Assessment of legislative-executive relationship: a case study of the 8th and 9th Nigeria's Senate
Thesis
The legislative-executive relationship is a fundamental pillar of democratic governance, particularly in presidential systems where the doctrine of separation of powers aims at ensuring institutional checks and balances. In Nigeria, this relationship has often fluctuated between cooperation and confrontation, influenced not only by constitutional mandates but also by informal political practices, party dynamics, and leadership personalities. This study explored the dynamics of this relationship through a comparative case study of Nigeria’s 8th and 9th Senates, both of which operated under the same ruling party (APC) and President (General Muhammadu Buhari, retd). The two Senates exhibited contrasting institutional behaviors: the 8th Senate demonstrated assertiveness and institutional independence, while the 9th Senate adopted a more compliant, executive-aligned stance. The objective of this study is to: i. Examine how constitutional provisions and informal political practices influenced the dynamics of the legislative-executive relationship in the 8th and 9th Senates. ii. Investigate the role of party loyalty and leadership personalities in shaping legislative independence and executive compliance. iii. Assess the governance outcomes resulting from legislative-executive interactions, focusing on policy efficiency and democratic accountability. Using the Principal-Agent Theory as its theoretical anchor, the study examined how constitutional provisions, such as Sections 4, 80, 88, and 147 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,1999 (as altered) interacted with informal mechanisms like party loyalty and personal leadership styles to shape legislative behaviour and governance outcomes. The qualitative research design used a case study approach supported by document analysis, media reviews, and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). Thematic analysis was used to interpret findings. Key findings revealled that constitutional authority alone was insufficient to guarantee legislative independence. Instead, informal political realities, including party control, internal party democracy, and the ambitions or docility of Senate leadership, significantly mediate institutional behaviour. The 8th Senate asserted its autonomy through delays in budget passage and rejection of executive nominees, but suffered from administrative inefficiencies and intra-party friction. In contrast, the 9th Senate prioritized cooperation with the executive, enabling policy continuity and budgetary timeliness, albeit at the cost of oversight and democratic accountability. The study identifies a trade-off between policy efficiency and democratic scrutiny, highlighting the tension inherent in legislative-executive relationship. The study recommended a comprehensive constitutional and institutional reforms to support legislative independence. Key among these are the amendment of Section 68(1)(g) to discourage opportunistic party defections, the legalization of independent candidacy, and the strengthening of internal party democracy. Additionally, reforms should aim at insulating legislative leadership selection from excessive executive and party interference. The study contributes to existing scholarship by filling key gaps in the literature, particularly the absence of a systematic comparison of successive Senates under the same political conditions. It also highlights the significance of informal political institutions—an often-overlooked dimension in constitutional and institutional analyses. For policymakers, the findings emphasized the need to cultivate a culture of principled legislative leadership and functional oversight to safeguard Nigeria’s democratic gains. Further research is recommended to explore how these dynamics evolve under subsequent legislative regimes, particularly in the post-Buhari era (499 words).