Suspension of Legislators: Legislative Autonomy and the Limits of Suspension Powers

Abstract

The suspension of legislators by their respective legislatures remain one of the most contested intersections between legislative autonomy and democratic accountability. While the power to discipline members is inherent in the legislature’s right to regulate its internal affairs, its exercise often raises profound constitutional and democratic questions. This article examines the delicate balance between legislative autonomy, democratic representation, and the limits of suspension powers with particular reference to the Nigerian experience and comparative commonwealth jurisdictions. Drawing from constitutional provisions, judicial precedents, and normative democratic theory, the paper argues that the suspension power, although justifiable on grounds such as maintenance of order, protection of institutional integrity, and enforcement of ethical standards, must operate within the boundaries of proportionality, fairness, and respect for the right of representation. Unchecked autonomy, the paper contends, produces a paradox of the legislature’s quest to preserve its independence which may, in practice, subvert the very principles of representation and accountability upon which its legitimacy rests. The paper finds that the true measure of a legislature’s autonomy lies not in its immunity from review, but in its fidelity to democratic values, constitutional restraint, and the enduring right of the people to be represented through their elected voices. The paper recommends clearer procedural safeguards, and codified disciplinary frameworks in order to prevent abuse