ see Campbell & Carayannis, (2013). Accordingly, the concept of governance in relation with “government” or “governs” has for long been around in political and academic discourse, depicting the tasks of carrying on governmental activities or assignment (cited in <http://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/governance-understand.html>). Governance to the World Bank (1993) is a system through which ‘power is exercised in the management of a country’s political, economic and social resources for development’. The emphasis here, according to the World Bank, is ‘the use of power to control political and economic resources of the nation’. Thus, governance is about securing political power in order to control economic power for the purpose of nation’s development.

Put differently, it is about using nation’s wealth for the benefit of the nation only. While the definition is true to the developed nations of the world, it is far from being true in the third world countries, especially in most African nations. Most African leaders cannot differentiate between private and public organisation; they run nation like their personal businesses and corner nation’s wealth for themselves and their cliques. To the IMF (2016) governance is seeing as ‘all aspects of the way a country is governed, its economic policies and regulatory framework’. It can be inferred from the definition that governance has to do with the totality of governmental actions and activities that are geared or directed toward making and realizing effective economic policies. The definition lays emphasis on ‘economic policies’ which is regarded as the backbone of the nation’s stability and development. Suffice to say a well-planned economic policy is a precondition for the survival, stability and development of the nation.

Government, as an arm of the state, is constitutionally bound to formulate and implement policies that will promote stability in the state. The ability of the government to accommodate public opinion in decision making, implement such policies with intermittent evaluations to ensure compliance is vital. It is equally ideal to guarantee the principle of rule of law objectively as this will, in no doubt, promote peace in the society.

Formulation and implementation of friendly policies will attract and encourage the citizens to participate both in economic and political activities freely within the confines of the state's policies. The smooth operation of economic and political activities will ensure social order. Good governance equally accommodates aspects of a civil society inclusion as stated earlier. Sharma, Sadana and Kaur (2013:64) observed that,

Good governance establishes the rule of law, enforces contracts and agreement between the individuals, maintains law and order, guarantees security to the people, economizes on cost and resources, protects the government and properly delivers services to the society. It also determines an optimal size of the government and makes best possible use of government resources.

Implementing a roadmap or adopting a framework on a people-oriented policy by the succeeding administration, though on a different political platform, is an element of good governance. Rather than implementing good policies initiated by an opposition party, political office holders often jettison the implementation and completion of such policies or projects. This accounts for a high rate of abandoned projects scattered in all the nooks and crannies of the Nigerian nation.

Governance requires all hands to be on deck. It entails the sum total of the ways in which individuals and government institutions manage their common affairs for the good of the state and the citizens.

2.1.6 Good Governance

The concept of good governance defies a precise single definition that commands universal acceptability. This has given rise to different meanings of the concept. The World Bank (2003) provided a simple definition of good governance and an extensive detailed analysis of its major components. Here the Bank contends that governance consists in the exercise of authority in the name of the people while good governance is doing so in ways that respect the integrity and needs of everyone within the state.

Good governance, according to this conception, is said to rest on two important core values, namely: inclusiveness and accountability. Madhav (2007) contends that good governance is tied to the ethical grounding of governance and must be evaluated with reference to specific norms and objectives as may be laid down. Ozigbo (2000) cited in Okpaga (2007) opined that before one discusses good governance, it is first necessary to examine the context of the term governance. According to him, governance denotes how people are ruled and how the affairs of the state are administered and regulated. Governance refers therefore, to how the politics of a nation is carried out. Public authority is expected to play an important role in creating conducive environment to enhance development. On this premise, Ansah (2007) viewed governance as encompassing a state's institutional and structural arrangements, decision-making process

and implementation capacity and the relationship between government officials and the public.

According to Anazodo, Igbokwe-Ibeto & Nkah (2015), politically, good governance refers the establishment of a representative and accountable government; good governance implies a strong and pluralistic civil society, where there is freedom of expression and association; good governance requires good institutions. Economically, good governance requires policies to promote broad based. Economically, good governance requires policies to promote broad-based economic growth, a dynamic private sector and social policies that will lead to poverty reduction Anazodo, Igbokwe-Ibeto & Nkah, (2015).

Governance can therefore, be good or bad depending on whether or not it has the basic ingredients of what makes a system acceptable to the generality of the people. The ingredients of good governance include freedom, accountability, and participation (Sen, 1990). The basic features of good governance include the conduct of an inclusive management wherein all the critical stakeholders are allowed to have a say in the decision-making process. Accordingly, good governance is the process through which a state's affairs are managed effectively in the areas of public accountability, financial accountability, administrative and political accountability, responsiveness and transparency, all of which must show in the interest of the governed and the leaders.

Good governance is categorized by contribution, rule of law transparency, receptiveness, fairness, inclusiveness, efficiency, productivity and responsibility. According to Doornbos (2001:94) state that good governance is used to invite judgment

about proper procedures, transparency, quality and process of decision making, and other such matters. In fact, it differentiates the actual self-understanding of the ruling groups from their real causal contribution to the prosperity or misery of their subjects Chabal&Simbine, (2000).

Actually, for Eyinla (2000:22), good governance means accountability, security of human rights and civil liberties, devolution of powers and respect for local autonomy, which all constitute a challenge to democratic regimes. Moreover, good governance has been linked to 'the extent which a government is perceived and accepted as legitimate, committed to improving the public welfare and responsive to the needs of its citizens, competent to assure law and order and deliver public services, able to create an enabling policy environment for productive activities; and equitable in its conduct "Landell-Mill and Seragelden, (2000:17).

The World Bank defines governance as a means where power is exercised in the management of country's economic and social resources for development and good governance for sound development management Potter, (2000). It encompasses a broad sphere of public sector management; accountability and legal framework for reforms; information and technology; legitimacy of government; competence of governments to formulate appropriate policies, make timely decisions; implement them effectively and deliver services Potter (2000:379).

Good governance is pivot to a successful democratization and development. The basic tenets of good governance must be well institutionalized and internalized, in the management of resources; the goal of development is assured. Davis (2003:1) assert that

an exercise for the management of national socio-economic development in an environment devoid of rancor, ill will, strife, struggle and disdain. It is a sine qua non to achieve oriented goal with an overriding need to frontier the welfare of government to the governed. Good governance in Nigeria entails stability as the propensity for political and economic plurality to enhance electorates' choice.

2.1.7 The Senate and Good Governance

The Nigerian Senate is the upper chamber of the National Assembly; the senate is comprised of 109 members, three from each of the 36 states of the federation and one from the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. A member of the Senate is referred to as senator or simply lawmaker.

Like every other law making body, the chief function of the Nigerian Senate is to make laws for the good and smooth running of the government of the Federation, by the provisions of section 88(2)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, the Senate is also vested to correct any flaws in regards of existing laws, the Senate are also charged with the responsibility to approve the appointments of judicial officers and approve and confirms others appointments by the executive arm of government..

The Senate owes Nigerians the fundamental duty to insist on good governance through qualitative legislation that can lead to socio-economic progress and prosperity of the country.

2.1.8 Legislation in Good Governance

In any democracy or civilian regime the legislature, the first estate of the realm, is supposed to play a very crucial role in ensuring good governance at the Centre and state levels through its oversight or monitoring functions. In a presidential system the legislature ensures that the minority has its say and the majority has its way. In Nigeria, the reverse has been the case since 1999 when the military vacated the political scene for a civilian regime.

The popularity of the legislature cannot be divorced from the wave of democratic growth across the continents. Indeed, if democracy is a system anchored on the informed and active participation of the people, the legislature is a vehicle for equal and wider representation Yaqub(2004). The existence of legislative institution comprises representatives of the people as a hallmark of democratic government from non-democratic ones.

The legislature differs in composition from one system of government to another as well as in their mode of representation. For instance, in a parliamentary system, members of the legislature are fused with members of the executive while in the presidential system; the legislature and executive are separated from other arms of government by different individuals to promote good governance. However, the legislators are elected in some countries like Nigeria, while in some other countries they are appointed. In spite of the differences in legislatures across the world, they have a common structural character that distinguishes them from other arms of government in a democracy. The common feature of legislator is their relation between members is not

that of authority and subordination but that of equality of members since they derive their authority from being representatives of the people Saliu (2004).

Legislatures play critical role in the promotion of good governance in democratic regimes. This role is primarily discharged through the exercise of the basic legislative functions of law making, representation and oversight. For instance, Johnson and Nakamura (1999) effective legislatures contribute to effective governance by performing important functions necessary to sustain democracy in complex and diverse societies.” Through their legislative function, parliaments are responsible for reviewing bills and enacting legislation, amendments and regulations which are needed to support reforms and national development programmes Sharkey, Dreger and Bhatia, (2006). Also, through their election, parliamentarians are the “trustees” of public mandate, given periodically through elections Marshall, (2003).

The legislature may exercise different functions from time to time depending on the political system; the two cardinal principles of legislatures in democratic a setting is law making and acting as watchdog on behalf of the people, without which democracy becomes messed up. Odinga (1994) noted that:

“If the constitution is the embodiment of the aspirations, ideals and collective will of the people, the parliament is the collective defender and watchdog of the aspiration, ideals and collective will of the people. If the constitution is the social contract between the people and government, the parliament is the advocate for the people and the arbiter of the national interest. Indeed, if the constitution is like the Bible, Quran and other religious treatises the covenant between the people and their leaders, the parliament is

the repository and protector of the oracles of the political covenant and social contract between the people and government.”

Consequently, for any democracy to grow, the legislature not only make laws for the good ordering of the society (including appropriation laws) but must as well ensure that such laws and others are not violated by other arms like the executive (Poteet, 2010). This it does this by acting as watch-dog over their policies through its oversight function. Most constitutions tend to document these two important functions of the legislature Taiwo & Fajingbesi, (2004). In other words, legislatures accomplish their tasks through men and women of proven integrity and good character that eschew temptations of falling to such issues legislated against. It is by this action that the legislature can be considered as a sub-unit of good governance and democratic sustenance.

2.1.9 Constitutional Provisions and Power Senate

The powers, duties and functions of Nigerian legislature are well spelt out in the 1999 constitution. In section 4 of the 1999 constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria provisions for the exercise of legislative powers by both the National Assembly and the States Houses of Assembly which powers must be exercised for purposes of achieving good governance, amongst others are made. Section 4 of 1999 constitution states:

“The legislative powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is vested in a National Assembly for which consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. . The National Assembly have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative list set out in Part 1 of the Second Schedule of the Constitution.

In addition the National Assembly has power to make laws with respect to the following matters:”

(a) any matter in the Concurrent Legislative list set out in the first column of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Constitution to the extent prescribed in the second column opposite thereto; and (b) any other matter with respect to which it is empowered to make laws in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. (5) If any Law enacted by the House of Assembly of a State is inconsistent with any laws validly made by the National Assembly, the law made by the National Assembly shall prevail, and that other Law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void. similarly (6) The legislative powers of a State of the Federation are vested in the House of Assembly of the State. (7) The House of Assembly of a State shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the State or any part thereof with respect to the following matters, that is to say- (a) any matter not included in the Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part I of the Second Schedule of the Constitution; (b) any matter included in the Concurrent legislative list set out in the first column of Part II of the Second Schedule to this Constitution to the extent prescribed in the second column opposite thereto; and (c) any other matter with respect to which it is empowered to make laws in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.”

