dc.description.abstract | One of the key functions of modern legislatures is oversight scrutiny of the executive branch to ensure accountability and transparency in the management of resources and implementation of laws passed by parliament. However, empirical studies revealed some lacuna regarding enforcement mechanisms and the attitude of legislators towards the whole concept of legislative oversight. It is in light of the above that this study examined the Effects of Constitutional Provisions and Political Will on Legislative Oversight of the 9th Senate Committee of Defence between 2019-2023. The specific objectives of the study are as follows: to examine the extent to which the provisions of the Nigerian constitution affect the oversight performance of the 9th Senate Committee on defence; and to determine the extent to which the political will of the Senate Committee on defence affect the performance of their oversight functions in the period under review. The research finding is expected to inform policy recommendations and reforms to strengthen legislative oversight mechanisms, promote positive attitude and integrity amongst legislators, thereby fostering good governance in the country. It would also help international donors and civil society organizations to know which areas to channel their resources in their effort to support the Nigerian legislature to become more effective overseers.
To achieve research objective one, the study utilized the Partisan Theory to show that committees are creation of political parties which maintain control over policies, hence members of the majority party are willing to collude and subvert constitutional provisions on oversight and disregard the wishes of minority parties. This is in agreement with the preponderant views of scholars in the empirical review that the drafters of the Nigerian constitution have made sufficient provisions for the regulation and control of the executive, but due to partisanship, the lawmakers have refused to harness the provisions of the constitution for intended purposes. For research objective two, the study employed the Principal-Agent Theory to explain the conflict that often arise when one person or group, known as the ‘agent’ is representing another person or group, known as the ‘principal’. The theory pre-supposes a relationship between a principal and an agent. The legislative body is elected by the citizens to supervise the implementation of policies that have direct bearing on their lives. In doing this, the legislature tries to strike a balance between their personal interests and that of their constituents. This was supported by views of scholars in the empirical review to the effect that since the willingness by legislators to enforce oversight may be tied to the expectation of deriving material or symbolic benefits, legislators would probably be willing to muster the political will to be effective overseers if they are sure of electoral return or pecuniary gains. Stratified sampling technique was adopted to divide the total population into strata, while purposive sampling method was used to allow the researcher exercise discretion in selecting competent respondents for each stratum. 412 sample was drawn from a total population of 6,153 with 397 questionnaires returned, representing 96% response rate.
Findings for research objective one revealed that although the Constitution has provided the legal foundation for legislative oversight, weak enforcement mechanisms have limited the effectiveness of oversight in the period under review. For research objective two, it was found that legislative oversight was weakened by lack of political will resulting in less rigorous scrutiny of defence activities.
For the findings of research objective one, it was recommended that a comprehensive review of the constitutional provisions related to legislative oversight be carried out to strengthen enforcement mechanisms. For research objective two, the study recommended the promotion of positive attitude and integrity amongst legislators to engender accountability and good governance. The study concluded that a combination of strong constitutional provisions and political will are critical to a robust and effective legislative oversight. | en_US |