| dc.description.abstract | The legitimacy of the Nigerian democratic process is currently strained by two persistent challenges: the monetization of the ballot (vote buying) and the inconsistent performance of electoral technology (BVAS and IReV). Thus, the obstinate incidences of vote buying and recurrent failures in electronic result transmission (e-transmission) have eroded public trust in electoral outcomes and fueled widespread skepticism about democratic governance. Despite progressive provisions in the Electoral Act 2022 that target modernizing electoral processes, gaps in enforcement, legal clarity, and implementation have left space for electoral malpractice. Though the current Act provide a foundation, it lacks the enforcement "teeth" and technical specificity required to ensure stability. This brief proposes legislative amendments to the Electoral Act aimed at criminalizing the logistics of bribery and codifying technical standards to restore public trust in the lead-up to the 2027 general elections. To move beyond symbolic bans, the National Assembly must target the infrastructure of vote buying. Secondly, technology should be a mandatory bridge to transparency, not an optional convenience This brief therefore recommends as follows:
i. Combating Vote Buying (The Financial Filter): • Intensify actions in establishing an Electoral Offences Commission: Separate the prosecution of bribery from INEC’s administrative duties to ensure specialized, rapid legal action. • The "Radius Rule" Enforcement: Amend the Electoral Act to mandate a strict 100 meter "No-Finance Zone" around polling units, where possession of large sums of unexplained cash or digital payment vouchers is a strict liability offense. • Whistleblower Protections: Legislate financial incentives and anonymity for citizens who report high-level vote-buying coordinators.
ii. Enhancing Technological Integrity (The Digital Guardrail) • Mandatory Real-Time Uploads: NASS may amend the Electoral Act to stipulate that election results are legally invalid if the raw data from the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) is not uploaded to the IReV portal within a specified timeframe (e.g., 6 hours post-polling). • Open-Source Audit Requirements: NASS may also legislate an annual, independent "Stress Test" and code audit of INEC’s software by a joint committee of civil society and cybersecurity experts at least 6 months before any general election. • Technical Accountability Clauses: Introduce personal legal liability for presiding officers or ICT staff found to have deliberately bypassed electronic transmission protocols.
Stability in Nigeria’s electoral system cannot be achieved through technology or law alone; it requires the legislative integration of both. By criminalizing the logistics of bribery and making technological transparency a non-negotiable legal requirement, Nigeria can move from a fragile democracy to a resilient one. | en_US |