Nigeria has a presidential system of government consisting of three distinct branches: the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. The legislative branch, the National Assembly, which is said to have been modelled after the United States Congress, is a bicameral body with a 360-member House of Representatives and a 109-member Senate. At the state level, this power is vested in house assemblies whose seats

range from twenty-four to forty members depending on the population of the particular state.

In addition to its legislative function, the National Assembly has broad oversight powers. The ultimate power in this regard, as in the US, rests in the National Assembly's power of the purse; except in instances where the Constitution itself specifies otherwise, spending any public funds requires the approval of the National Assembly. The Nigerian Constitution provides that “[n]o moneys shall be withdrawn from any public fund of the Federation, other than the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation, unless the issue of those moneys has been authorised by an Act of the National Assembly.”

The Constitution further provides that “no moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public fund of the Federation, except in the manner prescribed by the National Assembly.” It exercises this power in different ways, including vetting of proposals of the executive branch for funding various activities (mainly through the appropriations process); through audits of public accounts by the Auditor-General (who reports to the National Assembly); and through investigations of the conduct of persons, both natural and juridical, charged with implementation of laws or disbursement of any appropriated funds.

Also as in the US, the National Assembly, specifically the Senate, plays a role in filling key executive positions. Under the Constitution, staffing key executive positions, including the positions of Minister, Ambassador, and Commissioner, requires the advice and consent of the Senate. Further, the National Assembly exercises oversight over the power of the executive to enter into a treaty of any kind; before it can be implemented in

Nigeria, a treaty must first be enacted into law by the National Assembly. Also, a key oversight role of the National Assembly is the power to remove chief executives, including the President, the Vice-President, a Governor, and a Deputy Governor, for “gross misconduct.” In exercising this power, the Constitution requires some input from the judiciary.

Legislative-Executive relations is the interaction and total transaction that takes place between the Executive and the Legislative arms at a particular level of government where both institutions exist Bassey, (2000). Rockman (1983) identifies four major elements in legislative-executive relations namely, values and perspectives of governance; the major players, actions and institutions; and legislative control and supervision of executive behavior, which is referred to as oversight.

Anifowose (2008), views the executive as the arm of government responsible for applying the authoritative rules and policies of a society. The executive, he noted, by implementing the constitution, statutes, decrees, treaties, i.e., of the land gives effect to the will of the state. Furthermore, he noted the executive performs two principal roles which include ceremonial role and control of governmental administration. These two roles are performed by the executive as the Chief of the State and as Head of Government respectively.

He concluded that these two roles are performed by two distinct officials in a parliamentary system of government and by the same official in a presidential system of government. Ikoronye (2005) defines the executive as the organ of government which bears the responsibility of putting into effect the laws enacted by the legislature subject,

however, to the judgment and orders of the judiciary. Abonyi (2006) sees the Executive as that arm of government which is the teeth of action to the will of the state by carrying out or executing the law of the land as contained in the constitution, statutes, decrees, treaties, charters etc.

The functions of the legislature are done through the legislative process Okoosi-Simbine, (2010); Anyaegbunan, (2010); Omoleye, (2011). The examination of the extent to which the legislature is independent of executive's interference in its legislative process is therefore, an investigation of the extent to which the legislature is able to perform its constitutional functions without undue interference of the executive. Esebagbon (2005) and Anyaegbunam (2010) identify these legislative processes to include internal procedures and business of the House, debates and passage of bills, parliamentary finance, investigation process, scrutiny and approval of nominees for political positions, consideration and amendment and approval process of appropriation bills.

The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides for the separation of the personnel, powers and functions of the executive and the legislature. The separation of powers is understood to be a way of controlling the exercise of state power by fragmenting it among the three different institutions - the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. This separation of powers is the basic principle of the presidential system of government adopted in Nigeria since 1979 and enshrined in sections 4, 5 and 6 of the 1999 Constitution.

By the general principle of checks and balances, however, the powers are distinct but not wholly separate. Each of the powers designated a specific sphere of action

and there are situations when one power has a partial agency in the operation of another. The whole essence is to provide for balance of power among the organs of government. Accordingly, no one arm of government is superior to the other, neither is any subordinate to the other. Each organ is independent within its own sphere of influence. As noted by Campbell (2004), however, the principle of separation of powers is abrogated when a power is exercised by a branch of the government which possesses a different power. By the principle of separations of powers, the legislature is independent of the executive in performing its constitutionally specified functions and in conducting its internal affairs.

A good legislature accordingly, has to be relatively independent of the executive and participate in policy initiation rather than being a rubber stamp of executive proposals. Furthermore, one of the basic principles of a democratic system is the inherent right of the legislature to regulate its own affairs by determining the pattern and form of procedure to be followed in the conduct of legislative business Okoosi-Simbine, (2010).

Independence of the legislature from executive control is therefore, critical to the performance of the legislature's constitutional functions of citizens' representation through legislations and checking executive excesses, arbitrariness and abuse of governmental power. It is central to democratic governance. It is in the view of this that Section 60 and 101 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provide that the nation's legislative assemblies (National Assembly and State House of Assembly) shall have powers to regulate its own procedure, including the procedure for summoning and

recess of the House. It is therefore, not only a duty but also a right of the legislature to exercise its power independently without executive meddlesomeness.

On several occasions conflict between executive and legislature have been heating up the polity, to such an extent that Nigerians have feared that the Fourth Republic would be short-lived due to the recklessness and greed of some political elites. As Soyinka (2010) assert that Nigerians should rescue the nation from the cabal of reprobate gangsters, extortionists, and even political murderer.

Concepts in social and management sciences do not easily lend themselves to universally agreed definitions. This makes every definition perhaps only relevant within the parameters set for a given investigation. In the light of the foregoing, some concepts are central to the discourse in this paper. It is therefore necessary to examine them with a view to situate them within the context of our discourse.

Two of such concepts are executive and legislature. The executive run the machinery of government. It formulates the national policy and ensures that it is finely implemented. It is that branch of government that is charged with the implementation and enforcement of laws and policies and the administration of public affairs (see the New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy).

To Maduabuchi in Onyebuchi, (2013) and Andre (1994) while the executive as a form of government is responsible for policy formulation, evaluation and execution to realize set targets, the legislature enacts laws and make the same functional as instrument of cohesion in the society. Flowing from the above definitions, it is evident that all the levels of government, be it executive, legislature and judiciary, each of them may not

necessarily subsist without the other, meaning that each organ of government is mutually reinforcing and contingent upon the success or failure of the other.

Yet, legislatures all over the world have garnered influence that transcended the traditional role of rule-making or law-making. It is no longer “reduced to mere sound boards or mere rubber-stamps endorsing policies already framed by the executive (see for example, Jain, 1975:360). The executive is therefore seen as the appendage and embodiment of the legislative arm just as the judiciary as the third arm is seen as the arbiter of the two Ekhaton, (2003); Bade, (2000).

2.1.10 The Nexus Between True Federalism and Executive-Legislative Relationship in Nigeria.

The whole essence of the principle of federalism is about devolution of power from the centre to the state through to the local government level. To make the third tiers government relevant and for it to successfully bring government closer to the people, therefore what is good for the goose must be equally good for the gander. As envisioned by the 1999 constitution as amended the provision for separation of powers was intended to apply at the government at the grassroots.

Separation of power is essential for the good and smooth running of government for the benefit of the people. Accumulation or fusion of power in one arm of government has the tendency of leading to tyranny. The theory of separation of power could be interpreted as a different body of persons administering each arm of the government, i.e. the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. Each of these arms should be independent of and from the others in performing their constitutional assigned roles and function.

This principle advocated by Montesquieu was included in the constitution of the United States of America; which went a step further by providing checks and balances. The founding fathers of the United States believed in limited government. Government should be designed so that it would not become a threat to the liberty, since the founding fathers believed that power was a corrupting influence and that the concentration of power was dangerous. They believed in dividing governmental powers into separate bodies capable of checking each other in the event that any one branch poses a threat to liberty.

The checks and balances introduced in the American constitution were designed to ensure that the states are balanced against national government, the legislature is balanced against the executive, the judiciary is balanced against the President, Governors and Council Chairmen and the governed are balanced against the government. The logic of checks and balances was captured in the Federalist No 51:

“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. It may be a reflection of human nature, that such device should be necessary to control the abuses of government. The government itself is but the greatest of all reflection on human nature. If men were angels no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal control on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the difficulty lies in this, you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself (Jackson, 1995).”

2.1.11 The Principles of Checks and Balances

In spite of the magnificence of separation of power in governance, the of checks, which is actually intended to bail the citizens out of the recklessness of some power drunk executive or legislative body, must however be well balanced against the tyranny of any of the arms. The fact that absolute separation of powers is unattainable in any system makes the entrenchment of checks and balances imperatives. As a result, the organs of government can work harmoniously. This checks and balances is an arrangement whereby any arm of government serves as a check on another organ of government.

2.1.12 Causes and Challenges facing Executive-Legislative Relationship in Nigeria

Various factors can be identified as the causes of conflicts between the legislature and executive. For example, Rockman in Momodu & Matudi, (2013) identifies some causes of executive-legislative conflict namely: pride and personality clash, executive dominance, ignorance of the constitution, functional overlapping and legislative performance of oversight function. Generally, the causes of executive-legislative feud are highlighted as fellows: Struggle for power and domination; Conflict of roles; Limited conceptualization and understanding of their constitutional responsibilities; Highhandedness of the executive over the legislature; Greed and hypocrisy of members of the two organs; Lack of patriotism; Corruption; Poor leadership skills; and Poor conflict management skills.

The 1999 Constitution as amended explicitly states that the legislature shall make laws for the good governance of Nigeria; ditto the executive shall implement policies for

the good governance of Nigeria. It is however doubtful if these institutions have been able to conceptualize the intent and meaning of the spirit and letter of these words stated in the constitution. This is due to the fact that the quest for the achievement of good governance in Nigeria has continued to be a mirage, especially with the high incidence of poverty plaguing the citizens of the country as well as high level corruption among public officers in the government.

2.1.13 Selected cases under the 8th Senate

The recounting drama and conflict between the presidency and the senate in particular is the consequences of the leadership crisis of which the seed was planted by the rebellious legislators and how the party answered to the crisis. Not long after the dust had been settle on the leadership of National Assembly, the presidency commenced the prosecutions of senate president and his deputy, for allegedly forged the senate standing rules in their favour. Senator Bukola Saraki is been prosecuted separately at the Code of Conduct Tribunal for alleged falsification of declaration of asset form when he was about to leave office as the governor of Kwara State. At the time the senate president is under trial, the panama paper unravels Saraki properties in tax heaven; the presidency later dropped the forgery trial. The trial at the CCT disrupted seating the senators relocated to the CCT in solidarity with the senate president, as if it was the senate that is under prosecution.

In view of many, Senate President is been politically victimized by his party, and therefore, he must seeks help and support of PDP senators whose member he had helped to the post of deputy senate president. From the onset there was lack of coordination in

the presidency on the one hand, and between the presidency and national assembly on the other hand. There are contradictories policies, programmes and reports from ministries, department and agencies of government under the power and supervision of the presidency.

One of the issues that lead to the face-off between the executive and legislature is the discrepancies of what the executive presented as the 2016 appropriation bill and what the heads of some agencies defended at the appropriation committee. First, the lawmakers claimed that the executive had inflated the budget with unclear items injected; however, most of the MDAs claimed the budget the lawmakers were making reference to is difference from what they prepared for presentation by the president.

The discrepancies generated allegations and counter allegations, and the possibility that the presidency actually presented two versions of the budget. Again, that the budget was padded by cabals at presidency and in cooperation with the lawmakers may not be ruled-out. The house of representative investigated the allegation and subsequently suspended the chairman of the appropriation committee, Hon. Abdulmumin Jibrin, for 181 legislative days. Hon. Abdulmumin Jibrin had claimed that the speaker and other principal officers of the house inserted constituency projects into the budget. In the presidency, the head of budget office was sacked and replaced. There was also allegation of budget disappearing from the senate immediately it was presented by the president. The confusion that trails the 2016 budget is a reflection of lack of coherency, coordination and cooperation between and among the presidency, national assembly and APC. Even though the president constantly met with the senate president and speaker, it has not made their relation less confrontational and distractive.

The funding and execution of constituency projects have remained unresolved since 1999. The legislators had earlier fumed at the exclusion of the constituency projects in 2016 budget and threaten a showdown with the executive. After negotiating with the executive, the projects were inserted into the budget. The constituency projects is view by the legislators has their own effort to get the national cake to their constituents, and inability of any feasible project would negatively affect their ratings and re-election bid. The legislators were also not happy about their exclusion from the social welfare programmes of the present government. The senators wanted the programmes to be like a constituency projects that would get them directly involved. But, to the presidency, the legislators were only trying to hijack the programmes for their cronies and supporters and not for general goods as envisaged by the executive.

Similarly, another area of conflict between the executive and national assembly, particularly the senate is the rejection of summons by some government officials. First it was the secretary to the government of the federation (SGF), Babachir David Lawal that refused to appear before the senate. The summoning was sequence to the allegation of fraud at the Presidential Initiative of North East (PINE), the award of contract for grass clearing in refugee camps in the north east. The senate investigation unravels the fraud to the sum of N500m for grass clearing. Again the same award was contracted to the company in which the SGF have a substantial share which was against the rule of public procurement. In a move to give his refusal to appear a legal backing, he went to court but later rescinded and agreed to appear before the senate. The Senate forwarded its report to the president and order the SGF sacked. In his response, the president sent a letter exonerating Babachir David Lawal to the senate.

However, six (6) months after, the president ordered his suspension and constituted presidential panel headed by the Vice-President Prof Yemi Osinbajo to investigate corruption charges against the SGF along with the Director-General of National Intelligence Agency, Ayo Oke. Immediately after the swearing-in of president Buhari, change of leadership at EFCC was one of his priorities. Mr. Ibrahim Mustapha Magu though in acting capacity replaced, Ibrahim Lamorde, which many believe headed the EFCC of toothless bulldog. The EFCC act empowers the president to nominate the chairman of EFCC but subject to the approval of the senate. On the assumption of office, Mr. Ibrahim Magu embarks on anti-graft crusade, which could only be comparing to Mr. Nuhu Ribadu era in EFCC. Money was voluntarily returned, while EFCC operators engage in recovery of funds hidden in banks, apartments and stores.

Politicians, ex-cabinets members, paramilitary chiefs, military officers, serving and retired were investigated and in some cases properties and billions of naira were recovered. Nigerians especially those in support of the anti-corruption war of the present administration hailed the success recorded, even when the prosecution and conviction of the accused is a rare occurrence.

Still there's some sense of approval among the masses but the power interplay among forces in the presidency and the senate are hard bend not to see Mr. Ibrahim Mustapha Magu to cross the hurdle of a constitutional screening by the senate. The delay in forwarding the name of Ibrahim Magu was as a result of competing interest at the presidency. It took the bravery of Prof Yemi Osinbajo, the vice president then acting as president to forward the name of Ibrahim Magu as substantive EFCC chairman for senate confirmation. Unexpectedly, the senate rejected his confirmation due largely to a

damning report by Department of State Security Service (DSS) of him lacking integrity to continue as EFCC chairman.

President Buhari responded to the report by the senate of the rejection of Ibrahim Magu by ordering a separate underground background check on Mr. Ibrahim Mustapha Magu and no concrete evidence to implicate him of the allegation was found, therefore he was re-nominated and his name forwarded back to the senate. In another twist of events, D.S.S once again sent implicating report to the senate, therefore, the senate hinged on the report to reject the nomination of Mr. Ibrahim Mustapha Magu. The senate had capitalized on the power game and supremacy battle within the presidency. As one senator reiterated. We told the leadership of our party that political appointees of President Muhammadu Buhari were using the media against us, especially Mr. Ibrahim Mustapha Magu.

We stated to them that Mr. Ibrahim Mustapha Magu (case) was brought in dead; that what we did was to only conduct his funeral Baiyewu, (2017). EFCC had been investigating some senators of corruption especially ex-governors, there are some 17 ex-governors civilian/military governor/ administrators in the 8th senate Emmanuel, (2015).

Immediately after his first rejection, EFCC had accused the senate president of fraud in the Paris Club refund to states government. It was alleged that Sen. Bukola Saraki been a former chairman of the Nigerian Governors Forum (NGF) received the sum of \$3.5billion, the allegation the senate president denied. Despite Magu rejection by the senate twice, he still keeps his job as the acting chairman of EFCC which some senior lawyers have argued can remain in the job in an acting capacity. Some have suggested

that the presidency could forward Mr. Ibrahim Mustapha Magu for re-nomination until the senate confirms his appointment.

Other prominent aspect of frosty executive-legislative relationship was the confrontation between the senate and the Comptroller-General of custom Col.Hammed Ali. President Buhari had appointed the retired colonel as the head of the custom, raising eyebrow over the appropriateness of the post. While it is lawful for the head of custom to come outside the organization, the job title could have been an administrator of custom. Soon, the issue of uniform suffices, as retired military man; Col. Ali had said he wouldn't wear the custom uniform; because it would rub off his military prowess.

Custom had announced that it would embark on vehicle verification imported through land border and impound those without full duties. The senate summoned the CG and orders him to appear in appropriate uniform. The CG initially refused to turn-up and adamant not to appear.

He however appears before the senate in mufti and was turned back by the senators to appear in custom uniform. Later, the custom accused the senate of frustrating the new policy because it seized a SUV allegedly belonging to the senate president, the allegation the senate investigated and exonerate the senate president of any wrong doing.

In a move to inform the executive of the frustration of the senate, it had threatened not to take any further action on 2017 appropriation bill and the 27 Resident Electoral Commissioner nominees sent to it. In a swift reaction, the APC had caution the appointees to shed their sword and respect the senate. Subsequently, the senate proposed an amendment to the EFCC act that would transfer the power to appoint the chairman

from the executive to the national assembly. Again, in bid to usurp the power of the executive, there is another proposal to bring the code of conduct tribunal directly under the control and influence of the national assembly. The CCT has been placed at the presidency.

Even though there had been agitation in the past for the CCT to be taken to either the control of the judiciary or the legislature, however the present propose amendments are in bad faith. The power politics in the National Assembly took a new turn by the suspension of another member. Abdulmumin Jibrin had been removed and suspended as the chairman of the appropriation committee of the house of representative after the budget padding scandal of 2016. The second suspension was handed to Sen. Ali Ndume, by this time, had been removed as the senate leader in what looked like a palace coup. It was reported that Sen. Ali Ndume excused himself to observe the noon Islamic prayer and before he came back, power had changed hands. Sen. Saraki sacrifice Ndume for Sen. Lawan, his challenger for the senate presidency and the party's backed candidate. Sen. Lawan had been recommended to Senator Bukola Saraki as the Senate leader, but instead announced Ndume as the senate majority leader.

The reason(s) why Senator Bukola Saraki removed Senator Ali Ndume is clouded in obscurity. But it may not be unconnected to Ndume's constant support for President Buhari. In reacting to Magu rejection by the senate for the second time, Senator Ali Ndume had challenged the Sen. Bukola Sarki for lacking moral right to base Magu rejection on D.S.S investigation. In the floor of the senate, Senator Ali Ndume called for the investigation of Dino Melaye certificate scandal and the allegation by the custom of fake document to clear SUV allegedly belong to the senate president. Both allegations

were investigated by the senate committee on ethics; the report exonerated both Sen. Bukola Saraki and Dino Melaye. The committee recommended suspension of Ndume for 190 legislative days. There are similarities between the suspensions of Jibrin by house of representative and that of Senator Ali Ndume of the senate. First both men are members of APC the majority party in both chambers of National Assembly; second, they were allies of both senate president and speaker who defied their party.

According to (Chris and Gabriel) presents that despite the protracted acrimony between the 8th National Assembly and the Executive arm, the report indicated that it did well in passing 515 bills into law which includes the North East Development Commission, Not Too Young To Run, and others. Presentation of the report findings was made by former Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC, Prof Attahiru Jega, while the European Union supported YIAGA AFRICA on its findings. The report reads in part,

“The 8th National Assembly commenced its work amidst political tension, which arose from the manner in which its leadership emerged, contrary to the expectations (and directives?) of the All Progressives Congress, APC, hierarchy, and by extension, the presidency. U.S. trade deficit widens in August Full speech: Buhari’s remarks at Town Hall meeting with Nigerians in S/Africa “Consequently, the discharge of its constitutionally mandated responsibilities was circumscribed, and relatively marred, by a poor, if not an antagonistic working relationship between the legislature and the executive arms of government.

“This notwithstanding, the 8th National Assembly has received a favorable rating in the discharge of its responsibilities relative to the previous Assemblies, with regards to law-making and oversight functions. “For example, it has introduced and passed much more bills than the previous national legislatures, notwithstanding that a significant number of the bills have not been signed into law by the President (perhaps a result of the executive-legislative frictions. Similarly, a number of the 8th National Assembly’s key Senate and House) Committees have actively and vigorously conducted oversight functions, with positive and impactful results on governance and good order of the country” “Interestingly, 95.8 per cent of bills introduced during the 8th Assembly were private members’ bills. The dynamism in Bills sponsorship by legislators can be predicated on years of unbroken democratic governance and accumulation of institutional memory, which tremendously enhanced the law-making capacity of legislators in terms of expertise.

“During the four years of the 8th National Assembly, on average 541 bills were introduced and 129 bills were passed per year. This undoubtedly reflects high performance. Although a bill should, averagely, take less than six months to pass, our data reveals that out of the 515 bills passed in the 8th National Assembly, only 47 (9.1%) were passed within 50 days, while a whopping 271 (52.6%) took over 351 days to pass.” The report also highlighted some bills passed into law by the 8th National Assembly which include the Minimum Wage Bill; Not Too Young Run Bill; People With Disability Bill; Child Protection Bill; Local Government Autonomy Bill; Electoral Act Reform Bill; Grazing Bill; Public Procurement Bill, Basic Health Care Bill; Bill on Prompt Treatment of Accident Victims; Judicial System Protection Act; Whistle Blower Protection Bill;

Petroleum Industry Bill; Nigerian Financial Intelligence Bill; Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act; Abolition of Dichotomy Between HND and Degrees Bill; Agriculture Loan Bill; Nigerian Railway Authority Bill Public Treasury Bill; Police Act Amendment; Digital Rights Bill; Bill Against Sexual Harassment of Students in Tertiary Institutions; Bill on the removal of Age Limit in Employment; Federal Audit Commission Bill; Local Industry Bill; Peace Corps Bill; Bill on Test for HIV Status Before Marriage; and Girl-Child Marriage Bill. On oversight functions, the report scored the 8th Assembly ‘good’ on performance, “In all, therefore, the performance by the National Assembly Committees in the area of oversight was good. Overall, many of the committees met international benchmarks on requires the number of meetings and oversight activities (visits, hearings, referrals, investigations, etc). However, the report pointed out that there were challenges of funding, lack of committees’ expertise on technical issues, poor access to information during oversight functions, and others. Some of the recommendations made in the report include electronic voting on passing bills, adequate funding on oversight functions, advertising constituency projects, and others.

2.1.14 Managing Executive-Legislative Working Relationship for Good in Nigeria

We have identified some challenges facing executive-legislative relationship in its efforts to promote harmonious coexistence. On a prima facie basis, these challenges may appear huge and complex. Yet, they are surmountable. Natufe (2006) defines government as a collective body of elected and appointed institutions empowered to legislate and adjudicate for the good of the society.

However, Esman (1997) has argued that before governance can be considered good, government has got to be effective. It must first command the respect and allegiance of the people over whom it exercises governance and, must satisfy certain basic collective needs". Therefore, the ultimate objective of both the executive and the legislative has to be efficient and equitable delivery of public good to the citizens of a state and this is what is referred to as good governance and leadership.

2.2 Empirical Review

Study by Momodu and Matudi (2013) on the Implications of Executive-Legislative Conflicts on Good Governance in Nigeria reveal that several factors are responsible for the triggering-off of executive- legislative conflicts in Nigeria. These include: limited conceptualization and understanding of their constitutional responsibilities; struggle for power and superiority between legislature and executive; conflict of roles; display of personal ego between the leadership of executive and legislature; arbitrariness and domineering attitude of the executive over the legislature and greed and corruption between members of the two organs. The study also identified the negative impacts of executive-legislative conflicts on good governance in Nigeria. In determining the negative impact of executive-legislative conflict with an open-ended question, which states thus: "What do you consider to be the negative impact of legislative-executive conflict on good governance in Nigeria?" Only 86, representing (86%) of the respondents responded to the questions out of 100. Fourteen (14) respondents left the answer space blank, which represent (14%). The following negative impact was extracted: slowing down the pace of governance; creates suspicion and hostility between the two organs; encourages bad governance; public resources are

deployed by executive to create factions in the legislature, which undermines the unity of the legislature; it creates division between the executive and legislature; it also creates distraction to the process of governance; it creates tension and political instability and it encourages the culture of impunity and flagrant disregard to the rule of law among the political class.

Also, in determining the positive impact of executive-legislative conflict with an open-ended question, which states thus: “What do you consider to be the positive impact of legislative-executive conflict on good governance in Nigeria?” Only 72, representing (72%) of the respondents responded to the questions out of 100. Twenty eight (28) respondents left the answer space blank, which represent (28%).The following positive impact of executive-legislative conflict on good governance was extracted: it assist the legislature to constructively monitor and criticize the policies of the executive through their oversight function; it strengthens the democratic process; promotes good governance and responsible leadership; helps the legislature to check the recklessness of the executive; helps the legislature to set agenda for the executive in promoting good governance; promotes transparency and accountability in governance; assists the executive to be focused and committed to delivering good governance to the citizens and it helps the legislature to make efficient laws that will promote good governance. From this study, it can be depicted that indeed the executive have a two way relationship with the legislature and each play a significant role in the governance of a country.

In another similar study carried out by Oni (2013) on Legislature-Executive Relations in the Presidential System: A Study of Lagos and Ogun States, Nigeria, 1999-

2011. The research typology adopted for this study is the survey design with a well-structured in-depth interviews and questionnaires.

The study engaged both primary and secondary sources of data. The study reflect the percentage distribution of responses on the implication of the pattern of legislature-executive relations on decision making process of Lagos and Ogun State government, the result shows that 21% of the respondents in Lagos State strongly agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations between 1999 and 2011 adversely affected decision making process in the state, 48% merely agreed while 2% were undecided. On the other hand, 19% of the respondent disagreed and 10% strongly disagreed.

Similarly, in Ogun State, 47% of the respondents strongly agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Ogun State between 1999 and 2011 adversely affected decision making process in the state. 37% agreed while 1%, undecided. 6%however disagreed and 8% strongly disagreed. Observation of this analysis therefore indicates that majority of the respondents in Lagos State and in Ogun State agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in these states between 1999 and 2011 adversely affected decision making process in each of the two states.

Another implication of the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun states between 1999 and 2011 surveyed was delay in passage of appropriation bills. While 36% of the respondents strongly disagreed, 20% simply agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos State between 1999 and 2011 caused delays in the passage of appropriation bills in the state. 5% were undecided. 26% merely disagreed while 13% strongly disagreed.

In Ogun State on the other hand, 30% strongly agreed, while 37% merely agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations between 1999 and 2011 in the state caused delays in the passage of appropriation bills within that period. 1% however, was undecided. 11% on the other hand, disagreed while 12% strongly disagreed. This analysis indicate that majority of the respondents held that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos State and in Ogun State between 1999 and 2011 affected timely passage of appropriation bills. Also, the percentage distribution of respondents on the implication of the pattern of legislature-executive relations on legislative oversight in Lagos and Ogun States are presented.

The study indicates that in Lagos State, 36% of the respondents strongly agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos State hindered effective legislative oversight in the state. 20% merely agreed while 5%, undecided. 26% on the other hand, disagreed and 13%, strongly disagreed. In a similar dimension, 30% of the respondents in Ogun State strongly agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Ogun State hindered effective legislative oversight in the state. 37% merely agreed while 1%, undecided. 11% of the respondents however, disagreed and 13% strongly disagreed.

This illustration implies that majority of the respondents both in Lagos and Ogun States agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in each of the two states hindered effective legislative oversight in the states. Findings revealed that the continued interference by the executive in the legislative process of the House of Assemblies in both Lagos and Ogun States weakened the ability of the legislative bodies to effectively

perform their fundamental roles of citizens' representatives through legislation and oversight functions.

The cordial legislature- executive relationship in Lagos was propelled by overbearing executive with the ability, through access to the state resources for patronage politics, to perpetually subjugate the legislature under its whims and caprices and thus reduced it to a rubber stamp assembly for conferring the legitimacy required to function in a democratic environment. The cordial relationship however, became strained under a new administration following a resources distribution that was no longer mutually satisfactory to both parties.

The concomitance of the strain was legislature-executive gridlock that was based not on the legislative assertiveness of its representational role in governance. Findings also revealed the extent to which the politics of god fatherism, in an atmosphere of party politics that lack internal democracy, have exerted pressure and strains on the executive and the legislative institutions of governance, hence threatened the basic underlies of the presidential political system.

In a study conducted by Obi (2019), on the Executive- Legislative Relations: Explaining the Role of the Nigerian Political Environment on Performance of Legislative Oversight, The key objective assessed the role of the political environment on the performance of legislative oversight role by the Nigerian National Assembly. Qualitative data for the study was obtained through secondary sources, which was analyzed using content analysis. Since the issue of oversight involves the actions, struggles, bargaining and negotiations between two arms, the Game theory was used as the theoretical

framework for the study. The finding syndicate that the party system, the nature of politics, legislative capacity, political capacity and the character of the state have all conspired to adversely affect the ability of the National Assembly to perform its role in this direction. In the light of the above, the study recommended that there is need for serious changes in the party system, the nature of politics and character of the state, while both the legislative and political capacity of the Nigerian National Assembly need to be highly enhanced for it to be able to perform its oversight functions well.

Another study by Peter (2007) on Executive-legislative Relations in Nigeria: the Presidency and the National Assembly 1999-2006, examined the rancorous relationship between Obasanjo's Presidency and the National Assembly from 1999 to 2006. It argues that recent attention to executive-legislative relations has tended to focus on the perceived adverse impact of conflict between the executive and the legislature.

A variety of viewpoints have also been expressed both about conflict and cooperation. The extant literature has been suggesting that one or the other dominates, and benefits or liabilities result from either. Writers see conflict between the two branches as the unavoidable teething problems of the nascent democracy. The article contends that the rancorous relationship between the Executive and the National Assembly were based on personal interest and personality clashes and constitutional ambiguities in the 1999 constitution concerning the powers of the two organs. The article also examines the theoretical insight to this problem and comes to the conclusion that since Nigerian state came into existence albeit as peripheral variant of monopoly capitalism, this state shows all the interventionist character in addition to its unique form especially its underdevelopment and dependence, its authoritarianism and its low

autonomy. These situations have made the relationship between the two leading branches of government conflictive in nature.

Study by Abraham (2017) on Executive Legislative Relations and Good Governance in Nigeria: Historical and Current Reflections identified the struggle for supremacy, long history of military rule, selfish tendencies as some of the factors that pre-occupied both arms thereby making them unable to effectively deliver in the area of provision of good governance.

The study used the theory of separation of power on examining the relationship between the executive and legislature and the extent to which this relationship has promoted or hampered the provision of good governance in Nigeria. The study relied on the use of secondary data in its attempt to look at historical and current realities. The study recommended among others the strengthening of the justice system, building of national rather than parochial interests in elected official to mention a few as measures that will ensure that all actors in the governance process act responsibly.

Also in a different study conducted by Ngozi and Adebola (2019) which examined the Legislators and their Oversight Functions in Policy Implementation in Nigeria. The findings of the study revealed that members of the National Assembly believe they are performing their oversight function as it is expected and to this end, the legislators are in charge of the resources needed for the execution of governmental projects by any ministry of agency. But the study did not show how the relationship between the executive and legislature affect the governance of a country. The present study was designed to cover up those gaps.

From the foregoing analysis and examples cited, we can posit therefore that there exist a relationship between the Executive and the legislature and to this end, this study seeks to look at the 8th Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on how they linked with executives and what the outcome is on our government.

2.2.1 Research Hypotheses

The following hypotheses guided the study:

- (i) The relationship between the Senate and Executive has no significant impact on good governance.
- (ii) There is no significant influence of the Executive on the legislative processes.
- (iii) There is no significant relationship between lapses in Legislative process and good governance.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

The Theory of Separation of Power was adopted for this study.

The principle of separation of powers was first propounded by a Frenchman named, Bodin, in the 6th century. Another French philosopher called Baron Montesquieu wrote a book titled, “The Spirit of Laws” in 1748 which brought great popularity to the idea of separation of powers. Montesquieu stated that the rights and liberties of citizens can only be maintained if the three organs or powers of government are in the hands of different groups of persons.

The central tenet of the theory is that the three arms/organs of government, notably: legislature, executive and the judiciary should be separated from one another in both functions and composition of their respective members Bello Imam, (2005). Montesquieu (1748), opined that “there would be an end to everything, where the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise these three powers- that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and that of trying the case of individuals. Shortly after this, Blackstone (1765), an English jurist corroborated this opinion and shared similar views by asserting that, in all tyrannical governments, the supreme magistracy, the right of both making and forcing the law is vested in one and the same man, or in one and the same body of men, and whenever these two powers are united together, there can be no public liberty. The magistrate may enact tyrannical laws, and execute them in a tyrannical manner, since he has the right to dispense justice with all the power which he has the legislator thinks it is proper to give him. But, if the judicial power is joined with the legislative, the life, liberty, and property of the subject would be in the hand of arbitrary judges, whose decisions would be regulated only by their opinions, and by any fundamental principles of law, and at the same time which legislators may depart from, but judges bound to observe.

In consonance with the idea of separation of power, Klitgaard (1988) brings dimensions of institutional structure that he considers most critical in bearing on the opportunities for corruption: (i) the monopoly power of official; (ii) the degree of discretion that officials are permitted to exercise; and, (iii) the degree to which there are systems of institutional checks for accountability and transparency in an institution. Thus,

when officials have monopoly over goods provided by the government, we must have incidence of dominations.

Monopoly power could exist for the legal reasons that certain officials are the only ones charged with performing a certain task. Whether the officials will be in a favourable position to dominate depends not only on the monopoly they have over that particular activity, but also upon the rules and regulations regarding the distribution of government goods. Thus, the greater the amount of discretion given to an agent, the more the opportunities for an agent to give favourable interpretations of government rules and regulations to business; I exchange for illegal payments.

In applying this theory to the relationship between the executives and the senate in Nigeria, with much administrative discretion bestowed on the public administrations or bureaucrats, where they are expected to use their discretions or initiatives, invariably infuse the three powers I one, hence, they tend to abuse the legally established modus operandi of executing their mandate, with so much impunity. This situation turns service delivery for the citizens to personal parochial aggrandizement or benefits which impunity. Ipso facto, public officials tend to become dilatory in their official transaction of public service organisation.

CHAPTER THREE

Methodology

3.1 Research Design

This study adopted survey research methodology design to examine the effect of relationship between the executive and legislative arms in the 8th Senate on good governance. Survey is utmost fitting method for behavioral research and hence this study, its build on the relationship between the executive and legislative arm in the 8th Senate on good governance. Survey was carefully considered the most appropriate. This design was used in collecting data, form targeted populations. Analysis of collected data through statistical instrument and interpretations was carried out.

3.2 Sources of Data

The study engaged both primary and secondary sources of data. The required primary data were collected directly from the sample under study through the use of a well-structured questionnaire. The secondary data, on the other hand, were gathered from government gazettes, Legislative Hansards, bulletin, magazines, journals, newspapers, articles, and relevant textbooks, materials from internet, term papers and archival documents on the subject area.

3.3 Study Location

The Study was carried out in Abuja the capital city of Nigeria located in the centre of the country within the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). It is pertinent to undergo the study in Abuja since the topic of dissertation revolves around the effect of the relationship between the executive arm of government and the Nigeria Senate from 2015-

2019. It made it easier for the researcher to have access to right respondents to enable the findings justifiable.

3.4 Population of the Study

The executive and the legislature (8th Senate) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria constitute the study population. The executive consists of the President, the Deputy President and the Cabinet ministers at national level, and Members of the Executive Councils (MECs). d. The Ministers are appointed by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Senators are 109 while Ministers are 37 so the population of this study is 146. In this regard, the study examines the relationship between the Executive and the 8th Senate on good governance.

3.5 Sampling Techniques /Sample Size

For the purpose of this study purposive sampling was used to study the 109 senators from the 8th Assembly and 37 ministers from 2015-2019 as such the total population for this study is 146. Due to the large number of the respondents the researcher purposively chose 100 from the population as the sample size (n) for the study. Hence respondents 60 came from senators in the 8th Assembly and 40 ministers from 2015-2019 respectively

Therefore the sample size for this study is fixed at 100 representing the Senate and the Executives. Boomsma (1982) evaluated the robustness of CFA solutions for small Numbers (25 to 400). He found that the percentage of proper solutions, accuracy of parameter estimates, sampling variability in parameter estimates, and the appropriateness of the times two test statistic were all favorably influenced by having larger Numbers.

Based on this research, Boomsma offered his widely cited recommendation that N should be at least 100, but also noted that Numbers of 200 or more may be desirable in some circumstances.

This sampling technique was found suitable and reliable for this research thus because of lack of an adequate sample frame which would have been useful in other sampling techniques.

This sample size was arrived at due to the need to obtain a manageable sample size for the study.

3.6 Survey Instrument

The instrument used by the researcher in collecting data is the questionnaire. The questionnaire was found suitable as it was used to ascertain fact, opinions, attitudes, beliefs, ideas, practices and other demographic information from the respondents. The questionnaire contains Part A which revealed the demography of the respondents while part B provided options to the research questions formulated for the study.

3.7 Administration of Questionnaire

Questionnaires were administered to Legislators, Executives, Civil Servants, Politicians and Electorate. This was done physically in order to ensure proper distribution as administering the questionnaire can either mar the accurate result of the study if administered wrongly or make the research a success if administered rightly.

The questionnaire was administered randomly between the Legislature and the Executives.

3.8 Method of Data Analysis

The data collected from the respondents was analyzed using simple percentages, in tabular form with brief textual explanations to aid understanding and comprehension. Data collected was analyzed using frequency tables, percentage, simple descriptive data analysis and chi-square statistical analysis. Chi-squares is a non-parametric statistical tool which can be conveniently used in testing hypothesis as stated below:

$$\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(o - e)^2}{e}$$

Where χ^2 = Chi-square

E = Summation

O = Observation frequency

e = Expected frequency

CHAPTER FOUR

Data Presentation and Analysis

4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Background Information:

Table 4.1.1: Gender of Respondents

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE (%)
Male	105	57
Female	78	43
Total	183	100

Source: Field survey, 2020

Table 4.1.1 above indicates that out of **183** respondents sampled, **105** respondents representing **57%** are males while **78** respondents representing **43%** of the entire respondents are females. This reveals that majority of the respondents are **males**.

Table 4.1.2: Marital Status of Respondents

RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE (%)
Married	120	66
Single	50	27
Divorced	7	4
Widow	6	3
Total	183	100

Source: Field survey, 2020

As shown in table 4.1.2 above, it reveals that out of **183** respondents sampled, **120** respondents representing **66 %** of the entire respondents are married, **50** respondents, representing **27%** of the entire respondents are single, 7 respondent representing **4%** of the entire respondents are divorced while **6** respondents representing **3%** of the entire respondents. From the above, it is obvious that majority of the respondents sampled are **married**.

Table 4.1.3: Age Bracket of Respondents

RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE (%)
18-30	10	5
31-40	13	8
41-50	50	27
51- 60	90	49
61 and above	20	11
Total	183	100

Source: Field survey, 2020

From the above table **4.1.3**, it implies that the age bracket of **18-30** years were **10** respondents representing **5%** of the total respondents sampled, **13** respondents, representing **8%** of the entire respondents are between the age range of **31-40** years, those within the age of **41-50** years were **50** respondents representing **27%** of the total respondents, **90** respondents, representing **49%** falls within the age group of **51-60** years while the remaining **20** respondents, representing **11%** of the entire population are within **61** years and above. The review shows that most of the respondents fall under the age bracket of **51-60** years.

Table 4.1.4: Educational Status of Respondents

RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE (%)
Postgraduates	60	33
B.Sc./HND	95	52
Diploma/OND	12	7
School Cert.	10	5
Other	6	3
Total	183	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

Table 4.1.4 above shows that out of **183** respondents sampled, **60** respondents representing **33%** of the entire respondents are with Postgraduates Certificates, **95** respondents representing **52%** of the entire respondents are with University Degree/HND qualifications, **12** respondents representing **7%** of the entire respondents are with Diploma/OND, **10** respondents representing **5%** of the entire respondents are with secondary school certificate, while the remaining **6** respondent representing **3%** of the entire respondents are with other qualifications. The study shows that majority of the respondents sampled possessed **University Degrees/ HND**.

Table 4.1.5: Social Status of Respondents

RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE (%)
Executive	30	16
Legislator	90	49
Civil Servants	28	15
Politician	15	8
Electorates	20	11
Total	183	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

Table 4.1.5 above highlights the social status of the respondents which out of **183** respondents sampled, **30** respondents representing **16%** of the entire respondents are Executives, **90** respondents representing **49%** of the entire respondents are Legislators, **28** respondents, representing **15%** of the entire respondents are Civil Servants , **15** respondents representing **8%** of the entire respondents are Politician, while the remaining **20** respondents representing **11%** of the entire respondents are Electorates. The study shows that majority of the respondents sampled are **Legislators**.

Table 4.1.6: Respondents awareness of the relationship between the executive and legislative

RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE (%)
Yes	165	90
No	18	10
Total	183	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

As presented in table 4.1.6 above, it indicates that out **183** respondents sampled to reveal the level of awareness of the respondents about the relationship between the executive and legislative, **165** respondents representing **90%** of the entire respondents is aware about the relationship between the executive and legislative, while **18** respondents, representing **10%** of the entire respondents are not aware. From the review, it shows that majority of the respondents are aware of the relationship between the executive and legislative arm of government.

Table 4.1.7: Relationship between the executive and legislative

RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE (%)
Cordial	98	53
Not Cordial	80	44
I don't know	5	3
Total	183	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

Table 4.1.7 above denotes the knowledge of the respondents on the relationship between the executive and legislative. Out of **183** respondents sampled, **98** respondents representing **53%** of the entire respondents believed the relationship between the executive and legislative is cordial, **80** respondents representing **44%** of the entire respondents felt the relationship is not cordial, while **5** respondents representing **3%** do not know what their relationship looks like. From the review it is apparent that majority of the respondents agreed with **cordial relationship between the executive and legislative arm of government**

Table 4.1.8: factors influencing the relationship between the executive and legislative.

RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE (%)
Conflict of roles	10	5
Corruption between the executive and legislators	13	8
Executive dominance	8	4
Struggle for power and domination	10	5
Religion & ethnic sentiment	2	1
Oversight function of the legislature	5	3
Poor leadership skills	3	1
Lack of patriotism	13	8
All of the above	99	54
I don't know	20	11
Total	183	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

Table 4.1.8 above reveals the factors influencing the relationship between the executive and legislative arm of government, **10** respondents representing **5%** of the entire respondents sees the factor as **conflict of roles**, **13** respondents representing **8%** of the entire respondents sees it as

Corruption between the executive and legislators, 8 respondents representing 4% of the entire respondents think is **Executive dominance**, 10 respondents representing 5% of the entire respondents sees the factor as **Struggle for power and domination** , 2 respondents representing 1% of the entire respondents think its **Religion & ethnic sentiment**, 5 respondents representing 3% of the entire respondents agrees with **Oversight function of the legislature**,3 respondents representing 1% of the entire respondents think is **Poor leadership skills**, 13 respondents representing 8% of the entire respondents sees the factor as **Lack of patriotism**, 99 respondents representing 54% of the entire respondents agrees with **All of the Above** while the remaining 20 respondents representing 11% of the entire respondents **do not know** what the factor. The study reveals that majority of the respondents sampled **agreed** with all the factors mentioned in the questionnaire.

Table 4.1.9: executive interference in the legislative processes

RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE (%)
Yes	126	69
No	57	31
Total	183	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

As presented in table 4.9 above, analysis of the interference of the executive in legislative process of the 8th Assembly, 126 respondents representing 69% of the entire respondents feels the executive should interfere with legislative process, while 57 respondents representing 31% of the entire respondents **do not agree**.

Table 4.1.10: Ways Executive Interfered in the Legislative Processes of the 8th Assembly

RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE (%)
Approval of Appropriation Bill	30	16
Adoption of Rules and Procedure	15	8
Debate and Passage of Bills	12	7
Investigation Process	20	11
Screening and approval of nominees for political position in the country	99	54
Motion and resolution of the Senate	7	4
Total	183	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

In rating the ways executive interfered in the legislative processes , table **4.1.10** above reveals that **30** respondents representing **16%** of the entire respondents think the executive interfered in legislative process through **Approval of Appropriation Bill**, **15** respondents representing **8%** of the entire respondents think is through **Adoption of Rules and Procedure**, **12** respondents representing **7%** think is through **Debate and Passage of Bills**, **20** respondents representing

11% of the entire respondents agrees that it's through **Investigation Process**, **99** respondents representing **54%** of the entire respondents think is through **Screening and approval of nominees for political position in the country** , while the remaining **7** respondents representing **4%** of the entire respondents accept that it is through **Motion and resolution of the Senate**. The study shows that majority of the respondents **agreed** that the executives interfered in the legislative processes through **Screening and approval of nominees for political position in the country**.

Table 4.1.11: Rating the relationship between the executive and legislative arms of government in the 8th Senate

RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE (%)
Positive	70	38
Negative	102	56
I don't know	11	6
Total	183	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

As shown in the above table, **70** respondents representing **38%** of the entire respondents agreed that the executive and legislative arms of the government in the 8th Senate had a **positive** relationship, **102** respondents representing **56%** think their relationship is **negative** while **11** respondents representing **6%** **do not know** how to rate the relationship between the executive and legislative arms of government in the 8th Senate.

Table 4.1.12: positive executive/legislative relationship effects on the good governance of the country:

RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
It enhances the democratic process	40	57
Helps the legislature to check the excesses of the executive	5	7
Encourages transparency and accountability in governance	9	13
It helps the legislature to make effective laws that will promote good governance	4	6
Support the executive to be attentive and dedicated to delivering good governance to the Citizens	4	6
It assists the legislature to constructively monitor and criticize the policies of the executive through their oversight function	8	11
Total	70	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

Out of 70 respondents that agreed that the executives and legislative arm of government in the 8th Senate had a **positive** relationship in **Table 4.1.11**, the above table reveals that **40** respondents representing **57%** of the entire respondents accept that the positive relationship **enhances the democratic process**, **5** respondents representing **7%** think it **Helps the legislature to check the excesses of the executive**, **9** respondents representing **13%** of the entire respondents agreed that it **Encourages transparency and accountability in governance**, **4** respondents representing **6%** of the entire respondents felt **It helps the legislature to make effective laws that will promote good governance**, **4** respondents representing **6%** of the entire respondents agreed that it **Support the executive to be attentive and dedicated to delivering good governance to the citizens** while **8** respondents representing **11%** of the entire respondents established that **It assists the legislature to constructively monitor and criticize the policies of the executive through their oversight function.**

Table 4.1.13: Negative executive/legislative relationship effects on the good governance of the country:

RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE (%)
Gives rooms to bad governance	18	18
It produces political instability	10	10
It builds disunity between the executive and legislature	15	15
It creates interference with the process of governance	15	15
Slows down the pace of governance	38	37
it undermines unity within the legislature	6	5
Total	102	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

Out of **102** respondents that agreed that the executives and legislative arm of government in the 8th Senate had a **negative** relationship in the above **Table 4.1.11**, it reveals that **18** respondents representing **18%** of the entire respondents accept that the negative relationship **Gives rooms to bad governance**, **10** respondents representing **10%** think it **produces political instability**, **15** respondents representing **15%** of the entire respondents agreed that it **builds disunity between**

the executive and legislature, 15 respondents representing 15% think it creates interference with the process of governance, 38 respondents representing 37% accepts it Slows down the pace of governance while the remaining 6 respondent representing 5% agrees it undermines unity within the legislature

4.2 Analysis of Research Question

Firstly, the level of respondents sampled was 183 which is good to justify the study.

Three Research Questions guided this study; these questions were framed in the research instrument (questionnaire) therefore the analysis of research questions are presented below:

The first research question stated thus: **What are the factors influencing the executive and legislative conflict in Nigeria?** Responses from **table 4.1.8** provided answers to this research question. Majority of the respondents sampled, agreed with all the factors mentioned in the questionnaire such as **conflict of roles, corruption between the executive and legislators, Executive dominance, struggle for power and domination , religion & ethnic sentiment, poor leadership skills and lack of patriotism.**

However, the second research question stated that: **How does the executive interference in the legislative process affect development in Nigerian?** Responses from **table 4.1.9** and **table 4.1.10** answered this question. In analyzing the interference of the executive in legislative process of the 8th Assembly, **126** respondents representing **69%** of the entire respondents feels the executive should interfere with legislative process, while **57** respondents representing **31%** of the entire respondents **do not agree**. However, In rating the ways executive interfered in the legislative processes , **table 4.1.10** reveals that **30** respondents representing **16%** of the entire respondents think the executive interfered in legislative process through **Approval of**

Appropriation Bill, 15 respondents representing 8% of the entire respondents think is through **Adoption of Rules and Procedure**, 12 respondents representing 7% think is through **Debate and Passage of Bills**, 20 respondents representing 11% of the entire respondents agrees that it's through **Investigation Process**, 99 respondents representing 54% of the entire respondents think is through **Screening and approval of nominees for political position in the country** , while the remaining 7 respondents representing 4% of the entire respondents accept that it is through **Motion and resolution of the Senate**. The study shows that majority of the respondents agreed that the executives interfered in the legislative processes through **Screening and approval of nominees for political position in the country**.

Lastly the third research question stated thus: **What are the effects of the executive and legislative conflict in the development of the country** From the responses in **table 4.1.11, 4.1.12 and 4.1.13** represents the positive and negative effects of the executive and legislative conflict in the development of the country. Out of 70 respondents that agreed that the executives and legislative arm of government in the 8th Senate had a **positive** relationship in **Table 4.1.11**, table 4.1.12 reveals that 40 respondents representing 57% of the entire respondents accept that the positive relationship **enhances the democratic process**, 5 respondents representing 7% think it **Helps the legislature to check the excesses of the executive**, 9 respondents representing 13% of the entire respondents agreed that it **Encourages transparency and accountability in governance**, 4 respondents representing 6% of the entire respondents felt **It helps the legislature to make effective laws that will promote good governance**, , 4 respondents representing 6% of the entire respondents agreed that it **Support the executive to be attentive and dedicated to delivering good governance to the citizens** while 8 respondents representing 11% of the entire respondents established that **It assists the legislature to**

constructively monitor and criticize the policies of the executive through their oversight function. Also, Out of **102** respondents that agreed that the executives and legislative arm of government in the 8th Senate had a **negative** relationship in **Table 4.1.11**, table 4.1.13 reveals that **18** respondents representing **18%** of the entire respondents accept that the negative relationship **Gives rooms to bad governance**, **10** respondents representing **10%** think it **produces political instability**, **15** respondents representing **15%** of the entire respondents agreed that it **builds disunity between the executive and legislature**, **15** respondents representing **15%** think it **creates interference with the process of governance**, **38** respondents representing **37%** accepts it **Slows down the pace of governance** while the remaining **6** respondent representing **5%** agrees it **undermines unity within the legislature**

From this study, it is deductible that there exist some effects on relationship between the executive and legislative arm in the 8th Senate on good governance

4.3 Test of Hypothesis

Three hypotheses are chosen to be tested in the study. The researcher uses statistical testing technique to test the probability level, either to accept or reject the null or alternative hypotheses, so tested.

The researcher will reject the null hypotheses (H0) and accept the alternative hypotheses (H2) if the calculated chi-square is greater than the tested value.

Formular:

$$x^2 = \frac{E (o - e)^2}{e}$$

Where x^2 = Chi-square

E O = Observed frequency

E = Expected frequency

Σ = Summation of all items

X = Calculated chi-square value.

The probability level or significant level for this testing is 0.05.

Hypothesis 1

H₁: The relationship between the 8th Senate and Executive has no significant impact on good governance. Using table 7

Responses	O	E	O-e	(O-e) ²	O-(O-e) ²
Cordial	98	61	37	1369	22.44
Not Cordial	80	61	19	361	5.91
I don't know	5	61	-56	3136	51.40
Total	183				79.71

Therefore, calculated chi-square (χ^2) = 79.71

Degree of freedom (df) = Row- column = 5 – 1=4.

Level of significance = 0.05 while table value = 9.488

Decision rule: the calculated frequency is greater than table value; 79.71 > 9.488.

Therefore, we reject null hypothesis and accept alternate hypothesis which states that the Senate and Executive has no significant impact on good governance.

Hypothesis 2

H₂: There is no significant influence of the Executive on the legislative processes. Using table 11

Responses	O	E	O-e	(O-e) ²	O-(O-e) ²
Positive	70	61	9	81	1.32
Negative	102	61	41	1681	27.55
I don't know	11	61	-50	2500	40.98
Total	183				69.85

Therefore, calculated chi-square (χ^2) = 69.85

Degree of freedom (df) = Row- column = 5 – 1=4.

Level of significance = 0.05 while table value = 9.488

Decision rule: the calculated frequency is greater than table value; $69.85 > 9.488$.

Therefore, we reject null hypothesis and accept alternate hypothesis which states that there is no significant influence of the Executive on the legislative processes.

Hypothesis 3

H₃: There is no significant relationship between lapses in Legislative process and good governance. Using table 13

Responses	O	E	O-e	(O-e) ²	O-(O-e) ² 2
Gives rooms to bad governance	18	17	1	1	0.05
It produces political instability	10	17	-7	49	2.88
It builds disunity between the executive and legislature	15	17	-2	4	0.23
It creates interference with the process of governance	15	17	-2	4	0.23
Slows down the pace of governance	38	17	21	441	25.94
it undermines unity within the legislature	6	17	-11	121	7.11
Total	102				36.44

Therefore, calculated chi-square (χ^2) = 36.44

Degree of freedom (df) = Row- column = 5 – 1=4.

Level of significance = 0.05 while table value = 9.488

Decision rule: the calculated frequency is greater than table value; 36.44 > 9.488.

Therefore, we reject null hypothesis and accept alternate hypothesis which states that there is no significant relationship between lapses in Legislative process and good governance.

4.4 Discussion of Findings

The analysis illustrates whether the actual results from the answers acquired from the questionnaire are in sync with the views presumed in the stated hypothesis or not.

From the prior discussion, it was shown that executive-legislative conflicts have been happening at the Federal levels since the inauguration of the Fourth Republic and that it has been having weakening impact on the development of good governance at the Federal and State levels. From the analysis carried out so far in this study, it was found out that several factors are responsible for the triggering-off of executive legislative conflicts in Nigeria.

These include: conflict of roles, corruption between the executive and legislators, Executive dominance, struggle for power and domination, religion & ethnic sentiment, poor leadership skills and lack of patriotism. These findings are in tandem with the observation of Rockman (1983), who identifies the causes of executive-legislative conflict to include: pride and personality clash, executive dominance, ignorance of the constitution, functional overlapping and legislative performance of oversight function.

The study also identified the negative impacts of executive-legislative conflicts on good governance in Nigeria. These include: Gives rooms to bad governance, It produces political instability, It builds disunity between the executive and legislature It creates interference with the process of governance, Slows down the pace of governance, it undermines unity within the legislature. These findings are also consistent with the observation of Nwosu (1998) and Ajayi (2007), with regards to the Nigerian case, they

argue that the previous republics collapsed largely not because the constitutions were bad. Rather, the demise of these republics resulted from the inability of the governing elites to comply with the basic rules of the game.

The study acknowledged the positive impact of executive-legislative conflicts on good governance in Nigeria. These are: It enhances the democratic process, Helps the legislature to check the excesses of the executive, Encourages transparency and accountability in governance, It helps the legislature to make effective laws that will promote good governance, Support the executive to be attentive and dedicated to delivering good governance to the citizens, It assists the legislature to constructively monitor and criticize the policies of the executive through their oversight function.

These findings are in line with the work of Hellriegel & Slocum (2004), who found out that “conflict leads to improved problem solving or decision- making, to the stimulation of creativity and may increase the productivity”, of institutions and organisations. For instance, Nwokeoma (2011) indicates that the ability of any democratic government to deliver the concrete benefits of good governance to the citizens is determined by the smooth functioning of the executive, judiciary and legislative arms of government. He therefore argues that this assumption reinforces the theory of separation of the powers of the different arms of government to prevent arbitrariness, tyranny and recklessness.

What is important therefore, is that the executive and legislature must understand that they are both important institutions, having power to make or unmake the smooth functioning of the democratic process, as such they must collaborate together to work for the good governance of the state.

Lastly, comparing the hypotheses and the results from the respondents there is no full relationship between the two there for results from the hypothesis run differs in some aspect of the sampled respondents views. It is deducible from the findings from both the questionnaire and that of the hypothesis tested that there is no accord between the two as the responses from the questionnaire revealed significant relationship between the executive and legislature while results from the hypothesis shows no significant relationship between the executive and the legislature.

CHAPTER FIVE

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 SUMMARY

This study was to ascertain the Executive and Legislative Relationship with its effect on good governance in Nigeria. The research covers the period between 2015 and 2019 of the 8th National Assembly in the history of Nigeria's democracy.

The Study gave detailed introduction on the relationship between executive and the legislature, how it is imperative to examine if their nature of relationship foster good governance and how the study will be of immense benefits to stakeholders in the political landscape of Nigeria and also members of both the executive and the legislature in Nigeria.

Literature review was used in building up this research work. It also provided the theoretical frame work for the study. Thus, the theory of separation of power was adopted for the study.

The issue of research methodology starting from; the research design which is survey, source of data are both primary and secondary, the study location is Abuja, 183 is the population of study, purposive sampling technique was used, the research method of investigating was based on the copies of questionnaire that were distributed to the selected respondents, and the data collected from the respondents was analyzed using simple percentages, in tabular form with brief textual explanations to aid understanding and comprehension..

Data presentation was done through frequency tables, percentage, simple descriptive data analysis and chi-square statistical analysis and each table were properly interpreted according to the data computed therein. The chapter therefore contained 16 tables which gave a detailed and quantified explanatory of data gathered in the coverage of study.

A brief summary of the whole work done ended with conclusion and recommendation.

5.2 CONCLUSION

The issue of executive-legislative relationship as addressed by scholars and social commentators has been supported with an attempt at clarifying the rational surrounding the issue of executive and legislative arms of government.

From the findings of this study it shows that conflict of roles, corruption between the executive and legislators, Executive dominance, struggle for power and domination, religion & ethnic sentiment, poor leadership skills and lack of patriotism are major causes of conflicts between the executive-legislature.

The inevitable conclusion from the foregoing analysis of the effect of legislative-executive and good governance in Nigeria National Assembly reveals that the legislature has not lived to the expectation of Nigerians in terms of making laws that will guarantee good governance likewise the executive interference in the legislative processes.

The search for a harmonious relationship between the executive and the legislature is a continuous one for in every human relationship, there must always be reasons for disagreements. What however makes for the success of a government is its

understanding of the rules necessary to prevent such debilitating conflicts and the means of resolution of conflicts when they arise in order to avoid a breakdown of governance. In this vein there is need for Enlightenment Programmes on Executive-Legislature Relations; Collaboration between the Executive and the Legislature; Observation of the Principle of Separation of Powers; Effective Oversight Function and Independence of the Legislature and its Leadership.

In addition, searchlight was also beamed on the theoretical framework for a better understanding of the concepts under interrogation. Thus, separation of power theory has been examined as postulated by scholars. An attempt has also been made to establish the nexus between true federalism and executive-legislature relationship in Nigeria.

This work acknowledges the potential of the legislature as a veritable instrument of national development. It argues that the fundamental purpose for which the legislature was created is to promote national development. In practical terms, the effectiveness of the legislature in this regard depends, on some specific variables which include the election process, party control of the legislators, and the caliber of the membership of the legislature. The historical progression in the character of the legislature and the Nigerian experience are used to illustrate the views of the work. The work recommends among others the need for moral politicians.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the analysis and findings of this study, the following recommendations are made to progress the relations between the executive and legislature as well as improving their service delivery capacity for good governance.

1. The relationship between the Senate and Executive has no significant impact on good governance. Therefore, the Executive and Legislature must understand that they are both important institutions, having power to make or unmake the smooth functioning of the democratic process, as such they must collaborate together to work for the good governance of the nation. Both the legislature and executive should deem it necessary to always adopt dialogue in resolving their differences instead of resulting to outright confrontation that usually deadlocks the policy making and implementation process.
2. There is no full relationship between the executive and legislative arms of government; they should both get on regular capacity building on basic conflict resolution and management training with a view to improving their conflict management skills as well as their problem solving skills.
3. The Legislature should be insulated from the negative impacts of the executive; These include: Gives rooms to bad governance, it produces political instability, It builds disunity between the executive and legislature It creates interference with the process of governance, Slows down the pace of governance, it undermines unity within the legislature, this influence, mainly is counter-productive as it is intended to wave the minds of the legislators from the serious dealings of law-making.
4. Both the executive and legislature ought to value and firmly adhere to the tenets of the principles of separation of powers. The study acknowledged the positive impact of executive-legislative conflicts on good governance in Nigeria. These are: It enhances the democratic process, Helps the legislature to check the excesses of the executive, Encourages transparency and accountability in governance, It helps the

legislature to make effective laws that will promote good governance, Support the executive to be attentive and dedicated to delivering good governance to the citizens, It assists the legislature to constructively monitor and criticize the policies of the executive through their oversight function.

5. The legislature should evolve different techniques and strategies to strengthen its oversight function, which would enable it to conduct regular and in depth checks and monitoring on the activities of the executives- ministries, departments and agencies. This will put the executive on its toes and it would also make it more service oriented, accountable and transparent.
6. The legislature should enact legislations that would empower it to sanction the excesses and actions of the executive and MDAs that are inimical to good governance. It must also ensure through its oversight function that the executive and its ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) delivers on their policy mandates to the society at large.

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Appendix 1

LIST OF SENATORS 2015-2019

No	NAME	STATE/CONSTITUEN CY	PARTY	REMARKS (TREMS)
1	Enyinnaya Abaribe Harcourt (M)	Abia South	PDP	3 rd
2	Mao Ohuabunwa Arukwe (M)	Abia North	PDP	1 st
3	Orji, Theodore Ahamefule (M)	AbiaCentyral	PDP	1 st
4	Ahmadu Abubakar M. (M)	Adamawa South	APC	1 st
5	Binta Masi Garba (F)	Adamawa North	APC	1 st
6	Abdulaziz Murtala Nyako (M)	Adamawa Central	APC	1 st
7	Godswill Obo tAkpabio (M)	Akwa-Ibom North West	PDP	1 st
8	NelsonAsuquoEffiong (M)	Akwa-Ibom South	PDP	1 st
9	Bassey Albert Akpan(M)	AkwaI-bom North East	PDP	1 st
10	Andy Uba Emmmanuel (M)	Anambra South	APC	2 nd
11	Stella Oduah Adaeze (F)	Anambra North	PDP	1 st
12	Victor Umeh Cukwuunoyelum (M)	Anambra Central	APGA	1 st
13	Suleiman Nazif Mohammed (M)	Bauchi North	APC	1 st
14	Ali MallamWakili (M)	Bauchi South	APC	1 st
15	Isah Hamma Misau (M)	Bauchi Central	APC	1 st
16	Ben Murray-Bruce (M)	Bayelsa East	PDP	1 st
17	Emmanuel Paulker (M)	Bayelsa Central	PDP	3 rd

18	Ogola Foster (M)	Bayelsa West	PDP	1 st
19	Barnabas Gemade (M)	Benue North East	APC	2 nd
20	George Akume (M)	Benue North West	APC	3 rd
21	David B. Mark (M)	Benue South	PDP	5 th
22	Baba Kaka Garbai (M)	Borno Central	APC	1 st
23	Abubakar Kyari (M)	Borno North	APC	1 st
24	Mohammed Ali Ndume (M)	Borno South	APC	2 nd
25	Gershom Bassey Henry (M)	Cross River South	PDP	1 st
26	John Owan Enoh (M)	Cross River Central	APC	1 st
27	Rose Okoji Oko(F)	Cross River North	PDP	1 st
28	OvieOmo-Agege (M)	Delta Central	APC	1 st
29	James Ebiowou Manager (M)	Delta South	PDP	4 th
30	Peter Nwaboshi(M)	Delta North	PDP	1 st
31	Samuel OminyiEgwu(M)	Ebonyi North	PDP	1 st
32	Ogba Joseph Obinna (M)	Ebonyi Central	PDP	1 st
33	Sunday Oji Ogbuoji (M)	Ebonyi South	PDP	2 nd
34	Matthew Urhohide (M)	Edo South	PDP	1 st
35	Francis Alimikhena (M)	Edo North	APC	1 st
36	Clifford Ordia (M)	Edo Central	PDP	1 st
37	Fatimat Raji-Rasaki (F)	Ekiti Central	PDP	1 st
38	Duro Faseyi Samuel (M)	Ekiti North	PDP	1 st
39	Biodun Christine Olujimi (F)	Ekiti South	PDP	1 st
40	UtaziChukwukaGodfrey (M)	Enugu North	PDP	1 st

41	Gilbert IEmekaNnaji (M)	Enugu East	PDP	2 nd
42	Ike Ekweremadu (M)	Enugu West	PDP	4 th
43	Philip Tanimu Aduda (M)	FCT	PDP	2 nd
44	Joshua M. Lidani (M)	Gombe South	PDP	2 nd
45	Mohammed Danjuma Goje (M)	Gome Central	APC	2 nd
46	Bayero Usman Nafada (M)	Gomebe North	APC	1 st
47	Samuel Anyawu Nnaemeka (M)	Imo East	PDP	1 st
48	Uwajumogu C. Benjamin (M)	Imo North	APC	1 st
49	GoodHope O. Uzodinma (M)	Imo West	PDP	1 st
50	Abubakar Abudullahi Gumel (M)	Jigawa North-West	APC	1 st
51	Sabo Mohammed (M)	Jigawa South-West	APC	1 st
52	Muhammad Ubali Shittu (M)	Jigawa North-East	APC	1 st
53	Suleiman Hunkuyi K.N (M)	Kaduna North	APC	1 st
54	ShehuSani (M)	Kaduna Central	APC	1 st
55	DanjumaLa'ah (M)	Kaduna South	APC	1 st
56	RabiuMusa Kwankwaso (M)	Kano Central	APC	1 st
57	Barau . I. Jibrin (M)	Kano North	APC	1 st
58	Kabiru I. Gaya (M)	Kano South	APC	2 nd
59	Abu Ibrahim (M)	Katsina South	APC	4 th
60	Mustapha Bukar (M)	Katsina North	APC	1 st
61	UmaruI.Kurfi (M)	Katsina Central	APC	1 st
62	Adamu Aliero Mohammed (M)	Kebbi Central	APC	2 nd
63	Yahaya Abdullahi (M)	Kebbi North	APC	1 st

64	BalaIbn Na'allah (M)	Kebbi South	APC	1 st
65	Ahmed OgembeSalau (M)	Kogi Central	PDP	1 st
66	Dino Melaye (M)	Kogi West	APC	1 st
67	Alli Atta Aidoko (M)	Kogi East	PDP	2 nd
68	Abubakar Bukola Saraki (M)	Kwara Central	APC	2 nd
69	Mohammed Shaaba Lafiagi (M)	Kwara North	APC	2 nd
70	Ibrahim Rafiu Adebayo (M)	Kwara South	APC	1 st
71	Oluremi Shade Tinubu (F)	Lagos Central	APC	2 nd
72	Adeola Olamilekan Solomon (M)	Lagos West	APC	1 st
73	Gbenga Bareehu Ashafa (M)	Lagos East	APC	2 nd
74	Adamu Abdullahi (M)	Nasarawa West	APC	2 nd
75	Suleiman Adokwe (M)	Nasarawa South	PDP	2 nd
76	Philip Aruwa Gyunka (M)	Nasarawa North	PDP	1 st
77	David Umaru Male (M)	Niger East	APC	2 nd
78	Aliyu Sabi Abdullahi (M)	Niger North	APC	1 st
79	Sani Mohammed (M)	Niger South	APC	1 st
80	Gbolahan Dada (M)	Ogun West	APC	1 st
81	Olanrewaju Tejuoso (M)	Ogun Central	APC	1 st
82	Buruji Kashamu (M)	Ogun East	PDP	1 st
83	Tayo Alasoadura (M)	Ondo Central	APC	1 st
84	Yele Omogunwa (M)	Ondo South	APC	1 st
85	Robert Ajayi Boroffice (M)	Ondo North	APC	2 nd
86	Olusola Adeyeye (M)	Osun Central	APC	2 nd

87	Omoworare Babajide (M)	Osun East	APC	2 nd
88	Ademola Adeleke (M)	Osun West	PDP	1 st
89	Buhari Abdulfatai (M)	Oyo North	APC	1 st
90	Monsurat Sunmonu(F)	Oyo Central	APC	1 st
91	Adesoji Akanbi (M)	Oyo South	APC	1 st
92	Jonah Jang (M)	Plateau North	PDP	1 st
93	Joshua Chibi Dariye (M)	Plateau Central	APC	2 nd
94	Jeremiah Useni Timbut (M)	Plateau South	PDP	1 st
95	Ideozu O. ThankGod (M)	Rivers East	PDP	1 st
96	Magnus NgeiAbe (M)	Rivers South East	APC	2 nd
97	Uchendu I. Andrew (M)	Rivers West	APC	1 st
98	AliyuWamakko (M)	Sokoto North	APC	1 st
99	Ibrahim Abdullahi Gobir (M)	Sokoto East	APC	2 nd
100	Abdullahi Ibrahim Danbaba (M)	Sokoto South	APC	1 st
101	Yusuf Abubakar Yusuf (M)	Taraba Central	APC	1 st
102	Shuaibu Lau (M)	Taraba North	PDP	1 st
103	Emmanuel Bwacha (M)	Taraba South	PDP	2 nd
104	Ahmed Ibrahim Lawan (M)	Yobe North	APC	3 rd
105	Bukar Abba Ibrahim (M)	Yobe East	APC	3 rd
106	Mohammed Hassan (M)	Yobe South	PDP	1 st
107	Kabir M. Garba (M)	Zamfara Central	APC	2 nd
108	TijjaniYahaya Kaura (M)	Zamfara North	APC	1 st
109	Ahmad Rufai Sani (M)	Zamfara West	APC	3 rd

<u>Summary (Term)</u>	<u>Gender</u>	<u>Party (Summary)</u>
5 th Term- 1	M- 102	APC - 66
4 th Term- 3	F- 7	PDP - 42
3 rd Term- 7		APGA - 1
2 nd Term- 27		TOTAL- 109
1 st Term- 71		

Appendix 2

LIST OF MINISTERS 2015-2019

No	Names	States	Portfolio
1	Chris Ngige (M)	Anambra	Minister of Labour & Employment
2	KayodeFayemi (M)	Ekiti	Minister of Solid Minerals
3	Rotimi Amaechi (M)	Rivers	Minister of Transportation
4	Babatunde Fashola (M)	Lagos	Minister of Power, Works and Housing
5	Abdulrahman Dambazau (M)	Kano	Minister of Interior
6	Aisha Alhassan (F)	Taraba	Minister of Women Affairs
7	Ogbonaya Onu (M)	Ebonyi	Minister of Science and Technology
	Kemi Adeosun (F)	Ogun	Minister of Finance
9	Abubakar Malami (M)	Kebbi	Minister of Justice & Attorney-General
10	SenHadiSirika (M)	Katsina	Minister of State, Aviation
11	Barr. Adebayo Shittu (M)	Oyo	Minister of Communication
12	Suleiman Adamu (M)	Jigawa	Minister of Water Resources
13	Solomon Dalong (M)	Plateau	Minister for Youth and Sports
14	Ibe Kachikwu (M)	Delta	Minister of State, Petroleum
15	Osagie Ehanire (M)	Edo	Minister of State, Health
16	Audu Ogbeh (M)	Benue	Minister of Agriculture
17	Udo Udo Udoma (M)	Akwabom	Minister of Budget & National Planning
18	Lai Mohammed (M)	Kwara	Minister of Information
19	Amina Mohammed (F)	Gombe	Minister of Environment
20	Ibrahim Usman Jibril (M)	Nasarawa	Minister of State, Environment
21	Hajia Khadija Bukar Ibrahim (M)	Yobe	Minister of State, Foreign Affairs
22	Cladius Omoleye Daramola (M)	Ondo	Minister of State, Niger Delta
23	Prof Anthony Onwuka (M)	Imo	Minister of State,

			Education
24	Geoffrey Onyema (M)	Enugu	Minister of Foreign Affairs
25	Dan Ali (M)	Zamfara	Minister of Defence
26	Barr James Ocholi (M)	Kogi	Minister of State, Labour & Employment
27	Zainab Ahmed (F)	Kaduna	Minister of State Budget and National Planning
28	Okechukwu Enelamah (M)	Abia	Minister of Trade, Investment & Industry
29	Muhammadu Bello (M)	Adamawa	Minister of Federal Capital Territory
30	Mustapha Baba Shehuri (M)	Bornu	Minister of State, Power
31	Aisha Abubakar (M)	Sokoto	Minister of State, Trade & Investment
32	Heineken Lokpobiri (M)	Bayelsa	Minister of State, Agriculture
33	Adamu Adamu (M)	Bauchi	Minister of Education
34	Isaac Adewole (M)	Osun	Minister of Health
35	Abubakar Bawa Bwari (M)	Niger	Minister of State, Solid Minerals
36	Pastor Usani Uguru (M)	Cross River	Minister of Niger Delta
37	President Muhammadu Buhari (M)	Kastina	Minister of Petroleum

Summary:

Gender

Male: 33

Female: 4

Total: 37

Therefore, 109 Distinguished Senators

37 Honorable Ministers

Grand Total: 146

APPENDIX 3

The **NILDS-UNIBEN** PG School,
National Institute for Legislative and
Democratic Studies (**NILDS**),
No. 18 Danube Street, Off **IBB** Way,
Maitama Abuja
June, 2020.

Dear Respondent,

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE

I am a postgraduate Student undertaking a full time Master's in Parliamentary Administration programme of the University of Benin.

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the completion of the programme. I am carrying out a research on **Effect of the Relationship Between the Executive and Legislative Arm in the 8th Senate on Good Governance.**

As a result of the above, you are requested to fill the attached questionnaire. This is purely academic exercise and the confidentiality of information you give is assured.

Thank you.

ABAH EMMANUEL SUNDAY

PG/NILDS/1818044

Please kindly tick () in the appropriate box

SECTION A.

1. **Sex:**

(a) Male () (b) Female ()

2. **Marital Status:**

(a) Married () (b) Single () (c) Divorced () (d) Widow ()

3. **Age:**

(a) 18-30 () (b) 31- 40 () (c) 41-50 () (d) ()

(e) 60 and above ()

4. **Educational status:**

(a) Postgraduates () (b) B.sc/HND () (c) Diploma/OND ()

(d) School Cert. () (e) Other ()

5. **Social status:**

(a) Executive () (b) Legislator () (c) Civil servants ()

(d) Politician () (e) Electorates

SECTION B

6. Are you familiar with the relationship between the executive and legislative arms of government?

(a) YES () (b) NO ()

7. If **YES** is your answer to question 6 above, how would you describe their relationship?

(a) Cordial () (b) Not Cordial () (c) I don't know ()

8. What are the factors influencing the relationship between the executive and legislative arms of government?

(a) Conflict of roles []

(b) Corruption between the Executive and Legislators []

(C) Executive dominance []

(d) Struggle for power and domination []

(e) Religion & ethnic sentiment []

(f) Oversight function of the Legislature []

(g) Poor leadership skills []

(h) Lack of patriotism []

(i) All of the above []

(j) I don't know []

9. Do you think the executive should interfere in the legislative processes?

(a) Yes () (b) No. ()

10. In what ways have the executive interfered in the legislative processes of the 8th Assembly?

(a) Approval of Appropriation Bill []

(b) Adoption of Rules and Procedure []

(c) Debate and Passage of Bills []

(d) Investigation Process []

- (e) Screening and approval of nominees for political position in the country []
- (f) Motion and resolution of the Senate []
11. How would you rate the effect of the relationship between the executive and legislative arms of government in the 8th Senate?
- (a) Positive () (b) Negative () (c) I don't know ()
12. If your answer is 'POSITIVE' in question 11 above, what are the positive effects it has on good governance of the country?
- (a) it enhances the democratic process []
- (b) Helps the legislature to check the excesses of the executive []
- (c) Encourages transparency and accountability in governance []
- (d) It helps the legislature to make effective laws that will promote good governance []
- (e) Support the executive to be attentive and dedicated to delivering good governance to the citizens []
- (f) It assists the legislative to constructively monitor and criticize the policies of the executive through their oversight function. []
13. If your answer is 'NEGATIVE' in question 11 above, What are the negative effects it has on the good governance of the country?
- (a) Gives rooms to bad governance []
- (b) It produces political instability []
- (c) It builds disunity between the executive and legislature []

- (d) It creates interference with the process of governance []
- (e) Slows down the pace of governance []
- (f) It undermines unity within the legislature []